To state it succinctly, modern theories of "chance", which propose that the universe originated in quantum fluctuations, are simply incoherent. Space-time is understood as a property of the universe, which emerges with the universe. The quantum "fluctuations" which are responsible, as cause of, the universe's existence are necessarily prior to the existence of the universe. Such "fluctuations" without space or time are incoherent. In this case "fluctuation" is a term referring to an impossibility, activity without space or time.

1. The universe appears to be “fine-tuned”: the slightest variation beyond certain physical constants would not result in the universe as we understand it. — ModernPAS

This is the argument Aristotle put forward thousands of years ago, concerning the existence of any object. In this case, the op, the object is called "the universe".

Each object is distinct and unique from every other object. Every object has a 'form" which is proper to itself alone. What gives an object its uniqueness is what he called accidentals. The accidentals are what separates one object from another, when numerous objects are judged as being the same type of object, or the same class.

The law of identity is used to recognize the distinctness and uniqueness of each particular object. Even if two objects are judged to be the same according to kind or type, they are unique according to accidentals, and, each object must have all the accidentals specific to that object, in order to be the unique object which it is. Accordingly, each object, when it comes into existence, must be the exact and precise object which it is, or else it would not be the object which it is.

Now, the argument is that an object is not random matter, and cannot be random matter, because to be an object requires that matter exist in an organized way. it must have a form. So when we put this premise with the one above, "each object, when it comes into existence, must be the exact and precise object which it is, or else it would not be the object which it is", we find that "what the object is", (the form of the particular) must necessarily precede the existence of the object. If the form of the object did not precede its material existence, then the object could be something other than it is, and this is contrary to the law of identity.

Therefore, when we consider the existence of "the universe", as an object, it is necessary to recognize that "what the object is", the "form" of that particular object, is necessarily prior to its material existence.

For those so inclined, I think natural theology is justified in claiming that there's a prior cause. But what I think they're not entitled to claim is that this is something that can be proven. After all, for the believer, the Universe is evidence; that's what makes them believers! — Wayfarer

Actually the cosmological argument, if properly formulated, provides such a proof. What is require though is an understanding of the principles. Those who do not understand the principles reject the argument as incoherent.

The key principles to the argument are the dichotomous distinction between potential and actual, and the premise that only something actual may act as a cause. This excludes the possibility of infinite potential, as such a thing would be incapable of bringing into existence anything actual.

A simple representation of the argument goes like this. We observe that the potential for existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. By inductive reason therefore, in the case of every object, the potential for existence of that object precedes its existence. However, a potential can only be actualized by something actual. Therefore the potential for existence cannot precede actual existence in an absolute sense, because that potential could never be actualized. We put this together with the inductive conclusion that the potential for the object always precedes its actual existence, and we find that it is necessary to conclude that there is an actuality which is prior to all objects.

Much modern speculation refers to the infinite potential of quantum flux or some such thing infinite potential. But these speculators ignore the necessity imposed by the cosmological argument, of an actuality which acts as a cause, to bring an actual object into existence from the proposed field of quantum flux, or 'infinite potential'. This means that the proposed quantum flux which is supposed to be prior to the universe, is not a true "infinite potential", and is really limited by this pre-existing actuality. The need to recognize this pre-existing actuality is ignored when these speculators posit the emergence of time as "space-time".

Why not?

I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase. — Banno

It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.

Notice that explaining something requires no judgement of success or failure, while justifying something requires success. You say something, you believe that what you have said explains something, and that is your explanation, regardless of whether anyone understands it, let alone believing or agreeing to it. To justify on the other hand requires agreement, that's where "the correctness of" comes into play.

But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it. — Pfhorrest

That's right, providing the reason for an act does not justify the act. One must provide a "good reason" for the act This is evident from the fact that providing a bad reason (unsound argument) cannot justify an act. That's why it's very difficult to justify acts, as well as beliefs, through reference to "feelings". This is contrary to the common belief that we justify by referring to sensations ("I saw it" for example), which just provides us with appearances and no real principles.

The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.

And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus. — Banno

Right, error is common place, and that's why this notion of "fit" is not a good principle to base such judgements on. One person's method of judging a "fit" is completely different from another person's method. What method does your auto-correct use? You might notice here at TPF that some people have very odd ways of choosing words. I find it very odd that you would be judging whether the world fits to the words rather than judging whether the words fit to the world. When making a "fit" something must conform to the shape of the other. We conform the words to fit to the world, not vise versa.

You clearly use a completely different method for judging the "fit of wold-to-word" from me. You judge that "justified" is a word which fits your vanilla purchase, when all you've said in your attempt to justify, that you buy vanilla because you like it. I see that you are trying to conform the word "justify" to fit your perception of 'the world', but I reject your proposed conformation as a misunderstanding of the world.

Actually, no. If multiverse then the universe is in the multiverse. Either way, as defined we live in a (the) universe. — tim wood

"Universe" signifies the complete whole of all that exists. It's contradictory to say that the universe is in something else (multiverse), because this implies that there is something outside of, therefore other than the universe.

Acceptance of multiverse as an ontology leaves the concept of "universe" as incoherent.

Does a rabbit not live in a rabbit hole if his rabbit hole is on a mountainside where conjecturally at least there might be other rabbit holes? — tim wood

How is this relevant? "Rabbit hole" doesn't signify the complete whole of all that exists, so of course there might be more that one rabbit hole. But this doesn't justify the contradictory notion that there could be more than one universe.

To say that there is more than one universe requires changing what "universe' means. How would one define "universe' in this case?

But here's what we know: there is a universe. — tim wood

This is doubtful, and that's what multiverse speculation makes evident. "Universe" is to say all is one. "Multiverse" is to say all is a multiplicity. The two are incompatible. That's why there's a gap between quantum principles and general relativity, and the theory of everything is nowhere to be found.

The argument is simply that if system X is one which helps me achieve my goals it is justified that I maintain it. — Isaac

This is clearly false. If your goal is an unjustified one (a bad one), then system X as aiding in reaching this goal, is not justified. If your goal is to have so and so dead, using a gun to shoot that person in the head is not justified just because it helps you achieve your goal.

I'm talking about the having of goal, something which is common to every intentional creature. — Isaac

The problem is that a system is not used to achieve "goals" in any absolute, or general sense, any strategic system is geared toward a particular type of goal. To judge the system as to whether the use of that system is justified or not requires judgement of the good or badness of the particular goal which it is used toward achieving.

In order to be satisfied with that justification, one only need to also have goals and consider whether one would also maintain a system useful in helping to achieve them. It's about empathy. — Isaac

This again is false. We were not talking about judging whether the use of systems toward reaching goals is justifiable (in the most general sense), as you imply here, we were talking about justifying the use of a particular system. And to justify the use of a particular system requires judgement of the type of goal which it will be useful for bringing about.

You're conflation unrighteous (in a moral sense) with incorrect (a technical sense). Say a criminal mastermind sets up an elaborate trap to kill millions. He has used (to achieve his evil goal) the system of 3d spatio-temporal relativity. Is that system now wrong? Wat if he calculated how many guns he'd need using arithmetic, is arithmetic now wrong? — Isaac

You do realize this thread concerns ethical principles don't you? I do not know what you would mean by "incorrect" in a technical sense. But you now appear to have come across an important point. The same system may be used toward good goals, and toward bad goals.

In your example, it is the use of the system toward goal A instead of goal B, which is wrong. Perhaps we have been barking up the wrong tree, and you and I can move toward a compromise here. It is not the system which we justify, but the use of the system. Would you agree with this? A system is not the type of thing which we justify, but a particular way of using a system is what we justify. This allows that a "system" exists in a general sense, as an aid, or tool for assistance in achieving goals, but the system is not itself bad or good, because these are terms reserved for judging the goals. We might judge a system as more efficient than another, or something like that.

If we start referring to the efficiency as "good", while we also judge the goals as "good" we might equivocate.

Because you have to use a 'system' to judge the righteousness of the goal. Must you then justify that system? — Isaac

I think that if you start to understand the nature of particular goals, without referring to "goals" in general, you'll find that we do not apply a "system" for judging goals. This is why the nature of morality is so difficult to understand, and why there is so much variance in the ethical codes; systems produced by moral philosophy. Notice the system of ethics is derived from the moral judgement; a judgement which is based in some sort of intuition or something other than a system.

No, I know. I just thought I'd get it out there now. It's the subtext behind all of your philosophy. You don't seem capable of investigating any matter without forcing it down some path which ends with "...because God". — Isaac

I'm sorry, I'm just seeking the truth in these matters. If, where the inquiry leads offends you, then I apologize for the offence.

And apparently you would doubt doubt. Where does that leave you? — tim wood

It leaves me doubtful. Some people here at TPF claim it's impossible for me to doubt some of the things that I doubt, therefore my doubt of my doubt is warranted. Perhaps I'm misusing the word "doubt". This possibility warrants the doubt of doubt as well.

Do you think there's something wrong with claiming to doubt doubt? I think it's better than claiming to know that I know. There's an infinite regress implied here, and infinite regress is conducive of doubt. So there is nothing wrong with claiming to doubt doubt, while there is something wrong with claiming to know that I know.

You haven't 'explained', you've asserted. There's a difference. — Isaac

An explanation is a series of assertions intended to elucidate. That's what I provided. If what I am saying still remains unintelligible to you, then I have failed in that intention. I have "explained", but my explanation has failed.

Why not? You haven't explained your main objection. Why is utility not a justification for adopting a system? All you've done so far is asserted that it isn't, not provided any explanation as to why. — Isaac

OK, I clearly failed in my attempt. I'll try again. Utility is determined in relation to a goal. A thing is useful for obtaining such and such a goal, and that determines utility. Now, goals are inherently subjective, varying from one subject to another, due to the fact that they exist relative to one's intention. Intention is the property of an individual.

Justification, as it is defined, and generally understood, requires that one demonstrates the correctness, or rightness of what the person is claiming. This means that for the justification to succeed, and actually be a justification, there must actually be success. Notice the difference between explanation and justification. I can explain without success, but I cannot justify without success.

Demonstrating that a system is useful for obtaining my goal, does not demonstrate the correctness of the system because it requires that my goal is judged by the other person to be correct. If the system is useful for obtaining a goal which the other person believes is not a righteous goal, the system will not be justified no matter how useful it is. The utility itself will be judged as unrighteous, incorrect, and therefore unjustified. And an unjustified utility will not justify use of the system. In fact there will be the reverse effect. The more useful the system is for obtaining an unrighteous goal, the more unjustified the system is.

Therefore, I must first demonstrate to the other individual the correctness of my goal, before the utility of the system for obtaining my goal can be judged as justification of that system. And, the utility of a system, as justification for that system, is completely dependent on justification of the goal which the system is useful for obtaining. Are you not familiar with the phrase "the end justifies the means"?

Is that a better explanation?

Must it? Must everything be justified? How does that work non-circularly? If 'The Goal' is what I feel what am I supposed to do on finding that it is not justified (by your method which you've yet to reveal)? Am I supposed to now not feel that way? — Isaac

Where's the circularity? If the goal is not justified, then the means for obtaining that goal (the system) is not justified. Isn't this straight forward and obvious to you? It seems pretty basic.

So religious commandments have all of the criteria you list above, or lack them just as much? — Isaac

I haven't said anything about religious commandments, I'm addressing your deceptive claim that a system is justified by its utility.

Is there a philosophy of good, such as the epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge, and ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with morals, and aesthetics is the branch that deals with beauty. — god must be atheist

I would say that the philosophy of good is moral philosophy. Morality involves distinguishing good from bad. Morality may be subsumed within metaphysics, as a branch of metaphysics. It is necessarily prior to epistemology because the "correctness" which epistemology relies on is a form of "good". That is what Plato demonstrated in The Republic. It is metaphysics because of the requirement of determining the ontological status of "good".

Good is wholly undefinable. That something is good or not is a subjective judgment, and therefore to justify X as good because it leads to Y where Y is also good, is only justifiable by personal subjective means. — god must be atheist

This is exactly why the ontological status of "good" needs to be determined. Your claims about "good", that it is "undefinable", and that whether something is good is a "subjective judgement" are themselves subjective judgements. So it appears like the nature of subjective judgements, and the ontological status of such, needs to be understood in order to understand "good". Do you believe that subjective judgements are real things, with real ontological status, the nature of which may potentially be understood?

If you or anyone else justifies moral actions on whether they are good or not in intention or in final result, then you or anyone else is walking on thin ice. — god must be atheist

How else would you propose that one might justify moral actions?

Omnipresence. IF there were a god, wouldn't His presence be utterly overwhelming? This seems to be what many of the devout describe. — Banno

What the heck is "presence"? By the time I say "now" it's in the past. I'm afraid the presence of anything is not overwhelming. It's actually very difficult to affirm what it means to be present.

There are things that stand outside the tournament of justification, because they are needed in order for that tournament to take place. Isn't god just the sort of thing that would justify everything else? — Banno

I believe this is contradictory. Such a thing would be unjustifiable. And an unjustifiable thing cannot itself justify anything. Placing god in this contradictory category only makes the reality of god impossible. It would be an atheist definition. If we want to understand how a theist sees, apprehends, understands, or defines "God" an atheist definition is not helpful because clearly these two apprehend the meaning of that term in completely different ways.

SO there must be stuff that is beyond doubt. — Banno

I didn't think you were an idealist Banno, but that is the affirmation of an ideal. The only thing beyond doubt would be something perfectly well known, and such perfection is proper only to an ideal.

Now, if there were a God, wouldn't it be that sort of thing? — Banno

This may be the case, but I know you well enough to know that you will deny that the "stuff that is beyond doubt" is 'ideal'. You will claim that this "stuff" is some sort of foundational belief such as "this is a sentence of English", which is not an 'ideal' at all because it actually can be doubted. I can for instance doubt that it is a "sentence" because the "t" in "this" is not capitalized. and if that is not supposed to be the sentence referred to, what does "this" refer to? In fact, your example is a complete misrepresentation of what an ideal is supposed to be.

Try looking at mathematics, where each symbol is supposed to directly represent an object (mathematical object) instead of meaning something. When the symbol directly represents an object instead of having meaning, (such as the numeral "3" represents the number 3), there can be no doubt as to what the symbol means. Therefore we have ideal representation. Ideal representation is what is required to put an expression beyond the reach of doubt. The problem though, is that the whole system may be cast into doubt, by doubting the existence of such ideal objects.

There simply is no law that criminalizes collusion between a political campaign and foreign government. — NOS4A2

There sure is.

Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him? — Banno

How does this make any sense to you? It's like saying 'if what I tell you is true, then it is unreasonable for you not to believe me'. But of course your reasons for believing or not believing me are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether or not what I say is true. Likewise, our reasons for believing or not believing in god are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether there is or is not a god.

Circular reasoning involves using your conclusion as a premise in the same argument. In order to form the conclusion 'there is no other source for order', you already have to assume there is no other source for order- i.e. that natural cases of order are not caused by something other than a designer. — aporiap

The conclusion does not involve the prior assumption of "no other source of order". That is the conclusion, and this comes about from understanding the distinction between order and disorder, and the fact that order cannot come from disorder without a cause. That cause is design. That's simply what creating by design is, and ordering things is something only done in the act of creating by design. So when things are ordered there is design at work, because that's what ordering is. And things could not be ordered without having been ordered, by way of contradiction.

Randomness and chaos are intrinsic to the world. You will have to explain why there is chaos. — aporiap

I already discussed this with someone else in this thread, maybe you should go back and reread some sections. There is no randomness and chaos in the natural world, as the world appears to us. All that we sense is orderly, and this is because human beings are so disposed so as only orderly things are sensed. If there were unordered things out there we would not sense them. One might create a system where it appears like randomness and chaos prevail, but that would be a created system, and therefore it would be designed and ordered simply to produce the appearance of randomness and chaos, when the system is actually ordered to do this.

In that example we know the precise reason, it is the randomness of the inputs to the system. When you replace the random inputs with ordered inputs, the order of the pendulum swings goes away. — aporiap

But the system itself is created, which is what a "system" is, and is therefore ordered by that act of creation. For example, we create dice to give a random roll. But that system is created for that purpose, so it is inherently ordered, and this will not suffice as an example of natural randomness for that very reason. The pendulum system is set up (ordered) with random (unknown) inputs, just like the roll of dice gives unknown outputs. Since the system is artificial, and made to be this way, it is contradictory to say that it is not ordered.

I don't know what you mean by effective. By definition, probabilistic models incorporate randomness. It will not tell you the coin will be heads or tails after you flip it. It tells you it could be heads or tails. You could imagine there's a 'predictable pattern' though, if you knew all the variables you could know if it would be heads and so there's still a pattern. But fundamentally there is no predictable pattern of movement of a particle or the state of its properties (whether it spins in one or another direction, whether it's in this location or that location). It is fundamentally random. — aporiap

If there is no predictable pattern, then Schrodinger's equation would be useless. So when you talk about "no predictable pattern" you are not talking about the universe according to Schrodinger's equation, and that's why I accused you of contradiction. There is a predictable pattern, but some aspects are not predictable. Again, I went though this earlier in the thread, the overall system, as a whole, is orderly and predictable, though some aspects (what we call accidentals) are not predictable.

You 'infer', by analogy, 'order' in nature is designed. — aporiap

It's not inferred by analogy, it's an understanding of the word "order", what it means to be ordered. You seem to have no understanding whatsoever of what it means to be ordered, and you go off using the word in strange ways, as if when human beings set up a system like a random number generator, this is not an ordered system. Isn't it obvious to you that these systems are designed to produce these so-called random results and are therefore ordered?

To infer in the latter case, you necessarily need to distinguish between order and design because prior to inferring the order is designed, you are implicitly acknowledging the thing has a pattern i.e. order and yet, at that moment, it is not known whether that pattern is a design or not. — aporiap

You seem to misunderstand. To say that a thing has order is to say that it has been ordered, and this implies "by design". There is nothing else which orders things but a designer.

I see you mention "pattern", and you might want to go to Isaac's position, and argue that a pattern is completely subjective. Isaac said there is no order inherent within the thing, it is only in the observing subject's mind. Is this what you are saying? But if the pattern or order is within the thing itself, it must have been put there by design. Otherwise we could not call it a pattern or order, could we? If the things were positioned by some random force, then it would necessarily be just some random positioning of the parts. Don't you agree? It might look like a pattern to one of us, but we'd have to say that it's really random positioning. What could make it not-random, other than being positioned by design?

There is no person with a predetermined goal trying to make proteins. — aporiap

Who said there's a person involved? Trial and error is a process not restricted to human activities, and your description sounded exactly like trial and error:
"For every functional protein [e.g Hemoglobin], there are hundreds of 'pseudo' genes that failed to function in the process of attempting to make that one."
Do you not understand that "function" implies purpose? You write phrases like this, then in total self-contradiction you proceed to deny purpose. I really don't think that you have a good understanding of what you are saying.

The point is an object can do very different functions in very different contexts and be considered 'useful'. The definition of a purpose or final cause Aristotelian sense, is the singular intrinsic function of something [candle to light house, seed to form adult plant]. How can there be a fundamentally intrinsic function of something if it can function in multiple contexts? Sure we say a candle as having the purpose of lighting a room, but it can be used in many other ways that have nothing to do with that. — aporiap

You seem to misunderstand Aristotle's "final cause". The final cause is the goal, or end, what we might call purpose, and this is specific to the circumstances. Yes, it might be true that each particular thing has a singular final cause specific to itself, but that's because each particular thing exists in its own particular set of circumstances. You might say that this object, if it were in a different context, would serve a different function (in a counterfactual way), but the fact is that each object only exists in one unique set of circumstances.

How so? We can't continue to justify a system by logical measures (like non-contradiction). At some point it's just a faith and the justification is utility. — Isaac

Just as I explained. That X is good, because it is efficient for bringing about the desired effect Y, is not a real justification, it's an illusion of justification. It is required that Y be demonstrated as good, in order for the justification to be real. That utility is justification is an illusion, because utility is relative to the goal, or end which grants the thing its usefulness, and this goal must itself be justified. That's why Wayfarer referred to the need for a "summum bonum". So your claim that non-religious systems are more easily justified is false because the 'justification' you are referring to is not justification at all, but an illusion of justification.

One major difference between religious systems and non-religious ones is that faith in non-religious systems is more easily justified by their utility at helping to provide useful strategies... — Isaac

This may be true, but strategies are applied as the means to ends. We still need to judge the ends themselves, to produce a true justification, a justification which is more than just an illusion. This requires that the ends are put in relation to further ends, as the means toward those ends.

It's like the distinction between a valid argument and a sound argument. One can say my logic is valid therefore my conclusion is justified, but this is just an illusion of justification, because the premises might not be sound. Therefore we need to put the premises in relation to some further principles of truth, to judge how "good" they are, in order to produce a true justification.

That is the problem with your claim that faith in non-religious systems is more easily justified, the justification referred to here is just an illusion.

Your word salads are nearly unreadable. — NOS4A2

You mean inedible?

No—we will find out soon enough. — NOS4A2

You keep saying things like this. And when we find out that you were wrong you just go on to some other falsities.

Now, what I asked was: Did you believe Trump colluded with Russia to help him win the election? — NOS4A2

Colluded? He's a fucking puppet. The Russians said 'run for president, we'll get you in'. At first he didn't believe they could do it, but he really wanted it, so he went along with it. The deal with the devil. He let them groom him, creating the public image which got him to where he is now, president of the USA; giving up his soul in this pact. And that's all he is, as president, an image which the Russians have created.

Hey, NOS4A2! I can shoot the shit just as well as you. But my BS has a kernel of truth, yours has a kernel of falsity, true BS through and through.

First of all the argument is circular. Your discounting natural cases of order as having an alternative source of order depends on your [in all honesty, narrow-sighted] conclusion that there are no other sources of order. — aporiap

I don't see how the argument is circular. You accept that it is a "conclusion", therefore there is logic behind it. One of the most useful aspects of logic is to exclude from the category of "possible", things which are actually impossible. If this is what you call being narrow-sighted, then so be it. And I've already explained why it is illogical to think that order could come from anything other than design, so call me narrow-sighted, if that's what being logical is. I'd rather be narrow-sighted than believe that something impossible is possible.

This is despite the dis analogies in man-made and natural cases of order pointed out by Isaac - i.e. (1) that hurricane Katrina, black holes, snowflakes, the spherical ordered tangle of the rubber bands in my pocket, and mars, were not made with any clear purpose or intent; (2) that natural order results from self organization as opposed to an external agent or individual. These clearly provide enough justification to assume the things generating natural and man-made order are different . — aporiap

We went through this in this thread already. "Self-organisation" is a bogus concept. Organisation is already presupposed, required as an initial state for any system self-organizing, so it is just a matter of one form of order creating another form of order.

Furthermore, the fact that we can point to instances of order which we do not know the reason for that order, does not justify the claim that there is order with no reason for that order.

Secondly, there is a chicken and egg dillema here. The thing which allows humans to be intelligent, the their brain [we know this unambiguously because of lesioning studies, in which damage to the brain directly causes deficits in intelligence], is itself a natural object operating by universal natural principles. — aporiap

I really don't know what you might mean when you say that the brain operates by "universal natural principles". I tend to think that you're just spouting words, and you don't know what you're saying.

So, 'design', then isn't really the result of 'designers', it is fundamentally a result of the way the universe is intrinsically structured. So, in this view, there is only ever one ultimate source of order [and disorder] which is nature itself. — aporiap

Yeah sure, but the universe, as an ordered structure was necessarily designed itself, so how does this help your case? This is the same issue with your reference to the brain. The brain, as an ordered structure, was itself designed. So saying that the brain operates according to "universal natural principles" doesn't really say anything, because designed things operate according to such principles. In fact, that's how they are designed, through the use of such principles.

Anyway I've gone on a limb and did a cursory search for clear examples of order arising from entirely unpredictable, random processes. I was able to find a nice article which provides an example of pendulums which take on an orderly state of swinging when swung at in entirely random ways. In this case the ordered properties of the system - the orientation and swinging of the pendulums - results entirely from the disorder of the inputs to the system. So here is one case in which order comes out of disorder. — aporiap

I'll repeat myself, citing instances of order occurring, in which we do not know the reason why the order occurs, does nothing to support the claim that order could arise for no reason. So you might as well give up your search for these examples, if that's the reason why you're looking for them.

Of course we also know the universe is fundamentally indeterministic or random - this is why schrodinger's equation is a probabilistic model, not a deterministic law. — aporiap

This is contradictory. If a probabilistic law is effective, then the system is not random.

You've just decoupled 'intelligence', 'external agent', and even 'external cause' from 'designer'. How do you distinguish design from order? — aporiap

That's the point, any attempt to separate design from order is illogical.

Aristotle's entire framework of causation is just that, a framework. It doesn't necessarily map to reality. To give a real world example: There is nothing to suggest that proteins are made to function the way they function. For every functional protein [e.g Hemoglobin], there are hundreds of 'pseudo' genes that failed to function in the process of attempting to make that one. — aporiap

Ever heard of 'trial and error'? Trial and error by its very nature is a designed procedure. It requires a predetermined condition of success.

And proteins don't have singular purposes, they are multifunctional. In fact it's precisely this cognitive bias we have [ functional fixedness ], of assuming purpose, that leads to so many mischaracterizations of proteins -- we fail to realize just because they're important for something in one context, doesn't mean they have entirely different functions in others. To carry the example, hemoglobin, most well-known for carrying oxygen in the blood and most expressed by red blood cells in the blood. Carrying oxygen seems the 'purpose' of hemoglobin, but hemoglobin is also expressed in numerous other tissues. In those cells it plays roles completely different than its role as an oxygen carrier. This also discounts the non-bodily uses of something like hemoglobin. We repurpose proteins all the time, taking them out of their natural contexts to do other things. — aporiap

I'll repeat again. Just because we do not know the purpose, or in this case if someone says 'X is the purpose' when this may be proven false, that does not mean there is no purpose.

While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is the problem with such exclusive definitions. It is quite possible, and probable, that acts which fulfill the requirements for "religious acts" were being carried out before animals evolved so as to fulfil the requirements of being human.

This tactic of exclusion is common with philosophers who argue to prove a position rather than to learn the truth. We find it in definitions of things like "language", "meaning", and "intention". It is argued that these things are exclusive to human beings ("created BY humans") when evidence from the science of biology clearly demonstrates otherwise. Evidently it is profoundly wrong to assert that these things were "created By humans".

But I do not think it is correct to say that they were "created FOR humans" either. That appears to be some form of inverted anthropomorphism, or a misinterpretation of the purpose, or final cause which is apprehended as being the reason for existence of these things. To say that some prior creatures, or even God, did such and such acts "FOR" the sake of human beings, rather than for the sake of something else, with a lack of understanding of the intention behind those acts, therefore without sufficient proof, is to make an unjustified conclusion.

There is a need to prove that there exists an object in absolute rest because there are only two contradictory possibilites:

1. An object in absolute rest

or

2. Everything in relative motion

Since you're denying 2 then 1 must be the case. So, prove it. — TheMadFool

I was not denying 2, I was critical of anyone who would say that absolute rest is impossible, without first defining what "absolute rest" means. Now you have made progress toward a definition, saying absolute rest involves an "object" at absolute rest. Since I consider "absolute rest" to be an ideal, I don't agree with this requirement, unless an ideal is an object. Are you saying that an ideal, like "absolute rest", is an object? If so, in what way is it an object?

Let's try again...

Suppose there is an object, A, in absolute rest i.e. at rest relative to everything else.

But we know that there exists at least 2 objects in relative motion of the displacement kind i.e. the distance between them change e.g. a car moving towards you.

Is it then possible that A is at rest (absolute) relative to both the car and you??

There are three points: object A, the car (B) and you (C) forming a triangle.

We know that the distance BC is changing. Can the distance AC and AB remain constant i.e. can A be at rest relative to both B and C?

I think it's impossible. The pythagorean theorem proves it. — TheMadFool

You ought to see that this is nonsense. "Absolute rest" would be the standard by which all motions are measured. Therefore everything would be in motion relative to "object A" (absolute rest), unless there was something else which was at absolute rest. Only things at absolute rest would be unchanging relative to absolute rest, everything else would be changing relative to absolute rest.

Not it is NOT justified! Because we are using the "AND" in the GENERAL case of definition of marriage between any tribes A,B (whether A, and B are the same tribe or not), the general rule is:

IF
[50 men of tribe A are married to 50 women of tribe B
AND
50 women of tribe A are married to 50 men of tribe B]
THEN
A || B — Zuhair

You are refusing to acknowledge the equivocation in your use of "AND" in the rule. In the case of "A is married to B", quoted above, "AND" is used as a conjunction between two phrases which refer to two distinct sets of circumstances. In the case of S is married to S, "And" would refer to two distinct descriptions of the same set of circumstances.

So, in case (1), of "A is married to B", you have situation Y ( "50 men of tribe A are married to 50 women of tribe B") "AND", situation Z ("50 women of tribe A are married to 50 men of tribe B").
But in the case (2) of "S is married to S", you have the situation X, with two different descriptions of X ('50 men are married to 50 women', "AND" '50 women are married to 50 men').

See, in case (1) you are saying there is situation Y, "AND" situation Z. In case (2) the conjunction "AND" joins two descriptions, saying of the situation X, this description "AND" that description are true. Therefore there is equivocation in the your use of "AND", which is unacceptable for a "rule", one says 'there is situation Y "AND" situation Z', while the other says 'this "AND" that are true of situation X'.

Just substitute S instead of A and S instead of B, and you get the conclusion S || S. No equivocation at all. — Zuhair

Making such a substitution alters the meaning of "AND" Therefore the example employs equivocation.

But you are right in fact. I am not paying the slightest attention to your argument. — fishfry

Bottom line I have no idea what you're talking about. — fishfry

I assume then, that you still do not understand the distinction I made between what a symbol means, and what it refers to, or stands for. Perhaps if you read up on the kind/token distinction, that will help you.


When you say "S is married to S", it is quite clear that one S represents the fifty men and the other the fifty women. But you claim S represents the whole tribe. Hence the charge of equivocation.

50 men of tribe S are married to 50 women of tribe S,
AND
50 women of tribe S are married to 50 men of tribe S." — Zuhair

Your use of "AND" as a conjunction between the two expressions above provides the necessary ambiguity for your equivocation. "S is married to S" can refer to one situation only. Yet you use two distinct expressions. Since you allow that "S is married to S" represents the two distinct situations expressed above, the charge of equivocation is justified.

You said it’d be illogical to think there is any source for order other than a designer.

Your justification is that every instance of things we conventionally define to be ordered, derives from a ‘designer’. You infer from all instances of design-designer you’ve seen, that order in the natural world must also be from a designer. — aporiap

There's a further aspect which I explained earlier, which you don't seem to be accounting for, and that is that it is impossible that we will ever find an instance of order which we can justifiably claim came into existence without a designer. This is why I told Isaac that this is a pointless position to take.

I’m just extending the logic here. While it’s true everything we define to be ordered has a designer, it’s also true that all designers are intelligent terrestrial animals. — aporiap

This is illogical, and not an extension of my logic. We find designed order within the bodies of animals and plants, about which we cannot say that the designer is the animal and plant itself. The design comes from the genetics and underlying processes. So an animal such s a human being, designing something, is just an extension of this underlying designing which is occurring in all plants and animals all the time.

Therefore your proposed extension of logic is a composition fallacy. You are proposing that what is true of some instances of design, that the designers are "intelligent terrestrial animals", is true of all instances of design. But in reality we see design in lower level life forms, without intelligence, so we cannot restrict our conception of "designer" in such a way.

What we do, in philosophy and metaphysics is observe very closely, and analyze the intentional acts of human designers, which are very evident to us, so that we can develop an understanding of the underlying designing process which is responsible for the existence of living bodies. This designing is what Aristotle called final cause.

There is nothing to suggest designers could be otherwise because we’ve never seen any other possible designer, in the same way we’ve never seen any other source for design. So it would be illogical to assume that the universe could be designed by anything other than intelligent terrestrial animals — aporiap

Again, this is unsound logic. We often see designed things where the designer is nowhere to be found. You are not respecting this obvious premise, which along with the fact that our spatial-temporal perspective for observation is extremely limited, makes it very likely that there are many designed things where the designer is not evident to us. So when we see a thing which looks like it was designed, yet we cannot see the designer, there is no reason to conclude that it wasn't designed. In fact, this is the conclusion which I explained is pointless, because it can never be justified. And a conclusion which cannot be justified is an unsound conclusion and ought not be accepted.

You don’t see design in plants, you instead conclude that the order in plants is designed, which you ultimately infer from the fact that all man-made designs come from human designers. — aporiap

Right, strictly speaking, we don't "see" the design in plants. We see the order, and with the aid of equipment we might say we "see" the DNA etc., but we don't "see" the design. And this is consistent with human designs. We do not "see" the person's intent, or plan, it exists immaterially in the mind of the person. This is why understanding the nature of final cause, and how the object, as the goal, exists immaterially before it has material existence is very important to understanding the nature of design.

So, we know how to recognize order. And, we know a little bit about how ordered things come into existence through acts of human intent. So, when we see other things which have order, we can apply these principles, toward understanding how that other order (things ordered by design other than human intent) came into existence through design. Then we find consistency between these two, and we know we are on the right track. Your criticism appears to be that since there is not a necessary connection between order and design, we ought not proceed in this way. To answer your criticism, I would say that you need to understand the relation as one of probability rather than as one of necessity. It is this lack of necessity which validates the concept of "free will". There is not a relation of necessity between the thing ordered, and the design which orders it, there is a "free" act required.

By the bolded's logic, the universe must be designed by a terrestrial animal capable of design. — aporiap

But we see design in plants as well, so design is not limited to animals. It's not the argument which is ridiculous, it's the way you interpret it which is.

You all deny/critique that <all objects are in relative motion>

If you all are right then there is must be an object at absolute rest.

Can you prove that? — TheMadFool

There is no need to prove that. The person who claims that all motion is relative needs to prove that there is no such object as absolute rest. Until it is proven that all motion is relative, the critique of this premise is justified.

We're not talking about chairs. Four chairs over here are different than the four chairs over there. — fishfry

You asked for an example, so I gave it. What objects do the two 4s in "4+4=8" refer to in the example, if not the group of chairs here, and the other group of chairs over there?

Once again you are avoiding the question. We are talking about 4 + 4 = 8. You claim the two instances of '4' represent or stand for or refer to or mean two different things. — fishfry

No, you're not paying attention fishfry. I very specifically made a distinction between what the two 4s refer to, or stand for, and what they mean. They each mean a very similar thing, that there is a group of four objects representedby the symbol, but they refer to, or stand for, distinct things, like the two distinct groups of four chairs.

I implore you, please try to understand this. It's as if you refuse to distinguish between what a word means and what a word refers to. Here's an example. I might talk about my "computer". Do you know what "computer" means? Do you understand, that what "computer" means is something completely different from the object referred to when I talk about my computer? What it means is something completely different from what it stands for or refers to. These two are categorically different and to conflate them is a category mistake. That's the distinction I'm trying to make when I say there is a difference between what "4" means, and what the two 4's each refer to in the expression "4+4=8".

You have claimed that mathematicians use the word equality when they really mean congruence, equivalence, or isomorphism. — fishfry

That's ridiculous. I've repeated over and over again, that mathematician use "equality" to mean equality as defined by the axiom employed. And, the axioms do not define "equality" as identity. It is you who keeps making the incorrect assertion that mathematicians use "equality" to mean identity.

I ask you to introspect on the point that if you can't come up with specific examples, perhaps you don't understand your own ideas as well as you think you do. — fishfry

I gave you so many specific examples, like using 4+4=8 to recognize that putting two groups of four chairs together makes eight chairs. and also the very the act of counting things. Are you unable to read or something?

I stand by that order doesn't imply designer for the reasons I mentioned to — aporiap

I demonstrated that your so-called "reasons" are unreasonable, so why are you falling back on this unreasonableness? Let's look again.

I don’t think order implies a designer - part of that is because the examples of natural, order - snowflakes, molecules, galactic filaments- are so numerous and we know the mechanisms and none of them require an external intelligent designing agent for their generation. — aporiap

You now agree that we don't know the mechanisms well enough to say that these processes do not require an external intelligent designing agent. And now, all you say is that this idea of an intelligent designing agent is "ridiculous", without any reasons for this claim.

Meanwhile, I've demonstrated that the only way we know of, that order could possibly come into existence, is from an intelligent designing agent. And, it is unreasonable, and illogical to think that we could ever know of order coming from another source.

So who's position is really the ridiculous one?

I don't mean to be pestering, but what quantum mechanicals unknowns? All the quantum mechanics needed to understand basic subatomic interactions is well characterized: orbital geometries, bonding interactions between orbitals. The activities of the relevant subatomic particles - electrons and protons, are well known. — aporiap

How the particles move is an unknown. Some aspects of their movements are predictable, but that only means that the movements are orderly. The capacity to predict does not imply that the movements are known. For example, one could predict that the sun will rise in the morning, and predict the precise time of the rising and setting, while believing that a giant dragon is moving the sun around the back side of the earth every night, in an orderly fashion, therefore not knowing that the earth is actually spinning. If the movement of an object is orderly, its appearance is predictable, but the ability to predict its appearance doesn't mean that its movements are known.

If what you mean by "we cannot say they haven't been designed to behave the way in they do" is that until we have an explanation for why they behave that way, we can't say they haven't been designed to do so, then I'd also disagree saying it's not the forming of snowflakes that's designed, it's the fundamental constants and forces that are designed to be the way they are. — aporiap

Right, that's what design is, don't you think? To say that something was designed, doesn't imply that there is a person standing there making by hand, each designed object. We set up the production equipment, in the manufacturing plant, and pump out the objects. Of course those objects are designed. To argue that in this case, the objects are not really designed, only the production plant is, doesn't make sense. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to argue that the snowflakes are not designed, only the fundamental constants and forces which make them are.

The issue with "design" which you seem to be missing, is that things are designed for a reason, a purpose, that's fundamental to "design". So if these constants are "designed", then there is a reason for their being.

The designer would have to be explained as well as, by being able to interact with matter, it must have some sort of form or mechanism of interacting. This implies there's a logic or order to the way the designer works. This order would then need to be accounted for. — aporiap

That's not a very good argument. It's like saying "that's a dark and scary place, I'm afraid of what might be in there, so I'll just assume that there is nothing in there, that way I won't need to go in and look. People commonly say this about God, if you assume that God created the universe, this doesn't get you anywhere because now you have to determine what created God. But this is a false argument, because accepting God actually gets you one step closer. You must accept that there is God before you can start to understand God. So when the evidence points to God, as creator, it doesn't make sense to deny God on the account of, we still need to determine who created God. To recognize the reality of God is one step on the ladder, and regardless of how many steps there are, one step is still progress.

We are working with different definitions of inertia. Your definition, the tendency of parts of an object to remain together over time, is not the same as the traditional definition of inertia, the tendency of an object to maintain its state of motion - either continuing at a certain velocity or remaining at rest. I don't think either of these require a designer. — aporiap

It's the very same definition. The parts within an object are in motion, and that motion must remain uniform or the object will cease to exist as such. It's a matter of stability in motion.

The first case can be explained by just fundamental forces at work - at small scales [electron to maybe hundreds of kilometer range] electromagnetic force is most influential contributor to bodies maintaining their composition; at larger scales gravity is the most influential contributor.

The second case can be explained by general and special relativity. — aporiap

This is a good example of what I mean by the capacity to predict does not imply that the motion is understood. The capacity to predicted is based in the assumption of uniform motion, Newton's first law. But Newton's first law takes uniform motion for granted, it doesn't explain why the motion of a body remains constant from one moment of time to the next. And, when we get down to tiny particles, in short times we see no reason why this law ought to be upheld. Yet it is.

These explanations you refer to are not real explanations at all. To say 'mass is created by fundamental forces at work', really doesn't express an understanding of mass.

Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition. — tim wood

This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. They start out with a preconceived notion (a sort of definition) of what "knowledge" is. Then in all the proposed examples of how this supposed "knowledge" might actually exist, they find that the examples are lacking, and cannot assure them of what they are looking for within their defined essence of "knowledge", i.e. truth. At the end of the dialogue they realize that they were misguided by their own preconceived definition, knowledge as it exists cannot fulfil the criteria of their definition. The definition mislead them

This is why the method of Platonic dialectics is to not accept, as "the definition", any possible definition, but to respect them all, as exactly that, possible definitions. Then by analyzing possible definitions we proceed to get a firm idea of how the word is actually used. From here we can develop an idea of "the thing" which is referred to by the word.

No, I'm saying there is no such thing as 'actually' order. Order is entirely a subjective judgement, no 'actually' about it. — Isaac

OK, but now it's clear that you and I have completely different views of "order". I think order is something that the physical world exhibits to us, you think order is totally within the mind of the subject. I take it then, that if a person designs and creates something, this is not case of putting order into the physical object, by your definition of "order", because the physical object can never really have any order.

I don't agree with your interpretation. I think it defines away the meaning of intent. Why is 'carrying the dice' and intentional act and not just 'going about my day' (which happened to involve carrying dice), or 'living my life'. — Isaac

I think the answer to that is very obvious, and I don't understand why you would ask it. We are intentional beings, and act intentionally, so 'going about my day' is itself acting intentionally. Are you trying to argue that you are not an intentional being, and that your actions are not intentional? If so, I would say that this is just a ploy in an attempt to avoid legal responsibility. Trust me, it won't work, in the eyes of the law we are intentional beings and therefore responsible for our actions. You cannot avoid the fact that you are an intentional being, by claiming that you are not. That's why the argument of determinism does not absolve you from legal responsibility. No matter how much you insist that you have no intentional control over your actions, such assertions do not convince people that this is the case.

The subject wanting to justify some judgement does not in itself mean that they must then be capable of doing so. I want to fly but I can't. — Isaac

That of course is the very problem with your claimed stance, that order is completely subjective. Any claim of order cannot be justified. Even if the subject wants to justify that claim, it is impossible to. I see that our discussion on the topic of "order" is completely pointless now, because you very clearly have claimed a definition of "order" which renders any claim of order as absolutely unjustifiable. This means that "order" can be whatever you want it to be. You say "there is order here", and by your definition there is necessarily order there, regardless of what you are referring to as order. What's the point to insisting that this is what "order" is when you've made this concept into something which could refer to absolutely anything? And of course, for me to discuss "order" with you is a complete waste of time because you can say about anything, that there is order there, or there is not order there, and by your professed definition, what you say would be true.

Snowflake formation, molecule formation is known with sufficient detail. — aporiap

This is obviously untrue, as evidenced by the unknowns within quantum mechanics. Just because we can observe enough of the process to make us believe that we understand it, doesn't mean that we actually understand the activities of those subatomic particles involved in these processes. And until we understand those activities of those subatomic particles, we cannot say that they haven't been designed to behave in the way that they do.

How does inertia require a designing agent? — aporiap

Do you understand that every massive body is composed of parts? And, the parts within a massive body are not necessarily arranged in the way that they are, so as to make that particular mass. However, as time passes, the mass retains its composition, (parts not flying off in different directions), and this is inertia. This requires that the parts are "ordered" to maintain the existence of that massive body. As I explained to Isaac (who has now ignored my explanation and opted for an absolutely useless definition of "order"), the only way that we know of, by which these elements could be ordered like this, is through design.

I don’t think order implies a designer - part of that is because the examples of natural, order - snowflakes, molecules, galactic filaments- are so numerous and we know the mechanisms and none of them require an external intelligent designing agent for their generation. — aporiap

Actually, we do not really know these mechanisms. We can describe these processes to an extent, provide a partial description of them, but not enough to say that a designing agent is not necessary. As I explained a couple posts back, the fundamental aspect of such processes, which we take for granted, inertia (the tendency for things to remain the same as time passes), which is how we describe temporal order, cannot be accounted for without an appeal to a designing agent.

No, the laws of the country doesn't specify a tribe of one gender, tribes can only be named if they have 50 women and 50 men. Notice the definition of marriage between tribes doesn't say what's the total number of marriages, so although you have 50 marriages between tribe S and itself, and 100 marriages between tribes A and B when they are different, still both cases are concealed by the laws, and both receive the same description of being "married tribes". — Zuhair

You're missing the point of the criticism. What is "concealed", is the fact that half of S is married to the other half of S. In the case of A and B, all of A is married to all of B. So "S is married to S" does not mean the same thing as "A is married to B", because each "S" in "S is married to S" only represents half the entire original tribe of "S", whereas each of "A" and "B" remain consistent in representing the entirety of the tribes. Do you get the hint of equivocation in what "S" represents?

There is inconsistency in the application of the rules for what the symbols stand for. "S" is used to stand for the entire tribe of 50 men and 50 women, as stipulated at the beginning. But in "S is married to S", according to the example "A is married to B", the two "S"s must stand for different groups (tribes) which are married to each other. So, one S represents the women of the original S, and the other S represents the men of the original S. In other words, there is equivocation in the meaning of "S". Do you see this? "S is married to S" doesn't mean the whole tribe is married to itself, as consistency with "A is married to B" would imply, it actually means that half the tribe is married to the other half. Therefore each S in this case signifies half the tribe, whereas "S" was originally used to represent the whole tribe.

Of course there would be some hidden details no doubt, but the point is that there are indeed hidden difference, but since the definitions involved are blind to those differences they would pass the same. Like when we say for example "MAN" this denotes a lot of grown up males, but there are still many differences but all fall under the same SHELL. — Zuhair

The hidden difference is the difference in what "S" signifies. But that difference qualifies as equivocation, so the example is invalid.

We're talking about a state which 'appears' designed. One which has a type of order we recognise from other states we know to be designed. — Isaac

Personhood is a core concept in ontology. — Terrapin Station

You are the one who wants to talk about "personhood". I think this digression of yours is nonsensical. If you can come up with an ontologically based definition of personhood, be my guest. I already tried, to the best of my abilities, but in all my ontological studies I never came across "personhood", so my abilities are extremely limited in that department.

Order is a subjective opinion, it's just a pattern we recognise. — Isaac

This is where you show ambiguity, and perhaps inconsistency in what you are saying. If order is a "subjective opinion" then it is proper to the judgement that there is order, and the judgement itself, only. If it is a "pattern we recognize" then it is something within the thing itself (objective).

You spoke of order, last post, as if it were something within the object, recognized as "order" through association with intention. ("We're talking about a state which 'appears' designed. One which has a type of order we recognise from other states we know to be designed.") But now you're saying that someone could randomly throw the dice, with no intent of creating any order, and if a person happens to judge that there is order in the outcome, then there actually is order in that outcome. But really, this is just what you say, a "subjective opinion".

The problem with this scenario, is that throwing the dice itself is an intentional act. So you cannot remove the order which is inherent within the intentional act, simply by saying that you did not intend to throw any particular combination of numbers. The intentional act of throwing the dice six times in a row gives order to the outcome (six throws in a row) regardless of what the outcome is.

I could as easily have accidentally dropped the dice, if they landed 1,2,3,4,5,6, I'd say "oh look, that's an order I recognise". Nothing to do with intent. Same thing would happen if they were my phone number, but to you that would just be random. — Isaac

Again, you cannot remove intent from the act, by turning to a particular aspect of the act, and saying that this particular aspect was unintentional. That's what I tried to explain in my last post. The overall act (the act as a whole), you picking up the dice and carrying them for some reason, is an intentional act. You would have reason for carrying or holding those dice. The fact that you happened to drop them makes that particular aspect of the thing created (the precise time of the roll or something like that), unintentional, but it does not remove the intent which was behind the act as a whole.

That is what I explained. If we look at intentional acts in this way, we can distinguish the aspects of the outcome which are unintentional, mistakes, and we can analyze the "unknowns" which caused the mistakes. But mistakes, and accidents are inherent to intentional acts only. They require that the act itself is intentional, so it is contradictory to say that the existence of a mistake or accident makes the act unintentional.

Possibly, but that principle doesn't extend to an object created entirely by accident, without the intention to make anything at all. — Isaac

Of course you ought to see that this is contradictory. An accident, or mistake only occurs as part of an intentional act, so "object created entirely by accident, without the intention to make anything at all", is just contradictory nonsense.

No. This is the main issue. You're conflating 'ordered' with 'designed', the two do not describe the same thing at all, that is the very crux of the matter, you can't just assume it. — Isaac

"Ordered" and "designed" both mean pretty much the same thing, implying intent within the thing ordered, or designed. You are trying to create ambiguity between the act of recognizing an order (subjective opinion), and the act of creating a designed order (ordering the object), actually conflating the two to create inconsistency and contradiction through your attempts at obfuscation, as I described above.

What you described was a perfectly adequate working description of 'order', and yes, the universe exhibits such structure. But how can you justify saying it also bears the hallmarks of being 'designed' simply because you've recognised 'order'? — Isaac

I don't see why you have a problem with this. What supports your desire to make this unwarranted separation between "order" and "design"? Let's start with the assumption that "order" is completely subjective opinion, as you mentioned at the start of the post. The observing subject notices an "order". The subject claims there is an order in the object (the universe in this example). But this "order" is not justified by anything real within the object according to the specifications of the premise, it is just judgement made by the subject, subjective opinion. So the subject wants to justify the claim of "order", by pointing to something real, a real order in the object. The only recourse for the subject is to appeal to an ordered creation (design).

You might insist that if you and I, and others, all agree that there is "order" which is inherent within the observed object, and we agree on the nature of that "order", then this justifies the claim that there is real order within the object. But this is just inter-subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity cannot validate the claim that what "we" conclude about the object really represents what is true about the object. So this claimed "order" is still a subjective opinion, agreed to by other subjects.

Therefore, we must turn to the reasons why the object appears to 'us' as having order, to validate this claim which 'we' have, that it does have order. We cannot turn back to the individual subject, and say 'if the object appears to the subject as having order, then it has order', because we know that the subject may be mistaken. And if one subject may be mistaken, a number of subjects agreeing cannot remove the possibility of mistake. So we must turn to the object itself, and explain why the object appears to have order. Claiming that the object appears to 'us' as having order, therefore it has order, does not suffice. We could say 'it appears to have order because it actually has order', but this is also unjustified due to the same possibility of mistake. Therefore, to justify the real existence of order within the object (the universe in this example), we must demonstrate what it means to have order, and show that the object in question fulfills the criteria.

The only way to show what it means to have order, is to show an instance of ordering, demonstrating that the object has been ordered. This is an act of intentional ordering, design. Therefore your proposed separation between "order" and "design" is completely misguided. Ordering can only be demonstrated by design. You will never demonstrate, as you have tried through reference to accidents, an act of ordering which is not intentional. Each time you do this, by the very fact that you are doing it, it will necessarily be an intentional act. Thus you will never demonstrate how order may come into existence without intention, and you will never justify the claim that the order observed within the object is real, and part of the object, without showing that it must have been put there by design, intention.

Yes, all this is true of 'order', but my statement was about appearing to have been 'designed' a different property from merely being 'ordered'. — Isaac

The two are the same, by the principles described above. If something is ordered, then necessarily it appears to have been designed. There is no escape from this brute fact. This is because we cannot demonstrate an instance of order arising, without designing that instance. That's the problem with theories like "spontaneous order", and "self-organization" which alcontali referred to earlier in the thread. Any experimental demonstration of such things requires a designed system.

Order, within the natural universe is so pervasive, that we would need to design a very special set of circumstances to remove it for the purpose of experimentation, if we wanted to show order coming from disorder. But this act is already a designed act, therefore intentional, and ordered. And that's why this approach of yours is futile. We need to give up on these nonsensical, contradictory ideas, and recognize that overall, the universe is ordered, therefore designed, but there may be aspects of it which are mistakes, accidents. Then we can focus on these particular aspects, these parts which appear to undesigned, unintentional, and this will give us a route, a passage into the most highly disordered aspects of the universe, allowing such experimentation. But it makes no sense to pretend that the isolation of such accidental aspects is not itself a design.

Same conflation. 'designed' in the first part, 'ordered' in the second. The two terms are not simply interchangeable.

Even if we did accept this, it would simply be the claim that all ordered things must have been designed, which is the very issue. — Isaac

Now, hopefully you'll see how my claim is justified. Since we cannot demonstrate any instance of ordering without designing such a thing, and the claim that order simply exists in the object cannot be justified, the opposite claim to mine, that things may be ordered without design is completely unjustifiable. And, since we have a vast and magnificent multitude of examples where order is designed, as well as examples like yours of accidents, where order appears to be undesigned, but is really designed, it is simply illogical (by inductive logic) to make the claim that there is order which was not designed. So this proposed division of yours, between order and design, is unsupported, unjustifiable and illogical.

Therefore you ought to quit referring to such a division as a premise for criticism of usage of the terms, such as my usage. You are creating an artificial unjustifiable and illogical separation between order and design, and applying that unjustifiable and illogical principle as the basis for your criticism of what I am saying. Therefore your criticism has no efficacy and you are just wasting your time. It would be much more practical, worthwhile, and productive if you would just drop this nonsensical approach which is only hindering any progress which you might desire to make into understanding this reality.

Do you have any evidence for this? I don't judge things that way for one. — Isaac

This is another nonsensical point of departure. Look around you, in your house, at all the objects. How many of these objects do you judge to have been created with intention? How many of these objects have you observed a "person" or some such thing, creating? Now think about the judgements you have just made. Did you make the judgement that certain things were created intentionally, by imagining, or referred to in your mind, images or propositions about how the things were actually produced, manufactured by equipment and human beings, or did you make the judgement simply by seeing something about the object? I don't know of anyone who would think about the manufacturing process when making the judgement that an object was intentionally designed. We take one look at the object and make the judgement.

If that doesn't convince you about how such judgements are made, imagine that you see in the corner of the room an object which you are unsure whether it was created intentionally or not. Suppose it's a piece of rock, which may have been sculpted, or may be natural. If you wanted to pass judgement on this object, you might think about how you got it, but then you'd be trusting the word of the seller, or that information might not even be available in your memory. Isn't the more natural way of making such a judgement to look for evidence of sculpting on the stone itself?

We can. We just ask. — Isaac

There are at least two very good reasons why this reply is faulty. The first one, is that the person asked might not know the truth, might pretend to know the truth when not knowing, or might not speak the truth (deception). The second reason is even stronger. The artifact often lasts a lot longer than the person who made it, in this case there is really no reliable person alive to ask.

I don't think we can talk of sets here, because set theory already premises that "4" in one set refers to the same object as "4" in another set, and this is the false premise which I am trying to expose. So to be talking of sets is to already assume what you are trying to prove (begging the question).

Anyway, I'll try again to decipher your example. I think that the problem with the example is that once the symbol represents a group (tribe), then the individual members of the group loose their identity. So you say "a tribe is married to another tribe", when in reality each member of one tribe is married is to a member of another. This allows you, as a mathemagician, to set up a sort shell trick, where the actual thing under the shell, meaning the persons being referred to by the tribe name, is hidden.
Consider this:

Now we have the situation: A || B to mean tribe A is married to tribe B (according to rules above).
Now this is a predicative formulation, why, because A||B is a "proposition", it something that can be true or false, and the symbol || is denoting a "binary relation", so it is a "predicate" symbol. — Zuhair

In this case, what it is which makes "tribe A is married to tribe B", a proposition which is either true or false, is the individual marital status of the individual people. Without this there is no truth or falsity to the proposition.

So you proceed to hide the status of the individuals by saying that the proposition is either true or false. Now it appears like the status of the individuals is irrelevant, because the only relevant thing is the truth or falsity of the proposition. But in reality the truth or falsity of the proposition is still dependent on the status of the individuals. Therefore we must consider the status of the individuals.

Notice that we can have the situation were tribe S can marry itself!!! so we can have S || S
Notice that S occurred twice in the proposition "S || S" but still it denotes ONE object, although this object is a totality of many individuals, however that whole of many individuals is considered here as one object. So repeated occurrence of the symbol symbol in an expression doesn't denote different denotation, no here S repeatedly occurred in "S || S" but it still carries the same denotation, namely tribe S. — Zuhair

So this situation, in which tribe S is married to tribe S, if we consider the status of the individuals, must be analyzed. Remember the conditions, a male must be married to a female, so a person could not marry oneself. And, if the 50 girls of tribe S married the 50 boys of tribe S, there would only be 50 marriages, but in the case of tribe A being married to tribe B, there would be 100 marriages. This is exactly the quantitative difference I am talking about. If both the 4s in "4+4=8" represented the same object, then there would not be eight here, there would only be four. This is exactly what when S is married to S, there is not 100 marriages, only 50. But when A marries B there is 100 marriages. That's a substantial difference in the quantity of marriages.

P(S||S) = Q

Now we have two distinct occurrence of the symbol S on the left, but still it has the SAME denotational coverage! Both symbols of S denote the same object that is " TRIBE "S" ". — Zuhair

So this is not really true. S is married to S really denotes that the females of tribe S are married to the males of tribe S, which is substantially different from what is denoted by A is married to B.. So one S represents the males, while the other S represents the females. You have divided S into the subgroups MS and FS, and you ought to say that MS is married to FS. And now the mathemagician's shell trick of equivocation has been exposed. You claim that the same thing lies under each S, but in reality half of tribe S is under one S, and the other half of tribe S is under the other S. This is the only way to speak of S being married to S. This is verified from the fact that Q, the progeny of this union, is only half of C, the progeny of the union of A and B.

Not at all, I could previously specify that the 'order' I'm looking for is 1,2,3,4,5,6, then it is a 'specified sequence'. I then throw the die six times, it lands 1,2,3,4,5,6 exactly as I specified. It has not now become the case that the order arose by design, it arose by chance. — Isaac

Clearly that order arose by design. You specified the desired order, you threw the dice intentionally to create that order, and succeeded in creating that order. Any other set of throws would have been a mistake, or failure in succeeding at doing what you were trying to do. When someone proceeds in the process of trial and error, and has success, we cannot say that the success was not designed.

Yes, but this is exactly the context here. The OP is about the argument from design. The fact that the universe 'appears' to be designed, ordered etc. So if you say, "everything that appears ordered/designed is ordered/designed by definition" then you've either just begged the question, or defined away the distinction the whole investigation was trying to examine. The question is a simple one - does something appearing to us to be ordered/designed mean that some intentional force must have ordered/designed it? It's about what we can inductively assume from the evidence of order. If you want to say that the term "order" automatically implies a designer simply by the use of the term, then (apart from completely disagreeing with you) we'll just need another word to describe things which look like things which are ordered but might not be. — Isaac

I don't see your point here. Are you suggesting that we could judge something as having order, when in reality it really has absolutely no order, and what we thought was order was just an "appearance" of order? I think that's nonsense, because even for the thing to appear to us as something which could be judged, requires that it has some kind of order. Don't you agree that this is the way that the human body with its sensual apparatus works, we only sense things that are orderly?

I think what we are lacking here, and why there is such a gap between what you are saying and what I am saying, is a clear indication of what "order" and "disorder" mean, how such things would manifest in the world. Here's what I propose. Consider that we live in a world in which time is passing. Also, as time passes things change. What I think is that if when time passes in the world, there is a continuity of existence (sometimes expressed as inertia), then there is order in the world. For a thing which is composed of parts, to maintain its composure as time passes, requires that the parts are ordered to do this. So for instance, as time passes I see that the objects around me (which are composed of tiny parts) remain intact, as the objects which they are. I know that it is possible for these things to be annihilated, so I conclude that the parts are "ordered" so as to make the things around me remain intact as time passes. "Disorder" would imply that all the parts of all the things in the world would exist in any random way from one moment to the next. Can you agree with this proposal, and if not, why not?

Yes - by appealing to accidents and mistakes. What's wrong with that? Are you going to define away 'accident' now? — Isaac

I just threw that suggestion in, to see how you would respond. The problem is that accidents and mistakes are inherent to intentional acts. So if someone is trying to produce one thing, and instead they produce something not quite as intended, this does not mean that the thing produced was not designed. It just means that the thing produced did not come out quite in the way that it was planned. But this does not remove the fact that the thing's existence was planned.

This brings up the issue of one thing having many different aspects. We can look at a thing as a whole, and say that it was planned, or designed, but there might be certain aspects of the thing which were not designed, they came into being accidentally, or by mistake, even though the thing overall was designed. Generally this is due to the designer failing to grasp all the intricacies or complexities of the situation, or materials being used. Something like that might cause a mistake or accident. Do you agree with this line of thinking? If so, let's apply it to the universe as a whole. The universe displays order, and the property of having been designed, as described above in my proposal, with the concept of "inertia". However, there may still be certain aspects of the universe which don't seem to have any order at all. This would not mean that the universe is without order, it would just mean that there may be mistakes in the design.

We're not talking about a designed state. We're talking about a state which 'appears' designed. One which has a type of order we recognise from other states we know to be designed. — Isaac

Again, I see this as an unsound distinction. If something actually existed without order, it could not even appear to us at all. It would be so random, from one moment to the next (and that's an extremely short time), that it could not even appear to our senses which are programmed to perceive order. For example, some people propose that this sort of randomness exists at the quantum level. But this randomness doesn't even appear to our senses at all. We have to set up a complex apparatus to determine that such a disorder might actually be something real.

Therefore, I believe that if a "state" appears to us, it is necessarily designed, because we could not perceive a disordered state. This is a real, sound premise, because our perceptual systems of sensation could not make any sense out of a disordered state, so a "disordered state" could not appear to us. And since a "state" must have temporal extension, "disordered state" is actually contradictory. So your premise of a state which appears to be ordered, but is actually disordered, is contradictory, therefore unsound.

I'm saying that if we call a state 'designed' on the grounds that it was intentionally made that way, then it is reasonable to conclude that states which appear to be designed (ie ones which look superficially similar but whose history we do not know) may not actually be so, if we can point to states which look designed/ordered, but which we know to have happened by chance, or without intent. We have examples of such states. — Isaac

Here, you are taking Terrapin Station's faulty premise. You assume that we judge between designed and not designed on an analysis of how a thing was created. Was it created by a "person", with "intent", or not. But as I explained to Terrapin, this is not actually how we make such a judgement. We actually judge in the opposite way. We find all sorts of things which we believe were designed, and we judge that they were created with intention, by people. In fact, the nature of intention is such that even if we watched a person create something, we would have no way of concluding from this observation that the thing was created with intention. Intention is not observable. So in reality we look for certain features of things, which indicate that they were made with intention, and we judge that way.

This is why we need to go beyond the premise "if it was intentionally made, then it was designed", to accurately determine whether a thing was deigned or not. That premise is just circular, because in reality we cannot judge intention through observation, and we really observe to see whether the thing was designed, then conclude that it was made with intention. There is no way to observe intention in action, so we must judge the characteristics of the thing to determine whether there was intention. So we need a good description (like the one I proposed above) which can be used to distinguish order from disorder in things, and then we can apply this. This sort of principle allows us to determine which aspects of the intentional object were mistaken, or unintentional. With yours and Terrapin's premise, "if it was intentionally made, then it was designed", we have no principle to distinguish the unintentional aspects of the intentional thing.

How. What law of physics/nature prevents things from appearing ordered by chance. By definition, a chance event can result in any consequence it is not artificially restricted to chaotic looking one's. A random throw of the dice, with no intent, can still land 1,2,3,4,5,6. — Isaac

Consider the definition of order: "a specified sequence". Without the "specified" part, the sequence might appear to be ordered, but it is not. So the chance throwing of the die might produce 1,2,3,4,5,6, but it was not specified and therefore not ordered. A chance occurrence, by the meaning of "chance", cannot be an ordered occurrence by the meaning of "ordered". Whether or not one might say that a chance occurrence appeared to be ordered, or vise versa would depend on context, and what exactly would be meant by this.

The subject here is designed/not designed. In order for there to even be a category 'not designed' it has to be the case that some force can produce a state of affairs which are 'not designed'. Are you suggesting it is somehow impossible for this state of affairs to nonetheless appear to be designed by chance? — Isaac

There is a problem with the idea of a force producing a not-designed state, if the existing state is already designed. That force must come from within the existing designed state, an would therefore be part of the design. How could you say that the outcome of a design is not designed? Perhaps we could appeal to accidents or mistakes, but I think that the not-designed state could only come from a not-designed state.

And, as I explained above, it is impossible by way of contradiction for a designed state to come by chance. So it doesn't make sense to say that a designed state could "appear" to be designed by chance. It's like saying that a hectogon appears to be a circle. If you know it's a hectogon (designed state), and are calling it such, then you know it's not a circle (created by chance), so it doesn't make sense to say that it appears to be a circle (created by chance), when you know it's not.

That's not a common definition of "personhood."

That's why I said any definition is fine, but it has to be a common definition of personhood. — Terrapin Station

That was the number one definition of "person" in my OED, "an individual human being". That's why I chose it. For "personhood" I find "the quality or condition of being an individual person". What else did you have in mind?

As I suspected, I still think you are seeking some definition of "person" which will make your argument circular. A "design" is something only created by a "person" A "person" is the type of thing which could create a "design". What's the point?

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I take meaning and reference to be the same in this context. — fishfry

Let me explain what I mean by the difference between what "4" means and what it refers to. What "4" means to me is that there is four objects signified, which are classed together in a group. And "4" always has the same, or at least a very similar meaning to me every time I use it or see it used. It means four things grouped together. However, many different times when "4" is used, it is used to reference different groups of four. So for instance, someone says get me the four books off my desk, or the four bases in baseball, or get me four winter tires, etc., the "4" refers to different things in these different instances of use. Despite having a very similar (what we call the same) meaning every time it is used, it refers to different things.

You said that in "4 + 4 = 8" the two occurrences of the symbol "4' do not refer to (or mean?) the same thing. From my point of view there is simply no further conversation to be had. You're clearly serious, you're not trolling me. But when I try to take you seriously, I can't understand what you're saying. — fishfry

So imagine there are four chairs, and we represent those four chairs with the symbol "4". Now we want to add four more chairs, so that we might have eight chairs, so we represent these four more with the symbol "4". We can express this as "4+4=8". You must understand that the first four chairs, represented by the first 4, are not the same chairs as the second four chairs represented by the second 4, or else there would not be eight chairs. Do you understand this? Whatever group of four objects which is referenced by the first 4 in "4+4=8" cannot be the same group of four objects which is referenced by the second 4, or else there would not be eight objects.

Let's apply this to the most fundamental level of arithmetic. Let's say that the symbol "1" represents an object. If we add another object, and represent this with "1", so that we can say "1+1", don't you see that each of these 1s must represent distinct objects in order that we could get two from this? If each of the 1s represented the same object, how could there be two?

There is only one referent (or meaning) of the symbol "4" in the context of elementary arithmetic. — fishfry

When they taught you elementary arithmetic, back in primary school, didn't they show you a group of four objects, represented by the symbol "4", and then another, distinct group of four objects represented also by the symbol "4", and if you added these two groups together, there would be one group of eight, represented by "8". If there was only one group of four referred to by both instances of "4", how could you ever get eight? Clearly these two instances of "4" must refer to distinct groups of four, just like I was taught in primary school.

How did you ever get the idea that each instance of usage of the symbol "4" must refer to the same thing? Surely they did not teach you this in school, in elementary arithmetic. Where did you get that idea from?

What would help would be a simply clear example of WTF you are talking about. If the two occurrences of "4" in "4 + 4 = 8" refer to (or mean) something different, TELL ME WHAT THEY MEAN. Don't just toss out more paragraphs of obfuscation. Show me what you are talking about. — fishfry

Sorry, but I am not an elementary arithmetic teacher. But weren't you already shown this in primary school? This 4 references this group of four objects, and that 4 references that group of four objects. Obviously they must have shown you that each 4 necessarily represents a different group of four objects, or else it would be impossible to add them together and get eight. When this is what we were taught in primary school, where does your notion, that each 4 must reference the same group of four objects come from? Surely you must recognize that arithmetic would not work if this were the case.

You should give me a reference. If this is from some branch of philosophy or some philosopher's idea, let me know what that is. As it stands I think you were just warped by your grade school teacher. — fishfry

What reference do you need? It's so obvious, that if you cannot see it, I don't know what else to say. If the two 1s in "1+1" both represented the very same object, then there is only one object represented. Do you understand this? And if there is only one object represented, then it is impossible that there is two (or any other multitude) of objects here. Do you understand this?

And -- secondly -- why won't you engage on the specific disagreement we're having about mathematical equality? I claim it is logical identity. You claim it's what's normally called equivalence, congruence, or isomorphism. This is a point we could engage on but you won't engage. — fishfry

I already explained to you the difference between identity and equality, more than once. You keep asserting that in mathematics the two are the same, providing absolutely no evidence to back this up. I've already demonstrated that you simply interpret the use of "equality" in mathematics as meaning "identity". And despite me asking for them over and over and over again, you have provided no principles to support this interpretation, just the same assertion, this is what "equality" means in mathematics. So I conclude that your interpretation is a misinterpretation.

If your ideas are original, say that. If they follow from someone's work, say that. Give me something to hang on to. Because as it stands you're just saying flat out incorrect things, and waving your hands instead of giving hard facts, evidence, and examples to support your point. — fishfry

How many more examples do you need? Put an object on the table, represent it with "1". Represent the same object with another "1". Say this "1" added to that"1" gives me 2, and voila, see if you have two objects on the table? No you still have only one, the same object which was represented by both 1s. Try it with "2". Put two objects on the table, and represent them with the symbol "2". Represent the very same two objects with another 2. Put those two 2s together in "2+2", and say voila! 2+2=4, so I now have four . There seems to be a problem, you still only have two, the same two represented by both 2s.. Try it with "3", and the problem will just be getting bigger. I could go on with example after example, and watch the problem get bigger and bigger.

Now try it my way. Put one object on the table and represent it with "1". Put another, completely distinct object on the table, and represent it with another "1". Now put 1 and 1 together, say "1+1=2" and voila! you actually do have 2, for real this time. Problem solved! Each "1" must represent a distinct object, if 1+1 actually equals 2.


I'm sorry Zuhair, but I really can't follow your example. It's quite complex, and as I said I'm not good with symbols, so I just get lost trying to figure out what you're saying. Here's something to think about though, which might be relevant to the case of tribe S. There is nothing to prevent one from using "4" to signify the very same object (group of four) in multiple instances of use. The problem is that in many instances, like in "4+4=8", it cannot signify the same object. But in some cases, like "4=4", or 2+4=4+2, it can signify the very same thing. This is why we can say that a thing is equal to itself (identity is an equality), but we cannot say that two equal things are necessarily identical (equality is an identity). So we find that identity is a very special sort of equality. Perhaps it's an absolute, perfect, or ideal form of equality.

You can plainly see that one ball has caused the other ball to move. What can you possibly gain by trying to deny what everyone can see with their own eyes? — Ron Cram

That's an odd description. I've never seen a cause, and the way I understand "cause" it would be impossible to see a cause, so I reject that claim as false, just like I would reject as false, the claim that someone saw God. You are obviously using "cause" in a different way from me, and are unable to make your use appear coherent to me.

In relation to Newton's laws, the question is whether you saw the force, which acted on the ball, because according to Newton, force is what causes acceleration. Until you convince me that you can see a force, you will not convince me that you saw the "cause" of motion, using "cause" in a way which is applicable to Newton's laws. Any other argument is useless equivocation.

Every pool shark with $20 riding on the outcome of a game of 8 ball knows that cause and effect is in play. — Ron Cram

Do you not understand the difference between knowing that cause and effect is in play, and seeing cause and effect? One can know something without seeing it.

This next lesson explains that kinetic energy can do work directly as mechanical energy. — Ron Cram

What your lesson actually says is that a "force" does the work. You are leaving out an essential part of the equation, the means by which one form of energy is converted to another, and that is "force". As Newton explained, the billiard ball does not directly cause the other ball to move, it does this through the means (medium) of force. There is activity which occurs in that very short time between one ball moving and the other ball moving, and this activity is represented as "force" which is understood through deceleration and acceleration. The ball applies a force to the other ball, and the force is what causes the ball to move. The fact that the so-called transfer of energy is not one hundred per cent, and some is lost to inefficiencies, is evidence of this activity in the time between. And as I explained to you, in modern physics forces are understood in terms of fields, which represent potential energy, not kinetic energy.

Correct. This is why we call it a transfer of kinetic energy. — Ron Cram

That one ball stops having kinetic energy, and the other one starts, does not mean that kinetic energy was transferred.

Because of the conservation of energy. — Ron Cram

It could only be a transfer if the very same kinetic energy was in the second ball as in the first. But some kinetic energy is lost due to inefficiencies, therefore the second ball does not have the same kinetic energy as the first, and there is no transfer.

No, we observe one slow or stop and the other begin to move. — Ron Cram

Right, we do not see any kinetic energy being transferred from one ball to the other.

Because two solid objects cannot occupy the same space, when one moves into that space, the second ball has to move out of the space. This is the physical necessity I've explained. — Ron Cram

This is nonsense. The one object could resist being moved, and just absorb the impact. There is no necessity that the object give up its place to give it to the other object. Again, you are just making up this idea of "physical necessity". It's pure nonsense.

No, what we see is a transfer of kinetic energy. The first ball was moving, now the second ball is moving. It was knocked out of its space because two solid objects cannot occupy the same space. — Ron Cram

Asserting nonsense doesn't get you anywhere. You need an argument to justify your assertions. As I explained, there is no necessity that the object gets "knocked out of its space", it might absorb the impact, and the other object might bounce of, or explode into bits. Your so-called "physical necessity" is nonsense.

False. Kinetic energy does not need to be transformed into potential energy before doing any work. Kinetic energy directly does work. — Ron Cram

Back this up with a mathematical demonstration then.

False, but let's say this weird theory were true. In that case, we would still be observing cause and effect. — Ron Cram

That's not true, and this is the whole point, which I explained to you earlier. We do not observe energy. We apply the principles and deduce that the object has energy. We do not see energy with any of our senses, we use our minds to figure out that the object has energy, through application of the principles. The same is the case with cause and effect. Which senses do you believe that we use to observe cause and effect?

What I consider the most common, a person is an individual human being.

1. One billiard ball moves, strikes a second ball and causes it to move. This is cause and effect. What you are observing is a transfer of kinetic energy. The first billiard ball "has" or "is" kinetic energy. Either term is acceptable because kinetic energy exists because the ball is moving. The kinetic energy and the moving ball are inextricable. Because two solid objects cannot occupy the same space, when the first ball strikes the second, it causes the second ball to move. The first ball has slowed or stopped and the second ball which was stopped is now moving. That you are observing a transfer of kinetic energy is plainly obvious. — Ron Cram

I'll take a look at this for you. First, we cannot say that the ball "is" kinetic energy, because a ball is more than just that, and the fact that it stops moving and has no more kinetic energy, in your example indicates that it is more than just kinetic energy. So let's assume that it "has" kinetic energy, as a property. After the first ball strikes the second ball, the first ball no longer has kinetic energy, and the second ball has kinetic energy. So one ball looses kinetic energy, and another ball gains kinetic energy.

By what principle do you say that this is a "transfer"? One object looses a property and another gains a similar property, why would this be a transfer of property? Do you observe the property coming off of the one and going into the other? If it is true that two solid objects cannot occupy the same space, how does this premise validate your claim that one object transfers a property to another? What we observe is that one object ceases to be in motion, and the other starts to be in motion. We do not see any transfer of motion.

When you understand a ball as consisting of many parts, molecules, rather than as a mass with a centre of gravity, you'll see that all the kinetic energy of the one ball must be transformed into potential energy before that potential energy can act as a force to accelerate the second ball. So there is no transferral of kinetic energy, there is a deceleration of the first ball, as its kinetic energy is transformed to potential energy, and an acceleration of the second ball, as that potential energy acts to create kinetic energy in the second ball. Potential energy acts as a medium between the two instances of kinetic energy, therefore there is no transferral of kinetic energy, only two instances of kinetic energy, with potential energy separating the two.