There is no point is having a forum if all we do is dwel on the past. Should we call it a pastrum? — Razorback kitten

How are we ever going to know what to do in the future, if we do not pay respect to what was done in the past? We learn through experience. And if we can learn from the experience of others, that's even better because we can avoid making the same mistakes that someone else made.

No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally". — bongo fury

It's not a question of how it turns out, it's a question of whether or not there is something there being pointed to, and the answer to that question is no. The argument, that something may come about, and this particular thing would be the thing which is pointed at, doesn't make sense because that thing might not come about. And when it doesn't, this is clear evidence that the speaking was not a case of pointing to something, in the first place. That's the point, we have clear evidence here that speaking is not reducible to pointing at something.

I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion. — bongo fury

No, this is not intuitive to me at all. As I've said, I find that the majority of language use cannot be described as establishing a semantic relation between a word and an object. That's why I've taken the time to explain to you that very often there is no object which is referred to. "Get me a cup please", when there is a thousand cups in the room does not establish a semantic relation between a word and an object, nor is it spoken with the intent of establishing such a relation.

Furthermore, I really cannot understand what you could possibly mean by "pointing a word at something". As I said before, this is incoherent to me, and I asked you for an explanation. So you called it "labelling", but I don't see how labelling is pointing words. And speaking about things is not simply labelling things, it consists of describing things, saying where they are, etc.. These are not instances of labelling. This is what I've been trying to explain to you. It is one thing to name something, label it, and maybe you might like to call this pointing a word at it, but it is something completely different to say something about that thing. Let's assume we've labelled an object, "my phone", so that you would assume that when I mention "my phone" this is a matter of pointing to it. When I say something about my phone, like "I do not know where my phone is", how can you construe this as a pointing at my phone?

And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it! — bongo fury

You're very welcome, that's what I like to do, interrogate so that I might better understand your thesis, so it's really my pleasure.

Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. — bongo fury

Then it appears like you agree that it's not really a pointing. You might interpret "get me a cup please" as pointing to a cup, but you readily admit that this is a misinterpretation, because I'm really not fussy and I don't care which cup you bring me. Really, I'm not pointing at any cup whatsoever, or anything in particular, I'm just trying to get you to do something.

But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects. — bongo fury

Of course I would say that this theory is evidently wrong. We do not create the concept, idea, or form of "cup" by pointing at cups. We create such concepts through descriptions, just like geometrical concepts. This is not to say that a child cannot learn how to identify a cup by having people point to cups, but knowing how to pick out a cup from a bunch of objects does not require that the child has a concept, idea, or form of "cup". This is the difference between knowing how to identify a cup, and knowing what a cup is.

You don't go to a restaurant to get what you like, rather you go to a restaurant to (because you) like what you get. — tim wood

This statement is clearly false, and does not make sense. There is an illusion of sense, which you have created with ambiguity of verb tense. When you properly distinguish between what you've gotten from the restaurant in the past, from what you expect to receive in the future, then you will see that the reason you are going to the restaurant is your expectation to get what you want, not because of what you've gotten in the past.

The fact that you like what you've received there, in the past, does not motivate you to go there, in the future. What motivates you to go is the expectation of getting what you like, in the future. And this is the very opposite of what you say. This is the very difficult aspect of consciousness to understand, the conversion of past experiences into an expectation for the future. And understanding this conversion is very necessary because it is the expectation for the future which motivates one to act, not the experiences of the past. You cannot avoid this difficult aspect of consciousness, hiding it behind smoke and mirrors, by creating the illusion that it is past experiences which motivates one to act.

I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. — bongo fury

What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex.

The point I'm trying to make, is that I think we can understand some aspects of meaning in terms of pointing, but many other aspects of meaning we cannot understand in terms of pointing. So for instance, part of one's use of language might consist of pointing at a thing, and this is an important part of language and meaning, but what someone says about that thing, what it is doing, or describing its properties, cannot be understood within the context of pointing. This again is an important part of language use and meaning, but it is a part that cannot be understood as pointing.

This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions. — bongo fury

As I explained, this form of reductionism doesn't work. It creates the illusion of a complete understanding through explicitly equating one thing with another, "meaning is pointing", or "momentum is mass time velocity", when in reality there is much more to each of these concepts than that which it is equated with. Understanding "meaning" also requires understanding types of activities (and these cannot be pointed to), and understanding "momentum" also requires understanding inertia (which is not covered by "mass times velocity"), because "velocity" requires a frame of reference.. By saying one is equal to the other, an illusion of completion is created, which is really a deception.

As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard? — bongo fury

You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. And to simply point, without pointing at anything specific, is not really pointing at all. That's the point I'm making, you ought not characterize this as pointing. If someone uses language to refer to something, then we can say that the person is pointing at that thing. But when a person uses language to refer to something non-existent, how can we assume that this is a matter of pointing at something?

If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter? — bongo fury

I really do not see this inscrutability which you claim to be pointing at. What I see is that you are describing something as "pointing" when the thing being described really cannot be described in that way. So you might say "I am pointing to an inscrutability", but in reality there is no inscrutability there, only a vague inaccuracy in your description. What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, you try to dismiss the argument by saying that this is an inscrutable type of pointing. If "pointing" doesn't suit as an appropriate descriptive term, and there is something inscrutable going on, then why not just say that it is something inscrutable rather than a pointing.

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize. — bongo fury

I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing?

Let's assume to point is to direct one's attention. What exactly is the person who says "get me a cup please" directing the other's attention toward? Would this be an imaginary future state, in which the person speaking has a cup? Not really, because the person making the request is requesting that the other perform a particular action, and the reason for this is unknown. So, the person says it because the person wants the other to act. Where is the "directing one's attention"? We often act without directing our attention, as reflex indicates. I think that the principal use of language is to get a response, a reflex action, out of another, without actually directing the other's attention. Any attempt to direct the other's attention would be far too imposing on the other's sense of freedom, and the individual's own will to direct one's own attention toward one's own interests. Therefore attempting to direct another's attention would not be effective, because the person whom you were trying to direct (show the way by pointing), would dismiss this as interference against one's own free will to choose one's own way. So when someone says something, I think that person is simply trying to get a reaction out of the other, without trying to interfere with, or direct, the other's attention. Such actions as trying to direct another's attention (like pointing) would be received as rude and interfering, negative, and therefore not conducive to cooperation. Remember the distinction I made between using another, and cooperating with another? Directing another's attention, pointing, is an instance of using the other.

Can you provide a reference in Aristotle's writings where he asserts this position (that these forms are actualized by the human mind)? — Andrew M

I suppose the best reference here would be Metaphysics Bk.9 Ch.9.

Also, perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but you seem to be denying that particulars (say, ordinary objects like trees) have form prior to the existence of human beings. If so, I'm curious whether you also deny that particulars exist prior to the existence of human beings. — Andrew M

No, clearly I am not denying that, I am citing that as the reason why Aristotle must be understood as dualist. There is a duality of form, the form of the particular material things, which may be prior to human beings, and, the form which you call the abstraction. These are two distinct types of "form". Since forms are actual, having active existence, a dualism is described by Aristotle. But what Aristotle has done, is switched the positioning of the "Forms " in relation to Pythagorean Idealism. Human abstractions, which are forms in the sense of essence, universals without the accidentals, cannot be eternal, their actual existence is only produced by the human mind. However, the form of the particular may be prior to the temporal existence of material substance which expresses that form to us.

Here's a point he makes earlier in the Metaphysics, and this is tied in to the logic of his law of identity, which applies to particulars. A thing cannot be other than the thing which it is, otherwise it would not be the thing which it is. Also, a thing's existence is not random, it is what it is, and not something else, for some reason, or reasons. This he describes as the first question of metaphysics, not 'why is there something rather than nothing?' (which doesn't make sense to ask because we have no approach to answering it), but 'why is a thing what it is rather than something else?'. Now, we can apprehend that the form of the thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of the thing, otherwise the thing, when it comes into existence, could be other than it is. To ensure that the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else (which would defy the law of identity), the form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into existence, must be prior to the material existence of the thing. Otherwise the thing could be other than it is (defying the law of identity), or else it's existence would be completely random.

This is the principle which is expressed by Plato in the Timaeus (in not so clear terms), and is taken up by Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians (cosmological argument), which establishes Form as necessarily prior to material existence. Notice, that in his later work, Plato turns from independent Ideas (associated with the theory of participation, and Pythagorean Idealism), to "Forms", which are more closely related to Aristotle's "form". When we deny the possibility that material existence extends backward in time (toward the beginning) indefinitely (infinitely, as if there is no beginning to material existence), then we must accept that there is immaterial Form which is necessarily prior to material existence, in the beginning of material existence. Otherwise, the material things which exist would not be the things which they are (defying the law of identity), or material existence would be purely random (which is inconsistent with empirical observation). To maintain the law of identity, as well as the validity of empirical observation, we must allow that form is prior to material existence.

Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But, — bongo fury

Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things.

I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on... — bongo fury

It's more than just a matter of using "thing" in a loose sense, because there is an issue of the relationship between the general and the particular. We ask for something in general, and the response is to give us something particular. So for example, "can you get me a cup please", refers to "a cup" in the general sense, but the hearer might get a particular cup. Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup.

There is clearly a problem with this thesis, that speaking is pointing at things. It's obviously not "things" in any reasonable sense of the word, which are being pointed at in the act of speaking. And even if we use "things" in a very loose way, so as to include activities, the activity referred to is always (without exception) something general, while any "thing" referred to is something particular. Say a person describes an activity which has already occurred, such that we might think that it is an existent activity, the words used to refer to any activity always allow that one might be speaking about something else carrying out that (very similar, or "same") activity, rather than the particular thing which is being referred to as carrying out that activity. So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two.

When you say "speaking is pointing at things", and "I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense", you simply veil this incompatibility behind smoke and mirrors, as if you actually believed that you could use "thing" in a way which would make sense here. The problem of course, is that the general allows for the possibility of many different things, while "thing" indicates that a particular has been specified. So if we are pointing when we speak, we are pointing in many different directions according to the many possibilities allowed for by the use of the general, and the hearer might choose one direction, and act as if that is the "thing" referred to. But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time.

I've noticed a trend in modern metaphysics which is to attempt to create consistency between the principles of modern science, and the principles of Aristotle. This is done principally through a misrepresentation of Aristotle's principles, as you are doing. The reality is that science broke from the principles of Aristotle many years ago. So, we ought to be looking at the differences between modern science and Aristotle, created by this break, rather than misrepresenting Aristotle to create the appearance that modern science is consistent with him. The most obvious difference is that Aristotle's principles support dualism, and modern science has rejected those principles. So to present Aristotle, and simply leave out those principles which support dualism, because one wants to show Aristotle as supporting monism, is very distasteful.

That's not my reading of Aristotle. It is always and only the particular that exists and acts. A form(alism) without matter is merely an abstraction and thus not able to act. — Andrew M

There is nothing within Aristotle to deny forms without matter, nor that such "Forms", if they exist, are actual. That is why Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians maintain consistency with Aristotle's principles, despite Aristotle's difference from Plato. Plato is confused and full of changing views on this matter, as he learnt through his experiences. Aristotle denies matter without form, but not form without matter, and anything eternal must be actual. "Form" in Aristotle is actual, and this includes, essence, and formulae, which you call abstractions. These are the forms by which human beings actively change the world through intention, final cause.

What Aristotle denies is the eternality of these "forms". They are actualized by the human mind, and so if they existed prior to human beings, they could only exist as potential. Then he shows, with the cosmological argument that anything potential cannot be eternal. This creates a distinction between the forms of particular things, which may be eternal as the eternal circular motion is, and the forms which are activated by the human mind, which are not eternal because they are dependent on the human mind for their actuality.

This position is derived from the later Plato, Timaeus for example, and it is the means by which dualism escapes the problem of how the eternal may interact with the non-eternal. Matter, in the realm of "becoming", serves as the medium between the two types of actualities. Plato is famous for exposing the need for such a medium between the eternal and the temporal. Aristotle does not deny dualism, he simply clarifies the principles which make dualism reasonable.

Aristotle famously rejected Plato’s theory of forms and proposed his own theory in its place. — Andrew M

What Aristotle proposed is a duality of forms. And, "form" is very clearly defined as what is "actual". Therefore we have within Aristotle a duality of actuality, hence "dualism". To deny this, and deny that the soul is a form, within Aristotle's writing, is to deny a major part of his work. The assumption that essences, abstractions, are not actual within Aristotle creates a huge inconsistency making it impossible to understand how human beings act to change the world, through intention and final cause. Once you realize that these forms (intellectual objects) are properties of the soul, which is an active form itself, then you can make sense of the activities of living beings.

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle inverted Plato's ontology. For Aristotle, what is fundamental, and thus primarily known, is the particular. Hylomorphism is not a dualism, it is an abstraction over particulars. What is known about particulars (by way of experience) is isomorphic to how they (really) are. — Andrew M

For Aristotle we can't know the form of the particular because we know through universals. This leaves a gap of separation between the form of the particular, with all its accidents, and the form which a human being knows, the essence of the thing. Since "form" is the actuality of things, there is two distinct actualities and therefore dualism. One actuality is substantiated by the form of particular material things, and the other actuality is substantiated by the form of "the soul"..

Completion eludes us ... except maybe in death.

So what's so disgusting, and so alarming, about this episode, is that Mueller's findings and testimony are obviously damning; it shows beyond reasonable doubt that there was co-operation between the Trump campaign and Russian operatives to interfere in the US Presidential Election. And yet the main beneficiary of this effort will stand in front of the world's media and deny it - and sufficient numbers will believe it to prevent any action being taken. — Wayfarer

There's a saying, "it falls on deaf ears". I think it means that if they do not want to ear it, they will not hear it.

Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it? — bongo fury

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons. — bongo fury

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something?

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. — bongo fury

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? If not, I find it rather incoherent. What tool would you use to sharpen the tip of a word?

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented: — bongo fury

There's a problem with this type of restriction though. If you restrict your understanding of "using a word", to "using a word for the purpose of pointing at something", then all those instances in which people use words for something other than pointing at something will not be apprehended by your understanding. And if you say that "meaning is use", and restrict your understanding of "use" to the use of words, you will not apprehend all the meaning which is in those instances of using things other than words. Furthermore, if you restrict your understanding of "meaning" to "meaning is use", you will not apprehend all that meaning which is in things other than use.

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding.

The word "use" is used in many different ways. If we restrict "use" to the sense of using words, then I think you need to realize that we use words for a lot of things more than just pointing at things. Do you agree that the most common use of words is to tell someone what to do? And do you agree that this is not a matter of pointing at something? Why do you want to restrict the meaning of "using words" to "using words for a particular purpose", when that particular purpose is to point at things?

Agreement (about just where it is we disagree) looming in sight? — bongo fury

Lack of agreement does not necessarily mean that we disagree. If we do not understand each other then we can neither agree nor disagree. To be without an opinion on the matter allows one to neither agree nor disagree. And if the matter is seen as unimportant, or if there is no impending necessity of forming an opinion, one might intentionally continue in this state of neither agreeing nor disagreeing.

Whereas, I see it as a game of 'pretend', on which we must collaborate. — bongo fury

Yes, I understand this, but where does the "we must collaborate" come from? Let's assume that I want you to understand me, for my intents and purposes, and you want me to understand you for your intents and purposes, does that force the conclusion "we must collaborate"? If I am unwilling to help you, and you are unwilling to help me, then even though we want each other's help, we might just go on our separate ways, thinking that the other is unwilling to help. Where does the sense of fairness (you'll only help me if I help you), which is required for collaboration come from?

Which is fine, I'm not complaining. We have different agendas, different half-baked theories of discourse. I speak for mine when I say half-baked - yours can be done if you like.

As expected, very different views on "use", the difference resting, if I'm not mistaken, on whether we see reference as a matter of fact. — bongo fury

You haven't really described to me your view on "use", only repeating that it's very different from mine. Then when you allow me a little peek it appears to be very similar. You mention something about striving to agree, and the need to collaborate, but when I say something to you, you make a short reply and run away, saying we're very different in our views, making very little, if any attempt to agree. So it appears like you are proposing that we need to collaborate, and we ought to strive to agree, but you demonstrate the very opposite. This makes me very doubtful of your proposition. I don't see how you relate "use" to "we must collaborate". Do you recognize a difference between loving a person and using a person? How can you produce collaboration through "use" instead of through "love"?

I think a lot of these white evangelical leaders are doing more to hurt Christianity than the so-called New Atheists ever could.

Self-destruction is worse than being destroyed by something else. Didn't Jesus say something about that when criticized for not washing his hands, focus on the illness which comes from within.

You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Right, we can use language and play language games without any agreement, just like the girl in the op. Agreement may come afterwards, for those who strive for agreement as bongo says we do. Why impose "never" on your interpretation of what I said, when I never said never? Sometimes we agree, sometimes we do not. Where's the problem? When I speak of an instance when there is no agreement, why assume that I mean there is never agreement.

There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent." — Luke

Are you familiar with the term "context". I said that agreement [in that type of instance which was being discussed, ones like the op], is non-existent. How can you interpret this as "there is never any agreement"? Come on Luke, you're just arguing for the sake of arguing, when will you start striving for agreement?

about, specifically, which words (or pictures or sunsets) are pointed (already or eventually) at which things. — bongo fury

Let me repeat what I already said, in a different way. I really don't think that agreement is relevant here, at this level of meaning which is demonstrated by the op. When I say something to someone, and the person understands what I have said (understanding is demonstrated by the person's actions), I do not think that it is the case that the person agrees with how I use the words to point at different things. I think it is simply the case that the person understands how I use the words to point at different things. Understanding how the words are used, and agreeing with how the words are used, are distinct. So for example, when a person speaks to me using a lot of jargon which I do not think is warranted in the situation, I might understand what that person is saying, but I wouldn't agree with that person's use of words.

In this type of situation, we understand without agreement. Nor do we really strive for agreement because understanding is what is important, and so long as we understand each other it's sort of irrelevant whether or not we agree with how the other is using words. It might be better to say that we strive for understanding rather than agreement. But when it comes to philosophy, and logical arguments, agreement might be expedient toward understanding. Then we might strive for agreement, but this would still be for the sake of understanding. So we ought to give "understanding" priority over "agreement", as what is striven for, or required for language to be useful.

What you seem to fail to understand is that similarity is not a concept sufficient to substitute in all uses of 'same'. "Two dogs are the same kind of animal"; I cannot substitute "two dogs are similar kinds of animal" without losing the sense of the statement. — Janus

Yes I went through that already. It is appropriate, in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are of the same kind. It is inappropriate in a philosophical discussion, or logical argument, to say that two distinct things are the same. Despite the fact that we often say two distinct things are "exactly the same" in everyday language use, in philosophy this amounts to sophistry.

I see. I must have misunderstood when you said: — Luke

I apologize for lack of clarity at that point. I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. I believe that is what the op indicates, there is no agreement in that instance of use, yet there is still meaning in that instance.

Bongo had said that we strive for agreement, but I think that people strive for agreement sometimes, and other times not, so striving for agreement is not essential, just like agreement itself is not essential.

We can look at "definition" as a type of agreement, and agreement clearly has a place in language use, especially philosophy and logical proceedings. For example, "I agree, for the purpose of this logical argument, to use "same" in the way indicated by the law of identity. But such an agreement wouldn't restrict the way that I use "same" in my day to day use, which might be full of bad habits. And so long as people understand my day to day use of "same" there is no problem.

However, if I slip outside of the defined usage, which I have agreed to in the proceeding of the logical argument, if my bad habits overwhelm my will to maintain what I've agreed to, then I may be charged with equivocation.

Here is the problem which Wittgenstein exposes at 253 of PI. When we are talking about our sensations, and how one person may experience "the same" sensation as another, by what criteria of identity are we using "same" in this case? Clearly we are not using "same" in the way outlined by the law of identity, as the example of the chair demonstrates. However, there are enormous epistemological consequences which follow from this use of "same", as Witty outlines in the following section. Unless there is some clearly stated criteria (a definition, or agreement) for how "same" ought to be used in this type of situation, all the epistemology which is built on this use of "same" is completely unsound.

As I have already said the fact that the world of human experience, which is what we all experience... — Janus

You are making the same unwarranted generalization as Mww, assuming that we all experience the same thing. Quite obviously, we do not all experience the same thing, So there appears to be no basis to this claim that there is one world of human experience. Each person has one's own experience, and no two people have the same experience. There is no such thing as the world of human experience.

As I've told you, over and over now, you're starting from a false premise. Will you please dismiss this false premise, and start from the reality that each person has one's own experience which is very distinct from every other person's experience, then we might be able to properly discuss the role of perspective in relation to reality.

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

I think this is where your confusion lies Luke. I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. What I deny is that generalizations indicate sameness within the things generalized, and that agreements in ways of use create same use. What is indicted by generalizations is similarity, and what is created through agreement is similarity.

And being similar is distinct from being the same. Is this difficult for you to understand?

A definition of the law of identity gives its meaning, yet it is your claim that no two meanings are the same or that we can ever be sure that they are the same, since agreement in ways of use are non-existent, and we can at best have only similar but not the same ways of use. — Luke

No, we were working with the premise that meaning is use, and attempting to determine how "use" is being used in this sense. To say that a definition is what gives the law of identity meaning is way off track. It is the use of the law of identity which gives it meaning, and I readily admit that we do not use it in the same way, but similar ways. So I do not see that you are making any point here whatsoever.

Therefore, how can you use the law of identity as a law or a standard of sameness when the agreement of use is non-existent? You cannot be using it the same way as anybody else, including Aristotle, by your own argument. There is no such thing as the "same" because you have made it an impossible standard. — Luke

That's your opinion, it's not mine. If you think that the criteria for "same", as described by the law of identity is an impossible standard, and therefore you refuse to agree to it, then so be it. I agree to it, and other philosophers (Leibniz for example) agree to it, and therefore the agreement does exist. That you refuse to agree does not negate the agreement.

If you and I, and by association you and Janus, can agree that the term “perspective” denotes a particular attitude or opinion about a thing, and we each as particular persons all agree as a matter of discourse that the fins on a ‘60 Cadillac were rather extreme.....wouldn’t we have a common perspective with respect to extremism? — Mww

I don't see how agreement constitutes a common perspective. Care to explain? That we agree to refer to things using the same words does not mean that we have a common perspective.

If humans are known with absolute certainty to be entities with the capacity for perspective, then the concept of human perspective cannot be either false nor contradictory. — Mww

I think this is seriously faulty logic. That distinct human beings each have a perspective, does not produce the conclusion that there is one human perspective. That's some sort of composition fallacy, or a category error.

If there is something that is specifically the property of individuals, perspective, and not the property of a group of individuals, then to say that it is the property of the group is contradictory.

If it is true every human ever has or had or will have a perspective, then it follows necessarily there is a human perspective. — Mww

Fallacy of composition, text book case.

So, there is no single perspective, but "for us" signifies perspective in general, the fact that all those different perspectives are examples of perspective, human perspective. — Janus

OK, let's start with this then. "For us" signifies that there is such a thing as perspective. Further, "the world" is something created, constructed, from a perspective. The concept "the world" only has meaning from a perspective. Therefore perspective is fundamental to this thing, the world, which is signified by the concept. Furthermore, we could replace "the world" with "existence", to say that the concept "existence" is something created or constructed from a perspective, therefore perspective is fundamental to existence. Do you not recognize that there is no such thing as the thing represented by a concept, without that concept?

Please explain why you believe that such conclusions about the fundamentality of perspective are unwarranted. When "the world", and "existence" are concepts which are created from a perspective, and there is no such thing as the thing represented by a particular concept without that concept, what makes you think that there is such a thing as the world, or existence, without a perspective?

Are you not being a little harsh, perhaps? If there is at least one irrefutable commonality in human reason, wouldn’t the concept, or just the idea, of a human perspective be validated? — Mww

How does agreeing on something validate a common perspective? Suppose you and I agree to call something by the same name, how would this validate the claim that we have the same perspective of that thing?

The addendum “for us” is tautological, as you say, but it isn’t necessarily impossible and certainly not contradictory. — Mww

It is only tautological if "us" refers to a number of individuals, each with one's own perspective. It is false and contradictory if "us" refers to a point of view called "human", with its own perspective.

It's a shame that your use of the word "same" cannot be identical to Aristotle's definition, by your own argument, since he lived so long ago. — Luke

Of course my instance of using "same" is not the same as Aristotle's, that's exactly the point, and it's quite obvious according to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. Whether it's "identical" depends on how one would define "identical". Do we adhere to "identity" as described in the law of identity as the basis for "identical", or do we subscribe to some form of similarity to define "identical"? Leibniz argues, with his principle "identity of indiscernibles" that "identical" ought to remain consistent with "same"

But Wittgenstein offers a very adept demonstration of a difference between "same" and "identical" at 253-256 of the Philosophical Investigations. You should read it, since I know that you take Wittgenstein as an authority. Notice at 253, that two distinct chairs can be said to be "exactly the same", yet they are distinct and therefore not "the same" by any rigorous standard of identity. Then, at 254 he mentions this switching of "identical" for "same", as if it were a philosophical ploy. (This is the sophism I refer to, two chairs are said to be "the same", because they appear to be identical, when in fact they are distinct chairs and not the same.) .

It is very important to understand this distinction in the way that we use "same", as a foundation for understanding how we attach names to our sensations, which is what Wittgenstein is discussing in that section. We will assign two distinct sensations the designation of "the same", based on some judgement of similarity, despite the fact that they are not "the same" by any rigorous criterion of identity. So when he proceeds to discuss how a symbol "S" is used to stand for a "certain sensation", what the "S" really stands for is a generalized multiple occurrence of multiple sensations, which have been judged as being similar (identical), but are not really "the same" according to the rigorous law of identity. It is only by circumventing the law of identity, and the rigorous criterion for "same" which is associated with it, that a symbol may be used to refer to a sensation in this way.

Only if you hold "same" to the impossible standard that requires another person be in precisely the same place and time (and mind?) in order to replicate your usage. Nobody besides a misguided philosopher would ever use the word "same" in this way about meaning or use. — Luke

Don't be absurd, this is the "same" which is defined by the law of identity. It was stated by Aristotle as a means of expelling sophism from philosophy. If you want to call similar things "the same" then you are not engaged in philosophy, but sophistry.

We often speak of synonyms having the same meaning without requiring your impossible standard of sameness. — Luke

Sure, we use "same" in this way. But it's clearly a way which is unacceptable in logical, or philosophical arguments. "I have two distinct brothers who own the same car, and both drive their cars at the same time " Try to figure that one out. Oh, I really mean that they have similar cars, not "the same car". So, why didn't I say "similar" in the first place? I was just making use of a colloquialism to pull a trick on you. Ha, ha, isn't that a funny joke? Let's call it what it is, sophistry.

You say "synonyms have the same meaning". If you are using this as a premise for a logical argument, it's very clear that it ought to be rejected as unsound. What you really mean is "similar". So if you are trying to use this as a premise for an argument, please state it in an acceptable form. Don't use the form of sophistry.

That's just not how the word is commonly used, especially when describing linguistic meaning. — Luke

No wonder there is so much confusion in the land of linguistic meaning. Sophistry abounds.

As I stated in my reply to Marchesk, we need to differentiate between the use of language itself, and the analysis of language use. Generalization enters when we look at how language was used, in retrospect, it is not an essential part of using language in the first place. When we generalize, we class similar things as the same. This use of "same" does not mean to say that similar things are the same, it means to say that they have been classed into the same category. The category here is the distinct "way of using" the word. When you say "synonyms have the same meaning", you are saying that these words belong to the same category (way of using).

By the way, we haven't gotten anywhere near to the bottom of this problem of the sophistic use of "same" in the land of linguistic meaning. In this illusory world, two distinct occurrences of a word are said to be occurrences of "the same" word. So the mother says "function", and then the daughter says "function", and we say that this is two occurrences of "the same" word. Clearly if we adhere to the law of identity we can see that this is a misleading use of "the same". And, we can also see that the sophism in this land of linguistic meaning has a very strong base.

Stop being such an idiot. I think you know, or should know, full well that by "for us" I am referring to human perspective. — Janus

I have a perspective, and you have a perspective. They are clearly not the same. What I am asking is how do you validate this proposed "human perspective".

The distinction is between the "in itself' (no perspective or interpretation) and the "for us" (perspective or interpretation). — Janus

The point is that your proposed distinction is unacceptable because there is no such thing as "the perspective for us". As I explained, that is impossible, contradictory, and therefore your division is unacceptable. A similar, and acceptable distinction would be between "in itself", and "for me".

Are you ready to dismiss "for us", and start with an acceptable premise, "for me"? Then if we manage to synthesize a "for us", by way of some agreement, you might acknowledge that the "for us" is a synthesis of a multiplicity of distinct "for mes", and not actually a true perspective. it is artificial.

It's an amazing level of stupidity you are displaying if this is not deliberate obfuscation. — Janus

The problem you have created is that you are designing "perspective" on the faulty base of "for us", and therefore you obviously have no clear understanding of what a perspective actually is. In other words, it is you who is actually displaying an incredible degree of stupidity. if you have no desire to proceed, and attempt to remove this fundamental stupidity from you argument, then so be it. You can live with that stupidity.

The special theory of relativity won't help your case here because it is part of the "for us". The "for us" does not make "a useless tautology" because it highlights the distinction between knowing and the real. It is safe to assume that we and our perceptions are part of the real, but we and they are not adequate or sufficient to a complete revelation of the real, insofar as they will always remain partial (in both senses of that word). — Janus

Your proposition is flawed because it assumes a "for us". Since we each have our own distinct perspectives, there is no such thing as "for us", when we are talking about perspectives. So you have just made up an impossible scenario, a premise based in the contradiction, that "we" have "a perspective".

We cannot proceed with this discussion until you relinquish the contradictory premise of "a perspective, for us". If we are talking about perspectives, there is no such thing as "for us", do you agree? Either we are talking about "for us", in which case the unity of "us" must be validated such that "us" might represent an existing enity, or we are talking about "perspective" in which case we each have our own.

So we're right back to the same point, if we remove the "for us", which is clearly warranted because the unity which creates an "us" has not been validated as being anything real, then we are left with perspective as the fundamental principle of what is real.

Well, I think that generalization arises from the public aspect, the plurality of use. I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. Notice though, that it's a faulty sense of "the same", really meaning similar. But "similar" doesn't indicate agreement in the same way that "same" does. If a "game" requires multiple players with some such "agreement", then generalization is inherent within the "game".

The problem though is that all of this description is produced in retrospect, from analysis. In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. And when we reflect on this in a linguistic analysis we generalize, saying that this similar way is the same way. The generalization is produced by the analysis, which is an effort to understand, so "same" is posited to facilitate principles. It's a deficient "same" though. Then, we claim that we agree that this is the same way, and this supposed agreement supports the posited "same". The agreement is non-existent.

Yet we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement. It is therefore, when we want to say that "I play the same game as you", or some such thing, that the problem of generalization crops up. We are apt to use "same" in a way which is not consistent with a rigorous interpretation of the law of identity. The generalization is dependent on that loose use of "same".

As I said, I'm not denying the existence of generalizations, I'm just pointing out that the existence of such things is very hard to understand. A generalization, as a thing to be understood seems to defy logic. As indicated, they are based in contradiction.

To understand the situation, I suggest you start with what I would call the pure form of "meaning is use". In this case we begin with the assumption that every instance of use is unique, particular. We might say that the true and precise meaning of each word is given by the context of the situation. So in one instance "cup" would refer to a specific object in my kitchen, and in another, it would refer to an object in your kitchen. Do you see that the meaning of the word "cup" is different each time it is used to refer to a different object? When I sit in my kitchen and say "could you please get me my cup", it has a completely different meaning from when you sit in your kitchen and say that, because I am asking for a different object from you Here we have what I would call the pure form of meaning in which the word relates directly to an object without the use of generalization. Each instance of use is distinct from every other.

Contrast this with what others seem to say about "meaning is use". They would say that "use" refers to a "way of using" a word. In this case, there would be a way of using the word "cup", to refer to a certain type of object, such that the word has "a meaning" which corresponds not with the actual use of the word, but with the "way" of using the word. Notice the two generalizations inherent within "way of using", and within "type of object". So in this way of using "meaning is use", one generalization (way of using the word) is related to another generalization (type of object).

In the latter case, we have utilized generalizations to understand meaning. Now we must make a move to understand the nature of a generalization, or else we are not really understanding meaning at all. we would simply be describing meaning in terms of generalizations, without having a clue as to what a generalization is. What is the point of that? What do you think constitutes a "way of using"?

Are we willing going to go down the road that we can't use language to speak in the general sense? All word meanings are unique and particular? — Marchesk

No I wasn't really going down that road. Notice I spoke in a general sense, and I even used "use" in a general sense. Even so, don't you agree that each instance of use is unique and particular, having its own peculiarities, and no two instances are the same? If you agree, then don't you think that this itself is a meaningful fact? Or would you argue that this is a difference which doesn't make a difference? I would say the latter is contradiction.

Maybe I misunderstand, but if so, I can't help but think something has gone badly wrong. It's language's ability to generalize which is so very useful. — Marchesk

There is a very evident problem with the idea of generalizing, as bongo brought up, and that is the question of what is being referred to in the generalization. If we say that there is a category, a mental object, which is referred to, then we get lost in Platonism trying to validate such a reference. If we say that there is a "way of using" a word, then the generalization is intrinsic to this concept, "way of using". What would validate a "way of using", if not some faulty assumption that X (a particular instance of use) is the same as Y (a particular instance of use)? That there is a difference between X and Y, which doesn't make a difference, is contradiction because the very fact that it may be identified as a difference is an instance of making a difference. Therefore, contradiction is intrinsic to generalization. I believe it was C.S. Peirce who expounded on this incompatibility within the relationship between the fundamental laws of logic and generalization. For him, it manifests as vagueness.

I.e., there is no such thing as anything. — god must be atheist

Right, where can we start? To have any meaning, a symbol must be associated with a thing, correspondence. If there is no association there is no meaning, therefore the symbol is not a symbol and ought not be called a symbol. If the symbol may be associated with anything, then we have a very similar problem, the symbol might be called a symbol, but it may be associated with absolutely anything. What kind of symbol is that? Can we say that there is any meaning there? If we restrict the use of the symbol, then meaning is created, but it is not created by the use of the symbol, which is inherently free, it is created by the restrictions. Now we can dismiss the idea that there is necessarily a thing which is referred to by the symbol, because it is intrinsic to the nature of the symbol, that it could theoretically (potentially) refer to anything (and there is no such thing as anything), but its application has been restricted, and so it has meaning. The idea dismissed is Platonism, it assumes the restrictions as a thing, an idea. If the restrictions are not ideal, then we are left with the task of characterizing them. How could they exist?

haven't said it is true that "things only ever exist from a perspective"; I have said that this is only true with the added caveat "for us". — Janus

You clearly said, "leaving off" the "for us", that this is unwarranted. And that is what I objected to.

The further point is that if, leaving off that critical "for us", you then want to go on to say that since "things only ever exist from a perspective" and " nothing has real 'self-existence' or exists in its own right", it follows that the Real must be ideal, that mind or consciousness must be fundamental, you are drawing an obviously unwarranted conclusion; a conclusion no more or less unwarranted than saying that because things appear to us as material, then the physical must be fundamental. — Janus

What I said, is that if we leave off the "for us", and consider that things only exist from a perspective (and this can be derived from the special theory of relativity incidentally), then the conclusion actually is justified. You only make it unwarranted by adding "for us". But the "for us" only makes a useless tautology anyway.

So your answer to the question 'are you or anyone you know experiencing racism in your life (outside TV) , the answer is no. — halo

As I said, the answer is yes. I see it commonly, in my life, not on TV, not every day, but more times than I can count. And it appears to be on an increase.

They are completely taking it out of context. — halo

Really? It was a tweet. Trump doesn't make speeches. He makes sporadic remarks strategically aimed at incite.

The further point is that if, leaving off that critical "for us", you then want to go on to say that since "things only ever exist from a perspective" and " nothing has real 'self-existence' or exists in its own right", it follows that the Real must be ideal, that mind or consciousness must be fundamental, you are drawing an obviously unwarranted conclusion; a conclusion no more or less unwarranted than saying that because things appear to us as material, then the physical must be fundamental. — Janus

I don't see how you can argue this. If it is true that "things only ever exist from a perspective", then perspective is fundamental as the basis for the reality of existence. So unless you can separate perspective form mind or consciousness, the conclusion that mind or consciousness is fundamental to the reality of existence is clearly justified.

Again, it seems to me that you are drawing an unwarranted conclusion here. Of course our knowledge is always "for us" by us, of us, in us and so on. On the other hand we are warranted in assuming that the world exists independently of our observations of it, just not that it exists in the same form as our observations of it. — Janus

There is no such warrant. If the world as we know it is a construct of our minds, then the assumption that the world exists independently of our observations is clearly unwarranted.

So the mind is of course involved in "constructing experience and so knowledge", but so is the world in ways which must remain unfathomable to us, unfathomable at least apart from our scientific investigations of nature, human physiology and perception, and so on, which are all " for us" insofar as we are obviously involved in them.

We can see the world although we cannot see it but "through a glass darkly". — Janus

I see no reason to assume the reality of what you call 'the world". Once you accept the reality of the principle you've stated, that what we see is "through a glass darkly", then you ought to recognize that there is no reason to believe that there is anything at all beyond the glass. The glass itself could be generating the impression that there is something beyond it. The "darkness" of the glass could be what you call "the world". "The world" is within the glass

The question now is is this true, what is the nature of the glass. If the mind constructs the experience with what is received from the glass, then what is beyond the glass, what you call "the world" is irrelevant. Our reality is the glass itself. One might ask, whether or not the mind itself has constructed the glass. If the glass is the human body, the thing we see the proposed "world" through, then I would argue that the mind does construct the glass. And if we ask what it constructs the glass out of, we cannot say "the world", because "the world" comes after the glass, as a proposition of what is on the other side of the glass.

This is the importance of the temporal perspective. We create a tool by which we can observe (sense), let's call this the glass (it's the human body). Through the use of this tool we create "the world", which is supposed to be what we are observing through the glass. To say that the glass was created from the world is a faulty temporal perspective because the glass was created before there was a world. What is on the other side of the glass is not unfathomable to us, it simply requires determining what the glass is made of.

If the vast majority of people do not experience racism in THEIR day to day lives, then by definition , by sheer common sense, the race issue is leftist propaganda and in fact promoting racism by continuing suggest the idea.
Please take note that what you hear or see on television does not count, as television does not equal reality since information is deleted, ignored , focused or not focused on, or taken out of proportion. — halo

So when the vast majority of people see Trump encouraging racism on TV, this does not count as "day to day life" because it's not reality? I suppose you think that the film's been edited to make Trump look like he encourages racism when he really does not. Regardless, I think most of us do experience racism, outside of what we see on TV, most of us not every day, but how much is too much? And if it is observed to be on the increase, this is cause for concern.

I'm guessing you can't mean "there is no such thing as 'using something' in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular"? — bongo fury

Actually this is exactly what I said, and what I meant.

Rather, you are saying you oppose dignifying a narrower, technical sense of "use" whereby it means, more specifically, "using a word to refer to something" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction)? You want instead to emphasise and keep in play the very general sense of "using something in some way"? Resist reducing linguistic "use" to the mere pointing of words at things? — bongo fury

This is proceeding in the opposite direction of what I suggested. Each instance of use would be a particular act of referring to something, whether that something is a physical object, or a mental object like a type, a class, or category. Therefore "using something in some way" is excluded, as itself a mental object, a classification, which is not an act of use, it's a category.

Such a disagreement between us (where you resist what I embrace) is what I said I expected to be the case, yes. Do you agree this is the disagreement? — bongo fury

Do we have agreement then? The issue though, between us, was the relationship between meaning and use. You said you equate the two. I make "meaning" into a wider category than "use", such that all particular instances of "use" may be classified as meaningful, or having meaning, but not all instance of meaningful things are instances of use.

To explicate this, I brought in the distinction between "good" and "beauty". Instances of "use" necessarily relate to some "good". We use something for a purpose, and that purpose is the good which is expected to come from that use. But when we see beauty in something, such as a piece of art, there is meaning without use. The beautiful thing is meaningful, but not because it is useful. Therefore, meaning extends beyond "use" (good), into the category of beauty.

From this distinction we can produce two categories of "meaning", corresponding to two types of expression. We have expressions which are based in purpose, good, and use, as well as expressions which are based in art, creativity, and beauty. I would say that the two forms of meaning mix and intermingle. So in language for example, we find a mixture of purposeful use, and artful expression. Referring back to the op, we might ask what degree of artful expression is there in the child's statement, and what degree of use. I've noticed that children often enjoy saying unusual and creative things.

The logic is the same with either "seeing" or "experiencing".Hallucinating an asteroid is not experiencing an asteroid, but experiencing an hallucination. If an asteroid is experienced then it follows that the asteroid plays an essential part in producing that experience. The logic here is irrefutable. — Janus

What logic? It looks like a matter of begging the question to me, and that is a refutation Care to show me the premises and conclusion, to demonstrate that you are not begging the question? Your claim appears to be that "an experience" requires something sensed, the sensations play "an essential part in the experience". Is a dream not an experience? Suppose that the person was dreaming, and there was nothing "extra" acting as an essential part of the "experience". By what argument do you demonstrate that the person is wrong to refer to the thing in the dream as an "asteroid", and call this an experience of an asteroid in a dream. Clearly the person experiences "an asteroid", in a dream, and there is no "extra" playing an essential role in that experience.

We weren't talking about seeing an asteroid, we were talking about experiencing an asteroid, and what it is which "produces" the experience. I think that it is the systems within the human being which produce the experience, though I agreed that there is something "extra " involved with the experience. But you were claiming that the extra thing produces the experience. That, I think is clearly false.

The point is that there is no direct chain of causation between the thing within the experience, and the sensible "extra" thing which you claim produces the experience, so it is false to say that the sensible thing produces the experience. In reality, the causal chain which produces the experience occurs within the human being, and the things which are sensed act as influences on this experience. This is evident in the reality of hallucinations, dreams, and imagination. You cannot just dismiss the reality of these experiences for the sake of supporting your claim that the sensible "extra" thing produces the experience. Then suggest that we were discussing "seeing" rather than "experiencing".

Consider for example, the experience of hearing someone play the piano. What you hear is a series of notes and chords, music. If you look, with your eyes, you see someone playing the piano, and the person's actions correspond with what you hear. Because of this temporal correspondence, between what you hear and what you see, you might conclude that the person's actions at the piano are causing you to hear music. But you'd be forgetting the role that the human body plays in selecting a very specific and minute part of the vast reality around it, the notes, and focusing on that very tiny aspect, to hear the music independent of sights, smells etc., and even other sounds. Likewise, when you look with your eyes, you must focus on a very tiny aspect of the vast environment, to see that it is the particular actions of the person at the piano which correspond to what you hear.

So it really is the human body which produces the experience, through a process of selecting from what is available in the environment. Each sense is designed to distinguish a very unique type of information, indicating that the body has developed ways of separating out, and focusing in on very tiny aspects of a vast world, creating an "experience" through this process of separating things from each other. The experience is created by this process of separating things out, which the senses do, distinguishing minute parts, along with the brain synthesizing all this distinct information into a unity. The "experience" is the unity, and this unity is synthetic, produced within the body, with information selected by the body..

Why would it have to be a mass hallucination? if one person hallucinates an asteroid, then that person can speak about that asteroid.

There is no such thing as "use" in a general sense because each instance of using something is unique and particular.

There is no experience of the asteroid without the asteroid.. — Janus

But this is false. There could be an hallucination in which there is an experience of an asteroid, in which case there is the experience of that asteroid, the imaginary asteroid. Therefore there is the experience of the asteroid (the fictional asteroid) without any real physical asteroid. And this is not a small problem to be dismissed as nonsense, because in particle physics there are no real fundamental particles. There is something which is experienced, and the name "particle" is given to that experience, but there are no actual physical particles. So there is the experience of particles without any real physical particles.

In fact it is the conditions of the world, taken as a whole, including the human, that produces the experience of the asteroid, so the "something else" that produces the experience of an asteroid is nothing less than the whole world. — Janus

How would you account for imagination and creativity then? Suppose that someone creates a tune, and hums it in one's mind, or someone creates an image of a fictional asteroid, or a physicist creates a fictional particle. Why would you say that "the whole world" produces this experience when it's really just the imagination of the creator? .