The action itself isn't language, is it?

As someone who loves "art for art's sake," I'm not at all fond of people more or less demanding that the arts (at least if they're to be good, worthwhile, etc.) serve some other function, whether moral, political, practical, illustrative, etc. And I also strongly dislike what I call the "realism fetish."

I like music, for example, because I like the art of sound. I'm attracted to certain combinations of melody, harmony, counterpoint, rhythm, timbre, phrasing, etc. That's what moves me with music.

I like paintings because I like certain combinations of forms and colors and textures, etc.

Not that I dislike representationalism in the arts, but with that, I like fantasy, "fancy," etc. Show me what you can imagine, for its own sake.

This is essentially no different than discussing religious beliefs with Christians, say, and it's nothing like discussing something with people who are interested truth from a philosophical or scientific perspective, whatever the truth may be, whether it's what you'd ideally like it to be or not.

That human beings share the same biology and need for self-preservation and well-being (including for offspring and allies). So moral language builds in that common standard. — Andrew M

The action itself is, for example, Joe murdering Bill. It's the physical action of Joe taking a gun, say, and shooting Bill in the head. It's been claimed that the action itself somehow has the property of being morally wrong (or whatever moral properties someone wants to claim).

Or are we saying that we're not being literal in saying that the action itself has moral properties?

No, interpretation isn't objective. By objective I mean independent of any subject or subjective activity. Interpretation is a subjective activity. Obviously it requires a subject. Linguistic meaning, however, once it has been set, does not require a subject or any subjective activity at all times for it to persist. In this sense, it is objective. If all of us were to go extinct right now, it would still be the case that words like "car", "bike", "cat", and so on, mean what they mean in English. The language rules have been set. Why would they suddenly cease to apply, just because no one is there to understand them? — S

So the meaning becomes what in your view, a set of sounds, or text marks, or behaviors, or what?

Just as forthcoming as I expected specifying the evidence.

Hence, moral judgements are much the same as other judgements; they do not form a special "subjective" class. — Banno

What's any evidence of moral properties occurring extramentally?

Not sure why you're repeating that. I addressed all of that.

So my thought here is that we have two sets -- and because this is language that we probably don't want to use the relation of a strict ordered pair, but it gets the idea across of what we might mean by a relation -- a sort of table where things are grouped together. The elements of one set are the phonic substance, as Saussure called it -- or the digital shapes that we are using now. I imagine that we must be going from the phonic substance to something in the refridgerator. Now, meaning is just this association, so my question is -- what are the elements of the set within the refridgerator to which the phonic substance, scribbles, or digital shapes are relating to? — Moliere

First, I'm not a realist on mathematics, and especially not on sets.

Relations are simply any way that two things are related to each other. "To the left of (from perspective x)" is a relation. "Cause" a la "x caused y" is a relation. "Is the parent of" is a relation. "Is located on the same planet as" is a relation. Etc.

The relation in question with respect to meaning is that some individual is performing the act of making an association between x and y, where the association isn't just arbitrary for them, but is at least periodically, in particular contexts, brought to mind for them when they think about x and/or y.

Let's say that it does involve interpretation. Does it follow that linguistic meaning is not objective (which is where the discussion lead)? No, it does not. Not as I defined objective. Only irrelevant conclusions follow, such as that the meaning couldn't be understood. — S

How are you defining objective so that interpretation (and meaning) could be objective?

it is a result of setting a language rule. — S

Even if that were the case how would that not involve interpretation?

Ah, someone else who confuses understanding and meaning. My distinction can help you with that problem. What you're describing in your first sentence is understanding, not meaning. Meaning is something that external things can have, like a written sentence. — S

Oops. Nope.

it does not represent the nature of the action itself (which is itself right or wrong). — Andrew M

And evidence for that (the action itself being right or wrong) would be?

that convinces me that what you have said is insufficient to explain how we understand each other. — Banno

But I had just explained what understanding amounts to. What part of that did you disagree with, or what did you think it didn't cover?

No need. Others will help you. — Banno

No luck. A lot of people here seem to have the impression that "reading groups" should be somewhere between an apologetics strategy meeting and a cheerleading squad for the author.

I really need to take a break from this board sometimes. The, uh, let's call it "irrationality" just drives me bonkers after awhile.

Natural would be quantum fluctuations or such. Non-natural would be God. — Devans99

Why would you be associating "zero probability in some finite time periods" with god? That couldn't be more arbitrary.

Well, we disagree profoundly here. — Banno

So let's hash it out in the PI thread.

It's just that your explanation needs some more - you explain "sense"in terms of meaning. — Banno

Again, I'm not going to bother at all with anything based on a critique of whether anything is an "explantion" or not without you setting out your general criteria for explanations. (Which I'd then have to test to make sure that it's really your criteria.)

As it stands there is nothing that your two participants hav in common. — Banno

If that were so, then what of it?

What I say implies infinite natural Big Bangs (with infinite time). We can tell from astronomy that there is only one Big Bang so empirical evidence is in my favour when concluding that the Big Bang is singular and non-natural. — Devans99

You're only using "natural"/"non-natural" to refer to probability right?

Associating is putting . . . well, what? into a relation? Or not a relation? — Moliere

I wouldn't say that it's possible to "put something not into a relation with something else."

So yeah, it's a kind of relation.

And is language somehow then outside of meaning? — Moliere

That would just depend on how you want to think about it/what you want to focus on. You could just look at a text as marks on a page or utterances as soundwaves--those are aspects of what we commonly call language. If you just want to focus on that stuff, you can.

So if I associate tea with crumpets then I have a meaning, let's just say that I put them in any relation together (be it in space, as a meal, or within time) then that is the meaning-activity.


Where does language enter in this picture? — Moliere

Meaning is the associative act, not what you're associating (just to make sure you're clear on that).

Language enters the picture because it's one of the primary things we assign meanings to.

No, but all we need to be able to deduce that infinite Big Bangs occurred is to assign a non-zero probability of a Big Bang occurring in a tiny fraction of the universe's infinite history; that is sufficient to ensure infinite Big Bangs.

The actual probability numbers do not matter; all that matter is if the probability is zero (Big Bang must be a non-natural event) or non-zero (Big Bang must be naturally occurring and infinite in occurrence). — Devans99

If I say that the probability of the Big Bang occurring today is zero and you say it's not, then we need a way to determine which one of us is correct.

Whether we assign the term "natural" or "unnatural" is irrelevant, because per your comments above, those terms only refer to whether there is a non-zero probability in any arbitrary finite time period of x happening or not. So there's no need to even bother with the terms.

Why wouldn't that be an argumentum ad populum?

Like roll two dice, and if we get two 5s, we assign "zero," if we roll two 1s, we assign "0.5" etc.?

We're not just assigning probabilities randomly, are we?

- If an event is non-natural in a time period, then it has a 0% chance of occurring in that time period.
- If an event is natural in a time period, then it has a non-zero chance of occurring in that time period. — Devans99

That's fine.

Now, what is the probability based on? We say that x has probability n. (And whether n is zero or non-zero changes the classification per the above.) How is n derived?

Let's go with it. Does that perception have a meaning, or not? That, after all, is what I'm trying to understand -- your boundaries for the usage of the term "meaning". — Moliere

So it's important to understand that meaning is an activity that we perform. It's not something that external things have or not.

Can we perform that activity (the meaning activity) in response to our perceptions, sure. But it's not identical to the perceptions. It's something additional to them.

We have to say that the qualifier 'natural' applies to certain time periods. For an event to be natural within a time period; it has to have a non-zero possibility of occurring in that time period. — Devans99

You're not answering what the probability is based on. I don't know how many times I have to ask that until you'd attempt to explain what the probability is based on.

That's pretty much the view critiqued in Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

Almost every sentence of PI has some problem. I was detailing that in my comments on the PI thread.

What's hidden here? — Banno

What's hidden? I have no idea what you're asking. So here's an example where the sounds (or marks) you're making can't be given coherent meanings from my perspective.

As it stands, meaning is explained in terms of meaning. — Banno

I don't bother with criticisms about "explanations" unless someone gives their demarcation criteria for explanations.

Again, that's basically the sort of distinction I'm making. It's a locational distinction.

If meaning is all inside one's head, how is it that you and I can talk together about Paris? — Banno

You say "blah blah blah Paris."

I hear it.

I assign the meanings I do to those sounds, and as long as I can make sense, per my meanings, concepts, etc., of what you said, especially in the context of other things you've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding you.

I say, "Yeah, bleh bleh bleh Paris."

You hear it and assign the meanings you do to those sounds, and as long as you can make sense, per your meanings, concepts, etc. of what I said, especially in the context of other things I've said (and will say), that amounts to understanding me.

That's how we communicate.

Keep in mind that quite often people say things that don't make sense, per individuals' meanings, concepts, etc. That happens often on this board, for example. (And there are some people who post here frequently who I can never make sense of. They tend to be the people who are the most fond of continental philosophers . . . well, and/or some of the Aristotle fans.)

But much of the time, especially with simpler, more common utterances, we can make sense of what other people say.

It's not that complicated. It doesn't at all require that we have the same meanings in mind.

That is, when we each talk about Paris, we are not talking about the same thing.

And yet, in a very real sense, we do both talk about Paris. — Banno

You're perhaps conflating the referent and meaning?

but It's not like I am in here and the world I experience is out there. I am a part of the world. — Moliere

Refrigerators are a part of the world. But aren't some things inside of refrigerators and some things outside of them?

If Big Bangs occurs naturally, then there is always a non-zero probability of a Big Bang in any finite time period. — Devans99

Based on what? The fact that you're stipulating it?

Put it this way. If I were to say, "Between the last message I posted and this one--a finite time period, there was zero probability of a big bang occurring," we could know that I'm wrong by . . . . ? Well, by what?

If the big bang was a natural event, it would have a non zero probability of occurring over any finite period. — Devans99

Based on what?

Sure. It's not impossible for there to be just one big bang.

In order to say it's impossible, we'd need an argument for that, and our argument can't be that we're stipulating something else.

In one ear and out the other.

Go ahead and repeat the claim, though. Surely that will help.

Sorry I'm not using 'event' in the strict sense of relativity defines it; what I mean is infinite instances of the same class of 'event'; IE infinite Big Bangs. — Devans99

I wasn't using the term that way, either. There can be just one big bang, say, given infinite time. Again, see what I wrote above if you want to argue that's impossible. (While we continue to ignore the complete arbitrariness of assigning probabilities to this stuff, by the way)

Could it not be the case that we truly feel wrongly about a moral issue, though? Or no? — Moliere

All you'd need to do is point out what the truthmaker would be. Where is it located, what is it a property of, etc. However you need to specify it.