The point projecting to a point as point results in a 1d point. For example if projected in one direction it becomes a 1 directional line. The one directional line project in all directions in one direction becomes the circle. The nature of the point is defined by its projection in one direction, in both cases. — eodnhoj7

No. no. this is all wrong. Producing 1d lines in all directions from a point will never make a circle. That's very obvious. A circle requires that the lines from the point are all the same length, and are connected with a curved line. Where does the necessary curved line come from? That curved line, which connects through the medium between the individual straight lines, is essential. Likewise, a point projected to another point does not make a 1d line segment. The line segment requires a connection through the medium, between the points. That's why people say, no matter how many 0d points you put together, they will never make a line, because you cannot get to 1d from 0d in that way.

Your analogies are leaving out a very important point, the connection through the medium. You cannot get "intradimensional nature", from the 0d point, in this way, because there is a fundamental incompatibility between 0d and 1d, which we might call the medium. The same incompatibility is what gives us the irrational ratios between 1d and 2d. The two perpendicular sides of a square, representing two distinct dimensions produce an irrational ratio. The ratio between the diameter of a circle, and its circumference, being the relation between a 1d line, and a 2d curve, is also irrational. The medium, that which lies between the dimensions, is fundamentally unintelligible to us, because we understand space in terms of dimensions. So whatever it is which separates the dimensions ( and there necessarily is a separation according to the incompatibility described above), the medium, is fundamentally unintelligible, because it lies outside of our understanding (between the dimensions).

One of the big issues with any metaphysical ism, material or otherwise is how it handles emergence. — schopenhauer1

If one is to speak in terms of "emergence", then the first order would be to determine what emerges, and what does it emerge from. The different "isms" might treat these fundamental principles differently, so that talking "emergence" without first determining these principles might be very confusing.

As inversive of being, 0d point space exists as a dual to being with being being necessitated through directed movement requiring an "inversion of inversion" as an ethereal point space. This ethereal point space, as pure infinite movement as unchanging can be equated to not just a foundational glue to being (reminiscent of the Hindu akashic record) but being itself through a 1d point.

The 0d point effectively inverts the 1d point to many points, with the 1d point existing as one point considering void is nothing (which takes into account relativity and quantum connection simultaneously) and what exists as 1 through many is effectively the same. A point in locality A is still the same point in locality B considering the composition of both points is still composed of the same points and existing within a singular point field. — eodnhoj7

How could there be a 1d point? Wouldn't that be a line, and therefore a multitude of points marking a specific order? And if the point, instead of being 0d is infinitesimally small, without that specific order, then it occupies a 3d area, not a 1d point, though it may be ordered as a sphere or something else. So it cannot be correct to represent the emergence of being with a 1d point.

I'm not sure about matter separating non-dimensional points. I've never heard of that. — frank

It's only a suggestion of how one could try to conceive of matter as a medium, and also as "all there is". However, the problem I described remains, how to account for those non-dimensional points, with matter remaining as all there is. And without those points, matter is not a "medium".

You're missing my point. The measurements are indisputably factual, and the success of the predictions needs to be accounted for. If your metaphysics cannot account for it, then it has a fatal flaw. — Relativist

That's nonsense. There is an uncertainty principle which indicates that the measurements are indisputably not factual. That's what the Fourier transform indicates, some measurements cannot be made. If the measurements cannot be made, then whatever it is which takes the place of these measurements cannot be indisputably factual measurements, but are the opposite of this. Furthermore, if you cannot state correctly what it is that is being measured, you cannot claim that the measurements are indisputably factual. What does a wave-function measure?

The capacity to make correct predictions does not require correct measurements, it only requires statistics and probabilities. That's the point with the example of Thales prediction of a solar eclipse. Thales' models of orbits were completely wrong, so he clearly did not have factual measurements, yet he could predict the solar eclipse.

Add some phenomenology to it, and it becomes respectable philosophy, except for the part where we try to say that matter as medium is all there is, that doesn't make sense. — frank

I don't see the problem with matter as medium. All that separates two points, space, time, physical existence, can all be rolled into the concept "matter". It only becomes a problem under a monist guise, because those non-dimensional points which are separated by matter must be given some real existence, as other than matter, otherwise "medium' has no meaning here. So, to say the medium is "all there is" is really contradictory, because "medium" implies the middle, between that which is not the medium.

This is what I meant when I said "matter behaves", as it is the start of all this fiat. Matter is matter is matter. — schopenhauer1

This is just warmed over mysterian trash. — StreetlightX

Actually schopenhauer1 is right here. StreetlightX assigns to matter the capacity to act, (behave), and this is what is contrary to the pure concept of matter as passive, and is a display of classical mysticism.

If we proceed in Streetlight's vein of mysticism, we ought to assign to the behaviour of matter the adverb of "evil". That is what this line of thinking leads to, the notion that the activity of matter, by its very nature, is evil, and this activity must be brought under the control of the mind which seeks the good.

In the above, the rope is analogous to a field, and the ripple is a particle. (If particles were free standing entities, it would beg the question of a medium). — Relativist

A rope is a physical medium, within which a wave can travel . A wave can only exist in a medium. It's not particles which beg the question of a medium, a particle could move through empty space. It's the wave that begs the question of a medium. By claiming that the particle is not a particle, but a "wave packet", you need a substance for the wave to propagate in, as well as many other problems such as why a wave would move as a packet..

But it's consistent with the math. You don't have to accept realism, but if your ontology conflicts with the math of QFT (the math that produces the correct predictions) then your ontology clearly conflicts with reality and is falsified. — Relativist

As I said, the ability to predict doesn't concern me, it is irrelevant, because it can be used just as easily to support falsehood as it can be used to support truth. The point is that you can make accurate predictions with an incorrect understanding, and incorrect model, of what is happening. The ability to predict says very little about the correctness of the model. Thales successfully predicted a solar eclipse with a model which had the sun, moon, and planets, orbiting the earth. The ability to predict indicates that one applies mathematics in a way which is adequate for making the prediction, it does not indicate that the person understands the phenomenon predicted, nor does it indicate that the model correctly represents the phenomenon. That's why model-dependent realism is popular amongst some, it allows them to say that the correctness of the model is not an issue. Therefore the model might be full of contradictions, and have glaring problems, but so long as it fulfills the conditions, prediction etc., it might just as well be considered as the correct one.

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. — Sam26

Consider what Wittgenstein demonstrates at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. If learning a language consisted of learning rules, then one would already have to know a language in order to learn a language, because the rules would have to be communicated to that person, via language. This is what drove him to inquire into private rules, and private language, to account for the capacity to understand rules, if learning rules is necessarily prior to using language. But that whole line of investigation breaks down into nonsense. So we ought to conclude that learning language does not consist of learning rules at all.

The only "deficiency" you've identified is your incorrect assumption that it entails wave-particle duality. — Relativist

QFT doesn't entail wave-particle duality, it assumes it, as a premise. And if your claim is that QFT renders the particle unreal, and the wave as the only real aspect, then you still have the contradiction of a wave without a medium, and so an inability to say what a particle is (other than a particle). As I said, QFT doesn't resolve the contradiction of wave-particle duality, it only obscures it, hides it behind complex mathematics.

So your entire claim seems to hinge in a misconception of yours. — Relativist

Perhaps you're right, but you have yet to demonstrate that. So it's just an arbitrary and completely unsupported claim.

There ARE some contradictions in physics - where general relativity breaks down, and quantum theory doesn't apply. I assumed that's what you were talking about. My bad. — Relativist

Yes there are many different contradictions in modern physics. At least we agree on something.

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. The rules when set up may be arbitrary, but once set, like the rules of chess, you don't get to arbitrarily suspend the rules to suit your own particular view of the game. If you did you wouldn't be playing chess. — Sam26

Oh come on Spam26. There are no such rules to language use. We can use the words however we damn well please, and actually do, that's how languages evolve. Where would these rules exist, in the dictionary? A dictionary is not a set of rules. To describe language as being governed by rules reveals an extremely naïve view of language.

Our inability to know matter directly is not at all like Kant's claim that we can never know the noumenon. Why? (1) Because what we know is not something separate from the object, but an aspect of what it is now. If we could now nothing of the noumenon, this would be impossible. (2) We do know object's potential to change by analogy with similar cases. Again this is impossible for Kantian noumena. — Dfpolis

I do not believe (1) is true. There is a distinction between "form" in the sense of a thing's essence, and "form" in the sense of what is united with matter, complete with accidentals, in the case of a particular thing. This duality of form is important to understanding the philosophy of Aristotle. The form which is united with matter, complete with accidentals, in the case of individual, particular things, cannot be the same form as that which occurs in the mind through abstraction, because this form is the thing's essence, without the accidentals. So the form which appears in the mind, in knowing the object through its essence, is not an aspect of the object itself because it is not the actual form which the material object has. The form which the object itself actually has, is complete with accidentals. This distinction between the form which is in the mind, and the form which the material object has, is critical for understanding how knowledge is deficient and often mistaken.

First, this is a very strange claim for a Kantian. In Kant's view, time is not a noumenal property, but a "form" imposed by the mind. — Dfpolis

You are forgetting though, that "object" is the identity we give to the phenomenon. For Kant we can't give any identity to noumena, because that is unknowable. And for Kant time is an intuition required as a condition for the apprehension of phenomena. Time is not a form "imposed" by the mind, it is an intuition required by the mind in order that we may perceive phenomena, and objects. That's why temporal extension is a necessary aspect of being an object.

I have already given counter examples. I do not have the same properties I had as a child, but I am still the same person. — Dfpolis

You don't seem to understand. To be the person that you are, it is necessary that you had the exact same properties as you had, this morning, yesterday, the day before, the day before, the month before, the year before, and when you were a child as well. If, at any point in your life, the properties which you had were not exactly the same as the properties which you had at that point, then from that point onward through time, and therefore today, you would not be the same person as you are. Your history is your identity.

So, it is necessary that you had the exact same properties, as a child, that you did have as a child, and likewise as a ten year old, a fifteen year old, and every moment of your life, in order that you are the same person that you are today.

Quantum mechanics, special relativity, and QFT have been remarkably successful at making predictions. How is that "deceptive"? — Relativist

I already explained how QFT is deceptive, and the fact that you think fields are real things is evidence of the deception. What does prediction have to do with this anyway?

But making successful predictions is a good tool to aid one's capacity to deceive, so I don't see how making predictions is evidence that it's not deception. I could tell you deceptively, that a dragon carries the sun in its mouth, every night from the western horizon to the eastern horizon in the morning. My prediction that the sun will be there in the morning aids my capacity to deceive. The fact that I can predict where and when the sun will be on the horizon tomorrow morning doesn't mean that I know how it got there. And if I use this prediction to support my claim that I know how it got there, when I do not, I am practising deception. Therefore prediction is very useful in deception.

QFT DOES resolve wave-particle duality. — Relativist

Wave-particle duality is contradictory, plain and simple. The same energy cannot travel from one place to another as a wave and also as a particle, that's contradiction, it would have to be one or the other, or something completely different. The fact that you think QFT resolves wave-particle duality is evidence that the deception has been successful.

Since you believe particles are fundamental, how do you explain the dualistic results of double-experiments? — Relativist

I already told you, the theories involved are deficient. They need to be examined, the deficient aspects exposed and discarded. By the way, I don't really believe that particles are fundamental, my point was that physics treats particles as fundamental. It does not treat fields as fundamental, like you claim, because QFT is the model, and the particles are the things modeled. So physics does not treat fields as fundamental, despite the fact that some people like you claim that fields must be fundamental.

Field EQUATIONS are mathematical entities, and since they accurately predict behavior, they must be describing something that is actually there. If not actual fields, then what? — Relativist

Field equations accurately predict the appearance of particles. Therefore what they are describing "that is actually there", is the appearance of particles.

You don't seem to be doing either, since you just toss out the entire theory so you can propose a fiction. — Relativist

I'm not proposing any alternative model so I am not proposing a fiction. I am stating the obvious, that the entire theoretical structure of QFT revolves around a fundamental contradiction, wave-particle duality. What is required is to expose the simple deficiencies in the theories which produce this contradiction (principally the special theory of relativity), not to produce other, very complex theories (QFT) in an attempt to cover up the contradiction.

This is how the idealist avoids solipsism, by concluding the reality of the medium:
First principle: all that is real to me, is within my mind.
Second principle: I communicate with others, and am forced to conclude that there are others in the same situation as me, with realities inside their minds. Therefore there is a multiplicity of realities.
Third principle: There is a separation between my mind and the minds of others which creates the multiplicity, and this is the medium of material existence.

We proceed now with science and logic to model the medium, to figure out this separation.

Metaphysics aims to account for what exists. The best science tells us that quantum fields exist, and they behave per quantum field theory. If you don't account for quantum fields, then your metaphysics is at best incomplete, at worst - it is incoherent. — Relativist

I can very easily account for quantum field theory. It is a complex arrangement of mathematical equations established for the purpose of an attempt to reconcile the fundamental inconsistency between the theory of special relativity, and the empirical observations of quantum mechanics. This inconsistency manifests as the contradiction of wave/particle duality. Since quantum field theory is nothing but a mathematical attempt to cover up a fundamental, underlying contradiction, it is nothing but deception

So you may claim that quantum field theory is "the best science", but it is only "the best" in the sense of its ability to best deceive us, by obscuring this underlying contradiction. Better science would address the contradiction directly, and remove the offending theories, instead of hiding the fundamental contradiction behind a veil of mathematics, and appearance of reconciliation. No amount of effort and mathematical magic can establish the compatibility of a contradiction, it must be dealt with at the source, restructuring the principles which cause it. The attempt to obscure contradiction behind mathematics is nothing more than deception.

I sense you might be trying to claim that fields are just mathematical entities, but this doesn't address field behavior that does not fit a particle paradigm. Perhaps you're only treating classical objects (the stuff of the macro world) as truly "physical" - but this is question begging because the particles themselves are best explained as field quanta. — Relativist

Because they are mathematical entities, fields are not directly observable. Fields are mathematical equations designed to deal with the appearance of particles. QFT is the model, the empirical observations of particles is what is being modeled Therefore "field behaviour" is a misnomer, it just refers to how human beings must adjust their models to deal with the appearances of particles. Fields are manipulated by physicists, they do not actually have any independent behaviour.

You still have to account for what physics gets right. If you treat particles as fundamental, you will get even more wrong than physics does. — Relativist

You haven't provided me with any examples of what physics has gotten right yet, so I have nothing to deal with in that department. I see a fundamental problem which is a failure of physical theories to produce a proper relation between energy existing as waves, and energy existing as moving particles. The physical theories have provided no medium for the existence of waves, and therefore cannot account for the transferral of energy from the particle into the medium (as a wave) and vise versa. To replace the medium with "fields", as if fields have some sort of ontological existence is just to obscure this problem.

And yet it also gets many things right, and therefore it is reasonable to accept much of it as true. — Relativist

OK, I agree with that, physicists get many things right.

QFT is widely accepted by physicists, so if your metaphysics is not consistent with it, you have a burden to show that your assumptions are more likely to be true than QFT. — Relativist

Uh, wait, you're mixing physics with metaphysics here. Any physics ought to be consistent with accepted physics, but why ought metaphysics be consistent with physics? Metaphysics is a distinct subject from physics. If you think that one ought to be consistent with the other, then the burden is on you to demonstrate this. And why shouldn't physics alter their theories to be consistent with metaphysics instead of the inverse, which you are suggesting, that metaphysics ought to be made consistent with physics? I've already told you why physics is obviously wrong, it is rife with contradiction. So my burden has been released. Bye, bye.

A philosopher could think the physics has things wrong. — Terrapin Station

Thank you Terrapin Station for bringing that to Relativist's attention. And I am such a philosopher. If physics is full of contradictions (as it is) then most likely it has some things wrong. Relativist doesn't seem to believe that it is possible that any theories of physics might be based in principles which are wrong.

A metaphysics must be consistent with empirical evidence and with the best theories of physics. — Relativist

Whether mathematical fields are real and fundamental things is purely metaphysics, it has nothing to do with the theories of physics. You don't seem to know what you're talking about.

It's obvious that you are rationalizing God's existence, not "proving" it. — Relativist

Duh! That's what I repeated claimed. I'm glad you finally learned how to read. Who claimed to be trying to prove God's existence?

You are out of touch. I suggest you watch this video, starting at 15:00. Theoretical physicist Sean Carroll gives a brief overview of Quantum Field Theory. You will hear him say "Particles are not what nature is made of...what nature is made of is fields". "Quantum Field theory is the best idea we have about understanding the world at a fundamental level." — Relativist

So what? He's a mathematical Platonist who believes that mathematical objects are real, and nature is made of these. There is no question that fields are mathematical, that is obvious. But there are many physicists who take this position of Platonic realism. Just because a physicists holds different metaphysical principles from I, a metaphysician, doesn't mean that I'm out of touch. Since I'm a metaphysician, and he's a physicist, and we're talking metaphysical principles, it's seems more likely that he's the one who is out of touch. Wouldn't you agree?

That flies in the face of quantum field theory (QFT). Under QFT, fields (waves) are fundamental, and every point in a field is constantly fluctuating (and thus changing); that's why there is energy in "empty" space. Belouie's assumption entails a premise that is false, or at least unjustified. — Relativist

Such fields are mathematical though, and are not representative of any real physical existence because they represent probabilities, possibilities for physical existence. The fundamental particle is the foundation for physical existence, and the field mathematics can be used to represent the possibility for particles, not the real existence of particles.

It's just like mapping space with coordinates, the coordinate points do not represent any real physical existence, nor do the points in the field. The real physical existence, of what's there are the particles(or whatever a particle really is), but the "fluctuating" is just mathematics, because the wave function does not represent real waves.

Setting aside the above objections, this imp!ies an infinite past. Why did God wait an infinite period of time before creating the universe? How did he traverse infinite time to reach the time of creation? — Relativist

No, there is no infinite past implied, whether or not time has a beginning is not mentioned, nor implied. Actually, if you reread the post, I went on further to suggest that God might have created time, and this would imply that time is not infinite. It all relates to how one defines "time".

One sees proofs that time cannot be infinite and proofs that it cannot have a beginning on a regular basis, because both are inconceivable; yet one or the other must be true. Language is inadequate to the world we live in, never mind what is beyond. — unenlightened

Yes, the conclusions are all relative to how words like "time" are defined. So one proof would demonstrate time as necessarily infinite, another demonstrate time as necessarily having a beginning, but all this is, is two different descriptions of what time is. Now I wouldn't say "both are inconceivable" thought, because really such proofs demonstrate that both are conceivable. The question then, is what is the real nature of time, the real description.

This confirms the circularity I identified. You're choosing a conception of time that is consistent with God creating, and then claiming to prove God. — Relativist

Your claim of circularity is irrelevant. I didn't claim to prove God. I was just explaining how we could conceive of God as being outside of time. This allows for the possibility of God, as something outside of time, but there is no claim here for the necessity of God, therefore no proof of God. The necessity for God may be presented as the cosmological argument, which is related to what I said, but not what I produced, as I had no intent to prove the existence of God, only to explain how it is possible to conceive of God as outside of time.

So of course, I chose a conception of time which is consistent with God creating, to demonstrate that it is possible to conceive of God as being outside of time. To conceive of God is not impossible, it doesn't involve contradictions, etc., it only requires a particular conception of time. But this was in no way meant to prove the existence of God, which would require, as a starting point, to prove that this conception of time is the correct conception of time. If one is open to this type of understanding of time, accepting it as the real description of time, then that person might be moved by the demonstration which is the cosmological argument.

But you have to assume that something can actually exist atemporally and somehow perform an action, despite the fact that actions entail time. i.e. you have to assume there is a God. — Relativist

The key here is in understanding the relationship between material existence, and time. We need to separate the two, such that the activity of physical, or material, existence, and time, are not conceived of as the same thing. This is what Belouie suggests:

While time and change have become almost interchangeable in this context, I think it's important to differentiate the two. — Belouie

Logically, if physical change is occurring, then time is passing, but the inverse is not necessary. It is not necessary that physical change is occurring for time to be passing. So time may pass without physical change, but change cannot happen without time passing.

When we understand "time" in this way, as not necessarily tied to physical existence, then we can understand a time prior to physical existence, and therefore a time when physical existence starts, or comes into being. So in the context of Relativist's objection above, we now have the principles whereby God, being non-physical, i.e. immaterial, has time to "act".

This would put God outside of "time" and therefore eternal, if time is understood as necessarily tied to physical change. But since we need to alter this concept of "time" to allow for the actions of God, God is no longer understood as completely outside of time, with this refined concept of "time". But if we move further, and bind time to God, but not vise versa, then we can allow that God is actually responsible for starting time. This would put God outside of time, but the "act" of God which starts time, would have to be understood in another temporal frame work. So this act could likely be understood as something like a change in the way that time passes. The way that time passes now, and what we know as time, came into existence from God's act, which occurred in a different temporal framework.

I'm defining time according to Merriam-Webster: "the measured or measurable period during which an action, process, or condition exists or continues." To put it more simply, time is the measurement of change. — adhomienem

You have defined time as "the measured or measurable". But then you go on to say that time is "the measurement...". Do you not recognize the difference between "the measured" and "the measurement"?

OK. But I am talking physicalism. There is no room for a Platonic world where forms exist as universals. Universality would be what emerges from the inevitability of certain overarching structures ... the structures that can bring stable formal constraint to material uncertainty, per the OP. — apokrisis

Clearly you are the one making unnecessary assumptions. In ontology we must start with an open mind about existence. You accused me of starting from the assumption that the thing identified is a particular. When I said not necessarily, you claim we must start from a pnysicalist assumption. and not allow the existence of Platonic universals.

You have a glaring problem. You will not start from the assumption that the thing identified is a particular. And your physicalist bias prevents you from allowing universals to be real, and identifiable. This leaves you nothing to identify, so you cannot even begin to apply the law of identity. Without the capacity to identify anything, you have no basis for applying any logic.

No. It just says spacetime ain't absolute. And we already know that. The container is shaped by its contents. So the next step for physical theory has to be one that includes energy and gravity into the fundamental level description. — apokrisis

Where do you derive principles like contents and containers? And there is no necessity that a container be shaped by its contents. That's illogical, as the container shapes the contents and reciprocation is not necessary.

Structural realism says that the absoluteness, the unity, is to be found in that relation, somehow.
Spacetime doesn't have some inherent fixed order. That organisation emerges in reciprocal fashion from a relation that exists between energy density and spacetime curvature. So it is about the absoluteness of the three fundamental Planck constants, and the essentially dimensionless web of relations they then weave. — apokrisis

Perhaps the unity is to be found in the relation, but you cannot proceed with unnecessary assumptions that it is so necessarily. There is no logic to the claim that the container is shaped by the contents. We have many examples in our lives where the container contains rigidly, without being shaped by the contents. Reciprocation is completely uncalled for at this point, and should not be introduced until a proper separation through a thorough analysis is established.

The principles of physics do not suffice for an ontological analysis. You already employ a synthesis of space and time in "spacetime", and this concept must be deconstructed to determine whether it is ontologically acceptable.

Even if this were the case, the issue would be how do you produce that identity - the particularity that is what it is to be individuated in a physicalist realm of spacetime and energy? If you are concerned with ontology, you can't simply just claim identity as a brute fact of existence. And so OSR - piggybacking on condensed matter physics - can offer a theory of how identity can arise as localised acts of individuation. — apokrisis

See, you are insisting on a "physicalist realm" as your starting point. But this is cannot be produced as a starting point, because we are starting as human beings, attempting to understand. We cannot get ourselves out of that perspective, being a human being, therefore we must start with that assumption, what is true, and undeniable, that we have a specific perspective which is within a human body and is conditioned by the constitution of that human body. From this perspective, we attempt to identify things because this helps us to understand them and communicate about them, which helps us to obtain different perspectives and understand even better.

Without identity we have no hope of understanding anything. So it's not the case that identity is a "brute fact of existence", it's a brute fact of understanding. If you posit a realm where there is no identity, and claim that OSR's intent is to take us into this realm, then OSR is just giving us meaningless nonsense, where there is no understanding and no possibility of understanding.

It might be a problem for predicate logic. But that already presumes the existence of definite particulars as part of its axiomatisation. That is what the principle of identity is about. Starting off with that as the assumption already granted. — apokrisis

That's not quite true. The law of identity does not assume the existence of particulars, the existence of particulars follows from the application of the law of identity to the sense world. The thing identified by the law of identity is not necessarily particular, but when we apply that law to the sense world, we can identify things which are separate and distinct from each other, individuals, which move in different directions, etc.. So we conclude that there are particulars, and proceed to identify these particulars. It may be the case that all things are somehow really united as one, "the universe", and our senses are unreliable in showing us particulars.

But if it were the case that all things were united as one, "the universe" this would falsify relativity theories because it would mean that there is an absolute frame of reference. So the ontology you argue is faulty no matter how reality turns out to be. If relativity theories are ontologically true, then there is necessarily particulars, individual things which are related in relativity theories. Therefore we need to apply the law of identity and identify these particular things. And if we fail in our capacity to identify the particulars, and proceed toward the conclusion that there really are no particulars, then we must dismiss relativity theories which theorize about the relations of individuals, as necessarily false, and proceed to apply the law of identity toward the one whole "the universe" such that we can derive the absolute frame of reference..

Should ontology limit itself to that kind of atomistic or nominalistic reasoning? Why would you think so? — apokrisis

I agree that we should not limit ourselves to any unnecessary assumptions. But identity is necessary for any logic to proceed, and logic is necessary for understanding. If our believed premises force us to conclude that there are no real particulars, then we are forced to identify the entire universe as one whole. When this is the case, we can no longer support relativity theories as ontological principles.

So you want to wind physics all the way back to absolute Newtonian reference frames? Sounds legit. — apokrisis

If the identity of an object is lost, through the use of relative reference frames, then this is illogical and unacceptable as an ontological principle. So it is not a matter of winding back physics, relative reference frames might be very useful in physics. But for those (OSRists) who want to impose onto ontology what works for physics, even though it produces an illogical ontology, I would say that this is a mistake. Don't you agree? Ontology is not physics, and a principle which is accepted in the practise of physics may be unacceptable in ontology.

I'd modify "religion is the discipline" to religion is a discipline. And concede that in western culture, it's the main and often only choice. Apparently the ancient world was much concerned with which beliefs should be learned, and how, and wrote and studied much (much more than I was ever aware of) on the topic. — tim wood

I don't think It's a matter of which beliefs ought to be learned, but a matter of learning to have faith. That's what religion teaches us, to have faith. Notice how the Bible for example is not really involved in teaching you specific beliefs, it tells stories with morals, and describes how good wins out over evil. so we learn to have faith in good.

Now I think you and I agree that faith is an attitude towards action. But I think that it is fundamentally indifferent towards good or bad actions. That is to say that faith drives ambition, but ambition may be directed equally toward bad or good. So despite the fact that faith is a virtue, it is like many other virtues, like courage, which are means rather than ends themselves. And if a person with a character of many virtues is directed toward the wrong ends, those virtues become useful for carrying out bad acts. Therefore if faith is cultured, it must be cultured under the right conditions, or it could turn out to be bad instead of good. For example, when we have faith in beliefs which turn out to be wrong, the faith could have been a hindrance to us making proper actions.

I don't believe I being informed by fact, rather, I believe I'm being informed by beliefs and opinions. I take it all all so called'knowledge' with a pinch of salt. — TWI

Right, I am sympathetic to that position. But this is where faith is essential and necessary, without it we could not proceed with even the most simple activities, being too unsure and insecure.

Yet clearly we are not in fact always informed by fact. On this we agree, yes? And I suspect there are some - perhaps many - who do not believe we are always informed by fact. "Always" my word; I believe you implied it, I merely wished to make it explicit. — tim wood

Yes we agree here. And, because we recognize that we are not always informed by fact, though we hope we are, faith is of the utmost importance. Otherwise, we would not be able to proceed in our daily activities, out of fear that we are not being informed by fact, and our decisions and actions are mistaken. Hence the importance of faith.

So, let me return to your paragraph which I quoted.

To be brief, faith (itself) tells us nothing. Faith comes from within us. Therefore anything attributed to faith has its origins in us. At the same time not in fact - or we would be being informed by fact. Nor in reason, for reason would be informing us, and reason speaks of facts. To denominate any as "true" requires a definition of true. Except that one definition won't fit. Each will require its own truth. — tim wood

Faith does come from within, but contrary to your claim, it does tell us something. It tells us when to act. And since the act of decision making is itself an act, faith is far more important than any facts which might come to us from some external source, because we can never know with certainty whether what is coming from the external source is fact or not. Whatever comes to us from external sources, fact or not fact, must be judged, and since we can never be absolutely certain of our judgement, no judgement is possible without faith.

Do you not agree that faith ought to be cultured and propagated as a virtue similar to courage? And, that religion is the discipline which does this?

Yeah. So particles and spacetime points would be objects in a minimal sense. That minimal sense would include a "violation" of the law of identity - in the sense that the principle of non-contradiction would fail to apply. It would not be the case that x is x', but nor would it be the case that x isn't x'. Thus what is being asserted is that the identity of x is fundamentally vague - under the Peircean view that vagueness is defined by the failure of the PNC to apply. — apokrisis

Fundamental to an object's identity is it's spatial temporal location, that's what provides its uniqueness, its particularity, its individuality. Without this form of identity, we would just have a modified ancient Greek atomism, in which the world is made up of fundamental particles, each one exactly the same, and indistinguishable from each other, therefore each one having no particular identity. It is the object's spatial temporal location which gives it its individuality, and we, in identifying the continuity of that spatial temporal location are able to give it an identity.

OSRists, following the accepted principles of modern physics (principally relativity) apprehend this identity as relations which are external, extrinsic to the object itself. Therefore they claim that spatial temporal location is not intrinsic to, essential to, or necessary for the identity of the particle. So they deny the very thing which provides the identity of an object, its spatial temporal location, as not necessary to its identity. They are left with numerous particles which have the very same identity, because there is no way to differentiate between them, just like Greek atomism. Identity is minimized.

The glaring problem is that the theories of modern physics, are woefully inadequate, deficient in their capacity to provide the physicist with the means to determine the spatial temporal locations of fundamental particles. Therefore, the principles used in physics do not provide the means for identifying fundamental particles, because identity is based in spatial temporal location. The OSRist, in turn, trying to justify the deficiencies of physics, claims that spatial temporal location is not essential to identity. They're left with a "minimal" form of identity, in which many particles are the same, loosing the uniqueness, particularity, individuality, which a distinct spatial temporal location gives to an object.

You, apokrisis, will claim that this is all part of the vagueness of reality, reality is inherently vague. But this is wrong, the appearance of vagueness is caused by nothing other than deficient theories. The inability to determine the spatial temporal location of a particle, and therefore identify that particle, is a direct result of the mindset of modern physicists which makes spatial temporal location relative rather than absolute. .

In OSR, objects are the individuated. So they are the result of a multiplicity of possibilities being limited. — apokrisis

Do you not read your own quotes? This is from your passage above, from SEP:

French and Krause (2006) argue that quantum particles and spacetime points are not individuals but that they are objects in a minimal sense, and they develop a non-classical logic according to which such non-individual objects can be the values of first-order variables, but ones for which the law of identity, ‘for all x, x is identical to x’, does not hold (but neither does ‘x is not identical to x’).

This directly opposes what you stated above "In OSR, objects are the individuated."

Why do you find metaphysics such a struggle? — apokrisis

Faith comes from within us. Therefore anything attributed to faith has its origins in us. At the same time not in fact - or we would be being informed by fact. — tim wood

Clearly, we all believe that we are being informed by fact, otherwise we'd each have to be skeptical of all of our knowledge. But we aren't such radical skeptics, because we have faith that we are informed by fact. Without that faith we'd have radical skepticism because there is no way to know with absolute certainty that we are being informed by fact.

And as SEP says, that is how some in OSR see it too:



In any case, eliminativism does not require that there be relations without relata, just that the relata not be individuals. French and Krause (2006) argue that quantum particles and spacetime points are not individuals but that they are objects in a minimal sense, and they develop a non-classical logic according to which such non-individual objects can be the values of first-order variables, but ones for which the law of identity, ‘for all x, x is identical to x’, does not hold (but neither does ‘x is not identical to x’).

So you don't require the brute existence of primitive individuals to stand as the relata. All you require is some principle of individuation - a constraint on random accidents or chaotic variety such as for there to be something "there" to get the game of stable existence going. — apokrisis

Off you go, deeper into contradiction. Instead of realizing that the direction you take is wrong, because it's steeped in contradiction, and turning around to get out of this ontological quicksand, you sink yourself in deeper. Now you have objects which are not individuals. This object which is not an individual, what is it, a multitude of objects? Oh right, you don't respect the law of identity, so you allow that a multitude of objects have the same identity, and are therefore, one and the same object. An object is not an individual, it is a multitude.

Why would you say "all you require is some principle of individuation"? If you are denying the existence of individuals, then a principle of individuation provides you with nothing but a fiction. What good is such a principle, other than to create a fictitious individual? And a fictitious individual cannot be the placeholder for an actual individual in any true ontolology.

Yes. As I say, a monistic approach based on relations is no better than a monistic approach based on relata. When faced with a chicken and egg dichotomy like this, the proper resolution is not to try to win by eliminating one or other half of the dyad but instead, accept that the bigger story is the one of a triadic relation. Each half of the equation becomes now the other's cause. — apokrisis

Again, this is fundamentally illogical, to say that two things cause each other. It is nothing more than an infinite regress of coexistence. When all monist approaches prove faulty, the appropriate solution is to move on to dualism (as the ancient Greeks demonstrated), not to produce another faulty monism by claiming the two parts of dualism are united as one, in a triadic system.

Ontic structural realism is a philosophy which I am prepared to argue against. So it appears more likely that I'm not the participant for you, than that this is not the discussion for me. As usual, you demonstrate a keen disposition for inverting reality.

If you bothered to read with care, you would see the claim is that some changes make a difference and others don't. — apokrisis

And, the change which does not make a difference "is not really any kind of change".

And if you understood physics, you would know that Newtonian mechanics was founded on the fact. — apokrisis

Well, I do philosophy, not physics. As an epistemological principle it makes sense to say that some changes are relevant to the subject at hand, and others are not, therefore some changes do not make a difference to us in relation to this subject. But as an ontological principle, it is contradictory to say that if a change doesn't appear to make a difference to us, it is therefore not really any kind of change at all. The fact that you have called it "a change" indicates that it has made a difference to you.

Inertial freedoms exist because nature believes in the symmetries of translation and rotation. — apokrisis

What do you mean by "nature believes in..."? Do you consider nature to be a thinking, reasoning, "believing" being?

By the way, it was demonstrated by Aristotle that the relations necessarily precede the relata (relata being "things"). You would see this clearly if you would give up on the idea that there are differences which do not make a difference. That idea obscures the law of identity, clouding your ability to see things clearly. Any "thing" when it comes into being must necessarily be the thing which it is, or else it would be something other than itself. It is impossible that a thing could be something other than itself, by way of the law of identity. Therefore, any thing when it comes into existence must necessarily come into existence as the thing which it is. So, every thing, when it comes into existence, must be preceded by its formula (relations) which determine what it will be, or else it would come into existence as any chance, or random thing. We observe that things do not exist as chance or random objects. Therefore a thing's formula (relations) must be precede the thing's material existence.

If a change - swapping elements about - doesn't make a difference, then it is not really any kind of change. — apokrisis

I probably don't need to remind you apokrisis, as I've brought this to your attention numerous times already, but it's blatantly contradictory to say that there is a change which isn't a change. I don't see the point to basing an ontology in a contradiction.

I tried to do that by describing Armstrong's framework, and you simply rejected it based on your own ontological commitments. — Relativist

Don't you remember? I rejected Armstrong's framework because it is contradictory. It allows that a single thing is also a plurality of things. That's contradictory, a thing is one and many at the same time. You may refer to this as an "ontological commitment" if you like, but don't you think that philosophers in general ought to adhere to the law of non-contradiction as an ontological commitment, if adhering to the law of non-contradiction is actually an ontological commitment? In any case, are suggesting that we ought to let the law of non-contradiction be violated?

Here's the quote again:

A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing... — Relativist

It is impossible that, a single thing, an entity, can be a multiplicity of things, or entities, by reason of contradiction. If we allow that the identified thing is a multiplicity of things, then the law of identity becomes useless and logic is futile. Therefore, as an ontological principle, we need to allow for an existential difference between a whole and its parts, to avoid this contradiction.

Does this not sound like relativism to you? You have tied truth to a person's experiences. — khaled

No, I haven't tied truth to a person's experience, I've tied a person belief that something is true to one's experience. I think there may be a difference between taking something to be true, and it actually being true.

Now instead of having irreconcilable pivots, you have irreconcilable experiences. — khaled

And, I do not believe that these differences are irreconcilable. We have agreements, conventions, norms, these things are evidence that there is real reconciliation. The fact that we haven't yet reached reconciliation on all matters does not indicate that these matters are irreconcilable. I don't know how anyone could ever prove that an issue is irreconcilable.

You're still using consensus as a basis for claiming that humans get closer to objective reality when that is not at all the case. — khaled

You're wrong here. I am not claiming that humans are getting closer to objective reality. We've already agreed that it is impossible for human thought to reach objective reality, by that definition. So why should we even try to reach it? What I am claiming is that there is another form of "objective", which is actually reached through consensus. I also said that it is necessary to assume that there is such a thing as the absolute truth, because the converse assumption creates contradiction. The physical constitution of the human being makes it impossible for us to obtain the absolute truth, so we ought to settle on consensus. Agreement is good, for human beings, don't you think? Why should we ask for more than this?

That's not what relativism claims. It claims that the truth is unrealizable — khaled

I think you ought to read up a little more on relativism before making claims like this. Relativism claims that truth is relative. Therefore truth is actually obtainable, but there is no absolute truth, truth is relative. What is true for you might be different from what is true for me. So it defines "truth" in a way such that it is not absolute, it is realizable, but this is a different definition from those who hold that there is an absolute truth. It doesn't say that the absolute truth is unrealizable, it says there is no such thing.

I don't think we think relativism means the same thing. I define it as: an objective truth is unachievable and you define it as: an objective truth does not exist. See I'm reading everything you're saying and I'm like "yeah, exactly". There is no reason to assume consensus brings us any closer to this objective reality. It only brings us closer to reconciling the biggest set of experiences under one explanation. There is no reason to assume that gets us any closer to objective reality at all — khaled

We seem to agree on everything except what relativism is. We both think that there is an absolute truth which is unobtainable by human beings. You think that this is relativism, I think that relativism denies that there is an absolute truth.

Incoherent. Existence isn't "given". — Relativist

"Esixtence" is a word. It is assigned to things, we say that they exist. Therefore existence is given. Whenever we say that this or that exists, we give existence to that thing. My whole argument has been concerning the way we apprehend things. To say that existence is not given is what is incoherent.

We apprehend "2" as signifying one object, the number two, or we apprehend it as signifying two objects, but both at the same time is contradictory. We apprehend one family of swans as an object, or we apprehend seven individual swans as objects, but both at the same time is contradictory. To say that both, the one unity, and the multitude of individual parts, "exists" at the same time would require different definitions of "exists". Therefore the contradiction can only be avoided through equivocation.

Consideration of parts doesn't entail dividing it. — Relativist

Right, now you're starting to catch on. To consider a part as a part is to recognize the necessity of the whole. To consider the part as an independently existing object is to deny the whole of which the part is a part of, such that the part is not actually a part in this consideration. To call it a "part" is contradictory.
Therefore a part cannot be considered to be an independently existing object, It is dependent on the whole for its existence. It is given existence from the whole.

You seem to be reading meaning into the word "object" that I didn't intend. I was just referring to existents - anything that can be said to exist. An oxygen atom can be said to exist. An oxygen molecule (consisting of two bound oxygen atoms) can be said to exist. This does not entail "dual existence." It is mereological. — Relativist

My argument is that Armstrong's, as described by you, is an incoherent form of mereology. Instead of producing an acceptable explanation of the relations between part and whole, it provides a description which does nothing to resolve the contradiction involved with saying that a whole exists and its parts exist, simultaneously. To give existence to the individual parts requires dividing the whole, and this annihilates the unity which makes it a whole.

An oxygen molecule does not consist of two distinct oxygen atoms, because of the way that the atoms are bonded with electron sharing. The atoms within a molecule are not distinct, that's what a molecule is. So either there is two separate oxygen atoms, or there is an oxygen molecule, but there is not both at the same time. The description of an oxygen molecule is not the same as the description of two independent oxygen atoms, so the existence of an oxygen molecule is not the same as the existence of two oxygen atoms.

Then you are aren't understanding, because it does not entail this at all. Oxygen molecules exist, and so do each of the oxygen atoms that comprise the molecule. This is not "dual existence" - it is simply a consistent mereological account. — Relativist

This is inconsistent with the account you gave. According to that account, what exists, as "objects" are states of affairs. And accordingly, if the same oxygen atom is involved in an atomic state of affairs, and also a molecular state of affairs at the same time, it has a dual existence, existing in two distinct objects at the same time. Therefore an oxygen atom has multiple existences, existing in many states of affairs (objects) at the same time.

Once you understand it, you could perhaps try to find something incoherent - but you'll never understand it if you just dismiss the basics because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of reality. — Relativist

As I said, I dismiss it because it's quite clearly contradictory, just like saying that "2" refers to two distinct objects, and one object (the number 2) at the same time.

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...). — Relativist

This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence. And if we go to larger states of affairs and smaller states of affairs, we could get triple, quadruple, and so on existences. How could a simple thing, a fundamental particle have numerous existences at the same time, being involved in numerous SOAs? Do you see what I mean? If an SOA is an object, then a fundamental SOA exists as such, and also exists as an atomic SOA, and as a molecular SOA, and so on all at the same time. Therefore a single object has numerous existences all at the same time. Isn't that contradiction, to say that a single object has multiple existences at the same time?

A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist. — Relativist

See where the contradiction lies? You say "a state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing". The problem is that logically,a thing is necessarily one thing. If it is more than one thing, then it is "things" plural. But you are claiming that a thing is more than one thing. And this of course, is contradictory.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist. — Relativist

The point I was making is that if you describe a specific swan as a member of, or part of a group, then the object here is the group, and the individual swan is attributed to that group, as a property of that group. Therefore the individual swan is not an object in this description, it is a property of an object. If you make the swan the object, and try to claim that being a member of this group is a property of that swan, you lose the necessity required to make that swan part of the group. Any property that the swan has will not necessitate it being the part of a group until you allow that the group itself is an object. Then, and only then, can the individual swan be part of this group. But it is so by being a property of this group, not vise versa.

You can say "simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist", as you do, just like you can say that simultaneously the sky exists and the blue of the sky exists, one is the object and the other the property. But you cannot say that they both exist simultaneously as objects. Either the single swan is your object, or the group of swans is the object and the single is a member (property) of this object. Likewise, either we are concerned with "2" as an object, or we are concerned with the meaning of "2". If the meaning of "2" is our concern, then we are necessarily talking about two distinct objects. But if "2" as an object is our concern, then we are talking about one object. We cannot claim both as this is contradictory, to say that one object is two objects. This is the nature of unity, it necessarily negates the identity of the parts as individual objects, giving them a completely different identity, as a part rather than as a whole. An object is a whole.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion. — Relativist

It is not coherent, because it does not get beyond the problem of contradiction which I referred to, because it is inferred that one object is simultaneously a multitude of objects..