As I understand it, to say there is a universal law just is to say that there is a universally invariant form of action, a natural behavior which operates at all times and all places regardless of human awareness and opinion. — Janus

To claim an "invariant form of action", is to make a generalization about action. How do you jump from making such a generalization about action to the conclusion that there is a "natural law" which is the cause of that type of action which is described by the generalization?

Suppose that every time you drop an object in air, it falls. This indicates an "invariant form of action", so you can make a generalization. What principle allows you to say that there is a "natural law" which is the cause of this action, rather than something else, like gravity, which is causing the action?

Furthermore, isn't the real "cause" of the action you picking the objects up and dropping them? So you think that there is a natural law which causes this "invariant form of action", when the "invariant form of action" is really caused by you carrying out that similar procedure over and over again.

Hope that your anticipation is now elevated...

Enjoy the day, — Damir Ibrisimovic

I'm enjoying the day, along with my elevated level of anticipation.

OK, I'm ready. Now where's the joke? The anticipation's killing me.

The idea of the action of gravity is indispensable to the scientific understanding of the evolution of the Universe, so, that gravity was universal prior to the advent of human life is entailed by that understanding. How would idea of the universal action of gravity at all times and places differ from the idea of a universal natural law of gravity; a law which is real in more than a merely nominalistic fashion? — Janus

If gravity is the property of something, (say the universe, or things in the universe), then it is not a natural law, it is a property, so it should be understood that way. When I say "On a clear day the sky is blue" you ought to interpret that I am making a descriptive statement about the sky, not that the statement represents a natural law. Why would you think that we ought to interpret descriptive statements about the universe or about fundamental particles as representing natural laws?

Sure, topic, agreeable time period, and other details, would all have to be decided upon in advance.

Having posted the concept, I would suggest about ten to fifteen minutes of time to reply. If the debate period was designated as two hours, this would mean 4-6 replies per participant. One would have to have the two hour time period dedicated.

Shorter reply time might mean low quality replies, and longer reply time would require a longer overall dedicated time period (very serious participants).

Your ramblings are rather meaningless until we define substantial change. I've offered you a definition of substantial change. "Does "substantial change" imply that either a substance ceases to be, or that a new substance begins being, or both?" You reject it. Care to offer a better one?

However, when one goes on to say the laws of physics are "not representative of some 'laws of nature' which are operating to cause matter to behave the way that it does" one is making a claim inadequate to the actual practice of physics. — Dfpolis

I don't agree. As I said, I know some physicists, and they do not practise physics as if the descriptive laws of physics represent some "laws of nature"[. They work to understanding existing laws of physics and establish new ones, without concern for whether there is such a thing as laws of nature. Like I said, this is an ontological concern.

Since you didn't like my last example, I'll give you another. Suppose there is a law of physics which describes the activity of matter which is attributed to gravity. Why would you think that this law of physics represents a law of nature, rather than thinking that this law represents a description of how the activity of matter is affected by something called gravity?"

For example, we explain the time-development of the cosmos in terms of the laws of nature. This makes no sense if the only "laws" are descriptions formulated by modern thinkers. Why? Because such laws did not exist during the epochs of the universe they are supposed to have effected. It is also difficult to see how human descriptions could effect purely physical process, even at the present time. — Dfpolis

The fact that laws of physics can be extrapolated, projected, to a time when there was no human beings, doesn't support your claim that these artificial laws represent natural laws. That we can project the law of gravity to a time when human beings did not exist, doesn't prove that the law of gravity represents a natural law of gravity, rather than it being a description of how mass behaves when influenced by something called gravity.

Do you see my point? The laws of physics are descriptions with very wide (general) application, so they are generalizations. In order that they are real, true laws of physics, it is necessary that the things which they describe (gravity, Pauli's exclusion, etc.,) are real. There is no need to assume that there is a "law of nature" which corresponds. That is just an ontological assumption.

So, your claim is that physics is a species of fiction writing. — Dfpolis

You've obviously misunderstood what I've been saying. I hope that I've made it clearer for you.

the footprint (which is what you are measuring) is quite real. — Dfpolis

No it is not, that's the point, it is not a footprint, therefore "the footprint" is not real. And the thing measured, being a footprint, is not real. So you cannot base "existence" on measurability because we often measure non-existent things.

This is nonsense. A man robs a store. On the way out, he passes height marks by the door and is measured to be 6'2" tall. A witness says he has blue eyes, but really he has brown eyes. By your logic, the robber does not exist. — Dfpolis

No, by my logic his "blue eyes" do not exist. Where's the nonsense in that?

Please explain how this would work in a concrete case. — Dfpolis

I take a ruler and lay it beside something, measuring that thing. Why do you claim that it is necessary for that thing to interact with me in order for me to measure it. There is a medium between the thing and my eyes, which allows me to see the thing, but there is no interaction between me and the thing. And so long as there is a medium between the measurer and the thing measured, there is no interaction between the two. Clearly interaction is an unnecessary, and unwarranted stipulation on your part.

We need to agree to disagree on what Aristotle means by "hyle. — Dfpolis

I think we've already agreed, implicitly, to that.

2. You are confusing our understanding of life with our understanding of substantial change (aka generation and corruption). The context in which hyle as a determinate, active potency appears is substantial change -- in which one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing. The soul, which Aristotle defines as "the actuality of a potentially living thing" is the form of a single, living kind of thing -- not the principle of dynamic continuity in substantial change. — Dfpolis

Let me see if I can understand what you mean here, and why I have difficulty with it. First, I see that "active potency", if we adhere to Aristotelian principles, is contradictory. You are claiming that in certain types of change, "substantial change", there is a need to assume this "active potency".

In this instance, when one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing (substantial change), the principle of continuity, matter, or hyle, cannot be passive, you are saying that it must be dynamic. This is what we've been discussing, what Aristotle was calling the coming into being of things. And what you are not seeing, in those passages, is that Aristotle describes those instances of coming into being, by referring to the creativity. In the case of artificial things, the source of substantial change is in the soul of the man who creates. In natural living things, the source of substantial change is the soul of the living being. Therefore there is no need to do as you do, and assign dynamism to hyle. This only produces an inconsistency in Aristotelian principles.

The point of disagreement between us therefore, is in the relationship between "substantial change" and the soul. My interpretation is that substantial change, generation and corruption, whereby one thing ceases to be, or another thing begins being, requires a soul. Your interpretation is that there is no such necessary relationship, substantial change may occur independently of any soul, so long as hyle may be an active potency, a principle of dynamic continuity..

Shouldn't we define "substantial change" such that we can make an informed judgement on this matter? Does "substantial change" imply that either a substance ceases to be, or that a new substance begins being, or both? If so, then isn't this necessarily a discontinuity of substance? With "substantial change" we are referring to a discontinuity of substance. Matter, or hyle, is the principle by which the continuity of substance is understood, but now we are talking about a discontinuity of substance, so we can no longer refer to matter as our principle of continuity. If your intent is to seek a principle of continuity, such that the generations and corruptions of substance may be understood as "changes" rather than as instances of coming to be, and ceasing to be, then we must refer to something other than matter, or hyle. Can you agree to this?

Your logic is a little out of whack. If you are framing matter as the indefinite - in opposition to the definite - then that is just putting matter in the category of the metaphysically dichotomous. — apokrisis

Obviously, that is exactly what I said I am not doing, so your capacity for misinterpretation is overwhelming.

Dichotomies might be regarded as an intelligible form, but the whole point is that they are the intelligible form that subsumes differentiated categories, such as form and matter, into a higher level method of logical categorisation. Dichotomies talk about form and matter as being the limits of a common process of division.

So you are making the reductionist mistake of trying to reduce dynamical processes of opposition to mere standalone categories. And yet you know the logical definition of a dichotomy to be "mutually exclusive/jointly exhaustive". The coherent relationship - the asymmetry, or broken symmetry - is what it is all about. — apokrisis

Actually, you are making the reductionist mistake, as I explained. You reduce all aspects of reality such that they are described by logical dichotomies. With a clearer perspective of reality, you would understand that the primary divisions are categorical rather than dichotomous, and that the dichotomous is just one category rather than the entirety of reality as you describe. And if that category of "dichotomous" is claimed to be "exhaustive" then it is nothing but a false description. Categories are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive, and this underscores the imperfections of human knowledge. To claim that the dichotomous is "exhaustive" of reality is ignorance of this fact.

Not quite. Necessarily, before anything can be measured, it has to be measurable. If the electron did not exist, it would not be measurable.

Let me suggest that existence is convertible with the capacity to act in some way. For anything to be measurable, it has to respond to our efforts to observe it. Imagine "something" that did not interact with anything in any way. it would be impossible to observe, let alone measure. If if had no interactions, it could not evoke the concept <being>, and so would not be an instance of being. — Dfpolis

I don't think that this is actually the case. Hallucinatory things may be measured. So just because one provides a measurement of something, this does not mean that the measured thing is real. Imagine that I find Bigfoot's print in my backyard and I take a measurement of that footprint. So I have a measurement of Bigfoot's footprint, but the marking I measured wasn't really a footprint from Bigfoot, it was caused by something else.

Clearly, we cannot say "if the electron did not exist, it would not be measurable". A faulty description of the thing measured means that the measurement is of a non-existent thing. It takes 24 hours for the sun to orbit the earth, is such a measurement of a non-existent thing (the sun's orbit around the earth is non-existent).

Not on the view I am defending. Rather than being baseless subjective or social constructs. ideas are the actualization of objective features of reality, i.e. the intelligibility of the known object. — Dfpolis

You are completely ignoring the creative, imaginative, aspect of ideas. If you had respect for this creativity you would not claim that "ideas are the actualization of objective features of reality", because you would have to respect the fact that they are subjective creations. Ideas are an act of the subject, not an act of the "objective features of reality".

This problem is inherent in your description of the relationship between existence and measurement. "Measurement" is an act carried out by the measurer. The thing being measured need not be active at all, in order for it to be measured. Yet you claim that a thing must act to be measured. Therefore you have completely turned around the act of measurement, such that you describe it as an act of the thing being measured rather than an act of the measurer. And so, this is a false description.

This would come as a surprise to most scientists. We do not see ourselves as engaged in fiction writing, but in describing reality and especially how specific phenomena reveal and fit into the order of nature. — Dfpolis

No I don't think there's any surprise here. I know some physicists, and they recognize that the laws of physics are descriptive principles based in inductive reason, and not representative of some "laws of nature" which are operating to cause matter to behave the way that it does. This assumption that there are "laws of nature" which are acting in the world is ontological, not scientific.

This contradicts the previous sentence. How can you say there is no basis in reality for the concept of laws and then say that we arrive at the concept by induction from an evidentiary basis (a foundation in reality). — Dfpolis

Descriptive laws are passive things, they are human descriptions. There is no basis in reality to assume that there are corresponding active laws of nature causing the occurrence of what is described. For example, let's say that there is a descriptive law which says that if the sky is clear, it is blue. There is no reason to believe that there is a law of nature which is causing the sky to be blue when it is clear. That's nonsense, the reason why the sky is blue is not that there is a law acting to make it that way.

Since you agree that something acts to produce the observed behavior of matter, it is pointless to argue about naming conventions. — Dfpolis

You are either completely missing, or totally ignoring something here. Notice you say "the observed behaviour of matter". The activity here, which produces "the observed behaviour of matter" is the activity of observation. So if there is an activity involved in the production of these "laws" which are derived from those observations, it is the activity of observation. To assign that activity over to the thing observed is a category mistake.

Matter and form are just the useful conceptions that divide reality for us. Being is a whole. So we are speaking of taking a dialectical opposition to its limits so as to have a causal tale that makes a generalised sense. It sustains a mode of metaphysical analysis that works better than any other general scheme. — apokrisis

This demonstrates your misunderstanding of the categories of matter and form. This is a categorical separation, it is not a dichotomy of dialectical opposition. That is the difficult part of understanding this division. It is a categorical difference, so it is impossible to reduce it to dialectical opposition. All dialectical opposition is contained within the category of form, is/is not, have/have not, etc., all are formal dichotomies. This is why matter is left as indefinite, it is what is not suited to dialectical opposition. So there cannot be dialectical opposition between matter and form because that would put matter into the category of form.

Consider wayfarer's quote from Pattee above. The categorical separation is a requirement. And, the logical dichotomies of dialectical opposition all belong to the one category. Therefore the division between the two categories cannot be presented as a dialectical opposition, because that would annihilate the categorical separation, placing the two categories into the one, as a logical dichotomy.

For me, matter and form both have to be active in the sense that both have to themselves develop. And both have to be causes - a reason for concrete change. Yet still, those other contrasts, like active vs passive, will start to apply somewhere along the line. We wouldn’t hold on to these other dichotomies of existence if they didn’t have strong explanatory value. — apokrisis

You can say "for me matter and form are both such and such", but unless you remain true to the conception, of what use is that saying? You are not talking about matter and form anymore, you are talking about something completely different. Why use those words unless you remain true, or perhaps you are trying to be misleading?

So you are wrong to say all this metaphysical talk is purely conceptual. It is an attempt to dissect reality in terms of its actual logical oppositions. But also, it is definitely an exercise in modeling. So it is conceptual. But what seems missing in your replies is an understanding that what is central to the conception is the dialectical logic - the logic of symmetry breaking - that is at the heart of a hylomorphic analysis of nature. — apokrisis

Actually this is where you seem to go astray, you feel a need to model reality within your dichotomous logic. You do not allow for that part of reality, that category which is classed as outside of dichotomization. All of reality is forced into your logical box of "symmetry". So instead of putting matter where it is placed by Aristotle, as categorical separate from form, it is simply a mode of formal existence which you call symmetry breaking.

And I agree. That is the very point I make. Metaphysics only makes sense once all the conceiving is understood in terms of how the logic of symmetry breaking or dichotomisation would work. It is the mechanism by which primal divisions arise that is the key take home here. Categories are limits - the complementary limits of some deeper process of dichotomisation. — apokrisis

See, you are placing the "categories" within the logic of dichotomization. All categories are therefore representations of formal dichotomies. So you deny yourself the possibility of a category for things which are outside of formal dichotomy. That is where matter is placed by Aristotle, in a category outside dichotomization. But you deny yourself the possibility of any such category, by placing all categories within logical dichotomization, saying that categories themselves are limits. That categories are not limits is clearly evident when you consider the category of infinite.

My approach starts by granting the reality of finality in nature. And goals are constraints. Once a purpose has been adequately served, anything more doesn’t make an intelligible difference. — apokrisis

The point is, that your purpose is to state an example. In your example, a change occurs. So for the purpose of your example, the change qualifies as a change because you call it that, a 'change'. If you proceed to argue that the change is so insignificant that it doesn't even qualify as a 'change', then you cannot hold it up in your example, as a 'change', saying "look at this 'change' it's so insignificant that we can't even call it a change". Why are you calling it a change then? To do so is simple deception. You are saying we can't call it a change, but to make my demonstration, I will call it a change.

So regardless of what you say, this way of conceiving of existence is already basic to the metaphysics of science. It just makes obvious sense. — apokrisis

If science operates in this deceptive way, I pity the poor scientists who are being deceived. Is this like saying light is not a wave, because waves require a medium and there is no medium, therefore it doesn't qualify as a wave, but we'll just call it a wave anyway?

This seems like nonsense to me, probably in an attempt to cover up your previous statement, but feel free to tell us where in De Anima Aristotle says this. — Πετροκότσυφας

Did you read earlier in the thread where I quoted Aristotle's primary definition of the soul. It's Bk.2 Ch.1

Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge. It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul...

That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality, of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body organized.

You seemed to be arguing that if the soul is an actuality it is necessarily in motion. So to say that the soul is an actuality would be inconsistent with what he said earlier, that the soul does not move. But as you see, Aristotle allows for two types of "actuality", and this is why his philosophy supports dualism.

These are activities of the soul which involve change. Desires change", it really seems like you're now just making stuff up and contradict yourself. And Aristotle... — Πετροκότσυφας

If you knew Aristotle you would know that he defines the soul as an actuality, a form. That's what I quoted above, It's stated as the primary definition of the soul, so it's pointless for you to argue that this is not how he defines "the soul".

Yet, a couple of pages back you wrote about how complete and consistent Aristotle's system is. Also, I thought that Aquinas held that the eternity (or not) of the world could not be demonstrated and his belief in the newness of the world was an article of faith. — Πετροκότσυφας

It is complete and consistent. But upon presentation of the cosmological argument, in which it is demonstrated that actuality is necessarily prior to potentiality, in an absolute sense, he proceeds to speculate about that "eternal actuality". He comes up with an the idea of an eternal circular motion, which is consistent, but I disagree with. The reason why I say that this is repugnant to the intellect is because it does not provide an explanation, or a reason for existence, in any way. The intellect, seeking to know, desires the reason. So it is as Aquinas says, an article of faith, it is to have faith that such and such is intelligible, and therefore we continue to inquire and to seek the answers. But if we simply assume an infinite regress, we create the assumption that the beginning is unintelligible, therefore we cease inquiry, and cease to seek answers.

So the faith is related to the intelligibility of the unknown object. We cannot know that it is intelligible until we know it, but when we approach it we do not know it. So we have faith that it is intelligible and this inspires us to come to know it. If the unknown object is difficult to understand, so we simply assume that it's an infinite regress of causation, or that it emerges from random chance, then we designate the object as unintelligible and we give up the faith which is required to inspire the inquiry toward understanding. And that's why these assumption, which kill the faith to inquire, are repugnant.

This idea doesn't mesh with Aristotle's idea of there being first and second actualities, since first actualities, themselves being kinds of potentialities, would have to exist both within spacetime and outside of it. Some person's property of being sighted, or of being able to speak French, for instance, are first actualities, while the exercise of sight, or the act of speaking French, are second actualities. When a doctor restores the ability of sight in a formerly blind person, it would be weird to say that this restored ability is something that exists both outside of spacetime (qua potentiality to see) and inside of it (qua first actuality). — Pierre-Normand

This is the point I am trying to make to Πετροκότσυφας here, what is well expressed by you as the notion of first and second actualities. This is what allows Aristotle to say that the soul is an actuality, but also that it is not a motion. It supports dualism because motions are physical actualities while the soul is a non-physical actuality.

The need to assume secondary actualities is the consequence of the cosmological argument. What we understand concerning physical actualities is that the potential for any particular physical actuality precedes in time, that particular actuality. However, the cosmological argument demonstrates that it is impossible that potential is prior to the actual in an absolute sense. Therefore we have to assume a secondary level of actualities which is prior in time to what we observe as physical (spatial-temporal) actualities. These are non-physical actualities.

What I think is the important point in relation to your discussion with wayfarer, is that potentialities cannot be given the proper validity of real existence without the assumption of secondary actualities. Without secondary actualities, potentialities are all reducible to logical possibilities, things apprehended by the mind. There is nothing to ground them as real, other than logical axioms, which may just be pragmatic assumptions themselves. So if a physicist wants to hand reality to potentialities, then without turning to secondary actualities to support this reality, all there is axioms, which may be stipulated for reasons varying between practicality and aesthetics.

Several things are at issue here. You made the claim that what changes is the form. The quoted passage from On the Soul shows that this is false. — Πετροκότσυφας

No it doesn't show this as false. It says that the soul is not in motion. As a general principle for Aristotle, forms are actual, and as such they are what changes as time passes. This does not mean that all forms change though. Even if we equate change with motion, which Aristotle does not do, he distinguishes locomotion from change, the fact that some forms change does not mean that all forms change. So when a living body is described as a material body with a form, and that form is changing, then that form described is not the same form as the form called "the soul". Therefore if the form of the material body is changing. it does not mean that the soul, as a form is changing. So your quoted passage does not show what I said to be false.

Also, anwering to Yanus, you wrote that the universe as uncaused and the idea of an infinite time is repugnant. Yet, Aristotle held that time didn't have a beginning and the universe and motion were eternal. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't agree with this aspect of Aristotle's metaphysics, the idea of an eternal circular motion, it is clearly an unreasonable idea, so it, like the idea of infinite time, has been demonstrated by later thinkers, like Aquinas to be repugnant.

Right, strictly speaking, "movement" cannot be attributed to the soul. Movement is what is attributed to material bodies. But what is at issue here is whether or not the soul is a form, or actuality, which accounts for (as cause of it) the movement of the matter of living body.

Dfpolis was taking a position on Hyle. I disagreed with that, making the argument that he was treating the material principle as already having formal organisation in having an inherent and active intentionality. So in terms of "prime matter", his starting point had already crossed the line and ceased to be prime. — apokrisis

That's not surprising. As I've told you already, it is strictly implied within the concept of matter, that prime matter is impossible in reality. It may be a useful concept, but to imagine that it ever had, or will have any real existence is not only fictional, but an impossible fiction dictated by the concept itself.

However, that is also a reasonable view if we are talking about the actual world where it is only in our conceptions that we are wanting to insist on some absolutely dualistic separation. So it is also the case that any notion of prime matter is simply a state of being that is the least tellic, the least organised, the least shaped and directed. — apokrisis

If you are talking about a state of reality which is the most lacking in form possible (highest degree of privation), then this is not prime matter. So why talk as if it is?

And as we have discussed multiple times, I would then go beyond that qualification to say that both matter and form would have to co-arise from something even more extreme - a state of "actual" vagueness. — apokrisis

OK, so you have here a state where the form is so highly deficient that it is unintelligible to you, so you call this a state of "actual" vagueness.

You were already lost at step one - the idea that prime matter reduces to a notion of undirected flux, making matter already an active thing, just a chaotically unformed kind of active thing. — apokrisis

This though, your "step one", is an unwarranted assumption, or unjustified conclusion, and this is where you go in a contradictory direction to dfpolis. You have no principle whereby you can say that matter is an active thing. Dfpolis assumes that there are "laws" acting causally within matter, and this is what allows it to be active. "Prime matter" according to the concept of it, is pure potential, and cannot be itself active, yet you claim it "reduces to a notion of undirected flux". This is false.

It appears like you have assigned a highly deficient form to this matter, a form which is unintelligible to you, which you call "actual vagueness", and then you want to say that this form of matter is real prime matter. But prime matter, according to the concept cannot have any form, and that's why it's impossible in reality.

And I am completely opposed to your characterisation of prime matter as some kind of passive substratrum that awaits a shaping intentional hand to magic it into a world of objects. This is just the materialism of atomism. And Aristotle was a good deal beyond that. — apokrisis

As I told you in my last post, I do not say that there is a prime matter which awaits shaping by a hand. Matter is conceptual only, there is no such thing as prime matter, nor is there such a thing as the "in-forming of matter". This is an absurd mischaracterization of my position it is purely ad hominem.

Your argumentative procedure appears to consist of two aspects, asserting over and over again your beliefs, and instead of understanding and addressing the stated beliefs of others you attack them with ad hominem.

Physics does that by counting the microstates of a bounded system. So what is conserved is all the possible configurations of some collection of parts. A block of spacetime can contain some maximum number of different arrangements. — apokrisis

That's pure fiction. "Possible configurations" is constrained by the physicist's capacity to determine these possibilities. Quantum physics demonstrates quite clearly that the physicist has not the capacity to determine the possible configurations. Where is the particle? The physicist can consider that it is possibly anywhere, and everywhere, but the physicist cannot consider as a real possibility that it is nowhere. Since your "maximum number of different arrangements" will not even allow the possibility that the parts are nowhere, your "degrees of freedom" is simple fiction.

Your constraint is your refusal to recognize that matter is purely conceptual, in the mind only. You want it to be an active thing within the reality which you model, when in reality it is just a symbol in the model. And you seem to have no idea of what it represents in the reality which you are modelling. Therefore, you assume that it represents "vagueness", the unintelligible.

So that is how the model achieves conservation. And now the ontology works the other way round. It is the closure by being bounded - constrained - that underwrites the energy conservation. In general relativity, for example, energy is no longer conserved as a necessity. This is because the spatiotemporal boundaries are no longer globally fixed. They have a plastic geometry. — apokrisis

Right, instead of considering "nowhere" as a possibility, you are forced to relinquish accepted spatiotemporal boundaries such that your possibilities are no longer globally fixed, and are now literally "anywhere". Say good bye to any "degrees" of freedom.

And remember I asked you a direct question:



A constraints-based view of substance says limits on instability create stability. So in every moment, something could accidentally change. And very often in life, things do. But to the degree there is a global order or law in place, such accidental changes are suitably restricted. Things can't change enough to matter.

This is a perfectly intelligible ontology. Tell me one thing wrong with it.

...I'm sure you were just about to give an answer. — apokrisis

I already answered that question. It is completely contradictory to dfpolis' position in which laws are inherent within matter. And, both of you claim to represent the principles of modern physics. So, modern physics allows both, that "something could accidentally change", and that accidental change is impossible because the laws of nature are inherent within matter. That's what's wrong with it, it is a representation of deep inconsistencies within the discipline of physics.

Of course I didn't mention the blatantly obvious thing wrong with it, but since you asked again, that statement is contradictory itself, and we've been through this before. If something can change so much so that it is identified as a change, then we cannot say that this change does not matter. The fact that it has been identified as a change indicates that it matters. This is just another representation of your nonsensical, and contradictory notion that there is a difference which doesn't make a difference. The fact that it has been identified as a difference indicates that it has made a difference. That there is a difference which is not a difference is blatant contradiction. That you can identify a change as a change, and claim that it doesn't matter, after it clearly has mattered to you, because you have proceeded to identified it as a change, is simple dishonesty, lying.

I'll repeat. A constraints-based view of substance says limits on instability create stability. So in every moment, something could accidentally change. And very often in life, things do. But to the degree there is a global order or law in place, such accidental changes are suitably restricted. Things can't change enough to matter. — apokrisis

My point was that this is completely different from dfpolis' position that laws are inherent within matter, so no such "accidental change" is possible. Yet both of you claim to have a metaphysics which represents modern physics. Is modern physics that confused that it supports contradictory metaphysics?

This is a perfectly intelligible ontology. Tell me one thing wrong with it. And it fits the facts as science knows them. Unlike your story. — apokrisis

Right, and df's ontology, which is contradictory to yours, fits the facts as modern science knows them also. Unlike my story which avoids those contradictory facts of modern science altogether. So-called "facts" which support contradiction are best left where they lie.

You are still a century out of date. Energy is now countable as quantum information. Degrees of freedom are the conserved quantity. Cosmology measures the entropy of event horizons. Things have moved on. — apokrisis

And you think that is a step in the right direction, dissolving temporal continuity into degrees of freedom? How would you quantify one degree of freedom, to ensure that it is maintained, in continuity from one moment to the next?

Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis

Not at that point in the book, but in many other places, especially in On the Soul as I've already told you, he describes this associated form as the soul. Reread that passage, it's Bk7 ch9. He is distinguishing those things which move themselves (like in the case of dancing), from those things which do not have this capacity, like stones. He finds some ambiguity with things like "fire".

So he is not at this point describing how these material things are capable of moving themselves (i.e. the soul), he is just distinguishing them from those things which cannot, so that he can class them separately. When he does talks about how these living material things are capable of moving themselves, in On the Soul, he explains that it is due to a form, an actuality called the soul.

My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject. — Dfpolis

It appears like you have not read "On the Soul", if you think that the movement of living things is due to the activity of matter, and not the form which is called "the soul". Therefore your understanding is clearly not consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus, because you neglect a very important part, and that is the soul. How can you claim to be consistent with Aristotle when you insist that the activity of living matter is due to something inherent within matter itself, and not this form which he calls "the soul"? Sorry, but until you grasp the meaning of "soul", your understanding will not be consistent.

On the other thread you claimed to be theist. How can you be theist and not believe in the soul?

I did not say it interpreted the laws. It simply acts in a uniform, orderly fashion and that uniform mode of action is the foundation in reality for our concept <laws of nature>. — Dfpolis

Actually there isn't really any foundation in reality for your concept of "laws of nature". We have descriptive "laws" such as the laws of physics which are really just inductive conclusions. Some people have decided that these inductive conclusions which we call "laws" must have corresponding "laws", in nature, which are acting on matter to make it behave in the consistent way which allows us to make the inductive conclusions which we call "laws". But just because the inductive conclusions are called "laws" it doesn't really follow that whatever it is in nature that is causing matter to act in consistent ways,.is anything like a "law", it's more like a cause. Wouldn't you agree? Whatever it is which acts on matter, causing it to behave in the way that it does, can't really be anything like any laws that we know of.

You did say that what you called "laws", is operative, it's acting in a causal way. So when we see matter acting in a way which can be described by laws, what you are really saying is that the actions of the matter are just the effects of these "laws". The laws being the cause, are what is really acting, and what appears to us and our senses, as natural phenomena, the motions of matter is just a reflection of the real activity, which is the "laws' in action. Would you agree with me that the matter in motion is just a reflection of the real activity which is the laws in action?

Consider Plato's cave allegory. The cave people see reflections, shadows, or images of the real activities. They don't see the real activities, only the philosopher sees through these reflections to the real activities behind them. Carry this over to your discussion of laws. As cave dwellers, we see matter moving around. But this is only a shadow, or reflection, of the real activity which is what you call the "laws" acting to move the matter around. You, being the philosopher see through this to the real activity which is the "laws" in action, causing the appearance of moving matter.

You are confused. The point I was pushing was how physics is no longer based on that kind of material atomism. It agrees that it is form that gives persistent shape or individuation to raw potential. — apokrisis

I think that you are not quite grasping the concept of "matter". It was introduced by Aristotle as a means to account for temporal continuity. When change occurs, there is always an underlying substratum which remains the same, and this is called matter. This allows us to say that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object despite undergoing change. It is essential to the concept of "change". Without this concept, change becomes unintelligible because at each moment of change there is something new. This is not "change", but a ceasing to be of the old, and a coming to be of the new. Without "matter", which is the thing which stays the same from one moment to the next, we'd have to say that the old universe ceases to be, and is replaced by a new universe at each moment of change. Instead of ceasing to be, and becoming anew, at each moment, we allow that there is temporal continuity, the matter stays the same from one moment to the next, so it is the same universe from one moment to the next, but forms change.

And energy in turn has become entropy and even information. — apokrisis

What I was saying is that the concept most often used today, to account for temporal continuity, is energy rather than matter. This is expressed as the law of conservation of energy. So from one moment to the next despite changing its form (information), the quantity of energy remains the same, and this quantity of energy is how temporal continuity is represented. The law of conservation of mass is more representative of the concept of temporal continuity of "matter", but mass and energy are convertible.

The way physics is making sense of hylomorphism is as the informational constraint on entropic degrees of freedom. So nature is taken as dualistic in a sense. It is divided into the necessary and the accidental. The substantial or actual is then the third part, the middle part, where the two combine as a fact of physical development.

This means the material aspect is best understood in terms of fundamental contingency - action that could happen in any direction without purpose or coherence. Prime matter would be active, not passive. But active in the sense of pure undirected fluctuation with no stable identity. It would be utter flux. Which then gives form and purpose a useful job to do. — apokrisis

You describe this in a way completely different from dfpolis. You describe matter as complete freedom, whereas df describes it as having laws, constraints, inherent within. So you cannot claim that this is the "way physics is making sense of hylomorphism", because there is total inconsistency here. In reality, physics has no concept of matter, so hylomorphism makes no sense to physics, and that is why those, like you and dfpolis, who try to bring it to bear on the principles adopted by physics come up with completely inconsistent notions.

How does form in-form matter then? You are just repeating the usual issues created by your own particular notion of hylomorphism. It is because you presume the material principle to be already substantial and passively existent that you keep encountering the same logical difficulties. — apokrisis

I do not think that forms "in-form matter" at all. Matter is completely conceptual, it is the concept which human beings have developed to account for the temporal continuity of existence. In modern physics the concept of matter has been replaced by the concept of energy as the means of accounting for temporal continuity. So we cannot bring back "matter" as a concept, it has been antiquated and demonstrated as insufficient. "Matter" expressed the temporal continuity of individual material objects, while "energy" expresses the temporal continuity of relations. Now physics needs a principle to account for that part of reality which exists in relations. This is not "matter", because matter, as temporal continuity was subsumed under "energy", so that part of reality which exists in relations is now lacking in temporal continuity. Nor is it energy, which refers to the relations themselves.

So "form" refers to the relations, and the relations are also assumed to have temporal continuity as energy. In modern physics form and matter are unified, temporal continuity is part of the formula. Therefore matter (temporal continuity) is assumed to be inherent within form, and this is the energy of those relations. There is no separation in modern physics between the energy and the relations, so there is no room for hylomorphism without producing the necessary separation.

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".

Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis

I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul".

He uses living things as his primary source of examples of natural (as opposed to artificial) processes. I've already said that matter passively receives form in the creation of artifacts -- just not in natural substantial changes. — Dfpolis

Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. Clearly, under Aristotle's system the difference is that the living material thing has an active form within, the soul, while the stone does not.

Since Aristotle considers living things to be natural, and he describes them as being active according to having a form within, the soul, then it is clear that even natural changes are due to matter passively receiving forms.

Also, don't forget the numerous quotes I gave you, three in total, in which he says that coming to be is the same in cases of art and natural cases.

You have taken one passage which you misunderstand, and have built a complete misrepresentation of Aristotelian metaphysics around this simple misunderstanding

I mean that they inform future states. Of all the metaphysically possible future states only a determinate future state is actualized at a given time. As information is the reduction of possibility, the laws inform successive states of the cosmos. — Dfpolis

So the laws cause matter to behave the way that it does, by informing it? I assume that they exist as information then.

We have no evidence to suggest that matter is aware, let along aware of the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

How could matter interpret the information which the laws provide, in order to act according to the laws, if it is not aware of that information Don't you think that information is useless without something to interpret it? Do you know of any cases where information does anything without something interpreting it?

We know, as a contingent fact, that matter exhibits an orderly dynamics, which by analogy with human ordinances, we call "obeying laws." This does not imply either awareness or choice on the part of matter. — Dfpolis

Well that' a really bad analogy then. Human beings obey laws by being aware of them and choosing to obey them. If matter exhibiting "orderly dynamics" is not a case of matter being aware of, and choosing to obey laws, then how is this analogous? Why would you even think that matter exhibiting orderly dynamics is a case of matter obeying laws, when this has nothing in common with what we know as "obeying laws"?

Asking how the laws work is like asking what dynamics links the dynamic of a system to the system it is the dynamics of. That kind of question misunderstands what "dynamics" means. — Dfpolis

Actually, describing dynamics as laws operating within matter is the real misunderstanding of what "dynamics" means.

The Laws of Nature are immaterial, transcendent and immanent, principles which act (operating, controlling). So, they are independent of, and determine, existence. From a theological standpoint, they can be equated with God. — Galuchat

If these laws are immanent, within matter, as dfpolis claims, and they act within every piece of matter, how is it possible that the very same law acts (having causal impact) within each piece of matter throughout the entire universe?

You say that these laws can be equated with God, but I think that they are inconsistent with God. Such laws would cause all matter to move in a deterministic way, but God allows that we have free will, so the two are inconsistent. Which do you think is the case then, is all matter controlled by laws inherent within, in a deterministic way, or is there freewill, allowing matter to be moved according to the intentions of the freewilling being?

Are you saying that the things which will be will not be part of the universe? — Janus

No, I am saying that things which will be are not part of the universe. I am not saying that they "will not be part of the universe" when they come to be, I am saying that they are not part of the universe now.

Since things of the future must be represented in terms of possibility, what may or may not be, we cannot represent them in terms of what is. "The universe" represents all that is, and therefore does not represent things of the future.

Obviously I am not speaking about the totality of the universe at any particular time, but rather the totality of the universe, logically speaking. So, of course what will be is not a part of the universe now, but what the universe is now is not the whole of the universe. — Janus

Now you are implying contradiction. What the universe is, is what the universe is. But you want to say that this "is not the whole of the universe", (contradiction), because the universe is changing, and will consist of different things in the future. So instead of analyzing the nature of "change", as Aristotle did, you want to play logical games, sophistry, to make your contradiction, that the universe is more than what it is, appear true.

The point, as I said earlier is that we presently, and most commonly, employ, an inadequate concept of time. We do not recognize within commonly employed concepts of time, the substantial difference between future and past, a difference which is recognized and fundamental to the dualist "two substances", allowing that the soul has freewill. The consequences of this failure in the conception of time, are far reaching, beginning with the assumption of determinism, reaching deep into all branches of science, right down to the issue which wayfarer indicated, quantum uncertainty.

All the various problems which arise from this failure to account for what is most evident to us, as the most fundamental principle of reality, that the past is substantially different from the future, ought to be taken as evidence that our concept of time is sorely inadequate. Instead, extremely intelligent scientists try to explain away these problems with irrational solutions like "many worlds interpretation", refusing to look at the true problem, which is the inadequate representation of time, clinging to such rationalizations which are used to support the faulty concept of time. However, the guidelines for resolving these problems are right there, recognized and produced thousands of years ago as fundamental to reality, by dualist metaphysicians, who recognized this dual nature of reality, past and future being separated by the present. These principles which recognize this most evident and fundamental aspect of reality, are commonly rejected off hand as "theist", by the atheist prejudice which abounds.

No, "universe" signifies all things that have ever been or will be. The universe is not any particular collection of things at a time, otherwise it would be meaningless to talk about the origin of the universe or the infinity or eternality of the universe. — Janus

This is a faulty representation. Things which "will be" cannot be represented as part of the universe, because possibilities and choice will dictate many of these things. So we can represent the future in terms of possibilities but we cannot properly represent it in terms of what "will be". A determinist might try to do such, but will inevitably fail for not accounting for the real, and substantial difference between future and past.

So, the alternative would be to think of the universe as being not in time, but as holding the spacetime continuum in toto, within itself; as being the eternal "provider" of the temporal, so to speak. — Janus

I don't see how "universe" could be conceived of in this way. "Universe" generally signifies the collective existence of all physical things. These things clearly exist in time. Now you want to hand to "the universe" some type of existence outside of time. So all you are doing is taking the thing which we normally refer to as "God", the provider of temporal existence, and giving it the name "universe". Sure, this, what we call "God", which you now call "the universe", is uncaused, that's what I was saying. But it's not "the universe" as the word is commonly used, it is something outside the universe, which I would rather, according to convention, call God. What would be the point in defining "universe" in this way, such that it is outside the universe (as per common usage)?

The second point of discussion deals with the laws operative in nature

...
(2) These laws are immanent, operating in matter, and transcendent, depending on no single species or instance of matter, but controlling all matter regardless of constitution or properties.

...
(3) The laws explain things here and now because they act here and now. — Dfpolis

What do you mean when you say that these laws are "operative"? You say that the laws are immaterial yet they operate, acting to control matter.

Here's a comparison. Human beings obey laws. They know and understand laws, and act to control themselves in a way which conforms to the laws. In this way they act to control human beings from within their own minds. However, we still have the option of disobeying the laws, if we so choose. So this "acting from within", is really the individual acting in choice to follow the laws. The laws are actually passive, not acting at all.. Is this the same way that matter is controlled by laws? Does the matter know and understand the laws, choosing to obey the laws, but still maintaining the capacity to disobey?

If this is not the way that these laws operate, or act, to control matter from within, how else could they act to enforce themselves from within the matter?

Not going in circles, we're delving deeper into the same issues. It seems to be that our principal difference on this issue is the following. I think that "matter" as used and defined by Aristotle signifies something completely passive, and that is potential, or potency. You think that Aristotle uses matter to allow that there is activity inherent within matter. My argument is that in all the cases where he uses "matter" in this way, it is in reference to living things, and he has clearly attributed this activity which appears to inhere within matter, to a form, the soul. So I think you misunderstand his concept of matter.

Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support your idea that it is passive and devoid of anything analogous to desire? — Dfpolis

"Passive" means not active, inert, it can also mean that which is acted upon.. This is consistent with "it does not, itself, change". However, "it does not, itself, change", is not consistent with emotions such as desire, which you assign to matter. These are activities of the soul which involve change. Desires change.

Let me clarify. A potency can be passive -- like clay waiting to have a form impressed on it. Or, it can be active -- like an acorn able to become an oak tree. In neither case does the potency actualize itself. — Dfpolis

An acorn, able to become an acorn, is not active. It is waiting to have that form, just like the clay, so it is not active. When it starts to grow it has a form, the soul, active within it. The matter, or potency is not active, the form is.

Each kind of potency needs an efficient cause to actualize it (a potter in the first case, moisture and other environmental conditions in the second). One important difference between them is that, while clay receives its new form from an extrinsic source (the potter) and so is an artifact, the form of the oak is immanent in the acorn and so its germination and growth into an oak is a natural process. — Dfpolis

This is why Aristotle's principles are supportive of dualism, we have two distinct sources of form. A form may be imposed on matter from an external source, as in the case of art, or a form may be imposed on matter from an internal source, which is the case in living things, "the soul" being that internal source of form in the living body.

Yes, so organisms are natural. Still, we aren't analyzing beings, but substantial change. — Dfpolis

Notice, that in this part of the book when he refers to "natural" things, his examples are living things.

Again, what a thing is now is based on its form. Its tendency to cease to be what it is now, to become something else, (e.g. to germinate or to die), is not explained by being what it is now (its form), but by an intrinsic tendency (hyle) to become the new thing (e.g., an oak or decaying matter). — Dfpolis

No, there is no such intrinsic tendency to matter, it is inert. These living thing have a source of form within, called "the soul". The tendency for the thing to become the new thing, is the soul acting with final cause, the matter provides the potential for the new thing to be an oak tree. But the matter is not acing, it has no tendency, it is potency only, passive, inert.

This is in ch. 7, not 9. If you read chapter 7 from the beginning, you'll find Aristotle explicitly rejecting your view that matter is always passive: "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..." — Dfpolis

Your quote is at Ch 9. It says "some matter is such as to be set in motion by itself..". These are the things which have the form, "the soul" within the matter. He gives "dancing" as an example, and proceeds to say that a stone does not have this capacity. He concludes that the material things which have the source of motion within the matter, having the form called "the soul", cannot exist apart from the soul. "Therefore some things will not exist apart from some one who has the art of making them, while others will; for motion will be started by these things which have not the art but can themselves be moved by other things which have not the art or with a motion starting from a part of the product.

It is quite clear, that even with things that have a principle of self-movement, it is not the matter which is the cause of motion, but the "art" within. This is the soul. If you read Aristotle's On the Soul, this is essential to his biology. There is a principle of motion within the living being, "the soul", which is a form, and this animates the matter. It's vitalism plain and simple. The soul then, as the principle of activity, has powers, potencies, which are a function of how it utilizes matter. These powers are such as self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. Here's the primary definition of "soul", On the soul Bk. 2 ch.1 412a, 20-30

Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.
...
That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.

If you really believe that my other quote is out of context, coming at the end of that section on coming to be, you still need to address this quote, which is at the middle of the section.

1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.

Notice how he clearly classifies all together, "by art, or by nature, or by some faculty". There is no such distinction between things of art and things of nature, as you are claiming. I've given you three quotes which indicate this, one at the beginning of the section, one at the middle of the section, and on at the end of the section.

The similarity between substantial changes in nature and in art is not the matter, as you suggest, but that "generation proceeds from [essence]." — Dfpolis

Right, "essence" is formal. So the similarity between changes in nature and in art, is that the principle of activity, actuality, is formal. There is no such principle of activity within matter. That is where you misunderstand Aristotle, matter is inert.

The reason why I referred to Newton, is that this definition of matter, Aristotle's, was the only accepted definition of matter, and universally accepted, until relativity theory gained dominance, so it was the basis for Newton's laws. But under relativity theory, physical bodies are necessarily active, so there is no need for the concept of matter, except to understand inertia. Now there is inconsistency between energy based theories and inertia based theories. However, notice how Newton's laws of motion exclude the possibility of internally sourced motion, which you attribute to matter, and I attribute to final cause. This makes Newton's laws inherently inapplicable to living things.

No, my question is addressed when he says that "in some cases the matter .. can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis

Think again, and you really ought to read "On the Soul", it makes very clear how this principle of activity which appears to inhere within matter is really a form itself, the soul. This is why Aristotle's, system is so complete, and consistent. Activity, actuality, is always associated with "form" throughout the various disciplines, while passivity, potency, possibility, is always associated with matter. This is the key to understanding his complete works, do not stray from this categorization.

To what extent is it 'valid' to say: Their forms are different, but in essence they are both just marble. — rachMiel

Essence is a form, not the matter. The form of a thing is "what" it is. When we come to know things we abstract their essence, and this is an instance of "what" they are, a form which exists in the mind. The matter stays in the thing and we never properly get to know it, we only know its forms. So it can never be valid to say that the essence of a thing is its matter.

I have already said that we have no model for any interaction between the mental and the physical. If these are considered to be different substances then we must suppose that they must interact, even though we cannot form any idea of how that would be possible. — Janus

Read some Aristotle, there's a very good model for interaction between the mental and the physical. To deny this just indicates that you haven't read, or understood it. So your premise, that we have no model for the interaction between the mental and the physical is clearly false.

And you have so far failed to answer that question. — Janus

I answered that. To position the universe as uncaused would imply an infinite regress of temporal activity, an infinity of time before now. And infinite regress is repugnant to the intellect because it fails as an explanation. Since God is placed outside of time, being the cause of temporal existence, it is unreasonable to ask about the cause of God, "cause" being a temporal concept. I guess you didn't read my brief discussion of time.

None of this tells us that Aristotle thought hyle in natural processes was purely passive, gives a reference supporting that claim, or says how a purely passive matter can solve the problem of Physics i, 9 — Dfpolis

Look then, at Physics i,9, 192a, 28 -35, what he says of matter:

But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature so that it will be before coming to be (For my definition of matter is just this -- the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result). And if it ceases to be it will cease to be in the last, so it will cease to be before ceasing to be.

Notice, how matter is defined as outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be, such that to speak of it in these terms causes the contradictions indicated. It is an underlying substratum which does not change between before and after..

This is a non sequitur. Another way to be different is to be potential, but potential need not mean passive. To make your case, you need to show that potential (dynamis) implies passivity -- a difficult case to make given that the primary meaning of dynamis is "power." — Dfpolis

Potential is the capacity to act. As such it is not itself active. If it were active it would not be the capacity for action, but action itself. This is why potential and actual are categorically different. And, since it is other than active, we can say that potential is passive.

What makes you think that "power" implies action necessarily. It is the capacity to act, not action itself. So something with power may or may not carry out the action it has the power to do. "Energy" for example is the capacity to do work, it is the power to do work, but not the work actually being done. If the work is actually done the energy is spent.

One is defined as a kind of physis (nature = "an intrinsic principle of activity") and the other is not. Aristotle distinguishes artifacts by their lack of an intrinsic principle of activity. — Dfpolis

Living things have an intrinsic principle of activity, the soul, and it is clearly a form. This is explained in On the Soul. Therefore the intrinsic principle of activity of a living thing, in Aristotelian biology, is not material it is formal, just like the principle of activity in his physics is formal. The difference being that the living thing has a special type of form, the soul.

I believe that discussion is about artifacts. That is why I want the specific reference. — Dfpolis

Read the section I referred, Bk.7 ch.7-8. even the entire Bk.7. It will give you enough information to see that the difference between natural and artificial things, is not "material" as you say. The difference is in relation to final cause. Here's a piecemeal:

1032a
-12 Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something.
-20 --all things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each--and, in general both that from which they are produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced is nature (for that which is produced, e.g.a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so it is by which they are produced --the so-called 'formal' nature, which is specifically the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man.
33 --but from art proceed the things from which the form of the thing is in the soul of the artist.
1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.
Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...

Notice he starts out ch.7 by saying all coming to be is the same, there is "agency", there is "comes from something", and "comes to be something". The difference between natural and artificial is the source of the form, and the agency, being natural. Natural things have the source of the form in nature, and artificial things have the source of the form in the soul of the artist. He then describes artistic production, and how the form is put into the matter. The form isn't actually produced in the matter, it comes from the mind and is put into the matter. After providing an in depth description of how things are produced in art, he reemphasizes what is stated at the beginning, that natural things come to be in the same way.

Strictly speaking, form does not change. It is replaced by a new form. In Physics i, 9 Aristotle is asking, "where does the new form come from?" Your view does not provide a satisfactory answer. — Dfpolis

So, as described in Bk.7, in the case of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature, the form comes from nature.

In the discussion of Physics i, 9 there are precisely three principles, and hyle is the only one we have left after eliminating the original and contrary form. — Dfpolis

It appears you haven't read i 9 very well if you missed the part I quoted where he says this is my definition of matter, and "matter" is clearly stated as outside the sphere of becoming. Perhaps your question is left unanswered at that point, until he proceeds to discuss efficient cause and final cause.

Are you playing the sophist now? Clearly i have been referring to the two purportedly fundamental substances of dualism. I haven't said there is an interaction problem when it comes to so-called physical substances. In fact I have said precisely the opposite. — Janus

I'm not playing sophist. I want you to tell the problem you apprehend, with two substances interacting, so that I can address this problem directly. As you can see, we commonly speak of substances interacting, why should "fundamental substances" be any different? Did you know that there is a problem with how substances interact in modern physics, it's called quantum uncertainty.

Again, I believe you know very well what I meant and are indulging in sophistry. Why would it be any stranger to say that the universe is uncaused than it is to say God is uncaused? — Janus

But that's not what you said, you said "self-caused", not "uncaused". One implies a cause, the other does not, so they refer to completely different things. I believe the issue here is the nature of time. To say that the universe is uncaused implies that it extends indefinitely in prior time. Some people see the chain of efficient causation and assume it extends infinitely back in time. This is infinite regress, and it is repugnant to the intellect because it doesn't provide a proper explanation, and, since we see that things come and go in time, it is against our inductive reason to assume that something could last forever, infinitely.

God on the other hand, is placed outside of time. Being outside time makes it unreasonable to speak of a cause of God. I think that this is the problem of interaction which you refer to, how does something outside of time interact with something temporal? The issue is quite easily resolved by recognizing that the need to place God outside of time is the result of an inadequate concept of time. The "problem of interaction" is the result of an inadequate concept of time. When time is strictly related to physical existence, then non-physical things are necessarily outside of time. This excludes the possibility of non-physical things interacting with physical things, creating said problem. The problem is caused by an inadequate concept of time, not by the assumption of two substances. So the concept of time needs to be reworked to allow that non-physical things are actual, active in time. You'll see that the Neo-Platonists allow for a procession of non-physical things, and Aquinas used the concept of aeviternal to provide for the medium between the One, God, which is furthest outside of "time", and physical things with temporal existence according to the accepted concept of "time". Within this medium, which is essentially "the present", are both the non-physical realities of the future (having not yet been instantiated), and the physical realities of the past (having come to be).

Do you have a reference in Aristotle for this? And, how can a completely passive matter solve the problem he discusses in Physics i,9? — Dfpolis

I gave you one reference, but there's many scattered through Aristotle's work. The problem discussed here is the categorizing of the contraries. The outcome, which Aristotle settles on, as well as Neo-Aristotelians like Aquinas, is that the two opposing contraries are both of the formula, i.e. formal. This is evident in logic, being and not being, is and is not, has and has not. Matter cannot be opposed to form, so it is categorically different.

Change is described as an altering of the form, via the contraries, from has to has not, etc.. Form, being what has actual existence, is active in this way, changing. Matter, being categorically different is therefore passive. Notice at the end of that section he defines matter as that from which a thing comes to be, and which persists afterward. This makes matter passive, because when a thing changes from being one thing to being another thing, the matter persists, and remains the same matter.

In artifacts matter does receive its form passively from the artificer, In natural processes the role of matter is very different. — Dfpolis

I don't agree, Aristotle works hard to maintain consistency with "matter", and I do not see this difference between "matter" in an artificial thing, and "matter" in a natural thing. Notice how Newton formulated his laws of motion. "Inertia" is the primary property of matter, being "inert". In order that the form of the matter be changed, it must be acted upon.

Aristotle defines nature (physis) as an intrinsic principle of activity and tells us that matter (hyle) is a kind of physis -- and so a principle of activity rather than passivity. If you say matter is passive in natural processes, you confuse natural objects with artifacts, while Aristotle takes great care to distinguish them. — Dfpolis

I don't see this at all. And I don't see how you could argue that Aristotle claims that there's a different concept of "matter" for artificial things from the one for natural things. That would be blatant inconsistency, which Aristotle avoids.

So, where in the Metaphysics do you see the matter of a natural process passively receiving form? — Dfpolis

Why don't you read some of this stuff? It's the only way to really understand it, you need to read and reread it, because it's difficult. Try Bk.7 Ch. 7-8, for a good explanation concerning the relation between matter and form, but I think where he actually says matter receives form is prior to this.

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Only substance (ousia) changes -- substantially or accidentally. — Dfpolis

Substance changes, but substance consists of matter and form, and it is the form which changes.

He notes that the original form cannot explain it, because then it would have to work for its own destruction, Nor can the new, contrary, form explain it, because it's not actual (=operational) yet. So, all we have left is hyle, which must act to bring about the new form. — Dfpolis

No, hyle is not all we have left, don't make conclusions which are uncalled for. All you've considered here is formal cause, and concluded that it's not formal cause therefore it must be material cause. But you haven't considered efficient cause or final cause yet.

If you can tell me how dual substances are thought to interact then I'll be keen to hear it. — Janus

You'll have to tell me where you see a problem first. It is a common occurrence that one substance acts on another, so you'll have to be more specific. Here's an example, you tell me where the problem lies. Suppose it rains a lot, and the water washes out the ground. The water is one substance, and the ground another. It's called "erosion", one substance acts on another substance. Why do you think that interaction between dual substances is a problem?

Why would it be any stranger to say the universe might be self-caused than it is to say that God is self-caused? — Janus

I've never seen it said by a knowledgeable theologian, that God is self-caused. If I saw that, I would say it's contradictory, and reject it.

Were the first cause not uncaused, it wouldn’t be called ‘the first cause’. That's what makes it, you know, special. — Wayfarer

To say that it is uncaused is clearly not the same as saying that it is self-caused.

Absolutely NOT. From where did you pull the chain of assumption that leads you come up with the notion that the "I" is the cause and 'thought' the effect? — Marcus de Brun

Well what else would you call it. The thoughts are caused by something which is thinking, and I normally call this thing "I". Don't you?

If thought exists apriori the 'I' cannot function as its causation. — Marcus de Brun

I don't see why not. The conclusion that "I" is the cause of the thoughts is a posteriori, but this doesn't mean that the thoughts, which are produced by the thing called I, are not a priori.

You then insist upon the uninvited and unqualified imposition of TIME upon thought, vis the assumption that a cause 'causes' its associated 'effect'. This too is another enormous assumption that is dealt with to some degree by Hume. — Marcus de Brun

Doesn't the thought have to be about something, or it isn't a thought at all? So why wouldn't the thought be about "where did I come from"? You know that "thought" is the past tense of "think", so the thought must have come from an act of thinking which is in the past. That's logical isn't it? And don't thoughts naturally tend toward making conclusions? So if there was an act of thinking, isn't it necessary to assume that there was something engaged in this act, or else it wouldn't be an act at all? Why not call this thing "I"?

We are starting with the reality that it (thought) exists apriori to the 'I' and as such is independent of the 'I'. That the 'I' is a pancake and subject to the rules of pancakes, brings nothing to the table. (other than a pancake). — Marcus de Brun

OK, we have a thought. Where did the thought come from, what caused it? It is impossible that it willed itself into existence, because that would imply that it existed prior to its existence, in the sense of "self-caused", and that's contradictory. So something else must have caused it. Therefore the thought is not alone, as a solo, isolated and solipsistic entity, it comes from somewhere. Can we agree that this thing which caused the existence of the thought ought to be called "I"?

Nothing you have said explains how the problem of interaction is purportedly dispelled. — Janus

I know, it's a complex issue and not easily explained. But let me tell you, it isn't a problem. It's a straw man created by a misunderstanding of dualism, probably stemming from the simplistic Cartesian misrepresentation. So until you tell me exactly what you think the problem is, I can't tell you where your misunderstanding lies.

Yes, but the way you talk about it is in tendentious terms that already imply the reified notion of mind as substance which is separate from matter. — Janus

I wouldn't say that the terms are tendentious, they are just the terms by which an understanding is reached. If you deny the usage you will never develop an understanding. In high school I couldn't understand advanced forms of mathematics because my mind denied the usage of the terms.

"Matter" is a concept which is apprehended by the mind. If you refused to recognize a division between the thing which apprehends, and the thing apprehended, then this is a symptom of your denial, not a symptom of my reification of that division. The fact that it is possible for a mind to apprehend the concept of matter, and also possible for a mind not to apprehend the concept of matter, indicates that there is a separation between these two.

Neitzsche in aphorism 17 (BG&E) Reiterates Descartes own criticism of himself, with the empirically correct observation that 'a thought comes when it wills' and not when this 'I' thing wills it. Therefore if thought simply comes when it wills, and is not generated by the entirely presumptive 'I', we must conclude that thought is independent of the 'I' and return to the fundamental principle that thought exists apriori. — Marcus de Brun

It is impossible that a thought could will itself into existence. It must already exist in order to will anything. So willing itself into existence would mean that it wills itself before it exists, to bring itself into existence. But this is impossible because it would mean that it exists prior to its own existence. This description of a thought is nothing other than a description of a self-caused thing. That's contradiction because it means that the thing must both exist (as the cause) and not exist (prior to the thing's existence) at the same time.

Actual occasions have duration, incorporate data or facts from prior completed occasions and from future possibilities or potentials (through prehension) . Actual Occasions upon completion perish and become data or facts for the formation of new or subsequent Occasions.
...
One moment or occasion would seem to perish, and a new moment or occasion would seem to form... — prothero

This, I believe, may be debated. An event never really finishes, nor does it have a real beginning. We as human beings designate, somewhat arbitrarily, the beginning and ending of events. Whitehead recognizes the temporal duration, and therefore temporal extension of events. So as an event is occurring, part of it is already in the past. Since it's all part of the same event, the part in the past must be just as real, and existent, as the part at the present.

I believe that this is the point with concrescence. No actual occasion has concrete existence unless it has been involved in an act of concrescence. But this act of concrescence puts it into the past. So I do not think it is correct to say that actual occasions perish upon completion. It would be more proper to say that they have concrete existence.

Now we have the 'dynamic interaction' problem, which seems insoluble. — Janus

That issue was resolved a long time ago by Plato who introduced a third aspect as a medium between the two, the tripartite person. There are two completely distinct realms of being, and the third is the realm of becoming in which the two interact. As an analogy, consider the future and past as two distinct realms of being, and the present as the realm of becoming, where activity occurs, as the two interact. The problem is that modern monists reintroduce this so-called "dynamic interaction" problem without a proper understanding of dualist principles, therefore without realizing that it really isn't a problem at all.

I also don't agree with you that physicality is manifestly "brute", — Janus

Perhaps I don't know what you mean by "brute", but I think that this term is generally defined in relation to matter, "brute matter", meaning without mind, like matter. So if we take away the "brute" from physicality, we also take away the matter from physicality, and without "matter" temporal continuity becomes extremely difficult to account for. Aristotle introduces "matter" as a means for accounting for temporal continuity, all the aspects of reality which remain the same as time passes. For Newton, this is described as Inertia, the fundamental property of material existence, and "inertia" accounts for the observed temporal continuity of material existence. Inertia is the "brute" aspect of material existence. So if we deny the reality of this brute aspect of physical existence, inertia, we are left with no means for accounting for the temporal continuity of existence which we observe and are described by the laws of inertia.