Besides, whether formless matter ever was doesn’t change the fact that pure potentiality is the what prime matter is conceptualised as; and being so means it must be whatever is actualising it that prevents the world from being drastically different from one moment to the next, which is what I was quibbling about. — AJJ

The point though, is that it is impossible to conceptualize something which is logically impossible. You can say it "prime matter", but you cannot conceptualize it.

That’s fine. From reading a bit about Plotinus I take participation to mean being fashioned by Soul in imitation of whatever Forms. — AJJ

The Neo-Platonists, like Plotinus use a different conception of participation than the one Plato described derived from the Pythagoreans. This follows the difficulties with the original theory of participation revealed by Plato and Aristotle. I believe Plotinus uses a system of "emanation", and some other Neo-Platonists refer to a "procession". But this is a participation of Forms, strictly, and I don't think material existence is even necessitated in Plotinus' system.

Those quotes I referred to make a very clear point: the material senses (eyes, ears) perceive the particular being, the intellect perceives the form. The material thing must always, of necessity, be apart from us - in modern terms, an object to us, something outside of us. But 'the form' is known directly by nous, as the form is basically an idea, not a thing. That is the 'rational intellect' in operation. — Wayfarer

The senses, and the intellect are both powers of the soul. They both perceive a form. "Form" refers to what a thing is. The senses perceive the form of the particular (though this perception is deficient), while the intellect may apprehend the essence, which is the universal form. So for instance, through my senses I perceive the form of the particular object in front of me, my laptop, but this perception of the object is deficient, because I am only actually perceiving certain aspects of the form, its shape, colour, etc.. At the same time, my intellect apprehends the form of the thing in the sense of "laptop", recognizing the essence of the thing as a laptop.

The form is 'the type of thing it is'. — Wayfarer

Aristotle is very clear on this point, form refers to whatness, (I think it's called quiddity) what a thing a thing is. He starts with "form" as the type of thing, but proceeds to examine "form" in the sense of the individuality of a thing. This is made necessary by his law of identity which he proposed as a law against sophism. The sophist could claim that two things which are the same type, are actually the same thing. So the law of identity designates that two distinct things which appear to be the same (are the same type) cannot actually be the same thing. Since they are in fact distinct, there must be some formal aspects which distinguish one from the other. Remember, the intellect only apprehends form, so the distinction between two things must be formal if the intellect is to be able to grasp it.

Individual particular objects have a form proper to themselves. You'll see that this is one of the main topics Aristotle investigates in his Metaphysics, where he investigates being qua being. He dismisses the commonly quoted "why is there something rather than nothing", and poses instead, the question of "why is there what there is instead of something else". So this question becomes why is a particular object what it is, and not something else. This is because it is given a particular form. He's very specific on this point, a particular thing has a form unique to itself.

My thought is that there is no 'form of the particular' because 'forms' by definition are *not* particular but universal. Read this passage again: 'The proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized; the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.' And 'a particular being' is precisely a combination of accidents and universals, of (individualised) matter and (universal) form. Hence, hylomorphic, matter-form, dualism. — Wayfarer

I think if you read more you'll find it very clear that Aristotle proposed a form of the particular. "Accidents" are formal, part of a thing's form, they are just not part of a things essence.

The quotes in this post are all exactly about that, and, I must confess, make perfect sense to me. — Wayfarer

I mostly agree with what's in those quotes, except this:

The individuality of the object cannot be due to any of those abstractions, which are universals, and so must be due to something else. To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. "Matter" confers individuality, "form" universality. — Kelly Ross

Aristotle actually distinguishes two primary senses of "form", the form which we grasp, the universal, or the essence of the thing, and the form of the particular. The form of the particular includes all the accidentals, which are left out from the essence. We do not grasp the entirety of the thing's form. So it is not matter which confers individuality, it is form, but it is the property of a material thing, to be an individual. We have in Aristotle a distinction between form as essence, abstraction, or universal, and the form of the particular, material thing.

It is in understanding that each individual object has a distinct, and unique form, that you may come to realize that the form of a particular object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that particular object. This is one way that we come to see that form is prior to material existence. Material objects come into being. When a thing comes into being, it must be the thing which it is, and not something else. It is impossible that a thing is other than itself, by the law of identity. Further, a thing is an ordered unity, it is not random. By these two premises, it is necessary to conclude that what the thing is (its form) precedes its material existence.

I guess I don’t see why it does account for that; if matter is pure potentiality then it can be anything from one moment to the next. — AJJ

Sure, but for Aristotle prime matter, or pure potentiality, is incoherent, unintelligible, a logical impossibility by the cosmological argument. Simply put, a potentiality requires an actuality to be actualized. If there ever was a time when there was pure potential, there would be no actuality at that time, and therefore the potential could not ever be actualized, so there would always be pure potential with no actuality. However, we observe that there is actuality, so it is impossible that there ever was pure potentiality.

So this is where I like Platonism: the notion that there is an organising principle (Soul), which fashions the world after the Forms. That way it seems an object remains the same object throughout changes so long as it’s participating in the same Forms. — AJJ

The problem with the theory of participation, which Plato uncovered, and becomes evident from The Republic on, into his later work, is that the thing which is participated in is passive, as the thing participating is active. What Plato discovered, and this constitutes his proposal of "the good", is that in order for the Forms to have any real participation in the real world, they must be active, actual. He found this principle of action in "the good". We act for what we perceive as the good, and the Ideas, or Forms are directed towards the good, such that they receive actuality in this way, from the good.

This is why the philosopher in the cave turns things around, realizing that what the people in the cave see as reality, the material objects, are really reflections, representations of the Forms, which are actively causing the existence of material objects, which the cave people take as the totality of reality. So a material object does not participate in the Forms, the Forms actively cause the existence of the thing by informing the matter. This makes matter the passive aspect of reality, while Forms may participate in passivity by remaining the same, and having the potential to change.

What is it he says explicitly matter is? — tim wood

Is this a trick question? The whatness of a thing is the thing's form. Matter is distinct from form. So it makes not sense to ask "what is matter", because asking "what", is asking for a form. If someone tried to tell you what matter is, they'd be handing you a form, saying "this is matter".

My bolds. I had read previously that 'mother' and 'matter' were etymologically related but never knew how. — Wayfarer

Plato described matter in Timaeus in sexist terms, coming from ancient myths. It is a passive principle which receives the form, like being impregnated. Notice also the duality in "conception". Plato plays with that duality in Theatetus, when Socrates refers to himself as a midwife.

The issue of the intellect receiving the form of the object, in conception, becomes a difficult question for Aquinas. In order to receive the form of an object, the intellect must have a passive aspect. The passive aspect is a potential, like matter, but Aquinas wants to maintain the immaterial essence of the intellect, and I think he refuses to refer to this passive aspect as material in nature. The way I understand this issue is that the intellect is essentially immaterial, but it has material accidentals. The accidentals are what individuate us as distinct, separate, and unique human beings.

Another point: that Aristotelian dualism comprised 'matter and form', not the Cartesian 'matter and mind'. — Wayfarer

What Aristotle does, which is not as evident in Plato (except perhaps Timaeus), is extend the duality of reality into all things, all objects, not just human beings. Notice that Descartes brings us back to the primitive form of dualism, similar to the dualism expressed by the myths described by Plato. Plato demonstrated how difficult it is to make sense of this dualism. From this position, where dualism is extremely difficult to make sense of, we have the choice of two distinct directions. We can dismiss dualism as simply incoherent (as is the modern trend), or we can follow a system like Aristotle's, which extends dualism into all aspects of reality. I find that the cosmological argument is very important because it demonstrates very forcefully, and decisively, that the only rational way to proceed is to extend dualism.

To those others discussing "prime matter", the cosmological argument denies the possibility that the concept of prime matter could refer to anything real.

I don’t understand the above though. Since matter isn’t composite, doesn’t that mean the same matter underlies every object? In which case the only way to distinguish between objects is by their forms; but why then do individual objects remain the same objects as their forms change? — AJJ

This is a good question, and I think that the best way to proceed is to understand "matter" as an assumption. Aristotle assumed "matter" as the principle of continuity of existence. Ultimately, it accounts for the fact that the world cannot be randomly different from one moment to the next. Newton characterized this as inertia. I understand matter as the continuity of time itself. Modern physics now uses "energy" (conservation of energy), to refer to that which remains, or persists, through change, this allows the principle of continuity to cross between one object and another, such that the continuity of an object is no longer assumed in physics, as it is in Aristotelian physics.

So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction. — AJJ

It's better to look at matter as the potential for change. The concept of "matter" is introduced by Aristotle as a means for understanding the nature of change. If a thing has one form at one moment, and a slightly different form at the next moment, we say that the thing has changed. If "the thing" is identified strictly by its form, then at one moment it is not the same thing as it is at the next, due to it's changing. So in his Physics, Aristotle wanted to be able to explain what we all observe, and say, that a thing remains being the same thing despite the fact that there are changes to it. Matter is the underlying thing which persists, and does not change when a change occurs, and assuming the reality of matter allows us to say that the same thing persists from one moment to the next, but it changes.

I say it is "the potential for change", because it is what has been determined by Aristotle as what is required (logically) to make change into something real, something comprehendible. If we can state the form of a thing (describe what it is) at one moment, and do the same at a following moment, and see that the form is slightly different, then we ought to be able to account for the change to the thing which happens between these moments. If we account for the change by stating an intermediate form, which is different from the other two, this does not solve the problem because now we have changes between this form and the others. We cannot posit an infinite number of forms between one form and the next, to account for change, so Aristotle posits matter. Matter is not a form, but it provides the potential for one form to change into another, with the thing remaining as the same thing. Matter is what makes becoming intelligible.

The context here is Aristotle's hylomorphic particulars. Aristotle rejected the existence of anything separate from hylomorphic particulars - and specifically Platonic Forms. — Andrew M

Sure, Aristotle rejected Plato's form of dualism, to introduce one which he thought more reasonable. Rejecting Platonic Forms does not make one monist. I reject Platonic Realism but I am still dualist.

The thinking is not a Platonic Form, it is the thoughts of the unmoved mover. If the unmoved mover is the universe itself then the universe is also the final cause of the changes that occur within it (in any observer's reference frame). — Andrew M

But the unmoved mover is not the universe itself. It cannot be, for the reasons I've given. And a final cause is an intentional act, which is completely inconsistent with our conception of "the universe". Some people say that the universe was created by a final cause, but it is impossible that "the universe" as we understand it, is a final case.

What is said in BK.12, Ch.7, is that the unmoved mover is a final cause, and the type of motion caused by this final cause is circular. Notice the distinction between cause and effect at 1072b: "The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things are move by being moved." (4) "For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces."(9).

What Aristotle has argued, consistently throughout Metaphysics, is that the form of the particular is necessarily temporally prior to material existence of that particular, as a cause of it. His cosmological argument shows that the form of the universe (as a particular material thing) is temporally prior to the material existence of the universe. This means that it is necessary to interpret Aristotle as dualist, because the form of a particular exists independently from the material existence of that particular, prior to that material existence. To insist that Aristotle does not allow the form of the material particular to exist independently of the material particular (as you and dfpolis do), in order to make it appear as if Aristotle's Metaphysics is consistent with modern science, is a seriously mistaken interpretation.

A reference frame provides this (see the experiment I linked earlier). The universe is an inseparable and unchangeable unity (in the universal frame of reference). Whereas in our frame of reference, the universe is separable and changeable. — Andrew M

But a reference frame is artificial, and must be supported with valid principles to be other than arbitrarily chosen. To say that "X" reference frame will give us a unified universe requires that "X" reference frame be supported. There is no theory of everything, so such a reference frame does not exist.

That may have been fine with Aristotle who had a natural theology and located his unmoved mover within the universe. As he wrote, "the things nearest the mover are those whose motion is quickest, and in this case it is the motion of the circumference that is the quickest: therefore the mover occupies the circumference." (Physics 8.10.267b.7-8) — Andrew M

This is a good example of such a misinterpretation. What he describes here is a problem with locating the unmoved mover as within the universe. He says that things closest to a mover move the quickest, but with circular motion the quickest is the circumference. This leads us toward the conclusion that the unmoved mover is not within the universe.

However, he also says it is 'clear that it is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude' (which is the basic argument of the whole section); so rather difficult to imagine the sense in which the unmoved mover is 'located within the universe'; for without parts or magnitude, how can something be located? — Wayfarer

That's right, Aristotle at this point is arguing that the unmoved mover is not within the universe. This is the point where dfpolis and I had extensive disagreement. Df argued that Aristotle taught that the principle of actuality of a thing (its form) came from within the matter of the thing. But this is clearly inconsistent with Aristotle, who argues specifically at Metaphysics Bk.7 Ch.7, that the form of a thing is given to that thing from something else, whether it's a thing produced by art, or by nature

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is doublespeak. Sure, you are "better of" not to be starving at that moment in time, than to be starving at that moment, but If there is someone else around the corner, willing to trade two, or five, or ten loaves of bread for that house, you are not necessarily "better of" for making that trade. You could have walked around the corner and gotten a much better deal, in which case you would be even "better off"..

Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try saying this to an aggressive person. Please, don't be so aggressive. I'm just making a modest request. Good luck with that!

Your argument hinges on the claim that the State gives rise to a greater degree of standardisation than does a Stateless situation; that, under Statism, peaceful order is the norm and aggression is the exception, and that, under anarchy, we are wild animals engaged in perpetual aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

No, you don't seem to get my point. I am not arguing for Statism, I've told you this already, I am arguing that your principles are wrong. I did not say that without the State we are wild animals engaged in aggression. In fact, I said the very opposite. I said that in order for a State to come into existence, we must have an attitude of loving, caring and sharing, and having things in common. A State can only come into existence from these prerequisite conditions, because it requires agreement amongst people, and this can only occur if people are agreeable, and this requires the attitude I just described, not an attitude of wild animals engaged in aggression. Therefore, prior to the existence of the State, the conditions which were conducive to bringing the State into existence, and these conditions were therefore in existence without a State, were conditions of loving, caring, and sharing. These are the only conditions which could bring a State into existence, because a State requires agreement amongst its members.

It would be helpful for us to remind ourselves that the ‘standardisation’ we are concerned with is of a specific kind, namely a system of rights. This is the only reason why ‘convention’ entered the discussion, because rights are a convention, and convention requires at least some measure of standardisation for it to be meaningful. So the question before us is whether a State really does do the job that your argument needs it to do, in terms of creating a standardised system of rights, relative to anarchy. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, "standardization" is part of the second level of agreement which I referred to. This includes State, as well as rights. These things, State, and rights, can only come into existence following the first level of agreement which I described as loving, caring and sharing, generally having the disposition of being agreeable.

I have attacked your argument at both ends. First, I have argued that the State is a miserable candidate for being a rights-standardiser, rights-protector, rights-bestower, or however you would wish to phrase it. I argued that States are engaged in perpetual aggression towards their citizens (a point to which you have not responded at all), and that the historical record excites serious distrust of the claim that battle is some sort of occasional exception to a State’s normally ordered activity. The hundreds of millions of deaths which I enumerated in my previous post are to be accounted for by wars between States, and States murdering their own citizens. Does this give you a moment’s pause? It seems not. all you have to say is: — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not defending Statism, I am showing that your principles are wrong, so this ranting against States is irrelevant. As I already explained, your principles are wrong because loving, caring, sharing, and generally having things in common, are fundamental necessities for the existence of conventions (which are agreements), including conventions on rights. Therefore, sharing and having things in common must be the top priority of any system of rights because caring and having things in common is necessary in order for any system of rights to exist. Your NAP which gives top priority to personal ownership is inconsistent with this, it doesn't pay respect to having things in common. In fact it opposes this. It is therefore the proposal of a right designed to support the things which are incompatible with the existence of rights. It is an unacceptable proposal.

To be sure, the State does not have its own inherent agency. Only individual persons have this. There is nothing objectionable in speaking about ‘collective agency’ so long as we recognise that it is an abstraction, and that we be careful not to smuggle in any untoward ontological commitments (like the idea that groups have their own independent capacity for purposeful action). As Murray Rothbard says, ultimately, there are no ‘governments’; there are only certain individuals who act in a manner that is recognised as ‘governmental’. Recognising this is much more of a threat to Statism than an apologetic for it. It dispels the notion that there is anything peculiar about a State (or the individuals comprising it) which grants it license to engage in activities which non-States do not. You yourself have spoken of the State as though it has agency, on numerous occasions. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if you respect this, then you ought to quit talking about the State being an aggressor. Or is it that difficult for you to quit the doublespeak? I've tried not to speak of the State as if it has agency, though it is difficult because it is common parlance. I think that the closest I've come is to refer to things like state-run institutions. The common parlance tends to make us blame the faults of human beings on the State. The State has bad laws. If we separate these, we can ask whether a State is really a bad thing, or whether a State (which could be a good thing) is overrun by bad people.

So it looks like we agree on this much: peaceful cooperation, and standardisation regarding rights, are possible independently of the State. You extoll the virtues of education in further cultivating this standardisation, but there is no reason why this education could not occur under anarchy (indeed, hardly any education really occurs under Statism, see Caplan’s book I mentioned). — Virgo Avalytikh

I really don't see the principles here. How is it possible to have standardized education throughout a vast land without an organization like the State? The anarchists could set up an organization like a State, and call it something other than a State, but how would this be different?

Where does this leave us in the trajectory of the discussion? We began with the principles of right-libertariansm, private property rights and the NAP. You claimed that the NAP was useless (deceptive!) in the absence of a system of rights. ‘Rights’ are a service bestowed on an individual by the State, a service provided by the State (there is the State as agent!). I have agreed that the NAP does depend on a system of rights, and that rights are conventions, which of course require a certain measure of standardisation. The disagreement from this point has seemed to involve the question of whether I can sensibly hold to a system of rights, given my disavowal of the State. My response has been to point out that, not only is the State a truly miserable candidate for rights-bestower (or whatever job it is supposed to do here), it is also perfectly possible for spontaneous order and cooperation to arise in the absence of a State. This latter point is one which you now seem prepared to concede. So, as things stand, I feel like my position is vindicated. — Virgo Avalytikh

The point is that making the basis of the hierarchy (the principal right), the right to private ownership, undermines the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, and this is having things in common. So the NAP is backward. It belittles the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, yet it requires a system of rights itself. A true system of rights must start in (be based in) commonality (that which strengthens any system of rights because rights are agreements), what we all have in common, and proceed from there toward the properties of individuals. it cannot start from the properties of individuals.

I do not at all concede to your concept of "spontaneous order". I think it is illogical. As I said, in the absence of State, can come people with a loving, caring, and sharing disposition, and this must be cultured, it is not spontaneous. Further, a claim to the right of private property is inconsistent with this loving, caring and sharing, and so is not conducive to any cooperation.. That's why the NAP is fool's play, it induces disagreement.

Dualism assumes there are entities that have a reality independent of particulars. In this context it's the Platonic Forms (which Aristotle rejected). — Andrew M

I look at this as contradictory. An entity is by definition a particular. I find this to be a common problem with modern day philosophers, they define "dualism" in such a way as to make dualism impossible, then they frown on dualism as if no rational individual would ever accept it.

Yes, but as an actual particular, not as an independent form. Adapted to a modern scientific context, the universe is that grounding existent and, in its reference frame, is the unmoved mover (with nothing external to it). Note the parallels with a modern scientific analysis: — Andrew M

The universe, as it is understood in modern cosmology, does not qualify as an unmoved mover according to Aristotle's principles. In Bk. 12, Ch.7 of Metaphysics he describes the unmoved mover as a thinking which has as its object, the same thing as the object of its desire, such that the apparent good is the same as the real good. This is a final cause, as motion is caused by "being loved". Many commentators refer to this as a divine thinking, thinking on thinking, This produces eternal circular motion such as the motion of the planets. Circular motion is eternal because the perfect circle can have no beginning point nor end point. I admit that the no-boundaries theory of the universe is similar to Aristotle's eternal circular motion, but it does not contain the final cause, which is an essential part of "unmoved mover", as the cause of the motion. This is why Aristotle is very clearly dualist, the cause of motion of material objects is a 'thinking'.

The universe is as universal as it gets and it is the precondition for the (particular) subsystems for which change and time are applicable. — Andrew M

The "universe" is not necessarily the precondition for particulars. We observe particulars, and we can conclude the reality of particulars, from empirical evidence, but we need a principle of unity to conclude that all the particulars are part of a whole, "the universe". Empirical knowledge brings us to assume the reality of particulars, but it gives us nothing to validate "the whole", because we do not see that which causes unity. Without the principle of unity, 'the universe" is an untenable concept, and this is exactly what has happened in modern physics resulting in "the multiverse". Prior to special relativity, "time" was regarded as an absolute, and this was, for practical purposes, the principle of unity, every particular shares the same "now" in time, thus a unity of "what is". This is represented in The Old Testament as God, 'I am that I am', and Plato's Parmenides, 'the Idea is like the day, no matter how many different places partake of the day, it does not affect or change the day itself. Unity is ideal.

I can't see the point of the analogy. Consider a deck of 52 playing cards. You might argue that the 52 parts of the deck are all divided and distinct, and not parts of one deck. But then you are not talking about a deck anymore, you are talking about a bunch of distinct things. You can emphasize the separation between the parts which constitute the whole, or you can emphasize the union of the parts which make up the whole, but if you deny the union, you have no right to talk about the whole. So if you deny the union between Protestants and Catholics you have no right to talk about Christians.

This is why I asked if the standardisation to which you make appeal must be absolute. If the argument is something like ‘standardisation beats disunity, the State breeds standardisation, anarchy breeds disunity, therefore the State beats anarchy’, then the argument is defeated fairly definitively simply by pointing out that Statism gives rise to its own kind of disunity. — Virgo Avalytikh

So this is false. The "disunity" which you refer to here is artificial, manufactured by your way of speaking. You are talking about Protestants and Catholics as if they are not unified in Christianity, and you imply that the distinct forms of Protestantism are not unified as Protestant. That's like talking about the 52 distinct playing cards as if they are not one deck. Sure, you can talk about things in this way, but your conclusion that the parts of a whole are a "kind of disunity" is completely unacceptable because you have simply chosen an inappropriate description. The unity exists whether you recognize it, or choose to talk about the parts as distinct, calling them a disunity.

But there is more to it. What if the aggression to which Statism gives rise is of a scale that no anarchistic situation could ever dream of? Just look at the 20th century, the bloodiest century in history. 40 million dead in WW1, 85 million dead in WW2, and (estimates vary) probably more than 90 million deaths across various communist regimes. These are Statist phenomena. If anarchy obtained, and this was the death toll that resulted, I am sure you would see this as proof-positive that anarchy tends towards animalistic aggression. No doubt, this is passed off as a ‘blip’, as Statism ‘going wrong’. After all, not all States are created equal, and ours are the good guys. We can trust them to use their monopoly on force in the right way, rather than in a corrupt or murderous way. Well, the numbers are what they are, and this century is still young. We may see worse still before we’re through. By the time we do, it will be too late to recant. Send the ring back to Mordor and destroy it. No one can be trusted with it. That is just wisdom. — Virgo Avalytikh

All these killings and yet many would argue that the world has already passed into overpopulation.

One of the reasons why the State’s monopoly on force has perdured for so long is because it has successfully persuaded the vast majority of people that a State is absolutely necessary, and that there could not be a functioning society without one. — Virgo Avalytikh

You talk about the State as if it is a person with the power of persuasion. It is not, and this is another good example of your doublespeak. People persuade other people, groups of people persuade people, the State doesn't persuade anyone. If people are persuaded that a State is absolutely necessary, they have persuade each other. But this is to be expected, as I explained the learning institutions ensure that we see things in a similar way. And that's what learning is, learning is standardization. So I wouldn't really call this persuasion, it's just a matter of learning the accepted conventions.

For that very State to be the principal agent of ‘educating’ entire generations of people is as bone-chillingly Orwellian as the State dictating the language by which we may formulate such criticism. — Virgo Avalytikh

More of the same doublespeak. The State is not an agent, nor does the State educate people. People educate each other, and they generally follow the conventions. But even the conventions themselves allow people to go outside of the conventions. These are conventions of freedom. So when we educate ourselves for example, we are free to consider things which are unconventional. This is why anarchism may be discussed and explored, it is unconventional, but the conventions do not force us to remain within the conventions. The conventions actually allow for freedom of thought and expression.

In effect, you have simply been making Hobbes’s argument: human interaction, in its natural state, is a war of all and against all, in which everyone aggresses against everyone else to benefit at another’s expense, and the only escape from this situation is for there to be a State which maintains order. There is already ample reason for doubting that States do in fact maintain any adequate degree of order, given that they are agencies of aggression, and are responsible for more violence and death than any private agent could dream of. — Virgo Avalytikh

That is not what I have said at all. I said this:

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State. — Metaphysician Undercover

The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common.

This is why I posted the essay by Friedman. ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’ is concerned precisely with the question of how individuals bargain themselves up out of the Hobbesian state of nature. — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly I do not agree with the Hobbesian description.

If nothing else, please read Friedman’s essay and watch the video on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (10 minutes only). — Virgo Avalytikh

Well, I looked over the essay, I can't say I read it thoroughly. It doesn't seem to say anything about loving, caring, sharing, developing an agreeable attitude, and having things in common, which as I described is necessary for the existence of rights. The author seems to be obsessed by some Hobbesian fantasy.

I think we've made substantial progress towards understanding each other, though it's a slow process. Let me see if I can summarize where we stand. I dismiss the NAP as a principle which could be applied in practise upon abolition of the State, because the NAP requires a system of rights, which is provided for by the institutions of the State. You have proposed that the conventions required for such a system could come into existence through spontaneous order. I think that conventions consist of freely made agreements, and that people must be cultured in a particular way to be agreeable with one another in order for such conventions to exist. And, I think that this way of culturing people is provided for by the institutions of the State.

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State.

The system of rights, which the NAP presupposes, requires both levels of agreement. Notice that the second level of agreement, from which conventions like "rights" emerge, already requires agreement on having things in common, which emerges from the first level of agreement. Therefore any proposed system of rights, with any real applicability, must be based in a principle of having things in common. To base a system of rights in private ownership would undermine the foundation, (what is provided for by the first level, having things in common), leaving all conventions such as 'rights" which are derived from the second level, as untenable. Agreement on having things in common is necessary to any system of rights.

Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible? — AJJ

I think Aquinas demonstrated that the two conceptions are compatible.

There are few problems with this. — Virgo Avalytikh

That's good, few problems is good, many problems is bad.

First, I would ask how much standardisation you believe to be necessary. Must it be absolute? — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly, "absolute" in standardization is impossible.

If two nation-States both believe themselves (or their citizens) to have some sort of rightful claim over a territory, by what higher standard do they resolve their dispute? There is none, and so, just as two individuals with competing conventions would break out into violence and the winner would be determined by arbitrary force, so too would the two nations break out into war and, once again, justice would be the advantage of the stronger. Even a multinational political union could only ever be a partial solution. In order for a State to do the work you need it do philosophically, there really can be only one of them, and its scale must be global. Anything short of that, and the standardisation problem which you seem to be levelling at the an-cap position is equally applicable to a Statist situation. — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't see that this is a good argument. Essentially you are arguing that if two nation-States come to war over an issue of territory rights, (like the Falklands Islands for example), this is no better than having all human beings acting like wild animals or very young children, running around fighting with each other over every single object which they seek to use. Notice that in the former case, the majority of people are living in peace for the majority of the time, with a few issues arising which might cause battles, while in the latter case, the majority of people are battling each other for the majority of the time. That is why I consider the former situation to be better than the latter.

If, on the other hand, the standardisation does not strictly have to be absolute, then there is no reason why a State is necessary at all to preserve and enforce it. Once we establish the precedent that a convention can exist and be enforced at something less than a global scale, there is no longer any in-principle reason why its enforcement can only be done by the kind of thing that a State is. This is especially the case since, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the services of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution can be (and, to a significant extent, are) provided by private agencies. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, this is a very bad argument. You've mentioned the possibility of "as many rights-conventions as there are individuals", but that's not really possible because a "convention" requires agreement amongst individuals. So the issue is not enforcing the convention, it is a matter of creating and maintaining agreement. This is done through the educational institutions, not enforcement. Enforcement is only for the few who step out of line of the laws. If we stop funding educational institutions because they are an expensive State-run enterprise, and educate in other fragmented ways, standardized conventions will be lost to a multiplicity of fragmented conventions.

You really cannot portray conventions as being enforced, because conventions are a matter of freely agreeing. This is why the existence of conventions relies on standardized education, not the use of force. When I say that the State upholds the conventions through the means of its institutions, there are many more institutions than the ones I mentioned.

Moreover, we ought not to underestimate the tendency of individuals to arrive at a spontaneous order in the absence of coercive institutions. — Virgo Avalytikh

You might refer to educational institutions as "coercive institutions", but if you call this aggression, I think it is outside the NAP definition, so I think that would be equivocation. Anyway, the idea of "spontaneous order" was disproven by science in its original form of "spontaneous generation", though some people have rejuvenated the idea as abiogenesis. Regardless of how you present it, "spontaneous order" is illogical and inconsistent with fundamental metaphysical principles. I think that what you call "the tendency of individuals to arrive at spontaneous order" is really mostly the result of standardized education.

Spontaneous order occurs because it is in individuals’ interests to enter into peaceful constant dealings with others, and it is private property and non-aggression which allows this to take place. And, while the integrity of such a system requires the means of enforcing one’s rights against aggressors, the very system of private property and non-aggression is capable of producing such services without violating anyone’s rights, by the standards of the system. — Virgo Avalytikh

Here you go, wandering around in your circle, lost. You have explained the conventions as coming into existence through "spontaneous order", and now you say that the system of private property along with non-aggression is capable of producing the spontaneous order. See the circle? The system of property rights is a convention, which you have said could come into existence through spontaneous order. However, you here say that having a system of property rights is a condition which is conducive to such a spontaneous order. The "circle" is always a problem with this illogical concept of "spontaneous order". The so-called "spontaneous" order only comes into existence under the right conditions, but "the right conditions" itself requires an ordering. This ordering, to create the necessary conditions, is actually created by the thing which is supposed to come into existence from the spontaneous order. So the claim of "spontaneous order" really just reflects a completely different, unobserved ordering at a deeper level which is not immediately evident. In any case, I'm really surprised that a person of your intelligence would suggest the ridiculous idea that a system of property rights could come into existence through spontaneous order. And I'm even more surprised that you would also say that a system of property rights would be the favourable condition for such spontaneous order to occur.

I thought we had come to the agreement together that the NAP presupposes property. After I drew attention to the fact that this is universally acknowledged among libertarian theorists (the NAP being a libertarian principle, after all), I thought this was an agreement we had reached. Is this not so? My claim, in any case, is that the dependence relationship between the NAP and a system of property rights is one that is logical and not temporal, so I am not committed to holding off on ‘NAP-talk’ until after I have successfully realised a particular system of property rights in the world. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, the relationship between property rights, and the NAP as libertarians propose, is logical. I've shown that the premise is false therefore the logic is unsound. The NAP is based in unsound logic, so it ought not be considered as a principle which could be applied in practise. Of course you can talk about it all you want, but I don't see the point in talking about it as if it is a principle which could be practised, unless your intent is to deceive.

The only sense in which a State may be said to ‘solve’ such a disagreement, as far as I can see, is simply by picking a winner, and enforcing a single system of rights upon everyone. — Virgo Avalytikh

I agree with you here, remember, I am not supporting Statism, so I am not going to say that the system of rights enforced by the State is necessarily reasonable or just. But the state has the institutions, courts, judges, police, by which "a single system of rights" might be enforced. The NAP presupposes such a system of rights, requires it, without the means to produce or maintain it. Furthermore, the system of the State is one agreed upon by the convention of those in the position of forming such conventions, and this is intended to create a representation of what is agreeable to the general population at that time. With all of the institutions in place, intended to ensure that the use of force by the State is restricted to those conventions which are agreeable to the general population, it is completely irrational for you, an individual person, to refer to this as "arbitrary use of force".

It is just not altogether clear what you mean by ‘State’, nor what kind of philosophical work the State is doing in your argument. The arguments you are attempting to level against libertarianism can only be successful if the State solves the problems you raise. But I am still in the dark as to how it is supposed to do so. Can you explain? As things stand, the work the State seems to be doing is to enforce one particular system of property rights upon everyone (within its territory, that is). But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

Having a particular system of rights, which is intended to represent what is agreeable to the population in general, enforced by the institutions of the State, I believe is far better than having a multitude of systems of rights, enforced by the NAP, which would be absolutely impotent because the NAP requires a particular system of rights to have any practical application.

But if the State is not the source of conventions, and conventions can and do exist independently of the State, and if conventions can be enforced by non-States, I fail to see how you arrive at a State. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is where your faulty definition of "aggression" is at play in your little game. You assume, conventions can be enforced by non-States, which is fine. But your NAP, with your definition of "aggression" places the right to ownership as the highest right. This is a convention which I, as well as others, cannot agree to. Therefore it is very clear that as much as you might create a non-State entity which respects the NAP, others will create a non-State entity with no respect for the NAP. You assume to have the "right" to defend your property with force according to your principles, and the others assume a right to seize your property with force, according to their principles, and there is no peace. What good is the NAP if the vast majority of people refer to some other principle of rights?

But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

It's irrelevant whether the system is "the right" one. This is because organization and cooperation amongst people is better than disorganization and lack of cooperation, as it is conducive to a happy, peaceful life for the human population. Furthermore, if the persons charged with creating the conventions have a true respect for the general population, the State will have a good system, and be on track toward finding "the right" system.

If it is your claim, that the system of the State has as its end, something bad, and the organization and cooperation within the state is all going toward a bad goal, then you ought to be able to make a demonstration of this. Placing ownership of property as the highest goal of human existence, as your NAP does, and implying that the State's goal is to misappropriate the properties of individuals, therefore the goal of the State is something bad is just foolish, irrational talk.

If you want to demonstrate that the State is bad, get to some real principles, rather than playing with material objects like a child.

It is not possible to prioritise a non-property-right over a property right, because all rights are fundamentally property rights. I made this point here:

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends.

And it certainly appeared as though you concede this point: — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure, I conceded that point concerning "rights", but didn't you also notice that I appealed to something higher than rights? It is through the appeal to a higher principle that we have the means to prioritize rights. Notice above, I am talking about goals, and good and bad. This is the basis of morality, and rights are grounded in morality, not property ownership. Don't you think that the latter (rights are grounded in property ownership) is a rather foolish opinion? Rights concern property ownership, but you cannot ground a principle in itself, that would be circular, and not a grounding at all. So we ground rights in morality, and produce a hierarchy of rights accordingly.

Maybe you need to refine what you intend by ‘take advantage of’. In a voluntary trade, we both ‘take advantage of’ each other, in the sense that we both benefit from one another’s existence. — Virgo Avalytikh

If you do not recognize that there are transactions where one person takes advantage of another, or a group takes advantage of another group, and it is not by means of fraud or lying, and that these instances ought to be discouraged rather than encouraged, then I do not see any point in discussing this.

I think this is where my main problem lies. You are claiming that, in the grand scheme of things (ignoring fringe cases) any interaction that is not aggression - initiatory use of force, as you put it - is beneficial for everyone involved. The only way I can see this claim working is if you bend aggression to encompass a whole lot more than just the initiatory use of force. — Echarmion

That's right, that's why I mentioned to Virgo other forms of aggression, aggressive sales and aggressive trading on the market. When we are confronted with such "aggressions" we often make mistakes in our decisions. And these mistakes result in trades which are not mutually beneficial.

There is a leap being made here, and I do not make it with you. You seem to be saying, ‘We need to establish a universal convention of property rights first, and only then can we start talking about the NAP.’ — Virgo Avalytikh

This is your claim not mine, the NAP "presupposes" a system of property rights. Therefore there needs to be a universally accepted system of property rights before the NAP can have any merit. Otherwise the NAP is useless because it would be applied differently according to different conventions of property rights. This is obvious. I am just following the logic of your claims. The NAP refers directly to the right to ownership. You have stated this clearly. But if what I believe is my right to ownership is different from what you believe is your right to ownership, we would each apply the NAP differently. So the NAP would be meaningless in this case, useless. And when the land is full of people claiming that you have no right to ownership of what you claim to own, the NAP does nothing for you.

Alright, so let us say that ‘being good’ is a logical precondition of ‘not acting aggressively’. Does this mean that we cannot even have a discussion about the worthiness of non-aggression, until we have got a suitable number of people in the world to be good? I don’t see why. We can develop a system of thought with numerous logical steps, before we seek practically to implement the first, or before we have successfully done so. Of course we may. — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure we can discuss such things, but what force does a discussion impose upon our actions if we fail to agree with one another? When we discuss things and fail to agree, we will each retreat and resort to our own means. Since we haven't agreed on property rights, the NAP could not be relevant.

Again, a complete non sequitur. That the State is the only possible ‘source’ of rights has not yet been justified. Indeed, that the State even can be a ‘source’ of rights has not been justified. It is simply assumed. There is nothing special or mystical about States. They are associations of human individuals, who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a historically arbitrary territory. And this leads into another point which ought to be clarified: I do not begin with an opposition to Statism. That is an incidental consequence of libertarianism. It is because the State exists in violation of the NAP that it is objectionable. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've been through this already. I don't claim "the State" as the source of rights. I thought we agreed on "convention". But the State upholds the conventions with the means of force when necessary. Notice I say "when necessary". The majority of conventions are upheld by the State without the use of force, through institutions, because we readily agree to them. But without the State we do not have the institutions, nor the means to uphold the conventions, and the conventions fall apart. "State" and "conventions" co-exist.

That the State violates the NAP is simply an indication that the NAP places the right of ownership higher up in the hierarchy of rights, than the conventions which the State is bound to uphold places that right. The State upholds a multitude of rights, and there is a hierarchy of rights which itself is conventional. That the right to private ownership is limited, restricted, even forfeited in some cases, because other rights are of greater importance, according to the conventions which the State is bound to uphold, is evidence that the NAP is not a good principle. Why ought the right to private ownership be given such priority when the conventions which are presently accepted, and upheld by the state, assign a lesser priority to this right? The State can force one to give up ownership (fines) when that individual has committed offences not covered by the NAP. Clearly there is reason to believe that some rights ought to take priority over property rights. In this case the State is right in forcing one to give up one's property. Valuing private property higher than what is provided for in the conventional hierarchy of rights, validates the use of force against oneself, in contravention of the NAP.

You begin in the opposite direction. You begin with the State, taking for granted both its legitimacy and its necessity, as well as affording it the unique privilege of rights-bestower, and from these assumptions you take it that the libertarian alternative is impossible. But this is not convincing. Rights are principles, abstractions, and to leave the question of which rights are worth recognising, and which are not, to the State is simply un-philosophical. It is nothing short of ‘might makes right’ — Virgo Avalytikh

No. this is not all what I've been arguing.

If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. — Virgo Avalytikh

I've already given you examples of such, aggressive sales, and aggressive trading. They refer to the means by which one takes advantage of another in business transactions. If one takes advantage of the other, yet it is not fraud, you cannot call this "mutual advantage". Are you not familiar with these terms?

In Aristotle's Physics, the principles of change are matter and form. Form is what is actively changing, and matter is the underlying aspect of a thing which does not change, allowing us to say that it is the same object which has been changed. In Metaphysics, form is actual and matter is potential. This is derived from De Anima where matter which is the substance of the body gives form which is the substance of the soul, its potencies, potential.

I look at "substance" as primarily a logical term for Aristotle. It is defined in his Categories, and doesn't play a big role in his Physics or his De Anima. I look at substance as what substantiates logic, it's almost like what gives a true premise. Primary substance is the particular thing, what we would call the object, and secondary substance is what we would call the logical "subject". In ancient Greece there was an issue (which is actually prevalent today) with sophists assigning identity to the logical subject. This is probably why "ousia" was associated with the subject. But as a subject, is simply how an object is represented within logic, so if there is a problem with this representation, it's like a false premise, and the logic which follows is unsound. This is why Aristotle moved to put identity directly within the thing itself ( a thing is the same as itself), instead of the identity which we give it, what we say about it. So for instance, "Socrates" refers to a particular man, an object, and that object referred to is the primary substance. But if we make "Socrates" a subject of logic, and state the proposition "Socrates is a man"., then the identity of "Socrates" is not the object itself, but what the proposition says about Socrates, "is a man". This is substance in the secondary sense, it substantiates the logic, as the premise. Notice that within the logical system being employed, "Socrates" cannot refer to anything other than a man, this is fixed by the premise, and this is the stipulated identity of "Socrates". But if there is a problem with this initial identification, identifying the object which is referred to as "Socrates" as a man, then the soundness of the logic is off.

That is why Aristotle moved to put the identity of the object right into the object itself (primary substance) rather than what was traditional in the logic of the time, which was to make the identity of a thing, what we say about it, (secondary substance). Notice that what we say about a thing is formal, our descriptions are of the thing's form, what the thing is. But a thing always changes, it's form is changing, while the human description is fixed. So he uses the concept of "matter" to account for that changingness (the potential for change). Then "matter" accounts for that aspect of the object which the human mind cannot grasp, and the difference between the object in its own identity, and the object as identified by human beings. We identify the essence, but the thing itself contains accidents which are associated with the matter.

If you read carefully Aristotle's principal definition of "soul" (Bk2, Ch1) in De Anima, you'll see that the soul is a "form" of a body, the actuality of a body, and that this is a body with life potentially in it. I believe it is important to recognize that the soul for Aristotle is a form. It is not a composition of matter and form, which would be a body, it is just the form. Further, "actuality" is used here in the sense of possession of knowledge, rather than exercising the use of knowledge. So it is a possessive actuality, the body itself manifests as the knowledge possessed by that form. If you read further, you'll see that within the material body itself are the various potencies (potentials) possessed by the soul. These are the powers of the soul, power of self-subsistence, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, etc.. The key to understanding that these powers are all potentials, is Aristotle's description that each of these powers is not always active, as the being might be asleep, so the potencies must be actualized, brought into action.

Andrew M insists that the separation between matter and form can only be made in principle, in theory, but it is not a real separation. I argue that Aristotle gives reason to believe in a real separation. First, as I've argued above, he demonstrates that the form of a particular material object is prior in time to the matter/form composite of that object. Now, here in De Anima, the description of the potencies (powers) of the soul, as remaining inactive, in potencia, while the soul is active as the animal lives, requires such a separation between the actuality of the soul, and the various potentials. This separation between the actual and the potential is not just a separation in principle, it is necessarily very real, and is most evident in the case of a seed. The seed may lie dormant, as potential, for a long period of time. The knowledge within the seed is possessed by the soul, but is not actually being used by the soul, so there is a real separation here, between actuality and the potential.

Yes he refers to all of those things. However I'm asking for specific quotes that would demonstrate your claim that they are separable from particulars. Without that, you're assuming dualism without basis in your reading of Aristotle. — Andrew M

I think I've provided you with all that. The formula for the material existence of the particular is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that particular. What does "dualism" mean to you?

It is relevant because you seemed to deny it in your last two posts. — Andrew M

I surely didn't deny it, it's a principal point of the cosmological argument. What we observe is that the potential for a given thing precedes the actual existence of that thing. This is the case with every particular, material thing. However, the potential for a thing does not necessarily produce the actual existence of that thing, it requires another actuality as a cause of its actual existence. Since we cannot accept an infinite regress (without beginning), there is necessarily an actual existence which is prior to all material existence. This position, that the actuality of formal existence is prior to potentiality of material existence is reinforced by the logic that if there was ever a time when there was only potential without anything actually, there would always be potential without anything actual, because that potential could not actualize itself. However, what we observe is that there is actual existence. Therefore it is necessary that the actual is prior in time to the potential, in an absolute sense. And this is why Aristotle insists that no potential could be eternal, and he refutes Pythagorean idealism on this basis because they posit eternal ideas which Aristotle has demonstrated exist only in potentia.

You regard the form as the agent whereas I regard the particular as the agent. — Andrew M

Under Aristotelian terms, form is actual, matter is potential. A particular thing is a composite of matter and form. However, there must be some sort of form (agent) to act as a cause, in order to account for the actual existence of any particular material object. That form, (agent), as a cause, is prior in time to the material existence of the particular thing. The particular cannot be the agent, as this would mean it is the cause of its own existence.

The form of the geometer (somehow separate from the geometer?) didn't actualize the geometric construction, the geometer did. — Andrew M

The geometer's action is accounted for by final cause, intention, what later became known as free will. So it's true, as you say that the geometer, as a physical object, did act to bring about the geometrical construction on paper, but the cause of that act was a final cause, intention. This is where we see that Aristotle's principles support dualism, in the concept of "final cause", which is distinct from material, formal, and efficient cause. The intent, the form of the construct within the intellect of the geometer (the intellect being a property of the soul such that Aristotle says the form of the construct is in the soul of the artist) is the active cause, "agent".

A true but cryptic response. Do you think fruit would exist without particular fruit such as pears and apples? — Andrew M

The point for Aristotle, is not so much whether the universal form is prior to the particular. That is more of an issue for Plato in the Timaeus, and the Neo-Platonists, who describe this as a progression, or emanation. The One, being most universal is first, and imparts itself to the less and less universal, with the form of the individual being the last. What Aristotle demonstrates is that the form of the particular thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that thing.

The Neo-Platonists took this principle much further to speculate about how the form of the particular, which is necessarily prior in time to the material particular, comes from a more universal form. This is more like the relationship between the part and the whole.

I find your question is badly worded. I do believe there was fruit before there was pears or apples. So the wording of your question is clearly devised so as to be pointed toward a desired answer.

That, I think, best captures Aristotle's thinking about the natural world and makes sense of his rejection of Platonic forms. — Andrew M

As I said, Aristotle clearly denied matter without form, but he did not deny form without matter. In fact, the principles of his Metaphysics necessitate it, as is evident in his cosmological argument. Understanding Aristotle's cosmological argument is very important to understanding his metaphysics, because it unlocks the door to understanding the consistency between Aristotle, Neo-Platonists, and Christian theology.

I wonder if Virgo isn’t actually an older white male billionaire? She’s certainly a cheerleader for their cause. — Noah Te Stroete

Virgo claims to be a cheerleader for the wealthy, but really acts toward removing the rights to ownership with anarchism. That's why I call it deception. No State, means no universal convention on property ownership, means the NAP is inapplicable. It's deception to circulate the NAP as if a billionaire's right to ownership would be respected without the State to support it. I think Virgo is seeking financing for the anarchist cause. Give to anarchism, we guarantee your property rights with the NAP, at a cost much less than taxes.

And being able to leave if I disagree with the laws of that land. — Obscuration

That's a tough one, emigration isn't so easy.

That there is a plurivocity of opinions doesn’t mean that we should throw away the whole enterprise. People who disagree about the precise substance of rights may still agree that there ought to be a system of rights, just as two people may have completely different ontologies while still agreeing that ontology is meaningful and worthy. Moreover, the fact that there may be diverse conventions with regards to rights does not imply that all conventions are created equal. Some systems of rights are good and worthy, and some are not. This is where political philosophy has a role to play. By the same token, the fact that one system of rights might be recognised as ‘conventional’ does not imply that there is not a better system of rights that we might choose to employ. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, we can probably all agree that there ought to be a system of property rights, but this doesn't make such a convention magically appear. But the NAP, as described by you, presupposes the existence of such a system. So it is the NAP which ought to be thrown away, because its principal prerequisite does not exist. Once convention on property rights is established, then we might decide whether something like the NAP is called-for.

Coming at it from a slightly different angle (though it amounts to the same thing), rights determine the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

But you have been proposing a completely different angle, one in which the State has been abolished. At this point, there are no rights, that's the important point which you do not seem to be grasping. At this point we cannot say "rights determine the acceptable use of force" because there are no rights, the revolt is against the State which is the support of the existing rights. At this point, the use of force will be inevitable, it will be required to abolish the State. Furthermore, the use of force will play a role in determining which rights are acceptable, not vise versa.

The alternative to a system of rights is for there to be no principled system of resource-allocation, and no principled system determining the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

That situation follows inevitably from the anarchist induced abolition of the State. It is inevitable because of disagreement. There will be disagreement concerning the need to abolish the State, therefore disagreement as to whether such force is "acceptable use of force". The NAP which might be touted by those who abolish the State will not be respected because the Statists will declare wrongful use of force. And, as I pointed out, if the State is abolished, the NAP would then have no system of property rights to support it, so it becomes completely meaningless anyway.

What you have presented does not pose a particular threat to the worthiness of the NAP. Your argument seems to be that, since the NAP presupposes a system of rights, and since rights are conventions, and since there is no single, definitive convention regarding rights, the NAP should be abandoned. I don’t see how this follows. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try looking at it this way. Suppose we have a principle which states "if we are good, we will not act aggressively". Notice that "we will not act aggressively" requires "we are good", just like the NAP requires a system of property rights. Trying to get people to not act aggressively is impossible and a useless exercise if the people are not good. What is required is to make the people good. Likewise, trying to get people to respect and obey the NAP is impossible, and a useless exercise without an agreed upon system of property rights, because the NAP requires that. So what is required to work on is an acceptable system of property rights. That's how normative principles work, it's pointless to push a principle without the necessary conditions for application of the principle.

If you disagree, can you provide a specific quote where Aristotle would distinguish and refer to "immaterial form" and "material form"? — Andrew M

The point is that Aristotle does not disallow the possibility of form without matter, as he does disallow matter without form. He does not say specifically "immaterial form", but he refers to Ideas, essences, Forms, and intelligible objects throughout his Metaphysics, and clearly determines that essence is substance in Bk.7. Remember, in his Categories there are two distinct substances, primary and secondary substance. In his Metaphysics he looks at being qua being and determines that it is necessary to conclude that essence is substantial, this is Ch.6.

Now, in Ch.7 of Bk.7 he explains "agency", this is what is necessary for the coming to be (becoming) of any thing. It is necessary that the form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into being, is prior in time to the material existence of the thing, in order that the thing will be the thing that it is, and not something else. This is explained earlier, and supported by his law of identity. A material thing is a particular composition of matter, with a particular form, not other than it is, and not something random. So the form of the thing (what it will be) is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing. In the case of a thing produced by art, the form comes from the soul of the artist. So in Ch.8 it is stated that form is put into matter. I had a long discussion about this section of A's Metaphysics with dfpolis in another thread. Df argued that the form (as the source of actuality, what a thing actually is) of a thing came from within the matter, but this is inconsistent with Aristotle because matter is potential, and Aristotle clearly describes here that the form is put into the matter. This necessitates that the form of a particular thing exists independently of, and prior in time to, the material existence of that thing.

I'm well aware of the senses in which actuality is prior to potentiality but that is not what I was referring to. The temporal sense in which actuality is not prior to potentiality is discussed by Aristotle where he says, "... for the individual actuality is posterior in generation to its potentiality." (Aristot. Met. 9.1051a) [italics mine] — Andrew M

I cannot see how this is relevant. The potential for a particular material actuality precedes that material actuality in time, this is clear. However, to actualize that particular potential, rather than some other potential (because potentials consist of multitudes) requires an act of agency. It is this actuality, the act of agency, which is necessarily prior in time to the existence of any particular thing, which is being discussed here. The need to assume this form of "actuality" is what necessitates dualism. There is an act of agency which is necessary for the existence of any material thing, this is what accounts for the actual existence of a contingent thing. Since there cannot be an infinite regression of material things backward in time, one prior to the other infinitely, there is the need to assume an actuality (Form) which is prior in time to the existence of all material things. That is the cosmological argument.

Primary substance is particular such as Socrates or an apple. Secondary substance is formal, such as man or fruit. To suppose that man or fruit are separable from particulars comes from Plato, not Aristotle. This is what Aristotle's rejection of Platonic forms was about and it is why Platonism and hylomorphism are not consistent with each other. Though, of course, Aristotle is fine with "taking that which does not exist in separation and considering it separately" (Aristot. Met. 13.1078a) [italics mine]. — Andrew M

"Substance" is substance, whether it is primary or secondary substance. It appears like you haven't read Metaphysics Bk.7.



What evolves in later Platonism (Timaeus, Aristotle, Neo-Platonism), which is inconsistent with modern day representation of "Platonism", is a distinction between the Ideas produced by the human mind, and the true separate Forms. This separation is necessary to account for the imperfections of human Ideas. Human Ideas are created through abstraction, and appear to be posterior in time to sensible, material existence, while the separate Forms are necessarily prior in time to material existence. Aquinas provides a very coherent description of this difference. The forms of the human intellect, abstraction, conceptions etc., do not have separate existence, they are dependent on the material existence of the human being, and this material existence accounts for the deficiencies of these forms. However, there are separate Forms, property of the divine intellect, which are not dependent on material existence, material existence is dependent on these Forms.

The idea of right-wing anarchism strikes me as rather ridiculous. Since the poor outnumber the rich by a vast majority, how could these people reach a consensus which would allow the rich property owners to maintain their wealth? Who puts forth such crazy ideas ... Virgo?

Dualism doesn't follow from Aristotle's examples. The soul is not separable from the body - it is always the particular that acts (and thus is the locus of causality, including final cause). That is standard hylomorphism. — Andrew M

Aristotle denies that matter can exist independent of form, but not that form can exist independent of matter. And, when you understand the earlier part of his Metaphysics, which I referred to earlier, you'll see that the form of a thing is necessarily prior (in time) to the material existence of that thing. This necessitates a dualism between the immaterial form and the material form.

Logically, but not temporally. Which is what Aristotle says in the last sentence of the Chapter 9 quote. — Andrew M

He clearly argues that actuality is prior to potentiality temporally at the end of Ch 9, Bk 9, "so that the potency proceeds from an actuality". That's why potential cannot be eternal. I think you ought to read the entirety of Bk. 9, especially Ch. 8 where he explains in what sense actuality is prior to potentiality in time. 1050b, (5) "...one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.".

We agree that something actual is needed to actualize a potential. However the Aristotelian position is that that thing must be substantial, not merely formal. That is what we observe. — Andrew M

For Aristotle there are two senses of "substance" primary substance and secondary substance. One can be said to be material, the other formal. He provides the principles to deny that there can be material substance without form, but there are no principles to deny a substance which is form. without matter. This is why the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians who posit independent Forms as substance, maintain consistency with Aristotle.

The perceived threat is the military in the grand scheme of things, NOT Joe Schmoe who became excessively upset his boyfriend/girllfriend, or even extremist group personnel. Is Joe a threat? Of course, but not as large as a threat as the government entity trying to care for me.

30 people can do massive damage to an area when the citizens do not have the same weapons and tactical knowledge when they themselves are highly trained and capable. — Obscuration

Actually, contrary to what you say, if the citizenry are unarmed, and the military is armed, the citizenry will be subdued with very little "damage". But if the citizenry is armed and decides to take on the military, that's when you'd have "massive damage".

Remember that time is simply changes/motion. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense. How do you account for the difference between past and future with a definition of time like that?



That's exactly right. There must something which remains the same, through the temporal duration, in order that our calling it "the same river" is a valid identity. Aristotle resolved this discrepancy between being/not being (Parmenides), and becoming (Heraclitus) with his duality of matter/form. Identity, under the law of identity, as "the same thing", does not require that the identified thing does not change, it requires that the thing is the same as itself, therefore not other than itself, and this does not exclude the possibility that the thing is changing.

I would think this would be a huge problem for anarchists. With anarchy there would be no single convention on property ownership, so to propose a form of anarchism which pretends to be based in a system of property rights requires that those property rights be explicitly expressed. If these principles of property rights were adhered to, then I think we would just end up with a State, and not a form of anarchy.

There's more to life than private property. I have a lot of possessions, and they mean a lot to me. Some I bought, some given to me, some I found, and there's probably a few that I borrowed and forgot to return. Each one is in my possession and is mine. But if I said I have the right to claim any of these things as my private property I'd be referring to the legal status given by the State.

It doesn't follow in the least that therefore libertarians 'don't have' a system of property rights — Virgo Avalytikh

A multitude of different, incompatible philosophies of property rights does not constitute a system of rights. We've agreed already that rights follow from conventions. So when people do not agree there is no convention, therefore no rights. What you describe is incompatible philosophies, not conventions.

I would say that a major task of political philosophy is to determine in a reasoned way what kinds of conventions in relations to property are worth recognising and which are not. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if we can pick and choose which philosophies of property rights we would like to recognize, and call these "conventions", doesn't that mean we can choose our rights? What good is the NAP if it presupposes a system of property rights, and is built on property rights as its foundation, but each individual is allowed to choose one's own system of property rights, depending on their preferred philosophy?

The fact that there are differences of opinion on this question is not to say that there are not or could not be such conventions; it simply requires us to do the hard work that political philosophers do. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem though, is with the NAP. As you aptly demonstrated, it presupposes property rights, it requires them, and is meaningless, useless without them. Now you admit that such conventions (which establish property rights) don't even exist, and require philosophers to do the hard work of producing them. Therefore the NAP is meaningless, useless. So, let's dump the NAP as not worth the paper it is written on. Agree? Or, would you keep pushing the NAP creating the illusion that people who presently own property protected under rights given by the State, would maintain such property rights if the State were dissolved? I think that's deception.

And, as they all recognise, it presupposes a system of property rights. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've come back to the same issue we started with. You disavow the State, which gives a system of property rights, but at the same time you presuppose a system of property rights. Unless you produce an acceptable statement of property rights, you have no system of property rights, and therefore your presupposition is void, false. You've shown me two, very distinct and incompatibles systems of property rights, claimed by libertarians, the left and the right. Clearly the incompatibility between these two indicates that there is no such thing as the libertarian system of property rights, and your presupposition is void, false.

Your initial assertion was that the NAP is incompatible with private property. — Virgo Avalytikh

To be more precise, I said that the NAP is incompatible with the right to private property. You have shown me the fundamental disagreement between right and left on this issue of property rights, such that you have demonstrated that there is no such thing as convention on property rights. Therefore there is no "system of property rights". The NAP presupposes the existence of something which does not exist, a system of property rights. The convention required for there to be a system of property rights does not exist, yet the NAP presupposes such. That is why the right to private property (something recognized as non-existent, by lack of convention) is incompatible with the NAP which presupposes the existence of that right.

So to take the first example ("Why is the sum of the interior angles of a triangle equal to two right angles?"), the parallel line is drawn by the geometer. The "act of thinking" does not mean that the construction is in the geometer's mind, it means that drawing the line is an intelligent act (by the geometer). Once drawn, the question about the angles can then easily be answered. Similarly for the second example. — Andrew M

Right, now we have here what you call "an intelligent act". This is an act with a purpose, its purpose is to demonstrate the angles. The cause of such an act, in Aristotelian terms is a final cause. In Aristotle's biology, the existence of such acts is accounted for by the soul. And this is why he is dualist.

What Aristotle is showing here is that mathematical (and thus universal or eternal) truths can be discovered by acting intelligently on sensible objects, in this case the geometrical drawing of a particular triangle and a particular line. — Andrew M

But his demonstration goes deeper than this. Notice that he is arguing in this section, that actuality is prior to potentiality, in all senses of the word "prior". So he turns this against Pythagorean idealists, and those Platonists who adhere to Pythagorean idealism, to show that it is impossible that such mathematical "Ideas" are eternal. This is his famous refutation of such Idealism, known as the cosmological argument. It is impossible that potential is eternal. That is, looking back in time, it is impossible that potential is prior to actual. Converted to look ahead in time, this becomes the principle of plenitude, given enough time any potential will be actualize, so potential cannot be eternal in that way either.

The geometrical figures (as geometrical) are neither located in a separate Platonic realm nor in the mind, they inhere in sensible objects either as potentials (before construction) or actuals (after construction) and thus are a legitimate source of knowledge. — Andrew M

Let's assume that the geometrical figures inhere in the sensible world, prior to being actualized by the human mind, as potentials. According to Aristotle's cosmological argument, there must be something actual which is prior to these potentials. This is because if the potential was prior in time to the actual, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, so there would always be only potential without any actuality. Something actual is needed to actualize a potential. And what we glean from observation is that there is something actual, therefore actuality is prior to potential. The Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologians take up this argument for Forms (actualities) which are prior to material existence (material existence having the nature of potential).

It’s not a ‘problem’ at all. In a system of thought, some beliefs are relatively basic and some are derived. I have made no secret of the fact that the NAP presupposes a system of property rights; this is a point I have made numerous times. — Virgo Avalytikh

You're going around in circles, we've covered this already. The NAP does not presuppose property rights, that is your twisted interpretation. You have explicitly stated what is protected by right according to the NAP as "that which belongs to oneself". I grant you one's own body as "that which belongs to oneself". You have disavowed the State, so you cannot turn to any legal principles of ownership provided by the State. How do you get from here to a system of property rights?

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, I'll go with this, it sounds reasonable.

In regard to the concrete question of how a specific property right is generated in the first instance, there are two main competing views in the literature. Right-libertarians in the tradition of Locke argue that all external resources are originally unowned, and come to be owned as individuals engage in productive acts of transformation (‘homesteading’). Thereafter, just property titles are transferred through peaceful exchange, or gift. Left-libertarians, by contrast, and more in the tradition of Rousseau, consider all the resources in the world to be owned by everyone in an egalitarian manner. The arguments both ways are voluminous and technical, but if you can get your hands on ‘Left-Libertarianism and its Critics’ (Hillel Steiner and Peter Vallentyne, eds.), there is nothing better out there for exploring these issues. — Virgo Avalytikh

You propose here two distinct perspectives on property rights, Right-libertarian versus Left-libertarian. The two are not reconcilable. But from what I said above, we have an NAP which, contrary to your belief, does not require a system of rights. So why dwell on this issue of property rights? There is no need for property rights, it's a distraction from good governance.

Put a pin in the word ‘aggression’ for moment. There is a philosophically and practically meaningful distinction between the initiatory use of force which invades that which belongs to another, and the defensive use of force used to protect that which belongs to oneself (or some other victim of initiatory force which one wishes to aid). What the libertarian is seeking to do via the NAP is to distinguish these two things, prohibiting the former and permitting the latter. So the word ‘aggression’ is used to designate the initiatory use of force. Another word might easily have been chosen, but this one is perfectly suitable. There is nothing ‘improper’ about it. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem, Virgo, is that you are taking for granted ownership of property, "that which belongs to oneself" in your definition of aggression. If you properly define "that which belongs to oneself", you will see that this is one's body, and nothing else. The properties of "oneself" is one's own body and nothing else. To extend "belongs to oneself" beyond the limitations of one's own body, requires principles of justification. How do you justify your assumption that property beyond the limits of one's own body belongs to oneself?

So, when someone makes an initiatory use of force, to invade a property which is not a part of your body, but you claim as belonging to yourself, you have no principle by which to call this an act of aggression, because you have no principle justifying your claim that this property belongs to your self. All you have is a claimed "right" to ownership, without any State to support this right. Your NAP allows you to view an act as aggression if it is force against properties of "oneself", but what principles relate oneself to other things, allowing one to own others?

That's why I say you've hijacked the NAP to use it in an unethical way.

They are quite muddled. Most people form their beliefs about libertarianism based on what non-libertarians say about it, and it certainly seems that you have arrived at your position in this way. — Virgo Avalytikh

I've gotten my knowledge of libertarianism from you, in this thread. Are you non-libertarian? Perhaps your ideas are quite muddled.

It's a very crucial issue as it simply shows that not everything is taken care by the markets and there is this very real collective effort on the shoulders of the society, not the individual. — ssu

If everybody's priority for ownership of property, reasons for claiming ownership of things, was the same, then things might be taken care of by the markets. But there is a big discrepancy between owning capital and owning things for personal subsistence. Any reasonable convention designed to give a right of ownership needs to respect this difference.

Minor differences due to air pressure and the supposed variation in accuracy of thermometers can be taken into account and are irrelevant to the point. — Janus

Your point was the testability of the proposition "water boils at 100 degrees at sea level". You said, we could just take a thermometer and test this. My point is that such a test is impossible. Some days you will see that water boils at 100, some days it will not. You cannot test such a proposition in this way, because "sea level" is not the proper variable, "air pressure" is. Now that you see the need to properly account for the variables, you will see that other variables, such as the physical constitution of the water, also make a difference. Dissolved elements make a difference (ever boil sugar water?). And have you ever heard of heavy water?

Clearly, your claim about how easy it is to test such propositions is way off base. .

So, for example, how exactly evolution happened is not directly observable being in the past, whereas the proposition that water boils at 100 degrees at sea level can be tested by direct observation in the present using a thermometer. — Janus

It's not that simple though. Some days water will boil at 100, and other days not, in the same location, depending on air pressure. And even if you allow for differences in air pressure, all you'd be testing is the accuracy of the measuring instruments.

The issue here is an uninteresting semantic one. 'Aggression' has a specific meaning in the context of libertarianism: it is the initiatory (in distinction from 'defensive') use of force; hence 'non-aggression principle'. — Virgo Avalytikh

That's the problem libertarians define "aggression" in a way which suits their purpose, not in a way which represents the thing which we refer to as aggression. Then they hijack the non-aggression principle, applying this definition of "aggression", to create the illusion that the non-aggression principle is compatible with the right to own property. With a proper definition of "aggression", the illusion is shattered.

The libertarian has the right to use force to defend the ownership of one's property which has been obtained through aggressive means that do not qualify as "aggression" under the libertarian's definition. Simply put, the libertarian may use unethical, aggressive means (aggressive sales, aggressive trading, lying, cheating, fraud, etc.) to obtain property, as these do not qualify as "aggression" for the libertarian, then use force to defend the right to own this property.

To say of any particular action that it is ‘aggressive’ presupposes a background schema of rights. Therefore, rights are a precondition of aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is clearly false. There is no need for "aggression" to be defined in relation to "rights". You are just making this up in order to subjugate "non-aggression", thereby creating the illusion of compatibility between non-aggression and the right to property.

An act of aggression is an act of offence. There are offensive (aggressive) acts which do not violate another's rights. But sometimes if such behaviour becomes extremely hurtful, human beings will enact rights to protect people from it, as is the case with hate speech for example. Hate speech is an aggressive act.

Perhaps we have both signed up for a boxing match. — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly, a punch in a boxing match is an act of aggression. Most sports are aggressive, and much competitiveness in general, is aggressive.

I see that you trying to qualify "aggression" for the purpose of your argument. I think that to define "aggression" in relation to "rights" is really a mistaken enterprise, because aggression existed long before rights. Life forms other than human are aggressive, but they do no have human rights, so "aggression" is the wider category. Therefore there is aggression which is not relative to rights. This is extremely evident in acts of aggression which do not amount to an infringement on an individual's rights. To limit "aggression" to "right infringement" does not give a clear description of what aggression really is. And, as I told you, "right" is a concept which has emerged as a form of aggression itself.

The leap you make from this to a justification of Statism is completely unwarranted, logically. — Virgo Avalytikh

I didn't attempt to justify Statism. What I am arguing is that non-aggression is incompatible with the right to property. I even said that saying a State has the "right" to govern is incoherent. where does it look like I am trying to justify Statism?

You simply insist that, if we do away with a State, we would have to do away with rights too. But I see no reason to think that this is so. The fact that rights are commonly ‘associated’ with a State is not particularly decisive. — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not saying that it is necessary to do away with rights if we do away with State, but why not do away with rights? If "rights" are the means by which some aggressively oppress others, "right" is a harmful concept.

There may be a ‘common sense’ that the State is the source of rights, but I think there is an equally strong ‘common sense’ that it is possible for States to commit rights-violations of their own, implying that there is a higher standard of rights to which States are subject. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, I see no reason to call this "higher standard" by the word "rights". If it is a higher standard, then it does not categorize as rights.

Moreover, it is simply incoherent to say that declaring an act of ownership is aggression. Certainly, it can be aggression (like in the case of theft), but it is not aggression per se. It is incoherent for the same reason as Proudhon’s dictum, ‘Property is theft’, is incoherent; as Marx himself observed, you have to first have a system of property in place before you can even recognise theft (or any other kind of aggression) for what it is. — Virgo Avalytikh

It is not the declaration of ownership, 'this is mine' which is an act of aggression, it is the declaration of a right to ownership, 'people have the right to own things', which is an act of aggression. So it's not comparable to 'property is theft' it is inherent within the concept of "right", the declaration of a right is an act of aggression against all those who do not believe that the declared right ought to be a right. This is the problem with Locke's concept of social contract, it is not a contract which we willingly agree to, and therefore rights are imposed and enforced. Locke's idea that there are natural rights is what is incoherent.

And it is a false premise to assume that a system of property is required to recognize an act of aggression, because many acts of aggression have nothing to do with ones property, they are attacks against the person.

If rights do not exist prior to the State, then my first question would be: Where does the State get its ‘right’ to govern? Either this right comes from the State’s own declarative statement about itself, or else it is a precondition of the State. The former is simply circular: it is no more persuasive to argue for the State’s legitimacy by appealing to what the State declares about itself than when I declare myself to be the supreme ruler of the universe. If the legitimacy of the State is the very thing in dispute, then appealing to the State’s authority to justify its authority is begging the question. And if the State’s right to govern is a precondition of the State, then your assertion is simply false: at least one right can and does exist, prior to and independently of the State.

The third possibility, of course, is that the State really doesn’t have the right to govern — Virgo Avalytikh

Your options here are not exhaustive, some might say God gives the right to the State. Regardless, people have rights, a State is not the type of thing which could have a right. So we agree on your third option, I think it's incoherent to say that the State has the right to govern. The problem though, which I mentioned in the last post, the rights which individual people are said to have, are given by the State, or some other social convention. If we abolish the State, we give up what is given by the State, and this includes rights. There is no such thing as "natural rights", this is incoherent. You yourself have dismissed talk of "the natural" as providing no useful distinction. So, would you agree that rights come into existence (naturally) as a product of human conventions, such as the State, and do not pre-exist such conventions, which bestow upon the individual human beings, various "rights"? And, since "rights" are commonly associated with "the State", and you advocate for removal of the State, why not dismiss rights altogether as an archaic concept produced for the purpose of gathering support for the State, and opt for a completely different sort of convention, without 'rights'?

Again, no: ‘aggression’ is used very specifically in the context of libertarianism. It is defined as the initiatory use of force against persons of property. — Virgo Avalytikh

The phrase "person of property" appears to be incoherent.

As I explained above, a system of property rights is a precondition of recognising acts of aggression for what they are. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, this is incoherent, because you are defining "aggression" in relation to property, rather than in relation to people. It is very obvious that many acts of aggression occur against people regardless of the person's property. You cannot define "aggression" merely by reference to a person's property, or else you would have a decrepit principle of non-aggression which would only apply to property-related acts of aggression. You are merely subjugating you definition of "aggression" to the concept of property rights, to create the illusion that there is no incompatibility between "non-aggression" and "property rights". 'Aggression is an act against a person's property'. That's nonsense, and if we define "aggression" properly we see that the convention of "property rights" is itself an act of aggression.

Is it aggressive to lock your doors so that you can keep all of your possessions and your home? Do we own our bodies? According to you the State has the power to decide what we can or can't do with our bodies — Harry Hindu

I don't see how this is relevant, or how it is, as you say, according to me.

Political philosophy is not my thing, but I just thought I'd bring that up, because anyone who's seriously researched these two principles, ought to have come across this notion. To declare ownership is an act of aggression. Libertarians cloud this issue, creating the illusion that we naturally own things. In reality we are born without private property. We are born with nothing.

If the State violates the non-aggression principle by its very nature (and I believe that it does, contra Nozick), then it is illegitimate no matter what size it is, or what services it provides. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is exactly the problem. A "right", such as the right to property, is something bestowed on a person from the State. It is a "service" provided by the state. If the State, by its very existence violates the non-aggression principle, and therefore ought to be dissolved because of this, then everything given by the State, including the right to own property will be lost with the dissolution of the State.

You do not seem to understand what a "right" is:

Rights are legal, social, or ethical principles of freedom or entitlement; that is, rights are the fundamental normative rules about what is allowed of people or owed to people, according to some legal system, social convention, or ethical theory. — Wikipedia

Notice that a right only exists in relation to some sort of convention. It is not a property of a person, but of that convention. Further to this, the right to own property is a right which by its very nature requires enforcement, acts of aggression, because we are born with nothing. Perhaps you might avoid the necessity of force, by rewording the "right", as the right to give property, or sell property, but this implies that someone already owns the property which would be given or sold. Since we are born with nothing, we cannot get into the circle of ownership without acts of aggression.

I think the "non-aggression principle" has been shown to be deeply incompatible with the right to private property.

I really do wish to know why we should listen to philosophers. — Denovo Meme

If you read what a philosopher says, and it makes sense to you, this itself is an attestation to the philosopher's credibility. If it doesn't make sense, the opposite is the case. So, you should listen only to those philosophers who make sense to you.

How do you know it is widespread? — Moliere

It's widespread at TPF, although it has a bad reputation so many who practise it here, claim not to.

I would say that there are two distinct forms of scientism, those who believe "only science can give us truth", and those who believe "if it's claimed by scientists, it must be science". The op seems to focus on the former, but there may be some conflation between the two. The latter is much more prevalent, and extremely difficult to reckon with. The difficulty arises from the problems with defining what qualifies as science. Philosophers of science cannot even decide this, so how could the average person? The average person believes that if it is claimed by a scientist, or if the news media reposts it as "science", it is science. This is the scientism which is most widespread.

Alcontali has described a division between science and mathematics. Further, the axioms of mathematics are said to be arbitrary. If this is the case, then there is an incompatibility between using mathematics and practising the scientific method, because science requires premises which are empirically proven.

Scientism is so incredibly widespread, and its fake morality so prevalent with the unwashed masses, especially in the West, that it cannot merely be a character trait. There is an entire, organized media-clergy preaching its heresies. The political class loves it too. The political manipulators happily subscribe to it, because it increases their power. Scientism is a fake religion that comes with its own fake morality. It is simply obnoxious. — alcontali

Yes, rant some more, I love it!

Axiomatic derivation reduces theorems to underlying, unexplained axioms. So, if we equate the term "metaphysical" with presuppositionalism (apriori knowledge), then yes, mathematics is by design indeed presuppositionalist. — alcontali

How would you define "axiom"? Do you see a difference between an axiom in mathematics and an axiom in metaphysics? In mathematics an axiom is produced and stated to serve some purpose, and accepted because of its usefulness. In metaphysics an axiom is stated as something self-evident, and therefore is supposed as a truth.

Now consider the problem which is the societal illness called scientism. When modern science first began developing centuries ago, it was based in solid metaphysics, truths, and it was designed to bring forth further truths, by employing valid logic to truthful premises which were demonstrated to be sound through empirical process. Notice the base, sound empirically proven premises, not mathematical axioms. But mathematics proved to be an extremely useful form of logical. However, mathematicians are prone to produce premises which are simply useful axioms, rather than sound truths. They are useful for the purpose of solving a mathematical stumbling point. Many axioms simply veil, or make vague such mathematical stumbling points. So, into science creeps unsound premises, from mathematicians, which are accepted because they are extremely useful. Now pragmatism has invaded science. Science is no longer guided by the desire for truth, it has turned into the art (because mathematics is an art, and it has subdued science) of statistics and probabilities, because the goal is not to know the truth, but to predict the future.