Logic is ours not mine. We always intend the one and only 'landscape.' — plaque flag

Indeed. That is how language, mathematics, and all forms of communication are effective - they are part of a 'shared mindscape', so to speak, that have agreed references that we all understand. Or rather, that all those of our cultural type understand. (Because, as Wittgenstein says, even if a lion could speak, we would not understanding him.)

But this is also why my approach is not solipsistic. When I say the world is 'mind-made' I don't mean made only by my mind, but is constituted by the shared reality of humankind, which is an irreducibly mental foundation.

You cannot look at a landscape except from a point of view.
Therefore the landscape is constituted by (or created by) your point of view. — Jamal

That was given as an illustrative analogy, not as the main point of the argument. Note also I that I say that a perspective is required for any judgement as to what exists. There can be no answer to the question 'does [the object] exist irrespective of any judgement?' as that question requires that the questioner already has [the object] in mind, in order to frame the question. You may plausibly accept that [the object] continues to exist in the absence of any perspective, but that remains conjecture, even if plausible.

But the main part of the argument occurs further on, where I say 'there is no need for me to deny that the Universe ('the object') is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis ¹. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.'

[1] This insight is central to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant has been described as the ‘godfather of modern cognitive science’ for his insights into the workings of the mind.

Excellent post, thankyou.

Philosophers have called this minimal “I” a 'pure witness' or a 'transcendental ego,' — plaque flag

Which philosophers in particular? Any particular examples in mind?

I do understand why Husserl speaks of a transcendental ego rather than something neutral, something prior to such articulation. — plaque flag

Your presentation of the matter is somewhat idiosyncratic. According to various textbooks, the 'transcendental ego' refers to 'subjective consciousness devoid of empirical content', namely anything that pertains to the external world or to the ego's psychological states (e.g. feelings or moods). It is the "observing self" that remains when we bracket out or set aside all our beliefs about the world, including our own existence in it. This bracketing process, which Husserl termed "phenomenological reduction," allows for the focus on consciousness as such and its structures without becoming entangled in empirical or naturalistic assumptions. For Husserl, the transcendental ego is the source and condition for the constitution of all meaning and objectivity. Objects appear as meaningful and objective only within the intentional acts of the transcendental ego. This means that the world's objectivity and our knowledge of it are not simply "given," but are actively constituted by conscious acts. (It is in this last where one can trace the influence of Kant although of course Husserl also departs from Kant in many important ways.)

This doesn't so much 'dissolve the sensing and thinking subject', as dissolving acts of sensing and thinking so as to lay bare the transcendental subject.

But, do carry on. All grist for the mill, and a splendid mill it is.

what you are saying, Wayf, is too unclear for me to respond — 180 Proof

Well, fair enough, but what I was attempting to respond to

Unless solipsism obtains, mind is dependent on (ergo, inseparable from) More/Other-than-mind, no? and that "experience" consists of phenomenal traces (or outputs) of the 'entangled, or reflexive, interactivity' of mind with More/Other-than-mind? — 180 Proof

is hardly a model of clarity itself, you must admit.

I'm not sure what you mean by "objectively existent" or "objectivity". Please clarify what makes this "criterion" problematic. — 180 Proof

Not so much problematic as limited, not universal. Isn't to limit the scope of truth to what is objective a form of verificationism? As I already said, there are a priori truths, mathematical proofs, and so on which are not objective (meaning 'inherent in the object'), or rather, true in a way that is not necessarily objective in the strict sense. Objectivity is something to be valued - I'm not a relativist - but at the same time, it's not absolute, or rather, its scope is limited. For instance, Newtonian mechanics affords pretty well absolute objectivity when it comes to the laws of motion, but when you get to quantum mechanics, you encounter the whole issue of 'interpretation of the meaning of the theory' which is no longer an objective matter, even if the predictions it makes are extremely accurate.

What I was trying to get at is that I'm aware of the problem of conceiving life in terms of the 'elan vital'. That is very much like the imaginary ghost in the machine as you said. But, I said, If that sounds like vitalism, I am not proposing that 'life' or 'mind' is a substance in any objective sense - it is ill-conceived to consider mind as something objectively real, but it is AS IF there is a something like mind or life that animates the material form of creatures. But to say it is objectively existent is a reification. We can only be aware of it, because it is constitutive of our being, NOT because it is a knowable object or substance. That's what I'm working on trying to clarify.

Also, do you reject what I (briefly) say on the thread "What is real?" ... — 180 Proof

There's not enough detail to really say.

And what might be said about the energy we use to live? That which does all the computations and organismal procedures used to sustain us for a minute of experience. Can we say that that specific quantity of energy is used for self determination and agency? — Benj96

Organisms obviously utilise energy on a cellular and also bodily level. But 'that which does all the computations' is what, exactly? Whatever it is, I don't think it can be described as energy. It's something more like order. Perhaps the place to look for that, is the work of someone like Ilya Prirogine.

we cannot deny that the positioning of molecules in a specific way that confers sentient life is not a process carried out by energy. — Benj96

Confusing double negative, but I think what you're saying is that whatever it is that orders matter in such as way as to give rise to sentient beings, it not 'carried out' by energy. In which case I agree. Energy - which is the capacity to do work - is obviously an intrinsic aspect, but order is something else again.

And so, as we consider those laws, with which we judge with certainty those things which we perceive, while they are infallible and indubitable to the intellect of the one apprehending, indelible to the memory of the one recalling and unbreakable and indistinguishable to the intellect of the one judging, so, because, as Augustine says, no-one judges from them, but through them, it is required that they be unchangable and incorruptible because necessary, unconfinable because unlimited, endless because eternal, and, for this reason, indivisible because intellectual and incorporeal - not made, but uncreated, eternally existing in that art of eternity, from which, through which and consequent to which all elegant things are given form ~ Bonaventura. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Augustine on Intelligible Objects (clearly showing his Platonist influences):

1. Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way; it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. Augustine concludes from these observations that intelligible objects cannot be part of reason's own nature or be produced by reason out of itself. They must exist independently of individual human minds.

2. Intelligible objects must be incorporeal because they are eternal and immutable. By contrast, all corporeal objects, which we perceive by means of the bodily senses, are contingent and mutable. Moreover, certain intelligible objects - for example, the indivisible mathematical unit - clearly cannot be found in the corporeal world (since all bodies are extended, and hence divisible.) These intelligible objects cannot therefore be perceived by means of the senses; the must be incorporeal and perceptible by reason alone.

3. Intelligible objects must be higher than reason because they judge reason. Augustine means by this that these intelligible objects constitute a normative standard against which our minds are measured. We refer to mathematical objects and truths to judge whether or not, and to what extent, our minds understand mathematics. We consult the rules of wisdom to judge whether or not, and to what extent, a person is wise. In light of these standards, we can judge whether our minds are as they should be. It makes no sense, however, to ask whether these normative intelligible objects are as they should be; they simply are and are normative for other things. In virtue of their normative relation to reason, Augustine argues that these intelligible objects must be higher than it, as a judge is higher than what it judges. Moreover, he believes that apart from the special sort of relation they bear to reason, the intrinsic nature of these objects shows them to be higher than it. These sorts of intelligible objects are eternal and immutable; by contrast, the human mind is clearly mutable. Augustine holds that since it is evident to all who consider it that the immutable is clearly superior to the mutable (it is among the rules of wisdom he identifies), it follows that these objects are higher than reason.

Cambridge Companion to Augustine.

Maybe, just maybe, the bone spurs magically disappeared after 1968. — GRWelsh

Believe me, they were absolutely incredible bone spurs. They were by far the best bone spurs that anyone has ever had. Only Trump could ever have had bone spurs that were this amazing.

Here's a CNN list of 24 former Trump aides and allies all of whom now see him as a threat to democracy.

An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem. — schopenhauer1

Not what we understand as 'conscious' intention, but they can learn. I also agree that borderline creatures, like sponges and jellies, don't meaningfully manifest much in the way of intentional action, but even so many quasi-intentional behaviours can be observed on the level of the organic molecules that comprise them. (Take a look at From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott.)

Anything that "is not objectively real" is, of course, "conceivable" — 180 Proof

As stated at the outset, the OP is an argument against the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion of what is real. Accordingly, 'objectively existent' is not the sole criterion for what is real. There are kinds of things, like abstract objects such as numbers and logical principles, which are real but not necessarily objectively existent. There are a priori truths which are not necessarily objective, in that their veracity can be judged without recourse to external experience. More to the point, as you yourself said, the mind itself is not something that can be known objectively, in that it's never the object of cognition (except metaphorically). So when we try to consider what it is, or how it originated, then perhaps the best we can manage is suggestive metaphor. That doesn't necessarily fall to mere fantasy (unless you want to be completely positivistic about it.)

I don't deny that there is an entire vast domain which can be encompassed by the term 'objectively existent' although, as has been pointed out a few times already, this can also be understood as being 'inter-subjectively real'.

Speaking of 'anatman' - the Sanskrit term śūnyatā, meaning 'emptiness', is grounded in the awareness that objects of cognition have no intrinsic being (svabhava, literally 'own being'.) 'Realising emptiness' is the path of understand how the mind misconstrues objects of cognition as being inherently existent. I think the Buddhist expression 'realising emptiness' has a lot to do with seeing through the way in which the mind manufactures meanings about objects which they don't really possess. But it takes a pretty severe inner discipline to pursue that.

I agree with you about chasing enlightenment being very often a cult of the self — Janus

I would have hoped that a Philosophy Forum might be a place to discuss such endeavours, although there are always quite a few tourist members.

I can’t make heads or tails out of self-knowledge. — Mww

It's always struck me as one of the fundamental elements of philosophy, paradoxical and difficult though it might seem.

Unless solipsism obtains, mind is dependent on (ergo, inseparable from) More/Other-than-mind, no? — 180 Proof

Think about alternative terms for mind - psyche or geist, for instance (or the Sanskrit 'citta'). Is it not conceivable that the first stirrings of life, the very simplest organisms, are also the manifestation of mind? Which then over the course of aeons evolves into self-aware forms including rational sentient beings such as ourselves? So which comes first, viewed that way? Did the primitive proto-organic chemistry suddenly and miraculously develop into a chain reaction capable of homeostasis and evolution, thereby giving rise to mind? Or does a latent tendency in the Cosmos towards self-awareness manifest where circumstances are favourable? If that sounds like vitalism, I am not proposing that 'life' or 'mind' is an actual essence or substance in any objective sense. Think of it as a metaphorical expression which is nevertheless suggestive. And it maps well against the ancient maxim of 'man as microcosm' (from hermetic philosophy). In any case, it is a plausible model for preserving the ontological priority of mind (as disinct from relegating it to 'the product of' mindless processes.)

AFAIK, basically mind is a recursive (strange looping, phenomenal self-modeling) aspect of More/Other-than-mind – a nonmental activity (process ... anatman), not an entity (ghost-in-the-machine ... X-of-the-gaps), that is functionally blind to its self-recursivity the way, for instance, an eye is transparent to itself and absent from its own field of vision. — 180 Proof

Well, as said above, I agree that mind is not anything objectively real. 'Anatman' is a term in Buddhism, usually used adjectivally, i.e. 'all phenomena (dharmas) are anatta (not self)' - which does not deny that there are subjects of experience, although it is often misinterpreted to mean that. The meaning is to recognise that phenomenal objects are not the self (in addition to being transient (anicca) and unsatisfying (dukkha)).

As for the eye being 'absent from its own field of vision', that is exactly the metaphor behind The Blind Spot of Science article which you have previously dismissed (and which incidentally is being published in book form next March.)

I don't believe such exercises yield any definitive knowledge in the propositional sense, but of course, like any practice, they develop certain "know-hows".

But I have said this to you many times, and you are probably tired of hearing it, since it doesn't accord with your own beliefs apparently. — Janus

I agree with that, and I don't recall your having put it that way. That is what I think was the distinction between 'theoria' and 'praxis' in ancient philosophy, was it not? And the kind of 'unitive vision' that it was thought to culminate in was a blend of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. It's often said that philosophy lost its way by becoming totally absorbed in intellectual abstractions, whereas traditional philosophy (and Buddhist praxis) is very much grounded in bodily awareness (which is a basic feature of enactivism and embodied philosophy).

I've got to do an advertisement for a book, again - a little-known book, hardly commented on, which is why I mention it - De-fragmenting Modernity, Paul Tyson (a UQ academic):

We live in a strangely fragmented lifeworld. On the one hand, abstract constructions of our own imagination--such as money, "mere" facts, and mathematical models--are treated by us as important objective facts. On the other hand, our understanding of the concrete realities of meaning and value in which our daily lives are actually embedded--love, significance, purpose, wonder--are treated as arbitrary and optional subjective beliefs. This is because, to us, only quantitative and instrumentally useful things are considered to be accessible to the domain of knowledge. Our lifeworld is designed to dis-integrate knowledge from belief, facts from meanings, immanence from transcendence, quality from quantity, and "mere" reality from the mystery of being. This book explores two questions: why should we, and how can we, reintegrate being, knowing, and believing?

He traces the historical development of this 'fragmentation' quite plausibly, in my view. It's germane to the ideas in this thread. That re-integration or holistic vision is what I think philosophy ought to be striving for.

For the very reasons which you have adduced, I am not as confident as you are that what might be called self-knowledge is anything more than an appearance- it just tells us how things seem to us with no guarantee that it reflects any reality beyond human experience. — Janus

I understand that is your belief, but not that it is definitive.

Can you give me a couple of examples of self-knowledge arrived at through philosophy? — Tom Storm

I certainly won't hold myself up as one. But I have the idea that this is what philosophy in the pre-modern sense used to mean. You know - Pierre Hadot and philosophy as a way of life, how ancient philosophy used to be practiced rather than just being an academic pursuit. I had a kind of intuition of that, and I'm interesting in pursuing it although in today's world, it's something like forensic pathology. It is really difficult to tell if I'm actually learning something or progressing or whether I'm chasing rainbows (hence the icon.)

I tend to think our world is pre-cognitively co-constructed by the bodymind/ environment and that we are constitutionally blind to that process. — Janus

You frequently put this up as a kind of maxim, but one of the over-arching themes of philosophy since ancient times has been the possibility of self-knowledge. The fact that this seems such a remote or perplexing idea might be as much a consequence of the shortcomings of our way of looking at the question, as of the question itself.

First, I'll note that Schopenhauer1's comment above was in response to an extract of a précis I posted of Mary Midgley's book, Evolution as Religion, in the thread Mind-Created World. Details of Midgley's book can be found here.

doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view? — schopenhauer1

I'm attracted to the philosophical idea that the emergence of even the most simple organisms, is in some sense the appearance of intentionality as a mode of being. As Thomas Nagel argues,

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest.

(There's a paper by Evan Thompson on something similar to this idea, I'll see if I can find it and report back.)

If you look at the Medium version of the essay, I appended a quote from C S Peirce at the top:



Just to re-iterate the point of the argument: I am not disputing the scientific (i.e. naturalist) account but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. What I’m calling attention to is the tendency to take for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution. This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. This in turn leads to the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion for truth. (That, I contend, is the major source of 'scientism' and a major weakness of naturalism, generally.)

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves.' That part of the argument is supported with passages from Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order, not a philosophy text as such, but a cognitive science book.

From this, what I'm saying is that philosophical reflection or analysis reveals the way in which the mind creates - or construes! - the nature of reality. That is where insight, self-knowledge, becomes a factor.

Let's see how it goes now with McCarthy out. — ssu

I think it's going to be a complete fiasco. Commentators are saying that the reason McCarthy was dumped was because he had the gall to work with Democrats to avoid the massive consequences of a US debt default and later to keep the Government open. This clique of hardliners (let's just call them 'fanatics') may be willing to precipitate such catastrophes just to prove their point - even though they don't really have one, other than hating Democrats and defending Trump. They're not the least interested in solving the problems of actual government. One of them has said more than once that Government is useless and should be abolished. So there's every reason to think that come November, when the temporary funding resolution expires, there will major Government shutdown conducted by the MAGA fanatics and Trump minions.

It should be shouted from the rooftops that refusing to fund the Government (and a large part of the debt that was incurred under Republican presidents!) on pain of massive cuts to social welfare, is not a legitimate form of political discourse. It is essentially blackmail and extortion which has become almost business-as-usual through several decades of Republican malfeasance. It's a dreadful state of affairs and a sign that the ship of state is listing dangerously.

Here in Australia, there is a mechanism for what happens if the Government is denied funding (it's called 'blocking supply') or reaches impasse through some other means. A double-dissolution election is called ('double' meanining both Senate and House of Representatives, equivalent to Congress.) We've had some, over the years, and it breaks the deadlock by allowing the electorate to essentially re-make the Government. There doesn't seem to be any such mechanism in the US political system, so a deadlock appears quite possible.

The only possible silver lining to this very dark cloud is that in the end, Republicans are harshly punished at the ballot box next year, losing both Congressional majority and the Presidency.

I don't see how, because energy operates according to physical laws,
— Wayfarer

And consciousness doesn't? — Benj96

No, it doesn't. Not unless you're a materialist :rage:

Interesting thesis, and well-spoken. — Mww

:pray:

Banno appears to have the attitude that this is something which cannot be talked about, so shut up because you're proving me wrong by talking about it. — Metaphysician Undercover

:lol:

Buddhism is a sidenote here. My criticism is aimed at eclecticism and at disregarding the complex systemic context of claims. — baker

That's not at all what you said. What you said was

It seems that you're trying to get the benefits from Buddhism without really signing up for it. — baker

Which is patronising, and also irrelevant. The argument I'm putting forward has similarities to that of Berkeley, who had never heard of Buddhism, and other idealist philosophers including Schopenhauer (who had, but who was completely independent of it and Kastrup (who is a current philosopher.) The OP doesn't mention the Buddha, and the full version of the essay does only once in a footnote. As I said, this is a philosophy forum, and mine is a philosophical argument, convergences with Buddhist philosophy notwithstanding.

New telescope produces new perspective, produces new physics. — unenlightened

Quite. I recall an interesting article I read somewhere on how quantum physics and relativity required the invention of many novel forms of mathematics which were required by concepts that had never previously been considered. And I've mentioned many times the immense philosophical fallout from the advent of quantum theory in the 1920's, which is ongoing.

One of the important features of the [Bitbol] paper is that it isn’t trying to posit consciousness as an ineffable, inner sanctum — Joshs

I didn't think I was trying to do that (a criticism, by the way, that echoes Buddhism's criticism of Vedanta). I will add, I learned of Michel Bitbol from this forum (from @Pierre-Normand) and have found his work fascinating and enriching.

By the way, as I mentioned Bernardo Kastrup above, here is an interview with him that provides an effective intro for those who aren't familiar. Worth the read, in my opinion.

[deleted]

you're trying to do with words even things that can only be done with deeds — baker

I don’t really accept that. This is a philosophy forum, and the medium of discourse is writing.

That's not my motivating metaphor. But never mind, I think I've about done my quota for today.

It used to be the red one. But pick any cup you like. — Banno

I would have to have one in mind.

I like Mary Midgley's suggestion that they are simply different topics. — Banno

Her 'Evolution as a Religion' is a favourite.

Evolutionary Overreach: Midgley suggests that some scientists and science popularizers overreach by making broad philosophical or moral claims based on evolutionary theory. They treat evolution not just as a biological theory but as a complete worldview or ideology.

"Just-so" Stories: Midgley critiques certain evolutionary explanations, especially in the realm of sociobiology, as being akin to Rudyard Kipling's "just-so" stories – speculative narratives that seem more about confirming existing biases than rigorous scientific explanations.

Science vs. Religion: One of the book's main themes is that the discourse around evolution is heavily influenced by an unnecessary and damaging conflict between science and religion. This conflict is perpetuated by figures on both sides who treat science and religion as mutually exclusive domains.

Moral and Philosophical Implications: Midgley asserts that the implications of evolutionary theory have been overstretched by some proponents to make broad moral or philosophical claims, often with nihilistic or deterministic overtones.

Critique of Reductionism: A recurrent theme in Midgley's work, including this book, is her criticism of reductionism – the idea that complex phenomena can be completely understood in terms of their simplest components. She argues that while reductionist methods are useful in many scientific contexts, they are not suited for understanding human nature and morality.

Scientism as Religion: Midgley suggests that the dogmatic belief in a purely scientific worldview, often at the expense of other forms of knowledge or understanding, can become a kind of secular religion in itself.

Complexity of Life: Midgley emphasizes that life, particularly human life, is complex and cannot be boiled down to simple deterministic laws or principles.

Just my cup of tea.

So do we agree that the cup, unobserved in the cupboard, still has a handle? — Banno

Which cup? Presumably you have one in mind.

When there is no observer at a site then none of the derived features of the site brought into play by a human mind exist. — jgill

I will add, though, that for many purposes, it can be presumed that events will run their course as if it makes no difference whether or not there is an observer. That was what was meant by the 'mind-indepedence' of the objects of physics and chemistry, and it was very much presumed by the mechanistic model of the Universe - set in motion by the deist God of Newton, forever to run on its pre-determined course according to mechanical laws.

But that was all called into question by the 1920's discoveries of quantum physics, where the act of observation suddently became relevant to the observed experimental outcome. That is why Einstein felt compelled to ask the question (rather plaintively, I feel) 'Do you really believe the moon isn't there when nobody looks?'

So I wouldn't downplay the implications of 'mind-dependence' or its contrary.

If we instead said that physics talks about matter and energy and stuff like that, we wouldn't be surprised to find that physics tells us little about jealousy and democracy and stuff like that. — Banno

I'm attempting a philosophical critique of why it doesn't.

No. It was based more on a book I encountered when I studied comparative religion, by Wilfred Cantwell-Smith (cribbed from Wikipedia):

'In his best known and most controversial work The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind, Smith examines the concept of "religion" in the sense of "a systematic religious entity, conceptually identifiable and characterizing a distinct community". He concludes that it is a misleading term for both the practitioners and observers and it should be abandoned. The reasons for the objection are that the word 'religion' is "not definable" and its noun form ('religion' as opposed to the adjectival form 'religious') "distorts reality". Moreover, the term is unique to the Western civilization; there are no terms in the languages of other civilizations that correspond to it. He regards the term as having outlived its purpose.

Smith contends that the concept of religion, rather than being a universally valid category as is generally supposed, is a specifically European construct of recent origin. Religion, he argues, is a static concept that does not adequately address the complexity and flux of religious lives. Instead of the concept of religion, Smith proffers a new conceptual apparatus: the dynamic dialectic between cumulative tradition (all historically observable rituals, art, music, theologies, etc.) and individual faith.

The terms for major world religions today, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shintoism, did not exist until the 19th century. Smith suggests that practitioners of any given faith do not historically come to regard what they do as religion until they have developed a degree of cultural self-regard, causing them to see their collective spiritual practices and beliefs as in some way significantly different from the other.'

In practise, most times when a people start a sentence with 'religion is...' what usually follows is a regurtitation of their inherited prejudices. Kind of an 'anti-dogma'.

Or to put it another way the only reality we can imagine and talk about is a relational reality. but it doesn't follow that without humans nothing would exist. — Janus

I’m careful to explain that I’m not claiming that things go into and out of existence depending on whether they’re being perceived, but that, absent an observer, whatever exists is unintelligible and meaningless as a matter of fact and principle. Again, that even if you imagine an empty universe, you still introduce an implicit perspective. I said, of course there are unseen objects and empty rooms with nobody in them, but that is something one observer (myself) is saying to another (you).

The demand is that either everything is physical, and mind somehow emerges therefrom; or that everything is mind, and the physical little more than a pattern. What puzzles me is why we feel obligated to phrase the discussion in these terms; why the juxtaposition? — Banno

Physicalism is monistic - it says that there is nothing other than matter-energy. (And I have wondered whether that in its modern form is because it descended from monotheism - 'the jealous god dies hard'.)

Note I said at the outset that I’m not proposing mind as a literal constituent, that things are ‘made from mind’ as yachts from wood or statues from marble. So saying 'everything is mind' is not necessarily isomorphic to saying that 'everything is matter (or matter-energy)'. I think that's the distinction between 'epistemic' and 'ontological' idealism - that mind is the condition by which we know anything at all, which is not quite the same as saying that everything is mind, if you can see the distinction.

As for the juxtaposition - I do believe that there is a real conflict going on, a contest between the materialist attitude and its challengers. That that is what is behind the 'culture wars'.

You remember the brouhaha when Thomas Nagel published Mind and Cosmos?

It's trying to talk about stuff about which we cannot talk... — Banno

I will take issue with this. The basic thrust of the OP is to point out that in the 'experience of the world', the objective domain is not simply and unambiguously given. It points out the way our mind/brain construes the nature of the external world. As I've said, there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.

As I say in the OP, there is a sense in which nothing can be said about the world outside any knowledge or experience of it - but that does not prohibit analytical reflection on the question of the role of the mind or brain in the construction of our experience of the world. It needs to be understood what the argument is against. It is against the common presumption that 'the world makes mind' - that the mind is a product of or output of what are presumed to be the (purely) physical processes that purportedly drive evolution (a.k.a. 'evolutionary materialism). The default view of naturalism is that 'the subject' is, at once, simply the consequence of these purported causes, and also outside the domain of what can be known (whence 'eliminativism'). Phenomenology and other forms of (mainly European) philosophy are highlighting that, whereas your Anglo-American analytical philosophers on the whole would rather not. That's the only reason why you say 'we cannot talk'.....

(By the way, googling for the source of the quote that Josh provided above, I happened upon this pdf from the erudite and charming Michel Bitbol, a French - therefore continental! - philosopher of science - Is Consciousness Primary?)

argumentum ad manum.

. But what came next made it into a dog's breakfast, only cleaned up by Russell and Moore. — Banno

Oh, you mean when Moore discovered he had hands?

I do understand that German idealism kind of collapsed under the weight of its own verbiage. I nevertheless see it as the last gasp of the real Western philosophical tradition.

unhelpfully mentions the thing-in-itself. — Banno

And I'm cool with that. A lot of strife is caused by people wondering, hey, what *is* that? What is he talking about? If it's so mysterious, it must be something really important!

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble. — Emrys Westacott

Excellent, that's what I started with too. I'll always have a special place in my heart for old D T.

And that's a problem with both idealism and materialism, each supposing that it alone has priority. — Banno

Right. It's often given as the materialism or 'the object view' of Hume et al, vs the idealism or subject view of Berkeley et al. This is sometimes depicted as a kind of Hegelian dialectic, whereby first one, then the other, are held up as being fundamental, which plays out over centuries.

But I think that Kant's transcendental idealism evades this dichotomy, because Kant acknowledges the harmonious co-existence of both empirical realism and transcendental idealism.

Notice a little further down the page you linked to:

Although Buddhism devotees continuously inquire into and doubt the existence of the individual self, they do not deny the existence of “I,” who inquires and doubts self-certainty. For this reason, Buddha introduces the middle way, which is neither a self nor a no-self doctrine.

(That, incidentally, is a very sophisticated review.)

The 'no-self doctrine' would correspond to eliminativism. That is rejected in Buddhism as being nihilistic. The 'self doctrine' is the idea that 'I will be reborn in perpetuity'. Both these are rejected in Middle Way philosophy as 'extremes'.

Take a look at this verse from the early Buddhist texts. It's quite short. The point being that, when asked 'Is there a self?', the Buddha declines to answer (usually given as 'maintains a noble silence'.) That is one of the sources of Middle Way philosophy. Another is this one:

By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. — The Buddha, Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

I know it's a hard idea to get your head around! It was the subject of the post-grad thesis I did in Buddhist Studies 11 years ago, I still only got to a rudimentary understanding of it.

I am struggling to see the point of this thought-exercise. — Janus

Try reading it in context.

Mathematics is the world to the same extent that French or German is in the world, as a peculiar grammar by which we organize it for our purposes.
— Joshs — wonderer1

So do you think ordinary languages, like French and German, would have facilitated equal progress in physics and cosmology since the 17th C, in the absence of mathematics?

I will add that the expression that mathematics is 'in the world' is meaningless, just as it would be to say that a carton of eggs contains the number 12. Mathematics gives us a common symbolic means to describe, quantify and understand the world in a way that is not just based on individual perception but is grounded in a shared understanding and inherited knowledge.

The common core of all versions of religion is dogma, — Kaiser Basileus

I'll take issue with that. All religions have dogmas, that's for sure, but 'a dogma' is simply 'a principle or set of principles laid down by an authority'. Many other kinds of associations have their dogmas - accountants, architects, even science. 'The central dogma of molecular biology is a theory stating that genetic information flows only in one direction, from DNA, to RNA, to protein, or RNA directly to protein.'

Religions are such a diverse set of cultural phenomena that it is arguable that the word really has no useful meaning. What it does have, is a set of references, which is usually very much a product of the culture in which it's situated. In other words, we think we know what we mean when we talk about it, but much of that is hearsay.

But behind all of that, there are the accounts of encounters with the transcendent. These accounts span cultures and are found throughout history. Of course, the fact that we ourselves rarely have such encounters, means that normally they are only heard of second-hand. Even more so, in a secular culture such as ours, where the living traditions are rarely encountered, all sense that their might be something behind the dogma is lost.

In any case dogma is one of the consequences of religious consciousness, not necessarily one of the causes.

Then how do you overcome the problem of solipsism?

How does Buddhism overcome the problem of solipsism? — baker

I don't see how it applies. The form of idealist philosophy that I'm advocating does not say that 'the world only exists in your mind'. I'm referring to the mind - yours, mine, the mind that we as a species and culture share. The mind is not an objective reality, it's not a material thing - yet we can't plausibly deny it! That's the elephant in the room, the fly in the ointment, for naturalism.

Besides, I don't think that Buddhist philosophy has a problem with solipsism, because the basis of solipsism is that 'consciousness is mine alone'. What Buddhist would say that?

I once googled "how to be a genuine fake". That was how I formulated my inquiry! And Google gave me Watts' book! I was quite disappointed by it, though. — baker

That is the scandalous biography of Watts - I'm well aware of it and was dissappointed to read it at the time. In the end I decided it doesn't detract from the salience of his writings - Supreme Identity, Beyond Theology and Way of Zen have considerable merits in my view. What he said had to be said and I'm grateful that he said it.

I contend that it is not possible to make a case this way — baker

Like I said, you want to uphold the taboo! Push it behind the curtain, declare it out of bounds.

Look at the quote in the next post - that more or less re-states everything the essay says. (By the way, thankyou Josh, that passage really hits the nail on the head.)

going with paticcasamuppada makes you a member of a Buddhist epistemic community, at the exclusion of memberships in other epistemic communities. — baker

Just for the benefit of those unfamiliar with the terminology, paticcasamuppada is the 'chain of dependent origination' of Buddhism. It is true, as I say in the OP, that I'm drawing on non-dualist perspectives as well as phenomenology and idealism, and also that my overall approach is very much Buddhist. But I disagree that this 'excludes the argument from other epistemic communities'. As I said, we inhabit a pluralistic secular culture which ought not to make such arbitrary exclusions, and I believe the Buddhist perspective (which is really not a perspective!) is uniquely suited to the 'crisis of the Western sciences'. As did Francisco Varela, mentioned by Josh, who co-authored the ground-breaking book The Embodied Mind. It too incorporated many principles from Buddhism - for example:

The tension between the ongoing sense of self in ordinary experience and the failure to find that self in reflection is of central importance in Buddhism-the origin of human suffering is just this tendency to grasp onto and build a sense of self, an ego, where there is none. As meditators catch glimpses of impermanence, selflessness, and suffering (known as the three marks of existence) and some inkling that the pervasiveness of suffering (known as the First Noble Truth) may have its origin in their own self-grasping (known as the Second Noble Truth), they may develop some real motivation and urgency to persevere in their investigation of mind. They try to develop a strong and stable insight and inquisitiveness into the moment to moment arising of mind. They are encouraged to investigate: How does this moment arise? What are its conditions? What is the nature of "my" reactivity to it? Where does the experience of "1" occur? — The Embodied Mind, p61

I think that 'the taboo' exists, that it 'ought not to be spoken' because this kind of analysis is associated with religious philosophy or at least with a kind of deep introspection. Which is why I keep referring back to Thomas Nagel's important essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. He's a non-religious academic philosopher who has had that insight. That is the underlying dynamic, in a 'don't mention the war' kind of way.

Banno's Reality is limited to the reports of his physical senses — Gnomon

I wouldn't personalise it in that way. It's more the shortcoming of modern philosophy, generally. That's what we're both critiquing, although from rather different points of view.

A couple of articles of interest I noted during September:

Thomas Nagel reviews biography of J L Austin

Plus a very long interview with someone by the name of Aaron Preston, with discussion of the shortcomings of analytic philosophy, at least some of which made sense to me.

:yikes: Why thanks, very kind of you. Do give it a read, though, it includes at least some support from cognitive science.

I think your objections are naive and that idealism as I construe it is not necessarily saying what you think it is saying. I note that you think that it’s saying that the world is all and only in the mind - the first objection I note. I’m not arguing that. So your objections are basically to straw man versions of the argument. And I’ll also add that you’re not even really making a serious effort. I think it’s all variations of ‘argument from the stone’.

Don't worry, Banno. Rest assured your crockery and cutlery is just as you left it.

Could I perhaps suggesting reading some more of the essay? There is rather more to it than meadows.