To name is to divide or distinguish one thing from an other. Zhuangzi's Cook Ting (Ding) divides the ox along its natural joints. To divide things in a way that is contrary to their natural divisions is to force things. The proper division of things requires knowing the natural patterns and organization of things. Knowing what belongs together, what is a part of some larger thing as well as what is separable toward some end or purpose.

He says:

At the beginning, when I first began carving up oxen, all I could see was the whole carcass.
After three years I could no longer see the carcass whole ...

It is because he had been dividing oxen for three years that he no longer see the carcass as an undifferentiated whole. He saw that it is made up of parts. He say now:

I follow the natural form slicing the major joints I guide the knife through the big hollows ...

The ability to guide his knife takes skill developed through practice. But this is not the difference between him and a good cook:

What your servant loves, my lord, is the Dao, and that is a step beyond skill.

Going beyond skill does not mean to bypass skill. The cultivation of skill is an essential step in the effort to develop effortless action or wu -wei

We should not overlook the fact that this and other examples are about ordinary people doing ordinary practical things. As King Hue says in response:

Excellent.“I have heard the words of Cook Ding and learned how to nourish life!”

A few words that caution us about the use of words.

Chapter Sixteen:

Attain extreme tenuousness

Chapter 32:

When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are names.
Now that there are names, know enough to stop!

Ivanhoe translation

Zhuangzi poses the problem this way:

If we’re already one, can I say it? But since I’ve just said we’re one, can I not say it? The unity and my saying it make two. The two and their unity make three.

He said on the Cross: "My God, My God, Why Have You Forsaken Me?". How could He be abandoned if He and God are one? — MoK

There are different interpretations of what it means to be one. In the development of Christian theology it has been understood to mean one and the same. The same ousia. The same being. The same essence. Homoousion.

This is not the only sense of what it means to be one. To be one is to be united. To stand together rather than opposed. One who knows the Law, one, who recites the Shema and understands it, would not hear the oneness of God and man with pagan ears. Nowhere in the Gospel of Matthew do we find anything other than the distinction between God the Father and Jesus, a "son of God".

It is only by a confluence of later influences that results in an abuse of logic that a son is his own father.

Without the assumption that the two, God and Jesus, are one and the same, the story can be read in a way that is perhaps closer to the original. It appears as if Jesus knew nothing of the apologetics of sin and sacrifice that were to emerge. Like with Job and Ecclesiastes God's will is inscrutable. Why a man who was believed by his followers to be the Messiah was put to death was for them unfathomable. But in the ways of man myths emerged to try and make sense of it.

1. Composed beings are made up of parts. — Bob Ross

It is not as if living beings are an assemblage of parts that exist prior to or independently of the organism. We might say that the parts of living beings are made by or caused by that being though a process of autopoiesis.

2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement. — Bob Ross

No, the parts are contingent upon the being of which they are parts.

Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. — Bob Ross

What is an uncomposed part? Where do we find them?

An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts. — Bob Ross

A simple being without parts is an imaginative fiction masquerading as an a priori ontological necessity. The existence of the fiction, a simple being, is made up of and contingent upon a poorly composed chain of arguments that begins with something known but misunderstood, a living being that has distinguishable but not independent parts, and then posits something unknown and inexplicable as if it is a causal explanation.

27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is. — Bob Ross

Our use of the term 'good' does not entail that what is called good is without privation. "what the thing is" is an ambiguous claim. We might say that a dog or a meal a song is good but in none of these cases do we mean that to be a dog or a meal or a song is to be good or without privation. There are bad dogs and meals and songs. The claim that to be God is to be good because what God is is good is circular and question begging.

the bedrock, the groundless ground — Joshs

I think the following metaphor is apt:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

From On Certainty:

177. What I know, I believe.

179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.

180. Or again "I believe..." is an 'expression', but not "I know...".

424. ...One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it".

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

483. The correct use of the expression "I know". Someone with bad sight asks me: "do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?" I reply "I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it." - A: "Isn't N.N. at home?" - I: "I believe he is." - A: "Was he at home yesterday?" - I; "Yesterday he was - I know he was; I spoke to him." - A: "Do you know or only believe that this part of the house is built on later than the rest?" - I: "I know it is; I got it from so and so."

The idea that it's absurd to say one "knows" that one has a toothache suggests that "knowing" is about justification. — Count Timothy von Icarus

His remark is about the grammar of the word 'know'. It makes no sense to say that I have a toothache but do not know it. If it is not the kind of thing that I do or might not know then it makes no sense to say that I do know it.

The idea that one can doubt anything one "knows" also makes it pretty clear that "knowledge" here is something like belief. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What would it mean to know something but doubt it? I know by experience not to grab a hot pan from the stove. If I ever doubted it I no longer do. My knowing it has nothing to do with believing it or not believing it. I will get burned whether I believe it or not.

Two questions:

1. Where in the grammar of ordinary language do we find the idea that knowledge is justified true belief?

2. Where do we find Wittgenstein claiming that knowledge is justified true belief?

We are talking about very different things.

While I can see your point, natural theology will suggest that the regularities and rationally-intelligible principles that constitute what we describe as natural laws suggest a prior cause. — Wayfarer

Perhaps the pursuit of natural theology is to forsake wisdom as it is understood in the wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible. Perhaps the attempt to understand God in terms of rational principles is a misguided attempt to understand a God who is understood, to the extent he is understood, as willful.

One could argue among the aims of philosophy is to discern the boundary of what can be explained in terms of natural laws, and to intuit what may lie beyond it, even if it can't be stated in scientific terms. — Wayfarer

One could also argue that an appeal to intuition is in this case to mistake the imagination for intellection in the sense it is used in Plato's divided line.

You are circling the drain. Repeating the same claims as if they are truths.

We got now the first event of how the Trump administration will work as Musk showed his power in the incoming Trumpster-fire administration. — ssu

Short-term they will attempt to work as if the US is a joint business venture. People who do not understand how running a nation works might think this is a good thing, but the US cannot take advantage of the protections it offers to corporations that both Trump's and Musk's businesses depend on. Citizens are not workers who can be laid off and disregarded. The country is not for the benefit of the owners and shareholders.

Long-term it seems likely that the relationship between Trump and Musk will fracture. For both of them shared power means shared recognition and neither wants to play second fiddle. Then there is the question of who the "shareholders" aka Congress will back. Trump's power lies with his popularity, but Musk's with his technological prowess. And while the social media platform X dwarfs Trump's Truth Social, the more decisive power lies with Musk's SpaceX, for which Trump has nothing even remotely comparable.

.

It matters because it's relevant to what Stephanopolous said. ABC would probably have won the case, although it would have raised Trump's ire and led to his retaliation. — Relativist

I think the decision was made by or with ABC's parent company, Disney. They are concerned with Trump's escalating weaponization of the legal system while pretending that he is the victim. His strategy is always two-fold - legal determination backed by appeal after appeal and public opinion. The merits of the case was not Disney's main concern. They were more concerned with the process of discovery and what dirt could be found or manufactured against Disney's wide ranging assets and how this might affect their public image. As Trump knows well, whatever the truth may be, the harm comes from the accusations.

.

Does "natural" only mean things in the world that we already know of, and "super-natural" means things that we don't know of yet? — A Christian Philosophy

No. When you say:

We could entertain that the laws of nature are caused by prior laws, but this only pushes the problem one step back. To avoid the risk of infinite regress, a fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause. — A Christian Philosophy

that is an indication that you know the difference. What is natural means what can be explained, to the extent it can be explained, by the laws of nature. It is because you accept the idea that everything must have a cause and reject the idea that the laws of nature are self-caused that you "deduce" that there must be something that causes the laws of nature. Rather than questioning the principle that there must be a cause you simply posit the existence of one because you believe that there must be one.

Rather than the problem of an infinite regress, the problem is one of the limits of human reason.

I am unclear on what you mean by "natural" vs "super-natural". How do you define those two terms? — A Christian Philosophy

Roughly, natural explanations do not introduce anything outside the natural world. It rejects the idea that the world is contingent and requires a necessary cause, that is, a super or supra-natural cause that is above or beyond the limits of the natural world and on which the world is dependent.

What is questionable about the PSR? — A Christian Philosophy

We have been through this already.

I did not use the word "super-natural". — A Christian Philosophy

When natural explanations cannot explain why there is anything at all you resort to a super-natural explanation even if you do not use that word.

We should simply try to follow the rules of the PSR to its logical conclusion. — A Christian Philosophy

This is circular reasoning.

And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent things — A Christian Philosophy

All other contingent things? Something whose existence is necessary is not something that is contingent. If all natural things are contingent then what is necessary is not something natural but rather the cause of what is natural.

Why must there be a reason for what is? Positing a principle that there must be is circular and question begging.

We could continue to go round and round, but I won't.

There is no one definitive version of the PSR. — RussellA

That is not what I asked. I asked which version says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred.

I don't believe that the PSR can logically be formulated to apply to unknown events. — RussellA

Then you reject every version of the PSR that does not explicitly state that the principle only applies to events we know of.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a principle, and principles only exist in the mind. — RussellA

It makes an ontological claim.

When the original event happened, the event wasn't following the principle that it could only happen if there was a reason. — RussellA

How do you know that?

The original event wasn't determined by a Principle. — RussellA

The principle does not determine the event. The event occurs in accord with the principle. The principle is not the cause.

But then you say we can say something about an event we know nothing about, ie, that it must have a reason. — RussellA

That is not what I said. What I said was:

We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. — Fooloso4

I gave the example of

the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0 — Fooloso4

. Until recently we did not know it existed. We now know it does. According to the PSR it must have a reason for existing. That reason was not created by our discovery of it.

There is no one version of the PSR. There are different formulations. The PSR is a family of principles (SEP - PSR). — RussellA

And which of those versions says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred? Or is that your own contribution?

I am making the case that in the absence of a God, it wouldn't be sensible to apply a PSR to unknown events. — RussellA

How does our knowing that an event has occurred affect the event such that prior to our knowledge of it it did not or might not have a reason for occurring? We can now see events that occurred millions of years ago, how does our seeing it now but not previously change what occurred or why it occurred?

Is there any argument that could explain how we can know something about an unknown event, such as the unknown event having a reason? — RussellA

We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. In what way does our coming to know them change the reason for them occurring?

There are different formulations of the PSR. You cite one version of it. See SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason. — RussellA

I asked you:

Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? — Fooloso4

The closest you came to answering is:

For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans. — RussellA

You say:

A principle that cannot be justified shouldn't be used. — RussellA

but when I asked:

Are you arguing against the PSR? — Fooloso4

your response was:

No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown events — RussellA

Once again, whose version of the PRS are you relying on?

And again, the Webb telescope makes known to us events that were previously unknown. According to Leibniz version, the reason for the existence of these events is present in the events whether we are aware of the event or not. The reason is inherent to the event, not to our knowledge of it.

The existence of a being whose existence is an essential property is deduced directly from the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

What is deduced from a questionable principle is questionable.

This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.
— Fooloso4
What else could it possibly be? — A Christian Philosophy

Positing a super-natural being in order to explain what you cannot explain is question begging. It assumes what is in question, that there must be a comprehensive reason for what is.

To avoid the risk of infinite regress, the fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause. — A Christian Philosophy

What is this something? What is the explanation for this something?

You propose a formulation of the PSR — RussellA

I don't propose it. I cite it.

You must feel that there is a justification for this particular formulation. — RussellA

Prior to the question of whether one agrees or disagrees is the question of what the principle is. The principle is not based on our ability to know the reason, but rather states that there must be a reason.

I do not know that there is a reason or that there is not a reason for everything

For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans. — RussellA

Up until this point you have been treating unknown as unknown to us. If God knows then even if we do not there is still a reason for all events, reasons known to God. The reason for something is not contingent on our knowing the reason.

Is your argument based on the existence of a God? — RussellA

My argument is that if you accept the PRS then you must accept that there is a reason for everything whether that reason is known to us or not. One might, of course, object along the lines of our not knowing that there is a God who knows all things.

No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown events — RussellA

Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? Where does it say in that version that the PSR does not apply to unknown events?

I am arguing that it is not possible to know about something that we don't know about, including any reason for the something that we don't know anything about. — RussellA

There is a difference between knowing what the reason is and there being a reason. According to Leibniz version, as I understand it, everything must have a reason. That reason is intrinsic to it rather than something that only exists when we know of the thing or event. We cannot say what that reason is if the thing or event is unknown, but it must have a reason whether we know it or not. If you cannot accept that then you do not accept the PSR.

In this particular case, that the something we don't know about has a reason. — RussellA

Are you arguing against the PSR?

The expression "all events whether known or unknown" is a contradiction in terms. It is not possible to know that there are unknown events as they are unknown. — RussellA

It is not a contradiction. An event is something that happens. According to the PSR there is a reason for it happening. Our knowledge of something happening is not a requirement for it to happen. The Webb telescope has detected the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0, which formed about 290 million years after the Big Bang. There is a reason for it happening, whether we know it happened or not.

The question is: how far will they bend toward Trump's will — Relativist

Up until the point where it becomes a liability:

When prices continue because of tariffs.
When the US can't sell goods overseas because other nations will impose tariffs in response.
When there is a shortage of workers because of deportations.
When the effects of climate change can no longer be ignored
.

Therefore the PSR cannot be applied to the unknown. — RussellA

If the PSR is valid it should hold for all events whether known or unknown. If it happened then there must be, according to the principle, a reason for it happening. If PSR is restricted to what we know or observe then the reason for the star exploding is contingent upon our knowledge of it happening.

In conclusion, the PSR is valid, but only applies to observable facts, events and truths. — RussellA

Suppose a star explodes 10 light years from us. It will not be observable to us for 10 years. If the PSR only applies to observable,facts does that mean that with regard to that event the PSR is not valid and will not be valid for 10 years?

The traditional answer is: we can posit the existence of a First Cause which has existence necessarily or as an essential property. The existence of this First Cause is grounded by logical necessity ... — A Christian Philosophy

This is an a priori abuse of logic. Positing something that has existence necessarily as an essential property is essentially a conjuring trick. Something does not exist because you posit its existence as necessary.

Either there is an illogical jump from natural causes to a supernatural cause or this supposed first cause is itself in need of a cause.

Rejecting the idea that there is a reason would go against our reasoning process ... — A Christian Philosophy

It doesn't. It is unreasonable to assume that because we can find reasons for some things that we can find reasons for everything. It leads to the unreasonable assumption of a first cause.

(3) By elimination, they are designed. — A Christian Philosophy

More conjuring. This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.

... there still must be a prescriptive explanation for why matter and energy behave as described by those laws. — A Christian Philosophy

'God did it' is not an explanation.

Then, if we observe a rock falling there would be no reason why we hadn't observed the rock not falling. — RussellA

The reason we observed the rock falling is that it fell and we were there to see if fall. There may be various reasons why it fell and various reasons why we were there to see it fall. It does not follow from the fact that we can posit reasons for why we observed the rock fall, that there is a reason for everything.

You did not address the problem. Observing that a rock falls is not a reason for why the rock falls.

Sooner or later explanations reach a dead end — RussellA

What does this mean in terms of PSR? The observation that a rock falls is not a reason for or explanation for it falling. If explanation reaches a dead end then either we have failed to find the reason or there is no reason.

when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released. — RussellA

But gravity means more than that.

According to the original poster by reason he/she means explanation.

Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations?

The OP describes the PSR ... — RussellA

From the OP:

In this way, the PSR is also called “Principle of Parsimony” or “Occam’s Razor”: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. — A Christian Philosophy

We posit three explanations — A Christian Philosophy

It depends on the meaning of "reason" — RussellA

In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation.

Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question?

Thus, if all objects in existence are explained, by 1 of the 3 types of reasons as per the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", then existence is also explained. — A Christian Philosophy

This is question begging.It assumes what is in question, namely whether everything in existence can be explained. These three types of reason are based on the existence of things. They do not explain why there is anything at all.

On the epistemology side, yes, that is, our knowledge of the PSR is defended by that premise. — A Christian Philosophy

Well, if we rejected the idea that there is a reason then we would not look for for one, but it does not follow that there must be one.

This occurs when we lack data. — A Christian Philosophy

That is the point. Where is the data that is sufficient to conclude that everything must have a reason?

Since there are only 3 types of reasons in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", the laws of nature would be explained by 1 of the 3 types. — A Christian Philosophy

Again, this is question begging. It assumes what is in question. It does not explain why there are laws of nature and does not demonstrate that those laws are prescriptive rather than descriptive.

C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable — RussellA

Maybe a superior intelligence might understand it, maybe not. In either case we do not, and based on our ignorance we cannot conclude that the universe is what we might regard as reasonable.

C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question — RussellA

Sure, but the right question might lead to a rejection of the PSR.

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

I was referring to what you originally had as Parmenides conclusion, that the world has always existed. But your corrected conclusion is no better. Both are based on the wrong question (C2) - when did it come into existence? And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility?

Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. From this he concluded that the world has always existed (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason) — RussellA

The problem, as I see it, is the assumption that if one asks a question there must be an answer to that question. There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that:

C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited.
C2 - The question itself is the problem.
C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable.