I’m aware.

Given congruent, re: similarly constructed, rationalities, if to “point at meaning” is to indicate an origin for it, or if to “point at meaning” is to summarize its possibility, I can offer such pointing to be none other than reason itself, in the form a judgement whereby a conception conforms to its object or it does not. Here, it is judgement that points to, or in effect, mediates, meaning. Meaning is merely a product of reason and in no way is a property of that which reason examines.

As you say, you have to do something theoretical.

It’s all good. I don’t mind being corrected, should the occassion arise.

Over the years I’ve been accused of over-analyzing the bejesus out of stuff, so I’m pretty sure I make my intentions with respect to those terms either explicit or otherwise contextually obvious. If you know of a opposing instance, remind me of it?

What’s a po’ boy to do, huh? Hand-waving if he doesn’t, overstating the obvious if he does.

There is Plato’s ideality of forms, there is Berkeley’s subjective idealism, there is Wolff’s pluralistic ontological idealism, there is Hegel’s Phenomenological idealism, there is Kant’s Transcendental idealism, and a host of other sub-denominations. It is worthy to note that none before Wolff categorized “idealism” as a class of philosophical thought, adding the monist/dualist sub-strata to it, and none before Kant actually admitted to being, or in fact called themselves, one. As well, none but the most extreme branches of it outright denied the existence of an objective material environment, an absolute non-materialism, but rather, idealists varied in their respective rationalities for describing their approach to the form such objectivity would have or would be given.

Nonetheless, there indeed were flaws in most forms of subjective or absolute or immaterial idealism, which is probably why no one seriously considers them as theoretically useful these days. But they do stand in good regard for how far we’ve advanced in our speculative epistemological philosophy.

Don’t you just hate it when it’s presupposed about you, that you don’t know something after you’ve already rejected it?

The source of the time-independent “rocks are rocks” tautology”
“.....It is clear that in the description of the most general form of proposition only what is essential to it may be described -- otherwise it would not be the most general form. That there is a general form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of proposition is: Such and such is the case.

....and, lest we forget the case of the disappearing humans:
“....The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences).
Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it -- the logical form.
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with the propositions outside logic, that is outside the world....”

I know I know.....it’s been said (1787) one cannot and should not nit-pick a manuscript for his own particular purposes without jeopardizing the understanding of the totality of it. Been there, done that, got the extra-thick reading glasses to show for it. (Sigh)

Rhetorically speaking.

Ok.

How very “Xenophan-ic” of you!!

Can you spell “categorical error”?

The mashed potato thing is nothing but a form of “I know you are but what am I”

Try harder.

You’re welcome. Gives me a chance to show off. No..wait...I mean....(grin)

Don’t sweat keeping the thread open; wasn’t up to us. There’ll be others.

No one here should be talking about language being necessary for a rule to be expressed. — S

....unless they are of the mind that such expression contains the rule, the expression *is* the rule. Anything beforehand is nothing but synthetic a priori relations.

The alternative is contradictory, insofar as, if the rule is thought to be antecedent to its expression, hence antecedent to the language that expresses it, it can only be presented as such by speaking about it by means of the language it was supposed to be antecedent to. Whatever it was that was supposed to be a rule can’t be said to be a rule unless it is expressed as being one. If such were not the case, it would be impossible to distinguish rule from accident.

On the other hand, there are rules theoretically employed in the human thought system that are not generally expressed, hence are language independent, but still must be explicated and understood before being presented in a formal elucidation of how they are used. Analytic or synthetic propositions are such because of a rule to which they adhere but the rule is not contained in the proposition itself. In the same way, concepts relate to phenomena according to rules, such that we do not confuse the objects of our perceptions, but there is nothing in a concept or a perception that illuminates the rule.

As far as the OP is concerned, the ontology of meaning in language is contained in the language used in tandem with the rationality using it. Whether we create a new word or learn an extant word, all we’re doing is relating it to a concept in our heads. Nothing more, nothing less.

Idealist logic reigns supreme. Again. YEA!!!!!!

Fun while it lasted.

Irrelevant. No way to prove it, which leaves it as mere anecdotal fanfare for the common man.

Nothing I said suggests I want anything but a critique of MY thinking, not a substitution of yours for it. You did the latter constantly and never once did the former.

The reason this thread has lasted so long is because you’re fun to play with. You offer no argument in the dialectic style, but reject everything under the guise of failure to think like you do.

You over-estimate yourself by supposing there’s a box to think outside of. There isn’t; the OP is too straightforward to be out of a box. Being in an established metaphysical box is entirely sufficient to falsify the conclusins in the OP.

No definition is ever entirely sufficient for the explanation of a particular physical object, for definitions are universals. Nor is a definition ever sufficient for enunciation of the conditions of particular objects or sets of objects. Whenever definitions are used in your argument, you fail to sustain it.

No. You’re culpable for accusing me of it without showing how the failure manifests.

Do you recognize this: first positive, first negative, second positive, second negative....

Do you recognize this: first positive, first negative, second positive second negative....

And again

Answering a question with a question, and deflection of culpability.

Wonderful.

Do you understand that saying “rocks are just rocks” is a tautological declaration and not a dialectical contribution? Nobody can back-and-forth with “just rocks”. When the proposition is presented showing it is possible under certain conditions that rocks are not just rocks, and the rejoinder is, “Wrong. Rocks are just rocks”, the conversation’s over.

The votes exhibit the illegitimacy of your argument, and the fact nobody sticks around very long to parley with you should tell you you’re a philosophy_TYPE that doesn’t have much to say. To say you’re admittedly not a nice guy means nothing to someone here just to dialogue over a metaphysical quandry; nobody’s here to go out for drinks, but to see what you got for a brain, to investigate your capacity for reason.

You may well have it, but the precedents shown here and elsewhere certainly don’t display any of it. When your argument from authority is your own, small wonder folks just shake their heads and slowly back away.

........slowly backing away.

Re: philosophy-TYPE

“Snobbery” rather than “preference”

QED

All good.

As to having no choice, it is a matter of preventing endless regression, that we have to make an assumption somewhere along the line of methodological reduction. The principle is assumed, e.g., our perceptions, of themselves, don’t lie, etc., and the system to which the principle is applied is examined by means of it. We continue along with the examination until met with contradiction, in which case the principle is discarded and we start over, or until we are met with conformity to observation, in which case the principle holds. In between those two extremes reside laws, rules and habits. And language.

Agreed, in principle. Whatever is going on between the ears is under the auspices of natural law.

That being said, as long as we don’t know how something as apparently yet irrefutably real as an individual subject not yet derivable from natural law, can be present to our attention, and in fact *is* our attention, we are allowed to call the mind an abstraction of brain.

I’ve always thought, we know the brain operates on natural principles, by nameable characteristics, but our internal language is not of those principles or characteristics. One transposes to the other, sure, but, the difference is sufficient to authorize the speculative nature of thought itself. Besides, even if we prove how the brain is responsible for mind, we will still think we are thinking by means of mind. I can’t see any way possible to delete the physical mechanism from that which comes up with “thinking subject” to begin with.

I think I will agree with most of this.

If I were to add anything, I might say a rule presupposes a principle, whereas a habit presupposes an interest.

Another way to look at it is, a rule is reducible to a principle from which a corresponding behavior is obliged to follow, but a habit is not reducible to any principle, which permits habit to be merely a matter of convenience with arbitrary benefit.

In short, a law derived from a principle gives sanctity, or power, to a rule, but experience alone is the ground of habit.

Also, a rule presupposes a language for its expression. That which the rule expresses by means of language must already be given before the rule or the language, otherwise the expression has no content, therefore cannot stand as a rule.

Pretty hard to get philosophy of mind correct, when “mind” itself is rather abstract.

What would we get correct?

You philosophy-TYPES.....haven’t adopted a decent metaphysical theory and haven’t graduated to a decent enlightening beverage.

Two reasons: ego and intelligence. The first for thinking I might actually understand something so incredibly convoluted, and the second for thinking it actually makes sense to me.

It’s just speculative philosophy after all, which means it’s being correct is not a consideration, whereas it’s usefulness might be.

Ok.

Sure I could so posit, just by negating the tenents of the extant theory. First, I’d have to have a reason for so doing, then I would have to go about doing it, and after all that I would have to derive more satisfaction from doing so, I’d have to learn something, have my mind changed, conventionally speaking.

I haven’t got past having a reason yet, so the rest is moot. Which is merely a blatant cognitive prejudice, to be sure, but I’m ok with that.

Correct. The support is in the theory. Or, the support is the theory. And, as we all know, good theory must be falsifiable.

Assuming perception itself to be a passive faculty, appearance is what I am directly aware of. The naturally occurring information impressed on sense as appearance is a different form than the procedural information in the brain that gives representation of the appearance. Even allowing the all-inclusive four fundamental forces, the medium is different, the mechanics are different, yet the results conform to the incidence.

So isn't adding "do you think" to "is there a rock" redundant? — ZhouBoTong

No, because one can always think a rock without there being a rock. By the same token, it would be redundant to say I think there are rocks after one already has the experience of extant rocks. Knowledge is a stronger judgement of truth than mere thought.
———————-

How did that change how we study the stars? — ZhouBoTong

It may not, although the idea has been forwarded after the advent of QM that reason determines the nature of the experiment which in turn manifests in the experiment determining the nature of that which is being experimented on. This is because observation has been supplanted by the expectation given from mathematical prediction. Overall, however, in the macro world of direct experience, idealism in and of itself doesn’t change how we study, but rather how we understand what we study.

those of alive today have made idealism a part of our lives without even knowing it? — ZhouBoTong

They haven’t “made” it a part of their lives; it is an intrinsic part, exactly half, actually, of the system that makes us human. If you’d said without realizing it, I would be more inclined to agree.
———————-

How is it such a massive paradigm shift? It seems to me nothing changed. — ZhouBoTong

If one has no experience of what was, he thinks what is now has always been the norm. History books, the written record and imagination all say differently.
————————

concepts like math were a priori in that they already existed and humans discovered them — ZhouBoTong

The thesis:
Those certain natural relations already existed; that which became mathematical conceptions and the principles legislating their truths are determined in the mind a priori, sufficient to explain and necessary to understand those natural relations.

The proof:
In the absence of a priori knowledge, no figure is possible to conceive from the thought of two lines. Given a 6 and a 3, no concept of 9 is possible from them alone. Given a triangle, it is impossible to conceive from it, that perpendicular lines drawn from the midpoints of each line will meet at a point central to all of them.

With respect to th OP, humans will retain knowledge of post-human rocks in general via their extant experience, but that a priori knowledge is not the same as the direct a posteriori knowledge of a particular set of extant rocks required by the OP. The former is given from intuition, the latter is given from sense.

Think of it this way: instead of asking after rocks post-human, ask about the temperature. There were humans, humans look at thermometers, humans henceforth have indication of a natural phenomenon. Vacate all humans, then ask about the thermometer. Just because there’s no reason to think there’s no natural phenomenon to register on the thermometer doesn’t lend itself to any possible knowledge of what the indication is. Hell, I can’t even tell you the temperature in the next town over and I haven’t been deleted from anything.
————————

And here I had to think my way out of the church without even knowing what idealism was :grin: Doesn't this suggest that I didn't NEED idealism to do that — ZhouBoTong

Absolutely not. You had to reason your way out, which makes explicit your formal transcendental idealism. Unless of course, you simply got kicked out for stealing from the collection plate.

Because there are no basketballs in our heads, but we know all about basketballs. The thing we know merely represents the thing we know about.

A suitable alternative isn’t impossible, but it would have to be sufficient to overturn what it’s replacing.

Contents of consciousness are given from the human cognitive system, operating from the brain but are not the brain. Although advocates of modern neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience will shoot me if they find out I said that.

Yes.

(Weird. Did you see where the C & P included the time? Made it look like I said “....impressions seconds ago.”

In dreams, that which appears is the contents of consciousness.

In conscious awareness, that which appears are intuitions representing sensory impressions.

Fundamentally correct; the human system is internally representative.
Fundamentally incomplete: there must be something external to be represented.

Can you give concrete examples of the "gains" of Idealism? — ZhouBoTong

Great care is advised here, because there are many disciplines listed under Idealism as a philosophical domain, just as there is in Realism. The purely subjective idealism of Descartes has been pretty much refuted, the Monadology of Leibniz was constructed with insufficient explanatory power and Christian Wolff was far too dogmatic to survive criticism. In short, plain ol’ Idealism, without qualification, can’t be said to have offered much of anything except background for what came after. Just as Realism, in and of itself, is much too ambiguous to have any substance.

And what came after was a paradigm shift, the single greatest such shift in history, with respect to philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. And this shift was predicated on the absolutely necessary attributes of the human subject, in and of itself, which is of course, an idealist position. The difference was how the subjective condition unites with the objective, in a complete theoretical derivation which for the most part still stands today.

Here the gains are most important, to wit: when we talk about the world, it is us telling the world how we understand it, not the world telling us in fact what it is. In other words, it was classically thought that the image in the mind of, say, star, was because of the object itself and knowledge of the star was given by it. The new way says the image “star” belongs to the mind alone, hence the mind is responsible for everything having to do with “star”, meaning we tell ourselves how it is to be known by us. While we are not responsible for the existence of the star, whatever the star is will be determined by us and not by the star.

There’s also the aspect of the new Idealism in the reinstatement of a priori knowledge as being both real and substantial, whereas classically, and even mid-Enlightenment, a priori knowledge was generally either disavowed or at least misunderstood. Like, everybody knew mathematics was always true but nobody knew how it could always be true, what made it always true, with respect to human cognition. It wasn’t the instance of “ideas” in the mind for rememberance of things not in immediate attention, but a very real kind of actual knowledge by means of which intuitions based on extant experience are brought forth.

The greatest gain, if one wishes to think of it that way, is the ground being laid for the dissolution of the church’s stranglehold on philosophy. While religion was still primary in everyday life, the seeds were sown for academia to stand on a different soapbox. The power of the mind began to overshadow the power of the Establishment.

The rest is all downhill.

As I said in the beginning, there’s nothing inherently wrong with thinking there would be rocks, because sentience is not a requisite for existence. That is to say, just because we’re gone doesn’t imply rocks left with us, which permits the continuance of them. To say anything more than that, especially in a declarative affirmation, is irrational, for the painfully simple reason the proposition, “Is there a rock? Yes”, translatable without loss of coherence to “There is a rock”, is not susceptible to falsification.

Nevertheless, opinions rendered of idealistic bent had already been “reduced to the absurd” by the author, which immediately cauterized any rational argument predicated on pure reason alone.

Hmm, yeah. Reads differently the next day. Images can be a temporal sequence without being causal, of course. The specific relation expressions by our perception in this case would be succession.

Sorry. Dunno what I was thinking.

I’m cool with all that.