I don't understand what you mean by "void". There is a void when you're unconscious. You only anticipate when you are unconscious? — Harry Hindu

I mean an emptiness within, a hole. Have you never experienced anxiety?

The fact that you can even describe what it is like to anticipate means that your anticipation takes some form. You say that you have anxiety, which is a feeling - a form. Can you ever anticipate something good? What would it feel like to anticipate something good? How would you be able to distinguish between anticipating something bad and something good? — Harry Hindu

Sure, anticipation takes a form, but there are physical forms and non-physical forms, that's where dualism comes into play. A future thing, anticipated, has a form, but it's not a physical form, it's a form in the mind. The problem is that the form of the thing future is incomplete. I do not know exactly how the thing will come to be in the future, there are unknown factors, and the unknowns are the holes, the emptiness which is the root of the anxiety. Sure I anticipate many good things, and that is the root of my anticipation, looking forward to something good, but the good thing is not ensured until it actually happens. There are always imperfections in the plan, the formula, to bring it about, and these are the unknowns, the holes of anxiety. So the formula which is meant to ensure that the good thing actually happens according to plan is imperfect, it has holes, circumstances beyond my control, and this is the root of anxiety.

MU, can you shuffle with just your hands? You would be shuffling your hands, and in that case, would it be your arms doing the shuffling of your hands? Your hands are doing the action to the object. It just so happens that your hands are an object to. Your mind is processing the information. No information - no processing. How would you describe the process of reasoning without reasoning taking some form? How do you know that you are reasoning? — Harry Hindu

I don't see how this is relevant. The mind reasons, what you call "processing". Reasoning is not composed of "the information", as you have suggested, it simply uses information, as a tool. The information is incidental. It is even possible that the mind creates the information through observation, as is the case with AI. So information is not necessary for the existence of a mind, a mind can create its own information to reason with.

Working memory: memory that involves storing, focusing attention on, and manipulating information for a relatively short period of time (such as a few seconds). — Harry Hindu

Past by "a few seconds", is past. As it is clearly the case that things sensed are in the past by the time they are acted on by the mind, even "working memory" is involved with things past. Things sensed are things past.

Ostensive is used in linguistics to denote how the meaning of a word is given to someone else - usually a word that has a more abstract concept, that is a “feature” or “characteristic” of some intimated object (colour, size, quality, or other abstract term like “dozen” or “month”). — I like sushi

Wittgenstein can use words in a peculiar way, as we've now seen with "game". So it is important not to take any such thing for granted, and bring out what he really means by the word. Remember what he said at #3, you can make your description correct by restricting your definition, but then if we ask, whether your description is appropriate, "The answer is: 'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe.'"

I'm trying to diligently compare StreetlightX's interpretation of the text with my own, so here's how I interpret 33 - 36.

At 33 he describes how the distinction between shape, colour, etc., must be made in ostensive definition, by the speaker concentrating one's attention on which aspect is being referred to. If you're the one giving the demonstration, you must concentrate your attention on the aspect of the thing which is being named. The question is how this concentration of attention is communicated to the learner. So he discusses possible differences between attending to the colour and attending to the shape.

At 34 he points to the difference between what is intended by the giver, and what is interpreted by the hearer. There is an important point here, very relevant to "meaning", and that is that we have no description which "stands for a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of the definition." This is to say that as activities, the intention associated with giving, is distinct from the interpretation of receiving, and we have no description which conflates these two distinct activities into one process. There is no single process which encompasses both. The giving and the hearing are distinct activities and this is why there is never certainty on the part of the hearer, as to what the speaker's attention is directed toward.

At 35, it is described how there is no "characteristic experience" which can give the hearer what is intended by the speaker. No particular activity by the speaker can tell the hearer what the speaker attends to. There is nothing particular, no particular type of activity, "to mean the shape", "to mean the colour", and so on.

So at 36, that, the physical activity (the "body") which represents what is intended by the speaker (what the speaker means), is said to be non-existent, and so we say it's something "spiritual". There is no bodily activity which can appropriately represent what is intended by the speaker, so we say that this, what is intended, or meant, is something spiritual, mental, or intellectual.

I would dismiss StreetlightX's discussion of intension as a diversion, and not relevant to the text.

I was responding to the discussion of whether the Cartesian duality of mind/body was the same or not as the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter. — Valentinus

The Aristotelian position is that all physical things, animate and inanimate, consist of the dual aspects, matter and form. So unless you equate form with mind, and get into some type of panpsychism, Cartesian duality and Aristotelian duality are quite distinct.

I'm open to any and all suggestions. My goal is just to do something interesting. For example, if someone wanted to take on "Time" or "Infinity", I would love that -- it would be an excuse to dig into a profoundly interesting topic. — John Doe

What would be your approach to a topic like time or infinity? These subjects are so broad. with such varied perspectives.

So you're just saying that it's different in how Joe is thinking about it? — Terrapin Station

Yes, how Joe is thinking about it is different, because how Joe learnt it is different. He didn't learn how to play the game by learning the rules of the game, he learnt how to play the game by observing the play of the game.

Actually, I'm trying to figure out how "Joe memorized every square the bishop can move to" (ignoring the ridiculous of them doing that without mentally forming an abstraction of it) is different, functionally, than "Joe has learned that the bishop can move only diagonally." — Terrapin Station

Functionally? Of course it's the same functionally. Joe can play the game. We're not discussing whether it's different functionally, we agree that it's the same functionally. It's two distinct ways of knowing, which may serve the same function.

Let's say you get a lot of books for Christmas.
You also have a long list of books that you would like to read, but you didn't get any of those for Christmas.
Should you always read the books you already have before getting new ones? Even if they're not as interesting? How would you justify buying new books when you already have unread ones? What if a friend or family member asks whether you've read the book they got you and are sad when you say no? — Fuzzball Baggins

If, having unread books lying around is a problem for you, making you feel guilty for not reading them, re-gift them. Then they're not wasted. If the person who gave it to you asks, you can think of many lies, it got lost, it got stolen, etc.. If lying is not your thing, then when they ask if you've read the book, just say no, not yet. They'll only ask once or twice. You could always tell them you were too busy reading other books, and it's on your list. It really doesn't matter if you use a person's gift or not, we all know that, so we don't get offended. It's the thought that counts, and we rarely know what another will use.

What would the difference be there when we're talking about chess? How do chess rules require inductive reasoning where knowing the possible moves does not? — Terrapin Station

I told you, rules are generalities, individual possibilities are particulars. So for instance the rule states that the bishop may only move diagonally. That's something general. The person who knows the possible moves, but doesn't know the rules, will look at the position of the bishop and know every possible square that the bishop can move to, without knowing that rule. This person might not even know what "diagonally" means. You of course will ask how could the person know these possibilities without knowing the rule, but we went trough this already, it is proposed that the person may learn this from observation.

Wittgenstein damming the notion of a private language. — Banno

Consider that Wittgenstein has been arguing that one must already know some sort of language-games prior to being able to learn words ostensively. These language-games might just be private, so this is clearly not yet damning the notion of private language.

No, the ability to memorize a formula may have been acquired in the past, but it does not follow from that that the memory of the formula is about the past. From the past, not about the past: see the difference? — Janus

If it's from the past, then it relates to the past, and is therefore "about", meaning "concerning" the past. Consider that at that time in the past, you may have memorized the correct formula, or you may have memorized the incorrect formula. So whether the formula you remember is correct or incorrect is related to that past activity. And, whether the formula you remember is correct or incorrect is something "about" that memory.

I am saying that he would not know the rules, even though he learned how to play chess. He'd know possible moves, and knowing possible moves, and being able to choose from them, would allow him to play the game. And, as I demonstrated, knowing possible moves is not the same thing as knowing rules. Possible moves are particulars, rules are general. Knowing the particular possibilities is not the same thing as knowing the general "rule", because the latter requires an act of inductive reasoning. So you are creating a false representation, claiming a falsity, when you insist that knowing the particular possibilities is the same thing as knowing the rules.

Nonsense; you can for example memorize formulae. — Janus

Right, and when you have them memorized, and are capable of recalling them, weren't they necessarily given to you in the past. Therefore the memory of them is about the past, when they were given to you and you memorized them.

The analogy doesn't work because there aren't any "rules of getting to work" akin to the rules of chess, especially with respect to what people have in mind when they say that someone has learned chess. — Terrapin Station

That's exactly the point, I can learn the possible moves without learning rules. It wasn't an analogy, I was just demonstrating that learning the possible moves is not the same thing as learning rules. You had suggested that it was. Now you seem to be in agreement that it is not the same thing.

32. Augustin's description was "as if the child could already think, only not yet speak".

Wittgenstein damming the notion of a private language. — Banno

What Wittgenstein is discussing here, is the fact that learning a language when one already knows a language is quite different from learning a first language. And, he interprets Augustine's description of learning a first language as similar to how one would learn a secondary language. So he says that Augustine's description of ostensive learning requires that the child already knows how to think in the sense of "talk to itself", i.e. think using words. Clearly this description of ostension is incorrect, because the child hasn't yet learned how to use words, so it cannot think using words, to figure out the meaning of the words being ostensively demonstrated.

We went through this recently on a different thread. Let's say that "set" is defined as a "well-defined collection", as Wikipedia suggests. A "collection" in the sense of a noun implies having been collected, so an infinite collection is impossible because the act of collecting cannot be complete, and such a collection cannot exist. "Collection" in the sense of a verb, meaning the act of collecting, cannot be construed as an object, a "set", because this would be a category mistake. So an "infinite set", as an infinite collection in the sense of an object, is impossible by contradiction, and it is impossible as a "well-defined" activity because it is an incomplete activity.

I've read one physicist claiming that this means that existence, time, space, everything must be finite, because infinite sets are logically contradictory, as you can apparently change their ratios by changing the order in which you look at them. — Fuzzball Baggins

"Infinite set" is self-contradictory. "Infinite" implies unbounded, and set implies "bounded". To say that there is an infinite set is like saying that there is an infinite object, the two concept "infinite" and "object" contradict each other, such that this is impossible.

Memories and anticipations, AND the process of reasoning, are composed of colors, shapes, sounds, feelings, etc. ie sensory representations. What form does your anticipation take if not a visual of some future event? How do you know that you're reasoning at all if your reasoning doesn't take some form? What would you be reasoning about? — Harry Hindu

No, these things are not "composed" of sensory representations. In fact, my anticipation is more like a void of such, a nothingness, where I feel there should be something. It's this feeling that something is going to occur, but not knowing exactly how to picture it which causes anxiety. When I have anxiety, and no idea why, it's like a hole, a void within, which leads to this nagging feeling that something bad is about to happen.

Furthermore, with respect to reasoning, it is impossible to reduce the act of reasoning to the things reasoned about. One is the activity, the other, the things which are active. Consider shuffling a deck of cards. You cannot describe the act of shuffling, as "composed" of the cards themselves. This would be a complete misunderstand of the act of shuffling, which is carried out by the hands which shuffle, rather than the cards themselves. The cards are what is shuffled.

There is nothing about memory that restricts it to being in, or about, the past. Memory is simply information storage. There are different types of memory. Computers also have memory and are capable of making predictions/simulations/anticipations (they're the same thing) within their working memory. — Harry Hindu

This is completely wrong. Memory is restricted to being about the past, that's what the word means, it relates to things remembered. If you are using "memory" in some other way, then it's a foreign word to us. When a computer makes a prediction, it is not the memory which is making the prediction. This paragraph is all wrong.

Either that or SLX is one hell of a mediator.

What's the reason you couldn't logically have passive or active mind, as well as passive or active matter? — Terrapin Station

You could have these, but this implies that your primary division is passive/active rather than mind/matter. Analysis will indicate that you have no division between mind and matter. See, mind and matter are each divided by passive/active. This means that mind and matter have commonality, they both partake in passive, and they both partake in active, active/passive being the primary division. This implies that mind and matter are not actually divided, they are together in the passive and together in the active. Therefore you do not have a primary division between mind and matter. if you start with a primary division of mind and matter, and say that they are each passive and each active, you simply negate your division of mind/matter when you attempt to uphold the passive/active division.

It's a matter of knowing possible moves, rather than a matter of knowing rules. The two are distinct. For instance, I know that these possible actions, walk, bike, drive, take the bus, or take the train, will get me to work. When I want to go to work I simply chose one of these actions, depending on the circumstances. I do not know any rule which states that if I want to get to work I must chose one of these actions, or any such thing. So when I choose a means of getting to work, I am simply choosing a means of getting to work, from the possibilities that I know. I am not following any rule.

Hey Sam26, I agree with you (fancy that), SLX is doing a fine job.

Yeah, I agree with your objections about that. Sam's "cup" example didn't cut it, because using "cup" in sentences that people don't have a problem with is nothing like knowing how to play chess, where we mean anything like the conventional sense of what it is to know how to play chess. There's just no way to have learned how to play chess without knowing the rules of playing chess, since each piece has such specific ways it can move, with all of those being different, not being intuitive, etc. — Terrapin Station

What about something like the way that AI learns, just by observing? I don't think it will do anything outside of what has been observed, but it amasses, and processes such a huge volume of possibilities just from observing. Isn't that how those Go playing computers work? You can't say that it has learned the rules, yet it won't do anything outside the rules because it hasn't learned anything outside the rules, as a possible move.

For example, if you don't know that a pawn can only move straight forward except when capturing an opponent piece, and only one space at a time forward except on the first move, then it wouldn't make sense to say, with any of the conventional connotations, that "you've learned chess," But if you know that sort of stuff, you've learned the rules. — Terrapin Station

By observing, you would know that these are the only possible moves that a pawn could make, without having learned the rules. It's like inductive reasoning, by observing the same thing over and over again, you come to conclude that this is the only possibility, without first learning the rule.

My only other comment on this section is that I'm a bit baffled by this:"One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules." If we're talking about chess a la anything like what conventionally counts as knowing chess, I don't think Wittgenstein's claim there makes any sense. — Terrapin Station

We just finished going over this, starting here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/232532

And the other, crucial, ingredient, is reason. — Wayfarer

Oh yeah, forgot about that one. Ha, ha, Harry had me so focused on the things within the mind, that I forgot about the most important thing, the thing which makes it possible for there to be things in the mind in the first place.

I don't understand. Your mind is composed of your sensory representations. What is your mind without them? Ideas, knowledge, beliefs, language - all are composed of sensory representations. What use is a mind without senses? Starfish and jellyfish seem to have senses without mind (no central nervous system). Can mind exist without senses? — Harry Hindu

"Sensory representations" is only a part of what's in the mind. There are also memories and anticipations. I agree that it doesn't make sense to talk about a mind existing without senses, but it also doesn't make sense to say that a "mind is composed of sensory representations".

Everything you experience is in the past. Your mind is in the past. Your mind is always a process of memory (working memory). I think your notion of "mind" is incorrect and incoherent and is what is leading to your misunderstanding. — Harry Hindu

This is most obviously wrong. Things anticipated are in your mind, and not in your past. So it is incorrect to reduce the mind to memory as you do here. And if this is really the basis of your judgement that my notion of "mind" is incorrect and incoherent, it appears like you have things reversed, because your notion of mind is obviously incorrect.

Witty does indeed begin by saying that there indeed countless kinds of sentence. But importantly, he then goes on to say that there are "countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'". What is 'countless' in the second part of the sentence are neither 'signs', 'words', or 'sentences', but the kinds of use of them. In other words, the bolded 'this diversity' refers to the kinds of use, and not individual 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences'. And it is the kinds of use that correspond to 'new types of language' and 'new language-games'. — StreetlightX

I agree, a "kind of sentence" is a representation of a kind of usage. A language-game is an activity, and he is talking about different kinds of activities here. So "sentence" signifies a static physical thing, like a symbol or a word, but what is being talked about is the activity, the language-game. There are different kinds of activities within a language and one way of representing this is with the different kinds of sentences listed at 23.

And this makes far, far more sense that equating language-games with sentences. Not only because Witty is explicit that language-games consist of "language and the activities into which it is woven" (of which a 'sentence' cannot be), but also because it is consistent with Witty's previous description of a language-game as "the whole process of using words" (§7), where again, use is foregrounded, and not as it were, units of meaning. Finally, the fact that the primacy of the 'sentence' gives way to being simply one element in a set (list) of consisting of 'signs', 'words', and 'sentences' means that even if Witty did mean to say language 'were' sentences, they would also have to be 'signs', and 'words'. Which itself would be an incredibly strange thing to say. — StreetlightX

Again, I completely agree. A game is an activity (we've dispensed the qualification of 'according to rules' which I had added), and so a language-game is an activity. That's how game is being defined. It would be a completely incorrect interpretation to give primacy to the static sentence, over the activity which the sentence is more like a tool of. Witty's example at 23, that there are different kinds of sentences, serves to demonstrate that within this genus of activity called language, which he says is a game, there are various species, a multiplicity of language-games exemplified by a multiplicity of types of sentence. So reference to "sentence" here is meant only to exemplify different kinds of language use each as a distinct language-game. Therefore #24 starts with: "24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?..."

Again, I don't like nitpicking, (but it is sometimes necessary to get through to the true meaning). At 23, Witty clearly asks "But how many kinds of sentence are there?" ,And this is a carry through from his discussion of Frege's idea of "an assertion", which Witty characterizes as a kind of sentence.

So at 23 Witty proposes "countless" different "kinds of sentence", and each kind is described as a distinct language-game, such that new kinds come into existence and others become obsolete. "(We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)". And this evolution (my term), appears to be what is referred to when a language-game is said to be a "form of life". Forms of life come into existence, and become obsolete through an evolutionary process.

In any case, these nitpicky items are where inconsistencies in an author's work appear to lie. If we assume that there was no such inconsistency within the author's mind, therefore within what the author meant, then the appearance of inconsistency needs to be resolved to truly understand what the author meant.

We start with one whole, "reality". We either divide this whole according to the two categories of mind and matter, or we divide this whole according to the two categories of passive and active. The two ways of dividing are incompatible unless we equate mind with passive or active, and matter with the other. But, as I explained, this equation cannot be made in Aristotle's dualism. Therefore the two are incompatible.

Did you reply to my post without reading it? As I said in that post:

The reason why Aristotelian dualism is more advanced, and therefore more appealing, than Cartesian dualism is that it divides reality between the more evident categories of actual and potential, active and passive, or being and becoming, rather than mind and matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

To accept Aristotelian dualism rather than Cartesian dualism, is to dismiss the latter. For various reasons, the two are incompatible.

There is some Russophobia in this thread. — Wallows

If the attitude within the Russian leadership is that we are "the enemy", then "Russophobia" is justified.

Having participated in this forum for about a month, I'm beginning to suspect that my reasons for giving up discussing philosophy with people after I graduated from college may be justified. I find time and again that philosophers can't agree on basic premises; and if we can't even agree on basic premises, then our grandest conclusions have little value for the opposing team. — Noah Te Stroete

Do you not agree, that exposing "basic premises", analyzing them for meaning, and determining the differences in belief which exist between us, at this most fundamental level, is a worthwhile activity? Forget about producing some grandiose theories built upon the consensus and agreement of others, consider fleshing out the reasons why this is impossible, the lack of agreement in the basic premises.

If I assume Cartesian dualism (as much as I can try to make any sense of it, given that in my view the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent), I have no idea how actual/potential would solve the interaction problem, so that wouldn't be a sufficient explanation in my opinion. But what counts as a sufficient explanation is subjective. — Terrapin Station

First, we've dismissed Cartesian dualism, so there is no premise of "nonphysical existents". We have no division between physical and non-physical in that sense, so there is no division between mind and matter, therefore no interaction problem. Comprehend?

And I think the reason Aristotelian philosophy has made something of a comeback, is because the cartesian model, or what became of it, left out so much of obvious importance, that it really required going back and looking at the whole issue again. I think what was found was whilst many notions from Aristotelian physics were well and truly obsolete, the same couldn’t be said for every aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics - particularly the interesting doctrine of ‘hylomorphic dualism’. — Wayfarer

The reason why Aristotelian dualism is more advanced, and therefore more appealing, than Cartesian dualism is that it divides reality between the more evident categories of actual and potential, active and passive, or being and becoming, rather than mind and matter. In categorizing reality in this way, aspects of each of the two categories, actual and potential, may be present in both mind and matter. This avoids the ever-present problem of Cartesian dualism, which is the issue of how mind interacts with matter.

I'll tell you what I told Apo, we don't sense just differences. We sense similarities as well. Have you ever held a piece of wood in your hand? Can you not notice the similarity between wood as it exists prior to being assembled into something like a chair, and the assembled product of a wooden chair? — Harry Hindu

I notice this, but that's something apprehended by my mind, not my senses. I really don't think I can sense a similarity, because that requires an act of comparison, which is a mental activity. In your example there is a comparison with a prior time, and that requires memory. A difference on the other hand, is a relation between two things, so the difference itself, being a relation, is only one thing, and doesn't require a mental comparison to be perceived.

- but, these definitions are simply stipulative and (so far) shed little light on the specificity of why Wittgenstein calls them 'games' (and not, say, 'language-excercises' or 'language-activities'). Without an explicit discussion of games - which has not happened, but soon will - it's still the syntagm 'language-games' - taken as a whole - that is the matter for discussion, and not 'games' as such. — StreetlightX

After #7 he distinguishes different language-games. For instance, at #8 he describes "an expansion of language (2)". But he later distinguishes the language-game at (2) from the language-game at (8). And may refer to language(2) and language (8). So for example, at 16 it's "language-game (8)", but at 17, it's "language (8)", and at 18 its "languages (2) and (8)". So (2) and (8) begin as distinguishable parts of learning "a language". They become distinct language-games. Then the distinct language games are themselves referred to as distinct languages.

So I believe #23 to be quite important because we have an approach presented here, toward the division of human activity. He asks "how many kinds of sentences are there?" And each different kind of sentence (a seemingly endless number), is itself a different language-game, which through the prior example from Frege, and Witty's usage described above, could be considered as a distinct language. But each distinct language-game is really "a part" of the overall activity commonly called "language", And further, even "the speaking of language is part of an activity" or of a form of life, such that the overall activity called "language" is a part of an even bigger activity, a "form of life".

The principle by which the activity, language, is divided here, is according to the kinds of sentences. And you will see that each different kind of sentence serves a different purpose. So the principle presented here, by which human activity is divided, is the purpose of the activity. Activities are segregated according to their purpose.

But the soundness of this division process is questionable because it is theoretical, and most likely could not be carried out in practise. What I mean is that all the different kinds of sentences exist as an integrated part of language which is integrated into the form of life, such that the smaller parts really depend, for existence, on the larger "whole", as having been developed within the context of the whole. So they cannot really be separated out as a distinct language-games, or distinct languages within the larger whole "language". Nor can language be separated from the whole "form of life". The way that they are integrated denies that this is a real possibility, But it is, nevertheless, a very useful theory and thought process, to demonstrate this relationship.

I'm not asking you to tell me what the chair is composed of. I'm merely asking if you can make a distinction between different materials visually - without having to convert those distinctions into language to tell me what it is composed of. The difference isn't in the idea, but in how it actually appears and feels, and our words merely pointy to those distinctions. — Harry Hindu

Right, that's what I've been trying to explain to those people who have been suggesting that we could sense what the chair is made of, matter. We can't do that, we have to take our sensations, and put them into words through the means of ideas. We cannot sense what the chair is made of, be it wood, plastic, matter, or whatever. We sense differences, as you say, not what a thing is made of.

what are ideas composed of if not matter or mind? Ideas can be about matter or about other things, but all ideas are composed of matter is what a realist would say. — Harry Hindu

I really don't know what an idea is made of, but that is irrelevant. I'm just arguing against those who claim that we observe the existence of matter through sensation.

So I assume, that when Wittgenstein says at 33, "you must already be master of a language in order to understand an ostensive definition", he means "master of a language" in the same way that he means "master of a game" at 31. And this is a way of knowing how to play a game without knowing any rules to the game. So the type of language-game which the child has mastered (that of distinguishing types of usage as W describes) which enables ostensive learning, is a game which one knows how to play without learning rules.

In relation to "rules", I agree that it is too early for a discussion of Wittgenstein's position, but in relation to "games", I do not agree. "Language-games" have been extensively mentioned, beginning with the explicit definition at #7, where he describes ostensive learning as a language-game. So I think it is important to grasp at least a minimal understanding of what he means by "game". As you know, I was completely confounded because to me "game" means "play according to rules", and this is how I interpreted "game" in the sense of ostension being a language-game. But you and unenlightened set me straight, that this is not what Wittgenstein means by "game". Playing a game does not necessarily imply knowing rules, and I misinterpreted W's use of "game".

At #7, ostensive definition is called a game, a language-game. Being a game, I mistakenly understood this "language-game" as something which must be played according to rules. I thought that one must already know some rules in order to play the language-game of ostension, being a "game". That's why I got confused at #31. But I now see that Wittgenstein intends ostensive learning to be a game which one knows how to play without knowing rules (as per 31). I now anticipate that he is probably setting this up as the type of game by which one learns rules, learns how to follow rules, or some such thing. We will see.

Claim? That is the established definition of the word - go figure! — Heiko

Right, to define something is to state an idea. It doesn't indicate whether the defined thing could be observed or not - go figure.

It is the claim that the defined thing, "matter", is something observed rather than just an idea, that is what needs to be justified.

So you're telling me that you can't see the difference between a wooden chair and a plastic one? What is imitation wood if not the appearance of wood so that you can't visually distinguish between the plastic it is made of and actual wood? — Harry Hindu

What I'm telling you is that I cannot look at the chair and tell you that it is made of wood, or that it is made of plastic without having some idea of what wood and what plastic are. By reference to these ideas, I can deduce whether the chair is made of plastic or wood. And, as your example of imitation wood indicates, I might sometimes be wrong in my deduction. So clearly I am not observing with my senses what the chair is made of, I am deducing it.

What is the actual difference between ideas and matter? — Harry Hindu

Matter is an idea, but not all ideas are matter.

So you can't observe that the chair is composed of wood or platic, of a seat and legs? — Harry Hindu

No, those are deductions made from observations. How would you sense that the chair is composed of wood, plastic, a seat, or legs?

What difference does it make what word we use to refer to what things are composed of? Answer the question. — Harry Hindu

It makes a lot of difference what words we use to refer to what things are made of.. Each word has its own meaning, and some claims are more easily justifiable than others. That the chair is composed of a seat and legs, or even that it is composed of wood or plastic, is much more easily justified than that it is composed of matter. The latter appears to be entirely speculative.

Incorrect, their argument was that some were not "qualities" as you deemed them because they are part of reality. Pointing out that some aren't (as that user already admitted) is very much besides the point when they already admitted so. — MindForged

I can see that one, or both of us, misunderstands what Ikolos was saying. I can restate what I was saying though. I said that qualities can be quantified, but it is a mistake to attempt to qualify quantities. Both qualities and quantities are "part of reality", so this reference is just a diversion. The issue is what the mind is doing when it attempts to quantify a quality, or qualify a quantity.

Ikolos replaced "quality" with "relation", and I had to insist that relation is a quality rather than a quantity, because Ikolos wanted to argue that a relation is a quantity, without the required mental act which quantifies that quality.

How is that not an argument? Ease of use is a perfectly legitimate reason to do prefer something. — MindForged

As I said, there are many other numbers which offer equal, or greater ease of use, so there is no basis for your argument.

Also, try to do set a circle equal to 4 degrees and see how the math works out for you. — MindForged

If a circle were 4 degrees, I see that an acute angle would be less than one degree, and an obtuse angle would be greater than one degree. Forty five would be half a degree, and one eighty would be two degrees. Looks very easy to me. I'm no mathematician so I might be missing something. Where would the mathematical problem be, which would make 360 degrees mathematically easier than 4 degrees?

Matter occupies space and - in common day life - has a weight. Anything that has these properties is made of matter. That's the definition. — Heiko

That's just an idea though, an assumption, not an observation. You are claiming, to paraphrase, "anything that occupies space and has weight is matter". But what we sense, and observe, is particular things occupying space and having weight, not matter. So the validity of this idea, this assumption, or claim you've made, needs to be supported.

When we see a chair, how do we not see what it is composed of? If we can't say what it is composed of, how can we even say that what we see is a chair? — Harry Hindu

I don't see any logic in what you have written here. I see a chair, as a distinct entity, a unity, a chair. I do not see a collection of parts, molecules or atoms or any such thing. Therefore, I can say that I see a chair, this is supported by empirical evidence. The claim that the chair is composed of something, molecules, atoms, or matter, is the claim that needs to be justified.

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure. — Sam26

If you're still lurking Sam26, please notice that this passage is completely inconsistent with what our interpretation has provided for us, up to this point. For Wittgenstein, as explained so far in PI, a language-game is not rule based. Rules are not what makes play of the game possible. Therefore grammar (as rules) cannot be, for Wittgenstein, "what makes the moves in language possible", as you state above.

It assumed there are rules. We can certainly “play a game” without knowing the rules; which maybe where some confusion lies in your exchanges above (on one or both sides?). — I like sushi

In Wittgenstein's description of "game", up to this point in the text, I don't think that rules are assumed as necessary to a game at all. That is what StreetlightX describes above. Rules cannot be assumed here. if we can play a game without learning the rules, then rules are not necessary to playing a game.

I would hold off, for now, of getting too deep into a discussion of the nature of games and their relation to rules. There's alot of that to come, and as it stands, the thrust of the sections we are discussing have to do with the relation between ostension and rules (that just happen to be in the context of a game). — StreetlightX

Wait a minute. Rules have barely been mentioned to this point, as you astutely noticed. However, games have been consistently mentioned, even to the point of a description of what constitutes a "language-game", at #7, quoted above. Therefore the thrust of the sections we've been discussing has to do with the relation between ostension and games, not the relation between ostension and rules. He has developed a relationship between ostension and game play, something deeper than an analogy, as it is suggested that ostension is a type of game play (language-game), not "like" game play, as "analogy" would suggest. And, as our brief discussion above indicates, he has not developed a definite or firm relationship between games and rules, therefore he has not developed a firm relationship between ostension and rules. Nor has he even attempt to develop such a relation except the brief suggestion that one can learn a game without learning rules. But "rules" is still a phantom term here waiting to be defined within this schema.

I Like Sushi, as you are our professed leader, what do you suggest as our next section, somewhere around 45?