I'm doing both, as ever. — S

Ahhhh. So “you’re sooooo stupid!!!”is a successful refutation in your world?

What could possibly suggest I’m confused? Because I don’t agree with you? Because I don’t stick to your usage? Because the authority I’m using is confusing to you?

You can’t even know for sure I don’t completely agree with every thing you say, but took the antagonist approach just for the fun of it.

disagreeing with me over my realism — S

Oh but I don’t, in principle. Only difference is yours is necessary but insufficient, whereas mine is both because a form of idealism is attached as its complement.

your epistemology should be the laughing stock of philosophy. — S

But it isn’t. Lots have done what you are doing, mocking it without refuting it.

Go figure.

Along with Einstein, Newton, Galileo, Hawking, just to name a few.

Good company.

the idealist is one of an enlightened few and has seen through the smokescreen of naive realism and has grasped the Truth! — Theorem

LOL. There’s hope for you yet!!!! Forsake the LOOOSSERRR side and join the chosen. I’ll show the nudgenudgewinkwink secret handshake.

Drop that capitol T truth, though. Haven’t got that far.

Of course I’m a realist. How foolish to suppose there aren’t real things in the real world. Besides, I couldn’t explain my very own self if I denied objective reality. And if I acknowledge objective reality as not only reasonable, but absolutely necessary, I cannot then deny that same objective reality, and by association its contents, as present when I am not.

I call anyone an idealist if they are rational thinkers. Whether or not those anyone’s agree is nothing to me; it’s just what the name implies.

Do not confuse the appearing of physical manifestation of reflected light, with the conceptual appearing of the effect of reflected light. The eyes mediate the former into the latter and science agrees with the transformation of one kind of energy into another.

I have no experience of oranges in cupboards. My immediate cognition would be empty for lack of understanding. If you tell me there is an orange behind the cupboard door, I’ll say....ok, take you’re word for it. But no such knowledge of fact is available to me. Still, because I know “orange” and I know “cupboard”, I know a priori the possibility of oranges in cupboards is not self contradictory and is at the same time quite possible. Just like those stupid f’ing rocks.
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people mean two different things when they talk about the orange and the experience of it. — S

No, actually, they do not. The orange *talked about* IS the orange of experience, and similarly the orange merely thought is the orange of possible experience. The former is certain, the latter is not. The orange you ate is certainly a orange, the orange in the cupboard is possibly an orange.
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No matter the assignment of naitivity to this particular theoretical epistemology, it is complete. Any question asked of it is answered by it, according to its author. Whether it is appreciated or not is entirely irrelevant; it has yet to be successfully falsified or replaced. And even if science proves the physical mechanisms of the brain sufficient to account for subjective predicates, humans will still think as if it never did, and will continue to act as their own subjects.

It can be viewed that way, insofar as your order, or sequence, is correct. Nevertheless, when questions are asked about how it all happens, it becomes obscure because of the terminology specific to the theory. In other words, if the logical sequence leads to a certain conclusion, the wording of the conclusion cannot be used beforehand. This means we don’t experience phenomena or representation because phenomena occur in a series of steps before representation and representation occurs just fewer steps before we can call it an experience. Between is understanding, judgement, cognition, knowledge, then finally, experience.

Thing is, nobody questions reason in common everyday living. When you sense a touch, you immediately experience what reason has only allowed as phenomenon whether you know what touched you or not. By the same token, you do know what touch entails because you have been touched before, so you have extant a priori experience of being touched, hence intuitions of things that can touch, even if you do not immediately know what touched you this time. This is of course, more commonly referred to as just plain ol’ memory.

Another problem with this kind of idealism is that much liberty is given to the enunciation of “faculty”. In one place Kant will call representation a faculty but in another he’ll lead one to think of it as an object of some other faculty. Intuitions are representations but reside in consciousness, which really cannot be a faculty of representation because there are notions and ideas also resident in consciousness which cannot have representation, re: infinity, space, time, and other supersensible conceptions, including those cursed noumena.

Kant also acknowledges the theory is quite incomprehensible to those who do not wish to understand it. But if it is understood, it should be found sensible, intelligible, indeed logically possible, but nonetheless no ways near apodectically certain. It is, after all, just a theory.

Understood.

In CPR 1787 of course, he deleted that whole synopsis given in CPR 1781 you referenced as being incoherent. In B, noumena are give a whole lot less import, and stand as Janus contributed, as merely a logical complement to phenomena and of the form of mere “intellectual existence”. They are not intuited hence are unknowable, which led to the confusion of calling them “things-in-themselves”.

He had to do this, because if noumena are said to have a overt cognitive function we are then required to incorporate two separate and distinct representational functionalities, which the human mind does not have.

Basically, in the cognitive chain, appearances come first, as an un-named object called a phenomenon, occurring immediately upon perception. Empirical intuitions, which are concepts already resident a priori but derived from extant experience, relate to appearances via imagination by which phenomena are then represented, and if understanding judges the positive fitness of such relation we have cognition hence knowledge, if negative fitness we don’t, but we still have the experience of sensing something we don’t understand. It’s major importance arises from perception of objects or physical conditions yet unknown to us, or the understanding of merely possible objects.

In short, it’s a theoretical exposition of how we learn.

He did argue that insofar as sensible intuitions are appearances they must correspond to something else which they are appearances of. This he calls noumena. — Theorem

This is patently false, on two accounts. Intuitions are representations, not appearances, and, appearances correspond to real physical objects presented to sense before any treatment by reason. And they are NOT noumena.

But, in all fairness because you said “This he calls noumena”, if you could refer me to the text where I can read that, I shall be forced to reconsider.

Even paradigm-shifting thinkers aren’t right all the time.

I understand your critique of the Critique, and such has been argued similarly from Schopenhauer to Palmquist, Fitche to Russell, on the vagaries and ambiguities of pure a priori knowledge, the self-contradictions and inherent inconsistencies. Still, to call the Kantian theoretical representation “more opaque” is merely a failure to fully understand the depth of the procedure necessary for doing exactly the opposite, for the admonishment against filling ignorance with illusion in the name of assumption.

We don’t need causality to “know what they are like”; we only use the pure categories to show the fitness of their logical constitution as understanding thinks them, “them” being external objects. In addition, causality alone is not a category, but lies always in connection with dependence, which gives cause and effect. While some have claimed Kant used causality itself as a pure intuition, different in scope and employment than the categories, along with space and time, Kant himself does not.

Anyway....a time and a place, as the saying goes.

It doesn’t.

Under both currently understood physical law, and the logical law of identity, c + c = c is unintelligible.

If you don’t already have it, see http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/einstein/specrel/www/

shake your head and ignore it. — Theorem

Ignoring it then leaves one with rationality in general and humanity in particular irreducible to a non-contradictory fundamental condition, because the only other possible methodology, empirical science, cannot provide one. Yet. So far.

all physical objects also happen to be objects of experience! — Theorem

All physical objects also happen to be objects of experience OR POSSIBLE experience. This prevents the absurdity of “esse est percipi”. It could also be re-written as, all KNOWN physical objects also happen to be objects of experience. Not even science can deny that.

Reason acts when the object is internal; reasons reacts when the object is external. In the former reason gives itself its object, in the latter perception, or more accurately, sensibility, gives reason its object. We have to be able to account for our ability to think about real things when there is no real things present to think about. Otherwise we would never be able to remember anything. Metaphysically speaking, to be sure.

Science of course, has all that handled, with neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience, and Penrose, et al, wants to add in quantum potentials and what-not. Which is fine; won’t change the common man one wit.

Ok. I can go along with utility as an assessment of properties.

The minor eye-brow raising I might exhibit would be over any kind of properties of mind, but that’s beside the point.

are we saying that x, some object, like a hammer, literally has properties that are identical to what we're calling utility? — Terrapin Station

Exactly. Otherwise, we’re left with a wet noodle with the same utility as a hammer with respect to striking nails. While both can be used for it, the ends will be quite different because of their respective properties.

Analyze away. I just won’t be able to read or reply for awhile.

But the counter point will be.....no sense can be made out of something exists but has no utility. Which may be true, but that doesn’t make it a property. Properties are necessary; utility is contingent on properties.

I can’t see where utility is any more a property than meaning is a pattern.

If a thousand people witness something; the individual witness accounts are still subjective, aren't they. — wax

Yes. Accounts are subjective; the something is objective because of the implication given by “witness”.

Subjective: that upon which reason acts.
Objective: that upon which reason reacts.

There's the orange, and then there's how it appears. — S

The modern idealist will say this is backwards. That which is named is always first an undefined appearance susceptible to naming.

an orange just is the experience. — Michael

This is how that same modern idealist thinks. An orange, as any real physical object, just *is* the experience *because* it has already been named, or which is the same thing, cognized as meeting the criteria for “orange”. Experience is just another word for empirical knowledge.

I loves me some cheese, boy howdy.

Not so sure about that headgear though. I haven’t sat in a barber chair since cars had fins, so.....not sure about the fit.

Perused the thread; agreed without exception. 2 + 2 will equal 4 anywhere in the Universe, as soon as we get there to prove it. Or maybe as soon as we get there and find some intelligence ready to prove it to us. Or maybe just us getting there proves it. Either way, there’s going to be a mind, and by association, reason itself, tagging along for the ride.

Tegmark (2007) thinks the Universe is a mathematical entity in and of itself. But that’s way above my capacity.

Brief opening proposition here, or send me where I can see for myself?

In the words of the immortal Gilda Radnor.....never mind. Found it.

It better be. Mathematical expressions were initially deemed logically infallible, hence universally true. But we’d never been anywhere off-planet. Now, with spacecraft still operating billions of miles away sorta sustains the reckoning for universality.

I’ll never know, but I have to think mathematical logic is both necessary and universal. I also think it will be just as necessary and universal for any other relational intelligence similar to ours. Different symbols probably, but same operational predicates.

Cool.

I remember seeing that expression, but I didn’t stick around. Thread name?

Hmmm. The thesis would begin with.....meaning is a product of reason and is no way a property of that which reason examines.

The proof would take 7-8 pages, so we’ll forego that, with blessings (and chuckles) from the attendees, I’m sure.

I’d be even happier, ecstatic no less, if you’d chalk yourself up in the “meaning absolutely requires reason” column.

I’m a YankeeVirgoBabyboomer, and we operate better in a gang, doncha know.

You’re thinking it a dichotomy but in reality they are inseparable so it really shouldn’t be thought that way. Ok, I can dig it.

Ok. Then how does the idealist/materialist dichotomy fit in? I just brought up subject/object dualism because it seems to relate one-to-one with idealist/materialist, plus you mentioned an assumed observer. What difference do you see between the two ways of describing the same bilateral doctrine?

Are you agreeing, via shared belief, that the idealist/materialist dichotomy is false, but the subject/object dualism is not?

I read for context but didn’t find anything to answer my own question.

D’accord.

Metaphysical or ontological existence of meaning........reason. Everybody knows that.

If the universe exists without conscious minds inhabiting it, then of course it must embody meaningful information. Which would just mean that there is information there which would be meaningful to a conscious mind if there was a conscious mind. Why is this so difficult to understand? — Janus

It is difficult to understand because the argument is being forwarded by an intelligence the major premise denies. It does not stand to reason that a universe sans conscious minds must embody information, this claim stemming merely from the fact such entity currently inhabits a universe where meaningful information is embodied. Experience informs him one extant universe involves information, but that in itself does not permit him to say extant universes without him must also contain information. Just because it would seem absurd otherwise, is not sufficient reason to ground the impossibility of other kinds of universes beyond his ken.
“....those who do philosophy should not fear absurdies...” (Russell, 1912)

Furthermore, the minor premise negates the major, which dissolves the argument by creating a new one, and tacitly relegates the very concept of reactionable “meaning” to be intrinsic to the conscious mind.

It is well worth bearing in mind......constantly......human rationality is absolutely restricted to the human condition alone, and nothing should be ventured outside it with an expectation of knowledge.

existence of your interest or ability to decipher meaning says nothing about the existence of meaning itself — Janus

You are correct, of course. Generally, however, it must be admitted an intelligence is required for the existence of meaning, whether the instantiation of it, or the subsequent recognition of it. Given the abundance of theories on the topic over the centuries suggests a serious lack of consensus on the very idea of meaning itself.

Seems more parsimonious to think meaning is like the tree on the corner of 4th and Maple, Anytown, Anywhere......if there is one, fine, if there isn’t, fine. If we can’t tell the difference, the truth of the matter is moot.

I edited that line out to prevent the uproar sure to follow. It was put there with respect to noumena, with which I will hold in its original assertorial configuration.

That being said, and empirically speaking, that which is assumed to contain possible meaning, must still meet the criteria of possible decryption and possible understanding. Failing either of those, the actual meaning remains no more than assumption, and becomes factually irrelevant. There is nothing given from these failings that even suggests a congruent rationality imbued the assumed meaning in the first place.

From a practical point of view, I got no Interest in a meaning I can’t understand.

If noumena can be talked about then they must have something to do with meaning. — Janus

If viewed as you said, a logical correspondence to phenomena, and as I said, an intelligible extant, then there is no meaning associated with them.

It is apparent you may already be familiar with the interpretation that noumena serve the same purpose as schemata, wherein the conflict with impossibility of objective validity is reconciled. I personally don’t buy it, but I ain’t nobody, so........

But yes, the idea of noumena is subject to critical examination, in which case it is the idea with its object, and not noumenon.

It doesn’t, actually. Noumena can never relate to any empirical relation, and noumena can be talked about. Otherwise, the word and its use wouldn’t stand in its philosophical place. Neither things-in-themselves nor noumena can be known as they actually must be, from either experience for lack of an intuition, or from understanding for lack of a conception.

“....noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena...”
“....cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena)...”
“....noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity....”

Noumena can never have anything to do with meaning, for meaning always has its object.

Answer one, answer both.

Simple.

When is meaning?

Reference frames.

The thought experiment grounding Special Relativity as given in “The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” and demonstrated with mathematics, presupposes a third party observer of both the clock on the train and the clock on the platform. This observers sees both the reference frame of the moving passenger and the reference frame of the stationary perspective simultaneously. Or, which is the same thing, the third party observer witnesses the simultaneity of lightening bolts the two other references frames cannot distinguish. When technology advanced far enough to put the mathematics to the test, the clocks in the two reference frames showed the mathematical predictions to be correct, insofar as the respective clocks showed different elapsed times.

Nevertheless, there can be no third party observer for any physical experiment whereby velocities are sufficient for relative time dilation. In other words, no one is going to see the relative speeds of clock movements; all they can do is compare two clocks after viewing them in one reference frame or the other.

personally, I don’t think this changes much of anything. Time dilation is of course a natural phenomenon, but as far as we’re concerned right now, we cannot move at speeds fast enough for the differences in relative times to be noticeable.