I looked it up. The argument is known as the "Eternal Recurrence" and was proposed by various ancient philosophers including Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Heraclitus. The argument is based on the assumption that time is infinite and that the number of possible events that can occur in time is also infinite. If the universe is eternal, then it follows that every possible event will occur an infinite number of times. It was picked up by Nietszche. Where I had misunderstood it was to mean that, if all events are of finite duration, and the Universe is infinitely old, then everything that could occur would have already occurred, because no number of finite events could ever occupy an infinite expanse of time. But I'm not going to press the point!

Doesn't it stand to reason that, if the Universe was of infinite duration, and all events in the Universe are of finite duration, then all events would already have occurred? Isn't that deductively valid? (It also seems to map against the idea of the heat death of the universe, which is a hypothesis that the universe will evolve to a state of no thermodynamic free energy, and will therefore be unable to sustain processes that increase entropy.)

Not according to the cosmological model popularly known as the 'big bang'. According to that model the Universe emerged from the singularity approximately 13.8 billion years ago.

In an infinite duration, aren't all possible outcomes equally likely to occur? — Down The Rabbit Hole

In an infinite duration, and as all possible existents are of finite duration, then everything would have happened already.

Reasoning in religious ways is primarily based in biases. — Christoffer

Don't you think that might itself be rather a biased judgement?

The proposal you're suggesting is really like adopting the persona of the imagined 'Mr Spock' character from Star Trek, Spock, the Vulcan, possessed an enormous IQ and encylopedic knowledge, from a terrestrial point of view, but was often caught out by what we would now describe as his lack of EQ (although that term had yet to be invented,)

Reading your posts, you're basically coming from the perspective of Carnap and the Vienna Circle positivists, for whom anything connected to religion and metaphysics was nonsensical, and whose sole imperative was to put philosophy of a firm scientific footing. I don't necessarily want to go down the arduous road of trying to convince you otherwise, other than to suggest that positivism was, by the second half of the last century, regarded as a failed philosophical movement.

Yet even those philosophical pioneers [i.e. Plato and Aristotle] didn't make any claims of esoteric knowledge . . . did they? — Gnomon

Plato's writings make frequent references to Orphic myths and beliefs, such as the soul's immortality and the importance of leading a virtuous life to attain salvation. Some have argued that these references indicate that Plato was initiated into the Orphic mysteries, while others suggest that he may have simply been familiar with Orphic ideas through his study of ancient Greek philosophy and religion.

It is also worth noting that the Orphic tradition was one of many mystery religions that were practiced in ancient Greece, and Plato may have been influenced by other mystery traditions as well.

Appropriately, nobody knows for sure. But regardless there are esoteric elements in Plato, not least the tradition that his most important teachings were not committed to writing, but were transmitted from master to student directly. And neoplatonism, so-called, which was the later Platonic tradition, is one of the principle sources of esoteric philosophy in the Western cultural tradition.

many mystery seekers seem to be imagining and hoping for a loving & punishing Genesis type of Creator. — Gnomon

'Many mystery seekers' are dupes lead by con men. A lot of it is projection. If you know anything about psychoanalysis, you will know of transference, which occurs when a patient's unconscious feelings and desires are projected onto the therapist. You can imagine the scope for that happening in spiritual groups. But not all fall victim to that. There would be no fool's gold were there no gold, as the old saying has it.

I brought up the subject of esotericism in relationship to 'the transcendent'. The transcendent usually refers to a state or aspect of reality that surpasses the limits of ordinary physical existence, such as a dimension of reality that exists beyond the sensory world. In religious or philosophical contexts, the term 'transcendent' is used in relation to the deity or (in Buddhism) the state of being of a Buddha.

'Transcendental' by contrast is a philosophical term referring to something that is fundamental to the experience but which cannot be directly perceived or measured. In Kant, the term 'transcendental' is used to describe fundamental principles or categories of thought that are essential to experience, but are not themselves revealed in experience. Kant's philosophy of transcendental idealism holds that the mind actively constructs experience around such categories as time, space, and causality, that are necessary constituents of experience but which do not appear to us as elements within experience.

Both 'transcendent' and 'transcendental' imply a reality or being that is beyond or outside of ordinary experience or perception, although they differ in their specific applications and contexts. That is why the language of the transcendent is necessarily symbolic or allegorical (although it's also interesting to consider the sense in which the writings of German idealists were esoteric.)

One of the books I encountered in Buddhist Studies was called 'The Twlight Language' by Roderick Bucknell and Martin Stuart-Fox. The main idea of the book is to describe the esoteric language and imagery used in Buddhist texts and teachings, including the Pali Canon, Mahāyāna sutras, and Tantric teachings. It examines the use of symbols characteristic of Buddhism, such as the lotus, the mandala, and the chakra, in their role as catalysts for meditative awareness. It also demonstrates the skillful way in which Buddhism plays on words, uses double-meanings and other devices as 'skillful means' for conveying or provoking insights beyond the strictly empirical. This book provided an excellent compendium of the use of symbolic language to convey esoteric insights.

The Freemasons enjoyed a unique position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bloody well deserved, considering what they accomplished with no electric power

I never took a shine to Steiner, I went through most of Gary Lachman's book on him but I couldn't relate to him. But that doesn't detract from the point.

If depth has an ultimate floor, then the floor must be something which is utterly simple, pure, and homogeneous. — Art48

The idea of looking within, is not looking into the fine structure of matter, but paying close attention to the nature of lived experience. You can zoom in as far as you like on the micro-circuitry of your television set, but you'll never find a story there.

Yeah I don't unreservedly like their compositions, but I'm making an effort to get familiar with them as it's a genre I very much like, and it doesn't have a wide audience base. Yeah, Snarky Puppy, definitely - my son went to see them in Milwaukee just the other day, said they were sensational. (Oh, and they're also a little reminiscent of Level 42, particularly their melodic sense.)

Are you sure esotericism is the word you want? Perhaps you want ineffable. — Banno

Aren't they two different facets of the same thing? The point being, the communication of the ineffable was part of the role of philosophy. Interesting fact: Plato was a mystic, as defined by textbooks: 'initiate of the Greek mystery religions' (probably one of the orphic cults). This is why, I believe, it was said that in addition to the written dialogues, there was an unwritten component, although some of it was to become spelled out in the later tradition. A large part of Platonic philosophy was the preparation of the student so as to be able to grasp what was being taught, and I'm not sure that could be understood in propositional terms. Very much as described in Pierre Hadot's 'philosophy as a way of life'. It is those qualitative aspects that have been mostly redacted out of modern interpretations of Plato and philosophy generally.

Which is layers upon layers of syncretic Greco-Roman mystery cults, gnostic ideas, and the appropriations of both Judaic understandings and Homeric literature to create the legendary Jesus. — schopenhauer1

More to the point in this context is that salvation is available to all who will believe. That is what is behind the notion of equality in the first place. In pre-Christian cultures society was rigidly stratified. One of the reasons gnosticism was suppressed was because of its alleged elitism. (But then, Calvin has the Doctrine of the Elect, the difference being that nothing can be done on the part of the believer to be counted as a member.)

I notice you have not presented any argument as to the benefits of esotericism... — Banno

I didn't start off wanting to argue for the role of esotericism so much as recognition of it as an often-unstated issue. The question was about the role of the transcendent. In plain language, there is no role, nothing to discuss (positivism, basically.)

In esoterica, there is the use and understanding of symbolism, by which things are communicated that can't simply be said in plain language. 'What are those things? Show them to me!' will come the plain language reply. To which the only answer is a shrug.

Case in point - the apocryphal origin story of Ch'an Buddhism. According to legend, the Buddha gave this teaching in silence during a gathering of his disciples. He simply held up a flower and gazed at it, without saying a word.

The Buddha's disciple Mahakashyapa, who was known for his deep understanding of the Dharma, was the only one who understood the meaning of the Buddha's gesture, which he communicated by smiling, while the others in the assembly tried to guess at doctrinal answers. The Buddha then acknowledged Mahakashyapa's realization with a subtle smile, indicating that he had transmitted his teaching to him directly, beyond words and concepts.

The Flower Sermon is considered to be a pivotal moment in the transmission of the Dharma from the Buddha to his disciples, and from one generation of Zen practitioners to the next. It represents the idea that true understanding cannot be conveyed through words or concepts alone, but must be realized through direct experience. The story of the Flower Sermon has been retold and celebrated in Zen Buddhism for centuries as a symbol of the ineffable nature of enlightenment.

That said, Ch'an has produced and maintains a vast canon of teachings and commentaries. The Ch'an 'ko-an', famously exemplified by 'the sound of one hand', literally means 'public case' or 'public document'. I don't think it's an all-or-nothing proposition - the role of discourse is valued in Buddhism, but so too the acknowledgement that the fulfilment of the teaching is beyond it.

It's central to modern democratic liberalism, that's for sure. Whatever wisdom the crowds can muster. A large part of which is the heritage of Christian belief.

No better illustration of the kind of prejudice I'm referring to. Esotericism is essential to philosophy proper, but it's culturally subversive and so, often concealed, as a hidden layer of meaning in the texts themselves.

The jacket copy of the book referred to above Philosophy Between the Lines:

Philosophical esotericism—the practice of communicating one’s unorthodox thoughts “between the lines”—was a common practice until the end of the eighteenth century. The famous Encyclopédie of Diderot, for instance, not only discusses this practice in over twenty different articles, but admits to employing it itself. The history of Western thought contains hundreds of such statements by major philosophers testifying to the use of esoteric writing in their own work or others’. Despite this long and well-documented history, however, esotericism is often dismissed today as a rare occurrence. But by ignoring esotericism, we risk cutting ourselves off from a full understanding of Western philosophical thought.

More than risk. It's fait accompli.

For those into jazz fusion - Fool Arcana, a new band! They won a contest in Italy in April 2021, right in the thick of COVID which kind of hampered their launch. But they are producing some excellent material in that genre - think Incognito, Matt Bianco, Brand New Heavies, Chick Corea. All great young players, led by 22-year-old singer-guitarist Cecilia Barra Caracciolo and 23-year-old bassist Riccardo Oliva (listen out for the Fender Rhodes solo. Incidentally the name is derived from the first Tarot card, symbolising spontaneity and creativity.)

...the ineffable demarcation... — Tom Storm

The demarcation is that the esoteric is identified with religion, and religion has a meaning that is culturally specific. So to venture into the esoteric is to push a lot of buttons - hence 'defensive materialism'. This is held by those not consciously advocating for scientific materialism per se, maybe not even knowing what it really is, but it is a kind of default, because the alternative is identified as being associated with religion - and that, we could never admit, because

It so often is more about buying that hundredth Rolls-Royce and fucking the underaged. — Banno

Splendid illustration, thank you.

Wayfarer would put transcendence in the prime position. The trouble there is saying anything truthful. Such arguments are in danger of becoming either mere ritual again, or nonsense. — Banno

I've just realised what the missing word is in nearly all these debates: it is esotericism. Here, I was going to say something about the content of esoteric philosophy, but really it will suffice just to call it out.

I just listened to a lecture on Lloyd Gerson's most recent book Platonism vs Naturalism: the Possibility of Philosophy. In passing, the lecturer mentions that in this book, Gerson deals with the more esoteric aspects of Platonic philosophy, which are often omitted from other sources. Whereas it is precisely those aspects that most interest me. (A book that @Fooloso4 has mentioned a few times comes to mind, Philosophy Between the Lines, although I haven't read it.)

I got interested in philosophy through my encounter with Eastern philosophy, which is often esoteric. ('Upaniṣad' is derived from the term for 'up close', i.e. they are teachings given directly from master to student. Not that I myself have actually been 'up close' but the kinds of ideas found in The Teachings of Ramana Maharishi, for example, are derived from those in the Upaniṣads.) Whereas esotericism is almost entirely walled off from 20th century English-speaking philosophy. If it can't be expressed in plain language, well then, not really a suitable subject for discussion - nonsense, in fact. (I suspect that the influence of Gilbert Ryle is writ large in all this although those other names you frequently mention like Austin and Davidson would be like-minded, I'm sure.)

Anyway, now at least I've come to recognise this - only took 10 years.

Except that it has been empirically falsified: Famous Experiment Dooms Alternative to Quantum Weirdness

My interpretation is that biosemiotics was born out of the discovery of language and signs as a metaphor for organism which replaced the mechanistic metaphors of Cartesianism (although biology still uses mechanistic metaphors.) The benefit of the semiotic approach is that it allows the use of concepts such as semantics, syntax and representation on a molecular level, rather than the awkward and ill-fitting motors and levers ideas of mechanism. And I agree that it is a language. It’s infinitely preferable to mechanism as metaphor because it embeds meaning at the very basis of life. (It also resonates strongly with mythological metaphors of ‘the word’, although most of its scientific advocates are uncomfortable with that association.)

Incidentally for you and others interested in the subject of biosemiotics, here’s an open-access paper A Short History of Biosemiotics, Marcelo Barbieri, and another article by the same author on DNA as a code, What is Information?

In Phaedo 72b-e, Socrates has Simmias agree that there is such a thing as Equality itself--something that is independent of any particular case of equality such as sticks or stones of equal length or size. We know this Form of Equality, because it comes into our minds every time we see instances of equal objects. However, Socrates points out, equal stones or equal sticks may look equal from one point of view and unequal from another. Nonetheless, we would never be tempted to suggest that Equality itself is unequal. Therefore, the sticks or stones that are equal cannot be the same thing as Equality, since they can sometimes be unequal, and Equality itself never can be. If the equal things are different from Equality and yet can bring Equality into our minds, they must somehow remind us of the Form of Equality. We are aware that the sticks or stones fall short of being perfectly equal, but to be aware that they fall short, we must already have an idea of what it means to be perfectly equal; that is, we must already know the Form of Equality.

Fair point. I got that book when it came out, having read his dialogues with Krishnamurti. I haven’t read Pas’ book yet beyond the first few pages but I thought it worth mentioning. (I also understand that Bohm supported pilot wave theory which is basically a realist theory.)

I suppose my boring non-Catholic, non-mystical Fundamentalist Protestant upbringing didn't prepare me for mystical experiences. — Gnomon

I had no prep, and at the time, and for many decades later, I never associated that experience with religion. I thought it was about the nature of reality.

"As we learn from the particle physicists, if we ascend to a higher level of abstraction, things that seem different on the surface suddenly appear as manifestations of a deeper unity". Could that "unity" be the same Monism that we are discussing in this thread? :smile: — Gnomon

100%. I think that's the thrust of the book I mentioned at the beginning of the thread (here). I'm endeavouring, once again, to read up on neoplatonism, which provides a metaphysical basis for these ideas, and which Heinrich Pas refers to.

Sure, but the controversial element is whether "roundness" is a thing outside that concept. — schopenhauer1

But that, I suggest, is the fundamental misconception of the role of ideas in Platonic philosophy. It's not as if 'the ball' and 'roundness' are two things. Roundness doesn't exist as a kind of free-floating abstract shape in an ethereal medium which your actual ball is a poor imitation of (which is a popular depiction of platonic ideas). Indeed, ideas don't exist at all in the sense that objects do. I think what makes it hard to grasp - and this really is metaphysics - is that in those forms of classical philosophy, reality was hierarchical, which allowed for degrees of reality. Whereas modern philosophy has tended to 'flatten' ontology such that anything that exists, exists in the same way. This is why there are disputes over platonic realism in philosophy of maths. Numbers, and so on, don't exist in the same way as objects. So the tendency is to declare that they don't exist at all, save as mental constructs; things either exist, or they don't, in other words, existence is univocal, has only one meaning.

Wasn't really quoting him as a source, other than in an 'even Steve Pinker understands....' kind of way.

This is why, in the end, Heidegger said only a god can save us. — Badiou

Perhaps he should have moved to India. They have many.

as I am willing to envisage a god image…it's all the same woo woo BS to me….I don't see any particular value in this side alley — universeness

Apologies, I mistook you for someone who might have an open mind. I’ll keep out of your way in future.

have their own form of interaction that manifests roundness — schopenhauer1

Of which you have a concept, hence the designation 'roundness' that goes with it.

I'm with Russell on that. You're arguing from an empiricist viewpoint - that we learn the concept of roundness from the exposure to many instances of it. That is what JS Mill and others would argue.But there are counters to that - that in order to interpret those experiences we have, the idea of roundness must already be present in the mind. Here's one of my cribs about it:

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once. — Edward Feser

Feser, Some Brief Arguments for Dualism

There's also Descartes' argument from the Sixth Meditation, where he uses the chiliagon (a thousand-sided polygon) as an example in his Sixth Meditation to demonstrate the difference between intellection and imagination. He says that, when one thinks of a chiliagon, he "does not imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present" before him – as he does when one imagines a triangle, for example. The imagination constructs a "confused representation," which is no different from that which it constructs of a myriagon (a polygon with ten thousand sides). However, he does clearly understand what a chiliagon is, just as he understands what a triangle is, and he is able to distinguish it from a myriagon. Therefore, the intellect is not dependent on imagination, Descartes claims, as it is able to entertain clear and distinct ideas which the imagination is unable to picture. The intellect is able to grasp a perfectly determinate concept, such as thousand-sided object, which is practically speaking imperceptible to the senses.

Finally Kant and Mill on philosophy of mathematics - Kant had argued that the structures of logic which organize, interpret and abstract observations were innate to the mind and were true and valid a priori. Mill, on the contrary, said that we believe them to be true because we have enough individual instances of their truth to generalize: in his words, "From instances we have observed, we feel warranted in concluding that what we found true in those instances holds in all similar ones, past, present and future, however numerous they may be."  Although the psychological or epistemological specifics given by Mill through which we build our logical apparatus may not be completely warranted, his explanation still nonetheless manages to demonstrate that there is no way around Kant’s a priori logic. To recount Mill's original idea in an empiricist twist: “Indeed, the very principles of logical deduction are true because we observe that using them leads to true conclusions" - which is itself ana priori pressuposition!

...innate human capacity... — Mww

You may recall that empiricism disdains any such conceptions. No lesser light that Steven Pinker wrote a book on it. (As it happens, the last Christmas gift I was ever to receive from my dear departed mother. :fear: )

Couldn’t have chosen a better battleground than the suggestion that reason has been, or is being, eclipsed. In what world is that not a singularly foolish notion? — Mww

It is writ large in today's world.

In his seminal 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented a problem facing all accounts of mathematical truth and knowledge. Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.

What are 'our best' theories, and why do they entail that such knowledge is not possible?

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. We do not see integers, or hold sets. Even geometric figures are not the kinds of things that we can sense. .... Mathematical objects are not the kinds of things that we can see or touch, or smell, taste or hear. If we can not learn about mathematical objects by using our senses, a serious worry arises about how we can justify our mathematical beliefs.

But those mavericks known as 'rationalists' have the temerity to claim that we actually have rational insight!

[Rationalists] claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

Source. Bolds added. I've put that up as a microcosm of the larger issue, which is the fundamental irrationality of naturalism.

Some further reflections on same:

We may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined b nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual 'I' — Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy

As a philosophical conception, Empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect. As a result, human knowledge is simply sense-knowledge (or animal knowledge) more evolved and elaborated than in other mammals. And not only is human knowledge entirely encompassed in, and limited to, sense-experience ...; but to produce its achievements in the sphere of sense-experience human knowledge uses no other specific forces and means than the forces and means which are at play in sense-knowledge.

Now if it is true that reason differs specifically from senses, the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.

Hence, first, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency between what an Empiricist does -- he thinks as a man, he uses reason, a power superior in nature to senses -- and what he says -- he denies this very specificity of reason.

And second, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency even in what he says: for what the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients - sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Daily Beast asked ChatGPT to answer questions 'in the style of Trump', which it did, right down to stylistic ticks and bombast. Here's a sample:

Answer this question in the style of Donald Trump: Why should Americans put you back in the White House?

ChatGPT: Well, let me tell you something folks, nobody, and I mean nobody, has done as much for this great country as I have. When I was in the White House, we had record-low unemployment, we rebuilt our military, and we put America first.

But then the Democrats, and the fake news media, they came after me. They spied on my campaign, they impeached me for nothing, and they tried to steal the election. But I'll tell you what, I'm not a quitter. I'm a fighter. And I fought back harder than anyone else would have.

And you know what? We almost won. We almost took back the White House in 2020, but they cheated, folks. They cheated like you wouldn't believe. They rigged the election, they stole it from us, and they installed Sleepy Joe Biden in the White House.

But I'm not giving up, folks. I'm not giving up on America. I love this country too much. And I know you love it too. That's why I'm asking for your support. Because together, we can make America great again. Again.

Answer this question in the style of Donald Trump: But Mr. President, you know that the election wasn't stolen? The election wasn't stolen.

ChatGPT: Well, let me tell you something, fake news. You're wrong, as usual. The election was stolen, and it was stolen from me. We had massive voter fraud, we had dead people voting, we had illegal immigrants voting, we had ballots being shipped in from other countries. It was a disgrace, and everybody knows it.

But you know what? We're not gonna let it stand. We're not gonna let the Democrats get away with stealing the election. We're fighting back, and we're gonna keep fighting until we get to the truth.
Because that's what we do, folks. We fight for what's right, and we never give up. And I know that the American people are with us, because they know that the election was stolen too. They know that Sleepy Joe Biden didn't win, he lost, and he lost bigly.

So don't try to tell me that the election wasn't stolen, fake news. I know the truth, and the American people know the truth too. And we're not gonna stop fighting until we get the justice that we deserve. Because that's what true patriots do. We fight for our country, we fight for our freedom, and we fight for the truth.

Answer this question in the style of Donald Trump: Do you have any regrets about your actions on January 6?

ChatGPT: Well, let me tell you something, folks. What happened on January 6 was a disgrace. It was a disgrace to our country, and it was a disgrace to the millions of Americans who support me and my vision for America.

But you know what? I didn't do anything wrong. I didn't incite violence, and I didn't encourage anyone to break the law. What I did was speak the truth and fight for what's right.

And that's why I have no regrets about my actions on January 6. I was standing up for the millions of Americans who feel like their voices aren't being heard, and I was standing up to the corrupt politicians who are trying to silence us.

Now, some people might try to twist my words or take them out of context, but the truth is that I never encouraged violence or lawlessness. I simply encouraged people to fight for what's right and to demand that our voices be heard.

More at Thedailybeast.com

So for Horkheimer it’s not only traditional societies that had objective reason. In the Enlightenment, reason was still supposed to help us determine the right ends and not merely the means. The change comes with industrialization. — Jamal

I think the change came with the Renaissance conception of humanity. Many of the Renaissance humanists held philosophical views of dubious orthodoxy, but they held the world wisdom traditions in high esteem, so they still recognised a transcendent source of values, a summum bonum. That is what was to change. Reason is still valued today, but whenever it is praised, you can bet your boots that the it is 'reason validated by empirical observation'. The focus shifted, whereby the attributes that had been assigned to the Divine are now accorded to nature herself, as there is nothing 'above' or 'higher' than nature; nature 'creates herself' (understanding of which is the holy grail of naturalism. I've noticed a book recently on the debate between the humanist Erasmus and the fundamentalist Luther, Fatal Discord, which he says lays the groundwork for many of these attributes of today's worldview).

Not picking a fight, honest. — Mww

I was hoping to start one. ;-)

Reason was supposed to regulate our preferences and our relations with other human beings and with nature. It was thought of as an entity, a spiritual power living in each man. This power was held to be the supreme arbiter — Horkheimer

For Aristotle, reason was what made the human being unique. In the same way the ideal horse is strong and fleet of foot, reason is key to the essence of man; the development of reason was our telos, ultimate purpose. — Count Timothy von Icarus

'In the Aristotelian scheme, nous was the faculty that enables human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle (and also for Aquinas and scholastic philosophy), this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including imagination and memory, which other animals possess. For him then, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way - which is the basis of Aristotelian realism - and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. (And these universal categories were adapted by Kant.) Derived from this it was also believed in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual must require help of a spiritual and divine type (see SEP, Divine Illumination). By this type of account, it also came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it.'

This deeply resonates with me. I can't help but see the concluding phrase reflected in Wheeler's 'participatory cosmos'.

//I also can't help but believe that a great deal of so-called empiricist and naturalist philosophy is basically irrational in nature, as it has abnegated the idea of a transcendent reason, in favour of the merely instrumental.//

Theism cannot escape the 'who/what created god/intentionality,' question. — universeness

That's because, and pardon me for saying, your conception of God is anthropomorphic, based mainly on your stereotyped depiction of (and rejection of) religion. That's not something particular to yourself, by the way.

Are such extra-personal insights an aspect of your personal experience? — Gnomon

I equate them with conversion experiences, or steps on the path. I don't regard such insights as instances of extra-sensory perception. In late adolescence, I had some pretty momentous acid trips, which were revelatory in their own right (but I won't dwell on that as I have no intention of advocating illicit drug use). But I also had some real epiphanies at quite a young age. They are practically impossible to convey to others, and if I try to do so it will usually be misunderstood, but one of them was a vivid realisation of the 'I' as the universal ground of being. When I later encountered books about Advaita Vedanta I recognised that insight in them.

I studied Buddhist philosophy and attempted to practice meditation along Buddhist lines for many years, although that's now fallen away. I was member of an informal discussion group for about ten years. Through all of that, certain insights arose, and some of them stayed with me, but it's hardly like its depicted in a lot of popular literature. I had hoped these insights would be sufficiently transformative to burn through all my bad habits (samskara, in yogic terminology) but alas not. Finding a milieu of like-minded others is difficult, and maintaining a commitment without that, also difficult.

I found kind of a bridge to Catholicism through the Christian mystics and ecumenicals, like Thomas Merton. There's actually a thriving albeit small sub-cultural grouping of Zen Catholicism. The Sermons of Meister Eckhardt are a perennial favourite. I like Richard Rohr.

: the ability to convert "sense perception" into mental conception (imagination ; to see what's not really there ; abstract mind pictures). — Gnomon

I don't see that as the key ability in this context, although it's hugely important in culture and technology. The key insight I see is the ability to cut through the illusion of otherness. The illusion of otherness is a fundamental aspect of the human condition, it comes with being born, and sits underneath all our experience. But as Albert Einstein wrote in a letter of condolence, 'A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe", a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. The striving to free oneself from this delusion is the one issue of true religion. Not to nourish the delusion but to try to overcome it is the way to reach the attainable measure of peace of mind.' That is very much the key insight of non-dualism.

In medieval philosophy, the rational soul referred to the aspect of the human being that was associated with the faculty of reason and with free will and was the animating principle of the body. Reason was considered the highest faculty, which set humans apart from other creatures and made them capable of achieving true knowledge. It was believed that the rational soul was immortal based on the idea that the rational soul was not bound to the material world, but rather existed in a higher realm of reality. The rational soul was thought to be capable of attaining knowledge of the divine through contemplation and philosophical inquiry, and considered the ultimate goal of human existence.

Of course, that's an archaic belief system and we know now, thanks to science, that the principle behind all our faculties (including reason) is successful adaption and procreation.

The saddest, and most dangerous, thing about Trump is the way he has persuaded hundreds of millions of people that there are no facts. That he can appear on prime time and still insist that ‘the election was rigged’, after 60 failed lawsuits, the Jan 6 commission, and everything else that has gone down, just beggars belief. And the interviewers are so sanguine about it - they take his denial of reality as just another news item.

.....leaving the certitude of the cogito bobbing in its wake....

My only reaction to reading the above, is that whilst Harman et al wish to depict idealism as 'anthropocentric' or 'human-centred', in fact their claim to be able to dispense with the conditions of knowledge is vain. What they're seeking to arrive at is unconditional understanding, as if from no perspective. But it was just the realisation of the impossibility of that which lead to Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in the first place. And that attitude, by contrast, is actually marked by a kind of humility - a recognition that, as human subjects, our ways-of-knowing are conditioned from the outset, by our intellectual capacity, the kinds of senses we have, the kinds of reasons we understand. So Harman's approach is actually worse than anthropocentrism - it is attempting a kind of omniscience, an all-knowingness. They're all various forms of scientism in my view.

On a side note. Imagine - just imagine - the howls from the Republican Party if George Santos were a Democrat. The outrage! The denunciations! The calls for action! How dare he!

Hypocrisy, thy name is GOP.

//although should note some exceptions:

Other Republicans were less merciful, particularly Mr. Santos’s fellow New Yorkers. Representative Anthony D’Esposito, who represents parts of Nassau County, called Mr. Santos a “serial fraudster” who should “resign from office.” Representative Mike Lawler of the Hudson Valley said Mr. Santos’s conduct had been “embarrassing and disgraceful, and he should resign.” — NYTimes

:clap:

Okay boys, how much are we wagering? — Mikie

US$10.00 payable to charity of your choice :up:

Quick one-liner, or so…..what did you get out of The Eclipse of Reason? What is it the author wants to say, bottom line kinda thing? — Mww

It's about the instrumentalisation, and relativising, of reason - that reason used to be understood as an objective reality (although I think the world 'objective' is problematic in the context) but anyway, something which steered the world and which man could discern. Whereas it has become increasingly internalised, subjectivised, relativised. Also had insightful comments into the philosophical implications of Darwinism:

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature–even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man–frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, 10-11

'Regarding reason as a natural organ' is a profound shift in philosophy. This is tied to the rejection of platonic realism in mathematics, and the so-called 'naturalisation of reason' which was a major thrust of much 20th century English-language philosophy. It's all well beyond my education and skills to articulate in any detail but I see evidence for it in many places.