.

Yes. But the causal chain is a chain of people learning to refer to Aristotle correctly. Isn't it? What else could it be? — Ludwig V

Yep, and we need not be referring anybody or anything at all for it to be meaningful, as Wittgenstein said we must not confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name.

What does “water” mean? "Water" means different things to different people. To a scientist, "water" is necessarily H2O. To me, "water" is necessarily wet, in that if not wet it cannot be water. To a linguist, “water” is necessarily a noun. There is no one meaning of “water”, though each meaning is necessary within its own context.
— RussellA
And yet all these people can communicate. How is that possible? There must be common elements to all these different meanings that enable communication across contexts. Those common elements are what we might call ordinary life, which is the common context that links all three people. — Ludwig V

I would disagree with “to the scientist “water” is necessarily H2O” but I am not going to rehash everything I have said up to this point.

But I would like to add further criticism to this idea that water is essentially H2O. Take the following three types of water (and I could name many more)

1. “Sea water”
2. “Purified water”
3. “Purified heavy water”

Sea water >96% H2O unsafe to drink

Purified water >99% H2O safe to drink but long term use may deplete essential minerals

Purified heavy water >99% D2O ok to drink in very small quantities but very hazardous in larger amounts

All use the term “water” but there is no common essence between them.

I do not think "air" is a rigid designator, and so I am happy to not designate any of the components, whether a majority component or not, as the necessary referent of the term "air." — NotAristotle

Wow, quite an admission. I guess you are saying that when it comes to these general, vague terms like "water" or "air", we have either two choices, one, say possible worlds semantics/rigid designators don't apply, or we can just remove the vagueness and just say "water" means "H2O".

when it so refers it will be the case that necessarily water is H2O as a result of the identity between the stuff and what is referred to by the term in that context. — NotAristotle

If you are indicating that these terms are interchangeable, this is wrong. You would think that if one is saying water is identical to H2O that they would be interchangeable. But that is not the case. For example, can you say that if you had one molecule of water you had one water? No, the term "water" when used in science refers to a collection of H2O molecules that under particular temperature and pressure conditions exhibit the macroscopic properties we typically call a "liquid." But guess what, under others conditions this collection of H2O molecule would not be called "water" anymore, but "steam" or "vapor", and under other conditions you would call it "ice".

So, what is all of this logic posturing by saying "water is H2O"is a posteriori necessary truth to achieve in the realm of science? To make prescriptive linguistic corrections like "Hey scientist, you forgot what Kripke said about "water is H2O", when you call that collection of H2O molecules "steam" you are wrong, please correct yourself and call it "water".

Would be interested to hear what you think about it. — NotAristotle

There is a good quote from the Introduction in Noam Chomsky's book "Cartesian Linguistics" by James McGilvray that I find useful in this case:

“This is because, as Chomsky suggests, in the domains of mathematics and the natural sciences, one finds strong ‘normative’ constraints on same-use, constraints not found in the use of natural language, where people employ and enjoy linguistic creativity. Everyday speakers are not engaged on a unified project. And as Chomsky also points out, it is no surprise that Fregean semantic theories – those that suppose a community with shared thoughts and shared uniform symbols for expressing these thoughts, and an assumed constraint to be talking about the same thing whenever they use a specific symbol – work quite well with mathematics and the natural sciences. But they do not work with natural languages, a hard lesson for the many philosophers and semanticians who try to adapt Fregean semantics to natural languages.”

This is the problem Kripke has with using the natural language term "water" and trying to call it identical with the scientific term "H2O". His only choice is to massage that vague term "water" into a precise term like "H2O" to fit in with his domain of logic. Chemistry sort of does that by applying the chemical naming convention by calling H2O, "dihydrogen monoxide".

In Chomsky's "New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind" he gives many useful examples showing this difficulty,

"Even in such usage, with its questionable invocation of natural science, we find that whether something is water depends on special human interest and concerns, again in ways understood without relevant experience; the term "impurities" covers some difficult terrain. Suppose a cup1 is filled from the tap. It is a cup of water, but if a tea bag is dipped into it, that is no longer the case. It is now a cup of tea, something different. Suppose cup2 is filled from a tap connected to a reservoir in which tea has been dumped (say, as a new kind of purifier). What is in cup2 is water, not tea, even if a chemist could not distinguish it from the present content of cup1. The cups contain the same thing from one point of view, different things from another, but in either case cup2 contains only water and cup1 only tea. In cup2, the tea is an "impurity" in Putnam's sense, in cup1 it is not, and we do not have water at all (except in the sense that milk is mostly water, or a person for the matter). If cup3 contains pure H2O into which a tea bag has been dipped, it is tea, not water, though it could have a higher concentration of H2O molecules than what comes from the tap or is drawn from the river."

The composition may change in terms of NaCl, etc., but if you do not have H2O then you do not have water. Your response? — NotAristotle

Another way to answer this is "if you do not have H2O you do not have H2O, but something can always be named "water".

But please provide your response to this: If you discovered "air" is composed of 78% Nitrogen, 21% Oxygen and 1% Argon, what is rigidly designated in every possible world? Which one do you say, if you don't have X you do not have "Air"?

It seems you cannot use the same rationale like you do for "water", the most dominant component.

I think the real answer here is it does not matter what you say, only what we humans agree upon. Wittgenstein in PI 49 says something similar, "But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence consist of four letters or of nine? And which are its elements, the types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?"

My point with the example is prior to any Atomic Theory of Matter, the community can name the liquid and solid to assist in identifying macroscopic objects and processes without any consideration of microscopic structures. In the example, they simple refer to what is a clear liquid and a white powder and name both “warder”. The name functions for them, “Go fetch me a bottle of ‘warder’ from the shelf so I can perform the experiment” or “After the transformation, warder became a solid powder.” Naming in this example serves the community to identify macroscopic objects to fetch, focus attention, or call out. Knowledge of the composition of both need not stop one from using such a name to carry out these functions. There is no need to appeal to essences in all possible worlds to understand what the name is referring to in this example.

This is why I say there is no error in naming.

The composition may change in terms of NaCl, etc., but if you do not have H2O then you do not have water. Your response? — NotAristotle

Please take a look at my earlier response to this. But I like to address this in a little different way.

Let us say some fictitious community commonly calls a particular liquid "warder". One day they decide to place the liquid in a pot and place it over a fire to see what would happen. After several hours, they notice the liquid was gone, and there was a white powder remaining. In amazement, they thought the liquid was transformed in the white powder by the heat of the fire. They called this powder "warder" as well, for them it was just a transformation into a different physical state, a solid.

Centuries past, the community developed an Atomic Theory of Matter. Soon they discovered that the liquid they called "warder" was composed of 98% H2O and 2% NaCl. When they perform the same experiment of heating in the pot, they discovered the white powder they called "warder" was compose of 100% NaCl. But even with this discovery, they continue to refer to both liquid and white power as "warder". Have they made some error in this case? What is the nature of this error? Scientifically there is no error, the composition they got right. An error in naming? But one can use the same name to refer to multiple object anytime in language, context will clarify any confusion. If you say there was some metaphysical error committed here, well what was it? I don't think we can make any sense of what a "metaphysical error" would be in this case.

We are talking about naming a sample of liquid. Why we name a liquid is not because it identifies some essence in all possible worlds. For example, it would be wrong to say "0.00001 M NaOH is water", or "0.00001 M NaOH is H2O" This is the naming convention scientists use to describe the composition of the solution labeled "0.00001 M NaOH." The information the name provides tells the chemists that the solution is a base and the pH the solution is approximately 9. The term "water" would not convey this information because it is scientifically too vague. The chemist would prepare this solution with purified water, but this would demonstrate that 0.00001 M NaOH is not purified water. One difference, the pH would be different in both solutions, indicating different levels of hydroxide ions. Also, the solution would have the relatively large concentration of sodium ions. Simply put, 0.00001 M NaOH is not identical to purified water. However, in an entirely different context, you can go to the store and buy yourself a bottle of "Alkaline Water", which typically has a pH of 9. In this case, the seller is using the name "Alkaline water" to indicate that this is something you can drink."

So, if a read Kripke correctly, once we baptized that solution of "0.00001 M NaOH", it necessarily refers to what is the underlying chemical structure in every possible world. However, equally, if that same solution is baptized as "water", it necessary refers to what is the underlying chemical structure in every possible world. The underlying chemical structure referred to in 0.00001 M NaOH would be a covalent bonds with H20 molecule as well as the hydrogen bonding occurring between the H2O and hydroxide ions, and ion-dipole interaction between h2o and sodium ion. The underlying chemical structure for the solution called "water", according to Kripke, would be just H2O molecules. The very same solution with two completely different essences called out in every possible world.

There is a simple way out of this conundrum. First, scientific statements are about composition, not identity. Two, sometimes in language we use vague terms like "water" in a variety of ways to serve purposes other than scientifically precise ways.

Kripke’s Possible World Semantics is logic demanding purity in language and purity in reality. However, neither is pure when studied closely and neither need be.

Kripke asserts that science discovers that “Water is H2O” is a statement of identify. This is not the case. Utilizing the empirical implications of Atomic Theory of Matter, science discovers the molecular composition of everyday objects that we name like water”, “air”, “soil”, etc. One finding that science discovered is naturally occurring samples named “water” consistently will be composed of “H2O” molecules and other isotopes, gases, organics, and dissolved salts. Science is concerned with statements of composition not identity.

This poses a problem for the process of rigid designation. In rigid designation, the term “water” must refer to H2O in all possible worlds, because that is the structure it referred to when the name was first introduced (or “baptized”) in our world. This is quite a feat given that this was prior to any understanding of Atomic Theory. Somehow when naming any liquid we called “water” we somehow miraculously only referred to H2O and selectively excluded any other molecules that may have beenpresent, like “D2O”, “NaCl”, etc.

Kripke may respond that "water" fixes its reference to the dominant underlying chemical structure in our world. But this sounds more like linguistic legislation, the stipulation of essence. Consider the term “air”, another term that was used well before the development of Atomic Theory. What is the dominant underlying chemical structure that was reference when the term was first introduced? Nitrogen? Oxygen? Argon? According to Kripke, science discovers that “Air is N2” because it is the dominant underlying chemical structure. But this seems misaligned with how we typically use this term, “We took a trip to the mountains to breathe fresh air.” We could counter with another stipulation, and consider biological function to fix its reference, “Air is O2”.

Kripke imagines humans selectively baptizing a particular microscopic molecule and ignoring others by decreeing what are the dominant underlying chemical structure. What he really seems to be doing is performing a metamorphosis of the term “water” into the term “H2O” to gain that purity. “Water is H2O” is not what he is talking about, but “H2O is H2O”. This is the purity he longs for and easily fits into his Possible World Semantics. However, it seems at a cost, what was once a posteriori knowledge now turns into a priori analytical truth.

Sure thing, my critique would begin with natural kinds, and the “infamous” example “water is h2o”.

As a self proclaimed naturalist and a zealot follower of Wittgenstein, if you interested in Kripkean modal semantics and how its rigidity distorts what science actually discovers and how language is actually used, I would most happy present my lengthy criticisms on this type of thinking and its application. But i think this thread wants to enlighten these views, not critique them.

So while it is not necessarily so (the coin could be tails), something can be both possible and also be real at the same time. — EricH

I am a little unclear on what you mean here. When you say “something can be possible and real at the same time” what are you referring to when you say “something” The real coin? So, a real coin that landed on heads is the same as a possible coin that may land on heads.

If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist. — Ludwig V

Something is very puzzling on what is being said here. It suggests colorful scene, as if I should go to a private room close by eyes and think about three possible worlds, then, upon opening them I realize that one of the three was the actual world around me and thus, I conclude, all in one fell swoop, one of the possible worlds I consider was the actual world and it exist too. Now I can say to myself, "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist."

It reminds me of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus in section 5.5303 "Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.

It seems to me that the what is be said, that "If the actual world was not a possible world, then it could not exist." seems to fall in the latter camp, that it is to say nothing at all.

Hence, I conclude that talking about faith means abandoning it. As soon as you try to convey faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature. According to Kierkegaard, the only true preacher is the one who lives faith in silence. — Astorre

This reminds me of Tolstoy’s short story “The Three Hermits”. In the story, a bishop visits an island where tales describe three old hermits who live a simple life of prayer. Upon arrival, he is surprised on how they pray. “Three are ye, three are we, have mercy upon us” is recited to the bishop. The bishop is shock of their lack of traditional formality of prayer and thus teaches the correct way of prayer. After feeling satisfied they know how to correctly pray, the bishop leaves the island. As the boat moves away from the island, a light is seen from the direction of the island, the crew see the hermits walking on water towards the ship begging the bishop to teach them the right way to pray for they have forgotten. The bishop humbled and in awe by what he saw said, “Your own prayer will reach the Lord, men of God. It is not for me to teach you.”

1. Free will is an uncaused cause.
2. Everything has a cause.
3. Free will is incoherent.
4. We don't have free will.
5. We are caused and we cause.

3, 4, and 5 seem to follow from 1 and 2.

Are 1 and 2 true?

1 seems to be assumed true, a definition to be accepted as true for the sake of the deduction. Without proof or demonstration. What about 2? Is this another “assumed to be true” premise? If not, how does one prove everything has a cause?

This looks like religious dogma to be accepted without question, and see what consequences it has on one’s life after indoctrination.

Isomorphically, the world shares the same logical form as our thoughts and language. That explains why the world makes sense to us.

That there is stuff is still no more than a brute fact. — Banno

Looking at this from an early Wittgenstein perspective, a fact is just what is the case. And what is the case is some combination of objects. These objects are simple, can only be name, and spoken of but not asserted. A proposition presents the existence or non existence of facts. The totality of true propositions is what science strives for. Thus, the world is the totality of facts, not of things. So what are these things/objects? They are metaphysical presuppositions assumed in order to show how we come to understand the world around us.

Why not start with the premise that the world is pretty much just as it seems to be, and look for evidence to the contrary? — Banno

How can they do that? They construct the ladder from their senses to arrive at the conclusion their senses cannot be trusted. See the straight stick, see the crooked stick, trust enough on what we see, to understand what we see cannot be trusted.

It might be interesting to look at Malcolm's approach through the lens of one of the formal intuitionist logics. Perhaps relevance logic would be informative. — Banno

Not sure what formal intuitionist logics or relevance logic exactly means but saw some general descriptions and I wonder if the following two examples from Malcolm's body of work is something you have in mind.

From "Kripke and the Standard Meter",

"I have argued that in relation to actual operation of institution or "language game" of measurement with a meter stick, the sentence 'One meter is the length of S' is not a contingent statement. Do I hold then that this sentence expresses a 'necessary truth'? I would not say this either, especially if a 'necessary truth' is supposed to be something that is 'true in all possible worlds'. Certainly there is no requirement to hold that if the sentence is not a contingent statement then it must be a necessary statement. To think that this sentence should be characterized as either contingent or as a necessary statement seems to me to be looking at it in a wrong way. The sentence, 'One meter is the length of S', is correctly characterized as being, in relation to the institution of metric measurement, the definition of 'one meter' and also as a rule for the use of the term 'one meter'. One can also rightly say that this sentence was used to make a fiat or a decree."

From "“Anselm's Ontological Arguments",

"I do not know how to demonstrate that the concept of God-that is, of a being a greater than which cannot be conceived-is not self-contradictory. But I do not think that it is legitimate to demand such a demonstration. I also do not know how to demonstrate that either the concept of a material thing or the concept of seeing a material thing is not self-contradictory, and philosophers have argued that both of them are. With respect to any particular reasoning that is offered for holding that the concept of seeing a material thing, for example, is self-contradictory, one may try to show the invalidity of the reasoning and thus free the concept from the charge of being self-contradictory on that ground. But I do not understand what it would mean to demonstrate in general, and not in respect to any particular reasoning, that the concept is not self-contradictory. So, it is with the concept of God. I should think there is no more of presumption that it is self-contradictory than the concept of seeing a material thing. Both concepts have a place in the thinking and the lives of human beings."

The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.) — Ludwig V

Has this been proven to you, "The sceptic's argument is irrefutable".? If so, please let me know what this demonstration looks like.

But I don't quite see why you say both that you don't agree that the sceptic's argument is irrefutable and that it is impossible to prove or disprove. — Ludwig V

Let's see if I can make this a little clearer. I am not saying, I can prove or disprove the radical sceptic's argument. What I am saying is one can't talk about proving or disproving the radical skeptic's argument. Why? Radical Skepticism acts like a work of fiction. A work of fiction does not make assertions to prove or disprove, the very nature of a work of fiction is an absence of any assertion about the world. There is nothing to confirm or falsify in a work of fiction. So, like a work of fiction, there is nothing to confirm or falsify in the skeptic's argument as well.

The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.) — Ludwig V

You say the skeptic’s argument is irrefutable, but pointless. We definitely agree it is pointless. However, I am not sure I want to agree it is irrefutable, which I take to mean impossible to disprove. If I present to you a work of fiction, and you assert that this work of fiction is irrefutable or impossible to disprove, what could you mean by such an assertion? I make no claim that it is supposed to be true, nor that it should be entirely coherent. Or was it just to mean, we typically don’t talk about proving or disproving a work of fiction?

From my perspective, the skeptic’s argument is like a work of fiction. The main difference seems to be the intention of what is being present, one being “possibly real” and the other “make believe”. We are not trying to prove or disprove the intentions of the author, but what is being said by the author. And what is being said in both case makes no sense to even talk about proving or disproving.

As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus,

“6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.”

I don't believe so. The idea is that we learn what some thing is, name it, and then discover that everything we knew about it was false. — Banno

Nice summary of Kripke's view. Let me see if I can make sense of it.

Going back to my example of human beings able to distinguish between fresh water and sea water, you could also say humans have the ability to "pick out" a liquid that is fresh water and "pick out" a liquid that is sea water. As I indicated, this is with their biological machinery. From this perspective, humans do not need "names" or "descriptions" to perform this very act, it is a matter of survival. Again, there may be error along the way, due to sickness or injury (but to understand this notion of error, we need a notion of success). Additionally, we could use "names" and "descriptions" to describe this human act of picking out fresh water which in turn can be used to teach other humans. Nevertheless, if a human successfully "picks out" the fresh water, hydrates themselves, and survives to see another day, don't we want to say he knows how to "pick out" fresh water? If the answer is "yes", in this scenario, what sense can we make that this human could later discover "that everything we knew about it was false"? Seems we are flirting with radical skepticism.

I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in "On Certainty",

"If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the gas-flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be justified in this "I know" as I am in any. 'If I know anything I know this',- Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? - I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.-But still there is a difference between the cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N. whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

"Save the surface, and you save all." Sherwin-Williams

From, Pursuit of Truth, W.V. Quine

"Today, as usual, I came into the room and there was the bowl of flowers on the table. I went up to them, caressed them, and smelled over them. I thank God for flowers! There's nothing so real to me as flowers. Here the genuine essence of the world's substance, as its gayest and most hilarious speaks to me. It seems unworthy even to think as erect, and waving on pillars of sap. Sap! Sap!"

O.K. Bouwsma, "Decartes' Evit Genius"

Indeed, if Homer and Charles Dickens (and so Charles Darwin as well) could be speaking of essentially different forms of "water" and "horse" and "tiger," this would cast doubt on any grasp of human history, which in turn should cast doubt on any faith in scientific institutions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When someone is faced to take the initial plunge into any institution, whether religious, scientific, or philosophical, one can have faith to compel themselves into action to learn what this institution is all about. With time, one begins to learn the history, language, values, and ability to judge in that institution. Along the way. we also can learn its limitations and deficiencies. The next step, I believe, should be pragmatic. This is when faith is left behind and one uses what experiences they have gathered and apply them on how they see fit. There is a challenge in reacting in such a manner. All of these institutions will sometimes instill behaviors that can lead to rigid thinking and intolerance. I could find a religious practice that can calm my anxiety, and a medical technique that is useless. Or, find a philosophical idea inspirational, while a religious doctrine oppressive. Obviously, my tradition has shape me in such a way that I view myself as a free agent who can do this risk/benefit analysis. But even in such a tradition, there are challenges to having this position as well.

And if we discover that water is H₂O, then ☐(water=H₂O). And so on through the many different examples. Notice how each of these is a hypothetical – an "if... then...", in which the antecedent is found a posteriori - by looking around. But all that is being done here is ensuring that we keep our language consistent. Once we fix reference by accepting the antecedent, we are obligated to respect the modal consequences of that act of naming as expressed by the consequent. — Banno

From the same paper, Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat, Malcolm says something interesting in his introductory paragraph,

"One thesis of Kripke's is that natural kinds are 'originally identified' by human beings in terms of certain external marks and properties, but that scientific investigations may reveal that none of the properties by which we 'originally identified' a natural kind are essential properties of things of that kind. For example, tigers were originally identified by the properties of being large, feline, carnivorous animals, tawny yellow in color, with black stripes and white belly. But a scientific investigation of the 'internal structure' of tigers might have proved that something could have the all of the 'external appearances' of a tiger and yet not be a tiger because it doesn't have the right 'internal structure'. According to Kripke we might even find out, or have found out, 'tiger had none of the properties by which we original identified them'. This contention seems to me to be exceeding strange."

I as well find this exceedingly strange. Kripke often refers, in Naming and Necessity, to this mysterious "internal structure" that science can discover about tigers, but never mentions what this is specifically. But for me, what is equally mysterious is how does Kripke characterize an activity as a "scientific investigation". I am not sure why he so confidently declares "scientific investigations" as having the final say in what is or is not a natural kind, while human senses are somewhat problematic Take for example "water = H2O". Over millions of years, humans have evolved an exceptional detector of fresh water, called our taste buds and a brain. Our ability to distinguish between fresh water and sea water was essential for survival, the better we can make subtle distinctions of salt level in water, the less damage to our organs, and the less likelihood of dehydration. Without any "scientific investigation", or for that matter any linguistic tools, humans are able to identified fresh water from salt water. Could humans have problems using their fresh water detectors? Of course, injury or illness certainly could play a role in how well we can make this distinction. But, is what we do in a "scientific investigation" significant different? Well, technologically speaking, we need the aid of science to develop some artificial detector made of metal and silicon, combine it with some programming and we can get the instrument to detect H2O in whatever liquid we may inject into the system. Could the instrument malfunction and tells us something in error, of course. But the main difference I see here is one detector is a product of millions of years, and the other is the product of human engineering, but both are fallible.

We establish "natural kinds" because we as humans can agree on definition and judgment as it is applied to our natural surroundings, not because we identified some essence that exists in all possible worlds.

I will let you have the last word for now. I am sure our paths shall cross again about this topic.

This post has taken a few hours to put together, so thanks for the challenge. I hope you find it as interesting as I do. — Banno

Interesting and stimulating, it has put my mind in such a state of agitation.

Response nonetheless:

"116 When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?- What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to the everyday use." Wittgenstein, PI

In this spirit, along with my reaction to your's and others feedback, I believe I need to take a little more creative approach. I like to borrow, roughly, an approach Quine performed in Word and Object around his treatment of time. In previous post I presented three scientific equations:

1. E = Mc²
2. X = vt + Xi
3. 1/2Mv^2 = 3/2RT

Special attention was given to the symbol "=" that I believe gave way to talk of "identity" and "equivalence". After much thought, I started thinking this symbol was creating some problems. One, it was leading one to think there must be some similarity to logicians use of "a = a". Two, this symbol was distracting the actual meaning of these scientific expressions. Lastly, and obviously, its persistent use in mathematics may lead one to think this may be the ultimate meaning of these equations, "numeric value" is equal "numeric value".

Given these concerns, I think it best to leave behind the symbol "=" and use another, "⇔"

1. E ⇔ Mc²
2. X ⇔ vt + Xi
3. 1/2Mv^2 ⇔ 3/2RT

This different symbol is to emphasize what the relationship between both side of the equation. Let's take the simpler of the three equations, #2.

What is this scientific equation trying to express: For experimentally determine values of variables v, t, and Xi, where v is average velocity, t is duration of time, and Xi is the initial object's position, the object's final position is determined by v multiplied by t plus Xi. So, if you determine v, t, and Xi, you can predict X. Consider, equation #3, if you determine the temperature, you can predict the kinetic energy of the gas, or vice versa if you determine the kinetic energy of the gas, you can predict the temperature of the gas. Notice, there is no need to call these expressions as some kind of identity statement. This is just to introduce some metaphysical baggage that is not needed for these equations to function.

Historically, scientists established these equations well before the creation of S5 modal logic. What exactly is Kripke's value in calling them identity statements? That when we of talking about object's initial position and final position, we, by metaphysical necessity, must be talking about the same object. But this seems to be a troublesome expectation. What if the final position is not as we predicted, should we, as you say, "reject counter instances as errors of identification." No, we should proceed as scientists would do in these cases, see if we made some error in measuring, or maybe the instrumentation malfunctioned. But could you not say that you made an error by measuring the incorrect object? Sure, but I also could have measure the wrong object and found the position to be what was expected, and this just demonstrates that this has nothing to do with metaphysical necessity.

"124 Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it in the end only describe it." PI 124

My question is, if we make this change, does the objection you have in mind dissipate? Or are the problems that Malcolm suggests still there? — Banno

Where to begin? Let me take a stab at some Philosophy of Science and see where this goes.

Let us considered three "scientific equations":

1. E=Mc²

2. X = vt + Xi where v is average velocity and Xi is initial position.

3. Kinetic molecular theory is expressed as P = 1/3nMv^2/V and ideal gas law as P = nRT/V, we get the relationship between the two expressed as 1/2Mv^2 = 3/2RT

All three utilize the symbol "=", but should we assume all function as identity statements like the logician's "a = a"?

1. Examining E=Mc², does this express the idea that E is identical to Mc². Often physicists describe such a relationship as different forms of the same fundamental quantity that can be converted into each other. Strange to call this "identical" would you not agree? Yet there is an equal sign between the E and Mc². Seems to me that this symbol "=" means some fundamental quantity can be converted from one form to another and that is it. Can something be the same if they have different forms? I would say no. This is similar to the discussion with H2O and its different forms, steam, water, and ice. I would not say the water is identical with ice, or steam.

2. Is the final position of an object identical with the average velocity multiplied by time plus the initial position of the object? In the case, we are talking about differences in position, based on the initial position and the resulting final position, yet we use an "=" symbol to express such a relationship that an object has with space.

3. The Kinetic molecular theory equation is a theoretical mathmatical expression of the motion of molecules while the ideal gas law equation is more of expression of the actual experimental behavior of gas as measure by pressure, volume, and temperture. In this case, the "=" symbol is showing the proportionality of the average molecular kinetic energy to the absolute temperature is a conclusion drawn by comparing a theoretical expression with an empirical equation which summarizes macroscopic gas facts. As Malcolm says, a correlation is set up showing a relationship between getting hotter and rapid molecule motion.

My conclusion is that all three uses of the symbol "=" have different meanings in the aforementioned scientific equations. Additionally, these uses do not seem to reflect the logician's use in an expression such as "a = a". While I can see the application in Kripkes' examples of "table = table" or "Nixon = Nixon", its application to these so called "identity statements" discovered by scientist, well that is a bridge too far.

Here's the main paragraph concerning the issue from Identity and Necessity:

"In recent philosophy a large number of other identity statements have
been emphasized as examples of contingent identity statements, dif-
ferent, perhaps, from either of the types I have mentioned before. One
of them is, for example, the statement "Heat is the motion of molecules."
First, science is supposed to have discovered this. Empirical scientists in
their investigations have been supposed to discover (and, I suppose, they
did) that the external phenomenon which we call "heat" is, in fact,
molecular agitation. — Banno

"

As I have indicated, and seem to harp on; these identity statements that Kripke likes to use to support his views on a posteriori necessary truths seem to have issues.

Norman Malcolm, in his paper "Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat", nicely articulates some of these issues with calling "Heat is the motion of molecules", an identity statement. He says,

A remark repeated by Kripke again and again is that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion. I find this a puzzling assertion. It looks like a metaphysical proposition than a scientific one. I don't doubt that as the water in a pan becomes hotter the motion of the water molecules increases in rapidity, and as the water cools the rapidity of molecular motion decreases. Although science could establish this correlation, how could it establish that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion? Actually, I don't even understand the assertion either that heat is, or that it is not, "identical" with rapid molecular motion. Or rather, I think I do understand it if "identity" here just means the same as "correlation'. But if "identity" is supposed to mean something that is in addition to correlation, then I am completely puzzled as to what sort of scientific observation could determine either that heat is, or that it is not, identical with rapid molecular motion. Therefore, I doubt whether it is meaningful to say either that this supposed identity holds or that is doesn't hold; and, a fortiori, I doubt that it is meaningful to say that it holds necessarily."

In a foot note, Malcolm provides a reference from Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science" where he explains Boyle-Charles law from the kinetic theory of gases. Malcolm nowhere finds any indication that this law is establishing an identity statement based on Nagel's exposition.

I think we can both agree that the observations to establish "heat" on one side of the identity statement is very different when compared the observations to establish "motion of molecules" on the other side of the identity statement. So, it is difficult to imagine how observations will determine identity.

What about "correlation"? Correlation is typically defined by a relationship between two or more variables, where changes in one variable are associated with changes in another. It indicates that variables tend to move together, either in the same or different directions, but it doesn't necessarily imply one variable causes the other. One might say that science looks for natural correlations.

There is another type of correlation, one might call conventional. For example, the relationship between English language and the language of Morse code is one of isomorphism, based on one-on-one correlations, settled by arbitrary stipulation. I don't believe Kripke thinks he is nor scientists are stipulating that "heat is motion of molecules."

So, if the scientist is not discovering the identity statement, and Kripke is not stipulating the identity statement, how is this identity statement being established. Does common sense establish it? Does our intuition establish it? How does one go from "a = a" to "Heat is motion of molecules"? Just assume "Heat" and "Motion of molecules" refer to the same thing and all will make sense. O.K., but what was that "a posteriori" suppose to be establishing again in that "a posteriori necessary truth"

John Searle is a unique and interesting philosopher. He is a scientific realist who tip toes ever so close to being an idealist/indirect realist, while simultaneously and rebelliously rejecting later Wittgenstein's creed that philosophy should only describe and not theorize. You could say he is an internalist when it comes to meaning, aka "Meanings are just in the head".

I just realized, when it comes to pondering the phenomena of memory, are you basically saying we should forget about it? — Fire Ologist

Yes, welcome to Wittgenstein's therapy and watch your philosophical problems dissolve away.

Not sure what you are getting at, but I think a summary of what John Searle is doing in Intentionality may help to develop some understanding.

In the Introduction, Searle states, "One of the objectives is to provide a foundation for my two earlier books, Speech Acts, and Expression and Meaning, as well as for future investigations of these topics. A basic assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. The capacity of speech acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extensions of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to relate the organism to the world by way such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception. Since speech acts are a type of human action, and since the capacity of speech to represent objects and states of affairs is part of a more general capacity of the mind to relate the organism to the world, any complete account of speech and language requires an account of how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality."

Isn’t the above similar to just saying: “if we define our terms we can say whatever we want.” — Fire Ologist

Not quite, but in Speech Acts John Searle says, “I take it to be an analytic truth about language that whatever can be meant can be said.”

Let me immediately clarify this: I’m not asking whether a memory is automatically verified as accurate. Let’s put “memory” in quotes, to mean an alleged or purported memory, and I can still pose the question I’m posing: When I identify something as a “memory,” how do I know? What’s the difference between a “memory” of, say, London Bridge, and a mental image of London Bridge? Why is it that confusion between the two is extremely rare? — J

Why not question whether there needs to be some process of recognition or identification at all. We humans have natural responses we call memories, dreams, and imaginations. This differentiation becomes evident in the stream of life, not by an introspective process of comparing and judging images an individual privately performs to achieve some sort of accuracy.

Norman Malcolm, in Memory and Mind, presents a thorough defense of such a view. Is his chapter called "Mental Mechanism of Memory", he summarizes such a view:

"I do not wish to claim that brute-fact explanations are never acceptable. Far from it. What is objectionable is a maneuver that, in seeking to avoid a brute-fact explanation of memory responses, invents a mythology of mental items belonging to "the present occurrence of remembering," and then accepts a brute-fact account of the relation between those fancied items and our memory responses. If the memory theorists permit an appeal, as they do and must, to what our nature is, to how we are constituted, then it would seem that they have no adequate rationale for generating their philosophies of memory in the first place. Why should they not be content with accepting at face value the connections between past experience and our memory responses, that are verified by daily experience? Why not admit that if a normal person is shown a green object and ordered to bring another of the same color from the next room, he is able to comply without the assistance of a mental mechanism? Why not accept, simply as a fact, that some people are gifted with memory of music and others not, without trying to explain this difference by holding the the former must be guided in their playing or singing by auditory imagery which the latter lack? Why not concede that the influence of past training and experience is frequently direct, in the sense that it does not work its effect producing in us an apparatus of images and feeling, which in turn control our responses? The philosophers have been unable to believe what is before their eyes--that, for example, a person who witnessed an event can later give an account of what he saw. "There must be more to it than that," they think. They cannot accept, as a brute fact, that a person who has witnessed an event is subsequently able to describe it. They feel that there must be a memory-process which explains this ability. But the memory-process, consisting of some complex of imagery and feeling, which they interpose the original perception and the memory response, does not make the ability any more intelligible than it was before. The memory theorist makes a useless movement. He invents a memory process to fill what he thinks is an explanatory gap; but his own explanation creates its own explanatory gap."

There are numerous other examples. The upshot is that most philosophers who care now reject description theories. — Banno

Interestingly, John Searle takes a sort of descriptivist internal approach in his book “Intentionality”. He says, “The external causal chain plays no explanatory role whatever in either Kripke’s or Donnellan’s account, as I will explain shortly. The only chain that matters is a transfer of Intentional content from one use of an expression to the next, in every case reference is secured in virtue of descriptivist Intentional content in the mind of the speaker who uses the expression.”

Not exactly — Moliere

Not sure what you are referring to but I will take a wild swing.

One of my favorite passages from Naming and Necessity, “Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don’t have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope.”

Obviously, in the case “Water”, you may be pointing to one thing or a multitude of things. Sometimes you might be referring to nothing in particular at all. As for H2O, it is not about pointing at all but theorizing and testing (Also, not quite like viewing something thru a telescope).

But what I find revealing in Kripke’s passage is his interaction with the conceptual/abstract and the actual/concrete. Once there is certain stage setting with the world, he shows that we should feel confident in moving between talk of ideas and talk of actual things.

I think one could take your argument and claim that Aristotle and Lavoisier were not pointing to the same thing at all with the term "water." There was complete equivocation. Aristotle was pointing to the stuff found in rivers and lakes, whereas Lavoisier was pointing to H2O, and as Richard B argues, there is effectively nothing in common between the two and therefore "water is not H2O". — Leontiskos

The term “water” can refer to many things, while “H2O” seems to be referring to something very precise. It seems to me Kripke wants to say “water” precisely refers to one thing as H2O.

I find the quote from Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics useful:

“This is because, as Chomsky suggests, in the domains of mathematics and the natural sciences, one finds strong ‘normative’ constraints on same-use, constraints not found in the use of natural language, where people employ and enjoy linguistic creativity. Everyday speakers are not engaged on a unified project. And as Chomsky also points out, it is no surprise that Fregean semantic theories – those that suppose a community with shared thoughts and shared uniform symbols for expressing these thoughts, and an assumed constraint to be talking about the same thing whenever they use a specific symbol – work quite well with mathematics and the natural sciences. But they do not work with natural languages, a hard lesson for the many philosophers and semanticians who try to adapt Fregean semantics to natural languages.”

Ok, let’s explore extension.

Can we say water is necessarily H2O, D2O, HDO and T2O? (Because all of these naturally occurring in nature when analyzing water)

Or would we say no because I can imagine a possible world where water is just H2O?

Or is the rebuttal, no you can’t imagine water without the others.

Water is necessarily H₂O. — Banno

Are you saying H2O is necessarily H2O, or Water is necessarily H2O? If the former, sure; but the later, well I guess it depends on how you use the term “water”. And is this not where all the confusion and debate occur?

On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. — Banno

To keep whittling away, or should I say quibbling away, at this idea that "water is H20", I like to provide a quote from Sketches of Landscapes by Avrum Stroll,

"The discussion brings us to the category mistake argument. To simplify the discussion, I shall speak only about the collection of H2O molecules. The most important point to be made in this connection is that not all collections of such molecules are water. It depends on the nature of the collection, and this to a considerable degree is determined by such factors as air temperature and atmospheric pressure. Some collections are rigid, hard, and cold to the touch (ice I through ice VII). Some are liquid, tepid, and not solid. Ordinary persons call the latter aggregations "water" and the former "ice". It is a category mistake to infer from the fact that a particular collection of H2O molecules is water that every such collection is water. This seems to be the mistake that Putnam and Kripke have made throughout their discussion of water.

It leads to another. "Water' does not mean H2O, as they assert. For if it did and because water and ice are both composed of H2O, it would then follow that the meaning of "water" would be ice. But this is clearly false. Since ice and water have different properties, the former being rigid and the latter nonrigid, the two are not identical. Therefore, if "water" meant "ice, "water" could not mean water. Once again, we see that Kripke and Putnam are misled by their identity thesis into an incorrect linguistic theory."

I think Kripke and Putnam seem to be saying that each and every water molecule is H2O. But expression like this seems tautologous and insignificant, not profound metaphysically. I am reminded of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus,

"5.5303 Roughly speaking, to say of two things that are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all."