Yes, yes. But to understand it you'll need to have done a lot of preliminary reading on Free Energy principles and understand a little of basic neuroscience and Bayesian probability. Nothing super in-depth, but the arguments simply won't be persuasive without that grounding. — Isaac

Thanks, I'll take a look. Most of the non-fiction I read these days mostly just makes me realize how much I don't know. I tend to just plow ahead and then go back and try to fill in the blanks.

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question. — Banno

Yes. We had this discussion once, at least once, when you tried to shanghai one of my threads. Sometimes, often, I want to examine the substance and details of a particular position. Getting into arguments about the meaning of words can make that impossible. Making every discussion a free-for-all makes it so you can't dig deeply into anything. That happens every day here on the forum. That's why, for most discussions, laying out definitions at the beginning is important.

What would a life without any wants look like? — schopenhauer1

I live as close to a life without wants as I ever have or ever will again. Not rich but enough money to live on with the things that matter to me. A house with the mortgage paid. No debt. No desire for expensive things. A 10 year old car that runs well. Reasonably good health. Health insurance. Loved and admired by the semi, sort of philosophy community.

Now that I don't have to do things any more, I pay more attention to why I do the things I do. It takes some getting used to. That's what's good about having a life without wants - lots of time to pay attention.

Try reading my post again you pillock. — Jamal

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing. — Jamal

Your comment does not stand, because it takes me to be saying something I’m not saying, something I did not say in the post you responded to. You projected a position onto me that I do not hold. — Jamal

Ok then, I guess the subtlety of your argument confused me. We don't know people are conscious because... I think we're about to get into another discussion of what it means to know, which I'd rather not.

I think I can almost accept that I wasn’t clear enough. My criticism of the use of “I know that x” in cases of indubitable certainty is just a repeat of what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty, and I shouldn’t assume people are familiar with that. — Jamal

That rings a bell. I think I read it 53 years ago in one of the two philosophy classes I took in college. Maybe I'll even agree if that will put an end to the p-zombie bullshit.

Try reading my post again you pillock. — Jamal

I read it the first time. I read it again just now. My comment stands.

And don't call me Willcox.

I fully agree. In fact, I will make this statement a little stronger: Neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness. (At the level of the mind, of course.)

One must also recognize that there are prominent neuroscientists today who admit that and differentiate mind from brain. But this doesn't change the nature of Neuroscience. — Alkis Piskas

Saying that the brain and mind are different things is not the same as saying the brain has nothing to do with the mind or that neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness.

I can't conceive of any of the leading theories in quantum physics. — Isaac

Albert Einstein couldn't conceive of the leading theories of quantum physics. As you said, that doesn't mean they are wrong.

But if you think it would be easier with an example, we could use https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057681/1/Friston_Paper.pdf — Isaac

Have you read it? Is it worth it?

Do you not find the argument from analogy completely compelling? I know some don't, but I struggle to understand why not. — bert1

I agree. I don't get it either.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing. — Jamal

In what plausible universe would I be the only one who has this characteristic, even though everything physical about me and other humans is the same; even though my biology and neurology and that of other people is the same; even though my behavior and that of other humans is the same; even though what I report as my experience and what other humans report is the same. It's an argument looking for a issue to argue about when there's none there. What value is there in having this argument? What do we learn from it beyond the fact that humans will argue about anything.

I'm saying I've never heard of any cogent explanation for how matter can give rise to consciousness. I'm not claiming there are none. — Janus

See "The Feeling of What Happens" by Damasio. I'm not saying it will be convince you, but it is a serious scientific attempt at a preliminary explanation.

I think artificial intelligence will prove or at least threaten to be a mirror for us. — plaque flag

I see artificial intelligence; along with other advancements such as genetics, nuclear power and weapons, particle physics, nanotechnology, and longevity research; as the first times humanity has stepped beyond itself and its world to take on the power to change the basis of our reality in a practical way. I think maybe this is where it all breaks down. Maybe this is why no aliens will ever have to worry about humans coming along and invading. I worry for my children.

And yet isn't it fundamentally an experiential question? Is studying the nature of consciousness equivalent to actually charting the boundaries of consciousness? Or is it just a lot of talking about consciousness? Personally, I believe the boundaries have to be studied with severe existential commitment, otherwise, it is mostly just words. — Pantagruel

I think what we call phenomenal consciousness, experience, what it's like to be... is a mental process much like other mental processes. Everyone makes such a big deal about it, but I see it as an interesting subject to try to understand. I also think looking at experience from the inside is interesting. Are they the same thing? No. One is biology, neurology. The other is psychology, self-awareness. We use different terms to describe them, but then we use different terms to describe chemistry and biology too.

I suppose it's possible to walk the path; there are some physical observables (behaviour etc) which provide sufficient justification for claiming that a test subject has narrow content - the thing is it would always be return that the subject would have narrow content as a p-zombie is stipulated to be able to emulate any physical aspect of a human. The fork in the road is that there are non-physical observables which suffice for that justification - but I've no idea what they could be. — fdrake

The whole p-zombie thing has always driven me crazy. Of course other people have internal lives that are like mine, i.e. phenomenal consciousness, experience, what it's like to be them. Doubting that is the same as Descartes doubting everything but his own existence. What possible value is there in doubting it. By the way the argument is phrased, it is impossible to tell by any objective means. It's like the multiverse - metaphysics at best, meaningless otherwise.

So often we don't seem to have much of a grip on what is supposed to be meant by 'consciousness.' — plaque flag

That is painfully true, as evidenced by just about every related discussion here on the forum. Be that as it may, with current issues about AI, it looks like it's going from an interesting philosophical problem to a practical political and social one.

I just realized I left something out. I love dictionaries, thesauruses, lists of rhyming words, etymologies. I love definitions. I like to take a word I think I understand and see if I can write a useful definition. It's harder than it should be but satisfying when you come up with a good one. My favorite; egregious - conspicuously bad. I don't remember where I got that.

Definitions are not some formalistic, regimented requirement of mechanical language. They are something to play with, juggle, kick down the street.

Panpsychism might be a fact, but one that I don't know empirically. — bert1

We could have a long and fruitless discussion about this, but I suggest we don't.

OK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? What do we do? What tests do we give it?
— RogueAI

Another good question. — bert1

How do we know other people are conscious? What standards do we use? Apply those same standards to AI.

[edit] I see you made that same suggestion in a previous post.

The point he’s trying to make is that while cognitive science is adequate for the explanation of the various functions of consciousness, it can’t show how to bridge the explanatory gap between those accounts and the felt nature of first-person experience. — Wayfarer

Yes, I understand that's what he's saying. Isn't that rejecting scientific explanations for conscious experience? That's how I would characterize it.

@javi2541997

I don't know if you saw this:

In new book, Murakami explores walled city and shadows — AP

Neither does David Chalmers. — Wayfarer

I've only read a little by him. One essay on the hard problem and a few quotes. He sure seems to reject scientific explanations for conscious experience. Have I misread him?

why do you think it lost you — Banno

Because poetry wasn't the subject of the discussion. Because figuring out the language is part of the experience of poetry. Because providing definitions would, in many cases, distract from the experience of the poetry. Because poetry works on a different part of the mind than philosophy or prose. Because ambiguity in poetry is a feature while in philosophy its a bug. Because I'm not interested in the subject in relation to poetry.

I also didn’t bother following along when he began analyzing the poetry, and skipped to the end, which didn’t seem to be saying very much. Could be I’m missing out, but what I took away from it was that Collingwood is a good one to read on this stuff. (Self-reliance doesn’t imply that you shouldn’t read books, only that you shouldn’t get all your ideas from books.) — Jamal

I was thinking after I wrote that last post - Making a definition in poetry is like explaining a joke.

I am wondering, ↪T Clark, what you made of the article ↪Wayfarer linked. — Banno

It started out interesting, but then switched from talking about definition in a general or philosophical sense to a poetic one. That lost me, at least from the point of view of this discussion. The need for and use of definitions in poetry is very different from that in philosophy.

I do notice that you tend to personalize the issues, as you have done here, and that is indeed very different from my approach. I'm not saying it's bad or uninteresting; it's just very difficult for me to find a way of engaging with it (although I'm doing okay right now). — Jamal

This is definitely true. A lot of my understanding of philosophical issues comes from my examination of my own way of knowing and experiencing things. Introspection, intuition, are the most important aspects of knowledge to me. Maybe "interesting" is a better word than "important."

what is right for engineering may be wrong for philosophy. — Jamal

I think my approach is right for engineering and for my philosophy. Two of my favorite quotes which lay out how I see things.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet. — Kafka

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men,— that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for always the inmost becomes the outmost—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men, but what they thought. — Emerson - Self Reliance

By "genius," Emerson didn't mean like what Einstein was, he means more the essence of who we are. Both of these quotes describe a kind of philosophical, well, self-reliance. That appeals to me in all my western individualism. On the other hand, Lao Tzu also describes the rejection of tradition and authority in favor of insight.

I think I want to say that the latter is the definition-centric one and the former is more like philosophy, where "planning is guessing". That is, in philosophy and innovation, things have to be kept open to a significant degree; or to put it differently, we have to realize that things just are open. — Jamal

Yes... well...

All in all, I'm not sure that anything we've said makes your and my differing approaches to definitions any clearer to me. On the other hand, laying out my understanding of how philosophy works, how my philosophy works, has been helpful. It's the first time I've expressed it in the way I did here.

What I think Chalmers is actually trying to convey by 'something it is like...' is, simply, being. Being, and what it means to be, is surely one of the major preoccupations of philosophy (and much else besides) although it's not always explicit - for Heidegger questioning the meaning of being is philosophy. (And I do wonder whether eliminative materialism is in some ways a manifestation of what Heidegger called 'the forgetfulness of being'.) — Wayfarer

I think I recognize pretty well what consciousness is from the inside. I have no problem with how you've expressed it, although my take is less poetic and more matter of fact.

Another point I'd make is that there is the study of consciousness as an object of analysis - which is cognitive science - which I'm interested in, and trying to get a better understanding of. — Wayfarer

I'm surprised at this statement. It had seemed to me that you rejected attempts to understand consciousness from a scientific point of view. I think Chalmers definitely does. Or am I wrong about that? And yes, I agree, I want to know a lot more about cognitive science.

But the philosophical question about the nature of the mind (a term I prefer to 'consciousness') is broader, and deeper, than the specific questions which are the subject of cognitive science. — Wayfarer

My first response to that would be "Well sure, that's what psychology is about." I imagine you would find that unsatisfactory.

I think there's a completely unambiguous answer to that: we are not robots, or machines, or even simply organisms, but beings, and a science that doesn't understand that is a risk to humanity. You never know what you, or the person next to you, is capable of being, or becoming. — Wayfarer

It just seems like you could say the same thing about anything. There's more to the world than what science can see. Ok. I think that's a different argument than Chalmers and the other what-is-it-like guys are making. Maybe I'm misunderstanding it.

My objection to neuro-reductionism is that what it is seeking to explain is something which is different in kind to other topics of scientific analysis — Wayfarer

I don't think I'm what you call a "neuro-reductionist," although maybe you would disagree. I made the following comment earlier in this thread:

I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.

If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — Me

Do you have an answer to that question? If phenomenal consciousness is not a mental process, what is it? And why isn't it suitable for examination by scientific methods?

I more or less agree. I found his unpleasantness easy to ignore. But he pretty much asked to be banned in his last post, and he robusty refused moderation. — bert1

As I said, I didn't question the decision, but I often found his posts interesting.

Any views on this, — Tom Storm

Your OP made me think of a discussion @frank started a while ago - Occam's razor is unjustified, so why accept it?

Occam's razor says that if we have a choice between a simple answer and a compound one, we should pick the simple one.

It's widely accepted even though it actually has no justification. It's acceptance seems to come down to its intuitive or aesthetic appeal. Is that enough? Or should we just reject it? — frank

I disagreed with him in the discussion, but since then I've thought about it and I think he's right. It is an aesthetic standard, but I still find it compelling, or at least appealing. I'm not sure how that fits into your discussion, but it's what came to mind.

the Aeon article that Wayfarer linked to above — Jamal

I hadn't seen that link. The article looks interesting. Thanks.

It’s not clear to me whether this situation is the result of a lack of definitions, or an excessive focus on definitions. — Jamal

Maybe it's that you and I have a different approach to philosophy. Now that you've started actively participating in discussions again, it seems to me you focus more specific philosophers and works. In those cases, the context of the discussion can take care of a lot of the potential misunderstandings. I came to philosophy with my own understanding of how the world works, the nature of reality, how discussions should proceed. I also came from a profession where, given an audience which is often non-technical, defining terms was very important.

I think I use the writings of philosophers differently than some others on the forum do. I use them to test my understanding. If I find someone whose ideas resonate with mine, they can help me refine and extend my understanding. That's why Collingwood and Lao Tzu are so important to me. I've always disliked Kant, but more recently I've found that some of his ideas are similar to those of Lao Tzu. His somewhat different approach has been interesting. I think maybe the discussions I start, and often those I join, are more free form and are not tied down to specific works and philosophers. I often avoid those more specific discussions because I don't know enough to participate usefully.

I understand. This looks like stipulative definition, which I was mostly ignoring, treating it as something separate. — Jamal

That makes sense.

Or maybe what you’re referring to is the exception in my main thesis, those times when a term is so ambiguous that you need to prevent confusion with a clear statement that this, not that, is what you mean. — Jamal

I think that's part of it too.

Given we could agree (possibly) on the above, I'm not sure how there'd be any difference in saying that the purpose of consciousness is X, simply by restricting our frame of reference to the functioning of the organism. — Isaac

Reading your post, I couldn't remember how we got on this point. Going back and looking didn't help. So we can leave it there, as long as we agree that "reason" and "purpose" mean function and not goal, I'm ok with where we are.

An easy decision. An adolescent style of rigidity and dogmatism. Thought everything fit nicely into a flowchart. Constantly uncharitable, frequently insulting. — Mikie

I'll let the moderators make the judgements about banning, but I strongly disagree with your judgement about the quality of his philosophy. I think he brought something valuable to the forum. Again - that's not a criticism of this decision.

For the record, you are also often uncharitable and frequently insulting.

People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point. — Tom Storm

Hey! I resemble that remark.

Although I seemed to be starting out by “defining my terms,” in the way that some people in philosophical discussions demand, what I was really doing was explicating a concept that we’re all familiar with, and I was not aiming for comprehensiveness. I was beginning an analysis of a term which we already understand and know how to use; or, to put it differently, I was beginning to describe what we look for in a definition. It may have been a useful exercise, but not because you didn’t already know what a definition is, and not because there’s a likelihood we would end up talking past each other without it. — Jamal

As one of those who might be characterized as demanding definitions, I have some thoughts. The first is one I've expressed here often - many, I would say most, of the frustrating, fruitless discussions we have here on the forum start out with disagreements about the meaning of words and then never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues. I don't disagree that discussions where we work out among ourselves what particular terms mean are valuable. I have started a few discussions for that purpose - What does "mysticism" mean; What does "consciousness" mean; What does "real" mean. They were among the more satisfying discussions I've participated in.

On the other hand, I often start discussions about specific issues I want to examine, often something to do with metaphysics. In my OPs I often make it clear exactly what I intend the meaning of specific words are for the purposes of that particular discussion. Then I obnoxiously and legalistically defend that position, sometimes asking moderators to help. I do that because I want to talk about a specific concept or subject and I don't want to argue about what "metaphysics" really means. If I don't make those kinds of requirements, the thread will just turn into an argument about something I'm not interested in.

When I am participating in someone else's discussion, I try to follow their rules. If I am unclear about how they are using a word, I'll ask or I'll say what it means to me. If I don't like the definition of a particular word they are using, I can bug off if it bothers me enough. I often like rough and tumble rhetorical competitions - jokes, insults, and name-calling. But sometimes I just want to get down to work.

I vote 'property'. — bert1

Here's how Wikipedia defines "property." "In logic and philosophy (especially metaphysics), a property is a characteristic of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness." That's consistent with what I mean when I say "consciousness." As I see it, "conscious" is a characteristic, but consciousness is not. It seems clear to me that consciousness is a thing of some sort. We usually treat it as such.

I'm not sure if we can take this any further.

That may well be true of us-as-human. But the behaviour we don't drive might be driven by the consciousness of other entities. — bert1

I'm not sure what you mean.

Yes, I like that idea. It's what would go into my category of 'random' still though. Random, as in coincidence, no reason. — Isaac

That's a bit of an overstatement. Enlarged relative brain size might contribute to increased intelligence, but what that does is provide a new trait for natural selection to work on. Many of our most important traits started out that way. The bones that transmit sound in our ears started out in one of our ancestors jaw.

It may be before you came into this conversation, but I started out down this evolutionary route as an attempt to firm up bert1's original dissatisfaction with the explanations given, his sense that there was a 'why?' still unanswered. — Isaac

I generally reject "why" as a legitimate question for science. Science does "how." The image I see is one of a push from behind rather than a pull towards something specific. Like I said previously - It's an engine, not a steering wheel. We get where we get, but there was never a plan or reason for it. We make up the destination after the trip is done. This is a major theme in the history of theories of evolution - rejection of any directionality or teleology. That's one of the reasons it was so radical a theory. There's no room for purpose.

that's a topic for another conversation. — Isaac

Yes.

I agree, I think that's perfectly likely, but as I said above, in the context of this question in the OP, it wouldn't even arise if randomness (or lack of reason) were one of the options. — Isaac

Randomness is an essential factor in Darwin's theory and continues as one in modern understandings of evolution. Again, that's why it was such an overwhelming understanding.

1) 'there are no reasons (it just happened)' - the sort of option you're suggesting
2) 'because it confers some evolutionary advantage' - the kind of functionalist account — Isaac

Perhaps the ultimate point in evolutionary theory - Useful outcome does not imply goal, purpose, or reason. This is a fight that has been going on at least since 1859.

So I suppose the extent to which one is content with an evolutionary frame is the extent to which one is willing to allow for other influence. With behaviour that might be culture. With anything we might have randomness, or God, or our alien simulation managers... — Isaac

I remember an essay by Stephen Jay Gould. In it he described what happens when animals get larger. Their brains tend to get larger at a faster rate than their bodies in general. Conclusion - selection for a larger body might coincidently select for a even larger brain. Not really random, but not selected either.

For me, I think evolutionary psychology is almost all bollocks. I think that because cultural influences are just too obviously at least a possible factor. — Isaac

What Stephen Pinker says about language makes sense to me - humans have an instinct to learn language. The structures of our nervous systems and minds are built that way. Obviously, social factors also are involved. Pinker's views are not accepted by everyone. @apokrisis in particular believes language behavior can be explained by a generalized cognitive function. As always, apokrisis, forgive me if I misrepresented your views.

With consciousness, however, I can't really think of that conflicting influence. We could invoke randomness (it just turned up), but then we'd also have to explain why humans who didn't have it weren't easily able to outbreed those that did.

We could argue, as Dennet does, that it's an illusion, there's nothing to find a purpose to. But I dislike defining things away.

I don't dispute the plausibility of non-evolutionary accounts, they just seem far more complicated, have more loose ends, and don't seem to explain anything that isn't covered in a functional account. — Isaac

I seems to me, with no specific evidence, that consciousness could arise out of interactions between abilities for abstract thinking, language, and other higher level neurological function. Again - that's speculation. Which isn't to say that consciousness doesn't provide an evolutionary advantage.

That's exactly what I wanted to say! — Vera Mont

Can you expand on that? Is this something specific to consciousness, or do you think it equally unjustified to assign an evolutionary purpose to osmosis, or active sodium ion transportation? — Isaac

Sorry to take so long to respond. I didn't get a notice.

There's a long history in evolutionary biology of people off-handedly assigning evolutionary reasons why certain traits were selected with no evidence. A famous example was that mallard ducks sexual practices include males forcing females to have sex. People claimed that that trait was genetically controlled and could be the reason human males rape human females. So, my criticism wasn't about the particular example you selected, but the process of assigning evolutionary justifications in general. Obviously, eyes evolved so we could see. Many other traits have much less obvious purposes or even no purposes at all.