Do I think a representation? — J

I’m pretty sure the thesis says, not that we think them, but we think by means of them. Personally, I hold with the notion humans think in images, which are called representations, merely as a way to talk about what’s happening. I mean…we can’t express ourselves in image format, hence, we invent words in order to represent their fundamental composition or constituency objectively.

Anyway….that’s all I got.

I offer only that 3 is the least wrong.

The reason for my choice is that Kant says “I think” must accompany all my representations (B133, in three separate translations), not my thoughts. Some representations are not thought but merely products of sensibility, re: phenomena.

Thought is “….cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, conceptions are the representations of understanding. “I think” is not part of, nor is it necessary for, the synthesis by which thought is possible, but merely represents the consciousness that there can be one.

There’s a reason why “I think” is written that way when considering the systemic modus operandi, but not written that way when considered within a post hoc linguistic array.

But I know nothing of those other guys, so, there is that……

I was thinking that maybe you would agree that any cognitive system would be incapable of absolute knowledge because every cognitive system has an a priori structure to it — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree, unless you actually intended every human’s cognitive system has an a priori structure. But in saying every cognitive system generally, without the human qualifier, whatever kind of system that might be cannot be determined merely from the inference it is a system per se, which makes explicit there is no proper warrant for attributing an a priori structure to it, eliminating it as a condition for an argument.

Humans understand absolute empirical knowledge is impossible, humans have a representational, discursive tripartite cognitive system from which that understanding is given, from which follows, the best that can be said, the strongest affirmative judgement logically possible, is that systems congruent with the human system should also find that absolute empirical knowledge is impossible. We’ll know for certain if or when one presents itself to us.

I kinda question a priori structure as sufficient reason for human’s incapacity for absolute empirical knowledge. That such structure is an integral functionality of human cognition is not to say it is the reason for its limitations, if there is another more suitable reason.

On “reasoned beauty”:

Do you think we reason to an aesthetically pleasing emotion?

I am just asking if you would concur that knowledge of reality as it were in-itself would always be impossible under any cognitive system. — Bob Ross

I don’t know of any cognitive system other than the human, so I won’t concur with any supposed impossibilities inherent in them. But I will concur nonetheless that knowledge of any conceivable “-in-itself” of empirical nature, is impossible from within the purview of human intelligence of certain speculative composition in particular, as well as such congruent representational, discursive, tripartite intelligences in general.

Reality-in-itself is altogether useless to us, so why would we care whether or not we can know anything about it?

Nothing to do with secrecy; ol’ Bob and me, we go down this dialectical inconsistency road every once in awhile.

The carry on is just meant to indicate my total shoulder-shrug with respect to the OP.

”See what I mean?”
-Mww

I don’t. Isn’t ultimate reality the same as absolute reality? — Bob Ross

I already granted the conceptual similarity, but, no, I wouldn’t say they are the same.

But that wasn’t the point. There’s a disconnect between what you were asked, re: knowing ultimate truth (about reality), and what you asked of me, re: knowing reality (absolutely).

One’s a truth claim conditioned by logic a priori, the other’s a knowledge claim conditioned by experience a posteriori. What you want from me doesn’t relate to what was asked of you, that’s all.

But never mind. Carry on.

If someone claims there is an unconditional good…. — Janus

Then he’s already shot himself in the foot, insofar as the uncondition-ed is beyond human reason, and the uncondition-al is itself a rather suspicious conception. Better he propose a claim that there is that which is conditioned by good alone, which makes good a quality under which the conceptual object of the claim is subsumed, rather than the condition of that conceptual object’s possibility. Thereby, he is justified in claiming that in which resides good as its sole quality, serves as the singular necessary condition for that which follows from it.
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…..“can that be more than a mere opinion? — Janus

That there is that in which resides good as a sole quality is a claim restricted to mere opinion, yes, but the justification for that which follows from it, in the form of pure speculative metaphysics, can be logically demonstrated as a prescriptive practice, which is not mere opinion.
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If anything is said to be good, we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. — Janus

While that which is claimed to be good in itself is mere opinion, it can still be the case that whatever follows from it, iff logically consistent hence irrational to deny, that the ground for the claim is the subsequent affirmative justifications given from it.

Here’s an opinion, found in the opening paragraph of F.P.M.M., 1785: “…. Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will….”.

Me, I dunno if that’s true or not, but it doesn’t have to be, as long as it cannot be apodeitically proven false, and, as long as that which follows is logically consistent with it.

But, as in any speculative domain, it’s off to the rodeo, and the commoners get lost in the minutia paving the way.

Prima facie, as Mww would tell you, the only way to know reality absolutely is if one’s cognition were capable of representing with 1:1 accuracy; but this is never actually possible….. — Bob Ross

Careful, Bob. Even granting no conceptual conflict between ultimate and absolute, the initial query regards knowing about the ultimate truth of reality, but you’re roping me into a situation regarding the truth of absolute reality. See what I mean? Absolute truth (of ___), or truth of (absolute _____)?

But all that aside, you’re right: I would never admit to, nor be convinced of, the idea, much less the possibility, of knowing ultimate truth about reality, or, knowing reality absolutely.

Still, as in all the other similar occasions….thanks for respecting my opinions.

Cool synopsis. I’m all for reduction from the naturalist attitude, but that realm of “transcendental experience”…..that just felt weird coming out of my mouth. To just call it “reason”, of course, doesn’t advance the phenomenological program, so I get it.

….and speaking of presenting questions, something I distinctly remember doing, which at my age, is rather significant.

Ain’t gonna happen. He’s rather well-known for the questions he presents his dialectical companions, the lack of relevant response from one or another of them, would probably make him think twice when it comes to associating himself with philosophers in general.

I did not mean to overlook your request. — Mapping the Medium

….yet it repeats itself.

Socrates would object in the most strenuous of terms.

Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

I’m obviously not MU, but I asked first.

Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else? — Mww

Sorry, , for butting in, kinda. I recognize that you’re going deeper into the subject matter than my simple question asks.

A deflationist reading this will likely wonder what all the fuss is about…. — Srap Tasmaner

That’d be me, on the one hand, insofar as that which is, is given. But it is, on the other hand, the systemic function of my intelligence to internally model that which is given, in such a way as to accommodate my experience of it.

But that’s not the point herein, is it. There must already be an internally constructed model in order for there to be a duck as such, in the first place. Otherwise, there is merely some thing given, subsequently determinable by its behaviors. Or, as they liked to say back in The Good Ol’ Days, by its appearance to the senses.

So why do I need to model a real duck, if I’ve already done it? The duck I physically manufacture and situate in an environment adds nothing to my experience. Even if I discover the naturally real duck exhibits a behavior absent from my experience, and I manufacture Duck 2.0 incorporating it, the latest version must still have its own internal precursor, in order for its formally unperceived appearance to properly manifest.
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What do models model exactly? It's not a hard question; the answer is behavior. — Srap Tasmaner

While physically manufactured models model behavior, the necessarily antecedent intellectually assembled models, which do not exhibit naturally real behavior, do not. It still isn’t a hard question, it just doesn’t have a single, all-encompassing answer.

…..and then it joins a Forum. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know….it’s a bitch not being able to find any decent gymnasia these days.

what do you make of it, dear reader? — Arcane Sandwich

“…. Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion….”

What do I make of it? The subject matter herein merely illustrates that not much has changed in 3-4,000 years of documented human thought.

I was not writing that comment for academic scrutinization. — Mapping the Medium

Awww damn. I’m all warm and fuzzy inside. (Grin)

….he was not speaking of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline. — Mapping the Medium

Agreed; he was commenting on the inacuteness of common sense, and that they are not proper metaphysical cognitions, re: Hume and assorted and sundry British empiricists, I’m guessing. My problem was that he implied bad logical quality to metaphysical cognitions, irrespective of their connection to common sense thinking. With the caveat, again, in that I may not have given Charles his just due.

Yes, understood. I was just carrying over what he did for himself he meant for all rational subjects to do for themselves.

Familiar, yes; studied….not so much.

From that essay, though, comes one of my more seriously held cognitive inclinations, re: to believe is no more than to think, from which follows one says nothing more when he says he believes, than what he has already thought. And insofar as no belief is possible without the arrangement of conceptions, which just is to think, to speak from belief alone, holds no power at all.

Peirce explores the idea that beliefs settle our doubts because doubts make us uncomfortable. — Mapping the Medium

I rather think doubt is merely a negative belief, both of which are cognitions, discursive judgements of relative truth, whereas comfort is a feeling. I don’t associate one with the other, myself. Smacks of psychology….the red-headed stepchild of proper metaphysics.

Also from the essay, “…. imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied…”, which implies metaphysical cognitions possess bad logical quality, precisely the opposite of my personal opinion.
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Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else?

According to Kant…. — Corvus

Close enough, I suppose. I rather think accepting ideas and/or beliefs of others is dogmatism, which occurs when a subject presumes to advance in his own metaphysical thought without determining the validity of its ground as opposed to the habitual neglect of it, hence the proverbial “slumber”.

It follows that to awaken from a slumber is to begin what the slumbering prevented, in this case, determining the warrant for acceptance of any belief or idea, his own or someone else’s. So it isn’t what a subject falls into at all, but instead, what he comes out of.

So to awaken from dogmatic slumbers is to begin the critique of one’s own pure cognitions, for the origin, the warrant, hence the validity, of the principles upon which they necessarily rest, thereby promising that we “….must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics...”

Now what was offered as opinion with respect to one purportedly missing the opportunity to be awakened, just indicates he chose not to examine, or, as I mentioned, gave no evidence that he did examine, the validity of the ground the pure cognitions of his dialectical opponent presented to him, but merely designated the words representing them as neither wise nor intelligent, the epitome of sceptical appraisal.
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And the dogmatic slumber to awaken from? To critique the grounding principles for? That to which I wished to direct your attention, but apparently failed miserably?

Why, the “nominalism thought virus”, of course. Maybe it’s just me, but the subtlety in that phrase, that concept…..(sigh)

Another word is "sublime" — RussellA

Yep; good catch.

In us, beauty is found; sublimity is excited.

So be it.

One purportedly missed the opportunity to be awakened from “dogmatic slumbers”, the other personifies Sisyphus with a generally unrecognized metaphysical doctrine.

Same as it ever was……

Maybe your two-party dialectical failure to continue, relates to a proposed affliction resident in the “nominalism thought virus”.

Ok.

…..you don’t think there is anything about how reality is that can dictate out it ought to be. — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree with that. If I judge something perceived as offensive to my moral sensibilities, it is possible I may determine an act whereby that offense is rectified, which is the same as changing reality into what I feel it ought to be.

…..the moral anti-realist has to note that the ontology of morality is really just grounded in the projections of subjects….. — Bob Ross

Dunno about moral anti-realists, but as far as I’m concerned, morality doesn’t have an ontology, in the commons sense of the conception. On the other hand, I’m ok with the projection of subjects being the exemplification, or the objectification, of their respective moral determinations.

But this arena is anthropology, or clinical psychology, whereas I’m only interested in moral philosophy itself. Just like in cognitive systems: it’s not that we know, it’s how it is that we know; so too in moral systems, it’s not that we are moral, but how it is that are we moral.

…..and this is exactly what I understand you to be saying by noting that the wills of subjects are introduce new chains of causality into the world and are not themselves causal. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Backwards? The will of subjects is causal, insofar as it determines what a moral act shall be, in accordance with the those conditions intrinsic to individual moral constitution. But the will cannot itself project that act onto the world, insofar as any act requires physical motivations. The missing piece, or, the controlling factor let’s say, between the determination of a moral act and the projection of it, is aesthetic judgement, re:, does the feeling I get from the effect of this act reflect the feeling I get from the cause.

See the problem? The feeling of good in having willed a moral act does not necessarily match the feeling of good in having done it. And that is the mark of ideal moral agency: the only act willed is always good, the aesthetic judgement will always be positive, the act shall be done without regard to the consequential feeling of having done it.

Hence, the ideal of pure practical reason, and the ground of what makes a will good, doesn’t have an answer, the philosophy describing its function justifiably predicated on it being so.

This is a equivocation between ontology and epistemology…. — Bob Ross

I understand what you’re saying, but there’s a conceptual divide in place. Ontology as you intend the concept, has to do with things, what is and why, how, etc, of them. Epistemology, by the same token, has to do with the method, and the system using that method, belonging to a certain kind of intelligence, for knowing about those things subsumed under the conception of natural ontology.

Those don’t work for what’s going on here. Ontology, insofar as for that Nature is causality, and the human subject is the intelligence that knows only what Nature provides.

For what’s going on here, the subject himself is the causality, and of those of which he is the cause it isn’t that he knows of them, but rather that he reasons to them. It makes no sense to say he knows, of that which fully and immediately belongs to him alone.

This is where that thing I said about feelings not being cognitions, fits. And also, why everything we’re talking about here is of a far different systemic formalism. And while it is true we need that standard discursive epistemology to talk about this stuff, and we need the standard phenomenal ontology to properly deploy it for its intended purpose, there is no need of either in its development, in first-person internal immediacy.

What good is, is only determinable by moral philosophy, in which hypotheticals and mere examples have no say.

If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good. — Bob Ross

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good. I only said there is no scientific cause/effect evidence for the will itself, which is to say there is objective or empirical knowledge of it.

Our conversation became so spectacular, that they couldn’t help themselves — Bob Ross

Exactly the way I see it. Which makes….you know….two of us.

I am asking what makes a will good? — Bob Ross

I’m a fan of metaphysical reductionism, that is, reduce propositions to the lowest form of principles which suffice to ground the conceptions represented in the propositions, and, justify the relation of those conceptions to each other. Which is fine, but comes with the inherent danger of reducing beyond such justifications, often into relations irrational on the one hand and not even possible on the other, from the propositions themselves. The proverbial transcendental illusion, the only way out of which, is just don’t reduce further than needed.

And this is what happens when asking what makes a will good. If whatever makes the will good, can be represented as merely some necessary presupposition, it doesn’t matter what specifically is the case. It is enough to comprehend with apodeitic certainty that it is possible for there to be a root of what good is, hence it is non-contradictory, hence possibly true, the will just is the case. This is where it is proper for the common understanding to rest assured.

After having desolved the question of what makes a will good, it remains to be determined at least the conditions by which the possibility of its being good in itself, is given, which is the domain of the philosopher of metaphysics. These conditions are evidenced, and the case that there is such a thing as a will that is good in itself obtains, by the relevant activities of humanity in general, evil being the exception to the rule.

It is impossible to determine what it is exactly that makes the will good, for the simple reason it is impossible to determine exactly what the will is, which makes any scientific use of the principle of cause and effect in its empirical form useless. Best the metaphysician can do, is attribute certain rational constructs to the idea of a will, sufficient to explain man’s relevant activities, then speculate on the more parsimonious, the most logical, method by which those constructs originate, from which, as it so happens, arises Kantian transcendental logic.

That logic, then, while saying nothing about what makes a will good, is quite specific in a purely speculative fashion, with respect to the principles enabling the will to be that which is directly that faculty responsible for making the man a good man, by his proper use of it, and to whom is attributed moral agency.

The transcendental necessary presupposition: there is no good, in, of and for itself, other than the good will.
The form of transcendental principles: maxims, imperatives.
The transcendental logic’s original constructs: freedom, and autonomy.
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Right has nothing to do with good, but only with a good, or the good.

Anyway….food for thought. Or confusion. Take your pick.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction — Tom Storm

Agreed. That you use satisfaction, or I use contentment, we are in principle saying the same thing. To be a perfectly moral agent is to act, regardless of circumstance, only in accordance with that which provides satisfaction for the agent. Humans rarely do that regardless of circumstance, being influenced by everything from peer pressure to superficial personal gratifications, mere desires.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality. That’s the easy part; it remains to be explained what reason uses to make these determinations. Hence….moral philosophy.

Why wouldn’t the son just say oh HELL yeah I’m happy!!! Being a kid, he doesn’t consider it as being given pleasure, but only being given that by which pleasure in him just happens to be a consequence.

I mean, even if happiness is merely a subjective condition represented by contentment, contentment itself is no less a feeling of pleasure.

….philosophers and teachers are worthless if we can never be mistaken about what is best for us? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can never be mistaken about what’s best for ourselves iff we alone are the causality for it. We can be, and often are, mistaken in choosing to act in opposition to what is best. Philosophers and teachers have nothing to do with all that, except perhaps in the formulation of a speculative theory that explains how it all happens.

And how might we explain the ubiquitous human experience of regret…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That’s just the feeling one gets from a post hoc judgement that he’s chosen an act in opposition to what he knows is best. The proverbial easy way out….

…..you know by human nature what morally good acts are…. — Corvus

Absolutely. And from which arises my primary contention herein, that knowing what good acts are makes explicit you know what good is. And comes the notion that asking what is good, was never the right question to ask.

Oooo…devolution. I like that better. Aristotle = eudaimonia with or without arete, and Kantian happiness writ large, re: “…contentment with one’s subjective condition…”.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at?

Is the contention that individuals always know what is best for them and what is true for them vis-á-vis ethics? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not ethically, insofar as ethics carries the implication of external authority, re: jurisprudence, and my knowledge of what is best for me merely keeps me out of jail. If I do not accept the truth of external jurisprudence, I am entitled to simply remove myself from it, which makes that truth contingent on whether or not I am suited to it.

Knowing what’s best for me, on a much stricter sense, is an internal necessary truth, carries the implication of an internal authority alone, the escape from which is, of course, quite impossible. Being human, and given a specific theoretical exposition, yes, individuals always know what is best for himself, and he certainly knows what is true, because he alone is the cause of what he knows as best for him.
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I mean it just in the common sense that we have the potential to be/do things we currently aren't/can't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do in fact have the capacity to acquire skills. I admit we do have the capacity, the potential, to do things we currently wouldn’t consider possible. I won’t deny myself the capacity to cheat on speed limits which experience affirms and from which the potential stands, but experience proves I will deny myself the capacity for cutting off lil’ ol’ ladies in the checkout line, and from which the potential has always fallen but may not always. Doesn’t all that make common sense attributions rather lacking in explanatory power?

On the other hand, I do know I have the capacity to throw the trolley switch, I do know my moral constitution or agency proper, mandates that I will not, but I do not know, given the immediate occassion, whether or not that act manifests through my will. Which sorta IS the point, re: explanatory power for determining acts can never be found in capacity for acting, but only in that by which originates the determinations themselves.

True dat….but much more fun to figure out why, both that it is barmy, and in addition, the incessant supposition it’s necessary.

Cool. Gotta love it when a plan comes together.

Hey…people exploded on us. We got somebody’s attention, it seems. Was it our intellectually piercing dialectic, or were they just bored with what they were doing?
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…how does one evaluate what is a good or bad will? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: the goodness or badness of the will is a direct reflection on the worthiness of being content with one’s subjective condition, which is commonly called being happy, which is itself the prime condition for moral integrity. The one willing an act in defiance of his principles would post hoc evaluate his will as bad, earning himself the title of immoral.

It is only under the apodeictic presupposition of a good will, that immoral practices are possible. On the other hand, if the will is neutral or bad, it becomes nearly impossible to explain why the predisposition of humans in general, given from historical precedence, is to do good, to act virtuously.

….good itself is a word for property of the actions. — Corvus

I might expand to say that a word represents a property of actions, good is a word that represents a property of actions, quality is a property of actions, therefore good is a word that represents the quality of actions.

Does that expansion diminish your point? Hopefully not too much anyway, cuz I agree with your major point.

This is quite similar to the discussion (…) elsewhere…. — Leontiskos

I’m aware; I left a scant two cents there a few days ago.
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Aristotle would call this pleasure. — Leontiskos

True enough. and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other.
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….you are depriving yourself of what is truly best… — Count Timothy von Icarus

From the perspective of a case-by-case basis, have I not determined by myself the best for myself, in granting his personal philosophy irrespective of my possible disagreement with it, and, asking for his opinion of mine, irrespective of whether or not I think he’s understood it? Doesn’t this demonstrate that, at the very least, I am aware of how arrive at such determinations in this case, which would then serve as sufficient reason for consciousness of how to arrive at them in any case?
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Imagine a world where everyone is their best….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You mean like one of these “possible worlds” the postmodern analytical mindset deems so relevant? Dunno about all that pathological nonsense, except I’ll wager that world wouldn’t be inhabited by the humans commonly understood as such, by themselves.

So it is that, the circumventing of my own deprivation does nothing to show “St. Augustine, Boethius, or Plato are right”, which is indeed possible, but only that I am, which is apodeitically certain. And from that point of view….the only one that really matters….there is the ideal of good from pure practical reason.

How’s that for bourgeoisie metaphysics? Consign it to the flames?