A state of affairs (presumably conditional on some standard or value) — Andrew M

Conditional on some standard or value that's not a judgment, assessment, evaluative property, etc.?

What would the formalization of my argument be?

What would you argue that "good" is if not a judgment, assessment, evaluative property, etc.?

Man, you really, really don't understand what logic is.

Obviously I don't agree that you proved this logically, but given the sort of thing you seem to be shooting for, all I'd have to do to prove logically that you didn't prove it logically would be to say that just in case I don't feel that you proved it logically, then you didn't prove it logically. I don't feel that you proved it logically. Therefore you didn't prove it logically.

I would prefer not to continue this conversation, thanks. — Snakes Alive

Okay, you can stop anytime you like. (of course)

Number one: Are you reading what I'm typing? (That's not a rhetorical question, I expect you to answer.)

When I write that, answering is not optional for a conversation.

Are you now going to argue that rain is a judgment?

You'd need to provide the definition you're using of judgment, which I asked a few times and you just impolitely ignored

This is why I asked earlier whether you thought that the world only consisted of judgments. You said you didn't, and that whether it was raining wasn't a judgment.

We can judge that it is raining, but this does not mean that that it is raining is not a judgment. — Snakes Alive

How can you ask that right after I type: "We can make judgments about whether it's raining, but rain isn't a judgment"?

Are you reading what I'm typing? (That's not a rhetorical question, I expect you to answer.)

My question is, why does the fact that we only find judgments about whether something is good, tell us anything about whether things are only good to some S? — Snakes Alive

Again, the whole idea of "good" is that it's a judgment, an assessment.

We can make judgments about whether it's raining, but rain isn't a judgment.

It's weird that I'd have to explain that to you, because you'd have to have basically no conception of what "good" is versus something like "rain." It's like trying to explain it to a robot.

"It is raining," as an objective fact, isn't a judgment.

"Good" is a judgment

I explained that already. The rain conclusion has nothing to do with the premise. The premise is about judgments of "good"

-We only find judgments about whether something is good in individuals.
-Therefore, things are only ever good to some S.

Is a good argument

Great. So we agree this is a bad argument. — Snakes Alive

You changed it after I typed my response.

Your conclusion was initially "Therefore it's only raining to some S"

The conclusion has nothing to do with the premise, and it's possible for the premise to be true while the conclusion is false.

Right. Rain is an objective phenomenon. There's plenty evidence of objective rain.

Again, we just agreed that whether it's raining isn't just a judgment right?

So if you're asking whether it's raining based on a judgment to some S, whether it's raining is a fact that's independent of the judgmnet that S makes.

A good argument to whom, and for what?

As I noted two or three times, judgments are a particular sort of activity that individuals perform. But not everything is a judgment.

Sure. We agree about that. So we make judgments about whether it's raining. But that's not the same as whether it's raining. Not everything is a judgment. Just some things are.

Sure, so is whether it's raining a judgment?

It doesn't matter if you see the relevance. You should be capable of answering.

Nope. I asked you a question.

You don't think that everything in the world is a judgment, do you? What definition of judgment are you using?

You should be able to answer without seeing the relevance.

So, let's try this again indeed: You don't think that everything in the world is a judgment, do you? What definition of judgment are you using?

If judgment that something is P is only found in an individual is not[/o] a reason for believing that something can be P only to some S, say in the case of whether it's raining, then it equally cannot be a reason for believing this in the case of goodness. — Snakes Alive

You don't think that propositions and what propositions are about are identical, do you?

Again, judgments are a particular sort of activity that we do. That's not the whole of the world.

You don't think that everything in the world is a judgment, do you? What definition of judgment are you using?

Yes. Keeping in mind that judgments are a particular sort of activity that we do.

Sure, qua judgments.

So what's the evidence that good is always good to some S? — Snakes Alive

The fact that "good" judgments are found nowhere else but in individual activity.

Combo of (a) it not being necessary to specify that it's to someone, for the people who understand this--it's redundant if you understand it, and (b) mistaken beliefs about objective morality.

It's just like not needing to specify "in my opinion" for everything that's someone's opinion. Most people understand that most opinions are opinions without needing to flag it.

Says who? — Snakes Alive

Says the world. We only find "good" in judgments that individuals make.

Again, good is always to someone. That's part of what it means for good to be subjective.

"Good to S," some subject. "Good" is subjective. "x" was whatever the S in question is making the judgment about.

Any x is always good or bad to someone (that is, if anyone is making a judgmen about the x in question). The same x can be good to one person and bad to another.

Is it possible to approve of something that's not good? Yes — Snakes Alive

Rather, the answer is "No." What it is for x to be good to S, morally, is for S to approve of or prefer x, that is, to approve or prefer the behavior in question (where we're talking about behavior S considers more significant than etiquette).

Moral judgements, like all judgements, are true, or they are false. This follows from their predicate-subject form. — Banno

I'm a noncognitivist, basically an emotivist. Moral utterances are not true or false.

"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer.

If it can be proven logically that it is possible for time to pass without any changes occurring, — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, that couldn't be proven logically.

This is most to the fore when what you want is not what you know you ought do. — Banno

What you ought to do might be (in the service of) something you don't want?