Most usually what is considered good is what is considered moral.

What prevents men from doing this today, and what caused this breakdown that you talk about?

Sure, it is. Pain is intrinsically bad. — The Great Whatever

Stop asserting. Try arguing instead.

As to BDSM, first, there is no contradiction in saying people actively seek out or want to inflict bad things on themselves. Second, there is no contradiction in saying that some bad things might be pursued because they are intermixed with good things (i.e., one can find pleasure in pain, but then one must in some sense find the act pleasant, or they are not 'into' BDSM to begin with). — The Great Whatever

So you admit that pleasure and pain are not simply black and white labels for what is good and bad. There must be first a subject to experience them, and two, an opinion/preference about these experiences.

Of course you are. This might extrinsically cause some other bad thing, like gaining weight, but that too is only bad insofar as it is somehow painful to have more weight. Put anther way, eating the chocolate is not bad insofar as it is pleasant, but insofar as it causes you to gain weight. To see this, note that the dilemma disappears if the chocolate no longer causes you to gain weight, but is still just as pleasant. — The Great Whatever

But that's just what I'm saying, the circumstances are what dictate whether or not a pleasurable experience is desirable! The preference must come first. First, I must want to eat the chocolates. Then I can count it as a pleasurable experience.

Forcing me to eat the chocolates would be immoral because I would not want to eat them. It doesn't matter that I will inevitably taste the smooth, milky texture of the chocolate and get a spike in dopamine. That pleasure lacks any meaning towards me, and might as well not exist.

Hedonism as such is a claim about the good, and so makes no claims about obligations. — The Great Whatever

Okay, here we go, scenario time!

You, a hedonist, are walking down the street one afternoon when you bump into me. I tell you that I have a great offer that you won't be able to deny: an experience machine! You'll feel pleasure beyond your wildest imagination, but if you plug in, you will be in for the rest of your life. You will not be able to leave. But don't worry about your family or friends, I have plenty more of these machines back at my shop that I will hook them up to as well.

Being a hedonist, and professing that pleasure is the only good, you would be obligated to plug in to this machine on pain of contradicting your own philosophy. The only reason you wouldn't plug in would be because you don't desire to, even if there is pleasure available. Desire-satisfaction is a far better theory than hedonism.

So you seem to be making a strange claim here:

1) We cannot control our preferences.
2) The reason we cannot control our preferences is because we cannot control what causes us to suffer.
3) Yet our preferences are in some sense independent from this suffering. — The Great Whatever

Erm, no. I don't claim to know how preferences work, although I might actually end up pursuing a degree that may help solve this.

Pain by itself is not worth anything. There must be an entity that attributes a value to this experience. This is why pain is not necessarily equal to suffering. A person who is into BDSM, for example, wouldn't consider the pain associated with it to be suffering. They would actively pursue it.

Pleasure by itself it not worth anything in the same way as well. For example, let's there's a box of chocolates next to me. Eating them will stimulate my taste buds, release some dopamine to be sure, and give me a "pleasurable" experience. But say I want to lose weight. What then? Am I still enjoying this box of chocolates if I know I need to lose weight?

The problem I see with pure hedonism is that it inevitably leads to unsavory scenarios. Situations such as being jacked up on drugs simply because they make you feel pleasure. Even if I don't want to take these drugs, I would still be obligated to as a hedonist because pleasure is seen as good no matter what. This is otherwise known as the experience machine thought experiment.

But why would this be bad? To say this scenario would be bad would be to appeal to something other than the experience of pleasure. This is, as I have said, the preferences of the individual.

I see. I suppose I just had a wrong understanding of the existentialist perspective. I thought it was just dealing with angst at the loss of objective meaning.

But much of existentialism (not counting Christian existentialism) rests upon the assertion that there is no god, the universe is uncaring, unnecessary suffering exists, etc and therefore there is no meaning and therefore there is an existential crisis. But if the only thing that backs up these assertions are just vague feelings without any analytical thought behind it...that's kind of pathetic. It's as if there's an entire philosophy grounded upon nothing. No arguments.

Another thing you might mean is what people, when asked, say they approve and disapprove of; but this is clearly of not help, since you can't make something good or bad just by holding a certain opinion or saying it is. — The Great Whatever

Why not?

If that were true, there would be no problems, since you could just decide to approve of everything that happened and make it good. — The Great Whatever

Bullshit, we don't have that kind of omnipotent control over our preferences. I can't just say that being stabbed is okay to make it okay. It's not okay. I would prefer not to get stabbed because I prefer to not feel the sensation of suffering. But suffering alone without any preference has no value. Same with pleasure.

The reason rape is bad is that it is traumatic and highly painful, both during and for a long period of time afterward. — The Great Whatever

No, the reason rape is bad is because the act is severely disregarding the preferences of another person. It can presumably still be rape and not "feel bad" in terms of pain.

I never said our preferences are always motivated by pleasure. But it does follow, quite obviously, that not all of our preferences are motivated by what is good. — The Great Whatever

Well, you said your position was that pleasure is the only good.

Quite honestly, the only basis that I can come to for existentialist thought is that of dealing with disillusionment with the world. The breaking of our constructions, such as having a soul or there being a god. But there isn't any logical proof of existentialist metaphysics. Existentialism is just a way of coping and re-assessing everything you thought you knew. But I still do not see how one would go about proving, for example, that there are no values or that the universe is uncaring. They seem to be taken as the granted, null position. Not sure why.

That's kind of what I was thinking, that existentialism is more of a reaction to the religious dogma of the past. But it still begs the question of whether or not the existential dilemma is even a dilemma to begin with, or if it's just meaningless sophistry.

For example, take Sartre's famous words "existence precedes essence". Now this goes against centuries of philosophical metaphysics. Does Sartre actually have any professional metaphysics to back this claim up?

You can disagree with whatever you want. But if you disagreed, you would simply be wrong. — The Great Whatever

You are wrong. ayy

I would ask you to elucidate your position on what is good, and because it would be internally inconsistent, draw out a contradiction from it. — The Great Whatever

Like I said, I'm sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.

A man rapes a woman. This woman does not want to be raped, even though she might actually be feeling pleasure. Does this mean it is good?

It would disgusting if you said it was good because she was feeling pleasure, and pleasure was good.

Oftentimes our preference are motivated by pleasure. But not always. Satisfied Preference is my conception of good.

rather, pleasure is good, and hedonism is the recognition of this, and it is true whether you recognize it in a doctrine or not. — The Great Whatever

No offense but this is a total cop-out argument. I mean, how am I supposed to have a discussion with someone who will just say that I'm blind to the obvious (that pleasure is good)? It won't matter if I disagree with the proposition that pleasure is an intrinsic good.

Furthermore, this line of argument is not only applicable to hedonism. It's applicable to any position.

So it makes no sense to say that what will be of aid to you depends on which philosophy you adopt, if by 'be of aid' you mean 'be good,' and what is good isn't dependent on your philosophical worldview. — The Great Whatever

I might disagree that pleasure is intrinsically good. And when I say "aid someone" I mean to help someone with problems they might be facing.

And yes, Stoicism says pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, but this is wrong. Pleasure and pain are the only things that are good or bad on their own terms. — The Great Whatever

Hypothetically speaking I could disagree. You could call me out and say I'm wrong, but how would you actually formulate an argument except by simply copping out and proclaiming that you are right even if I don't recognize it?

Things like virtue, and so on, are only good in virtue of certain arbitrary opinions, customs, consequences, social norms, etc., and then only insofar as they are efficient causes of pleasure. — The Great Whatever

Pleasure may be defined differently. Obviously a Stoic is going to disagree with your assessment that all pleasure is good no matter what. Also, pleasure being a "good" is really only based on the arbitrary basis of our conscious experiences and our opinions of them. A nihilist could just as easily say this is all bullocks and that there is no good or bad experiences.

In other words, virtue is always 'good insofar as...' — The Great Whatever

Insofar that it leads to eudaimonia, which is not equal to pleasure.

For the record, I am sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.

I was going to reply using my own words but I found a source that words it better than I could:

In the briefest of outlines, the Stoic theory held that the only good thing is virtue (aretê, ‘excellence of character’) and the only bad thing is vice, its opposite. Everything else is ‘indifferent’ between virtue and vice, being in no sense at all good or bad. Thus the Stoics maintained that the bulk of humanity, in pursuing wealth and material goods, status, health and anything at all that is popularly conceiving of as good is making a mistake so long as that pursuit is based on the belief that these things really are good, or are desirable because they are good. Living virtuously is necessary and sufficient for living well and being happy, and the ‘indifferent’ things, although worth pursuing to the extent that it is appropriate for human beings to seek adequate shelter, sustenance and companionship, are in no way required for eudaimonia.

So pleasure and suffering only become "good" or "bad", ethically, when they are associated with virtue or vice. Otherwise they are indifferent, neutral, and are not required to obtain eudaimonia.

Of course if you consider yourself a hedonist then I suppose this doesn't have much bearing on your conception of the world. But for those who do not subscribe to a strictly hedonistic philosophy of living, Stoicism might be of aid.

I can see how Stoicism could be used to ensure people are content even if their empire is abusing them. — schopenhauer1

This would be violating the principle of charity.

Yeah, I miss the like system but I don't miss the reputation system. Too bad they are linked.

I think you are expecting too much.

Of course if my dog died I would be filled with grief. It is a natural reaction to such circumstances, and it's probably unhealthy to keep it all bottled up.

A key concept in Stoicism is that a person has a duty. Ever been given a special job, even if it is menial? For some reason everyone seems to get perky when they have an important thing to do. It gives them a sense of purpose and pride. Move out of the way!, I'm here to deliver a very-important-package to a very-important-person!

So I think a Stoic would say the duty that someone has, no matter what, is to live virtuously. And if you cannot live virtuously anymore, it is time to die (which many voluntarily did so). And so no matter what happens to you, you can cope with it because it is your duty to do so, so you can continue to live virtuously.

Instead of interpreting Stoicism as an insta-cure to all pain and suffering, it might help to interpret it as a movement that advocates a certain perspective towards pain and suffering. I think this applies to other philosophies outside of Stoicism as well.

Also, it should be noted that Aristotle thought that the constant striving towards perfection was never-ending.

I looked it up, Wayfarer, Aristotle advocated what is known as immanent or moderate realism.

I found a short summary of Aristotle's criticisms of Platonism, which I think accurately sums up the problems I have with the theory and general Realism for that matter.

I don't know whether to classify Aristotle as a Realist or a Nominalist, though.

I also don't agree with everything Aristotle said, especially the part regarding the anthropomorphizing of particulars striving for perfection. We humans can do so, and in fact Aristotle's thoughts on this are strikingly similar to that of Nietzsche's, but ultimately the universe is under the influence of entropy. So there really is no "perfection" here, unless "perfection" means to return to the state of absolute potential substance.

I believe I just described Aristotle's hylomorphism, that is, that matter (hyle) assumes forms (morph). His Prime Mover was pure Form, and he also conceived of Pure Matter, which could be interpreted as a predecessor to quantum indeterminacy.

I think the conversation regarding the existence of universals often overlooks a key topic, and that is whether or not properties even exist, as in, is there an ontological structure behind common concrete particulars. Because you can be a nominalist and still accept that there are properties, just that they are concrete particulars (tropes). It's taken for granted that "redness" is something that can be taken as a separate, independent entity from an object. It's taken for granted that "triangularity" is something apart from the triangle itself.

However, I don't see why there is the need to postulate the existence of a shareable entity, or even entities at all. I find it absurd that there are specific "properties" that "make up" something.

Things can be similar because they act similarly. A red object is just a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it reflects light. A triangular object is simply a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it looks triangular. Instead of properties being like a metaphorical sticker that is applied to objects or coalesced to bring forth an object, properties are merely the manifestation of matter as it is changed. They are what matter is doing, not what matter is possessing.

Well, I recently quit my job so there's that.

I have recently read about Aristotelian Substance Theory. Aristotle argued that the fundamental thing is the Kind, and that by belonging to a Kind, an object was given as essence, or a set of necessary properties. Additional properties could be added on, but did not change the fundamental essence of the character.

I'm actually kind of leaning towards this theory, albeit ignoring his declaration that living creatures were kinds (he thought teleology explained by life could not arise from non-life, evolutionary theory would like to disagree). The fundamental, elementary kinds of the universe are like gluons, muons, electrons, or strings/quantum foam.

Anyway, I still am very confused on how this talk of universals is supposed to be compatible with modern physics. Say I have two apples. I see that they are both "red". They are quite similar in shade, in fact, they might even be exactly similar in color. But this doesn't mean that they share something. It just means they have exactly similar shades of color. So universals are a worthless addition.

So if the problem is that we are social animals and but other people are frustrating, how does one resolve this tension? Is it better to habituate ourselves to be alone or is it better to resign ourselves with dealing with the frustrations of other people as just the cost of being a social animal? — schopenhauer1

Honestly this seems like a question that can be answered simply by appealing to the general psychology of an individual.

I don't really like parties. I hate huge social events like dances and parades. I'm much more introverted.

Whereas an extrovert might enjoy those things.

However I do contend that a quite ironically large amount of our suffering is caused by our interactions with other people, interactions that we pursue because we are social animals. Regardless, an extrovert might say that it was worth is because they need these social gatherings to be happy.

So my prescription would be to have a balance. If you are frustrated with people all the time, then you need to find new people to spend time with. It is inevitable that you will be let down by other people, but realize also, that it is inevitable that you will let them down. The key is to find the right balance.

Maybe we can keep the likes/agree off but make it a notification instead?

The problem I see with universals is that they are seen as abstracta, and I'm not sure if I agree that abstract objects exist. I don't see any difference between them and NOTHING.

Furthermore, if I were to postulate the existence of abstract universals, they would be "fundamental" universals, not these bullshit universals like "Bob the monkey exemplifies the universal of having a tail." I can't bring myself to accept that floating around somewhere in ethereal, non-spatiotemporal world is an object that is having a tail-ness.

Yikes, I have realized that I have been severely misunderstanding universals, and confusing them with the qualia from the philosophy of mind.

However, I'm still confused on whether or not universals are seen as these ethereal things that exist in a different plane or universe. "Spooky"

But generally speaking the modern philosophical lexicon doesn't allow for the distinction between 'what is real' and 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

This is an interesting idea that I have never thought about.

Trope Theory is very similar to Realism, but simply posits that instead of abstract universals, there are only concrete particulars, and that properties are made up of "tropes". Each trope is unique.

Yes. By and large, I think women merely put up with men and do not really care for them. — The Great Whatever

I would tend to agree with you in that most women tend to be this way. Very machiavellian. But men tend to also objectify women instead of seeing them as people.

The world is all smoke and mirrors. If you want to understand the world, you have to understand that. — The Great Whatever

According to your perspective, the world is all smoke and mirrors. This doesn't strike me as a very strong argument.

For instance, that cup exists, this keyboard exists, the computer in front of me exists. When we speak of abstract objects, such as number, we are not speaking of something that exists, but something that pertains to the operations of thought itself. — Wayfarer

So do universals exist? I say they are real, but not existent; they pertain to the nature of reality and of thought, but are not concrete particulars and so don't exist in the same way that concrete particulars exist. — Wayfarer

You may be interested in Trope Theory.

I found a great, short resource that sums up the problem of universals for those who don't know it too well. It also has the perfect paragraph describing what I find to be troubling about universals:

"On the realist account, it seems a particular must either have a universal or not –
something is or isn’t a banana, is or isn’t yellow, and so on. But psychologists have
recently argued that this ‘either is or isn’t’ judgment isn’t how our concepts work. Are
plantain bananas or not? More or less? When does yellow become orange or green? Is a
shark a fish? Many concepts seem to work by comparison with a prototype, a defining
example (yellow, fish, banana), and other things are judged to be more or less similar to it
– which is what a nominalist would say."

From Wikipedia:

Brassier himself, however, does not identify with the speculative realist movement, and, further, debates that there even is such a movement, stating "The 'speculative realist movement' exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. I don’t believe the internet is an appropriate medium for serious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct a philosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students. I agree with Deleuze’s remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a ‘movement’ whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity."

Whichever question is better, there's nothing to stop me from asking, "What makes them the same?" And so I will: why are two tropes similar? If A and B are resembling tropes, but C is not a resembling trope to either, then why is that? — Pneumenon

I'm not sure, actually. The book I'm reading by Loux is actually quite confusing in this regard.

And what's a structure? Because if two objects can have the "same" structure, then you're appealing to universals again. Ditto for the "brain-interpretation" counter, which seems to be positively full of holes. Is the brain doing the same interpretation over and over? And even if red is "just" an experience, is it the same experience over and over? — Pneumenon

But doesn't this lead to the positing of some mystical "connection" between the brain and the realm of the universals? How do we, as concrete particulars, come to know about universals?

That's the central problem: if nominalism were true, then I'd expect my experience of things to be a completely chaotic flux of absolute randomness with no identifiable patterns whatsoever, because as soon as identifiable patterns crop up, universals have already snuck back in. But experience is not a chaotic flux of absolute randomness. — Pneumenon

Gotcha, makes sense. Like Dennett's idea of the Cartesian theater. If dualism is not correct, then thoughts exist, which means these abstractions exist.

Same for "names." Let's say that every name is an action rather than a universal. So what? The question then arises: if I say "Bob" twice, then in what sense did I say the same thing twice? — Pneumenon

This goes into the difference between types and tokens, I believe. Tokens are different auditory and visual representations of a name.

Which actually just makes names seem like universals. huh

I'll address the third man argument, as well as your last paragraph, later, because they're both almost worthy of threads in themselves. — Pneumenon

Cool, thanks.

Love is described as ineffable because it is the only thing that has the capability of fulfilling the hole in our lives. We are born alienated from the world and alienated from other people, completely metaphysically isolated for the entirety of our lives. To feel love is to come as close as is possible to merging the consciousness of two people; it is to feel more concern for another person than about yourself, and is the height of compassion. To love is to know that the journey of life is to be shared.

I've tried really hard to be a nominalist for a long time. What I've found is that, if you're too quick to reach for Occam's Razor, you slit your own throat. — Pneumenon

Haha, I like that. Ockham's Razor is one of the foundational aspects of nominalism, but is also heavily criticized.

That's the problem, really. I think that the reason for there being so many different kinds of nominalism is that nominalists tie themselves up in knots trying to reduce the non-concrete to the concrete without invoking the non-concrete, and failing, and then trying something else. If the problem keeps resurfacing like that, then you should probably take that as a hint that your approach isn't working. — Pneumenon

This, along with your example, I disagree with (tentatively at least). The Realist is demanding something to be explained that cannot be explained because it is not even anything at all; it's unscientific and an appeal to "common sense", which I don't find to be very convincing. I don't see why these "universals" can't be seen as a type of meme within language.

R: So what's similar about our reaction in both cases? Are there not, then, "reaction universals?"
N: Perhaps they're just similar reactions.
R: What makes them similar?
N: There are aspects of each reaction that are the same.
R: Are the aspects universals, then? — Pneumenon

I think the best answer to this from a nominalist perspective is Trope Theory. Each of these properties are similar, but none are identical. They are unique.

Argh, this is a very frustratingly confusing topic. I think the best way of explaining what I'm getting caught up with the most is that, perhaps, the Realist is correct because properties are like the "life" of an object. I think actually a better question instead of asking what makes things similar is what makes things different. The nominalist would answer that what differs is the material structure of the particular, like the atomic structure, or the string/quantum foam/etc structure. But this begs to question as to why these different structures give rise to different properties.

However, it could be said that properties are just subjective experiences, right? "Redness" doesn't actually exist, it's just a photon with a wavelength of 620-750 nm that is interpreted by our brains. Which actually leads to the problem of qualia, not universals.

Furthermore, I don't understand how Realism avoids infinite regress (Third Man argument). If a is F, then a exemplifies F-ness. But F-ness also must be explained, by Super-F-Ness, etc. If universals are immune to infinite regress, why aren't particulars?

Additionally, I fail to understand how we can come to understand such things as "abstract" objects. To be perfectly honest they simply come across as spooky, superstitious ghosts.

Would it be incorrect to understand universals as "POTENTIALS OF EVERYTHING THAT IS POSSIBLE"?

It's easy to identify philosophy, but impossible to describe it.

I got glasses for driving today, so that was cool.

Smartasses tend to be dumbasses in disguise.

I'm sorry that was uncalled for.

Although I think many of these New Atheists and their kin are hateful of religion because they don't want the universe to be under the dominion of a deity, I also find that the concept of a divine order, in which there is a purpose and no way out, to be quite nightmarish. Not only do I find the concept of a deity or religious doctrines absurd, but the concept of a divine order is utterly scary.