This is explained quite well by physicist Richard Feynman…. — Metaphysician Undercover

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....”
(Feynman lectures, (CalTech, 1956), in Vol. II, Ch 1.5, 1963)
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I can see I’ve opened a can of worms…. — Wayfarer

Nahhhh…I get it. Pretty simple, really. It all begins with an idea, in this case, “fields”. Forgetting the altogether unremarkable commonplace rendition of field as merely grass-y ground, the idea of fields as “quantitative values in space” or fields as “subjectivity”, are nothing but the idea under which distinguishing conceptions are subsumed, but without contradicting the bare notion itself.

This field possesses, e.g., momentum and energy, that field possesses, e.g., sensibility and discursive/aesthetic judgement;
This field is the condition of every object to which it relates, that field is the condition of every subject to which it relates;
That the relations are different does not contradict the validity of the respective conditions. That every particular kind of thing called a subject belongs to a subjectivity field is no less logically coherent than every particular kind of thing called an electron belongs to an electromagnetic field.

Whether that’s of any benefit or not, whether there’s any explanatory gain…..dunno. As my ol’ buddy Stephen says…..nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.

Wonderful that after your whimsical poem….. — Wayfarer

I was merely highlighting a personally-opined absurdity, re: casting a very specific intellect into the virtually unfathomable waters of Mother Nature.

I mean….how in the HELL would we humans ever know whether a honeypot ant underground in the Sonoran desert, after having turned into a nectar larder for his hive-mates to survive on during the dry season, can be considered conscious of having done so, to have instilled feelings for an otherwise impossible-to-neglect evolutionary obligation.

So we got these cool little mini-cameras down there about ten feet of so, witness the transformation of these little guys, gawk in wide-eyed wonder, then exalt our own silliness by asking if maybe they’re embarrassed from being spied on. We would be, so why wouldn’t an ant, huh?

But why stop there. Why not offer….probably best received in some peer-reviewed anthropomorphism journal….that they’re actually proud of their evolutionary majesty, which we can justify to ourselves because they haven’t ganged up and destroyed the cameras, which OBVIOUSLY means either they’re quite comfortable exhibitionists, or, they’re perfectly aware that if they do, whoever put them there will stomp the shit out of their snug home it took three years to build.

(Sigh)

“…. There is unrest in the forest
Trouble with the trees
For the maples want more sunlight
And the oaks ignore their pleas
The trouble with the maples
(And they're quite convinced they're right)
They say the oaks are just too lofty
And they grab up all the light
But the oaks can't help their feelings
If they like the way they're made
And they wonder why the maples
Can't be happy in their shade.

There is trouble in the forest
And the creatures all have fled
As the maples scream, "Oppression"
And the oaks just shake their heads
So the maples formed a union
And demanded equal rights
They say, "The oaks are just too greedy
We will make them give us light".

Now there's no more oak oppression
For they passed a noble law
And the trees are all kept equal
By hatchet, axe, and saw…”
————-

Not much for guidance I know. But still….for that intelligence internally sufficient to enable itself with such a notion as “subjectivity”, is just as enabled to either deny it elsewise on the one hand, or make an absolute mess of it altogether on the other.

“….It is the highly distinctive spirituality of Kant’s philosophy that provides its transformative force, its cultural gravity, and its historical specificity. At least that is what I shall argue in the following entirely provisional and experimental outline of the forms of spirituality present in the Critique of Pure Reason….”
(Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 8)

Sure, just about any text can be interpreted to suit the reader….
————-

…..even if almost always at the expense of the author:

“….. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.

Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions….”
(A345/B403, in Kemp Smith, 1929)
—————-

Because of this….

“…. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious—as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public.…”
(Ibid Bxxxv)

….in which spirituality, being conspicuously absent hence apparently not universally injurious, seemingly warrants it as not only provisionally and experimentally discoverable somewhere in the text, but possibly useful, in direct opposition to the author’s declaration of the soul’s nature as “….purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious…” (A799/B827, in Miekeljohn, ca1852)

Philosopher: I’ll tell you how I think;
Psychologist: I’ll tell you how you think.

(Sigh)

I’m no more a fan of phenomenology than I ever was.
— Mww

Would you mind saying a little about why? — Tom Storm

Ehhhh….it’s just me; I never graduated from the continental German Enlightenment paradigm on the one hand, and never gave….never saw a reason to give….post-Kantian speculative metaphysics due diligence on the other.

To put a finer point on it, while admitting a somewhat incomplete grasp of phenomenology proper, that of it I do understand, has already been accounted for in Kant’s “objective unity of self-consciousness”.

While it may be perfectly valid in phenomenology that “….consciousness is the grasping of being…”, I prefer that the grasping of being should belong to understanding.

“….Consciousness as a self-contained ‘subject’….” seems better said with ego as the self-contained ‘subject’, ego representing the totality of all those representations of which the self-contained subject would be conscious.

I’m not in any position to deny the validity of phenomenology, while reserving the purely subjective right to ignore it.

Hume's expression of the vulgars….. — Corvus

HA!! Yeah, Schopenhauer uses the word, too. Not as pejorative as we tend for it these days. Kant was a little more kind, just calling out as common rather than vulgar.

Still, we see changes in meaning for words in our own language, in addition to translation difficulties in others.

Many thanks for the commentary, but I must say, I’m no more a fan of phenomenology than I ever was. While I understand it was never your intention to convert anyone, but merely to present evidence for it, I don’t feel I’m missing much of significant import, especially with respect to that which “…held true for the entire classical tradition….”, of which I’m not a member.

Yeah, ol’ Dave’s Treatise is pretty good reading; lot simpler than the German-language counterarguments that came later.

I don’t see a connection between time and the idea of objects, though, when it comes right down to it. Depends on what you mean, I guess. Time and objects as such, real things….that’s different, and we do see a connection therein, via the categories.

But that question is distinctly Kantian, isn’t it? — Wayfarer

Yeah, I suppose it is. Maybe more Hume-ian. I was just looking for some background the easy way, is all.

Things might exist, unbeknown. — Banno

Of course, but irrelevant.

Understanding time requires a mind. That does not imply that time requires a mind. That's a step too far. — Banno

True enough, insofar as you’re using understanding as a verb denoting a cognitive activity within an intellectual whole, which nevertheless presupposes that which is being understood.

Understanding, as a noun representing a specific cognitive faculty, has its function predicated on the conditions of time alone, at the exclusion of space, which logically cannot be given by that which uses it. Hence, time, in and of itself, as a stand-alone conception, requires something for its validity, even if it not be understanding as such, but still within the human intellect somewhere. So….pure reason.

FYI, in Kant the former here is a metaphysical conception of time, the latter is transcendental exposition of time. The former regards its use, which we empirically verify every time we use a watch, the latter regards its origin, and that in the strict syllogistic method of propositional logic a priori, which we cannot empirically verify at all. With the empirical verification possible on the one hand in conjunction with observation, and the empirical verification impossible on the other in conjunction with the logic of infinite divisibility, arises the ideality of time. And space.

All of which makes explicit, the premises for this particular metaphysics being granted, events cannot be said to occur in temporal sequence, which implies experience thereof, unless the relative times of each are measured. Furthermore, events cannot even be supposed as occuring in temporal sequence, without such a priori condition as ground for how it is possible all of those conceptions relate to each other, regardless of any eventual or subsequent measurement.

For what it’s worth….

What's your view on time? — Corvus

As The Man says, without the “subjective constitution of our senses in general”, time is meaningless. Which translates to, as far as I’m concerned, time is only meaningful should I have occassion to determine some phenomenal duration relating two instances of it, or, some phenomenal coexistence related to a single instance.

Which still leaves the inception of time and space into our subjective constitution….assuming of course there is such a thing to begin with…..for which some pure formal metaphysics is required.

Or so it seems.

Investigate someone else’s metaphysical exposé of time, you’ll get a different set of premises for its explanation, right?

Everybody should go back to Kant, but most everybody is “done with all this (kind of) thinking”.

I’m more affirming your arguments than denying them, except for the opening statement, which I find catastrophically false, if only with respect to the CPR, re: space is no more real than time, and thereby doesn’t exit as do the real objects that are conditioned by it.

Pretty simple, really: space doesn’t move, and time doesn’t change, yet the movement of things in time is the ground of all empirical knowledge whatsoever. How to reconcile one with the other, is what the hoopla is all about.

Yeah, well, you know….no one’s gonna admit to being “done with all this thinking”, but might still judge that everyone else seems to be done with his.

I wouldn’t go so far as to say Hume’s is a contradiction, but moreso an incomplete philosophy. He just didn’t think deep enough into the abstractions prevalent in human intelligence, granting only “quantity and number”, thus relying pretty much exclusively on empirical cause/effect.

E.C.H.U., 12, 3, 132, 1748, says it all, methinks.

I never said otherwise! — Wayfarer

So manifestly tiresome, I should think, to be put in a defensive position, the accusatory ground for which having been seriously misunderstood. Or perfectly understood but miserably disavowed.

Given that Kant has already been invoked, as he usually is, it is permissible to further posit the “transcendental illusion”, whereby your defense of existence/non-existece, with respect to mind**, is mis-taken by antagonists in their collective proclamations regarding only existence (of)/non-existence (of), under the same conditions.

How foolish to ask of existence without mind, absent conjoined temporal qualification, when it is from mind the question is asked, in which that very qualification is immediately presupposed.

Existence is not an existent, from which follows existence belongs to mind alone as a pure conception; existence is given iff there is that mind capable of its deduction, and, that in which such deduction resides.

On the other hand, that which is conditioned by the pure conception, re: that which is an existent, merely indicates that on which the cognitively functional part of the human intellect performs. Cognitively functional in juxtaposition to the aesthetically pleasing.
(** reason, in all congruent instances)

All that to say this: even without any possibility of apodeictic empirical justifications, re: proofs, I agree with what you’re saying.

Science was born out of the quest for Truth, capital T…. — Wayfarer

Being more versed in the classics, what do you think an example, the chronological forerunner, of the modern(-ish) principle of induction would be, which says there can be no empirical discovery of capital T truth?

And given that “the quest for” is very far from “a determination of”, with respect to capital T truth…..I think it better said that science was born out of the incessant yet never entirely sufficient, not so much the comprehension of Nature, but comprehension of the human being’s relation to it.
————-

Conclusion — Wayfarer

As expected, well done. From this particular armchair, comes from it: the more the attempt to eliminate the explicit duality of human intelligence, the more the immersion in it. From which follows the general justification, detachment from objectivity doesn’t work.

Oh. And…please, pass the syrup?

Wonder. And the suspected deficiency thereof.

Might that be your bridge to the phenomenological “self-meditation”, by which one “….is able to liberate oneself from the captivation in which one is held by all that one accepts as being the case….”?

Phenomenology (…) is like studying the act of looking…. — Wayfarer

Not much rescuing of the subject there, insofar as the subject still has the functional necessity for understanding the content the study of looking implicates.

I know you knew, and thereby expected, such objection would arise; far be it from me to disappoint, donchaknow. (Grin)

(ever-so-slight nod, from the back of the room)

Not talking about an item.

Dunno if he states that unequivocally, but if his notion of absolute time is justified, then one has no logical recourse but to agree that time is independent of us.

But then, it is profoundly contradictory to profess the absolute of anything whatsoever, in juxtaposition to the impossibility for empirical verification, so…..

But all that really doesn’t matter, if time is given from the way we perceive, then time’s independence from the way we perceive is also contradictory, therefore, wrong.

If (….) time is coming from the way we perceive…. — frank

…..how can it possibly be independent of us?

Cool. Thanks.

I can dig the union (unity, if I may be so bold) of knower and known, but I’d like to see intellectual space allotted for procedure.

suffice to say that it sees philosophical detachment as superior to scientific objectivity, because it doesn't pre-suppose the division between knower and known that characterises modern thought. — Wayfarer

Even if philosophical detachment doesn’t presuppose the division, does it arrive at it through some form of logical inference?

I think Mww would agree that objects being real checks out…. — Bob Ross

Yeah, he would. With the provisio that “checks out” is relative to a specific theoretical framework. Within the confines of that same framework, it follows necessarily that space and time are not real.

But then, of course……there’s possibly as many frameworks as minds that can think them up.

Good quote.

I'm betting sure that Kant never said that any noumenon "appears." — tim wood

Safe bet, go all in. Wife’s car. That autographed Roger Maris 59th. First-born.

….what appears is the phenomenon, that is, a creation of mind…. — tim wood

What appears is the thing, that which effects the senses, the material object the representation of which becomes experience. Phenomenon is the creation of intuition specifically, mind generally if you like, representing the affect on the senses.

The noumenon is no creation of mind, and being itself thereby not a phenomenon, never appears. — tim wood

Not a phenomenon hence never appears, true, but a creation of understanding specifically, mind generally if you like. A creation of understanding is a conception; noumena is a conception alone, never anything else, never cognized, never sensed.

As an aside, Feynman said in one of his CalTech lectures, that fields are real things, insofar as they occupy space and are measurable as a force over time. From this point of view, magnetism does not refute empiricism, iff empiricism represents the possibility of knowledge of real things conditioned by space and time. Problem is….I can’t find the reference so…never mind.

If the senses are out there, and what appears to the mind is in here, then where does the boundary between these two lie?
— Metaphysician Undercover

In the faculty of intuition, where that which appears acquires its representation, called phenomenon. — Mww

OK, you say that intuition provides the boundary between the senses as out there, and the appearances in the mind, as in here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ve already stated that appearance is that which is an effect on the senses, as input; appearances, then, and the senses can be said to be “out there”. How the senses react to that which appears, as output, is sensation, which can be said to be “in here”. There is nothing to be gained procedurally speaking, by asking for a boundary, when all that’s necessary is a transformation of whatever kind, between out there and in here. I’ve also said already the human is not conscious of all that transpires between the appearance of a thing to the senses, and the judgement attributed to it, and if we’re not conscious of it we can neglect the effort required for determining wherever some boundary may be.

So "the faculty of intuition", may in this way, provide the mind (the internal) with the capacity to be receptive to sense activity…. — Metaphysician Undercover

And that’s all we need to move on to the next faculty, the next procedural step on the way to determining how the appearance is to be known. There is an explanation for what intuition does pursuant to speculative metaphysics, but, again, the subject himself, being unconscious of the what, has even less need of the how.
————-

All of my sensations appear to me to be right in the organs which sense them. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s fine, if you like. I’ll stay with the effect of things on my sensory devices on the one hand, and the sensations such effects provide, accommodated by the type of sensory devices I possess, on the other. All I need is an input to the faculty of intuition, something from which phenomenon can be constructed. This is required in order to determine which sense has been affected, and what
a posteriori material is being processed, in which form may be imagined as belonging to it, and, VOILA!!!…a very basic image is born.
————-

A completely legitimate explanatory bridge.
— Mww

I wouldn't say the gap is bridged legitimately. You have conveniently left out the role of intuition here, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not left out; yet to be a systemic consideration; intuition plays no role in perception, but only in the formulae for representing that which is perceived.
————-

An object necessarily has a form, as its identity, and "form" is intelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. And where, in Kantian transcendental metaphysics, does form reside?

Notice that "intelligible" signifies the possibility of being grasped by an intellect, so actually being apprehended by a human intellect is not required. — Metaphysician Undercover

Intelligible means necessarily cognizable by the human intellect, re: all logical criteria have been met. Unintelligible, then, merely means a cognition is impossible, even if a representation relating to a conception, is not. So what makes a conception a legitimate thought, but for which schemata representing it, is not at all possible? What’s missing?
—————-

This is how Kant turns things around from the traditional Christian perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting approach, but very far from the textual explanation.

Anyway…..enough for now.

If the senses are affected by the things sensed, then the senses are noumenal…. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that doesn’t follow at all. That’s like saying an ice cube is noumenal because it shatters when hit by a hammer.
————-

If the senses are out there, and what appears to the mind is in here, then where does the boundary between these two lie? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the faculty of intuition, where that which appears acquires its representation, called phenomenon.
————-

If I say that the senses are out there, then the idea of a boundary between in here and out there makes no sense, because the sensations are in here, yet also in the senses, which are out there. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sensations are in the senses? If there were the case, why would we have both? You want the hand to tell you the thing is heavy when all it can do is tell you of the appearance of cellular compression. You want the ear to tell you there is a sound when all it can do is register the appearance of variations in pressure waves. And so on….
————-

….you have phenomena as belonging to intuition, a completely different thing from senses providing "internal images of the external things". — Metaphysician Undercover

Senses providing “internal images of external things” is not what I said.
————-

If mind is assumed to be the composite of those faculties, and all the faculties cannot be shown to co-exist as a unity of "mind", then there is an incoherency within the conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t say all the faculties couldn’t co-exist. In fact, I said the mind could be called the composite of all the faculties, which makes explicit they do co-exist. Each faculty can still be imbued with its own dedicated functionality without contradicting the notion of a unity.
—————-

This capacity, to distinguish between external and internal, which you assign to the senses is an arbitrary judgement. That, distinction is a spatial judgement, so it requires intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

This little dialectical segment is my fault, for not correcting you here:

So the Kantian system is really inadequate to account for reality because it doesn't allow that the senses partake of both, the external and the internal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant defines reality as “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general…”. From that definition, insofar as only from the senses, and correspondingly by the sensations given from them, is any account of reality possible. This just says reality is given to us if or when the senses deliver sensations. So it is that the senses are in fact involved in both the external (input: effect of that thing which appears) and the internal (output: as affect corresponding to the appearance, which just is sensation). A completely legitimate explanatory bridge.

I probably should have just said…the senses allow us to distinguish. Or, allow a distinction to be possible.
————-

So the whole is filled with a self-contradicting idea, an intelligible object which is unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Might help to know what the “ever-so-abstract logical hole” actually is, where it resides, and the complications arising from it. Knowing that, it becomes clear there is, not a contradiction but a theoretical inconsistency, inherent in noumena. It is not itself a self-contradictory idea, but it is an unintelligible object.

And Kant doesn’t, indeed cannot, deny the possibility of noumena, insofar as to do so is to falsify the primary ground of transcendental philosophy, re: “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, which just says if I do think noumena, which is to hold a certain conception, and then prescribe to myself an object corresponding to it, then I immediately contradict the mechanisms I already authorize as that by which corresponding objects are prescribed to me at all, from which follows I have contradicted myself. The warning ends up being.…think noumena all you like; just don’t try to do anything intuitive with it. And if you can’t do anything intuitive with it, don’t bother thinking it in the first place.

The logical proof, and thereby the unintelligibility, is in the mechanism by which objects are prescribed on the one hand, which is determined by the very specific functionality of individual faculties on the other.

The legitimizing of noumena resides in a cognitive system I do not possess, arising for no other reason than I cannot say the cognitive system I possess is the only one there is. Phenomena belong to humans, noumena might belong to dolphins, or honey bees, or some rationality unknown to us. Which is….DUH!!!!…..all of them.

Philosophers get acclimatized to a very general use of words like "appearance". — Ludwig V

True enough, plus, words often get defined in order to accommodate a project. I’ve already mentioned the difference in meaning for the word appearance relative to the Kantian metaphysical project, as opposed to the common meaning relative to others.
—————-

….the senses do nothing but forward information in the form of sensation….
— Mww

Well, that's how we think of them, especially when we have little or no idea how they work. — Ludwig V

These days, there is good evidence for how they work. Before, thus from a metaphysical point of view, how they work wasn’t important enough to jeopardize speculative philosophy, insofar as humans are not even conscious of most of that which is under the purview of natural law anyway. Even now, while science has cleared much ignorance, the subject himself in general remains unconscious of most of his own intellectual machinations.
————-

….the fact that we can tell that some experiences are misleading means that we can distinguish appearances that are not misleading from those that are. — Ludwig V

And how do we tell? From whence does the distinction arise?

Sweeping up all sensations under one description is misleading and creates unnecessary problems. Look at the details. — Ludwig V

Not sure what that means. I can describe all sensations as merely that by which I become aware of my environment. I am not mislead and have no unnecessary problems, because the description does not contradict the facts. Someone else, describing senses in some other way, might then think me misled and invoking unnecessary problems, which is fine by me.

Show me the details?

First off….nothing following is meant to change your favored philosophy. You know yours as well as I know mine, and we can forgive each other for our separate ways. That being said, here’s some stuff I think might alter your view.

So the problem I see, is that this assumes a sort of Cartesian separation between external and internal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You called it a “Kantian distinction”, which I think much more the case than separation. It is inescapable that the human sensory apparatuses are affected by things appearing to them, which tends to negate the premise the senses and that which is sensed are separated on all accounts.

In addition, it is equally inescapable, hence trivially obvious, that the real physical things out there are not the representational things of experience.

So, yes, a decidedly refined sort of Cartesian dualism.
————-

So if the senses are causally affected by activity which is external, they must be completely "out there" themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hesitate to admit the senses are causally affected, but rather think they are functionally affected, in accordance with the natural physiology, which makes explicit they are “out there” themselves, in relation to the cognitive system itself. That is to say, the sensory devices are just as much real objects as are basketballs and snowflakes.

But if the senses are creating the phenomenal appearances in the mind, they must be completely internal — Metaphysician Undercover

Ahhhh, but they do not; the senses do nothing but forward information in the form of sensation, again, in accordance with respective physiology. Not hard to understand the senses as merely a bridge between the real and the representation of the real. Phenomena belong to intuition, which is a whole ‘nuther deal than appearance/sensation, which might…..very loosely….be deemed the source of the internal images of the external things.

So the Kantian system is really inadequate to account for reality because it doesn't allow that the senses partake of both, the external and the internal. — Metaphysician Undercover

As stated above, the account does allow the senses to, maybe not partake in so much as distinguish between, the external and the internal.
—————-

That's the problem with naming the noumenal as completely inaccessible to the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

It cannot be completely inaccessible. If noumena were inaccessible to the mind there could be no conception of it. Which highlights a misconception: Kant’s is a system in which different faculties function in unison. Mind may be understood as the composite of those faculties, but it remains that each faculty does its own job, and when examining the system, to overlay all onto mind misses the entire point of the examination.

Noumena are inaccessible to some faculties but not others, so it cannot be said, or said accurately, they are inaccessible to the mind. Technically, noumena are accessible to the understanding alone, insofar as the understanding is the faculty of conceptions, and a conception is all a noumenon could ever be.

Be advised: you lose absolutely nothing by neglecting noumena entirely when examining human knowledge. The only reason Kant brought it up was to plug an ever-so-abstract logical hole.
(Actually, some secondary literature accuses him of backing himself into a corner, from which his extrication demanded a re-invention of classic terminology, which in turn seemed to demand an apparently outlandish exposition, which really isn’t at all.)

Anyway….ever onward.

But it's actually very significant in metaphysical implications. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps. In Kantian metaphysics, though, the notion of appearance is merely intended to grant ontology in general, which serves to limit metaphysics to the conditions of a “logical science”, entirely internal to the human intellect. Which reduces to….whatever’s out there is whatever it is; all that remains is to expose how the human intellect of a specific dedicated form treats it.

I don't think that we first recognize that something appears to us and we then make judgements about it…. — Ludwig V

If such were the case, though, you’d have a logically consistent answer regarding when a mistake is known to have been made.

I'm not a fan. — Ludwig V

Don’t blame ya; I’m not either, but probably for different reasons.
—————-

I believe that since appearances are the creation of the living system….. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s fine; I’m not going to argue with that. Myself, I prefer to think of appearance as something that happens to, rather than being a creation of, the living system.

….mistakes inhere within the appearance, as mental illness demonstrates….
— Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with that. But consider - if all you have to go on is appearances, how do you know when you have made a mistake? — Ludwig V

What are you guys calling “appearance”? The context of your dialogue obtains from Kant’s notion of intuition with respect to the world, in which appearance has nothing to do with mistakes, and, the world has nothing to do with appearances.

The only way your dialogue works, is to correlate appearance with “looks like”, while Kantian phenomenal correlation is with respect to “presence of”. In order for your arguments to hold, therefore, re: mistakes are inherent in appearances, you have to allow the mere presence of a perceived thing a form of cognitive power, or, grant to appearance more content than the space and time Kantian doctrine permits.

Not to curtail your dialogue, but as stated it’s not consistent with the reference upon which it is, at least initially, premised.

Thing is….I’m sure both of you are fully aware mistakes in empirical cognitions inhere in judgement, not in appearances. And mental illness is not the rule, but the exception to it.

I know the term "doubt" is sometimes used to refer to an emotional state, but here I think it just means demanding justification for a proposition. — goremand

Yep, pretty much where I’m coming from. Self-awareness implies sensibility; self-consciousness implies logical thought. Doubt, insofar as it is a relative judgement, presupposes logical thought, of which the subject himself must be conscious. If such be the case, then we can just say self-consciousness represents the entirety of that which the subject himself must be conscious, from which follows the notion of a strict requirement, or what can be termed a principle.

…..self-awareness doesn't seem like a strict requirement for doubt. — goremand

I’d go with self-consciousness myself, rather than self-awareness.

Self-something, at any rate.

Interesting interpretation, I must say. I’ll have to think about it, try to find some correspondence with the relevant text.

So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary?
— Mww

Spatial movements are what make 'the concept' of time necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. That’s all I was asking.
————-

Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space?
— Mww

This is relativity theory. It's known as spacetime, in which time becomes the fourth dimension of space. — Metaphysician Undercover

“…. In order to have a complete description of the motion, we must specify how the body alters its position with time; i.e. for every point on the trajectory it must be stated at what time the body is situated there…”
(Einstein, Relativity….., 1. 3., 1916, in Lawson, 1920)

I don’t find the justification for the given “alters position with time”, with your “fourth dimension of space”. Besides not needing to delve into non-Galilean parameters.