If you look up the definition of the noun form of 'a being' in any dictionary, — Wayfarer

It amazes me you continue to argue about this. I’ll grant your point about the noun form in common usage —because it doesn’t make the slightest difference to what I’m talking about.

Wasting time making a joke about climate change as Australia is literally burning to the ground isn't my idea of "using my imagination."

Unless you're a climate change denier, in which case: bye!

Good in Plato's philosophy, you mean? And what do you mean by "being"?

Okay. Put a freeze on elections. Climate deniers are removed from office. A climate coup is enacted. Media must apply for new registration. Those that print contrary reports are to be fined or threatened with imprisonment. Corporations are put on notice.

As I said, only China and India will contribute CO2. — Brett

Forgive me, I thought you were trying to have an adult conversation. My fault.

In English, the word ‘being’ applies to living creatures. Chairs and other object are artifacts, objects, tools, etc, but they’re not designated as ‘beings’. As I say, this is simple English albeit with philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. The word "being" in English references "existence" as well, and not simply human or living existence. It's the present participle of "be." But this completely misses the point anyway. What I was talking about was in the context of ontology, not common usage.

It seems that before anything happens at all, people will have to (1) vote out of office climate deniers and other politicians bought off by Big Oil and (2) escape the shackles of propaganda, misinformation, and sophistry being carried out by the industry, particularly in countries whose economies rely heavily on fossil fuel.

Governments are bought these days, and they're bought by concentrations of wealth and power. What's unfortunate is that because they also own the media companies, they can convince a sizable number of those who actually do vote to vote for leaders who are actively pushing us in the direction of extinction.

What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

BTW -- no one is making claims about consciousness, because no one has told us what consciousness is. It would be like saying "neuroscientists are making claims about ectoplasm."

Oddly enough, when they even try to make a definition, they fall back on those long-dead philosophers you find so boring.

If its everywhere, it universal. Objects appear in my visual field as an instinctive act - without any intent of objectifying anything. It isnt cultural. It is biological. — Harry Hindu

No, it isn't. To say every human being has perceptions is more accurate, but to say what they perceive are "objects" -- a concept with a long history -- is to mistake the current (Western) worldview with a universal. The Greeks didn't view the world this way, nor did the Christians. That's not to say they didn't perceive things -- of course they did. But they did not refer to things as "objects" in the sense we mean. So to argue the subject/object distinction is universal is a mistake.

I dont understand why people still resort to pointing to long-dead philosophers claims as if they'd say the same thing knowing what we know today. That's not interesting. What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

Neuroscientists and biologists all have philosophical beliefs guiding their research, and often follow dead-end paths because of holding bogus ones.

To wonder why we study thinkers of the past is kind of ridiculous.

But I think that the fact that we can't differentiate "beings" from "things" actually conceals a very profound philosophical truth. A chair is not a being, but a cow is a being. When Heidegger talked of 'forgetfulness of being', was he talking about forgetting his car keys? — Wayfarer

Of course a chair is a being. Heidegger's talk about forgetfulness of being is not about beings, but that on the basis of which beings "show up" for us at all -- namely, "being" (some like to capitalize this, but I don't).

Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that? — Wayfarer

To say any being is not a being is meaningless. An object is a being. A chair is a being. That building is a being. That piece of sand, Bach's fugues, mineral baths, and a trombone. All beings. Literally everything in the world has being. As I said above, to reserve the term "being" for "sentient being" is an extremely narrow and specialized usage.

Although it may not be a conscious decision, all thought and action implicity assumes the subject-object distinction — TheMadFool

I doubt that very much. This conception is so prevalent in the west we take it as part of human nature, but there's no reason to assume it's universal.

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies. — Andrew M

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples.

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it? — Andrew M

Because while they may not themselves explicitly refer to the res cogitans or the res extensa, they both discuss knowledge and theory from the subject/object formulation.

I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of course. — Mww

Please rephrase. This makes no sense.

The reason this matters, is that habit cannot explain the first learning of what may eventually become habitual. Pure reason, on the other hand, has no problem with it. — Mww

I'm not sure "pure reason" really explains all habits either.

But in modern times, Popper and Kuhn are probably the main influences (and Positivism before that). — Andrew M

Popper and Kuhn are interesting, but themselves presuppose Descartes' ontology.

It's true I can see other people as 'objects' in a sense. But think about the implications of that. When you refer to other persons, you use personal pronouns. You don't treat them as objects, as 'it' - at least, I hope not! - because you implicitly recognise that they are subjects themselves, and not just objects to be picked up and put down. — Wayfarer

By "being" I'm not talking about "sentient beings." By "beings" I mean to include literally any entity or "thing" whatsoever. This is where the miscommunication is coming from.

Re Heidegger - I've only picked up bits and pieces. I am loath to study him in depth and detail. — Wayfarer

I can see why. But once you give him enough effort, it's very interesting.

No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. — Mww

I can tie my shoe via mere image without conscious thought because I already know all there is to know about tying shoes, that is, by habit. — Mww

These seem to contradict each other. What I thought you were talking about was habit, something in which the subject/object distinction (and even consciousness) often plays no role. That's not to reduce all of human behavior to habit, of course. Not sure how it's therefore the grounds for refuting Hume's thesis of human action by habit.

Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. — Wayfarer

You lost me here. Objects aren't beings?

The reference to Heidegger (who's fascinating to me) was very relevant indeed. I suggest "Being and Time" but more importantly, and too often ignored, his "Introduction to Metaphysics."

In a scenario where Alice sees Bob, Alice is the seeing subject and Bob is the seen object. — Andrew M

Yes, that's a linguistic distinction. That's not what I was getting at, as I feel I've made clear already.

A philosophical basis would have to be something substantive, non-trivial, something that is both consequential, and that could plausibly be constituted differently and have different consequences. — SophistiCat

Says who? That's a nice list, but you'll rarely find that to be the case in the sciences. The philosophical justifications that many modern scientists make (if pushed, at least in my experience) is from the philosophy of science of maybe 100 years ago or so.

I think Schopenhauer puts it best:

"Descartes was probably the first to attain the degree of reflection demanded by that fundamental truth [that the world is representation of a subject]; consequently, he made that truth the starting-point of his philosophy, although provisionally only in the form of skeptical doubt. By his taking cogito ergo sum as the only thing certain, and provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential and only correct starting-point, and at the same time the true point of support, of all philosophy was really found. This point, indeed, is essentially and of necessity the subjective, our own consciousness." World as Will and Representation Vol. II, p 4.

I think he's correct, and I think this idea -- as I said originally -- still dominates much of philosophy and science today, especially in epistemology.

This seems to be too thin for a philosophical basis. Can you elaborate? Not the specific meaning of "subject/object" (I think we have clarified that part), but how you think that forms the philosophical basis. — SophistiCat

Again, it seems to me that since Descartes epistemology has become predominant, the "problem of knowledge" -- how we know anything at all, what knowledge is, etc. This view of a conscious being (a subject) which takes in the "objective" world through means of sensibility (the "representations" of Kant) is an underlying assumption in modern science to this day. It barely gets questioned anymore, thus serving as a philosophical basis and a framework for understanding human knowledge, perception, and thus the universe.

The image of tying a shoe is much more the case than the thought, “I am tying my shoe”. — Mww

That's a very interesting point and, incredibly, often overlooked when discussing human action.

I think it’s a distinction without a difference. All subjects are objects. — NOS4A2

But not all objects are subjects it would seem, unless you attribute to rocks conscious awareness, which I doubt anyone would.

The idea as human beings being subjects and the world being the object is what I'm referencing here. That we're thinking things in the sense Descartes meant -- consciously aware beings, and since Kant subjects with object as "phenomenon" and representation. Schopenhauer discusses this at length as well, as one of the most basic principles of all knowledge.

It's hard to see things any other way, I realize...hence why I'm wondering about others' opinions.

In my analysis this marks the advent of the distinctively modern outlook, formed by the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which sought to sweep away all of the ambiguities and obscurities associated with metaphysics and view the world and its problems solely through the perspective of scientific rationalism. However as various critics of the Enlightenment have long since noted, this too embodies a kind of metaphysics, or rather, attempts to address many of the questions associated with metaphysics through the perspective of naturalism. — Wayfarer

Very true.

With reference to the OP, do you see the world in some other way? what other way would there be to see the world? — tim wood

What's "OP"? Original Post? Anyway, yes when I'm thinking about the world I think this distinction makes sense, and I see why it's been so powerful.

Or at least Ockham. — bongo fury

Hmm, really? That's interesting. Never read Ockham. Where does he touch on this?

The notion of subject/object is me thinking as subject in relation to the world as object, not the world as subject/object in itself, which is how I understood the question, re: “see the world that way”. — Mww

Very true. I meant it in the former way.

If I were to start over, I would start not with what's often called "philosophy" but with learning history, dwelling especially on the Greeks. Read Homer, learn the Greek language.

As far as texts -- start with Parmenides' poem and the fragments of the presocratics. Then Plato and Aristotle. Once you get to Plato and Aristotle, with a decent understanding of the Greek language and the general historical context, then everything else in Western history and philosophy has been basically determined, from the Christian thinkers to Descartes to Kant to Hegel.

Then I would start on the most relevant for modern times (in my view):

Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Chomsky.

If you want to study the subject, which is not necessarily the same as developing a personal philosophy, I strongly recommend studying it historically. Start with the pre-Socratics, then read forward - widely, synoptically and historically. Try and get a feel for the questions that were being grappled with and the historical circumstances in which they arose. Get a feeling for dialectic - that is one of the most elusive aspects of philosophy. Don’t neglect Plato. Find some question that nags at you, then try and find sources that seem to be dealing with the same questions. Learn to feel the questions, not simply verbalise them. — Wayfarer

This is excellent.

Ugh. Whatever.

You're boring me. Bye.

It would be well to recall that Einstein originally constructed his model of the universe out of nonverbal signs, 'of visual and some of muscular type.' As he wrote to a colleague in 1945: 'The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined.' Later, 'only in a secondary stage,' after long and hard labour to transmute his nonverbal construct into 'conventional words and other signs,' was he able to communicate it to others. — Galuchat

Certainly worth bearing in mind, yes.

The best exploration of the nature of a 'market' is Ludwig Von Mises's Human Action. — Virgo Avalytikh

Oh, and what exactly makes this the "best exploration"? According to who? You?

(You see how easy it is to play these philosophy games.)

For anyone who knows, is there a book in which Chomsky lays out his own political philosophy (since he very clearly has one) from the ground up, as it were?
— Virgo Avalytikh

It sounds as if the answer is 'No'. — Virgo Avalytikh

How the World Works, Understanding Power, American Power and the New Mandarins, Powers and Prospects, Who Rules the World?, Government in the Future, Because we Say So, etc. I skipped the recommendations and went straight for an answer to your question about principles, since I've read Chomsky widely. But nevertheless, here you go.

In any case, 'power' and 'justification' still have not been defined. Expressions of 'power' are indeed everywhere, which is why they are multivalent and don't admit of an easy, monolithic definition that unites them. I might be justified in pulling a child back from a busy road, but that still doesn't give a 'justification condition'. What precisely is the condition of justified coercion? Multiplying examples does not give us such a condition. — Virgo Avalytikh

They have been defined. It's quite true that there are no easy definitions that accounts for all situations, and in fact one can define a word anyway one likes. What's interesting is finding out why the notion is defined in this way in a larger theory and ask about the theory itself, whether it's sensible, etc. Regardless, if you knew that "power" -- in the same way as "truth" or "beauty" or anything else -- is multivalent, then why ask for a definition at all?

Also, to say "power is indeed everywhere" is already admitting there's something you believe to be "power," something that allows you to pick out those examples as examples of power.

I don't know what you mean by "justification condition." The point isn't to create a rule that one can follow in every situation. If that's what you're asking, then neither you nor I can provide it. You have to look to specific situations, not abstract fantasies. Chomsky excels, more than any living writer, in precisely that: the real world and the effects of policies on real people, all around the world. Worrying about "principles" and abstract philosophizing doesn't concern him much, it's true. That's not to say he doesn't have them or hasn't discussed them, but something like "the workplace should be democratized" and "structures of hierarchy and control aren't self-justifying" are clear enough formulations for what should be done.

The best exploration of the nature of a 'market' is Ludwig Von Mises's Human Action. A market is 'free' to the extent that it is not subject to invasion, and the best exploration of the nature of this invasion is Rothbard's Power and Market. For an application of Locke's classical liberalism to the ethical categories of libertarianism (e.g. property, aggression), see Ibid., The Ethics of Liberty. — Virgo Avalytikh

Still undefined. Sounds rather vague, as well. What is a "market"? Why should Von Misse's definition of "free market" be any more important than anyone else's? "Free market" is multivalent, after all. I recommend reading less of these "libertarians," but feel free to synopsize-- perhaps there's something interesting there. Personally I think the ideas thrown around over the years about "free markets" is pure fantasy; they've seemingly never existed except in libertarians' imaginations. In the real world, there's almost always strong state intervention in the economy.

I really don't think it's necessary to get quite this prickly. I have not attacked Chomsky. My query was just that - a query — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't see what was "prickly." The problem is that you've asked a question, received an answer, and then changed the question.
(1) You asked for principles, claiming you couldn't find any in Chomsky. I gave several.
(2) You then ask for "definitions," which I gave.
(3) Then you say they're not definitions because they don't account for all the data, that the terms are "multivalent." You ask for "axioms" and dismiss Chomsky as "informal" writing and not presenting his views "systematically" enough (which, it seems, only means "Not in the fashion of my favorite libertarian writers").
It's a little circular.

More importantly, I have also said, repeatedly, that I'll answer any specific question you have about Chomsky's political philosophy. You've failed to ask one. Instead you ask for books where he lays this out, which I gave (above). I assume you'll next say that those aren't good enough because they're not written in the style of Rothbard? But then all this has boiled down to is: "I don't think Chomsky is as clear as Rothbard et al." Which is fine -- but that's not really a "query" is it?

Of course I'm putting words in your mouth there, so maybe I'm wrong about the last part.

Yes, I'd be embarrassed too. Run along.

That's funny.

Being and nothingness are two poles of an opposition. — frank

Riveting analysis.

Make it interesting or I'll be sure you're an idiot. — frank

Well I'm already sure you are, just from that comment alone, so NO. End of discussion, and reported. How about this: read some Heidegger.

Not gibberish, just vague. Take 'power' for instance: 'power', like other foundational concepts in political philosophy, like liberty, rights, obligation, equality, etc., admit of numerous conceptions. They do not come pre-interpreted for us. — Virgo Avalytikh

Which is why I explained earlier what is meant in this context by power: structures of hierarchy and control. In any situation, from families to businesses. In the workplace (the most relevant here) you have bosses giving orders to people below them in rank, etc. You see people organized like this everywhere - in the church, in the military, in corporations, and so on.

You can claim it's all "vague" and play philosophical games with semantics, but it's not vague at all. Spending a little less time in the classroom or library, you'll see it all around you. You'll see it in academia as well. To claim these principles are "vague" is to claim anything is vague. Fine, we all know that's a move for philosophy students -- and not always a useless one. But in this case, my sense is you're not confused at all. You're just playing games.

And what of 'justification'? What, in principle, would or could constitute a 'justification' of a coercive institution? — Virgo Avalytikh

Chomsky often uses the example of his granddaughter running into the road. If he grabs her arm and pulls her back -- that's control, use of force, etc., but he could give a justification for its use. Hence why he's not a pacifist -- war can be justified. Although it's rare, it can be done. As far as coercive institutions -- you can invent all kinds of scenarios where they could be justified, although admittedly it almost never happens in the real world. There's a lot of pretense, of course, but we easily see through that. Going to war is a good example -- always some "justification" for it, usually pretty flimsy.

As for the claim that workers should own the companies in which they work, there is nothing axiomatic about this. — Virgo Avalytikh

You didn't ask for an axiom. The world is a complex place, and this isn't mathematics. You asked for various principles on which Chomsky bases his critiques and political philosophy. I've given some.

Political philosophy in general benefits greatly from being presented in a cumulative, systematic form, beginning from first principles and making plain the assumptions at work. — Virgo Avalytikh

And I gave you some principles. Must every thinker lay out his thoughts like the libertarian thinkers you happen to admire? Who says philosophy benefits greatly by laying it out in this way? Remember your original post:

But, among his (more than 100) books, I have yet to find one in which he lays out his political philosophy with clarity, reasoning his way up from first principles. — Virgo Avalytikh

And again I ask: what exactly are you looking for? You asked for principles, claiming Chomsky doesn't lay them out -- I've given them. Then you claim those principles are too vague and aren't "axioms." It appears all you're really saying is "anyone who doesn't lay out their political philosophy like my favorite political thinkers is unclear." Fine. But Chomsky isn't unclear to me, and I've both talked with him and read him widely.

The point is, right-libertarianism's opposition to the State and advocacy for the free market are logical derivations from its more fundamental opposition to aggression. 'Aggression' is not left as a vague banner behind which to rally, but is defined in terms of a system of property which is explored and defended at length, and which itself has a tradition going back to Locke. And this is not unique to the 'right': Marxist philosopher Gerry Cohen also manages to present himself in this way (he is far and away the best Marxist, precisely on account of his clarity). — Virgo Avalytikh

Vague. What is the "free market"? How can a "system of property" (vague) be "aggressive"? What in Locke are you referring to?

It seems exactly like another "banner behind which to rally," only for some reason you think it more axiomatic than "systems of power/authority/domination/control should be justified," which is kind of ridiculous considering the latter is a principle you yourself live by every day.

The issue is that Chomsky is not particularly persuasive, except to the already-convinced, and this is owing to the relative informality of his approach. — Virgo Avalytikh

I did not show up to Chomsky "already convinced," by any means. It took some effort to understand his thought, an effort which apparently you're unwilling to make.

Fine, let me qualify: for anyone who's actually read it and understands it, that's certainly not what it's about. Just the phrase "concept of being emerging" is ridiculous to anyone who's read Heidegger, since being is not a concept or a being or a word in the sense he's meaning it. Sure we can try talking about it, but it's an extremely complex thing to discuss.

And it certainly doesn't "emerge" from "dread of nothingness."

I did this to show that it is perhaps misleading to suggest that the reason we breath is to speak, and that to equate ‘language’ with some innate capacity is kind of leaning in this direction too - as there is no hard physical evidence for some ‘language module’ anymore than there is for some ‘conscious module’. — I like sushi

What's misleading is the near universal belief that language is for communication and evolved as such.

Also, no one is talking about a language module in your sense. If one can't talk about language as a separate (though obviously interactive) system of an organism, then let's also throw out study of vision, digestion, circulation, the nervous system, etc. -- after all, they're not completely separate from the rest of the body either. It's a trivial semantic digression you're making, without any motivation other than to apparently hear yourself talk.

I’m new to this myself. Would you use ‘thought’ instead of ‘intelligence’? I’m still trying to determine whether it’s true that ‘thoughts are "sentences in the head", meaning they take place within a mental language’. (Wikipedia.) — Brett

Let's separate "thought" from "language." Thought can happen without language is my belief, and there's good evidence for that. Thinking is not merely restricted to "sentences in the head." I've had colleagues argue that thinking and language are the same thing; I'm just not convinced of it.

There has been talk in decent times of "mentalese," for example. Which is interesting, but we know very little about it.

My belief is, language doesn't have a strictly scientific explanation. It's associated with intelligence, and I don't know if intelligence is something that can be understood through the evolutionary perspective; that once we become language-using, meaning-seeking beings, then we've escaped the gravitational pull of biology. — Wayfarer

Doesn't have a "strictly" scientific explanation? How are you defining "science"? Language is certainly amenable to analysis, scientific or otherwise. True, language could be magic -- but I don't see any reason for taking that route.

Have you read Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? All about the concept of being emerging from the dread of nothingness. It's awesome. — frank

That's not what it's about.

What I bemoaned was the lack of a work of systematic political philosophy in which the reader is led to anarcho-syndicalism from a set of first principles. I observed that neither Chomsky nor his heroes (Rocker, Proudhon, Bakunin) seem to have produced such a work. — Virgo Avalytikh

So the principle that power should be justified and the principle that workers who run the companies should own the companies is what, exactly? Gibberish? Seems very clear to me. The fact that he doesn't write in precisely the same way as the Austrian school is a merit, in my view. But even if you don't agree, what exactly are you asking for, specifically? As someone who has read Chomsky widely, I'd be happy to answer to the best of my ability.

If you want philosophical principles on which his anarchism itself is based, Chomsky discusses this too -- at length.

I didn't accuse you of being an enemy of Chomsky, but I am a bit skeptical about how much you've read- since so far what you've claimed he's lacking he's expressed consistently and clearly throughout his writings.

If you want it formatted differently - like in a list or something, fine. But that's hardly a fair criticism. Chomsky's principles and political philosophy can be understood despite not writing like Rothbard.

That sounds wonderful - the problem is that this is a statement which would also be endorsed by figures who arrive at radically different conclusions from Chomsky, figures who have written with far more clarity and systematicity. So much is left unsaid; hence why a systematic political programme would be welcome. — Virgo Avalytikh

You're moving the goalposts. You specifically mentioned his "principles." That's been given. Anyone who accepts this principle may arrive at different ways to implement it politically, but different conclusions? I don't think so - unless they're simply professing to believe in it. What "figures" who endorse this principle are you talking about specifically?

Chomsky has been both "clear" and "systematic" for 60 years. If you deign to read anything he's written, you'd quickly find that out.

As far as a "systematic political programme" -- this is meaningless, until it's explained what you mean by it. Chomsky has addressed specifically the idea that workers (of a factory or a business) who run the company should own the company. This has very specific and real-world applications which we could get into. As opposed to sophomoric academic political system-building which may be fun, but which are both easy and useless.

So much is left unsaid — Virgo Avalytikh

No. So much is left unread. By you.

No confusion here. — I like sushi

No, there's plenty of confusion - you just don't want to admit it. Go talk nonsense somewhere else.