If you really think that you've observed matter before, tell me what does matter look, sound, taste, smell, or feel like?

Planck Length, Planck Scale, speed of light (which is basically a scale constant) are not in any sense arbitrary. Unless Im mistaken, the SI system is based on non-arbitrary physical constants not this nonsensical notion of "qualities" or whatever. And even if it isn't, such a thing is possible but the gain is little for all the work required. See Natural units. — MindForged

As I said, and provided examples for, some divisions of degree are arbitrary, I didn't say that all are arbitrary. But the fact that some are, is all that's required to disprove Ikolos' claim that quantity is what is measured. Actually, quantity is the measurement.

That something could be done a different way does not make something arbitrary. There are perfectly sensible reasons to put the number of degrees at 360. It's a highly composite number allowing us to avoid fractions (which are hard for humans to do, hence the preference for decimal expressions), it's not a large whole number so it's fairly easy to do basic math with (particularly division), etc. I'm thinking you're using a weird definition of "arbitrary" or not explaining why it is (supposedly) so. — MindForged

That's not even an argument, the number of degrees in a circle is not arbitrary, it was chosen because it's "easy to do basic math with". The principle divisions of the circle are the four right angles. So the number of degrees in a circle need only be divisible by 4 in order that "it's fairly easy to do basic math with". That the circle consists of 360 degrees, and not 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 400, 800, or any other number of degrees divisible by 4 is arbitrary. That the number of degrees in the right angle is 90, and not 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 100, 200, or any other number, is completely arbitrary.

Not a substratum. Material is all there is--well, material, relations of material and motion of material. We're not positing things we don't observe. — Terrapin Station

No one has ever sensed matter. We do not observe matter. The things we observe are objects like the chair, the table, and the various other objects we encounter. To say that these things are somehow composed of matter is to posit something we do not observe, matter, as a material substratum.

There is no textual evidence to support arbitrarily cleaving the phrase in two. Speaking of 'stretchs of creative interpretation'. Nothing in the rest of the post refers to the PI either, so is entirely neglectable. — StreetlightX

Games are going to keep on cropping up here, so I think it's worth mentioning some games without rules: sandcastles, cowboys and indians, trains, bricks, dollies, ... not that we cannot make some rules for any of them if we want to play making rules, indeed making the rules is often a large part of playing dollies, but there is no essential need, such that if it is not rule bound it is not a game. — unenlightened

OK, I just thought I'd get some clarification on this matter, seeing as we're supposed to be reading this text together, it's good to have agreement on interpretation. To me, the common use of "game" is to play according to rules. That's my natural interpretation of "game". But if rules are not implied when Wittgenstein makes an analogy between games and language use, referring to "language-games", he uses "game" in a sense which neither implies that the game player is following rules, nor does it imply that the game player is not following rules. One "language-game" might be played according to rules, but another might not be played according to rules.

7. In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the
words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the
following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is,
he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there
will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the
teacher——both of these being processes resembling language.
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as
one of those games by means of which children learn their native
language. I will call these games "language-games" and will sometimes
speak of a primitive language as a language-game.
And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after
someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the
use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into
which it is woven, the "language-game".

So in the above example when the learner is learning how to name objects, and this is referred to as "language-games", we ought not interpret this as the learner learning rules. The learner might be playing a language-game which does involve rules.

Come on, now. You can't be so unintelligent that you believe that not agreeing with something amounts to not understanding it, can you? — Terrapin Station

When it's a sound argument, and one disagrees, it is obviously a matter of misunderstanding. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to recognize that.

However, one thing that might be missed - because people have been anticipating alot - is that §31 is actually the first time in the PI that Wittgenstein actually begins to discuss 'rules' explicitly at all. So far, rules were mentioned only back in §3, where, interestingly, Witty actually objects to characterizing games in terms of rules, and says that such a characterization is a 'restricted' one that doesn't capture the generality of games. To recall:

§3: "It is as if someone were to say, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .” - and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but they are not all the games there are. You can rectify your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games." — StreetlightX

At the outset of the book, I would strongly object to this interpretation of #3. At that point there is no reason to interpret that Wittgenstein implies games could be played without rules. In this phrase, “Playing a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules . . .”, the reference to board games is "on a surface", not "according to certain rules". So it's a real stretch of creative interpretation to claim that Wittgenstein might be implying here that a game could be played without rules. In common usage, "game" implies "play according to rules", and what is implied by W's phrase is that a game could be played in ways other than "on a surface". Your interpretation would appear as completely unwarranted..

However, as I stated earlier, there is a sense of "playing games", like "she is playing games with us", in which one plays without rules. But these are private, unconventional games, and the phrase carries with it a connotation of trickery, foolery, or even deception. If we take away the necessity of rules from game play we no longer have a "game" in the common sense of the word, we have a "game" in this other sense.

That ought to put us on alert to the fact that rules are not - so far at least - crucial elements in Wittgenstein's conception of games, and hence, language. This is something that will be developed here in §31 even more. §31 beings by characterizing a situation in which in order to understand a specific ostensive act ("This is the king”), one must know the rules before hand. What is being illustrated here is again, the need for prior knowledge before ostensive explanation can 'work': — StreetlightX

OK, #3 did not convince me. As I said it's a stretch of creative interpretation to think that Wittgenstein is implying that a game could be played without rules. However, #31 appears to be explicit. So, if Wittgenstein is using "game" in this way, he is using, or conflating, two distinct senses of the word. He is using "game" in the sense of a board game, or the game of chess, in which "play according to rules" is implied, and he is also using "game" in the sense of a private, unconventional game, where there are no rules, but this sense of "game" implies trickery, or deception.

With Wittgenstein it is very important to distinguish which sense is intended by his use of common words. Failure to do this will produce equivocation in one's interpretation. And this qualifies as misunderstanding. So for instance, he might use "game" as "play according to rules" in one paragraph, and in the very next paragraph, use "game" as "play without rules", and if the interpreter fails to recognize that these are two distinct senses of "game", the result is equivocation within the interpretation, misunderstanding. Moreover, we cannot combine these two to make one sense of "game" because "play according to rules" and "play without rules" are logically incompatible.

As with §3, Witty is here circumscribing (limiting) the role or importance of rules as necessary elements in the understanding of ostensive explanations. While acknowledging their necessity in some circumstances, the appeal to rules does not exhaust all of them. The rest of §31, which doesn't discuss rules at all, simply goes over some of the same ground as before: the need to have a certain kind of knowledge before ostensive explanations can work. — StreetlightX

Yes, I very much agree that this is the actual point which Wittgenstein is making. The reference to games is an aside, a diversion or distraction. One might say that he is playing games with us with this distraction, but that in itself is a real living example which serves to prove the point. He's very crafty, isn't he?

We might consider two aspects of game-play according to the two distinct senses of "game". One is the actual play of the game, in which one acts according to the rules. The other is the strategizing which is still part of the play, but there are no rules to it. There is a relationship between the two, such that when we are using language and want to give something a name, a label, there is an aspect of following rules, and an aspect of strategizing. This seems to me, to be the reason for the line "Settle the name yourself".

.

Yes, and what do you measure my friend? Quantity. Hence there is quantity yet, and you measure it. That fact that the methods and units of measurement may be relative(as you correctly say) does not make this less true, i.e. quantity is presupposed REALITER as what is to be measured. — Ikolos

No, this is clearly not the case. The units of measurement, which are counted as a quantity, are very often created by the human mind, for the purpose of measurement, they are artificial. So "quantity", as the thing measured, is not necessarily presupposed. In the cases where we cannot find individual units to count, we simply create them, giving us the capacity to measure without there being any real quantity which is being measured.

We're talking about measuring quality, which is said to differ by degree, and the problem is that the units of degree are often artificial and may be arbitrary. For instance there are degrees of temperature. The thing measured is a difference, the unit of measurement, one degree, is artificial and arbitrary. So the quantity is artificial, and there is no actual quantity which is being measured, the "quantity", as the measurement, is assigned to it, arbitrarily, it is not something within the thing measured.

You can also look at the 360 degrees of a circle in the same way. That number of degrees around a circle is complete arbitrary. The circle could be divided into an infinite number of degrees, and there could be an infinite number of degrees between each of the four right angles, and any other angle around the circle, expressing a continuity around the circle, rather than the discrete units of degree which are commonly used. This is actually expressed with minutes and seconds. There is no real quantity of measurable units which are being measured around the circle.

Independently existing matter, independently from particular modes of perceiving it, and that actually causes any perception to happen. — Ikolos

That's a postulate of physics?

No one divide space by degree man, that is nonsensical. — Ikolos

Have you not heard of a circle?

Rule-following is an activity, and it's one of the activities that takes place in a game. It doesn't necessarily mean that you have learned rules or that rules have been stipulated in some way prior to the learning of the game. The same is true when you teach a child what the word cup means, the child doesn't need to know anything about a rule in order to learn how to use the word. The child observes, and probably already has some background of what it means to associate a word with an object. This is similar to the person in Wittgenstein's example (PI 31), where there is no learning of the rules explicitly or implicitly. Note though that the person has a background with learning other games, and as a result it makes it easier for them to figure out how the game is played. — Sam26

I see how this is true, concerning how a child learns to use words, that the child could learn how to use words, without learning any rules, and even develop a sufficient vocabulary this way. But I don't see how this could be the case for learning any sort of game. Anyone trying to play a game, having learned in this way, would inevitable stray out of bounds of the rules, and would have to be told the rules, and told to stay within the boundaries of the rules. So it would be impossible for a person to learn to play a game without learning the rules, because any practise would involve straying beyond the bounds of the rules, and therefore being taught the rules. In other words, the others engaged in the play of the game would not allow the person the necessary practise to learn a game, without teaching that person the rules.

Perhaps if Wittgenstein took the more general activity "play", and said that a person could learn to play without learning rules, this would be more acceptable, because "knowing how to play" doesn't imply knowing rules, like "knowing how to play a game" implies knowing the rules. However, since we see that one can learn to use words without learning rules, wouldn't it be a more appropriate analogy to say that learning a language is like learning how to play, and learning the more complex parts of language, like the various logical systems etc., in which rules are involved, is like learning how to play different games?

Suppose now, that the person in this scenario, of whom Wittgenstein says "in another sense he is already master of a game", is not really master of a game at all, because he knows no rules. All he is master of is play; he knows very well how to play. Someone says to him, "this is the king", in order to bring a rule into his play, teach him an actual game. The "place" which is "already prepared", as Wittgenstein says, is the person himself, already knowing how to play, and now ready to commit to some rules. That is the place which has been prepared for the rule, by the practice of play.

Did you read Berkeley's "Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonus"? If so, it appears like you didn't understand it. He clearly demonstrates that there is no reason to believe that there is anything called "matter" in the world that we sense. The notion that there is matter out there being sensed, is just an idea created by the mind.

Since you're lurking around this thread Sam26, maybe you could give me your opinion on #31 of PI. It appears like Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is a way that one can learn how to play a particular game, or even a multitude of games, without learning rules. What do you think about this?

One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.

Berkeley's idealism is actually very informative. He demonstrates that "matter" refers to nothing other than an idea; it doesn't refer to anything which we can sense. At his time, it seemed like a radical idea, but it's commonly accepted today. .

Frankly, a definition so senseless as all the medieval definitions were. You are deeply confused. — Ikolos

It's the #1 definition in my OED under "quality". I really think that it's you who is confused. would you prefer:"a distinctive attribute or faculty: a characteristic trait"?

Now, if something is to be selected as a discrete unity, as you say, it presupposes a quantity on which this selection is operated. Or do you think we actually create quantity by itself, against the basic postulate of physics? — Ikolos

You clearly have this backward. Unity does not presuppose quantity. Quantity follows from unity, that's how we measure, by units. Quantity requires the individuation of units, therefore it requires unity. Unity does not presuppose quantity. So it s quite clear that we do create quantity, as it is minds that individuate units such that something may be counted. Which basic postulate of physics states otherwise?

Hence as the scale of degrees(quality) relies on a spatial property, than the degrees do rely on that to. — Ikolos

Yes, I agree that "degrees" rely on "quantity". And a difference of quality is measured as a difference of degree, that's the point I made. This is what allows us to measure different qualities. When we notice difference, and we produce "degrees" to measure that difference, we produce the means to quantify that quality. The units of measure, "degrees", by which the qualitative difference is divided, may be a completely arbitrary production of the mind. And, this arbitrary division of the qualitative difference, into fundamental units, "degrees", may give us the capacity to measure the quality.

But neither Space nor matter presupposes any detectable quality by themselves. Quality, furthermore, presupposes a RELATION between space and something, which renders possible to detect some spatial properties or, as you seem to prefer, to select from that properties units, in respect to which establish a scale of measuring. This something is matter. Matter does not imply quality(degrees) but the distinguishability of degrees implies matter. But matter presupposes space. Then quality presupposes space. Either you identify space with the properties we can distinguish and classify under the kind 'spatial' and name IT quantity, or you do not identify space with those properties and call those properties 'QUANTITY' it is the same for our question: quantity it is presupposed by quality. — Ikolos

You are misrepresenting the difference which exists within the thing, matter, and replacing it with our measurement of that difference, which is with degrees. Degrees of difference are not necessarily distinguishable because "the degree" may be arbitrary. The premise of "the distinguishability of degrees" misleads you. So we commonly divide space by degree with no implication of matter.

It's continuous, as opposed to discrete? "Gunky" seems to imply a mixture of both.

As you can see, we can quantify a quality and this is what provides us with the capacity to measure. But to qualify quantity, and this is what set theory does, is a mistaken procedure because it inhibits our capacity to measure, by imposing qualitative restrictions on quantity.

Quality is the degree of excellence of a thing. This implies a relation, and as I said, relations are inherently qualitative. However, it does not imply a quantity, as quantity requires discrete units, and "degree" may be applied to a continuum. It is only when we refer to individual "degrees" that quantity is implied in such a relation.

This is false. Sets are based on RELATIONS(between something, i.e. a set, and its elements. The empty sets have a relation such that no elements belongs to it). — Ikolos

A relation is a comparison between a quality of one, and a quality of another. Therefore it is inherently qualitative.

Numbers are sets, in the usual axiomatizations, so cardinality very naturally fits our idea of quantity. — SophistiCat

The only problem here is that "sets" are based in qualities, and there is a conceptual difference between quality and quantity. Therefore set theory does not naturally fit our idea of quantity. So set theory provides a set of axioms which modify mathematics in a way so as to be inconsistent with our natural idea of quantity.

I was thinking the very same thing. All the canary does is sing without saying anything; but if something shuts it up, then it's time to take notice. Imagine if they took a parrot into the mine. The parrot would be telling the miners what to do, all day long. Probably the tweet! tweet! of the canary is a little easier to put up with.

You haven't really identified 3 distinct things. You've only identified one thing, the number 3, and the fact that "2+1" is identical to it, or just another way of describing it. — Mentalusion

No, that's the point 2+1 is not identical to 3. Nor is it a different way of describing the same thing. Do you know what equivalent means? It means have the same value. These two things, "2", and "1", together have the same value as this thing "3".

It's similar to Frege's evening star/morning star example, albeit analytical and not empirical in nature. If you don't see how that's an identity statement having learned arithmetic, I'm not sure I can explain it any more clearly. — Mentalusion

No, this case is not analogous, as it is a case of using two different names to refer to the same thing, it is not a case of giving the same value to different things. Do you see the difference?

It's also implicit in logic that there are people around who can think, but no one believes that particular implication has any place in the formulation a formal logical system. — Mentalusion

That's clearly false, because I surely believe it. And, believing that human thought is what formulates formal logical systems, I really can't understand how you could truly believe that human thought doesn't have any place in the formulation of formal logical systems

That all said, there is a paradox here, because when we get to discussion metaphysic, ontology, etc. the assumption I think most people make is that our reasoning should be logical. In that case, whatever we say on a metaphysical level is going to be constrained by what we think logic requires. However, when we work out what logic requires, we do so with a naïve, inexplicit understanding about the nature of time. So there is a circularity which is what you might be worried about, but I guess most people would just say it's not vicious and be content to live with some degree of fundamental paradoxality, especially given the proven practical benefits and results logic produces being just what it is now. — Mentalusion

I think, that the appearance of "a paradox" is just a function of your extremely naïve and unrealistic understanding of what logic is.

This can all be stated even in a world where time is gunky. — Mr Bee

Gunky?

Think we could figure out a way to get that million bucks?

I'm not convinced that's the case. Perhaps some of the issue is that the formalized LNC, -(p & -p), doesn't have anything explicit to say about properties, only propositions, and so is more akin to the math expression. — Mentalusion

Even when the LNC is taken to be about propositions, there is a necessary temporal qualification. Opposing propositions cannot be "at the same time" true. As I said, without that it loses its grounding. This is what allows the relativity of simultaneity to work. Depending on the frame of reference, "X occurred at precisely 10:00" might be true or it might be false because "at the same time" is reference dependent.

In the case of the math expression, "2+1=3", I really don't seen any temporality at all. You could read it the way I was proposing, but I think a more natural reading just sees the expression as an identity that holds absolutely and with regard to temporal sequence. I don't see how a things identity with itself necessarily implicates time. — Mentalusion

I don't see how 2+1=3 is an expression of identity. You have identified three distinct things, "2", "1", and "3". The "+" symbol says that you add the first two things together, "2" and "1". The "=" symbol says that these things added together are by some standard equivalent to the third thing, "3".

If you claim is more of a metaphysical one - that time is inescapably implicit in any claim about anything whatsoever - such that we just can't think anything unless we assume time is present, I guess it's true but probably tautological. It would be like a Kantian category: a condition of thought itself. I wouldn't take that to be a proper subject for propositional logic, though. — Mentalusion

That's right, it is "implicit". But since we're discussing logic, whatever is implied is relevant. So we can't just dismiss the proposition that temporality is implied within logical principles as irrelevant. Even if it is tautological, if it is true, it would be an important ontological principle

So if you don't need a conception of time in order to do the calculations (except, of course, practically speaking in the sense that it takes time to mentally calculate), whether mathematical or logical, why introduce it? — Mentalusion

The answer to this is that time is what grounds the validity logic, making it sound. Sure, you don't need a conception of time to carry out valid logic, but what's the point if your conclusions are not sound? If we do not qualify the LNC with "at the same time" it becomes unsound because it's clearly true that one thing can have a property then not have that property, as time passes. Likewise, "2+1=3" loses its soundness if it is not grounded in something like "if you start with two and add one you get three", that's what makes it true. There is always a temporal connotation in logical principles, and without it logic gets divorced from truth.

We certainly don’t arrive at the term “number” before we have the terms “one,” “two,” “three,” etc.,. — I like sushi

I'll offer an explanation, but just to be clear, this is outside of the reading, it's based in personal opinion. There is a very peculiar relationship between universals and particulars which the human mind develops, that has the mind reciprocating back and forth from one to the other, in order to understand each of them. The understanding of any particular thing progresses by relating it to types, categories, and the understanding of the universals, types, categories, progresses through an understanding of the particulars. In your example here, "number" refers to a universal, a category of things. while "one", "two", "three" refer to particulars.

What I believe Wittgenstein is arguing is that in order to learn how to name a particular, this requires that one already has some understanding of the different types, universals, and the capacity to distinguish types. This is not to say that the person knows how to name types or universals, just to recognize them. So the temporal order of learning which W would be arguing, is that one first learns that there are different types of things, and actually learns how to distinguish different types, as necessary for, and therefore prior to learning how to name particulars. But this does not mean that the person knows how to name types, because this would come after learning how to name particulars.

This analogy might be useful. The conscious part of learning could be like the visible spectrum of wavelength. There is much learning which occurs outside the boundaries of consciousness, just like there is much electro-magnetic activity occurring outside the boundaries of sight.. When the conscious mind looks at "learn" it sees the #1 definition, "gain knowledge of or skill in by study, experience, or being taught", because that is the part it is actively involved in. However, there is a second definition, a broader definition which is simply "acquire or develop a particular ability", and this better captures the entirety of "learn". The conscious mind, in its bias, wants to narrow the definition of "learn", restrict what it means to "learn" in order to exclude that part which is outside of its domain.

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication;
only not everything that we call language is this system. And one
has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an
appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate,
but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of
what you were claiming to describe."
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

Attention to this aspect of the work will clear up alot of what is going on in §31, which MU is struggling with. — StreetlightX

I'd say "struggling with" is an understatement. I cannot find the coherency in the passage, how the different imaginary scenarios are supposed to relate to each other, and where the expression "Settle the name yourself" is drawn from.

I see how he moves in the earlier parts of the book, from describing different ways of using the same word (senses) at the beginning of the book, to the more general different ways of using language, after the reference to Frege at 22. At this point, he establishes that "language" as a type of activity, still consists of a multitude of distinct ways of using words (according to different purposes) Then, he returns to the very specific and very important part of language "naming". For reference, this is how "naming" was described at 15:

It is in this and more or less similar ways that a name means and is
given to a thing.—It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to
ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

So at 29 it appears like it is implied that naming is a matter of placing a word into a role which has been prepared for it within language. Perhaps there is a thing and language provides the means by which a particular word would be required to label that thing. However, we can't lose track of what has just been painstakingly described, that "language" if analogous to "game", actually consists of a multitude of different language-games, different ways of using words. Language is a classification of a type of activity with a whole slew of sub-classifications. So there is a matter of positioning the word within the appropriate language-game. Therefore naming must not be just a simple matter of finding a word's place within "language" as a whole, but the more complex matter of determining the appropriate language-game, and the word's role within that particular game.

Now we get the complex problem of 31. At the beginning of the section, a word is a physical object, analogous to a specific chessman. At the end of the passage, the word appears to be a name. What is not obvious is the transition, how the word becomes a name. There is a number of different scenarios we are asked to imagine. 1. A person who has learnt the rules of chess but has never been shown an actual piece. That person is shown "this is the king". 2. A person who has learnt how to play the game without learning the rules. That person is shown "this is the king", assuming he is unfamiliar with the particular style of piece. 3. Someone is explaining the game, points to the chessman and says "this is the king, it can move like this...". That is my understanding of the scenarios we are asked to imagine, 2 appears to be a bit odd, but in each case I assume that the piece, the chessman being shown as "the king", is analogous to a particular word being shown in ostensive definition.

It is going too fast. Plus a silly tit-for-tat which I wasted time reading didn’t help. — I like sushi

Some of us have more free time than others in the present context, so our paces vary. The tit-for-tat develops in the wait period as a wasting of time. It's a natural manifestation of this type of forum, a social medium which allows the commentator access 24 hours a day, seven days a week. If it stays relatively on topic, it's a harmless digression.

But if you do not read the text thoroughly you'll have difficulty distinguishing the personal opinion of the commentator from the material of the text. This is a very important, and difficult aspect of interpretation, to exclude your personal opinion, box it out of your interpretation, and failure to do this leads to a faulty commentary. This is why secondary sources ought to be approached with caution, and I like your attitude toward such, read them afterwards, after you've developed your own interpretation. At this point one might carefully analyze the places where one's own interpretation varies from the interpretation offered in the secondary source, in an effort to determine why such a variance has occurred.

At the moment comments on 1-30 are welcome ... no doubt people will ignore this and plough ahead with pet theories. Maybe they’ll take the hint? Maybe more than two people will respond? Maybe people have been put off? — I like sushi

I'm a little bit unruly myself, so I'll mention a passage at 31. It's just outside your arbitrary divide of 30, but very relevant to the material of 1-30, which we all seem to have a grasp of by now. So please don't expel me from the group for going out of bounds.

This passage, I find to be very complex and difficult, and my inclination is to read it and skip along without understanding it, as I am inclined to do in many passages from Plato, where too many ideas are intermingled in a small space on the page, transposing to a short time in the mind. This passage seems like it was intended to say something very important about how we learn a word, (though he says "name"), which is not really an ostensive learning, but I can't quite put my finger on what exactly is being said. The key point in the analogy which is hard for me to grasp and apply, is that the chessman corresponds to the physical word. And, the (ostensive) demonstrations referred to are meant to demonstrate the use of the word, as a physical object, analogous to the use of the chessman. But at the end, he explicitly refers to "name" as if the physical word is supposed to be a name. Here's the passage:

31. When one shews someone the king in chess and says: "This is
the king", this does not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already
knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king.
You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever
having been shewn an actual piece. The shape of the chessman corresponds
here to the sound or shape of a word.

One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.

Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I
begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it
can move like this, . . . . and so on."—In this case we shall say: the
words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition
only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is,
if he has already played other games, or has watched other people
playing 'and understood'—and similar things. Further, only under these
conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in the course of learning the
game: "What do you call this?"—that is, this piece in a game.

We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something
with it can significantly ask a name.

And we can imagine the person who is asked replying: "Settle the
name yourself"—and now the one who asked would have to manage
everything for himself.

Is there anyone here who is ready to tackle this passage, and render clear the meaning of the closing statements? I get lost at the second paragraph, the second imaginary scenario. because it seems like the person in the scenario already knows how to use words, yet is also being shown words for the first time. Or is this meant to be like translation, the person is being shown new words which correspond to the ones already known? If so, how could a name be translated?

Far from being useless, I'm advising you and those here about to listen to Sam; certainly he will be a better guide than MU. — Banno

I explicitly stated that I am not going to lead this discussion, so I am not trying to guide anyone. If anyone decides to follow me and ends up screwed in the head in accordance with Sam26's experience, that's not my responsibility.

If you listen to MU you'll all be screwed in the head. — Sam26

We're all fucked in the head. Isn't that what Wittgenstein demonstrates in PI?

Anyway, those are my thoughts for what they're worth. — Sam26

Seeing as you don't seem to have anything useful to add, I'd say your thoughts aren't worth very much. But we're all fucked in the head anyway, so who cares?

But there's something funny in all that, at least to my ear. It almost seems like we need to already know the truth of our premises in order for the logic to be worked out. But if that's the case then how does logic retain its usefulness in the cases where we do not know the truth value of some conclusion? We may have good reason to believe the premises, but couldn't a novel argument actually be a case where we are proving that the form of our argument is, in fact, fallacious because it leads to a false conclusion?

In which case, what is the point of soundness anyways? — Moliere

It's not that the logic cannot be worked out without knowing whether the premises are true. But the conclusion cannot be said to be sound without knowing that the premises are true. This is evident from the fact that the conclusion may be valid but not sound.

If we have good reason to believe that the premises are true, and also that the conclusion is false, then we have good reason to doubt the soundness of the argument. Each aspect, the premises and the logical proceeding, ought to be analyzed for the possibility of mistake.

Looks like Mueller's got a lot of evidence. And now, Manafort's cooperation, even if it wasn't a charade, would be moot.

Again, only in the trollish way that consciousness is "linguistic." — Terrapin Station

You're trying to change the subject again. We were discussing specific mental activities required for ostensive learning, not consciousness in general. Obviously you've reversed who the troll is here, just like you reversed where the stupidity lies by claiming that the one who states the obvious is stupid for stating the obvious, rather than recognizing that the stupidity belongs to the one who claims that what is obviously relevant is actually irrelevant simply because it's relevance is obvious.

Thanks P-c.

No, it's irrelevant to the question of whether you can learn language ostensively that the student is doing non-linguistic things mentally, because "learning language ostensively" doesn't imply that the student is NOT doing non-linguistic things mentally. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense, as a necessary part of language this cannot be said to be "non-linguistic".

We're not saying something so stupid as, say, "One has to be conscious to use language. Therefore consciousness is part of language, and one doesn't learn how to be conscious ostensively. Thus, language can't be learned ostensively," are we? Because as I noted, that would be really, really stupid. — Terrapin Station

Why is that stupid? If one must be conscious to learn language, then consciousness is a necessary part of language. It may be a matter of stating the obvious, but stating the obvious is not being stupid. People sometimes ignore the obvious, or even, for some reason insist that the obvious is irrelevant, perhaps because it is obvious. Therefore it is sometimes necessary to state the obvious, and insist on its relevance by demonstrating this logically.

It is that other type of behaviour, (your type of behaviour), of dismissing the obvious as irrelevant, which may be described as stupidity. If we were discussing what a human being is, and someone said, it's a living being, this is not stating anything stupid. It is stating the obvious. But if you were to insist that being alive is irrelevant to being human, that is really really stupid. So it really looks like you are a splendid display of stupidity. Why don't you shut up and get with the program?

Nothing comes from nothing. "Original" does not mean that it came from nothing, that would be nonsense.

Consider this Devans99. Each sensation is distinct, particular, and unique, due to the changing nature of the world which we sense. Therefore a thought which is derived from a sensation, is necessarily a truly original thought.

So you mean inspired by an earlier thought or sensation?

I was following what you stated:

No, but the question remains 'is it possible to have a truly original thought?'

IE one not inspired by any other earlier thought/observation. — Devans99

It's irrelevant to learning language. — Terrapin Station

As necessary for ostensive definition, it is necessary for learning language. Therefore it is not irrelevant. Likewise, counting to five is necessary for counting to ten, therefore it is not irrelevant to counting to ten.

Re the counting analogy, it's the same as saying that the student can learn to count to ten without already knowing how to count to ten. — Terrapin Station

That's false, counting to five is something other than counting to ten.

If you wanted to ask, "Is it possible to learn how to count to ten without knowing how to count to five first," you'd need to actually ask that. — Terrapin Station

Can you not read? I stated that as a true proposition: "one must first count to five before counting to ten". If you doubt the truth of this proposition, and want to ask if it's possible to learn how to count to ten without first learning how to count to five, and challenge the soundness of my argument, then be my guest. Perhaps you might make a case.

If you want to argue that it's not possible to ostensively learn language, you'd have to say what one can't learn ostensively that is language. — Terrapin Station

This has already been stated, we've been through this countless times. There are specific mental activities which are required to be performed by the student in order that the student may learn by ostensive learning. These cannot be learned by ostension. But they are a part of language, just like counting to five is a part of counting to ten.

No one is claiming "that is language". You clearly misunderstand what Wittgenstein means by "language". It is not a thing you can point to and say "that is language". "Language" is a word which refers to a certain type of human activity, with a multitude of sub-types, just like "game" is such a word.

Your comments in the following section are an incoherent mess, but I'm trying to avoid some other big tangent: — Terrapin Station

Right, you're trying to avoid the point which Wittgenstein is making, so that you may carry on with your nonsensical misunderstanding. Either pay attention to the book, or excuse yourself from the discussion. But to dismiss the theme of the book as a "big tangent" is unacceptable behaviour. If it all appears like an incoherent mess to you, then perhaps you ought to forget about it.

How exactly do our minds differ from computers? — Devans99

Mind is a property of a living being, a computer is an inanimate object

No, but the question remains 'is it possible to have a truly original thought?'

IE one not inspired by any other earlier thought/observation. — Devans99

I answered this already with deductive logic. Let me repeat it clearly:

P1, If all thoughts are inspired by earlier thoughts, then since there are thoughts now, it would be the case that there has always been thoughts.
P2, Thoughts are a property of living beings.
P3, There has not always been living beings.
C1 from P2, P3, There has not always been thoughts.
C2 from P1 and C1, Not all thoughts are inspired by earlier thoughts.

W then goes on to mention something of symbolism and categories (yet I don’t think he explicitly says “categories”?) when talking of colour, shape and number (23 - ref. to language/words as “tools”, 28, 29 to 35 - talk about numbers, colours and shapes). — I like sushi

I don't think he mentions "categories" explicitly, but he is continually referring to types, and kinds of usage, as well as senses. So if we can divide language into different ways of using words, as per #23 quoted earlier, ( https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/230433 ) then an identified way of using words, as an identified activity, is implicitly a category. Consider what is then said at #24:

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view
you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?"

Keep in mind what is implied in the analogy at #2 #3, that a game is a type of activity which consists of sub-classifications, different types of games such as board games, etc.. Language is a type of activity which is sub-classed into activities such as those mentioned at #23. The act of "questioning" therefore is to proceed with a type of activity which is a sub-class of the overall classification of a type of activity called "language". Thus it is a particular type of language-game within the category of "language-game", like a board game is a particular type of game within the category of "game".

I don't agree that having some of "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" is necessary prior to learning language via ostension.

I suppose we could load "what Wittgenstein means by 'language'" in a way that it might matter, although the contortions needed for that might make it so that we might as well say "what Wittgenstein means by 'language being a necessary prerequisite'" in a manner that, if carried through wholesale for everyone, for everything they say, would disable ever taking issue with anyone about anything.

"Oh, well what Charles Manson meant by 'curing society' . . ." and so on. — Terrapin Station

In order to understand what Wittgenstein is presenting, you need to understand how he is using "language". The word "language" for Wittgenstein does not refer to a thing which you can point to and say "that is language". It refers to a type of thing, and that type of thing is an activity, just like a game is an activity. So we cannot divide language into parts as if it is a physical thing, it gets sub-divided into different types, just like one subdivision of "animal" is "mammal", and a subdivision of "mammal" is "human being". These are types. Refer to the analogy at #2 #3. "Board game" refers to a type of game. Describing what a board game consists of does not provide a description of the broader category of "game".

What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there is at least one type of activity, which exists within the broader classification of activities, called "language", that cannot be learned by ostensive definition. He identifies this type of activity as distinguishing types.

The answer is yes, I disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension.

That the student knows or does something that's not itself language, prior to learning language via ostension, is irrelevant to the question. The question isn't whether it's impossible to learn or do any arbitrary thing that one might know/do only via learning language through ostension. — Terrapin Station

This is demonstrably false. Consider this true proposition: "one must first count to five before counting to ten". Now consider that a person learns how to count to ten. Counting to five is "not itself" counting to ten, but it is clearly not irrelevant to counting to ten. Counting to five is "necessary" for counting to ten.

So when you dismiss what is necessary for ostensive learning, as irrelevant to ostensive learning, you are making the same mistake as one who would dismiss counting to five as irrelevant to learning how to count to ten.

I didn't agree that they have to know anything about any language. — Terrapin Station

It's not a matter of knowing anything about any language. That's not what we've been discussing, you're changing the subject. A person can know how to use language without knowing anything about any language.

Teaching/learning refers to the activities of both the teacher and the student. To say that the activities of the student are something additional to learning/being taught is to not undertand the terms teaching/learning. — Terrapin Station

The point is that the activities carried out by the student, which are necessary for the student's ostensive learning, are not learnt through the ostensive learning. Therefore they are "something additional" to what is learnt by the ostensive procedure. If you can't understand this then so be it.

If you want to bring up any commentators, then feel free, as far as I'm concerned. But I am not the leader of this group.