Nietzsche saw nihilism in the West as the result of the "death" of God and a decadent culture. We've lost our instincts and haven't created a "single new god" in millennia. He is constantly going on about creating new values, in an attempt to overcome this nihilism.

Heidegger could have spared himself, and us, a bit of grief if he addressed one simple question. If there is such a thing as forgetfulness of Being, is there remembrance? If your take on his view of the Greeks is what he did believe of them, he's got them wrong. They, the Greeks, were far more down to earth than he gives them credit for. Their poetry might have been highfalutin, but they were not. I wonder what Aristophanes would make of Heidegger's seriosity? — Gary M Washburn

Remembrance of the question of being, yes. That's what he's trying to do: re-awaken that question, the question that's been forgotten.

To say Heidegger isn't "down to Earth" is kind of ridiculous. His entire analysis of the "worldhood of the world" emphasizes average everydayness and "ready-to-hand" activities like hammering and opening doors. As for the Greeks, he has quite a bit to say about their analysis of everyday practical activity, if you're interested in reading him.

Protected from the great powers around them by sea and geography, they were surrounded by cultures in which powerful rulers, or esoteric priests in the case of Judea and Egypt, who used the written word as an instrument of oppression. That is what writing was invented for. — Gary M Washburn

There's a lot of debate about why writing was invented. Many believe it was for accounting, etc., but it's not settled scholarship. To make declarative statements like "That is what writing was invented for" really makes me want to ignore you. No offense, just figured I'd give honest feedback. Let's not pretend to know things we don't know and give lectures on them.

That is, our incapacity for remembrancing Being is our way of needing each other free, and maybe even setting “Being” free, to grate upon the received terms of our minds and so refresh those terms and distinguish us from the tyranny of that receipt. And in that case, Heidegger is indeed wrong. Dead wrong! About us today, and about the Greeks. And about what “Being” is. — Gary M Washburn

You just don't know what you're talking about, I'm afraid. Please provide any textual evidence to back up these bizarre statements, because otherwise I have no idea what you're talking about.

Again, "Remembrance of being" refers to re-awakening the question of the meaning of being. The question has been forgotten -- we are no longer concerned with or it, we take it as self-evident, etc. Heidegger says over and over again that we all walk around with a "pre-ontological understanding of being," so it's not that there is something "out there" that we need to "remember." This is just a complete misreading if that's what jumps to mind. But, honestly, I think you're just uttering nonsense. I'm happy to be proven wrong -- but with sources.

Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity — W. J. Korab-Karpowicz, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This is excellent.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.
— Heidegger: B&T, #3

Trivial, blind and perverted is not "wrong"... according you. What means "wrong" to you?

In my opinion you are blind to the true meaning of Heidegger's work. You trivialize and pervert it. But don't worry. I am not saying that you are wrong... according you. — David Mo

Because "wrong," in this case, is meaningless if you mean in terms of accuracy or correctness. What would be "right"? The Greeks? Well we know that's not the case because, according to Heidegger, although they questioned being they were still very much within the realm of the "metaphysics of presence," which is the basis for the rest of Western philosophy. So if it's not about the questioning of being, it's about the interpretation of being -- so what's the "correct" interpretation? Since Descartes and Kant are "wrong," what's "right"? Heidegger's interpretation? Well, as we've discussed before, Heidegger does not offer an interpretation or definition of being.

So where are we left? Exactly where we were: (1) the questioning of being has become forgotten and concealed, and (2) the interpretation (or "meaning") of being has been taken for granted as something present-at-hand, as a particular kind of being ("substance," mainly). So the question of the meaning of being should be re-awakened and we should begin questioning again, rather than taking it as trivial or "self-evident." That's all. Nothing about "right" or "wrong," no negative assessments of Aristotle or Descartes. Plenty of wrong translations of Greek philosophical words (in Heidegger's view) like "phusis" as nature, "ousia" as substance, and "aletheia" as truth -- but that's all. In relation to the "original" meanings, how they were translated was inaccurate, incorrect -- "wrong."

This is why you won't find "wrong" in Heidegger regarding Western interpretations of being. It's why he explicitly says he does not mean anything negative like that.

I'll call attention yet again to how boring this conversation is. You truly have nothing left to say. But carry on...

No. He never once says anything about "inaccurate metaphysics" or that concealment is "wrong."
— Xtrix

"Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance" (ItM: 148/207) — David Mo

I'll say it a thousand times: his is in reference to translations (which he says at one point always includes intepretation). Heidegger is talking there about how the Greeks are interpreted in terms of substance ontology -- and that interpretation is false. What does this have to do with Western metaphysics being "wrong"? Notice he doesn't say substance ontology is "wrong," he says that interpreting the Greeks this way (retroactively) is falsifying what they "really" (according to him) believed.

Referring to translations of the Greeks. He's claiming their original way of seeing the world -- as phusis -- gets mistranslated and thus the original meaning gets falsified. So what?
— Xtrix
.

So what? You mean Heidegger didn't think the forgery was wrong? — David Mo

What forgery? Regardless, yes he thinks this interpretation of the Greeks is wrong.

Do you have a special problem with the word "wrong"? Otherwise your position seems incomprehensible to me. — David Mo

I do, yes. This whole line of discussion started with what I admitted was a bit of a nit-pick, but I stand by it still. The claim that "all of Western philosophy after the Greeks is wrong" or any such claim like that is just a misunderstanding of Heidegger. If that's not what you're saying, fine. If you're talking about translations and interpretations of the "original" Greek meanings, then yes Heidegger thinks they're just wrong. That's not the same thing.

I think I would start fighting if it came to a civil war type scenario. Say Trump refuses to leave office -- I think at that point we'd have to band together against the military. That's not too far fetched anymore.
— Xtrix

Of course it is. There's no way US military will fight against US citizens. Trump isn't popular worthy the military. — Benkei

I'm not so sure about that. But there's also militias to worry about. In any case, I'm hoping you're right.

Pretty interesting to watch
— Xtrix
And what will it take for you to do more than watch? I'm not suggesting there is something you should or could do, because I don't know what that would be, other than by voting. But what would it take? — tim wood

Good question. I don't just watch and vote. I try organizing people. Right now we have a 180 members in a local group here in New Hampshire, "Seacoast Progressives." I'm getting more involved with people running for state assembly, etc. I try to sign petitions and join protests when I can. My strong suit isn't in protests, however -- I hate them, but recognize their importance.

I think I would start fighting if it came to a civil war type scenario. Say Trump refuses to leave office -- I think at that point we'd have to band together against the military. That's not too far fetched anymore.

Oregon, being a gun friendly state that allows for open carry of firearms, I'm surprised no civilian there has decided to defend him- or herself with a gun from being kidnapped. To their credit, I suppose. — tim wood

Yeah, I think it's strategic. I think that's exactly what Trump wants.

Trump's getting desperate. Pretty interesting to watch this tinpot dictator try to turn our country into a police state just so he doesn't lose an election.

How do you can dissimulate the absolutely obvious expression "falsified from the bottom up"? — David Mo

Referring to translations of the Greeks. He's claiming their original way of seeing the world -- as phusis -- gets mistranslated and thus the original meaning gets falsified. So what?

Page 2 of Being and Time:

"Yet the question [of the meaning of being] we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become trivialized."

Also page 2:

"...a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect."

"In this way, that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method."

Does any of this sound like "all philosophers and metaphysics since the Greeks are wrong"? If so, you're wrong. Heidegger is uninterested in making claims about the truth or falsity of metaphysics since the Greeks. There have been many interpretations of Being, but today it's trivialized, concealed, and unquestioned. It's time to re-awaken that questioning, and in so doing perhaps find new interpretations.

If Heidegger ever once stated that Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, etc., were all "wrong," he'd be an absolute joke figure. Which is apparently what you would like to turn him into. But you'll not find it in the texts.

The meaning of words in Greek philosophy is not an academic issue for him. Inaccurate translations are a reflection of inaccurate metaphysics: the concealment of Being. To reveal means truth in Heidegger, concealment is wrong. — David Mo

No. He never once says anything about "inaccurate metaphysics" or that concealment is "wrong." That's your projection, and it's not in Heidegger. Not once.

The question of the meaning of being has been concealed and forgotten. That doesn't make Descartes, Kant, or Hegel "wrong." This is a childish way of looking at things. But go on arguing it if you must.

According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being.
— David Mo

What I was trying to explain is that Newton's theory is still valid in the terms that the theory is limited. That is, it is valid for concepts defined in the terms of Newtonian physics. Absolute space -independent of time and perspective- perfectly works in phenomenal objects. In this sense, it is still applied with constant success.

You pretended that it was the same case with the theories that are limited to talk about God, substance or other partial aspects of metaphysics, which according to you are valid "interpretations" of Being or partial aspects of it. I explained that for Heidegger this was not true. Theories about God, for example, are not different or partially valid interpretations, but wrong approaches without a correct comprehension of Being. Heidegger says textually that only a previous understanding of Being can lead to understanding of the sacred. Therefore, everything that is said about God outside a Heideggerian phenomenological perspective is invalid (inapplicable, if you want to say so). — David Mo

The analogy to Newton and Einstein was to demonstrate only that because A becomes the dominant theory does not always necessitate that B is "wrong." This is true for theories in science as it is for interpretations generally. Sometimes theories and interpretations certainly are simply wrong. But it's not always the case.

I brought that up in the context of your claiming that Heidegger is making some kind of negative judgment, which I don't see supported and in fact have quoted him directly saying he does NOT mean it this way. This was the only point, and a fairly trivial one.

There are many interpretations of being. Heidegger is not interested in proclaiming them "wrong" or "right." All he does is point out the interesting historical fact that there has been this series of interpretations, which are variations of the Greek interpretation of being as ousia, and that the "question of the meaning of being" has been forgotten and hidden, covered over as a question. He believes this question should be re-awakened.

That's all.

Of course, this is not compatible with your theory that all interpretation is valid. Heidegger never said such a thing. — David Mo

I never claimed that "all interpretation is valid." Not once. Nor has Heidegger.

The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely (ItM: 46/64)

Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance (ItM: 148/207)
"Misses its sense entirely"; “Falsified from the bottom up”. Is it not clear for you? What context can change the meaning of phrases expressed so strongly? — David Mo

Here again, as I've said before, Heidegger is talking about translations. When talking about translations, of course he believes that many are simply inaccurate. This is a matter of scholarship.

You claimed, however, that Heidegger thought that Western philosophy (including the Greeks) was wrong. Those are two very different things. Here's what you have said:

He considered that Western philosophy had overlooked, deformed, degenerated, etc. this question since the time of the Greeks. — David Mo

Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, — David Mo

According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics perverted the correct questioning of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greeks were right and western metaphysics was wrong. So much so that philosophy needs to start again, which does not happen until Heidegger arrives. Of course. — David Mo

Here is what Heidegger says:

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." — Xtrix

The question of being has been forgotten. The early Greeks (including Plato and Aristotle) still asked that question. It is not a negative judgment on Western metaphysics that it's become concealed.

So your above quotations are accurate, but they only mean that the original sense (or meaning) of various Greek words have been misinterpreted over the years.

It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden"
— Xtrix

I don't understand anything. The text above is by Heidegger? If so, it's misquoted. Quotes and reference are missing. — David Mo

No, I was just quoting my entire paragraph. It's not Heidegger, it's me. Hence why no references.

I don't understand either who talks about "the interpretation of ousia as substance is hidden". Is the interpretation hidden? That doesn't make much sense. Can you explain it better? — David Mo

You're the one that was making that claim, not me -- remember? Look:

The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix

This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. — David Mo

Now you're agreeing that it doesn't make much sense?

I think a lot of this could be avoided if you just quoted (or perhaps read) more fairly. The context matters.

I think this whole mess you're making is because you didn't understand my opening remark. I can explain it better, if you like. — David Mo

That very well could be, and I welcome you to.

There is no mystical "hidden". But we do hide from ourselves, and with good reason. Any claim of understanding Heidegger should be suspect. — Gary M Washburn

True, which is why I give plenty of textual evidence. This is what the thread is about. If I'm mistaken, I'm not seeing it. Maybe it's just me being daft, I don't know. I'm sure I'm not 100% on everything, but in understanding the general thesis I feel I have a pretty decent understanding, after a year of study.

The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix

This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. Your interpretation of Heidegger seems a little "autistic", if I may say so. I mean, you don't listen to the words of Heidegger himself. — David Mo

Your way of phrasing things is misleading.

Read the whole paragraph:

Also, "theory of Being" should be "interpretation of Being" in the above context. To talk about this interpretation not being understood without a "previous" interpretation (or theory) is nonsensical. The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being, it's interpreting Being -- on the background of the present moment (parousia) -- time -- which is indeed hidden as the horizon (or perspective) upon which Being is interpreted (in this case as "constantly present," later translated as "substance").

Emphasis mine. It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden" -- it is THE interpretation of the West, with different variations over 2500 years.

Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do.
— Xtrix

That's funny. — David Mo

Ok!

Sorry, but I really don't see the relevance of this. I have no idea what you're responding to.

You can praise yourself, but I don't think what you say is very "interesting" because it doesn't go to the heart of the matter.

The mistake that Heidegger blames on the metaphysical tradition is to err on the key question: Being. That's why he says it has to be "destroyed". Please read my previous comments. — David Mo

I have, and even if I were to agree with you that Heidegger is being negatively judgmental in some way in his analysis, it's hardly the "heart of the matter." In fact it has no real effect on his thesis. If he were as critical of Western metaphysics as Schopenhauer was of Hegel, it wouldn't prove anything. It's simply the only point left you feel competent enough to take a stand on, while ignoring the much more relevant issues -- namely, that it is from the standpoint of time (the present) that Being is interpreted from the beginning of philosophy to today. Whether this is "wrong" or "covered over" or "forgotten" really makes no difference. The question is: is this thesis accurate? Is it supported by historical and textual evidence?

Take it from the man himself (at 6:32):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcm05b8m6tQ&t=527s

"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." -- Heidegger

This is what I've been saying all along. The rest is your interpretation, and you're welcome to it. But it's so far from the main issues raised in Being & Time and the Introduction to Metaphysics, that to carry on about it already proves me point.

According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being. Western metaphysics was perverted because it hid Being under Substantialism.
On the other hand, the law of gravity can be understood without the general theory of relativity. Therefore, Newton could not degrade, nor err, nor hide a superior reality, as Thomas Aquinas or Descartes did. He worked correctly in the field of objects within his grasp. No one is going to destroy Newtonian physics. Scholasticism, on the other hand, must be destroyed as a system. — David Mo

Your reading of "destroyed" isn't accurate. I think someone on here already pointed that out to you.

Also, "theory of Being" should be "interpretation of Being" in the above context. To talk about this interpretation not being understood without a "previous" interpretation (or theory) is nonsensical. The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being, it's interpreting Being -- on the background of the present moment (parousia) -- time -- which is indeed hidden as the horizon (or perspective) upon which Being is interpreted (in this case as "constantly present," later translated as "substance").

Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do. Your ego isn't letting you see that, which is why you persist with irrelevancies at this point. This isn't a flaw in intelligence -- it's simply that I've dedicated more time in reading him. I can very easily admit that you probably understand many philosophers better than I do, and if I were interested I would want to learn about them collaboratively rather than defend some position on limited information. But that's me. You started with a real effort and some interesting questions, but now I'm afraid I'm rather bored with going in circles and repeating things I've already written.

More interesting lines of discussion (both ignored by you) that bears repeating:

Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."
— Xtrix
I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"?
— David Mo

That's a great question. There's plenty to talk about there. He has a lot to say in Being and Time about the "present-at-hand" relations to things in the world. This is the "mode" in which he believes nearly all philosophy has dwelled -- by seeing things as present before us, as substances or objects. This is the connection to the "time" part of the title -- that Being gets "interpreted" from the perspective of time. (Namely, the present.) — Xtrix

Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing.
— Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive.
— David Mo

Substance. Or God. Or nature. All interpretations of Being, and all restrictive in their interpretations.

Being itself isn't restricted to any class of entities.

Heidegger has an entire chapter on this, titled "The Restriction of Being." He goes through four of them: being and becoming, being and seeming, being and thinking, being and the ought. This is how being has been historically interpreted and "set apart" from something else. Being "and not", etc. — Xtrix

I have no way of knowing exactly what you're responding to here.

Let us pass to a specific context. We can analyze this text of Heidegger and you would have the opportunity to explain that Heidegger doesn't say that Western metaphysics is wrong ant that we shouldn't "destroy" it to regain the true way of Being. — David Mo

Notice he doesn't once say that Western metaphysics is "wrong." The question has been forgotten and concealed, and the "orignary" way the early Greeks thought about it has indeed been deformed and misinterpreted, etc. If we want to say that therefore Aristotle, Descartes, Suarez, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and even Heidegger's mentor Husserl are all "wrong," then we can -- but as I said from the very beginning, that's pretty misleading and, as you've now shown, not in Heidegger.

Plato was not a metaphysician or an ontologist. He was a dramatist. Scholars universally miss this. — Gary M Washburn

Plato was all of those things, and more.

To say he was merely a dramatist is at best an understatement.

Deteriorated, dogmatic, concealment, misinterpretation, deformation, to destroy our genuine relation to things.

These are Heidegger's words. — David Mo

And without context, just that -- words. As I mentioned, from my reading these statements are almost always made in reference to translations of words and how the question of "Being" has been lost. I'd go through each one, but it's really not that interesting. You're taking a stand on this one narrow issue because you apparently have nothing left to discuss.

Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing.
— Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive. — David Mo

Substance. Or God. Or nature. All interpretations of Being, and all restrictive in their interpretations.

Being itself isn't restricted to any class of entities.

Heidegger has an entire chapter on this, titled "The Restriction of Being." He goes through four of them: being and becoming, being and seeming, being and thinking, being and the ought. This is how being has been historically interpreted and "set apart" from something else. Being "and not", etc.

You think. Enough to share it. Therefore there is. For you at least. — Outlander

No, there isn't. There's plenty of things I believe are true. "Ultimate truth" is meaningless.

nor his general thinking the ultimate Truth.
— Xtrix

Do you feel it leads you toward it or away from it? Not much more you can ask for these days really. — Outlander

Neither -- because I don't think there is an "ultimate truth."

But Heidegger doesn't think of it as "perverted" or "wrong."
— Xtrix

What kind of question is this? — David Mo

It's not a question.

Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, — David Mo

"Falsity" in the sense of being concealed, covering-over, and forgetting.

The term "misinterpretation" applied to Western philosophy appears from the first pages (7/10) and throughout the work. — David Mo

"Applied to"...mainly in the context of how words are translated (and thus interpreted), yes.

Heidegger understands truth as aletheia. He describes it with various words that refer to a revelation or unveiling of the concealed. (Very poetic). Cf. Being and Time (223/265). That's what I'm talking about. I don't know what other sense you're talking about. — David Mo

No, that's correct. But if you know that, then how can you be interpreting "falsity" or "wrong" as anything other than a concealment and hiddenness?

But as I said before, I'll gladly capitulate: maybe Heidegger was "negative" about the Western tradition. He says repeatedly he does not mean to sound like he's making a condemnation, but regardless -- I'm not particularly interested in this line of discussion, as I said from the beginning I think it a fairly nit-picky type point. You've chosen to focus in on this point almost exclusively at this point. I think that itself is telling.

Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."
— Xtrix
I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"? — David Mo

That's a great question. There's plenty to talk about there. He has a lot to say in Being and Time about the "present-at-hand" relations to things in the world. This is the "mode" in which he believes nearly all philosophy has dwelled -- by seeing things as present before us, as substances or objects. This is the connection to the "time" part of the title -- that Being gets "interpreted" from the perspective of time. (Namely, the present.)

Heidegger is explicitly referring to the realm of that mysterious stuff called Being. At least it can be said that this Being is universal. He says so. He does not mention a restricted scope, — David Mo

Yes, but I didn't say that "Being" is restricted (it is indeed everything), but that the interpretation of Being certainly is. And that interpretation has been taken for granted for a long time. This is the entire thesis.

Heidegger is explicitly referring to the realm of that mysterious stuff called Being. — David Mo

Again, I don't think "realm" or "stuff" are appropriate here. Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing. What "is it" apart from any individual being? This is the question: the meaning of "Being." Heidegger wants to re-awaken that question.

Again, was Newton "wrong"?
— Xtrix
Newton was (and is) right within the scope of his theory. — David Mo

Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."

Then you go on to make a lot of assertions...

Nevertheless, Heidegger poses a question with a universal scope: Being. According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics perverted the correct questioning of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greeks were right and western metaphysics was wrong. — David Mo

No. The question has been forgotten, it's true. But Heidegger doesn't think of it as "perverted" or "wrong." He just doesn't. Your reading is just incorrect, I'm afraid. He will go on about how the interpretations have varied and how the "question of the meaning of being" has been concealed/forgotten or simply taken for granted.

So much so that philosophy needs to start again, which does not happen until Heidegger arrives. Of course. — David Mo

You keep insisting on painting a picture of Heidegger as having some kind of God-complex. I really don't see how this is justified from any reading of him. But yes, given the state of the world and the history (as he understands it) of Western thought, we should return to the questioning of the meaning of Being. This much he claims.

Hermeneutics, with Heidegger at the head, claims something confuse or contradictory: truth doesn't exist ("Truth is untruth", in Heidegger's words). They (you) don't say that absolute truth doesn't exist. This would be reasonable with some additional clarifications --I have done some above. They (you) claim an absolute truth against the truth. An absurdity. — David Mo

I claim none of those things.

The "truth is untruth" quote is, of course, a deliberately cheap thing to do. Of course it looks ridiculous without further explanation. I'm not interested in playing games like that, though. If you want to know what he means by that, I'd be happy to explain it -- or read it yourself, if you're interested.

If what you (or they) mean is that all truth fits within a scope, that is not denied by anyone outside the field of rationalist metaphysics. It is a rather trivial truth. But it does not prevent us from saying that, according to Heidegger's own words, the Greeks were right in the face of scholastic medieval metaphysics or Cartesian rationalism, for example. — David Mo

"Right" about what?

Of course, like every prophet, — David Mo

...

Heidegger changed his theory later because he wanted to and reserved the truth for poetry. — David Mo

What "truth"? In Heidegger, it means something very different.

Sorry to say, but this is once again sounding like something from a secondary source. The Cliffs Notes version of later Heidegger thought isn't of much interest to me.

Defend what point?
— Xtrix

There's an example up there. "It's either half empty or half full." Perfect hermeneutical relativism.To err in the wrong direction by degenerating the answers to the point of needing a "new beginning" is to be half right. — David Mo

"Hermeneutical relativism" is a redundancy. We're talking about interpretation. Interpretation presupposes a point of view, of course. So a kind of "relativism" is already implied in the word -- it's relative to a perspective. It doesn't mean that truth is relative. I gave the simple example of the glass simply to demonstrate that just because an interpretation, or description, doesn't account for all the data doesn't make it "wrong."

Again, was Newton "wrong"?

But this isn't very interesting -- if you want to use "right" and "wrong" in describing the history of philosophy, I won't object any further. As I said, it's a bit of a nit-pick. But it's of tertiary importance.

But you've given no indication here that you've read one word of Heidegger. If you're in the "ignore the man because he was a Nazi" group -- that's fine. Then why come here at all?

If Heidegger is doing anything he's pointing out that there has been something overlooked
— Xtrix

It is evident that we speak different languages. According to Heidegger there is an essential question: What is being? He dedicated several books and many lectures to it. He considered that Western philosophy had overlooked, deformed, degenerated, etc. this question since the time of the Greeks. If overlooking, deforming and degenerating a main subject is not to be wrong, what does it mean to be wrong for you? I'm afraid you speak a language that I don't know. And it's not English. — David Mo

Because it'd be like saying that if one states "the glass is half empty," it's "wrong." It's not wrong -- it's just as true as the opposite. There are various ways of interpreting things. Our way, in the West, is to interpret being in terms of time. This is the "metaphysics of presence." It's gone through various adaptations for 2,500 years. That's the thesis.

Again, if you want to say that this all amounts to Western thinking since 500 B.C being "wrong," you're welcome to. But it's not in Heidegger. Forgetting, overlooking, concealing, and taking for granted have very different connotations -- in English.

Well I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence, but I'm not advocating for irrationalism or mysticism if that's what you're hinting at.
— Xtrix

Irrationalism or extreme relativism, which is the same thing. You refuse to defend your point because "there are many theories", "I don't know what Being is", etc. — David Mo

Defend what point?

If after this quotation you continue affirming that for Heidegger Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Greeks who were in this line were not right, it is that we do not understand the same for "being right". — David Mo

Exactly. It's not that Hegel, or Kant, or Descartes, or Augustine, or Greeks (presocratic or not) were wrong. Likewise, science isn't "wrong" either -- if Heidegger ever claimed that he'd be laughed out of the room, rightfully. If Heidegger is doing anything he's pointing out that there has been something overlooked (and then not even questioned) in our tradition. If we want to say that this is the same as not being "right," I think that's a little misleading. I don't think Heidegger would be that presumptuous, and is why he almost always speaks highly of these thinkers.

I will continue with the rest of your commentary when I have time to read it. — David Mo

Your first two paragraphs have a lot to talk about. You'll allow me to stand on them. — David Mo

Very true, and please do.

You define the method of interpretation as going anywhere in any way. That's very Heideggerian, but it doesn't work for me. The act of knowing is supposed to be reasonably shared, but if all is fair the result can be chaos and confrontations can take us anywhere. I don't think you're serious about this. — David Mo

Well I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence, but I'm not advocating for irrationalism or mysticism if that's what you're hinting at. But if you could elaborate I'd rather wait until I respond to something I don't fully understand yet.

The proof that you don't seriously mean it is that in the next paragraph you put "apart from the interpretation". But here too you are remarkably confusing. From what you write next I get nothing. That Being is neither this nor that. The conclusion does not seem to be very conclusive, truth be told. Besides, how do you arrive at the question of what Being really is apart from the interpretation? Is there any other method that you have not told us about? I hope it would be more precise that interpretation. — David Mo

I don't think I've fully understood you here, either. But as for the first question: I don't think there is an answer to what Being really is. There are plenty of interpretations and tacit assumptions, etc., but nothing I can define, measure, or formalize with confidence -- far more brilliant minds than mine have done so, and I'd simply defer to their interpretations, which is not very interesting.

As far as the self goes -- I have thoughts on the self, but what's the connection to Heidegger?.
— Xtrix
Nothing. I think I explained that. It's a dirty trick of the word processor program of auto-correction. It has a mania for change "Being" for "Self". Also "pressence" for "pressure". Although I correct its mistakes, sometimes I miss one. I should take out the auto-corrector, but sometimes it comes in handy. — David Mo

Right, that's partly my fault, I completely forgot.

I don't see Heidegger necessarily thinking Parmenides or Heraclitus somehow got it "right"
— Xtrix

There are many Heidegger's passages on the capital importance of correctly understand the "concealed" message of Greeks. An example:
Once again, we will rely on the two definitive thinkers Parmenides and Heraclitus, and we will try once again to find entry into the Greek world, whose basic traits, though distorted and repressed, displaced and covered up, still sustain our own world.
— Heidegger: Int to Meta, p. 96/132
I think it is impossible to understand Heidegger without his personal version of them. However, it is possible to discuss Heidegger's philosophy without Heraclitus and Parmenides if someone wants to defend him. I am not sure you want to do so. — David Mo

But that's all different from saying they're "right," remember. He does indeed think their thinking has been concealed and covered over, etc. But as I said, from my reading anyway (and I can give you references if you'd like), I see him as saying they're both still part of the "metaphysics of presence" -- they're still presencing. This is why Being has been interpreted this way from then onwards, and why it "had to be" -- because the seed was already there at the beginning. So in Plato and Aristotle Being becomes Idea and Ousia, respectively, as the Romans and Christians it becomes substance and God, and through Descartes as the res, also a substance. "Being" then becomes a mistake, a vapor, an error, empty, meaningless, etc., and the question of its meaning becomes completely forgotten, ignored, or dismissed as senseless.

This is the point in history where Heidegger comes in, in the 1910s, inspired by "phenomenology." During a time in history where technology was advancing exponentially, physics and chemistry were being transformed, and mathematics was undergoing a "crisis" of foundations. It's a time when Russell and "analytic philosophy" was emerging and mathematics was attempted to be "reduced" to logic. A lot of influence from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche too. Worth keeping all this in mind when reading him, of course.

So you have it exactly right -- I'm only challenging the idea that Heidegger judges Parmenides and Heraclitus as "right" per se. He no doubt has the highest respect for both thinkers (and Anaximander) and, as you rightly quoted, believes their thinking was the inception of philosophy and still "sustains" our own world today.

What Being means to you? Why is it so important? — David Mo

I think it means what we want it to mean -- how we interpret it. I think history bears this out, in fact, in terms of the history of ontology. Here it's "substance," there it's "idea," or it's "god," it's "energy," it's "will," it's perhaps the "thing in itself," it's rationality, it's "nature," etc etc etc. It corresponds with the meaning of being human, too -- which is most important and a crucial point in Heidegger (and why he bothers with the question at all, in the end).

What "is" being apart from our interpreting it? Well, it's not a "thing" (a being) at all, or an object at all. That's why the confusing statement that "Being is not a being." Is it a kind of "nothing," then? Sure, but even the idea of "nothing" is something. Nihilism is a big problem, and here he agrees with Nietzsche -- but it permeates this part of the modern age. We're technological/nihilist. A way to get beyond this is to confront Nothing and Being.

This is all very anxiety-provoking in the modern age. It feels groundless. But as Heidegger says, if we don't "flee" from it, we can achieve a kind of liberation (like the Buddhists often talk about), and that can transform our way of being/living. By accepting the groundlessness of life, you don't have to "grasp" a hold of something as the "ultimate truth" or the ground of all being, etc. This is needed now more than ever, because we as humanity are killing ourselves, heading right for destruction (this is in the nuclear age, even prior to climate change).

Now is this itself an interpretation of "being"? Not that I see -- because it's not a definition of "it." It's simply an acknowledgment that we as human beings question and interpret things. We're "ontological," in the sense of questioning being and beings, and "hermeneutical" in the sense of interpretation. Since at heart we're historical/temporal beings, it is from the standard of time that we interpret or question anything at all, including "being" itself. Let me digress a bit to fill this out before you respond...

Most of us, most of the time, are not doing ontology or thinking philosophically or scientifically, or even "abstractly." Once we see that -- which we all agree is true, I think, and only need to examine ourselves in our "average everydayness" (as Heidegger puts it) to remember it -- then we see that what we DO (most of the time) in this everydayness gives us plenty of clues as to what our "pre-theoretical" (assumed, tacitly held) understanding of life, being human, and Being generally, is.

There's a whole story there, too -- about the "world" and our "Being-in-the-world." Turns out by looking at what we do for the most part (when not being theoretical or "the rational animal"), using Heidegger's analysis and terminology -- that what we are, as the entities that ask about being and have an understanding of being, is "care" (Sorge).

We're caring beings acting in the world towards goals, projecting out into the future towards which we go, anticipating, moving towards something now for the sake of something later (a tacit plan or goal). Crude example: if we're hammering, we're doing so as part of a whole totality of other beings and equipment which only make sense in the context of house-building, which only makes sense in terms of the human need for shelter, etc.

That's only a rough sketch of his ideas. I only digress here a bit to round out the picture a little, because if you dwell on any one aspect of his philosophy it can look insane (especially when approaching it from, as example only, more of an analytic point of view -- which is far more clear and precise), so it's good to give a cartoon-like overview.

Turns out, of course, that our average everydayness, which is not theoretical, and which represents "care," -- turns out that this is really "time" in the sense of lived time or existential time. It's on the basis of this meaning of time that "world time" (clocks, calandras, a series of "nows", etc) is derived, through measurement and counting.

Heidegger calls this lived time "temporality."

One thing I like about Mr. Heidegger is his simple examples to illustrate all of this -- liking hammering, or turning a doorknob, or being a professor and lecturing. We could use driving or any often skill or activity to demonstrate what he's getting at too. Turns out that these obvious things, in his hands, undermine 2,500 years of tradition. That's a big claim to make. So why?

Because he will claim that temporality (the caring being-in-th-world that is a 'there' [dasein], which we see in these average behaviors) is essentially how a human being interprets anything at all and, therefore, includes the activity of philosophy and science. How does this undermine the tradition?

Because this has been overlooked and concealed. Because he will claim that since the dawn of philosophy in Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, Western thinking (philosophy) has been dominated by one aspect of lived-time (temporality): the present. Hence we interpret Being and TIME ITSELF from the perspective of the present, as something "present-at-hand" (the permanent, an enduring prototype, substance, an object that persists, a particular entity). If we're staggering in history, we're staggering in part for this reason. So a new perspective should be opened up in which we can interpret ourselves. Later Heidegger says it's the poets and artists that can lead the way on this. Kind of ironic.

I hope this makes sense. I realize on first glance it sounds like a lot of confused, jumbled bullshit. Please know I'm quite aware of that and am thus always reluctant to give condensed accounts like this -- always also with the awareness that this is only one reading of Heidegger, which he himself may have thought was completely wrong. But I feel it's only fair to give my own synopsis, given your (difficult) question. Quoting Heidegger all day would be more time-consuming and a bit of a cop out.

My own personal view is that turning to the Eastern tradition is an important move in the right direction. Bringing back a sense of the "divine" in life (not supernatural), perhaps like the Hindu or Greek-religious interpretation, would be a good thing for humanity right now. When it comes to ideas of this sort, I'm much more in agreement with Nietzsche and much more drawn to Marx, Chomsky, and Wolf -- who I think are on the right track in emphasizing politics and economics.

Cheers.

I also appreciate your efforts to answer my questions, even when I feel they are not correct or as inextricably confused as Heidegger himself.
I also appreciate your recognition that Heidegger is not "always clear". I would say that he is almost always confused. But I am predisposed to give the benefit of the doubt and to think that this confusion is not a deliberate device to leave the door open to a possible retreat, but the result of a basic misguided approach to metaphysical pseudo-problems. — David Mo

Fair enough.

o confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought,
— Xtrix

You're getting lost here. Why is Heidegger making this long journey to the Greeks' vision of Being? — David Mo

Because he argues it's the Greek way of interpreting Being (I'm using capitalization now simply for clarity) that determines all other interpretations in the West, down to the present age. He says this many times. He will say that it starts with phusis and ends with ousia in the Greek era. He will then go on to say that ousia (translated as "substance") is an interpretation from the perspective of time, namely the present. Hence the "metaphysics of presence" as the history of Western philosophy. This is one major part of Being and Time and the Intro to Metaphysics -- the "historical" part, or the "deconstruction" part (which was never written for Being and Time but which does should up in other works).

In general Heidegger thinks that the Greek philosophy - Parmenides and Heraclitus especially - was in the right direction and only with "lanitinization" Western philosophy lost its way. — David Mo

There's debate in Heidegger scholarship about this, but from my reading I don't see Heidegger necessarily thinking Parmenides or Heraclitus somehow got it "right" while Plato and Aristotle didn't. True, their thought was prior to the almost immediate disjoining of "being" from "becoming"/"seeming" -- but they both were still very much within the Western tradition of interpreting being from the perspective of time as "presence." They were "presencing" as well. He will say that this is the inception, and the inception ends (in greatness) with Plato and Aristotle.

Regardless, I'm not seeing the relevance in bringing Parmenides or Heraclitus in to the discussion at this point. Remember, what set this digression off was the following:

The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth. — David Mo

Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. — David Mo

Based on my study of Heidegger, I can easily see what he's describing here is not his view at all, even without referencing the book in this case, but from the quotation itself one might believe it. — Xtrix

He'll then go on to discuss the history of being, from the Greeks onward, and conclude that being has been interpreted as "constant presence, on as ousia." (p. 216) To confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought, it's precisely what he's trying to un-do by pointing out that time (temporality) is the perspective that guides the Western way of interpreting Being (as presence). — Xtrix

So again, what you quoted is not Heidegger's position -- he's describing what has been thought. There's no way he himself is claiming that "being" is "substance." He wants to get outside this interpretation, in fact.

As far as I know, there are three forms of knowledge: rational discursive, empirical -- also known as empirical intuition -- and intuitive. It is obvious that Heidegger's "pre-ontological" knowledge of Being matches the third type. — David Mo

That's fine -- if we want to describe it as a kind of "intuition," I don't have anything against it, as long as we remember it's not what Heidegger says and has potentially some rather problematic connotations. So call it the "intuition of being" if you'd like, as long as what we mean is a pre-theoretical understanding I think that's safe enough.

In particular, this path is especially marked at the end of this chapter: The "horizon" of Being was "pointing our understanding" on the path of "presence and subsistence". It is not necessary for him to write the word, although he does: "substance". This is exactly what pressure and subsistence mean.

Strong arguments are needed to change this conclusion. I do not see them. — David Mo

Well don't take my word for it, just keep reading. I'm pretty confident on this point, and it's all over his writing: he does not believe "being" is a substance. His entire philosophy wouldn't make the slightest it of sense if he did, in the same way it wouldn't if he suddenly described the world in Cartesian terms. So really, strong arguments need to be made to the contrary -- and so far you've quote one sentence which, as I've said, you're mistakingly (but understandably) attributing to Heidegger himself. I gave a rather lengthy explanation and quotation in my last post, as well.

Your example does not add any clarification. Babies and animals have no "definite" knowledge of the causes. They are simply conditioned to respond to certain stimuli with certain behaviours. Something like a pre-concept of cause slowly makes its way into children's minds through a repeated process of generalising responses. We have to wait for the formation of abstract language to talk about a "definite" knowledge of the concept of cause that is accompanied by a defined understanding of the word "cause". Dissociating one thing from the other is impossible. — David Mo

I didn't say it was a "definite" knowledge, though -- just that it was present. Again, use "intuitive" understanding of causality, if you'd prefer. It's exactly not abstract, linguistic, or theoretical -- yet still there. That's the point.

I think your effort to personally interpret Heidegger is most interesting assuming you are willing to defend Heidegger's theory of Being. In this assumption I would ask you what the Self means to you. Why is it so important? — David Mo

But I don't think Heidegger does have a theory of Being.

As far as the self goes -- I have thoughts on the self, but what's the connection to Heidegger? As far as I know he doesn't talk very much about it.

Good questions: because those are all interpretations of being.
— Xtrix

And poor Heidi adds nothing - yeah, he's interpreting it too, don't believe his hype - that either improves upon or invalidates these other 'ontologies'; that there are so many (much more than I'd care to list) both within the European philosphical tradition and other traditions, makes it clear that the "forgetting of being" is only, or mostly, a parochial Wilhelmina anomaly which, no doubt, the Nazi movement under the spiritual guidance of the good Herr Rektorführer was "called by destiny" to remind das Herrendasein, das Man und andere Üntermenschen that  “das Nichts nichtet". :eyes: — 180 Proof

He's not interpreting being, no.

As far as improving upon or invalidating other interpretations -- I think he contributes a great deal to understanding the history of the interpretation of being, and it's important to our current age.

The rest of this paragraph is pretty jumbled -- I don't know if you're deliberately trying to be unclear, or why all the strange references ("Wilhelmina anomaly"?), but what do you mean by "there are so many (much more than I'd care to list)"? So many ontologies?

If that's what you meant, then in his view, there have been several: the Greek interpretation/ontology, the Roman variation, the Christian variation, and the modern (Cartesian) variation. We're standing now, he'd argue, in a technological/nihilistic understanding of being. But in my reading, he's never dogmatic about a set number. Perhaps there are indeed "so many" (and I'd encourage you to give at least a few examples) interpretations, that doesn't really impact his thinking.

Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being?
— Xtrix

How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such, as trees—how are we supposed to be able even to look for such things as trees, unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance? (…) Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what "tree" means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being.
— Martin Heidegger: Introduction ot Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 84

It is obvious that the postulation of a special Being whose meaning does not depend on particular entities forces Heidegger to invent an extra rational knowledge that I have called "intuition" to make it intelligible. To speak of "pre-ontological", as Heidegger does, seems to me to introduce an unnecessary neologism for what classical philosophy defined as what is neither empirical nor discursive: intellectual intuition. — David Mo

If we want to equate "pre-ontological understanding of being" to "knowledge" or "intuition," that's very misleading -- in Heidegger's context. Which his why he doesn't use either term.

The quote you gave was part of the chapter "The Question of the Essence of Being," which is worth keeping in mind, and was used as an example of Being's uniqueness, in that it is implied in any particular being whatsoever. In the same way that "treeness" is understood before we look at individual trees, so being is understood before we look at any particular being. He'll go on to say that the analogy is limited:

"Consequently, it remains questionable whether an individual being can ever count as an example of Being at all, as this oak does for 'tree in general.' It is questionable whether the ways of Being (Being as nature, Being as history) represent 'species' of the genus 'Being.'" (IM, p. 85)

So to read into all this that Heidegger is advocating a kind of Platonism is just wrong. There is no "independent knowledge," as you claimed -- being is simply understood when referring to any entity. The last sentence of your quote captures it. It's a very simple point, really. Basically a truism dressed up. That's on Heidegger, though, and his confusing circuitousness.

Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language.
— Xtrix

The word "Being" is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. "Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely indefinite. According to the usual logic, we have here an obvious contradiction.
— Heidegger, Op. Cit., p. 82

Therefore, there is a special knowledge ("pre-ontological") that goes beyond the individual entities.
This means opposing the empirical to the irrational intuitive which is becoming more and more complicated. Because if Heidegger recognizes here a logical contradiction he does not have any other choice but to impugn the own logic, which he does in another part of the book. He has already challenged philology and the history of philosophy. Now logic and experience fall. Open field for irrationalism. — David Mo

Let's be clear about what's being said, which I believe you're overthinking: being is "indefinite" in that we can't define it, but yet we "understand" it -- why? In the same way we understand "tree" beforehand, only in this case (re: Being) without any definition. To put it another way: the being of any object or entity whatsoever is presupposed or implied when talking about anything at all: Bach's fugues, mineral baths, rocks, trees, people, suntan lotion, justice, anger, cars, etc. But yet when we ask about "Being" in general, we can't give an answer. This is what makes it unique, and quite different from trees (or dogs, or any other entity). From page 85:

"The word 'Being' is a universal name, it is true, and seemingly one word among others. But this seeming is deceptive. The name and what it names are one of a kind. Therefore, we distort it fundamentally if we try to illustrate it by examples--presicely because every example in this case manifests not too much, as one might say, but always too little. Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what 'tree' means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being. The necessity for us already to understand the word 'Being' is the highest and is incomparable. So the 'universality' of 'Being' in regard to all beings does not imply that we should turn away from this universality as fast as possible and turn to the particular; instead, it implies the opposite, that we should remain there, and raise the uniqueness of this name and its naming to the level of knowledge."

There's nothing irrational about this. It only appears to be contradictory. He will go on to say, in fact, that "Being" has indeed been interpreted -- as ousia, at the end of Greek philosophy.

"Being, from which we set out as an empty label, must therefore have a definite meaning, contrary to this semblance of emptiness." (p. 216)

Also: babies and animals have an innate sense of causality. Is that entering the realm of the "irrational intuitive"? Just because something cannot be defined, or is held tacitly, doesn't necessarily mean it's irrational. If we choose to define it this way, fine -- but in that case, nearly everything we do is irrational. So it goes with any pre-theoretical understanding of being as well, by definition. But that doesn't progress the conversation at all.

"Suppose that there were no indeterminate meaning of Being, and that we did not understand what this meaning signifies. Then what? Would there just be one noun and one verb less in our language? No. Then there would be no language at all." (86)

In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will,"
— Xtrix
... he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger.
— Xtrix

I would say that the problem is not only with Heidegger, but also with you (so much love gets contagious). You cannot deny that Heidegger speaks of Being as " something " and say at the same time that it implies the designation of " something ". — David Mo

That's precisely what I'm denying, because there's no evidence of it and, in fact, quite the contrary: he emphatically states, over and over again, that Being is not a being. Being has certainly been interpreted throughout the ages, explicitly (substance, God, energy, will, etc), but that has nothing to do with Heidegger -- he offers no interpretation whatsoever. His goal is to reawaken the question and to describe the history of how its been interpreted -- which he could be completely wrong about, it's true, but let's first be clear about what he's doing.

In fact, Heidegger is forced to adopt a substantialist language to define Being. But as he had said before that it was "ineffable" he now has to camouflage it as a "common horizon" to all the diverse meanings of being (this is just what meaning is):

The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth.
— Op. Cit., p. 96

Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. — David Mo

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and say you've misunderstood this, rather than accuse you of deliberately taking it out of context. Based on my study of Heidegger, I can easily see what he's describing here is not his view at all, even without referencing the book in this case, but from the quotation itself one might believe it. So let me quote in full:

"However, a definite, unitary trait runs through all these meanings. It points our understanding of 'to be' toward a definite horizon by which the understanding is fulfilled. The boundary drawn around the sense of 'Being' stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth.
This all points in the direction of what we ran into when we first characterized the Greek experience and interpretation of Being. If we follow the usual explication of the infinitive, then the expression 'to be' gets its sense from the unity and definiteness of the horizon that guides our understanding. IN short, we thus understand the verbatim noun 'Being' on the basis of the infinitive, which in turn remains linked to the 'is' and to the manifoldness we have pointed out in this 'is.'
[...]
Accordingly, 'Being' has the meaning we have indicated, which recalls the Greek conception of the essence of Being -- a definiteness, then, which has not come to us from just anywhere, but which has long ruled our historical Dasein. At one blow, our search for the definiteness of the meaning of the word 'Being' thus becomes explicitly what it is: a meditation on the provenance of our concealed history."

He'll then go on to discuss the history of being, from the Greeks onward, and conclude that being has been interpreted as "constant presence, on as ousia." (p. 216) To confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought, it's precisely what he's trying to un-do by pointing out that time (temporality) is the perspective that guides the Western way of interpreting Being (as presence).

And from contradiction to contradiction this Being is becoming more and more like God: ineffable, an entity different from the entities but by which the entities are what they are, the object of an intuitive knowledge and the end to which all things must tend. Without God, I mean without Being, even nations sink into the darkest decadence. And, of course, this Being also has his prophet: Heidegger. — David Mo

God is one interpretation of being, yes. That's Anselm, Spinoza (in my understanding), etc. Call it "Christian ontology," as Heidegger does in various places in his writings. But you'll never hear him say Being is anything like a "supreme Being," which the capitalization itself may indicate -- and which we discussed before.

You affirm, with Heidegger, that the concept of being has a meaning ("horizon", he says) only that you assimilate to the existence. Heidegger, who never wants to be clear, adds to the existence ( presence ) the substance. — David Mo

This is only barely coherent to me, but as I mentioned above, Heidegger does discuss the history of the interpretation of Being as substance and presence. This is not, however, his position. "Horizon" is used to refer to time, not as a "meaning" of being. He will argue that time is the "horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being" (Being and Time, p. 1) -- but that's quite different.

Lastly, I appreciate the time you've taken to actually read Introduction to Metaphysics and your take on it. In case there's any doubt, I do respect your views. I happen to disagree with you in this case, but your observations are not so easily dismissed -- I did have to take some time to think about them in some cases, and even go back to the text itself. That's worth pointing out.

Cheers.

I've read this, and it's rife with confusion. I'll respond in detail when I have time.

My understanding is that being reveals itself to us (according to Heidegger), while there is nothing to be revealed for a Buddhist — Gregory

Well beings reveal themselves, anyway. Buddhists certainly "believe" that there are beings (or phenomena).

Where can I get those lectures? — Gregory

Online or at your library. Some are PDF, but I haven't searched -- I have the book itself. There were others, but the one I have is "Hegel's phenomenology of spirit."

The essence of Buddhist philosophy of nature is that everything is completely impermanent. These Buddhist thinkers say there is nothing underlying every thing. The principle at the bottom of the universe is that A causes B, B causes C, and C causes A. So a circle. This takes the bottom out of the universe. I'm wondering how far Heidegger would agree with considering that he thinks Being is real — Gregory

I myself see a number of parallels to Buddhism and Daoism in Heidegger. But when you say he thinkers Being is "real," I'm not sure what you mean. He has a lot to say about the concept of "reality" in Being and Time, in fact. It's true that a core principle in Buddhist philosophy is the concept of anicca[/i (Pali), impermanence, but I don't see how this is rejecting "reality" while Heidegger is somehow accepting it.

Hegel posits nothing and being as the abstract form of the Idea which sublate each other into the world, which is pure becoming (Shunyata). I am very interested in reconciling Buddhism, Hegel, and Heidegger — Gregory

Heidegger has much respect for Hegel and published a great deal of lectures on him. He sees has as the end of the Western tradition from the inside. Nietzsche marks the end of it completely (although Heidegger will argue his "eternal recurrence" is simply his interpretation of 'being').

If we're to reconcile them, I think Heidegger would agree with the Buddhists (and Daoists) that we need to "get in touch" with our being again. Buddhists will do so through the practice of meditation (vipassana), while Heidegger wants to "reawaken the question of being" approached as a thinker. He sees this as necessary to creat a new interpretation of being, since our current interpretation (which has its roots with the Greeks) as resulted in nihilism (here he agrees with Nietzsche) and has been completely forgotten.

As far as Hegel goes -- Heidegger is certainly historical and likewise interested in the presocratics. Where Hegel's dialectic fits in with Heidegger, or his ideas of Being and Nothing, I don't feel confident enough to comment on -- I'm only in the beginning stages of reading Hegel, and I can't from memory recall much of what Heidegger says about him, unfortunately.

So Heidi says. — 180 Proof

Yes, with reasoning and evidence which is quite convincing, at least to me.

"'Being' fundamentally means presence."
"Presence" of ???

Perhaps it's my stumbling-block too, Xtrix, like Heidi's references to "what is" - what is ??? — 180 Proof

The presence of whatever is before us, whether numbers or trees. Whatever persists (or "holds sway"). To say "presence of" you may be implying a subject/object distinction, but I'm not sure -- if that's the case, perhaps that's the stumbling block. It was for me as well. It's just hard not to think of any phenomenon as an object or representation for a "subject" or a "thinking thing" (res cogitans). This is why he emphasizes "being and thinking" as the fundamental way we "relate to" and thus "interpret" being:

"The entire Western tradition and conception of Being, and accordingly the fundamental relation to Being that is still dominant today, is summed up in the title Being and thinking." - p. 220 (Intro to Metaphysics)

BTW, I'm well aware of how Heidegger looks from the outside. I'm sure it must appear like Zizek or Derrida appear to me. I'd be very skeptical as well, especially if you peruse their "work." All I can say is that, for me, once I took the time (over a year) to do a careful study of his thought, the more and more I've learned and the more convinced I am that he has a very simple (when boiled down), but very deep, analysis of history, of time, and of our interpretation and relation to "being" itself. I've found it very useful indeed -- though not in the same way as studying physics, mathematics, biology, economics, or world history. But he's not intending to shed direct light on any of those subjects anyway.

However, if this read of him uncharitably misses the mark, why didn't he just come right out and say, paraphrasing Laozi's nameless dao and Buddha's anatta-anicca, or Schopenhauer's noumenon (à la natura naturans), that "the meaning of Being" is ... Bergson's la durée? Why the (crypto-augustinian re: "time") mystery-mongerer's career? All that rambling, oracular, mystagogy just buried the lead, as they say, making it easier for everyone (even old Marty at the end mumbling, bumbling & stumbling through 'das Geviert') to lose the plot. — 180 Proof

Good questions: because those are all interpretations of being. The Dao, nirvana, the will to live (which Schopenhauer associates with Kant's noumenon, but not completely -- even he says it's simply the "closest" we can get to it while still "within" time), are all dealing with similar things, it is true -- as is "God," for that matter. They all interpret beings and being. Heidegger isn't interested in interpreting it by way of a definition himself, but in reawakening the questioning of being, and so our interpretation of it (and thus human being).

As far as Bergson, Heidegger actually mentions him often enough, as one thinker in a chain (since Aristotle) who has tried interpreting time. Needless to say, he does not think Bergson gets it right with duration. Spinoza's natura naturans, from what I understand of it, seems very close to Heidegger's treatment of phusis -- which shouldn't be a surprise, as the Latin "natura" is how phusis was translated. But again, my reading of Spinoza is restricted only to the Ethics. If you care to say more about it, I'd be interested.

Heidegger will talk much about "time," as you know. From his perspective, there's "time" as a sequence of "nows," since Aristotle, and there's temporality, or as someone one here said "existential time," which is essentially the structure of how we live: thrown, anticipating, and absorbed (past, future, present). He will say being, but also time itself (as ordinarily understood), has been interpreted from the "perspective" of one aspect of temporality: the present.

"But this 'time' still has not been unfolded in its essence, nor can it be unfolded (on the basis and within the purview of 'physics'). For as soon as meditation on the essence of time begins, at the end of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself must be taken as something that is somehow coming to presence, ousia tis. This is expressed in the fact that time is conceived on the basis of the 'now,' that which is in each case uniquely present." (p 220)

The true world — Twilight of the Idols, How the True World Finally Became A Fable. The History of an Error.

I think Heidegger would agree wholeheartedly with Nietzsche here. Heidegger wants to get outside the tradition which Kant himself (whom Nietzsche is essentially referring to here, along with Plato) is still very much a part of. Thus all the examples of "hammering" and "average everydayness." This is the pragmatic part of Heidegger, and why he carries on so much about phenomenology and the "hidden" and "concealed" aspects of life, which philosophers have nearly always ignored (in his view).

This is like asking what were our ancient hunter-gatherer ancestors doing when they learned about the animals in their environment, how to grow plants, etc. before "science" was even put forth in Galileo. Humans have done science and thought logically since our arrival on this planet, but not always. — Harry Hindu

Sure -- but it wasn't "science" or "logic" in the sense that was meant above. Hunter-gathers weren't conducting controlled experiments, nor were they doing syllogisms. Again, this is why I said the equating of "logic" to "thinking" is misleading. Thinking has gone on for millennia, just as language has. Logic and grammar are not that.

I think those who are voting "logic" are equating logic with thought. I don't see them as synonyms, however, any more than the rules of grammar is synonymous with language.
— Xtrix
No, we are equating logic with a particular type of thinking - correct thinking vs. incorrect thinking. — Harry Hindu

So "first philosophy" is such, and the basis for the others, when it's "correct thinking"?

If you're equating logic with correct/incorrect thinking, then that is in itself a rather narrow view of thought. Thinking happens all the time. To say thinking is "correct" because it conforms to the rules of logic just doesn't tell you much. Not all thought is logical, or mathematical, or even linguistic.

It is not true, then, that in order to use the word "tree" one must have a knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees that have been presented to the speaking subject. The concept is formed from them and used in a process of continuous variation. It does not exist as an immutable entity and prior to the use of language achieved by who knows what mysterious intellectual intuition. The same with "tree" as with "being". — David Mo

Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being? He's not echoing Plato.

It's not independent knowledge -- but it is a kind of understanding, which he calls the a pre-ontological understanding of being.

You get at it better here:

First of all because it is not true that the use of a term means any defined "intuitive" understanding. — David Mo

Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language. This is not profound -- it's a truism. It's like saying there's an awake human being, or consciousness, uttering the sentence. Big deal. That shouldn't be controversial. The question is: what IS a human being, and what IS consciousness? Likewise, what is this "pre-theoretical, pre-conceptual" understanding of being?

As Carnap says, the problem with Heidegger is that he makes a jumble of all these uses to build a fictional "entity", which is-but is not-one thing or a "fact": the " Being". — David Mo

This is just way off. A pretty common misunderstanding. Being isn't a "fact" or an "entity" at all. That does indeed seem strange, admittedly, and can make sense only in the context of his philosophy. Read in isolation, it's almost gibberish.

In the Heideggerian explanation any use of "is" is confused with "exist". — David Mo

I can't think of any examples where "is" doesn't imply that something appears, is there, or "exists" (as in being) in some respect. So I fail to see how it's confused.

Now, when a theologian speaks of God's "being" he can say two things: his existence or his essence. God exists or God is immutable, eternal, etc. When a normal person wants to say that a communist exists or is in the garden he uses expressions like "there is," "is in" (or he names it while pointing it out!), but he does not make "Existence" a problem. In fact, the problem of the existence of something is easily solved because it is understood as the "absolute position of the thing"--I think the phrase is from Kant--the relationship that is established between one thing or event and others in the world. When I say that "there is a communist in my garden," I am not referring to a mysterious quality of being of that communist, but I am putting it in relation to the context of the world of speakers. If I say that God exists, it is because I establish some relationship between God and my world. — David Mo

I'm afraid I don't see how any of this is relevant. From Intro to Metaphysics, p 62:

"In these lectures, we constantly return to the Greek conception of Being because this conception, though entirely flattened out and rendered unrecognizable, is the conception that still rules even today in the West--not only in the doctrines of philosophy but in the most everyday routines. Because of this, we want to characterize the Greek conception of Being in its first fundamental traits as we follow the Greek treatment of language.
This approach has been chosen intentionally in order to show, through an example from grammar, how the experience, conception, and interpretation of language that set the standard for the West grew out of a very definite understanding of Being."

From 64 (so there's no mystery):

"What grounds and holds together all the determinations of Being we have listed is what the Greeks experienced without question as the meaning of Being, which they called ousia, or more fully parousia. The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely. In German, we have an appropriate expression for parousia in our word An-wesen <coming-to-presence>. We use Anwesen as a name for a self-contained farm or homestead. In Aristotle's times, too, ousia was still used in this sense as well as in its meaning as a basic philosophical word. Something comes to presence. It stands in itself and thus puts itself forth. It is. For the Greeks, "Being" fundamentally means presence."

This is the thesis, and in this context regarding language speficially (the chapter title being "The Grammar and Etymology of 'Being'").

Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo

What "problem"?

In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will," or else tacitly assumed in everyday life and discernible based on average, everyday actions and routines (what it means to be a human, what it means to be anything at all, etc -- just as looking at what ants do will tell you something about their pre-theoretical nature).

The point is to re-awaken the question.

Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination! — David Mo

No, this is your own interpretation (apparently), which is a misunderstanding. Which is easy to demonstrate: nowhere, not ever, will Heidegger claim that "being" means a being. I would challenge you to provide textual evidence if you believe it so. Thus, to say he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger. Perhaps it's due to a lack of imagination?

Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. I would say it's some sophisticated form of delusion. Much less when he's able to transfer his monomania to many intelligent people. Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt. So I see no reason to insult anyone for it, unless their monomania becomes a danger to others. — David Mo

It's fairly clear to me, however, that you don't really understand what the "problem" is -- thus, hardly in a position to talk of a "pseudo-problem." Because if, in your interpretation, the "problem" is one of defining being, or attempting to link being with A being, etc., then you've completely missed the point.

I repeat myself:

it sounds to me like you're hit this particular issue more to "refute" than learn. — Xtrix

I think those who are voting "logic" are equating logic with thought. I don't see them as synonyms, however, any more than the rules of grammar is synonymous with language.

Logic is the most fundamental branch of philosophy, as it is applied to all the other branches. Without logic, you can't make reasonable or sensible arguments in the other branches. You wouldn't even be able to make viable distinctions between the other branches. — Harry Hindu

But what your describing sounds more like thinking generally, not necessarily the subject of the rules of thought as propositions, etc., which is what logic is. Then we have to ask -- what were philosophers doing before the "logic" was even put forth in Aristotle?