What I was talking about is distinct fields in the same place. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I’m ok with that. Earth’s magnetic field and gravitational field are in the same space. But the particles associated with those fields are not in each other’s spaces. Neutrinos pass through the gravitational field without bothering anything, right? Jets pass through the magnetic field, and while some of the particles of the jet’s composition may be affected, for all intents and purposes, the jet isn’t, despite the reality that it’s 1 x 10 -32nd of an inch shorter than it was when it was on the ground.

But I see your point. It was Feynman in a CalTech lecture, who said fields could be considered things, insofar as they do occupy space. But you know ol’ Richard….he’s somewhat cryptic, if not facetious.

It’s as if Kant doesn’t want to be a full-blown idealist…. — Tom Storm

Correct, he does not want to be thought of as a full-blown idealist. He does, on the other hand, state for the record (A370), of all the idealist doctrines he lists, he is of the transcendental variety. It is this variety alone which argues as you say.

He argues against all full-blown idealists, such as Descartes and Berkeley, and even the quasi-transcendental idealists, here and there, but those mostly because they don’t realize that’s what they really are, or are oh-so-close to really being if they’d just gone one or two steps further, such as Mendelssohn, Libneitz, Wolff, Baumgartner, et al.

As for noumena directed/indirect compromise…maybe, maybe not. I don’t have any interest in it, and Kant didn’t even know about the direct/indirect dichotomy. Or perhaps what it represents he would have called it something else.

But at any rate, noumena in the Kantian sense is not a compromise of any kind, but rather an example of understanding coloring outside its own rule-bound lines.

I thought that Kant believed we could know nothing of the noumenon. — boundless

He didn’t believe it; he stated for the record that nothing can be known of noumena as a logical deduction in accordance with a theory he himself constructed. I’d rather think he trusted in the logical construction of the theory, rather than only believed in its conclusions.

That being said, we can know nothing of what a noumenon is. We can think anything of it we please, as long as we don’t contradict ourselves. To think a thing as a mere conception, is not to know it as an experience. The confusion of the two, is exactly where we begin to contradict ourselves.

The direct/indirect realism debate is meaningless to me. You’ll notice I don’t have enough interest to partake in any of it.

Why can’t two things occupy the same field without occupying the same space?

If the sun’s light is a field projected from itself, how can it occupy the same field as that which receives it?

Any division of space is still just itself a space. So while a molecule occupies its space, the atoms comprising it occupy their own spaces, from which follows they are not in the same space as each other, although they are all in the same space of all possible things.

This signifies the ideality of space, and of time, in that everything sometime must be somewhere.

This is some good stuff, I must say. Well-thought, well-written.

Two relatively minor counterarguments, if I may:

One, at the beginning, where you relate the in-itself to mind-independence. No conception can be mind-independent, and any thinking with respect to a mere concept, is itself conceptual, hence likewise must not be mind-independent.

“…. The concept of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory…” (A255/B310)

The text designates the thing-in-itself as a conception, so…..
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The other…

Kant posits it simply on the logical grounds that if there are appearances then there must be something which appears. — Janus

….very true, and in which the logical ground is key, but one degree of freedom, so to speak, out of place. If there are appearances there must be that which appears, and that which appears are things. I think correctly placed, the logic adhering to the “in-itself” says, that because there are things that appear, there must be things in themselves from which the things that appear are given.

It is in this way the perceiver is relieved from being in any way necessary causality for the things that appear, which immediately falsifies the proposition we create our own reality, and as an offshoot of that he can say he doesn’t care where a thing comes from or how it got to be as it is, but only cares about how he is to know it, the possibility of which is the primary consideration of the CPR thesis anyway.

Now, on the one hand it may be that the in-itself is, as you say, either utterly amorphous or else nothing at all, but on the other is merely that by which infinite regress regarding the ontology of things becomes moot. This particular, and perhaps on my part rather subjective, deduction receives its justification from Kant himself, in that “… the proud name of an ontology which presumes to offer (…) things in general in a systematic doctrine (…), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding….” (A247/B304)

Two cents…

Many things seem to share the same space, and that becomes problematic for physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

True enough, but my response would be….my experiences are not on so small a scale. I remember reading…a million years ago it seems….if the nucleus of a hydrogen atom was the size of a basketball, and it was placing on the 50yd-line of a standard American football field, its electron’s orbit would be outside the stadium. Point being, there’s plenty of room for particles to share without bumping into each other. And even if the science at this scale says something different, it remains a fact I can’t seem to get two candles to fit in the same holder without FUBARing both of ‘em.

Another way to look at the overall problem of distinctions and differences, and more of my particular interest: find out what the rules are, let the sufficiently related exceptions to those rules be what they may.
—————-

….you accept the idea that intelligibility doesn't come from the subject? — boundless

Yes. Intelligence comes from the subject; intelligibility is that to which the subject’s intelligence responds.
—————-

….this tension could label Kant as dogmatic on noumena… — Tom Storm

Noumena being altogether irrelevant, Kant labels himself as dogmatic, that is, to be dogmatic is to prove conclusions from “secure principles” a priori (Bxxxv). Technically, it is reason itself that is dogmatic.

The subject himself, on the other hand in the use of his reason, engages in dogmatism in its “loquacious shallowness under the presumed name of popularity”…. ibid

(The regular run-of-the-mill genius Prussian academic’s way of saying, hey, don’t gimme that look; I’m just repeating what I been told)

…..but in dogmatism is technically using “philosophical concepts according to principles which reason has been using for a long time without first inquiring in what way and by what right it has obtained them.” (ibid

And how, you ask, and I know you are….doesn’t everyone?…..is the way obtained and the right secured, for these principle’s use as dogmatically conclusive proofs? Why, from the critique of pure reason, of course.

And there’s more. Oh so much more.
—————-

….he is meant to remain entirely agnostic, yet he slips into asserting what the noumenon cannot be…. — Tom Storm

He is perfectly justified in asserting what a thing is not, without ever knowing what it is. A thing is or is not (this or that) iff it does or does not conform to the relevant principles the critique of pure reason as shown to be rightfully secure. From which follows, a noumenon is in every way and by every right a valid conception according to the principles by which any conception is possible, but in no way and not by any right at all, is anything to be known of it, according to those principles by which knowledge is possible.

All that is mainly responsible for the advent of analytical philosophy, re: the attempt to relegate systemic speculative metaphysics to practical nonsense, insofar as the proofs are all logical conditioned by premises, rather than empirical conditioned by observation.

Over ’n’ out.

The fact that it might be impossible for us to know how sentient beings came into existence doesn't exclude that an explanation is possible in principle. — boundless

Tautologically true; we’re here, for which some explanation is necessary.

Me: ….impossibility to know the truth of an explanation.
You: …impossibility to know an explanation;

Me: ….proof of an explanation.
You: …absence of an explanation;

I don’t know what to do with this.
—————-

an impossibility to know an explanation isn't a conclusive evidence of an absence of an explanation. — boundless

That’s exactly what it means. The possibility of knowing a thing, herein an explanation, presupposes that thing by its existence in some time….somebody made one up. The most conclusive evidence for the impossibility of knowing a thing is that the thing doesn’t exist in any time…no one has made one up ….which just is the absence of it.

All of which is irrelevant, insofar as I never said there wasn’t or couldn’t be an explanation, which means there always was or possibly was something to know. The justification for the explanation, on the other hand, the ground of its truth, may or may not meet the criteria for knowledge in general. It follows we may well know an explanation without granting that it is sufficient for what it seeks to explain.

To not know is very far from the impossibility of knowing.

Passage. Movement. Passage of time, movement of time, movement of an infinite immaterial. Irrational.
Passage. Change. Change of time. Change of a motionless, infinite immaterial. Irrational.
—————-

There is measure of duration or succession of things in relation to each other, in units of time.
There is measure of change of place, the motion of a thing in relation to itself or something else over a series of units of time. These empirical measurements are physical activities in the use of instruments, therefore objective, but they are measures of duration or succession/coexistence, which all relate to determinable empirical change, not to time itself.

There is a change in the condition of a subject, e.g., from aesthetic measure of having no fear to the fear of, having no hope for, etc, the object for which there is possibly no experience, hence this determinable change is entirely subjective.

There is a change in the condition of a subject, from having no knowledge of the duration of a thing, or the succession of a thing in relation to another thing, to knowledge of these insofar as he has accomplished a relevant measurement, such change precisely as subjective as his fear or hope, albeit with an object of experience related to it.

When is the last time? What is there that will be the last time of? If it cannot be said what the first or last time is, how can it be said to pass? Or to change? That the last time of a house is the burning down of it, such that the passage of the house’s time is given, says nothing at all about the first or last of time.

Pretty sad and quite unphilosophical, for a guy to look at his watch and actually think he’s observing time. Or for him to ask what time it is, and actually think he’s getting an answer about time.

That same sad unphilosophical guy is perfectly aware the time he thinks he sees on a watch, or the answer he gets when asking of the time, is always and only given in numbers. He’s no more aware of the infinite, immaterial primitive condition of numbers, then he is of the necessity that time be just as infinitely and immaterially primitive as the numbers used as the units representing it. Guy might as well be doing magic.

If the units created to represent the immovable, infinite immaterial are strictly human conceptual constructs, how can that which is represented by them be any less a conceptual construct? Just as Nature has no numbers of its own, so too does it not have time and space of its own.
—————-

Everydayman doesn’t know and doesn’t care that no space is dependent on another, which is to say no one space is conditioned by any other space, but any one time absolutely presupposes that time antecedent to it, which is to say any one time is conditioned by that time antecedent to it.

Because of this, there is no conceptual conflict in a thing being in this space or in an adjacent space, whether a progressively or regressively conditioned space, and there is no conceptual conflict in a thing being in this time and a regressively conditioned time, re: the past, but there is necessarily an experiential conflict in the thing being in this time and then in a progressively conditioned time, re: the future.

Also from this, it is the case it is impossible that a thing can be in a space at one time and in an adjacent space in the same time, but a thing can be in a space at a time and in the same space in another time. No two things can be in one space, but any one thing can be in two times.

For he who proclaims all these space/time conditions are of Nature herself, cannot explain how the human intelligence grasps by itself, and that a priori, that of which only the totality of all experience can prove. To prove these all belong to Nature herself, there must be found no exception in the totality of all experiences, to which he does not have even the least access.

Where he can find no exception is only if these conditions belong to him alone, in direct correspondence to the totality of his own experiences, the rest of all possible experiences remain subject to logical inference regarding experience in general.

If the human intelligence does not permit, merely from the impossibility of its proof, that these conditions are laws of Nature with respect to its objects, they must then be no more than the rules of that intelligence with respect to the objects of its experiences.
—————-

On About time. Not this or that time, not the time in, not the time for, not time the measurement of.

On About time itself, as intended by the thread title.

(Blush)

….measuring something doesn't mean we've created the thing that we've invented a measurement for. — Philosophim

Isn’t the mere observation of difference outside the intellect sufficient reason for its creating a relation representing that difference, within itself? And if we, the subjects in possession of that intellect, want to know what that observed difference is with respect to its relation represented in us, isn’t it required of us, by means of our own intellect, to invent a method for its determination?

The relation we create is the thing we invent measurement for, given some difference we observe. After it’s all said and done, we find there are but two fundamental, primitive relations for any possible observation, aggregate and succession, from which follows the intellect’s logical deduction of “space” as representing the one and “time” as representing the other.

The common rejoinder is…why not just measure the difference, insofar as it is not by our intellect that differences are possible. But we don’t care that there is difference, if we want to know what the difference is, which manifestly requires we be affected by it, which is precisely to observe there is one.

As soon as we are affected, the difference in things immediately becomes the difference in us, the very relation our intellect creates…..and from there it’s off to the epistemological rodeo.

The problem is that, insofar as understanding cannot work with a mere idea,…..
— Mww

Not sure of what you mean. — boundless

Yeah, my fault. I never should have gone so far into the metaphysical weeds, probably further than required for grasping the OP’s basic ideas, and certainly much further than most folks are prepared to accept.

I was only voicing concern for attributing to time plausible explanatory ground for the existence of sentient beings. It’s like…seeking an answer the truth of which is impossible to prove, given from something the truth of which is impossible to know.

The OP and its arguments have nothing to do with (…) any kind of creature….
— Mww

This is true. And while I agree with the OP, I think we need to do better at responding to the type of question that boundless raises. — J

The OP concerns itself with time. The type of objection subsequently raised, re: existential contingency of sentient beings, and therefrom better attempts at responding to such objections, involves an altogether different set of initial conditions.

As the transcendental origin of time is noted in the OP, the logic of relations to it is quite something else.
—————-

'antinomy' is a call for a resolution/explanation rather than a statement that such a resolution is impossible. — boundless

Which is fine; reason itself calls for resolutions, but it is understanding from which any and all empirical resolutions originate. The problem is that, insofar as understanding cannot work with a mere idea, re: the existential contingency of sentient beings in general, there can be no empirical resolution possible from judgements made relative to those ideas, that isn’t either thetic or antithetic, meaning in dogmatic conflict with each other relative to the idea.

Anyway….the OP stands iff sufficiently capable sentient beings are given.

…..the existence of individual sentient (or perhaps 'rational') beings is contingent… — boundless

The OP and its arguments have nothing to do with the being or becoming of, hence attempts no explanation for the existence of, any kind of creature, individually or in general, but necessarily presupposes the sentient human variety of it, both individually and in general, from which follows the existential contingency of them, is irrelevant.

The argument reduces to the condition that time belongs to the individual human, not the thing to which he and all humans in general relate themselves.

Good.

In addition, time as a pure transcendental conception, is that by which logical inference is validated, and that, in turn, falsifies what is claimed as knowledge, re: “we know that the physical world existed….”, by assigning to such judgements logical necessity rather than mediated experience.

Some background:
….300 years ago, physical science, while no longer in its infancy, was nonetheless still a toddler, and of more significance than what it’s done is what it hasn’t, the foremost of which is to dislodge Greek logic from its pinnacle of pure human thought;
….Kant was the chair of metaphysics and logic, of the Greek variety necessarily, from which it is reasonable to presume he must ground his original metaphysical thesis in the established logic he himself taught, even in the face of the as-yet unrealized enormous power of physical science;
….in Greek logic, the prime considerations are identity and contradiction: this is only this and never that. In Kantian duality conditioned by identity and contradiction there is no need of the excluded middle, but what is required are those conditions by which it is provable this is indeed only this and never that, which is accomplished by the mere definition. In a brand new philosophical structure having no procedural precedent whatsoever, it is simply a matter of validating a conception by defining what it’s supposed to do (A727/B755).
….the reader should always guard himself against putting words into Kant’s mouth, speaking for himself but calling it Kant. While Kant admits to constructing merely a theory, and acknowledges there is nothing to prove his theory is indeed the case, and recognizing the absolute necessity in sometimes leaving well-enough-alone, re: dismissing infinite regress as theoretically permissible by admitting there is that for which explanation is more confusing than beneficial (A496/B54), it remains internally consistent and logically united, which is all a theory is ever meant to be.
————-

Some groundwork:
….when Kant says his brand new metaphysics is complete, he means he’s given you everything you need to follow along, from the names of the faculties required to perform tasks, the names of the tasks required for the system to function, and their relation to each other and to the whole;
….beginning with a logical ground, coupled with specificity in definitions of terms, progressing through purposeful methodology, ending in a complete prescriptive intellectual system, results in a paradigm shift in philosophy itself. One can now take it or leave it, but he is not rationally justified in changing it.
….for Kant, in his speculative metaphysics, external things are given, such that no ontological conditions need be considered, insofar as what we think about and what we deem ourselves as having knowledge of as experience, is far less important than the method by which thought and knowledge are even possible in the first place;
….Kant’s system is in effect for each and every perception, every single one of them, ever and always, on the one hand, and congruently for each and every instance of pure thought on the other. The system cannot be turned on and off, it is a constant companion of the otherwise rational intellect, the fundamental condition of humanity in general. Hence the complexity of the philosophy itself, in accounting for how all that works, and why it should be that way;
…the Kantian system will not work for those thinkers for whom the dualistic nature of human cognition is indefensible, or downright wrong. One must acquiesce to human cognitive dualism, or stand aside from Kantian metaphysics.

Now, return to your seats ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls; the shows about to begin.

(OOOO!!! Aaron Copeland, aka, Emerson Lake and Palmer:
“Welcome back my friends
to the show that never ends.
We’re so glad you could attend
Come inside, come inside.

Come inside, the show's about to start
Guaranteed to blow your head apart
Rest assured you'll get your money's worth
The greatest show in Heaven, Hell, or Earth
————-

What's pertinent here, then, is the term noumenon or noumena, already given in Greek logic, the modern version only so for statements regarding, not of what it is as that was left unchanged from the Greek, but its origin, its validity and the placement in the new system it may or may not occupy;
….understanding is the faculty of thought, thought is represented in conception, conception is the spontaneity of thinking;
….I can think whatever I please (fn, Bxxvi), understanding being the faculty of thought, understanding then, is the origin of thinking whatever I please;
….a problem with thinking whatever I please, a problem with understanding being the origin of any thought whatsoever, is that understanding has no limit imposed on itself by itself. (A238/B297)
….before anyone objects, that understanding is regulated by rules of logic, it must be remembered understanding the faculty (the origin of conceptions) is not understanding the cognitive activity (the synthesis or conjoining of conceptions to each other). The faculty understanding is not under the rules of logic, these belonging to judgement, which informs of the correctness of synthesis but not of the spontaneous origin of conceptions synthesized;
….because it is not contradictory for understanding to merely originate conceptions, it is perfectly warranted to originate any conception it can think, any conception which arises spontaneously from it, is legitimate merely from being thought;
….there is nonetheless a control for understanding; it is reason, which has nothing to do with experience (A302/B359).
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….the standing definition of noumenon, established by the Greeks and left undisturbed in Kant, is simply that object of thought. Period. No more, no less. An object of thought in Kant, however, is a conception, from which follows noumena in Kant is merely conception. Period. No more, no less.
….in the Kantian system, conceptions in general are necessary but conception alone is useless. To think a conception, to have the spontaneous origin of one given, signals an end in itself (thoughts without content are empty, A51/B75), insofar as there is nothing to conjoin to a single conception, a singular instance of spontaneous thought, thus it is that noumena is an empty conception;
….an empty conception such as this, while valid and non-contradictory, is therefore called noumena represented in a negative sense, meaning to indicate that conception representing a thing, not a thing of sensible intuition which is already called phenomenon, but a thing of thought alone for which there is no intuition of any kind at all. (The faculty of thought does not intuit, the faculty of intuition does not think. A52/B76, this is this and not that, a fundamental ground of dualistic transcendental philosophy)

But….why?
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…there is no why, or, any why makes no difference with respect to any other why. Kant used mathematics to prove the possibility and validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, and by the same token used noumena to prove understanding can think whatever it wants, and by association I can think whatever I please. He would have been logically inconsistent and his metaphysics would not be complete, if he proclaims I can think whatever I please, then not present a worthless example as easily as the worthwhile, of doing it;
….so the why understanding does its thing having been said, that being just because it can, still leaves the why of the uselessness of the conception itself, other than the fact it is a singular thought, which reduces to….why is it only a single thought, and, why does it follow that because it is a single thought it is unknowable;
….understanding is the source of conceptions, thought is the synthesis of conceptions. To synthesize conceptions presupposes a relation of separate instances of them, from which follows that in understanding….more correctly judgement, most correctly imagination….to synthesize conceptions, it must seek from itself through spontaneity of thought, or from consciousness through the collection of all antecedent cognitions, those conceptions to be conjoined;
…any synthesis of conceptions in understanding is for the express purpose of cognizing empirical objects; there is no other use of understanding in its empirical sense except experience (A237/B296);
….given that understanding is for the express use for experience, any conceptions imagination uses in its synthesis towards cognition of things of experience must themselves be empirical conceptions;
….that to which all empirical conceptions point, is sensibility, insofar as all empirical conditions whatsoever, arise externally from and are given to the system through the senses;
…the origin of those necessary conditions for the empirical understanding of existent things by means of the cognition of their representations, then, is intuition, from which follows that which imagination synthesizes with conceptions in understanding, must come from intuition;
(To shorten it up, I leave out the origin of phenomena, which represents the synthesis of conceptions in intuition, and thereby the separation of aesthetic sensibility from logical understanding)
…but for noumena, again in its negative sense, originating not externally and given to the senses, but spontaneously arising from thought alone, there is no phenomenal representation from which imagination in understanding uses in its synthesis of conceptions into a cognition;
…hence, noumena remain an empty conception, meaning there are no intuitions to conjoin with it, and for which the express purpose of understanding for the possibility of experience, is therefore denied to it.
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….a citation from Kant where he explicitly says that the noumenon is not the thing in itself…. — Janus

….there isn’t one, but the reader’s sufficient familiarity with the thesis as a whole can grasp the fact Kant wants….actually needs….it to be understood they are nowhere near the same. In fact, they cannot be the same and have the text maintain its accordance with established logic;
….sufficient familiarity looks like, Kant specifically states the understanding treats noumena as it treats the thing it itself (A255/B310), insofar as they both originate as single conceptions, meaning neither of them have conceptions subsumed under them, meaning neither of them relate to cognizable things. Just understanding once more thinking whatever it wants, the difference here is, the thing in itself, while not cognizable as such, still has validity because of what it is not;
….the fact noumena represents things that cannot be cognize says nothing about the things that can, and noumena cannot because they lack intuition, they lack intuition because there is nothing given to sensibility relating noumena to the pure forms of intuition, space and time;
….that which can be cognized, then, does have associated intuition, which then requires an exposition for the possibility of intuition;
….for the possibility of intuition is the necessity of an external object given to the senses, which is called a undetermined object of empirical intuition (A20/B34), or, an appearance in the sense of being presented to, as opposed to looking-like. Appearing to, not appearing as;
….all well and good, but the thing that appears was at some time that same thing which didn’t, or hasn’t, or won’t, appear, in which case it is nonetheless an object, just that object having no effect of he senes, or, which is the same thing, isn’t an appearance;
….but the thing given must be distinguished as to its causality, either it is given merely from being perceived, or, it is given because it was already a real, physical existent, for otherwise we are forced to affirm the appearance of something without that which appears (Bxxvi), the thing…without the thing, the thing now…the thing before now;
….it is much more rationally determinable, and much less potentially contradictory, to grant the thing given to sensibility was an already real, physical existent, which still begs the question as to what it was before became an appearance, which is for the understanding alone to discover;
….understanding thinks its conceptions, therefore to think the thing before appearance, to think the conception and represent it as the thing-in-itself, is a perfectly legitimate activity of understanding in its transcendental sense, meaning thought with respect to all cognitions in general, not just this or that particular cognition.
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…..provide a coherent distinction between the two concepts. I can see a distinction between things in themselves and the noumenon…. — Janus

Noumenon and thing-in-itself are both objects of thought, neither are appearances to sensibility, therefore neither are knowable through discursive cognition (A260/B315);
Noumena are not knowable because they have no intuition, they have no intuition because, as an object of thought, there is nothing to give to sensibility to intuit in any time;
The thing in itself is unknowable because it has no intuition, it has no intuition because as an object of thought, the thing-in-itself is not given to sensibility to intuit at any time, but there is a change of state through one time, wherein the thing-in-itself as conception becomes the thing of existence, and that is what appears;
That thing-in-self, upon being subjected to sensibility as an appearance hence no longer in itself, then becomes experience, its representation resides in consciousness, therefore does not revert back to being in itself when not perceived, but we can still think of it as it was when it was a thing-in-itself, only now it is thought as a thing in general. Discursive thought from conception becomes transcendental thought from an idea.

My version of coherence, while leaving out a lot of detail.

Thanks for asking. Hope I didn’t disappoint. Got questions, ask.

I can do that. It’ll be here by the time you get back tomorrow.

Hmmm. I guess my view would be that I don’t have one? I can’t make positive judgements with respect to spiritual states or higher consciousness, insofar as I have no idea what either of them might be like, so their relation to noumena would be impossible for me to describe.

On the other hand, given what I understand of noumena, irrespective of spiritual states and higher consciousness, there is no possibility of accessing noumena at all. Even so, that is not to say they are impossible, from which follows access to them is not impossible, from which follows given sufficient means, they might actually be accessible. Just…you know…not by humans, iff humans really do have the type of intelligence that informs both of the origin of them, and of the impossibility of access to them because of it.

Still, even if we don’t actually have the type of intelligence from which noumena as we think of them originate, that in itself is not sufficient reason for permitting spiritual states and higher consciousness to have access to them. Even those would have to be in some form of intelligence so different from ours we still wouldn’t have access, insofar as we wouldn’t understand how some other intelligence works.

The whole point of the critique of pure reason: overloading the system beyond its legitimate bounds will never get us where we want to go.
—————-



Interesting what Chuck says. Thanks.

if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says….
— Mww

I don’t think he does. — Wayfarer

Ok, good to know.

Will is not a noumenon in the Kantian sense, nor an object behind appearances, but what is disclosed in immediate self-awareness prior to representation — Wayfarer

And this is what Kastrup says? Or what Kastrup says Schopenhauer says? I’d agree will is not noumena, but would argue S says will is that thing-in-itself impossible NOT to know. Which is fine for him to say, but it is still in direct conflict with Kant. Be that as it may, of course; the thread title doesn’t implicate Kant anyway.

As a matter of interest, though, I wonder how will, being that which is disclosed in immediate self-awareness prior to representation, connects itself to “world”. As in….World as Will and Representation, 1844.

Are you rejecting the existence of other consciousnesses or just the idea that they have any actual connection with yours, as distinct from merely a similar constitution to yours? — Janus

I have no warrant for rejecting the validity, or indeed even the constitution, of resident consciousness in other human subjects, but I am perfectly within my justifications for denying, a priori, if there should be such consciousness in other subjects, the influence of it beyond its own range.

The point was, that the universality principle which holds for each and every instance of a particular, re: human subjective consciousness, is not the universality principle which holds for each and every possible objective condition in general. In other words, the universality of consciousness is one thing, but universal consciousness is quite another. The former the negation of which is contradictory, the latter the affirmation of which is impossible. All of which reduces to….it’s fine to say everyone has his own consciousness, but the possibility of such truth cannot stand as sufficient ground for saying consciousness is universal.
————-

Kastrup follows Schopenhauer in saying that we do know something of the noumenon in that we are instances of it….. — Janus

This is why I let three pages here go by without commenting: I don’t know Kastrup at all, so I have no reason to think he follows Schopenhauer. But I do know Schopenhauer, and he doesn’t so much favor the knowledge of noumena as he does the knowledge of the Kantian ding an sich. So if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says we know something of the noumena because we are instances of it, he is in utter and complete conflict with Kant, who was the originator of the modern version of both noumena and ding an sich, and possibly in some conflict with Schopenhauer in that the latter only concerns himself with the fact Kant disavows any possible knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which Schopenhauer argues we certainly do, iff the thing-in-itself is represented as will, which has nothing to do with noumena in the Kantian sense at all.

And here, of course, is what you were talking about with that alternative turn of phrase. Kastrup and Schopenhauer apparently both treat noumena differently than Kant, and maybe ever differently than each other. But regardless of all that, it amazes me to no end, how it is even possible to suggest we are instances of noumena in the first place, without, first, representing the concept outside its original definition, and second, accepting the newly represented concept as having some sufficient form of additional explanatory power.
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….in that we know ourselves both form the outside, as manifest entities and form the inside via introspection. — Janus

So the argument for sufficient explanatory power resides in the notion we know ourselves in two different forms of ourselves. Which is true enough, insofar as we know ourselves as both subject and object. But these are different kinds of knowledge, re: empirical/a priori, originating under different conditions, re: theoretical/speculative, and are not connected in any way with each other except transcendentally, for the belonging of both to a single consciousness.

None of which is sufficient reason to suggest we humans are instances of noumena, insofar as the very notion of noumena in its original Enlightenment sense, has no possibility of ever having an object subsumed under the conception of it.

Again, I’m not familiar with the preemptive conditions necessary in Kastrup, that facilitates the suggestion of a possibility in his philosophy that has been established as impossible in its predecessor.
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So, experiences are of things not appearances? And experiences are not appearances but experiences of what appears? Language gets tricky in these kinds of matters. — Janus

Yes, language is tricky, but here I think it’s more a matter of systemic procedure. In short, though, no, experience is not of things or of appearances; experience is of representations of appearances, and appearances are the effect of things on sensibility. You could get away with saying experience is of phenomena, which is a representation of that which caused sensation, sensation being whatever affect the appearance of a thing has. Technically, in theoretical constructions, more is required for experience than mere phenomena, but it isn’t really wrong to begin with it. It’s like…you can’t get to the conclusion of a scientific theory from mere observation, and you can’t get to the conclusion of a hypothetical judgement with only a major premise.

And, correct, experiences are not appearances; one is the temporally/methodically opposed extreme of the other. For human intelligence in its empirical domain, there is nothing for it before the not-known of appearance, and there is nothing for it after the known of experience.

The correspondence of the unknown appearance, to the known experience, through representation, depends exclusively on relations prescribed by the system itself (however metaphysically speculative that may be) and therein resides the commonality between various instances of that system in separate human subjects. It never was the contribution of the thing; it was the contribution of the system to which the thing (“…the undetermined object of empirical intuition….”) is given, which is functionally identical for all otherwise rationally-capable humans.

If an object is as round for you as it is for me, it does not follow it is round because of the object, which may only possibly be the case, but because your system and my system are so much alike yours tells you the object is round and mine tells me the object is round, which is necessarily the case. It is impossible to determine roundness from the object alone, but can only be determined from the effect the object has. We are supported in this, for the roundness of objects for us with our intelligence, does not necessarily hold for forms of intelligence in which roundness is impossible for us to be acquainted. If the object was indeed round in itself, and the same object was given to any other kind of intelligence it would necessarily be round for that intelligence as well as our own, which is something impossible for us to know.

Things that don’t appear to sensibility cannot be known by means of the system, but can be inferred from within the system;
Things that are inferred from within the system may never be given as appearances to the system, hence may never be known by means of the system, but that is NOT to deny their existence;
Things that are inferred may never be appearances, hence may never be known by means of the system, and that IS to deny their reality.

Inference implies the proper use of logic. But human intelligence is prone to mere thought, which is a use of logic in form but not necessarily in accordance with rules of proper inference. In other words, as I’m sure you’re aware, we can think whatever we want. Carrying these threads out to their conclusion is found the absurdity of proclaiming humans as instances of noumena, or asserting the roundness of things to a fish, unless the rules themselves are changed. And if the rules change, that which the rules governed must also change….so how in the HELL would the idea that humans are instances of noumena ever have been formed in the first place?
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I'm on board with the idea that we have two modes of attention and understanding. — Janus

I’m with you. I’ve always been a proponent of the intrinsic human dualistic nature, so would you also admit to being one? Maybe you’re of the opinion that being on board with an idea, isn’t the same as being a proponent of what the idea suggests. Or maybe being dualistic in some aspects of human nature is not to be dualistic in toto. What say you?

I’m also with you…or him anyway…regarding the instrumental nature of left hemisphere, but I’m not so sure about it being the causal condition of all that bad stuff.

But then…there’s today’s major headline…..(shrug)

….whatever other tasks you may have set yourself…. — Janus

I thought about applying some pure reason to this universal consciousness idea, but….turns out…it’s too much like aspens communicating with each other: cool idea but without any possibility of obtaining certainty. And without that possibility, it is then commonly called a waste of time, makes no difference whether true or not, which is synonymous with being irrelevant.

The common rejoinder then becomes…yeah, but it’s fun to play with, right? But no, it isn’t, if it follows that your consciousness has anything whatsoever, in any way, shape or form, to do with mine, which seems plausible given its ground as a universal condition. I summarily reject your consciousness as having anything at all to do with mine, simple as that. Easy to see that if I reject yours, I must also reject anyone else’s, which is to reject every instance of it except my own, which just is to reject the universality of it.
(BOOM!!!)

Or, how about this: is it just me or is there a teeth-grinding contradiction in “extrinsic appearance of inner experience”? Have we not yet come to grips with the certainty that no experience is ever of appearances on the one hand, and no experience is itself an appearance, on the other?

Even the thread title implies an inconsistency, in that the strictly metaphysical doctrine of idealism as such concerns itself only with the internal machinations of human subjects, for which, regarding the being of external things in general, there is not the least import. Descartes may be forgiven for labeling internal machinations/external things in general as different substances, with its accompanying ontological implications, as long as he is credited as first to demonstrate the necessity for there being such a difference in the first place, and in which ontology as such falls aside.
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….disagreement often hinges on an alternative turn of phase or two. — Janus

True enough, for folks like us. On higher levels, alternative turns of phrase lead to completely different philosophies, in which case the philosopher’s alternative conceptualizations revert to the Everydayman philosophiser accepting them, which then very well could be his mere misunderstanding.

Like, me, and, universal consciousness. Extrinsic appearance.

And those thinking Kant a phenomenologist. (Sigh)

The world as perceived…. — Janus

…the world (as perceived), is presupposed, and from such temporal antecedence….

…..is obviously not independent of the perceivers. — Janus

….the independence of it with respect to perceivers, is given necessarily. That which wasn’t already there (and is so for whatever reason and in whatever manner), cannot be something there (merely from its effect on some form of sensibility).

The world as perceived not independent of perceivers, is far too close to tautological meaninglessness, insofar as perception is not independent of perceivers.

The world (…) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (…) is independent of perceivers….is false;
The world (perceived) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (world) is independent of perceivers….is false.

On the other hand, insofar as that which is perceived necessarily exists given its effect on sensibility, to then grant such existence is obviously not independent of perceivers, says far too much with respect to both perceiver and perceived, for the simple reason existence has nothing to do with perception, but is only the necessary condition for its possibility. Whatever the relation between existence as such, and the form of its manifestation in things, which just is that necessary condition, occurs further intellectually/rationally downstream than mere sensation.

Is time just some overblown metaphysical concept, or is it something which seldom receives proper attention.
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But it seems obvious there is a "contribution" to what is perceived from a perceiver-independent reality that ensures the possibility of a shared world among perceivers. — Janus

…from a perceiver-independent reality contradicts the obviously not independent of the perceivers.

The contribution to what is perceived, just is whatever is perceived. But it does not follow, given sufficient distinctions in species-specific intellectual capacities, worldly contributions to perceptions of one species have any apodeitic commonality with worldly contributions of another, for granting such certainty is tantamount to equating rational intellect with mere instinct.
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I had a JRT, I was her one and only human her entire life. For 18 years she was a job-dog, a hiking partner, a pillow thief. Every once in awhile, when I said something to her, she’d tilt her head in that oh-so-cute sorta way, and it occurred to me…she’s wondering what I meant. Only after a few of those, I began to think maybe she was wondering….WTF am I supposed to do that??? There’s no way to tell, from a mere tilt of the head, whether the confusion it suggested belonged to her because of her, or to her because of me. The point being, not the confusion, which may not have even been, but the possibility of correcting it, which may not have even been necessary.

Some nature show tells me aspen trees, given their interconnectedness, correspond according to a root system. Then I try to imagine trees talking to each other, and I get nothing. But I cannot say they don’t talk to each other, only that I can’t imagine how they do. Or, they really don’t and some other natural condition gives that appearance. I mean, a chemical injected in one tree showed up in another, miles away. If I deny anthropomorphism, trees are just trees and anything that connected will interact naturally, I’m not any part of it and therefore shouldn’t get all prophetic over it.

My New Year’s resolution…don’t bug so much.

Wish me luck?

….without any self-reflective conceptualization such as "I have an itch". — Janus

Pretty much what I’m saying: there’s nothing cognizable in a sensation alone, so nothing to do with its cause or its resolution. Pure reflex of course being irrelevant.

I was agreeing with Sellars’ thesis that empirical knowledge of things is not possible from sensation alone, but still favoring the notion that knowledge THAT there is a thing, is a non-contradictory, hence completely rational idea.

A sensation just is. — Esse Quam Videri

Right, hence my meaning in saying to know of having it is superfluous. In response to your to have it and know you have it are two different things.

The point never was the sensation to begin with, but the thing I know that is necessarily its cause.

It’s so easy to get lost in the minutia.

….having a tickle and knowing that you're having a tickle are two different things. — Esse Quam Videri

I don’t need to know there is a sensation beyond having one. The given sensation makes the knowing of it superfluous.

The recognition that it can't be denied is itself a reasoned judgment, not an immediate content of sensory experience. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, for sensation is not the immediate content of sensory experience, but merely the occasion for its possibility.

The proof sensation cannot be denied is determinable from the change in the condition of the affected subject from the time before to the time of each and every such occasion. This is an aesthetic judgement, from which the subject cognizes nothing at all, not a reasoned, re: discursive one, from which a possible cognition always follows.

In order to know that there are things one must have grasped concepts such as "thing" and "existence" and made a judgment on the basis of those concepts. — Esse Quam Videri

In order to know what things are one must conceptually represent them to himself and judge accordingly. This is knowledge of.

One has no need of conceptual context for mere appearances to sensibility. One can have (the sensation of) a tickle on the back of his neck without the slightest clue as to its cause, antecedent experience not necessarily any help except to inform of what the cause is not, but not what it is.

To know that there is a thing, some as yet undetermined something, is merely the impossibility of its denial that isn’t self-contradictory. It is said to be given for the simple reason the perceiver, insofar as he is affected by it, cannot be its cause.

Sellars is correct as far as empirical knowledge mediated by discursive judgement is concerned, of course. Knowledge that there is a thing, is not that.

Ehhhh….I don’t do psychology. I’m happy just knowing stuff, and while I think of myself as a knowing subject, that is not to say I know myself. But I seriously doubt the full complement of my intellectual capacity is available to my conscious awareness, metaphysical theories aside, and I’m certain I know nothing at all about the manner in which my brain presents a subject from itself that doesn’t have itself recognizable in it. (Sigh)

In terms of moral disposition, which is where I think most like to say they know themselves, I would admit to only this, I do know what I should do, I do know I hope to do what I should, but to know I will do what I should is not given from any of that.

Oh damn. Sorry. Not sure what I’d change, but thanks for correcting me.

Again, I’d agree self-awareness is intrinsic to every conscious act. I maintain, on the other hand, there are acts of the intellect of which the subject is none the wiser.

Some would argue that awareness of things is knowledge that there are things. Plato, Russell, that I am familiar with. In juxtaposition to knowledge of things.

In order to know I must do a lot more than understand.

In order to understand I must think.

What is it for you to inquire? How would you describe it?

This is a whole ‘nuther argument.

I might agree that understanding and all are acts of the intellect, and the subject to which they belong is conscious of his participation in some of them. But that’s not the same as saying consciousness is approximating itself when it “manifestly does” the same thing.

So, yes, I think there's a great deal of continuity from Plato>Aristotle>Kant….. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it’s kinda hard to make certain just how much Aristotle is in Kant, beyond the general conditions. He does credit the categories to Aristotle, but doesn’t for the intrinsic duality of human intelligence. I’m wondering if Aristotle didn’t go that far himself, which would explain why he didn’t get the credit, at least for the idea on which the theory as subsequently built.

Anyway….thanks.

Ousia is closer to “being” or “what-it-is-to-be.” — Wayfarer

As you know, Kant was the chair of metaphysics and logic, and had great respect for Aristotle, using logical syllogism as ground for his critical program. Do you see any similarity to, or perhaps a continuation of, the earlier, in the later?

“…..The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which therefore endures while everything else changes….” (A144/B183)

I see consciousness as inherently reflexive. — Esse Quam Videri

That’s you talking, not the system in which consciousness is a consequence.

It can (and manifestly does) use experience, understanding and reason to appropriate itself as experiencer, understander and reasoner. — Esse Quam Videri

If I am the experiencer, understander and reasoner, what am “I” doing while consciousness is, for all intents and purposes, making of itself a copy of me?

Even if it be allowed to consciousness that it uses, say, understanding, it cannot do so in the approximation of itself as an understander, for it is the understander which stands in consciousness of its thinking, from which follows consciousness, in approximating itself as a thinker, is conscious of itself being conscious of its thoughts, which is absurd.

If perchance then the same scenario holds for experiencing and reasoning, the whole proposal falls apart.

Consciousness is a consequence of faculties, having no pretensions of being one.

Or so it seems……

a proper understanding of the empirical depends on a proper understanding of the transcendental — Esse Quam Videri

…proper understanding of the origin and use of the transcendental. Transcendental is a condition representing the possible determination of the particular iff the general is given.

That space is a general intuition, is a transcendental proposition; that things have their own spaces, is an empirical one.

I am approaching it differently — Esse Quam Videri

As did Schopenhauer; nothing wrong with it, as long as it remains true to its name. Wouldn’t be fair or right to call it transcendental philosophy when approached differently enough to falsify its tenets.

I’d agree Kant’s account is epistemic, but not sure about “prior to the empirical”. And I don’t know in what sense any of Kant’s account is ontological, re: “… The proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine must give
way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding…” (A247/B303).

I think what you are describing here is idea that the system in operation is, in some sense, “overabundant” with respect to the system in the talk of it…. — Esse Quam Videri

Actually, I was going for the opposite. The system in operation is just that; the talk of the system is over and above, or in addition to, the operation itself. I mean…the system never talks to itself, isn’t trying to understand itself; it is just that which understands, and is necessarily presupposed by the talk of it.

I would sooner just admit to the intrinsic circularity of the human intellectual system, regardless of its name. To use reason in describing what reason is or does, and all the other speculatively derived faculties and conditions as well, is the epitome of circular reasoning, but at the same time, is in all cases unavoidable, for otherwise, as you say, inquires would cease.

The warning to guard against it, and the method for it, is in the text, but the elimination of “in-excess” thinking and rational constructs generally, is impossible. Search for the unconditioned and all that jazz.

This is why Kant took pains to emphasize his method was strictly grounded in tripartite logical syllogism, in which the truth in the premises grants the truth in the conclusion. He never says his system is in fact the operative human system, which he would never admit to knowing in the first place, but only the “if this then that” construct.

I can sorta see the “object-in-itself” is in excess of the “object-for-consciousness”, but they are certainly very different from each other.

…..some readings of Kant seem to leave us completely separated from an unknowable reality. — Wayfarer

We have to be completely separated from the unknowable, don’t we? An unknowable reality is a contradiction in terms, technically, but still, we have to be separated from the unknowable simply by the limitations of our system of knowing. But that’s fine; we aren’t seeking the unknowable anyway. We want to know what’s given to us, not what isn’t.

….the 'unknowability of existence' is a fundamental philosophical virtue…. — Wayfarer

Many things exist; there is no such thing as existence. Nothing whatsoever is added to the conception of a thing, by including existence in its predicate.

The rejoinder often in the form…is existence a property of a thing, or a condition for the possibility of a thing? It is neither, if it is actually a category, and categories are that which grounds the very possibility of experience of things in general. Theoretically.

Dunno about virtue, though. Not sure about its philosophical significance.

The purpose of transcendental philosophy should be to give an account of the structure of subjectivity, not the content, whereas the question of mind-dependence is a question that should be asked at the level of content, not structure. — Esse Quam Videri

The structure of subjectivity goes beyond the purview of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in that the structure of subjectivity must include pure practical reason, re: moral philosophy, which transcendental philosophy does not address. Ref: A15/B29

Transcendental philosophy has for its object the structure and bounds of pure speculative reason, all its content already having been abstracted, and the critique of it is that by which understanding obtains the rules for its proper concerns, re: the possibility for and validity of pure a priori synthetic cognitions in relation to empirical conditions.
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Kant gives you the “participatory” part, but it’s at the expense of the “knowing” part. — Esse Quam Videri

Might this be separating the system in the talk of it, from the system in the operation of it? The system in and of itself, regardless of the talk about it, is both participatory and knowing. The system doesn’t have subjects and objects; the talk of it merely reifies some speculative content into comprehensible expressions, of which the modus operandi doesn’t have and therefore of which it makes no use.

Bottom line is we don’t know how we know stuff, but we’re at a complete loss if we then say we really don’t know anything. As soon as we say we know we are obliged to say how we know, in which is found the necessity that the part that participates in knowing, and knowing which is participated in, are the same.

In Kant then is found that the participatory part is the prescription for the knowing part, hence cannot really be said the one is at the expense of the other.

If I’ve understood you close enough, that is.

Ok. Thanks.

What the mind already knows about the object is the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, in that the object in its entirety is the experience. When the perception is already determined as, e.g., basketball, as far as the human intellect is concerned, the totality of conceptions subsumed under the general are included in the experience whether or not consciousness registers them. Such being the case, what is not known about the thing is not in-itself, but can be nonetheless cognized as an inference to a possible experience, insofar as the logical object of those inferences is necessarily contained in the thing experienced.

What the mind doesn't know about the object is the object as it is in-itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Given the above, it is clear this is not the case, under the assumption the object the mind knows of, is the same object the mind may not know all of. It is absurd to suppose the dark side of the moon, at those times in which there was no experience of it, there was only the dark-side-of-the-moon-in-itself.

What the mind doesn’t know about a thing doesn’t necessarily indicate a thing-in-itself. It is entirely possible the mind doesn’t know about a thing because there’s no thing to know about.

THAT the mind doesn’t know OF the object, is just what it means for the object to be as it is in itself.

Therefore, the object as it is in-itself is in excess of the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

In a sense, yes. But these merely represent time differentials between the thing in itself and the same thing for-consciousness. Wordplay: in-itself vs in-us; in-itself vs for-consciousness. In-itself as a thing vs thing given to us as appearance vs thing represented in us as phenomenon.

Furthermore, the act of asking a question presupposes that what the mind doesn't yet know about the object (the in-itself) is knowable because, again, otherwise it wouldn't ask the question. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, with the caveat that part of the thing the mind asks about is not any part of the thing in itself. By definition, the mind cannot even ask about the thing-in-itself, but is perfectly within its cognitive purview to ask about things merely possible for-consciousness, to use your term.

Still, there are myriad instances of asking questions even about things the mind thinks, but for which the mind already knows the experience is impossible. One of the more familiar instances being….what is it like to be a bat. Again, in your terms, what is known is a bat; what is asked is what it is like to be a bat-in-itself, from which what is proposed as being knowable, is actually not.

Therefore, the act of asking a question about an object presupposes that the object as it is in-itself is knowable. — Esse Quam Videri

The act of asking a question about an object presupposes the possibility of an answer relative to the object asked about. The object asked about is the object or possible object for-consciousness, not the object as it is in itself.

If it is the case the perception of a thing is the perception of a whole, it makes sense that the thing-in-itself of which there is no perception includes the whole of that thing-in-itself. From which follows the possibility of knowing all of the one, but the impossibility of knowing anything at all in part or in whole about the other, while at the same time granting necessary existence relative to a perceiver, of both.
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On the other hand…..

There is a kind of in-itself-ness of things for which there is experience. It is not irrational to allow knowledge of the basketball itself to not include knowledge of the air contained inside its spatial boundaries. Or that the knowledge of the exterior spherical surface material does not grant knowledge of the interior spherical surface material. But it is understood a priori, first, that there must be those, and, second, there is no need, and indeed it would be superfluous, to cognize such distinction necessarily, in order for the experience of the thing as a whole to reside in consciousness without self-contradiction.

But it doesn’t serve any useful purpose to suppose the air in the basketball is some thing in itself. Or even the microscopic things of which there isn’t any direct experience at all. Which makes sense, because all that stuff each has its own name, whether directly experienced or not, which presupposes it is some thing already known or inferred logically by the same mind that comprehends the necessity of all the constituency of the thing as a whole experience.
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Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. — Esse Quam Videri

That which is inferred is a strictly logical construct. Existence is a category, and all categories and their subsumed conceptions have reference only to things of experience, and never to merely logical inferences. An existence is empirically given, an inference is only logically valid. Under these conditions, it cannot be said noumena exist, but it can be said it is impossible to know they do not.

Noumena are no more than that which understanding thinks, understanding thinks only in concepts, therefore noumena are no more than concepts. Concepts do not exist, they are no more than valid thoughts, valid meaning they do not contradict anything in the thinking of them. They would certainly contradict experience if it were possible for that which is no more than a mere thought, to be an experience. I mean…if that were the case, everybody could buy a unicorn.

The transcendental subject is not even a concept or a thought of understanding. It belongs to pure reason alone, as an apodeitic principle thus is even further from existence than a mere thought.

In Kantian dualism is the irreducible necessity that if this is this, it cannot ever be that. If existence is this, nothing that does not have this can exist. If inference is that, nothing that does not have that can be an inference. Existence is not inference; inference is not existence. Irreducible necessity meaning one can’t be a dualist for one thing but not another. If he is a dualist he is so in toto and cannot rationally oscillate between being one for this and not one for that.

Of course, if one doesn’t consider himself a proper Kantian dualist, he’s at liberty to mess it up any way he sees fit (grin)

Yours are interesting arguments; I only comment in reference to the claimed source material, your interpretations of it, or conjunction with it, be what they may.

Do you believe there’s such a thing as pure reason? — Tom Storm

Ehhhhh…..I’m sure there’s an abundance of abstraction, from the physical mechanisms of the brain to those conditions which facilitate an explanation for something every human ever, is only seeming to do. If it were ever to occur to me the goings-on between my ears wasn’t a general range of mental constructs, I wouldn’t be able to say a damn thing about what is going on.

I mean….even if I had a completely determined physical explanation for my abject hatred for the taste of Lima beans, isn’t it still me that hates that taste? What kind of explanation is really worth entertaining, that says neural pathways, or ion potentials, hate Lima beans?

So, yes, there is that which is called pure reason, even if only within a speculative non-physical explanation for physical conditions. And the kind of pure reason it is, depends on the domain of the philosophy that uses it. For experience it is pure theoretical reason; for which experience is impossible it is pure speculative reason; for moral philosophy having to do with the will it is pure practical reason.

The critical human is going to explain things to himself, whether or not there’s sufficient proofs for what he claims. It’s just what he does.
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….internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.
— Mww

I'm not sure I understand this sentence. — Tom Storm

It’s the simple representation of how a subject feels about that stuff of which he is the sole determinant factor. Which is the irreducible condition of Kantian moral philosophy: the proper moral agent will do what he’s already determined must be done, whether he feels good about doing it or not. That’s the subject’s condition because of himself: he feels like shit for what he did at the same time it’s he alone, that determined what was to be done. Or he feels great, depends…..

Is that Camus in the background, firing up a Gauloises? — Paine

“…. One must imagine Sisyphus happy….”

Because the reference is Kant……

The matter of pure reason is interesting. — Tom Storm

For his relation to moral philosophy, care needs be taken for which pure reason matters.

I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. — Tom Storm

…entirely a priori, but not necessarily understanding.

I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning — Tom Storm

Experience is irrelevant, for to be entirely a priori simply means “not independently of this or that experience, but absolutely independently of all experience…” (B3). The role of affect holds, but not as the senses are affected because of real objects, but the internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.

…..a sound morality is a form of rationalism. — Tom Storm

“Sound” indicates a logical condition. Moral philosophy doesn’t incorporate logic in the same way as transcendental philosophy, these being distinct and altogether of far different origin and manifestation. It may be more appropriate to consider the form of rationalism for the latter as sound, but with respect to the former, it is properly considered “lawful”.

But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense. — Tom Storm

Agreed, and for me, the something that seems like common sense is in fact the intermingling of anthropology, ethics, or cultural normativity, with moral philosophy proper. The rather vast difference between the plurality of human engagements, and singularity of the human condition which determines the variety of responses to them, mistakes the effect for the cause.

I am also open to idealism, but I don't see how this is a particularly useful view. — Tom Storm

For that which belongs to a human for the simple reason it is irrevocably a necessary condition, any explanation for it must be a form of idealism, iff idealism is that by which the internal machinations of humans in general, whatever they may be, is susceptible to exposition in a rational doctrine. Still, a rational doctrine of what it is to be moral, which is always metaphysical, is not always reflected in its exhibitions, insofar as the mere behavior of the subject not always accords with his own metaphysical doctrine.

morality is best understood beyond preconceptions, homilies and slogans, by looking inward through self-reflection — Tom Storm

If morality is a necessary human condition, there’s no need to look for it. All the moral subject does with his philosophy, which just is the looking in some form or another, is come to grips with himself when he’s failed.

Anyway…..interesting topic, even if I got no interest in relativism or anti-foundationalism. I like to keep my -isms irreducible.