You seem to have difficulty accepting the truth. Is that evidence against your own premise?

Let's go back to the op:

Any claim that there are no facts (nothing that we ought to believe) can be met with the questions, “Is that a fact? Ought we to believe that?” and so on to infinity. — AJJ

How would you deal with an ontology like pragmatism? Assume a process ontology which declares that there is no such thing as facts because all of reality is in motion and relative. You ought to believe such and such because it is a useful principle. So, for instance, science doesn't deal with facts, it operates with principles which are useful for prediction, therefore they ought to be believed.. And, 2+2=4 is not a fact, it is a useful principle, therefore it ought to be believed. There is no point to your question "is that a fact?", because you must establish first that the idea of "a fact" is an acceptable idea, within this belief structure which already rejects the idea of "facts" as useless.

This is because a local-to-local comparison of grammar does not generalise: local-to-local comparisons - which must always involve examples of language-in-use - shed mutual light on each other (ie. with respect to the specificity of the language-games involved, along with their grammar, and according to the forms-of-life which grant them relevancy), but they don’t ever (can’t ever, according to Witty) amount to (or lead to) a ‘theory of language’ as a whole. — StreetlightX

If language consists of distinct objects, separate language-games, and there can be no such thing as a theory of language as a whole, then it appears like the Philosophical Investigations' whole enterprise, which was to describe "language" (remember #7 ... I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"), seems to be self-refuting. There is no such thing as "language".

It appears to me like he has proposed two completely different ways to describe language, which are distinctly incompatible with each other. One description is as a bunch of distinct objects, language-games, and the other, the various actions which comprise language as a whole. At this point in the text, he is clearly rejecting the latter in favour of the distinct language-games. But now we have no principle whereby we might unify distinct language-games to say that there is such a thing as "language".

I will stress that going forward from this point we must reject the inclination to think that there is such a thing as "language", because it is firmly denied. And to follow Wittgenstein's intention we must adhere to this principle that there is no such thing as "language". The description is of distinct language-games without a unifying principle.

Last thing: If you say that someone can know the truth yet still do wrong, then I’d say they’re justifying that wrong to themselves with something they believe is true, but is actually a lie. — AJJ

That's clearly not the case, because the person would believe contradictory things as true, I ought to do this (being the real truth), and I ought not do this (being the rationalized justification for doing wrong).. The person would believe both of these as true at the same time.

It seems to be pointless discussing this with you, but if you've read some Plato, you might recognize that this is the issue that Socrates had with some sophists. These sophists claimed to teach virtue. They put forth the principle "virtue is knowledge", and charged lots of money to teach virtue. By questioning whether virtue was the type of thing which could be taught, Socrates discovered a hole, a gap between knowing ethical principles, and behaving accordingly. He discovered a defect in the principle "virtue is knowledge", because knowing what one ought to do does not necessitate the person to do it.

This gap becomes very evident when we consider immoral people, who study the law to find loopholes so that they can get away with their immoral tendencies. I wouldn't say that these people believe that the law is the truth, and they justify disobeying the law with something else which they believe as the truth, or that they believe what they are doing is supported by truth, and the law is not, they simply do not believe in truth. There are people who just do not believe in truth (president Trump for example), and this belief is well grounded in science based ontology like model-dependent realism.

There is no point to insisting that these people believe it is true that there is no truth, because this just demonstrates that you misunderstand the nature of belief. Belief is based in faith and confidence, and believing that something is true is a type of belief. It is to add an extra layer of confidence to a specified belief, to attribute truth to it. So you have two distinct beliefs, the belief in X, and the belief that X is true. To say that this is redundancy is to demonstrate a misunderstanding of the nature of belief. To believe in something (such as I believe in myself) does not necessarily imply that one thinks the thing believed in is true.

know it is true that I should help you when you’re having a heart attack, therefore I help you. Like I’ve said, goodness and truth - or how we perceive them - are the basis for our actions. — AJJ

However, as I said, there are many instances when someone knows what ought to be done, but does not do it. For example, knowingly breaking the law, it happens all the time. So it's completely false to say "I know what I ought to do therefore I do it". It must be something other than knowing what ought to be done which inspires one to do what ought to be done. This was covered in some depth by Augustine.

Again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. — AJJ

Actually, I've considered what you've said, and demonstrated it as false, reread the above if you still do not understand that.

But whatever. I’d like to ask this important question again: Where does our inspiration to be moral come from, if not from our understanding of what is moral? — AJJ

I don't think anyone knows the answer to that question, that's why there is philosophy, to seek the answers to questions like that. But it's very clear that the inspiration to be moral does not come from understanding what moral is, just watch a child learning. We only come to understand what moral is, a long time after learning how to be moral, if ever.

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary. — AJJ

But you haven't explained how knowing that it is true that one ought to do something leads to the person actually doing something.

I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it. — AJJ

And I do not agree with that, for good reasons, as I explained.

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this. — AJJ

This is ridiculous. You are reducing confidence to a belief in truth, when in reality the confidence which is required to proceed with an action has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. If an action worked for me in the past, I will proceed with it again. I may even develop a habit. I am proceeding with the action to bring about what I perceive as a good, not because I believe that I know the truth about what good is.

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious. — AJJ

Again, this is ridiculous. If you want to reduce the faith and confidence which is required for the actions of an animal such as a human being, to a matter of believing that something is true, then that's your own business. But if you are inclined toward understand the truth about what motivates animals to act, and what produces the faith and courage required for such acts, you would be wise to dismiss this premise as faulty.

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral. — AJJ

We teach children to act properly when they are far too young to understand the "truth about what is moral". Only at a much later age, if they study philosophy, will they come to understand about what it is to be moral. So it is very clearly untrue that we must understand the truth about what is moral, before we can be moral. In reality we learn to act morally long before we understand the truth about what it means to be moral. In fact, philosophers today continue to debate about the truth of what it means to be moral, and if they are respectable philosophers they recognize that the truth about what it is to be moral has not yet been uncovered.

understand our actions are based on our beliefs. I understand you as saying that this means it can be the case that we ought to believe certain lies. I’m saying that it isn’t that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way the lie facilitates. My example illustrated this; you’re just being a pedant. — AJJ

As I explained, your example failed, and I still don't think that what you claim is possible. Our actions are tailored to our beliefs, the actions are designed to bring about what is believed. I really do not see how it is possible to change the belief and expect that the different belief would bring about the same action. You seem to believe that this could be done, but your example did not show it.

We ought to believe what is true, since believing what is true leads to doing good anyway, unless you can give an example where this wouldn’t be the case, where believing the truth would lead to doing wrong. — AJJ

I gave you my example, one could believe what is true, and still be sedentary. Therefore believing what is true does not necessarily lead to doing good actions. Doing wrong is irrelevant because one could not do what is good without doing wrong, simply by being inactive. Being inactive is neither doing good nor doing wrong.

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth. — AJJ

This is false, and I went through it already. When I proceed with a project, a plan, I believe that there is a high probability that I will be successful, and that good will come from the procedure. When I start the procedure I do not believe that it is true that good will come from the action because I have respect for the fact that failure is possible, there could be an accident, and harm could come from the procedure instead.

If you really believe that you ought to believe the truth, you should have respect for this. When judging whether or not to proceed with an action, we often consult truths to aid us in the judgement, but there is no truth to whether or not the action will be successful, prior to carrying out the action, and to believe that there is is to believe a falsity.

Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good. — AJJ

There's no contradiction. Do you recognize the difference between saying "X is probably the case", and "it is true that X is the case". When I believe that my action will be successful, and I have the confidence to proceed, I do not believe "it is true that my action will be successful", I believe "my action will probably be successful".

It is you who is being pedantic, trying to restrict the use of "believe" to truth. So you claim "I believe I will be successful" means "I believe it is true that I will be successful". But believing does not necessarily imply truth, as your pedantic ways suggest. It sometimes means to have faith and confidence, and this is the case when we believe in the success of our actions. When we believe in our actions, we have faith in our ability to judge, and confidence that the good will come from the action. Truth is not relevant here.

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth. — AJJ

Do you not see the unwarranted jump which you are making here? You are jumping from knowing or believing the truth to "abiding by the truth". Knowing the truth does not make one abide by the truth. People often know what they ought to do, yet act in a contrary way, like when they knowingly break the law. This is what I've been trying to tell you, knowing the truth does not inspire one to act well, it is something else which inspires morality. And this is why the inspiration to be moral must take priority over the inspiration to know the truth

If I’m lied to and told there is no erupting volcano but I need to leave the area for some other innocuous reason, then I won’t panic and run over people. But neither will I panic and run over people if I’ve learned that this is something I shouldn’t do anyway. The ought resides in the action/non-action, not in believing the lie. — AJJ

The point I made though, is that the action comes about as a result of the belief. If the reason for leaving is innocuous, then you will not see the need to leave, and you will not necessarily leave. So the example doesn't bring to the discussion what you want it to bring.

And I was saying that bad things cannot come from truth, but they obviously can from lies. — AJJ

As I said, this is irrelevant if not actually false, because what is important is bringing about good things. Bad things may come about, at any time or place, and knowing the truth cannot prevent them, just like inaction cannot prevent bad things. So unless you establish a relationship between "good" (which is what inspires one to act) and "true", then whether or not bad things can come about from knowing the truth is completely irrelevant to preventing bad things, or bringing about good things.

And all the time you’re doing this you are appealing to the truth; the truth of what is good, and whether or not good will come of a certain belief or an action. Why do we appeal to these truths if it is not good to do so, if it’s not the case that we ought to? — AJJ

This is not the case. We act when we believe good will come from the action. In no way am I claiming that we act when we think that we know the truth about what is good. This is what I said about actions being based in the probability of success, not in the certainty of truth or falsity.

just don’t think you’ve thought about this. Of course knowing the truth necessitates action. The only way it wouldn’t would be if it were true that we should never take any actions. — AJJ

Ugly fallacious logic. It is not true that we should never take any actions. Therefore we should take action now.

You need to explain how knowing the truth necessitates action.

Again, you just haven’t thought about this. — AJJ

It would be possible to take the same actions without believing the lie, so believing the lie isn’t strictly necessary. — AJJ

I don't recognize how this would be possible. Actions are determined as necessary in relation to particular ends. The end is the belief, of what is required. So, we have a belief of what is needed and we tailor our actions toward that belief. We can consider different possible actions for fulfilling the same belief. However, the action, as required for the belief, is contingent on the belief. So it really doesn't seem possible to come up with the same action without the same belief as to what is required. If we change the belief, the contingent actions will change accordingly. How do you suggest that we could change the belief of what is required, and still come up with the same action as being required for the new belief.

Is it even possible for bad things to come from believing the truth? — AJJ

I'm not talking about where bad things come from, I'm talking about where good things come from. So this question is irrelevant. If good things are the things which are desired, as needed, then we ought to tailor our beliefs such that they naturally bring about good things. If, in the process of judging a particular belief, the possibility that it might bring about something bad comes up, then we need to consider this. But we start from a good, what is needed, and until believing the truth is demonstrated as something needed, or good, truth has no relevance.

What is true is good. I’ve already said you can form the same bottomless pit with “good”. Is it good to believe true things? No? Well is it good to believe that?. And so on. Eventually you’re forced to say yes, because it’s good to believe true things, and we ought to do things that are good. — AJJ

You don't seem to be grasping the principle. Truth is good and good is truth, is a bottomless pit, because it's circular. To avoid the circle (bottomless pit) we need to ground something. So we ground "good" in action, activity. Activities are things which bring about real change in the world. "Truth" does not do the same thing, it doesn't bring about any activities, or change in the world. The person knowing what is good will be inspired to act, to bring about the good, while the person knowing the truth would be sedentary without a sense of what is good. It's good to believe X, because X belief inspires one to act, and this creates change which is believed to be good. But we cannot say this about "truth". Knowing the truth does not necessitate any particular actions. So we cannot say that it's good to know the truth until we can say what good the truth brings about. However, we can say that a certain belief is good, because it brings about good actions, regardless of whether or not it is true.

We always judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, it’s impossible to do otherwise. By saying, “I’m taking this action not because I’m certain it’s true, but because good will come of it”, you’re actually saying, “I’m taking this action because I believe it is true that good will come of it, and we ought to believe true things.” — AJJ

This is not true at all. Our beliefs regarding actions are based in probability. We proceed when there is a high probability of success, not when we are certain that it is true that there will be success.

He revealed the US doing truly awful, immoral things as we "brought Democracy" to the world. If you're outraged about Assange's alleged "spying" but unaware of the war crimes he revealed, you should educate yourself about the particulars. Your outrage is misplaced. — fishfry

There's nothing new here, U.S. government agencies have always been doing truly awful things as they attempt to bring democracy to the world, from the blatantly illegal (Iran-contra for example), to the utterly disgusting (Vietnam for example). The WikiLeaks revelations are status quo. If we're not already outraged at all these terrible things which US government agencies do in the name of bringing democracy to the world, why would you think that we should be outraged at what they want to do to Assange?

Why would you think that we would single out this one instance of U.S. government agencies unfairly treating one individual (Assange), and direct outrage at the government for this act? Do you not recognize that in all the "truly awful, immoral things" which the US does, the American people are implicit? That's the nature of the beast (democracy) the government fulfills the will of the people. If Assange has revealed crimes, they are the crimes of the American people, and criminals get mad at those who turn them in.

I can't make out what you are trying to say. If a certain belief leads to good actions, then why can't we conclude that we ought to hold that belief?

You insist that we ought to believe the truth, but why? Unless there is a good which comes from believing the truth, which is better than the good which comes from believing the lie, then this claim is unfounded. Do you have a principle whereby it is demonstrated that believing the truth is always better than believing a lie?

I don't see the bottomless pit. The bottom is what is good. You want to make the bottom the truth. Clearly these two are not equivalent, so why do you give supremacy to truth over good? I give supremacy to good because human beings are active beings, involved in doing things, activity is the natural tendency for the human being and to be sedentary is unhealthy. Therefore I assume that beliefs are for the sake of these activities which we engage in, and the beliefs which we ought to hold are the ones which are conducive to good actions. If a true belief is conducive to good actions then it is one that we ought to hold. If it is not, then there is no reason to hold it. And if a false belief is conducive to good actions, then it ought to be held.

A belief needs to be judged in relation to something in order to determine whether or not we ought to hold it. Being fallible human beings, with fallible minds, we have no guarantee that what we think is the truth is really the truth, so we cannot judge our beliefs in relation to the truth. Therefore we need to judge whether or not we ought to hold this or that belief in relation to something other than the truth. I think that we ought to judge the beliefs in relation to the actions which they bring about, whether they bring about good or bad activities.

What do you mean?

In many countries there is a legal principle known as "aiding and abetting", which holds those who assist in a crime as accountable.

So the driver of the getaway car is not guilty of robbing the bank, even though the driver was going to get a share of the loot?

using coherent terms like physical and non-physical is necessary, for either the will is born out of a prior state of actuality and therefore physicality, or it is born out of a prior state of potential and non-locality...and its freedom is entirely dependent upon whether it is born of actuality (actualized potentiality) or potentiality (unactualized potentiality). — TheGreatArcanum

If the will has any power at all it must be an actuality. So why not simplify all this to say that it is a non-physical actuality?

If it is the case that facts are things we ought to believe, then the OP argument works. The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ

But it's not absurd to deny that facts are what we ought to believe, as the example of the noble lie demonstrates. It is arguable that in some cases it's for the person's own good to believe a lie. If that's the case, then it's not the facts which ought to be believed. We ought to believe what is good for us to believe, regardless of the facts.

As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one. — AJJ

This is what's absurd. It's not the lie itself which is beneficial it's the belief in the lie which is beneficial. The lie would be useless if no one believed it. If the people know that it is a lie, then they will not believe it, regardless of whether they ought to believe it or not.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ

I agree that there could be no objective values without facts, but we cannot derive "if there are no objective values then there are no facts" from this. That would be some sort of inversion fallacy. "If there are no facts, then there are no objective values" is not convertible to "if there are not objective values then there are no facts".

It is probably the case that objective values are dependent on facts, and that's why I agree with that, but as the others point out, facts are not dependent on objective values. We do not say that X is a fact because it is what we ought to believe, we say that we ought to believe X because it is a fact. This leaves the issue of why we ought to believe facts as unanswered, and unaddressed, so we cannot conclude that because there are facts there are objective values.

Your bridge example is a practical illustration of why it is we ought to believe facts, but I’m simply saying we ought to believe facts because they’re true, because it’s absurd to say otherwise. In practice the things we believe may or may not actually be facts, but I’m talking abstractly - that it is abstractly the case that we ought to believe facts. — AJJ

Saying that it is absurd to say otherwise does not resolve the issue. We need to say something about "ought" which demonstrates that we ought to believe facts. "Ought" refers to what is good, so we need to show that it is always good to believe facts to make the inductive conclusion, and the consequent proposition, that it is good to believe facts. There is still a problem with this approach though, and that is that what is good, therefore what we ought to do, goes far beyond believing facts. There are many things which we ought to do which cannot be described as "believing facts". So it is a mistake to define "ought" in this way, which limits it to believing facts.

You've hit upon an important issue here, what is commonly referred to as the noble lie. This is introduced in Plato's Republic. The noble lie is an instance of the rulers lying to the ruled, for their own good. If we accept the noble lie as a valid moral principle, then we deny the inductive principle that we ought to believe facts. Many would argue that the particular noble lie expressed by Plato is wrong, but it may be argued still, that sometimes it is better for a person not to know the truth. And this indicates that "ought" goes beyond "truth".

Or under the veneer of this culture is there a monstrous subculture? — tim wood

Yes, anarchists.

I agree that the doctrine derived from the need to reconcile Jesus' divinity within the context of monotheism. — Relativist

I think the rational basis of the Trinity is actually derived from Plato's tripartite soul, and this happened to fit well with the Church dogma, that held Jesus as Son of God. From Wikipedia I notice that the Nicene creed, which established Jesus as Son of God had to be later amended to add the third part, Holy Spirit.

St. Augustine's "On the Trinity" is consistent with Plato's tripartite soul. He speaks of the three parts of the intellect, memory, reason, and will. The intellect, as one thing, is composed of these three parts.

these processes are controlling the body; if it is not true that the will can set the brain in motion, all of your wills and the words and actions that result from them happen by necessity or by chance and not by your own volition. and if there is an observer, that observer is just watching the will and the effects which follow from it as a passive observer and not an active agent. and when the brain ‘makes you stop thinking,’ you have no say in the manner, because you don’t have a will if it cannot start or stop brain processes. you are not the active agent of your thoughts by the passive watcher of them. this can be disproven in a few seconds through some phenomenological observation. it’s one of the most absurd positions ever held, and even more absurd that it’s considered to be rational by educated people. — TheGreatArcanum

It's not necessary that the will "set the brain in motion", all it needs to do is affect, or change the motions which are already there.

I explained already. I never said there were no other functions, but I certainly implied that there are no other functions worth mentioning regards to human purpose - the requirements of sustenance, shelter, sociable interaction, and reproduction. — I like sushi

You were not talking about human purpose though, you were talking about the purpose of the brain. I don't see how you can make this jump now, to the purpose of a human being, What would the purpose of a human being even be?

Note: I was being generous in my reply. I don’t generally talk about bodily organs having a “purpose”. Fro me a thing is made for a purpose; such as a knife, hammer or wheel. We could talk about the ‘purpose’ of red blood cells being to transport oxygen and carbon-dioxide, but given we’re looking for clarity of language within philosophical discourse I prefer to say “function”. I have nothing more to say on the matter; take it or leave it. — I like sushi

Then I suggest you made an error when you tried to state what the purpose of the brain is.

don't forget that brain processes can be set into motion by the will; so to say that the will is contingent upon brain processes is a contradiction. — TheGreatArcanum

I think that the brain is always active so I don't really agree with this idea of setting brain processes into motion.

Are you asking about this out of curiosity or trying to suggest I know nothing about brain function? The OP is referring to “purpose” not “function” - that is why I replied in the manner I replied. — I like sushi

I was trying to correct you. You said "the function of the brain is to process sensible data". When I suggested that the brain has other functions, you insisted "there is no other function". But clearly the brain has other functions, or other purposes (however you want to word it), like the example in my last post.

There is a sort of paradox involved with the idea of describing language. When we describe something we state, using language, how the thing appears to be. We do not alter the thing described, we leave it untouched, just described. We go around it with our words, so to speak. But if language is the thing we want to describe, and we must use language to describe things, it is impossible to leave language untouched in the act of describing language, because we would need to use language in describing itself. So a proper description of language is impossible. Language is the tool which we use to describe things, so if a hammer is the tool which we use to hit things, then trying to describe language is like trying to hit the hammer with the hammer.

Wittgenstein has devised an ingenious way around this paradox, by seeking to describe the activity which language is involved in, rather than trying to describe language itself. The activity is called language-games. So the language-games take the place of language, as something which can be described, the activity which the tool is used for. He is describing what we are doing with language (playing games) rather than trying to describe what language is (which is impossible due to the paradox). The problem now, at this point in the text, is that he wants to treat distinct language-games as distinct objects, to be compared, instead of adhering to the principle, that what is being described is the activity which language is being used for. We ought to maintain Wittgenstein's principle, that different language-games are just different ways of carrying out the same type of activity, i.e. the sort of activity which language is used for. However, he wants to set them off as distinct objects which can be arranged or ordered. So he now falls into the trap of the paradox, setting up language-games (as distinct objects, like distinct languages) to be compared and described individually, rather than describing language-games as the activity which language is used for.

Agreement is reached without ever being expressed. — unenlightened

The point though is that the words must be expressed before they can be agreed on, so agreement follow language.

In terms of “purpose” - external - there is no other function. If the brain didn’t process input from the outside world it would be no different to a rock. — I like sushi

What about the other functions of the brain though? For example, doesn't the brain also have the function of controlling other parts of the body?

First sentence is fine. but how can the suggestion be made until we have agreed that 'name' and 'suggestion' mean what we agree they do? — unenlightened

I don't see the problem. People make noises without any agreement as to what the noise means.

The distinction between a tree and a shrub, for instance, is pretty well established to the extent that you and I can argue about it with some hope of arriving at a resolution that is not based on our reaching an agreement but on our learning the agreement that has already been made by generations of yore. — unenlightened

I'm talking about how that agreement made by generations of yore came into existence. The spoken word must be prior to the agreement as to what the word means. Therefore it is impossible that language is built on agreement.

This pair of remarks are one of a few handful in this section, I think, where Witty actually goes about spelling out - making explicit - why he keeps insisting on the 'descriptive' nature of his investigations, and why there is no 'explanation' in them. They are best approached, imo, as methodological pointers. — StreetlightX

The method described is inconsistent with "no need for explanation". To arrange things, give them an order (132) for the purpose of clarity, is to "explain".

As stated at 132, there are many possible orders, arrangements which could be made in the act of comparing the language-games, perhaps orders could be established for purposes other than clarity. Wittgenstein has chosen "clarity" as the purpose for the ordering, and so he has chosen to explanation.

I don't agree with that. And the reason is that naming is essentially random. So prior to the existence of language any particular part of the reality which surrounds us could be called by any name whatsoever. Things do not have names until after there is agreement that this will be the thing's name. And this agreement can only be produced by someone suggesting names for things. Therefore the existence of the name is prior to the existence of the agreement that this name names this thing. So in relation to things spoken about with language, agreement is posterior to the language which speaks of the things, that agreement being dependent on the language which speaks of them. This must also be true in the case of stating a thesis. Agreement concerning the things spoken of in the thesis can only occur after the thesis is stated.

This leaves the response of "I knew that already", in a precarious position. Suppose someone states, for the first time ever, the most extremely obvious hypothesis, and everyone agrees, thinking "I knew that already". How did you already know that? It's impossible that someone told it to you already. And it's not likely that everyone who says "I knew that already" had already thought up that very hypothesis, or someone else would have already stated it. So this only leaves something like Plato's theory of recollection. But that's absurd to think that we already know everything before being taught it, and learning is just recollecting what we've already known - forever, I suppose. What does it mean to be struck with something which is so agreeable to you, it's as if you already knew it, yet it's never been taught to you before, and it's just being apprehended by your mind now? We can't truthfully say "I knew that already", because that particular thing is just being demonstrated now. But it's so consistent with everything else which we already know, and therefore so agreeable, that it's as if we already knew it.

The function of the brain is to process sensible data; the empirical evidence for this is quote overwhelming I feel - it is factual. — I like sushi

That is one function of the brain. What about its other functions?

Actually Luke, I was having a very relevant and interesting conversation with Pomophobe, and the term was not used that way until you interrupted, changing the subject, with a complete straw man accusation of contradiction. Now you insist on continuing your digression into some sort of ad hom nonsense. Why did you interrupt in the first place if you had no interest in the subject being discussed?

I only introduced "foreground" because it was necessary to counter your claim of contradiction.

Is it not obvious to you though, that a thesis must be stated before it can be agreed to? So this statement of yours makes no sense: "we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance". You are saying that there is no point in advancing the thesis which everyone will agree with. That's like saying that there is no point in carrying out the activity which I am certain to have success at. How does that make sense to you?

The idea in PI 128 is a kind of ideal, i.e., if we were able to apply Wittgenstein's methods (it's not method by the way), then clarity would be achieved. There would be no debating the obvious, we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance. — Sam26

Wouldn't the thesis (which stated the obvious) have to be advanced before we could agree on it?

The problem according PI 129 is that what's hidden is what's before our eyes, it's something so familiar that we tend to ignore or miss it because of its "simplicity," or again, its "familiarity." It seems as though the answer to our question or confusion lies in the open, which means according Wittgenstein, that we fail to be struck by it. However, once seen anew, it becomes "striking" and "powerful." — Sam26

Perhaps the strikingly obvious thing is that a thesis must be advanced before it can be agreed on.

I don't know since I have no idea what these terms mean. I've asked you to explain what you mean by 'foreground' and 'background' in my last two posts. — Luke

"Background" was Pomophobe's term so it probably really only makes sense in the context of that discussion. I think I understood what was meant, maybe I didn't. But you're trying to pull that term out of its context, and oppose it to "foreground". Maybe you think that might help you to understand it, but it might just create confusion if it was never used as an opposition to "foreground". I think it was used more like the context, or environment, within which something exists.

So the foreground is expressed opinions and the background is unexpressed opinions, right? — Luke

No, I do not think you can correlate these two divisions precisely in this way. There is a foreground and a background, also there are expressed opinions and unexpressed opinions, and the two correlate roughly, but not precisely or exactly. So the background enters into expressed opinions, in things like philosophy and metaphysics, and in creative acts unexpressed opinions enter into the foreground, so there is overlap.

The appearance of contradiction which you refer to only occurs when you attempt to precisely correlate divisions of distinct categories. This is the deficiency of inductive reasoning, when we correlate distinct categories to state a rule, the exception to the rule creates the appearance of contradiction. For example, you attempted to precisely correlate the division between expressed and unexpressed opinions, with the division between agreement and disagreement, so that all unexpressed opinions would disagree, and all expressed opinions would agree. But it is clearly evident that some expressed opinions disagree and also some unexpressed opinions might agree. However, it may still be the case that expressed opinions agree to a large extent, and unexpressed opinions disagree to a large extent, so there would still be a correlation to be made, but not an exact or precise correlation. Since I claimed a correlation of sorts, and you interpreted that this correlation ought to be an exact or precise correlation, when I was really speaking in terms of rough boundaries, you apprehended a contradiction. How would you suggest a boundary between the foreground and background be drawn?

If you're interested, maybe read the complete intercourse between pomophobe and I. Pomophobe referred to a "background or framework that we are always already in". If "the background" is like the context, within which language exists, then this context is thoughts and opinions, some expressed, some not. If you think about the nature of opinions which have never before been expressed, I think you should see that they would mostly disagree with one another.

If you cannot see this, then I don't think there's much that I can do to help you to see it, because I cannot show you unexpressed opinions, you can only find them for yourself. It is possible that you are not the creative type, and so you derive your opinions from others, and therefore are unfamiliar with opinions which have never been expressed before. To "agree" means that the opinion is similar to another, but what makes an opinion "original" is its difference from all others.

To change my words from "we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions" to "all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement", is not to demonstrate a contradiction but to exemplify a straw man. "Background" implies that there is also a "foreground", so your representation of the background as "all" is unjustified. I distinctly said that we must consider the possibility of both agreement and disagreement within the realm of unexpressed opinions.

It's this remark which I was replying to:
Kippo said: "Biological determinism is certainly true to an extent...".
I think there's a problem with saying that something is true to an extent.

I suggested that when the causes for a certain type of behaviour are seen to be biological, for the most part, like habits, yet there are exception to the rule, then biological determinism is ruled out by those exceptions. And "true to an extent" doesn't make sense. But I just said "determinism" is ruled out, so you jumped in on my mistake, and said it's not, because there could be other determinist causes which are responsible, that are not biological. I meant to say biological determinism is ruled out.

Your disagreement is evidence that the background of unexpressed opinions is comprised of disagreement. If it were comprised of agreement, then when the time came to express yourself you would express agreement. You did not.

You're focusing too much on the unobservable. I also said they can just be unobserved. You were claiming determinism is falsified by observing a behavioral pattern to be broken. You're wrong, because we may simply be unaware of all the factors that collectively cause the behavior, some of which are less frequent. — Relativist

No, I was not claiming that determinism is falsified in this way, I was claiming that "biological determinism" is falsified in this way. Biological determinism is dependent on what is known to biology, so you can't just claim that the cause of the behaviour is something unknown to biology because that is self-refuting to biological determinism. Either the cause of the behaviour is something known to biology or it is not. If it is not, then biological determinism is falsified.

In other words:
We ought to consider that unexpressed opinions can be either an agreement or a disagreement.
If we do this, we should see that all unexpressed opinions are a disagreement.

Yeah, that follows. — Luke

The conclusion is not supposed to follow logically, it is supposed to be an observation which will be made if you look at things the way I said. Your disagreement is evidence that what I say is true.

This is a delicate issue. I see the value of the approach that starts within an individual brain/mind and works outward, and it's good for many purposes. But I think it might get in the way of contemplating language. In short, it's tempting but artificial. The background or framework that we are always already in seems to include an elusive sense of The World that is not theoretical. We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them. And perhaps language in primarily about coordinating our messing with these objects. We don't stare at tools. We use them. And they exist differently for our use than they do for our staring. In short I'm saying that we apply this Heideggerian insight to language and get some of what I find anyway in Wittgenstein. — pomophobe

The problem I see with this perspective is that tools (therefore language if it is a tool) are themselves artificial. So if we describe our relationship with the world, as "messing" with it, we also need to account for the creation of the tools by which we mess with it. Therefore there is something amiss with the following statement of yours: "We are just always already in a world of objects that we can talk about, and our primary relationship to these objects is messing with them". Notice that you say we are already in a world of objects "that we can talk about". The reality is that we cannot talk about anything until we have "language" to use for that purpose.

I suggest that to understand the nature of language we need to remove the presupposition that language exists, because the existence of language is contingent. Resist the temptation to take it for granted, and consider the conditions which produce its existence.

I will grant to you, as a starting point, that prior to language, there was a world which living things were messing with, for the sake of agreement, because we need agreement for a starting point. The question of whether or not these words, "world" and "messing with" are truly adequate, I'll put aside for now so we can have a starting point. But I cannot agree with your proposition that this was a world of objects. That there are objects prior to the language which refers to objects is a critical point which some philosophers have cast doubt on. Is it the act of identifying and naming something which individuates that thing from its environment, as "an object", or do objects already have existence separate from their environment prior to being apprehended as such? I think Heidegger and phenomenology in general, supports the former, that an "object" is artificial in this sense, it is created by the act which individuates and identifies it as such.

If it is the case, that objects are artificial in this way, then all objects are themselves, in this sense created, and they may themselves be tools. Therefore the fundamental agreements of language are the agreements concerned with which aspects of the world that we are messing with, are individuated and identified as objects. Once we agree what it is that is the object we are referring to, then we can work on agreement concerning what can be said about the object. From this perspective, prior to identifying and naming things as objects, animals without language would not have apprehend the world which they are messing with as consisting of objects.

IMV the correspondence theory of truth, despite all its problems in the ether of speculation, is part of this automatic framework. It's so automatic that even its critics tend to use it as they criticize it. 'The correspondence theory of truth is wrong ---doesn't correspond to truth.' — pomophobe

Consider correspondence in a slightly different way now. We would commonly think that correspondence is creating and arranging our words to correspond with the world. However, we were already messing with the world before we even created language. In this act of messing with the world, there is always the element of arranging the world to correspond with "what we want". With the advent of words, "what we want" may become truth, having our words correspond to the world. Then we might mess with the world with the intent of producing truth, or correspondence. So correspondence might be just as much involved with arranging the world to correspond with our words, as it is arranging our words to correspond with the world. Furthermore, since our "messing with the world" to produce what we want goes much deeper, extending far before the existence of language as a tool for this purpose, it is very likely that correspondence is more of an aspect of us arranging the world to match our words rather than vise versa.

For me it's the other way around. The automatic and therefore elusive background is genuine. The hammer in the hand that's being employed has a different kind of being than the hammer that's being stared at and described in terms of its density and shape. In the same way we use language automatically even as we construct artificial theories about what we are doing. — pomophobe

We agree that the background provides what we call the "automatic", but where we disagree is whether the true and natural automatic reaction is to agree or disagree. I believe that the true automatic reaction is disagreement, like Luke's above, and what is evident anytime we dig down to the fundamentals of ontology, is disagreement. At the fundamental level, metaphysics, there is nothing but disagreement until we decide on principles of agreement. And agreement must be cultured and trained into us through discipline.

For me we don't even consciously assume this background. 'Assumption' is artificial here. The child learns to talk before she learns to talk about her talk philosophically. The stuff closest to us is to close for us to me without straining to notice it. Recall that a more mundane example of the background is just the ability to speak English --along with the largely unfathomed and perhaps unfathomable depths of all this means. — pomophobe

But the background must be prior to language, as what provides for the existence of language. And when we dig down through language, and see that it consists of all sorts of different language-games and vague concepts, as Wittgenstein describes, we find that the background is one of disagreement.

When we look at what is close to us we see all sorts of agreement. We might falsely conclude, and therefore assume that the background is a background of agreement. But when we step back to look at the wider picture we see a vast array of different language-games, and recognize that agreement only exists within particular, individual language-games, and the true background, which is the background of all language, is a background of difference, disagreement.

From my point of view, your ability to say 'it's just not there' depends precisely on its being there. You are intelligibly telling me that I am wrong about our shared world, that this background is a mirage or a superstition --- does not correspond to the way things really are. I'm claiming that we talk and act (without consciously assuming it) as if we share a world and can both understand and be understood. When we try to sort this out carefully, we find it hard to tell a consistent story. Our know-how won't fit inside our know-that. Our conscious models tend to run aground, hence the endless debates in philosophy, while the rest of the world just uses this framework that philosophers stubbornly insist on squeezing into a little system of knowing-that.

Words like 'truth' and 'know' are so easy to use when we aren't playing philosophy. They are the hammer driving a nail in a concrete situation. Pluck them out and just stare at them and a debate about these mundane things will rage for centuries. Yet within this same debate they'll be used in the ordinary-primary-easy way without anyone remembering that they don't yet know what they 'really' mean. If the joke wasn't misleading, we might say that what they 'really' mean is whatever philosophers don't mean by them, or when they use them without their thinking caps on. — pomophobe

I mostly agree with all of this, but only because I agreed above to the proposition of "a world". But now you've added "shared" to say it's a shared world, and I don't really agree with your use of that term. Notice though, that what you are talking about is "endless debates", and this is more descriptive of a background of disagreement rather than a background of agreement. The fact that we produce agreements for particular purposes, at a particular places and times, and this allows us to talk and act as if we share a world, indicates that for these purposes we share a world. Of course this is the way things "really are", but what good does it do to assert that? Both "agreement" and "disagreement" must be shared, so saying that the background is "shared" does nothing to support the position that the background is one of agreement rather than one of disagreement.

I understand that approach too. It's a good model when dealing with certain issues. Certainly our collisions with others and objects shape our individual models of or perspectives on the world toward consensus. But we've been doing this a long time! Our species has been designed by the training you mentioned on the genetic level. So I'd say goodbye blank slate and goodbye isolated ego. Yes I can look at an individual human, but that's like looking at a wolf and ignoring to what degree the wolf is a 'cell' in the pack. So the individual wolf is real, but our thinking of the wolf is shallow when we ignore the pack (and then its environment, etc.) With humans the situation is seemingly even more extreme. — pomophobe

It appears to me, like what you are saying here is that there is no need to analyze the foundation, the bottom, the basis of language, because it's been there for so long that we must already know it. So you look at the forest, and you know the forest like the back of your hand, but you haven't got a clue what a tree is. Nor do you have the inclination to understand what a tree is, because you assume that you must already know all about trees to be able to know the forest.

IMV, the complete absence of a shared background between people wouldn't even be called disagreement. They wouldn't have anything to disagree about. It seems to me that sharing in the same reality and at least one language is presupposed in an argument. How can I disagree with Snorf from a trans-human dimension when he says

Dalk fadlka454df acdmlk(%df dfokmsdfbl)#$kmdsfv mldkfvmlkdfvmdfvlkdfvm )(*342 — Snorf

And what would I disagree about? When humans disagree, it's not usually an idle question. How best to do things and what should be done in the first place come to mind. — pomophobe

You are framing "disagreement" in a very particular, and I would say peculiar way, as if disagreement only exists if it is expressed. But disagreement is to hold a difference of opinion, just like agreement is to hold a similar opinion. We ought to consider the possibility that each of these may exist without the respective opinions being expressed in language. If we do this, we should see that disagreement is the background of unexpressed opinions, while language and communication are the means by which agreement emerges.

So let's hypothesize that at a time prior to human language, there were animals who were thinking, and therefore had some sort of opinions, but those opinions were generally in disagreement. There is an issue with your expression of "sharing in the same reality", because one's reality cannot be otherwise from what is present within one's mind. If we want to make a generalization concerning "the reality", then the reality is that each of these animals has a different reality. It is only when human beings come to communicate, and agree, that there becomes such a thing as "the reality".

I have a vague sense of agreeing with you, but for me you have turned the page here in a way that I can't follow. In the context that I take for our background, the background is ours. We are on the same stage in front of the same cardboard scenery, hence the metaphor. What you say above reminds me of 'war is god' and other important insights (that conflict/chaos is the mother of order, etc.) — pomophobe

So this opinion, "the background is ours" is where the mistake lies. "Our background", is artificial, created through language and agreement. This background of commonality is the mistaken assumption which we must dispense. It is that faulty requirement Wittgenstein refers to. We tend to assume that this underlying agreement, this common background, "must" exist in order for language to work. But in reality, it's just not there, and that assumption just leads us to different forms of Platonism where the fundamental agreement, and commonality of opinion, precedes human existence. In reality human beings work with language to create an environment of agreement ("the world") from a background of disagreement. The real background consists of isolated individuals with differing cognitions (disagreement), from which agreement is cultured through training etc..

No it doesn't. The behavior may be due to a complex set of factors that are unobserved or unobservable. — Relativist

But that's just invoking magic, claiming unobservable causes.

As an extreme example, consider a deterministic account of a human choice: it is determined by the prior beliefs (short and long term), desires, dispositions, transient urges .... — Relativist

This is not a good example of unobservable causes, because these causes are observable, to the person acting. They are not properly unobservable. And when they are properly observed these things are understood to influence actions (affect them) but not cause them.

I understand your concerns. Still, I read Wittgenstein as pointing to a mostly unnoticed background that makes such disagreements possible/intelligible. Were it not for this background, the debate could not continue. It looks to me that knowledge-how is deeper and prior to the knowledge-that which would like to assimilate it but can't. — pomophobe

I see what you saying, but stating it as "the background which makes disagreement possible", is only an inversion of "the background which makes agreement possible". The latter recognizes that agreement is not automatic. The problem being that disagreement is prior to agreement because agreement requires some sort of understanding, which is gained, whereas disagreement (lack of agreement) does not. So disagreement (lack of agreement) precedes agreement which is something which comes into existence in a temporal order, from a lack of agreement. There is no background required for disagreement, it is simple difference.

We see that agreement is necessary for knowledge-that. And, we see that distinct people can know how to do the same thing (produce the end result) in different ways. They therefore disagree. So agreement is not necessary for knowledge-how, and as you say, and knowledge-how is prior to knowledge-that. If you were to ask, what good is agreement, for what purpose do we agree, someone might say that it is required for Knowledge-that. But how is knowledge-that better than knowledge-how? And if this can't be shown what's the point to agreeing? Then unless we agree simply for agreement sake, agreement cannot be automatic.

Look at 129, what you call "the background", is probably what he refers to as the most simple and familiar. it is the one thing which is always there, yet unnoticed because it is the background. The background is disagreement. It is always there, everywhere, in the background. But what drives us is agreement so most disagreement goes unnoticed. Then it appears like agreement is the background and disagreement springs from agreement. That is, until it strikes you that the real background is disagreement, difference, and this is what is most striking and powerful.