1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function.
— Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations. — RussellA

I can see how you might think they're contradictory, but I'm making a subtle distinction about truth, which I believe Wittgenstein is also making. Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. Wittgenstein points out, “It belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted” (On Certainty 342). They’re not conclusions; they’re the ground.

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. Hinges can't be meaningfully doubted without collapsing the system. Doubting “The earth exists” isn’t false, it’s nonsensical, as no test could apply outside the framework of everyday epistemological language. Doubt is essential to how we use traditional propositions. “The keys are on the table” invites checking; it’s true or false based on what I find. However, again, the truth of a hinge, which is like a foundational conviction, is indubitable (impossible to doubt, unquestionable).

Hinges are indubitable not because they’re proven beyond doubt but because they’re the foundation of doubting, outside the game of justification. Ordinary propositions play inside that game, subject to the rules hinges silently uphold. Wittgenstein’s move is to say: what Moore calls indubitable truths aren’t truths in the propositional sense. they’re the very backdrop that lets propositional truths get their life.

Think of a conviction, one could hold that it's true without appealing to justification, it's bedrock to a system of beliefs that are justified and true. These truths are essential to how I act in the world, but their function is much different.

If I repeat myself, it's for effect.

Ya, but not in the way I'm presenting this issue. I can't find anywhere where someone makes this connection, but I could be wrong.

Here's my abstract for my upcoming paper.

Wittgenstein's Hinges Reimagined

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) final notes were published posthumously as On Certainty (1969). In these notes, he introduced the concept of hinge propositions (OC 341) as a response to G.E. Moore’s arguments (“Proof of an External World,” 1939) against the radical skeptic. Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification. They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. This paper reimagines hinges as foundational convictions, namely, as arational certainties that act as a foundational platform that grounds our epistemological language and systems of proof.

Building on this foundation, the paper extends Wittgenstein’s hinges to Kurt Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931), which demonstrate that any consistent formal system of arithmetic will necessarily contain unprovable statements. Godel’s mathematical discovery parallels Wittgenstein’s hinge insights, revealing the need for system-enabling certainties that ground both frameworks. The problem of infinite regression further illustrates the need for foundational convictions.

This bridges the gap between mathematical formalism and epistemological foundationalism and challenges the notion that any comprehensive proof is possible in either domain. The paper offers a novel approach to understanding the limits and foundations of human knowledge.

I am fairly certain that in PI Wittgenstein says specifically that meaning is often, but not always, use. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are a lot of nuances to use as meaning (ostensive definitions, family resemblance, etc), but use is king in the PI.

But what determines use? Wouldn't the causes of use and usefulness play an important role in explaining language too?

For instance, the way we use words, the reason we find it useful to use them in certain ways, is dependent on the properties of what the words refer to. Across disparate languages that are developed in relative isolation, the use of terms for certain natural phenomena will be similar because the things the terms describe are similar. Hence, meaning can be traced back, in at least some cases, to reference. Otherwise, our use of "dog" would have nothing to do with dogs, which doesn't seem right. But if the usefulness and use of "dog" is determined to some large degree by dogs, then use is going to be in some sense downstream of being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Language users determine use, and it's important to recognize that no one person determines use. If someone, a scientist, creates a new word to express a new idea, that word will not get a foothold unless other language users start using it in the same way.

Sure reference, for example, ostensive definition is a way of learning words, but ultimately use is the driving force. If I teach a child by pointing to a pencil and saying, "Pencil," that is a tool that informs use. How do we know if the child understands? We observe how they use the word across a wide range of contexts or language games. If the child points to a cup and says pencil, then we know that they aren't using the word correctly. There has to be community agreement (cultural and social practices otherwise referred to as forms of life).

Use, for the most part, isn't determined by the thing itself (the dog); it's determined by language users and the explicit or implicit rules involved in the respective language game. What we use as a name for a dog could be almost anything.

Second, I had forgot Grayling's full example. People can use "QED" and the like consistently, in the correct way, and not know their meaning. However, consider "kalb." It means dog in Arabic. You now know what kalb means. However, if you don't know Arabic, you don't know how to use it in a sentence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that people can use a word correctly (consistently) without having some idea of what the word means. Maybe they can't express the meaning, but they still use it correctly. As long as they are using the word correctly in a variety of language games, then they know how to use the word. Meaning again is use, not determined by giving some dictionary definition.

I might not be able to use "kalb" in a sentence, but I can say "kalb" and point to a dog. This demonstrates that I understand how the word is used in Arabic. Use doesn't always require complete sentences.

I tried to answer most of your concerns.

First, it might sound simple (i.e., that you're reducing meaning to something simple) saying that use is meaning, but Wittgenstein spent quite a bit of time explaining it. It's not reductionist.

Second, nothing I've read in that long post does anything to dispel the idea that meaning is primarily derived from use. Some of it shows that people can start using words differently from their intended purpose, but even if this happens, the new use will drive the new meaning. Use is not absolute; it changes, and new uses are formed. Sometimes incorrect uses morph into new language games and that incorrect use becomes accepted as just another use within a certain part of a culture.

How do you think people learned the meaning of words before there was writing? They observed how people used words/language.

Meaning is primarily driven by use. Even dictionary definitions are driven by use. A word might have many different meanings, depending on how many uses there are in a language. It's not context-driven, although context is important, because you can still use a word incorrectly within a context. So, it's use within a culture of language users.

Hinges, hinge beliefs and hinge propositions... — Banno

It's the world of hinges.

By the way, I might submit a paper as part of the Philosophy Forum's paper challenge. I'm not sure yet, but I'm working on it. It depends on how lazy I am. :grin:

I don't think anything I can say will convince you. I've explained it six ways to Sunday. For example, I don't know how many times I've said that hinge beliefs are considered true, but you're locked into one view of truth as if that' the only way we can use the word.

Meh. Moyal-Sharrock tries something like this, taking "belief" to mean "trust" alone. — Banno

Where did I say that?

What do you see as the ‘rules’ of ‘I have hands’ such that they hold across language games? Would Wittgenstein accept that there is any sort of understanding that holds ACROSS language games? — Joshs

The first rule might be assumed embodiment, i.e., I act as if I have hands by grabbing and pointing for e.g..

The second rule might be realizing there is a linguistic baseline. It’s a shared certainty that’s voiced. Pass the potatoes assumes hands, doubt this foundation and things stall.

The third rule is immunity to doubt. Doubting here would break the frame or foundation, not allowing further linguistic action.

Yes, I think Wittgenstein would allow for basic understandings across language games. E.g., when we first believe things, it’s a broad swath of things. That I have hands underpins many of the language games of science, daily chat, games, etc

What you’re looking for as a hinge is the underlying metaphysics making intelligible both the kind of faith and the kinds of doubt that accompany it, rather than the proposition ‘God exists’. — Joshs

I'm looking for both.

Good questions.

.

Wittgenstein is simply deluded about the nature of truth, knowledge, and justification. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't believe you would say such a thing. I have disagreements with Witt, but to call him deluded, it seems to me, demonstrates your delusion. Even people who disagree with Witt wouldn't make such a comment. It shows your bias and lack of knowledge on the subject.

I don't want this thread to become an argument about the existence of God, and whether belief in God is a hinge. If you want to consider whether belief in God is a hinge, please do it in another thread. That said, I will partially answer the question about whether belief in God could be considered a hinge in the Wittgensteinian tradition.

The Christian in acting their life cements the hinge "God as the ultimate source of all power", which is their truth. The Atheist in acting their life cements the hinge "there is no God", which is their truth. The Agnostic in acting their life cements the hinge "it is impossible to know whether there is a God", which is their truth. — RussellA

There is no doubt that Christians and other religions consider belief in God a hinge belief or foundational conviction. There is also no doubt that such language games exist. But just because there are language games that express these ideas doesn’t mean that all language games have equal footing. Some language games have a much better grounding, and we are constantly revising them.

However, the question of whether belief in God could be a hinge in the OC sense is an interesting question. Consider the following: “God exists” might ground certain practices like prayer, morality, and cosmology in the same way that “The Earth exists” grounds geology. Doubting that “God exists” would unravel the entire language game of many religions, just as hinges would unravel epistemology.

Also, for many, “Belief in God” isn’t up for debate within their lived belief system. It’s not a hypothesis that’s tested (for many) it’s a conviction that’s lived.

On the other side of the argument, “I have hands holds across contexts and language games. Atheists function without belief in God, but how would they function without the belief we have hands? Moreover, belief in God is doubted by many, and it’s debated in theology and philosophy. Wittgensteinian hinges resist doubt (OC 19 “incapable of doubting”). The belief that God exists invites doubt, even among those who believe.

I would say that in some cases, especially if someone had a direct experience of God, it could be a hinge for them. I think consciousness is a hinge, and if consciousness is fundamental, then it could be considered a hinge. Moreover, some might argue that consciousness/mind as fundamental might be God. I’m not sure, although I believe consciousness is fundamental.

There’s much more that could be asked and questioned, but this subject should be in another thread.

Your question @RussellA is a good one and is being debated by some philosophers.

Let me explain it one more time why hinges aren’t propositionally true.

1. They’re not open to judgment – typical propositions like “It is raining,” are moves subject to true or false on evidence (OC 243 “compelling grounds”). Hinges are the board itself without the hinges no moves happen. Their truth is accepted as a precondition that makes testing possible. They’re true because we live them – e.g. grabbing a cup, not proving hands exist. They’re simply not candidates for truth/falsity. They set the stage for the testing of true and false.

2. Typical propositions can be doubted (this is key) – “Is it really raining?” If you doubt that you have hands you are not refining the truth; you’re opting out. The truth of hinges is a kind of immunity, not a verdict reached by evidence or reasons.

3. Hinges aren't true because they’re factual, but because they’re the frame facts rest on. The hinge “The Earth exists” isn’t a discovery, it’s the ground for discovering rain (OC 99 “riverbed”).

Sure, hinges look like typical propositions, i.e., they have a subject and predicate, but the job of a hinge is not the same. You don’t come to know its truth by investigation. It’s the rule that allows the game to move forward. Treating hinges like typical propositions is like trying to prove to someone that it's true after explaining the rule in chess that stipulates how bishops move. It’s not a move that we judge in that way, it’s the condition or foundation of the game, just like the pieces and the board. Hinges enable truth talk, they’re a precondition. Their truth is a necessity, just as the rules of chess are a necessity that enables chess games.

Propositions can be true or false, but hinges are true as a condition of being a hinge, i.e., it's their foundational role. Moreover, it’s our acting that cements them in place, not any fact that establishes their truth.

Knowing how is knowledge as a skill, we're talking about knowledge as beliefs and so was Wittgenstein. To act, we have to believe that we have hands, and this belief is reflected in our actions. This is even before knowledge as a skill. Hinges are before any knowledge.

The propositions that set the game up are not typical. If, as Wittgenstein says, Moore's propositions are not known, then they are not epistemological, i.e., not justified or true. They are only true in that we accept them as true (like any conviction/belief) to support our system of beliefs. The propositions you're referring to are true because they refer to facts or states of affairs. In this sense they are justified, justification ends with hinges.

Propositional truth is dependent on language, i.e., the concept is linguistic. You seem to point to some truths as metaphysical that we access intuitively. Hinge propositions arise in our acts (I'm referring to pre-linguistic hinges). For e.g., my use of my hand shows my belief that I have hands. This is different from what you're saying. Your idea seems completely dependent on minds apart from language, thus the intellect aspect, but I'm not sure.

My point is trying to clarify different uses of truth in our language. And the difference in the roles of truth in our systems of belief. You are correct that there are different roles or layers of hinges. The rules of chess are hinges (foundational to the game), and "I have hands" is a foundational truth that stands outside of epistemological games. Again, they are arational, but can be used sometimes as typical propositions.

Wittgenstein's hinges are foundational convictions that have no justification. This seems much different from the intuition you're referring to. What's an e.g. of a self-justifying truth?

The way you can differentiate between hinges and other typical propositions is that doubting them is generally senseless. Wittgenstein's hinges apply to all epistemology and any system of belief. "I possess intellect" could indeed be counted as a hinge, similar to we all possess consciousness.

We accept them as true as part of a role. They're not true in the same sense that your typical proposition is. There is a difference between truth as a matter of fact or state of affairs, and truths that have a role that is arational and foundational. It's very much like accepting the rules of chess to play the game. Indeed, bishops move diagonally, but no state of affairs supports this rule. It's just foundational to the game of chess.

I've been trying to investigate whether anyone else has made the connection between Wittgenstein's hinges and Godel's unprovable statements. I think hinges provide a unique way of looking at Godel's theorems. They allow the system to work, just as they allow epistemology to work. They're unprovable, but system-sustaining. In other words, these are mathematical hinges. I think this idea of mine is original, as far as I can tell.

The difference between hinge propositions and typical propositions has to do with the role they play. Typical propositions are tied to states of affairs and assessed via justification. They’re players in the game, subject to the rules of truth and falsity (OC §243). Hinge propositions are foundational— truth is not a property they possess but a role in epistemological language games. They’re the rules or ground of the game, not subject to its moves (OC §204: “Our acting… lies at the bottom”). The idea of foundational convictions captures this idea.

Moore is claiming to know. In other words, he believes he's justified. He's arguing against the skeptics who are claiming that he doesn't know.

Moore's papers indicate the opposite. As for your last statement, hinges are not true or false in the propositional sense but are accepted as true or false as a matter of conviction or for purposes of utility.

How would I explain Wittgenstein’s hinges to someone who never heard of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty?

Imagine trying to answer some question – like what’s true or what’s real, or whether you’re really sitting in a room typing. You ask yourself, “How do I know this?” or “How do I know that?” You’re like the kid who keeps asking “Why?” to every possible answer but never concluding because you’re in an endless loop of whys. You can’t seem to get anywhere because you can’t prove everything, no one can.

A philosopher named Wittgenstein who wrote about this kind of stuff said that there is a way to avoid this endless loop. His solution was that we accept certain basic beliefs without proof. He called these hinges, like the hinges on a door that allows them to open and shut. Without the hinges, the door falls off; without basic beliefs, language, and our thinking would similarly fail.

So, what are hinges? They’re everyday basic beliefs that we don’t usually question. For example, “The Earth existed 10 minutes ago,” or “I have hands.” These are the kinds of basic beliefs that we accept as true without normally requiring proof. We take them for granted because they’re part of how we live and act in the world. Wittgenstein pointed out that we need these kinds of beliefs to even start to ask questions or to figure things out. For example, before you open a door you don’t start wondering if the door exists, you assume it exists, and that's a hinge. It’s not like it’s magically true; they’re what we rely on to do the things we need to do. They’re like the rules of a game that we agree to accept to play the game. You don’t ask, “Do bishops move diagonally?” – everyone accepts the rule who plays the game that bishops move diagonally.

Another guy named G.E. Moore tried to say, “I know I have hands,” as if it was a matter to be justified or a matter of proof. Wittgenstein disagreed, saying that it wasn’t a matter of proof. He said that these beliefs were so basic that a proof wouldn’t make sense. Such beliefs are where questions begin. They are the foundation that supports what we know and doubt. Without hinges we would be confused, unable to reason or doubt. It would be like having a chess board and pieces but no rules. You couldn’t play the game.

Is this not Utilitarianism? — Hanover

It's not utilitarianism.

What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

You point out the harm done. Even in courts when accessing a lawsuit e.g., they focus on the harm, and if you show harm, then in many cases you win the case. It's not difficult in most cases to objectively demonstrate the harm done when lying (to relationships) murdering, stealing, and a host of other actions. To me, this seems rather obvious. How do we access the harm? We give the evidence or reasons to support the conclusion. The evidence usually comes in the form of testimony, reasoning, sensory experience, etc.

If you want to make the argument that morals are not relative to time, place, and the peculiarities of different cultures, you can, but you're going to have argue either some mystical creator of morality or you're going to have argue something inherent within the constitution of the human DNA that demands them. — Hanover

I think there is a place for the mystical, but I disagree that moral arguments depend on some mystical God/creator/lawgiver. I think a very strong argument can be made that there is an objectivity to much of moral reasoning even if you remove the mystical. This isn't to say that culture, history, emotion, empathy, etc. don't play a part, they're just not the foundation that supports the argument. The problem is that people seem to want clarity and precision, and it isn't going to be found. There will always be grey areas needing more clarity because our knowledge is limited.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over. — Tom Storm

I don't see why it would be considered a good theory, but that's my view. I see much of philosophy as useless or poor epistemology, and emotivism is just one such theory.

I don't think morality can be derived from any logical arguments. In fact, logic is as likely to be the ally of evil as much as good. — frank

Logic plays an important role, but it's not the only way we justify our beliefs, it's just one of many ways. Again, as I commented to @Tom Storm an overarching view of epistemology is extremely important and Wittgenstein's ideas go a long way in answering such questions. There are many different ways we justify beliefs (many different language games), and understanding these language games helps us get the fly out of the fly-bottle. I don't agree with Wittgenstein's metaphysics, but his linguistic analysis is still the best along with Austin.

I agree that logic doesn't differentiate between good and evil, but that doesn't mean it's not useful in these discussions. Part of the problem is that we rely too much on logic, as if it's the only source of our justifications. It reminds me of people who continually rely on science as if it's the only good source of knowledge. It may in some cases be more precise, but it depends on what we're trying to answer.

Doing the right thing is an extension of love. All of it is meaningless without the reasoning behind it. My metaphysical view is that consciousness/mind is at the core of everything, and that core is love. However, moral language is an extension of that love.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. These statements fail where they must function as propositions to maintain meaning and inferential coherence. (This was pointed out in the Frege-Geach Problem.) These kinds of statements (“Stealing is wrong” akin to “Boo to stealing,”) cannot account for the logical role moral statements play in our ethical reasoning. Emotional statements lack what’s needed for validity. Emotional statements, again, lack a truth value.

There have been various attempts to address this issue, but in my opinion, they fail.

:grin:

It's better than no waving at all. :grin:

The idea that emotion plays a primary role in determining which actions are immoral and which are not is a non-starter for me. I don't see this as a worthy moral theory. I think you agree. I agree with you that our actions are primary. I try to make such theories as simple as possible for people. I see right and wrong in terms of the harm done and mitigating the harm. Other issues play into morality like intentions, values, virtues, and mitigating circumstances.

When you say "morality is about harm done," it seems to me thsi is expressing an emotional reaction to harm. How does harm become objective? — Tom Storm

Emotional reactions will always be a part of moral and immoral actions, but it's not the guiding principle behind moral action. One could imagine a person not responding emotionally and yet able to recognize that a particular action is immoral. Why? Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person cutting off the arm of another without good reason. The harm done to the person is objective, viz., the blood loss, the arm on the ground, the screams, and the reactions of family and friends. All of these components are objective and clearly objective. This is true whether you respond emotionally or not. And where there is a question as to the harm done, which clearly happens, then we can debate whether or not there is harm. One can see the objective harm in stealing, lying, betrayal, etc. By the way each of these (stealing, lying, and betrayal) have nuances that people debate about, but that's just the nature of the subject. It's not always clear that harm has been done, so we shouldn't always be absolutist about these things. But generally speaking, we can say these actions are immoral.

We might also add that when confronted with two evils, choose to do the least amount of harm (the principle of harm) based on the facts available to you.

Bedrock for me refers to hinges that are more fixed than other hinges. Hinges are layered, some more fixed than others, but the riverbed works well too. Nowhere does Wittgenstein use the word absolute so I stay away from that in most cases. Some hinges are absolute. For example, we are a body separate from other bodies.

it usually means a starting-point for a ratiocination. "Bedrock" seems more like an absolute to me - unquestionable in all contexts. So I'm broadly with you and Sam26 on this. — Ludwig V

I don't hold to the view that Wittgensteinian hinges are necessarily absolute. In fact, most of them are not. For example, the rules of chess are hinges and they aren't absolute (absolute meaning they can't be other than they are). Most are contingent.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. I believe morality is rooted in emotion (though I don't necessarily subscribe to emotivism or expressivism) and also involves intersubjective agreements - cultural values. — Tom Storm

I'm not a fan of the "truth-apt" language. I look at truth, and other concepts like knowledge in terms of their use (language games), so my take is very broad. I'm very much a Wittgensteinian in this sense. I don't think I would agree that morality is rooted in emotion. Although there is obviously an emotional component. I think generally morality is rooted in the harm done, i.e., X is immoral because of the harm it causes. However, this is not always the case I'm sure there are exceptions. I agree that it does involve "intersubjective agreements" and "cultural values," but I also think there is an objective component to moral values.

If it's something you're born with why do we have to teach children right from wrong? Moreover, what would it even mean to be born with that knowledge, i.e., moral knowledge?

One could say that it's a matter of convictions (personal and communal). However, most people do have negative feelings about the matter because they see the harm done.