He has a friend who claims to be able to transcribe normal speech into text. — BrianW

??? Who wouldn't be able to do that if they're literate? Someone says, "Hey Joe--where you going with that gun in your hand?" You should be able to transcribe that to text.

Re the mind-reading stuff, since there are good reasons to believe that it wouldn't be possible, it would need to be tested in a controlled setting. If we had verifiable results in a controlled experimental setting, then probably people would be a lot more likely to believe it.

I'd have to see the video in question to assess it in any manner.

Therefore, truth(s) isn't always a property of propositions. So, what relation between truth and propositions are you expressing? — BrianW

It's not a property of all propositions. But it's a property that only propositions have. It's not a property of something else.

Again, re the analogy, not all music has an 11th chord in it. But when something has an 11th chord in it, it's music. That's only a property of music. You're not going to find an 11th chord in the grass or something like that.

But we don't designate the relative as the absolute manifest within. — BrianW

What in the world is that? I haven't the faintest idea what that's saying.

What I was asking in this second part is how it would make sense to say that something i a "fundamental of reality" but not a state of affairs.

Synonyms for "diagnose" include "identify" and "recognize."

"Diagnose" doesn't imply pegging the cause of something.

this process is beyond space and is therefore occurring within a self-referential point. It’s very simple. — TheGreatArcanum

That's very incoherent rather.

Truth, for me, is not a property of propositions, firstly because propositions could lack truth(s) without losing their identity. — BrianW

Re this, falsehood is a property of propositions, too. "Truth is a property of propositions" isn't saying that all propositions are true. It's instead similar to "11th chords are a property of music." We're not saying all music has an 11th chord.

Re this: "I agree that facts are states of affairs but truth is the expression of the fundamental(s) of reality." "Fundamental(s) of reality" that somehow aren't states of affairs?

So what do you sense?

What's mutually exclusive is that either you sense extension or you do not. If you do not, but you sense something, what's left? A point, right?

No, I choose to believe in non-contradiction, because it compares better — Pippen

Are you choosing that it "compares better"?

In analytic philosophy, it's standard to see "the way the world is" (aka "states of affairs" (aka "facts")) as distinct from truth. Truth is taken to be a "property of propositions." (And propositions are taken to be "the meaning of statements" (where statements are claims about facts, aka claims about the way things are, or they're the sorts of sentences that can be true or false).)

What you're asking about there are facts. But per the above, facts are something distinct from truth.

Otherwise there would be no truth beyond people's thoughts and the truth we assert would have their limit of existence as the birth and death of humanity. — BrianW

To which I say, "Yes, that's correct. There's no truth beyond people's thoughts . . ."

With respect to the aspect that you'd say is identical, how would you say that time passes, since time is change or motion?

Well, as I said the only thing that remains absolutely unchanged is identity. — Janus

If x at time T1 and x at time T2 have an absolutely unchanged identity in your view, isn't (aren't?) the identity of x at T1 and x at T2 identical? If not why not?

No, I don't agree with nominalism. I say that I am, logically speaking, the same entity today as I have been at every moment throughout my life, and that this logical sameness does not depend on my remaining absolutely unchanged over that time. — Janus

Okay, but do you understand that nominalists are only denying something absolutely unchanged on numerically distinct instances?

So would you say that you're choosing to believe the principle of noncontradiction, for example, where you could just as easily choose to believe the opposite?

It's logically the same. It need not be absolutely unchanged in order to be the same entity over time; — Janus

So the way that I'm using "literally" or "logically the same," which is a conventional way to use both terms, is that there's nothing different in either case. Regardless of the words we use, what nominalists are denying is that something is the same in this sense in two instances. They're not denying something other than that. So it's turning out that you might actually agree with nominalists, but you just have an issue with the terminology.

And when our thinking is wrong or deficient in some manner, is it still logic or logical? — BrianW

But judgements can be misleading, and states of affairs can change. Can truth be either? — BrianW

In other words, you don't accept that either are defined by thought, and you're positing some sort of abstract, extramental existent instead.

The whole notion of "free reasoning" seems rather odd. That doesn't seem to mesh with the logical notions of validity, soundness, implication, etc. We don't choose what follows logically.

I don't think there's any good basis for trying to state a generalization about that.

Claiming that something is the case for most people for something like this would require empirical studies that no one has done.

Boole's 1854 text had an insightful title: "The laws of thought."

Or more fully, "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities"

Logic is the way that we think--specifically an abstracted way of thinking about certain kinds of relations.

Truth, by the way, is a judgment about the relation of propositions to something else, such as states of affairs.

if there exists a non-spatial aspect to reality, the all isn't material. so saying that all causes are material causes, when some causes have their origin in the non-spatial and others have their origin in the spatial is to purposely ignore the distinction between them when distinguishing them is paramount. — TheGreatArcanum

Then it's not just due to a definition.

Who is positing something nonspatial? You're saying that materialists are doing this if they posit a first cause? How are you figuring that?

If that's all we're doing, couldn't we define it another way?

I'm just pointing out that it's not the same for everyone or in each scenario. It's not the case that one thing or the other catalyzes more imagination for everyone.

a first cause isn't born out of physicality, but the lack thereof, — TheGreatArcanum

Which we'd think because?

you have so understand the nature of materialism, which suggest that the causal chain is without beginning and without end and without disruption, — TheGreatArcanum

Where are you getting this from? Materialism only posits that the world is solely comprised of material (and (dynamic) relations of material). Materialists can have any view of "first causes," causality in general, etc.

In movies, some imagery is given to you. That's not all you can visualize, however. You can--and often are expected to--visualize things that happen offscreen.

By the same token, we could say that with books, all the words/thoughts/descriptions are given to you, whereas with films, you need to fill that stuff in for yourself via your imagination.

So just make up some fantasy that we like the idea of?

because if there exists a single first cause, in any sense of the word, the physical chain of causation which supports hard-determinism is non-existent — TheGreatArcanum

So once again, in the spirit of pausing when something questionable is said, what would any support for that statement be?

I would argue consciousness is the product of a central all spanning consciousness — christian2017

What would that idea be based on?

One could engage one's imagination much more when watching a film than when reading a book, too. It just depends on the individual and the occasion.

So first, "we shouldn't make this statement as if it's something universally applicable" doesn't imply that it's never applicable. In other words, an example of it being applicable wouldn't suffice to make a universal statement.

Secondly, and I'll leave it at this for the moment, because it's best if we tackle just one thing at a time, "to drink" isn't necessarily a conceptual "destination" is it?

I'm saying that we've tried the (stereotypical) male approach to solving ethical problems — Wallows

Philosophy shouldn't be in the business of "solving ethical problems" anyway, as there are no normative facts about ethical stances.

What's "best" for anything is subjective.

Ideally, yes. In practice? Not so much... — Wallows

Well, what could we possibly be doing when we're discussing that stuff that feminism, or gardening, or wearing bolo ties, etc., would have anything to do with it? What would be an example of that?

There's a repugnant feeling of male superiority or downright chauvinism that has dominated philosophy since Aristotle and the likes. — Wallows

I don't think it makes sense to talk about beliefs and attitudes in a generalized way like that, unless we've done the empirical research--it would have to amount to surveys in a case like this--that enables us to make statistical statements. I'm skeptical that (a) we have the relevant information for most historical philosophers to know whether they'd endorse anything like "male superiority" or chauvinism, and (b) the philosophers for whom we'd have the relevant info tend (say over 70%) to have those beliefs/attitudes.

I could be wrong about (b) of course (I'm far more confident about (a) due to familiarity with the literature), but I'd be skeptical about it until examining the empirical data.

What's more important though is that this really shouldn't have anything to do with philosophy. It doesn't at all matter if one is a feminist or not when one is discussing whether universals are real, when one is addressing Gettier problems, or even when one is looking at how moral statements work formally.

How can you burden people to make decisions many of whom are unqualified to do so and call it a 'right'? — thedeadidea

We're not (at least in the U.S.) forcing people to vote. I wouldn't say it's a burden to folks if they're only doing it because they're choosing to do it.

Aside from that, I don't want to say that people are required to know something particular or to have particular beliefs, etc. to vote. (And I also don't want convicted felons to not be able to vote, by the way.) If we're worried about people not having enough info to vote intelligently, then how about we work to provide the info instead?

This is a possible culprit, or at least one of them. It came out in later 2013:

Odd spike around 2014. — Baden

Not sure what it would be, but it's surely correlated to some popular media usage--a song, something some media personality (entertainer, TV presenter, etc.) said, etc.

How can that be? Just the fact that they're women? — Wallows

Sorry, didn't see this question until now.

In other words, I don't see "feminist" as having any bearing on doing philosophy, at least if you're doing philosophy right (in my view).

It's just like whether you're a gardener or not should be irrelevant to philosophy, and whether you wear a bolo tie or not is irrelevant to it.

Or it's like thinking that it makes sense to section off physics so that we note that a group of people are "Britney Spears-listening physicists," as if that would or should have any impact at all on the physics they're doing.

The way you phrased the comment was "Due to the fact that these terms require definitions, this can not follow logically," as if any terms that would require definitions excludes those terms from arguments that follow logically.

If you just wanted definitions, you could have just asked that.

But aren't you familiar with the idea of extension(ality) in ontology? I'm asking because if this stuff is that unfamiliar/that new to you, it's going to be difficult to have the sort of conversation I was hoping to have.

As computers become more and more capable and can interact with people and other computers in complex ways, we as yet have no indication at all that they are the least bit conscious, — Unseen

It's going to be difficult to ever say if they're really conscious rather than simply just good emulators from a behavioral perspective, but on the other hand, the difference can have so little practical value that it hardly matters. The same goes for other people, really, as it is.

Just exactly WHY are humans (and higher animals as well) conscious at all? It seems totally unnecessary and seems to have no survival value, either. — Unseen

It's extremely useful to survival that animals are able to do things like formulate type abstractions (so that they can recognize things in the environment that are dangerous versus not dangerous, for example). So consciousness definitely has survival advantages. With creatures like humans, we'd have to be very, very different than we are, with very different capabilities, to be able to survive long enough to reproduce without consciousness.