Aristotle relates the telos of individuals to the fulfillment of their kind of being, as noted in the quote given above. I will add the passage that prefaces it for clarity: — Paine

Well, obviously there are many different kinds. So this "good" must be specific to the kind. Now how do you make this compatible with what you said earlier "the good as a quality of creation as a whole", when the whole consists of many different kinds each with its own sort of good?

On the contrary. Chapter 10 of Book Lamba of Metaphysics presents the good of the whole world as the relations between beings through the order imposed by the Mover. — Paine

Again, you state "relations" here in the plural. There is a number of different relations therefore there must be a number of different goods. By what principle do you attribute these relations, which are the goods, to the whole, rather than to the individuals. A relationship between you and I has aspects specific to me, and aspects specific to you, but nothing proper to "the whole".

Take Socrates' description of "just" for example. The just state is the one in which each individual does one's own thing, minds one's own business, without interfering in the affairs of others. Clearly, each individual has one's own goods, making each individual privy to one's own particular affairs. But what "good" has the state? The state is said to be just, because it provides for each individual to have one's own particular goods. We cannot assign "good" also to the state, without changing the meaning of "good", because a state is a different kind of thing from an individual. And if you insist that the good of the state is the same as the good of the individual then we have a vicious circle of logic which provides us with no headway in trying to understand "good".

However, the term "good" is used in the categories of substance, of quality, and of relatedness alike; but a thing-as-such, i.e., a substance is by nature prior to a relation into which it can enter; relatedness is, as it were, an offshoot or logical accident of substance. Consequentially, there cannot be a Form common to the good-as-such and the good as a relation. — 1096a, 16

Primary substance for Aristotle, as defined in his Categories, is the individual. So if the good is a quality of substance, it is attributed to the individual. This is why there cannot be a Form of the good.

A Venn diagram — Fooloso4

It was a simple statement, not a Venn diagram. You're trying to alter the premise.

A Venn diagram with one circle being the things you pursue and the other circle being the things that are good shows that there is an area of overlap but also an area that does not overlap. They are not the same. — Fooloso4

There's a big problem with this assumption. Plato said "the good" is what every soul pursues. It is you who wants to define "the good" as something other than this, in some way which would allow your Venn diagram of overlap. So I asked you, how are you going to define "the good" then. It's easy to make a bold assertions like "every soul pursues the good some of the time, but not all of the time", but by what principles are you going to distinguish between when the soul is pursuing the good, and when the soul is not pursuing the good? And what kind of randomness within the soul would make it be pursuing the good at one moment, but not pursuing the good at the next moment? We do not experience such random shifts in our pursuits.

Suppose for example a person is working on a good project and is therefore pursuing the good. But something comes up and the person perceives a need to steal, to keep the project going. The person is still working on the good project, therefore pursuing the good. But since the person is actively stealing, is the person pursuing the not good at the very same time that the person is pursuing the good? How could the person be pursuing the good and pursuing the not-good at the same time, in relation to the same project?

Formal systems can be supported by acts of measurement. That makes them useful as models of the world. — apokrisis

Sure, but the point is that the standards as to what constitutes "support" for a formal system cannot itself be a formal system. So it's wrong to characterize something which is not understood as a formal system as "frantic hand waving", or else formal systems would just be totally useless fictions or fantasies.

The word 'matter' is etymologically related to 'mother': — Wayfarer

That's right, Plato's description of "matter" as the female receptacle, in the Timaeus is very sexual in nature. Plato plays with word meanings like that a lot. You'll see Socrates described as a midwife when "conception" is discussed, in the Theatetus for example.

In the passage from Book Lambda I cite above, the element of causality of what Aristotle finds to missing from Plato's good: " And those who posit the Forms also need a more authoritative principle; for why did things participate in the Forms or do so now? " — Paine

What I argued with Apollodorus in the other thread, is that "the good" itself is not properly a Form. The key to understanding this is that the good enlightens the intelligible objects, like the sun enlightens the visible object, as described in The Republic. This puts the good into a separate category from the Forms which are intelligible objects. It is by making the good into a Form, that Apollo equated the good with the One, and insisted that the One is the first principle for Plato, claiming the Neo-Platonists to have a better interpretation of Plato than Aristotelians.

The One is definitely a Form, but Apollo and I discussed Aristotle's mentions of a difference between mathematical objects and Forms, because the One can be seen to be both. I argued that mathematical objects are just a special type of Form which are derived from the One, which crosses the boundary between types. However, the good escapes mathematics altogether, and as I argued, even if we make a hierarchy of type of Forms, the good must be something completely different, by the sun analogy. And the good belongs in the category of many, not of one.

Pursuit of the good in this context is not an object or a goal in the way one says that the telos of making a chair is made actual when the plan for it has come into being. Learning what is real versus what is opinion is the activity being sought after. Aristotle speaks of telos as becoming what one was made to be, as quoted above: — Paine

I would say that thinking in this sense is in the pursuit of a goal. The goal might be truth. But then the goal might be some other pragmatic thing based on application, or prediction, or whatever. It is this feature, that the action is carried out for a purpose, a goal, but the goal is unclear even to the person thinking, which creates the problem. And if we look directly at the action, as Aristotle did, in his ethics, in an attempt to determine the end, we see that whatever end is intended, becomes the means to a further end, and then a further end, which appears as if it might extend indefinitely, unless we posit an ultimate end, as he did, happiness.

In speaking of the good as a quality of creation as a whole, this language of telos for individual beings is exchanged for the outcome of the activity of the unmoved mover: — Paine

I don't understand this at all. You seem to be making "the good" into "the One", like Apollo was, saying it's "a quality of creation as a whole". And this appears completely inconsistent with Aristotle. For Aristotle, perfection, or good, is a feature of the individual, in its fulfilment of its own particular form, which is unique to it, and only it, by the law of identity.

What are you talking about? There is no unstated premise in the distinction between seeing what you eat and eating what you see. Either you eat everything you see or you don't. — Fooloso4

I can't believe you don't see this. The statement says I eat what I see, and it says I see what I eat. There is no difference between these unless it is specified either I see more than I eat, or I do not see more than I eat. That further premise is not provided. So your claim "either you eat everything you see or you don't" is not relevant to any conclusion drawn. The information has not been provided. Allowing such information to affect your conclusion is invalid logic. You are producing a conclusion drawn from a premise which is not part of the argument.

It's a sophistic trick, a form which is very commonly exemplified with equivocation. A common word will be used in a premise, and the premise will give that word a very strict meaning. However, since it's a common word, the interpreter will assign a much wider meaning to the word then is given to it by the premise. Then the interpreter will allow a conclusion based on the wider meaning, rather than adhering to the strict meaning given in the premise. This is equivocation, and its very similar to what you re doing here. You are giving a wider meaning to "see" than what is provided by the premise "I see what I eat". The premise allows only what I am eating to be what I see, but you are assuming some further meaning of "see", not stated.

For whatever that’s worth..... — Mww

When I'm getting attacked mostly on the basis of ad hominem

Well, consider the source. Enough said. — Fooloso4

It means a lot.

Thermodynamics is the ground for time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not really true. Time is a constraint in thermodynamics, but thermodynamics is clearly not the ground for time, because time is an unknown feature. We cannot even adequately determine whether time is variable or constant. I think it's important to understand that the principles of thermodynamics are applicable to systems, and systems are human constructs. Attempts to apply thermodynamic principles to assumed natural systems are fraught with problems involving the definition of "system", along with attributes like "open", "closed", etc..

Definition requires difference. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a mistaken notion which I commonly see on this forum. Definition really does not require difference. Definition is a form of description, and description is based in similarity, difference is not a requirement, but a detriment because it puts uncertainty into the comparison. So claiming that definition requires difference, only enforces my argument that this is proceeding in the wrong direction, putting emphasis on the uncertainty of difference rather than the certainty of sameness. A definition which is based solely in opposition (difference), like negative is opposed to positive for example, would be completely inapplicable without qualification. But then the qualification is what is really defining the thing that the definition is being applied to.

Logically, it would make more sense to start down at the very smallest differences that can be discriminated. If you wanted to define visible colors, you work your way around something analogous to a digital color wheel, and tweak the various shades in small increments until you've laid out a map of all the discernable colors. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Notice what you say, you look for something "analogous". Analogy informs us through similarity, not through the differences. The differences are what we must work to exclude, to make the analogy work.

If you look at theories of parts and wholes in metaphysics, generally it is proposed that things are just the sum of their traits, and so traits are the logical unit of analysis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not true at all. It is generally proposed in metaphysics, and supported by evidence, that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There is a logical fallacy, the composition fallacy, which results from what you propose.

The primary opposing theories to this view hold that objects possess an essential haeccity, a substratum of "thisness." This substratum of bare being/identity makes a thing different from just its traits, and so neatly solves many problems of identity that come up when you posit that a thing is just the tropes/universals it possesses/instantiates. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And this is nothing but nonsense. What could a "substratum of 'thisness'" possibly refer to? "Thisness" is what we assign in predication. It is a feature of human description. It is impossible that the human description is the substratum of the thing itself. This is the same sort of problem which you demonstrate with thermodynamics and "system" above. You attempt to make the description, or the model, into the thing itself. But then all the various problems with the description, or model, where the model has inadequacies, are seen as issues within the thing itself, rather than issue with the description.

Mysterious tendencies don’t lend themselves to formal treatment, just frantic hand waving. — apokrisis

Nothing in the real world submits itself to "formal treatment". Formal systems are pure theory. And, there is a very real divide between theory and practice, which produces the necessity for standards of application. The standards for applying formal systems in practice, cannot themselves be formal systems. So those who dismiss such standards as "frantic hand waving", choosing to apply formal systems willy-nilly, produce nothing but fictious nonsense.

But the problem with that view is, it doesn't allow for the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, nor for the fact that mathematics is governed by rules. So I'm firmly part of the 'mathematics is discovered' camp. — Wayfarer

This problem goes both ways. There is the "unreasonable effectiveness" to deal with, but also there is mistaken axioms to deal with. How do you account for the reality of mistaken discoveries? What is it that is discovered, when the discovery is a mistake?

So, how does your acknowledgement that the pursuit of the good is difficult relate to your previous claims that there is no 'overarching' good? — Paine

Pursuit of "the good" as one individual object, the One, is a mistaken venture, and that is the obvious reason why pursuit of the good is extremely difficult. I covered this with Apollodorus, who insistently reduces "the good" to the One, in another thread. Incidentally, this is one reason why Aristotle rejects "the form of the good", because "the good" turns out to be a multitude of particulars, rather than one specific form.

but everyone wants the things that really are good — The Republic 505d

Understanding "the good" is how Plato came to the revelation (in his middle period) that the Pythagorean theory of participation was inadequate. If you look closely you'll see that he actually rejects "participation" in his later work, such as "The Sophist", and this rejection is what Aristotle provides us with a continuation of.

The principal issue is the relationship between passive and active, which Aristotle did an excellent job of exposing. In the theory of participation, the Idea is passive, and the objects which partake in the Idea are active, in the sense that they partake. This passivity denies the Idea any active causality in the real world. But what we see in the evidence of artefacts, is that ideas are somehow very causally active. So Plato sees "the good" as what gives causality to ideas, and this is final cause in Aristotle.

This is the reversal of "representation" which is required to truly understand the nature of knowledge. Commonly, knowledge is described as a representation, a modeling, or a map of the real world. But this totally misses the principal function of knowledge, which is to bring about change in the world. So we need to reverse things, to see the real world as a representation (or reflection) of the ideas. This is the significance of the cave allegory. The shadows on the wall are the material artefacts, the fire is the good, and the human beings are using the ideas to create the shadows. The shadows are a reflection of the ideas, but they can only be apprehended as such through a grasping of "the good", as the fire. Once the philosopher apprehends this, then he ascends beyond the cave (the artificial world) to an understanding of the whole world in this way. The material existence is a reflection of the ideas, but we cannot neglect the fact that it is only such if we appeal to a higher "good" beyond the human good. The human good is the fire, the higher good is the sun.

Do you eat everything you see? — Fooloso4

This is the unstated premise, (that you do not eat everything you see), which makes your example an example of sophistry. In logic the premises must be stated, and if you appeal to subliminal implications it's not valid logic but sophistry.

This is another example of the philosophical problem with our materialistic (matter-based) language. Aristotle defined "substance" from two different perspectives (the "qualifications" I mentioned before). When he was trying to distinguish his pragmatic philosophy from Plato's idealistic ideology, he took matter as the primary. But when he was trying to define his notion of "hylomorphism", he had to distinguish the Actual material (hyle=stuff) from the Potential design (morph=pattern). Hence you have a which-came-first dilemma : the mental idea or the material actualization of the design? — Gnomon

I think you have things a little backward here. Substance in the primary sense, is the most basic, common, and truest sense of the word. This is what Aristotle says at the beginning of "Categories" Ch 5.

"Substance in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the general to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these therefore --- that is to say, the species 'man', and the genus 'animal' --- are termed secondary substances. — Aristotle Categories 2a 10-15

Now, when we turn to his "Physics" we see that the primary substances. particulars, necessarily consist of both matter and form. The form of the particular (primary substance) is very different from the form of the of the species or genera (secondary substance), the primary "form" includes accidentals which are unique to the individual, and the secondary "form" is an abstraction, a formula or essence.

Under the principles outlined in his physics, the "form" of the particular individual is what accounts for its actual existence, what it actually is, and the matter accounts for the potential for change, the fact that it could be other than it is. Therefore, contrary to what you say the actual existence of a thing is attributed to its form, while potential is assigned to the matter.

Since I'm an Architect, I tend to think that the mental image (imaginary structure) is prior to the physical building (material structure), hence primary. And morph/form is what I mean by Aristotelian "substance" as the immaterial essence of a thing. I realize Ari's ambiguous reference is potentially confusing. My Enformationism worldview is plagued by many similar dual-meaning words : such as physical "Shape" vs mental "Form". Do you know of another philosopher who found a non-ambiguous term to distinguish between Substance and Essence? — Gnomon

This "which came first" dilemma is resolved in Aristotle's "Metaphysics". He poses the problem of why is a thing what it is, rather than something else. Why is it the very unique and particular individual which it is, and not something other than this. He refers to his "law of identity", that a thing is necessarily the same as itself, and it cannot be other than itself. And, since when a thing comes into being (becomes, or is generated), it is necessarily an ordered whole rather than parts randomly scattered without order, it is necessary that the form of the individual is prior in time to the material existence of the individual.

He supports this conclusion that form is prior to matter, in the absolute sense, with his so-called cosmological argument. It is impossible that potential is prior to actual because this would mean a time when there was only potential, and nothing actual. But potential cannot actualize itself, as any potential needs an actuality to actualize it. Therefore if there ever was a time with pure, absolute potential (what some call "prime matter"), there would always be pure absolute potential because it could never actualize itself. What we observe is actuality, therefore pure absolute potential is impossible. And, we must conclude that form, as actual, is prior to matter as potential in the absolute sense.

Notice that this leads to a duality of "form". There is "form" in the sense of secondary substance, formula, which is the species, or genera, and there is also "form" in the sense of primary substance, which is the form of the particular. The two are distinct because the form of secondary substance is an abstraction which is universal, an essence, and this does not include the accidentals. In the primary sense, "form" is a particular and unique individual, including accidentals. This "form", in the sense of primary substance is necessarily prior to the material object to account for the truth of the law of identity. So "form" in the sense of primary substance may exist independently of that substance, but we cannot assign "substance" to that sense of "form", because "substance" requires the duality of matter and form.

Talk of "mysterious tendencies" need to be replaced by talk of entropic gradients, — apokrisis

Why? How would replacing "mysterious tendencies" with "entropic gradients" improve one's understanding? I think this would be a step backward, because "mysterious tendencies" is the more general, and "entropic gradients" is the more specific. Real understanding assigns logical priority to the more general. So for instance, we understand "human being" through an understanding of "animal", and we understand "animal" through reference to "mammal", etc..

So, we should start by defining "mysterious tendencies" as aspects of reality which are not properly understood, or something like that, instead of proceeding to talk about "entropic gradients" in the pretense of understanding.

It does not follow from the claim that we pursue the good that the good is whatever it is we pursue. — Fooloso4

Yes it does, unless one states that we pursue something other than the good as well as pursuing the good, the inverse holds. No qualification is stated at this point. We pursue the good, therefore whatever it is that we are pursuing is the good. The end.

We may see what we eat but that does not mean we eat what we see. — Fooloso4

Yes it does mean that. I see what I eat means very exactly, that I eat what I see. That I may be seeing other things, or that I might eat other things, needs to be mentioned to be made relevant. If you tell me, "I see what I eat", then ask me "what do I see?", so I name what you are eating, and you say I am wrong, because you were looking at something else as well, you are only practicing sophistic deception by using unstated premises.

If the good is whatever we pursue then the destruction of the rain forests to build luxury housing is good. To kill everyone you do not like is good. To enslave people in order to obtain cheap labor is good. — Fooloso4

Actually you need to distinguish the means from the end here. The luxury housing is the good which is pursued, the destruction of the rainforest is "just", or justified by this end. So it is beneficial. That's what I described above, concerning Plato's statement that the just and beneficial exist in relation to the good, as the means to the end.

The problem you disclose here (i.e. that what is sought as "the good" to some might not be thought to be good to others), is dealt with by Aristotle in his classic distinction between the apparent good, and the real good. But we can find the seed to this distinction in Plato, at the part I referenced above for example:

And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believe to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here. — The Republic 505d

Thanks for the quote, it puts what I've quoted in context. Notice that after he says that the good is what every soul pursues, he proceeds to say that we are unable to get an adequate grasp of it. Our actions are brought about by our pursuit of the good, but we are not even able to properly grasp the good which we pursue. This is why Plato argues that virtue is not knowledge. Aristotle assigns "happiness" as the ultimate good, attempting to bring the good into the fold of intelligibility.

I think you'll find the best discussions about whether virtue is knowledge, and teachable, in Protagoras and also Gorgias. This I think is where he does the most work to separate good from pleasure.

But only one is realistic. — Wayfarer

Incidentally, I believe what I described is why the observations of quantum mechanics are so difficult to interpret. Because relativity principles are so deeply entrenched in modern physical theories, the consequence is that any interpretation is correct, but no interpretation is the true interpretation. As it turns out, Many Worlds becomes the best interpretation, but that's just a reflection of the logical consequences of staying true to the principles employed. The conclusions reflect the premises. And so it is a nonsense interpretation which denies the possibility of a real world, thrown out to us, because the principles plugged in, deny the possibility of a real world.

One answer I got on Stack Exchange was:

There is no causation in logic. Some formulas are equivalent to others, and common language confuses the issue with formulations like "this circle has circumference Pi because its diameter is 1", when in fact saying one proposition is the same as saying the other. It is not analogous to physical causation (I.e. The observation that some events often happen in succession).

I see the point, but I can't help but think there's something wrong with it. I mean, it seems to me science relies heavily on the application of logic to the analysis of causal relationships. And that 'natural law' is where these meet. You conjecture that if [x] then [y], and then carry out an experiment or make an observation that confirms or disconfirms it. So I'm considering the idea that scientific law is where logical necessity and physical causation intersect, but I've never heard anyone else say that. — Wayfarer

Actually there is causation at work in logical necessity, it is final cause. This is a very important philosophical principle to understand. It is Plato's "the good", described in "The Republic" as that which makes intelligible objects intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. Why do we adhere to logic, and say that conclusions are necessary? Because it is good and useful to do that. Why do we understand "2+2=4"? Because it is good and useful to understand this. That is final cause at work.

We're sorrounded by the products of applied maths and physics. — Wayfarer

The "products" you mention here are "the goods" which the intelligible objects help to bring into existence as final causation. Notice that the intelligible objects themselves are not the actual cause. The desire for the good, what we call "intention" is the actual cause, and the intelligible objects are the means to that end. They become intelligible to the individual, because the individual has the desire for the end. That is why the good, as final cause or intention, is not the intelligible object itself, but that which makes the intelligible object intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible.

Plato exposed this principle, and it has a long history in theology. The revelation of the true nature of the good as a cause, final cause, is called "seeing the light" because of Plato's analogy. Why is there a world? Because God saw that it was good, final cause. Under this principle all human knowledge falls to pragmaticism. But then a higher form of knowledge is revealed to us, that which knows the truth, divine knowledge. And when we make "the truth" the good which is sought, we allow ourselves to be ruled by divinity, making human knowledge compatible with divine knowledge.

But only one is realistic. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's the way we look at it, as the laity, but it's not the way that the principles of relativity theory dictate that we look at it. By relativity theory we do not judge a model of moving bodies on the basis of which model is more realistic, the judgement is made on other principles such as which model is more useful for the purpose at hand, which is usually some sort of prediction.

Are you familiar with model-dependent realism?

Both models are useful. So if usefulness is the basis for judgement of correctness, then both are correct. But the point is, what this example provided. If there is no true way of modeling motions, i.e. different ways of modeling the same moving bodies are useful for different purposes, then the judgement of theories is based in usefulness rather than truth. Following from this, relativity will become the prevailing theory, because it is naturally versatile by allowing the same moving bodies to be modeled in whatever way proves to be the most useful. If you are one to believe in "truth" you will see that relativity theory is a forfeiture of truth.

The laws are such that living beings have evolved. They might have been otherwise, but we would never have been around to discuss it. — Wayfarer

If living beings have evolved, and the universe has evolved, then why not believe that the laws have evolved as well?

So I think the Copernican revolution was more radical than Einstein's in that sense, as Einstein didn't invalidate the basic tenets of Newtonian physics in the way that Copernicus did Ptolemy. — Wayfarer

The Copernican revolution did a very odd and sort of paradoxical thing, and that is that it gave birth to modern relativity theory. If the motions of the planets could be represented equally through the Ptolemaic model as through the Copernican model, then both models are actually "correct", when correctness is determined by usefulness. They are both useful in their own way. But if both models are actually correct, then there is no true or absolute perspective, from which to judge motion, and motion is best represented as relative, and relativity theory is derived.

If we take the position, that one of these models is the correct, or the true perspective, then we deny the relativity of motion, and assume an absolute, or true perspective for motion. But when we take the perspective of relativity theory, we deny that any model of motion is the true model.

The paradox is that the lay person will see the Copernican revolution as giving us the true model of the solar system, while the physicist will see the Copernican revolution as demonstrating the utility of relativity theory. So we, as the laity, come away from the Copernican revolution thinking that it has been demonstrated that there is an absolute truth to motions, while the physicists come away thinking that it has been demonstrated that the best way to model motions is as relative. So the Copernican revolution has demonstrated to some of us, the truth of absolute motion, while it has demonstrated to others, the validity of relative motion, i.e. relativity theory.

Somehow it escapes MU's notice that there is the problem of unjust actors and unjust actions in the Republic. — Fooloso4

How is this a problem? We ere talking about "the good", not "just" or "unjust". You never moved to establish a relation between these. And I still do not believe you could if you tried, because it's not at all straight forward.

Declaring they are identical, and that that fact is obvious to anyone who has done enough reading is an odd abandonment of a thesis. It is a kind of solipsism. — Paine

And I suspect the latter, for you often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about and it's by their relation to it that just things and others become useful and beneficial — The Republic 504e

Notice above, that what is described as being in relation to the good, is what Aristotle calls the means to the end. The good is the end, and things are deemed as just or beneficial when they are apprehended as the means to the end. Now consider the line below, and take it for exactly what it says. "Every soul pursues the good". Therefore what every person pursues is the good. In Aristotle this is final cause, as in his example, health is the reason why the man is walking. Health is what the man pursues, and is therefore the (final) cause of him walking. It is the good, in this instance, what the person pursues.

Every soul pursues the good and does its utmost for its sake.[/quote} — The Republic 505e

Ζ.3 begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of something: essence, universal, genus, and subject. . . . Aristotle’s preliminary answer (Ζ.4) to the question “What is substance?” is that substance is essence, but there are important qualifications. — Gnomon

Essence is "substance" in the secondary sense, notice "universal", "genus", "subject". That is how secondary substance is defined. In the primary sense, substance is defined as the individual.

Aristotle used this to forward the conclusion that the universe is eternal. — Kuro

The conclusion is not so simple, because the argument you presented must be taken within the proper context. Notice that the paragraph closes with a conditional statement: "But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must also be true of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion." So he then proceeds to question the idea of eternal motion. He concludes that there must be a first mover which is not itself moved, and this denies the possibility of eternal motion. The unmoved mover implies that there is something outside of motion and time, so "eternal" is given that meaning, outside of time, and infinite motion, as well as infinite time, are rendered as incoherent.

Is your intent to demonstrate your sophistic skills? — Fooloso4

No, I am demonstrating Plato's use of "the good". You use "good" in a way which demonstrates that you do not understand Plato, so I am trying to help you. If you have no desire to understand, insisting that my demonstration of what Plato wrote is just sophistry, then this discussion is pointless.

Republic 509b:

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the the known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it ...
(Bloom translation) — Fooloso4

Exactly as I described above, "consequence of the good" refers to what Aristotle named as final cause, purpose. "Being known" is subsequent to (the consequence of) the purpose or intent of the knower, and purpose and intent are necessarily relative to a good. So for instance, I'll learn how to change a tire for the purpose of repairing a flat. Repairing the flat is the good. That knowledge within me (how to change a tire), that instance of "being known", is a consequence of the good I intend, which is to repair a flat.

You have a desire to take another step, to make a judgement as to whether what I intend (as the good), is a true good or is perhaps not good. But you have given me no principles for making such a judgement, nor have you given me reference to where Plato describes such principles. As I've told you this sense of "good", which has an opposite, "not good", is not consistent with Plato. "Pleasure" has its opposite, "pain", but "good" has no such opposite, and this is why "good" cannot be equated with "pleasure".

Therefore I assume that this is just your own subjective opinion, a feature of your imagination, this sense of "good", which you are trying to insert into the discussion. Thus it is you who is practicing sophistry, trying to slip in a meaning of "good" which is not consistent with the one which is the subject of our discussion, in an attempt to equivocate.

Aristotle made a distinction between two kinds of "substance". : 1. Primary Substance -- Being qua Being, or 2. Secondary Substances -- species & genera (i.e. specific instances of Being). As I interpret those categories, Primary Substance is Essence (massless potential), but Secondary Substance is Matter (massy existence). The earthy "ground" I take for granted is Secondary & sensory, hence no mystery. But, the "substance" that "miraculously" gives mass to matter is Primary & abstract. Actually, Mass is merely a different form of Energy : energy transforms into mass, which is the property of matter that is mysteriously attracted to other masses via gravity (L. heaviness). — Gnomon

Primary substance, as defined by Aristotle is the individual, the particular, such as the individual man, or individual horse. Secondary substance is the species such as "man" or "horse". Since the category of "primary substance" consists of particular items, we cannot say that these are massless potentials. Each object has a form unique to itself, as well as its matter. This is the basis for Aristotle's law of identity, and his hylomorphism. What provides the "substance" to the particular, has been debated. Some would argue that it is the matter of the object, some would argue that it is the form, which constitutes the substance. I would argue that "primary substance" requires both. But if "form" is argued as prior, and responsible for the identity of the particular, this leaves matter as unnecessary (demonstrated by Berkeley), which is consistent with the true to the definition of matter, as potential, and this means that primary substance, as particular individuals, is not necessary, particulars are contingent.

So I think that you conflate the categories here. Matter is defined as potential, and matter is what is said commonly, to have mass. However, when we assign a property to "matter", we are assigning a form to it, properties are formal. So this is the first mistake which a physicist, (Newton for example) might make, to assign mass directly to matter as a necessary property. This negates the true definition of matter as pure potential by restricting that potential to the characteristics of mass, saying that all matter must have this specific formal attribute, mass.

If we say that all individual particulars have matter, and all matter has mass, then we lose the capacity to speak of massless potential in the form of primary substance. Primary substance is necessarily a combination of matter and form, so when we say that matter necessarily has mass, we lose the capacity to speak of massless matter, and therefore we lose the capacity to speak of massless primary substance as well because primary substance must have matter. And since matter represents the potential of primary substance, we can have no primary substance in the case of massless potential. Massless potential cannot have matter and therefore cannot be primary substance

So physicists fall back on secondary substance, a specified form, to speak of massless individuals, particles. However, then these particles escape Aristotle's law of identity, not being identified as matter and form (having no matter, because the true potential of matter has been lost by assigning matter the property of mass); consequently these particles can only be understood as generic forms (secondary substance), and cannot be given the status of true identifiable individuals (primary substance).

In my thesis terminology, Primary Substance is the Power to Enform, to give form to the formless. In Einstein's equation, that mysterious ability to create Mass from the massless is "magical" Energy. And according to current Information theories, Energy (potential) is merely one form of generic Information -- the same non-stuff that creates Meaning in a brain. So, shape-shifting Information does seem to be magical -- but it's also material, and that's what brings massless ideas back down to earth. — Gnomon

I don't think this is really consistent with Aristotle's "primary substance", because under Aristotle's definitions, primary substance is an individual object, and an object is a unity of matter and form. However, if we assign the identity of the particular, to the formal aspect, as I described above, then the form of the particular is necessarily prior to its material existence, as what determines the particular's existence as the unique individual which it is. This enables the concept of independent Forms. But the union between matter and form must remain a mystery because "matter", by definition refers to the aspect of the particular which is unintelligible to us. If we assign a property to matter, like "mass", in the attempt to bring matter into the realm of intelligibility, then we defeat the purpose of the concept, to refer to the unintelligible aspect of reality, and we delude ourselves by thinking that the unintelligible has become intelligible.

Relations that are "resistant to change" are eternal & infinite, like Primary Substance : — Gnomon

This is not realistic. As we know, an object is resistant to change only until the necessary force required to change it, is applied to it. So we cannot represent "resistant to change" as eternal and infinite, that would be a mistake. Each object has its own temporal duration, as a property of its own internal resistance to change, and external forces applied to it, and never do we find an eternal and infinite object. This is what is meant when we talk about objects as being contingent, they are generated and corrupted.

The problem is to distinguish the one from the other. If your relationship with Marilyn Monroe is only to see her on the screen, then this relationship is exactly the same whether she's presently dead or alive. In this situation there is no difference to you between sophistry and philosophy.

Apparently, MU, I'm not as 'smart' or 'full of gnosis' as you — 180 Proof

And:

I'm in good company — 180 Proof

While I'm at it, I'll add this:

the human tendency toward self-flattering delusions is well known. — lll

So traditional metaphysics is comparable with physics, biology, and mathematics ? Why not mention astrology, phrenology, and numerology ? Why not theology, an especially obvious choice? Could not the theologian insist on the same point? — lll

Yes, sure why not? These are all fields of study along with physics, mathematics, biology and metaphysics, requiring effort and learning of principles. And, I would expect the ones who made the effort to study them to have a better understanding, and be more capable of discussing those principles. Do you have difficulty with this?

Any more questions? :smile: — Gnomon

I understand primary and secondary substance in a way slightly different from you. Maybe I'll get to that tomorrow.

But that does not mean that everything we do is good. — Fooloso4

Yes it does mean that everything we do is good, unless you move to judge "good" by some other principle. What principle would you propose?

Sin is fundamental to Christianity, although that problem was supposed to have been fixed, Christianity does not claim that people no longer sin. — Fooloso4

"Sin" is a completely different concept. We were talking about "good". This is the point, it is a mistake to oppose "sin": with "good". A sinner is still fundamentally good, therefore we forgive.

Knowledge of the good itself is not knowledge of what motivates one's own actions but rather what distinguishes between those actions that are good and those that are not. — Fooloso4

Again, if "good" is not defined in the way I described, a definition which is consistent with both Plato and Aristotle, as that for the sake of which an action is carried out, then what principle do you propose? You talk about some phantom sense of "good" which is supposed to have an opposite, "not good", and you claim that knowing this "good" will provide you with a basis for judgement between "good" and "not good". But obviously this is just your phantasy, there is no such sense of "good".

Suppose we define "good" as the opposite of "not good". How is this supposed to help us distinguish actions that are good from actions which are not good? That is why we don't define "good" in this way, we define it in relation to a specific purpose. Then we have a principle to judge whether an act is conducive to the specified good.

It is clear that you have not read or perhaps just not understood what Plato says about the good itslef in the Republic. — Fooloso4

In The Republic, the good is what makes an intelligible object intelligible, just like the sun is what makes a visible object visible. This is exactly what I've been describing, an intelligible object becomes intelligible to a person, as it is required for a purpose. The purpose, or good, lights up the intelligible object, making it intelligible, just like the sun lights up the visible object, making it visible.

Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand criticisms of traditional metaphysics tend to try and dismiss criticisms of traditional metaphysics with faulty principles. — lll

This is actually untrue. Those who are well educated in traditional metaphysics have very little, if any problem understanding such criticisms, and tend to address them adequately, with sound metaphysical principles. But those not educated in traditional metaphysics, being unwilling to make the effort, do not have such an understanding, and tend to dismiss traditional metaphysics with faulty principles. Therefore the knife really just cuts one way. What is the case generally, is that what makes a subject difficult to understand is that special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. This is no different from mathematics, physics, chemistry, or biology for example.

My point is only that doubt requires grounds just as belief and disbelief do. — 180 Proof

And my point is that this is manifestly untrue. "Doubt" is an uncertainty, and as such it is fundamentally different from belief, which is a form of certainty. The mental state of being uncertain does not require grounds, and it especially does not require "compelling grounds" as you stated earlier. Compelling grounds is what produces certainty, and certainty is fundamentally distinct from uncertainty.

To clarity, epistemic attitudes contrary to the status quo – positing new doubts, new dis/beliefs – require grounds and lacking those grounds the status quo remains (i.e. certainty). — 180 Proof

Again, this is fundamentally incorrect. There is no need to posit alternatives in order to be uncertain of the status quo. In reality, the "status quo" needs to be justified. It is fundamentally illogical to accept "the status quo" simply on the basis of authority. This is why so many people reject religion, because we are often asked to accept the principles on faith without being offered any justification of those principles.

there are no grounds for "doubting everything that can be doubted" — 180 Proof

And this is also incorrect. There is very good grounds to doubt everything which can be doubted. Any principle which has not been adequately justified may prove to be unacceptable if doubted. And, since we cannot know prior to doubting them, which ones are unacceptable, we must doubt everything which can be doubted, in order to determine which ones are unacceptable. Even if it turns out to be only a sparse few principles, out of a vast lot, we cannot know which ones until we doubt them all.

One doesn't begin uncertain and then becomes certain or begin certain and become uncertain; one is always both but in different respects and striving to discern which is which or when it's the case and when it's not the case. Epistemic attitudes or perspectives are much for fluid and nonlinear than you seem to assume, MU. No wonder you don't understand Witty et al. — 180 Proof

Finally, I think that this is obviously false as well. We do begin uncertain, as little babies. Schooling teaches us how to become certain. It is true though that a grown adult is usually certain in some respects and uncertain in others. Retaining an open mind (uncertainty) in the face of an education system which attempts to rid us of this, is something which requires significant philosophical training. But the fact that most adults are certain in some respects and uncertain in others, does not negate the fact that we begin as uncertain.

There is a distinction between the intent of or motivation for an act and the evaluation of that act. Not everything we do is good. — Fooloso4

But everything we do is for a good.

Being directed toward an end is not the same as attaining that end. Not every act is good. — Fooloso4

As I explained in a post above, every act is inherently good. I don't know if you read that post, but this is fundamental to Christianity, and why love and forgiveness are the chief principles of Christianity.

When Plato talks about "the good" he does not mean some quality that is good but the good itself. The good itself cannot be opposite of itself. The good itself is not some thing or act that is good. Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good. — Fooloso4

The good itself is what motivates the act, what Aristotle calls "that for the sake of which". Knowledge of the good itself, is knowing what motivates one's own actions. Since every act is particular, there is a specific good unique to each and every individual act. Accordingly, your phrase "Knowledge of the good itself is that by which we can truly determine whether a particular act is good" makes no sense at all. There is no such thing as an overarching "the good", relative to which, particular acts might be judged as good or not.

Yes, Wittgenstein can be very misleading. He ought to be discussed in the thread on sophistry.

Read the thread on hinge propositions. There I argued that Wittgenstein is fundamentally wrong on this issue. That he is wrong on this issue ought not surprise anyone, given his attitude toward metaphysics. Those who are not inclined toward making the effort to understand metaphysics tend to try and dismiss metaphysics with faulty principles.

How do you think that the present situation of human beings with knowledge, evolved from the prior situation of beings without knowledge, if uncertainty is not prior to certainty?

It matters tho if one switches from 'mind' to 'language,' especially if one is supposed to be engaged upon a super-seance of that aforesaid mind. Nothing blinds as reliably and effectively as the so-called obvious. — lll

Mind is logically prior to language. So such a "switch" is a move in the wrong direction. and will only mislead you, as 180 Proof is obviously mislead into thinking that certainty is prior to skepticism. Language is a product of minds, just like certainty is a product of skepticism, and any attempt to reverse this logical order, is a mistake. This is why semiosis, which reduces fundamental biological processes to a form of language, results in panpsychism.

Only where there are compelling grounds am I "skeptical". — 180 Proof

I see you take the unreasonable approach 180. The rational human being says "only where there are compelling grounds am I certain". In other words, compelling grounds are what removes skepticism, not what induces it.

For pragmatic l purposes -- such as walking on solid ground -- I take matter for granted. — Gnomon

But the point is that you do not need to take matter for granted to be walking on solid ground. You just need to walk, and not think about what the ground is made of. And, it could turn out that the substance of the ground is something completely different from what is described by the concept "matter", just like it turned out that the earth orbits the sun instead of the ancient idea that the sun was going around the earth.

But for philosophical speculations, I have followed the findings of Quantum & Information sciences, to the conclusion that ultimate reality is in-substantial & immaterial. So, it seems possible that our massy world is constructed of weightless-but-meaningful relationships, such as mathematics & logic. — Gnomon

The problem with this is that you are lacking substance here. Meaningful relations between weightless things does not magically create a "massy world". Substance is what gives mass its inertia, its resistance to change, the ability to support you when you walk. So for example, if the ground was composed of meaningful relations of weightless things, we need to know why these relations are resistant to change. It is this resistance to change which produces the appearance of weight, and the massy world. But telling me that this is the result of meaningful relations doesn't tell me anything, unless you can say why some relations are more resistant to change than others. Does this mean that some are more meaningful than others? Why are some relations more meaningful than others?

Can you direct me to a more accessible source of information on the "annihilation of matter" concept? :smile: — Gnomon

Have you seen Berkeley's "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous"?

It could be that taking 'mind' for granted is the end of philosophy and not its beginning. If you make this or that concept sacred, you're just scribbling a creed for a cult. — lll

It's not a matter of making any particular concept sacred, it's just a matter of recognizing that any philosophizing you are doing is done through your mind. You might call it something other than "mind" if you like, but it's still the same thing by a different name.

Perhaps 'logic' is largely a ghost story. — lll

That's always a possibility, but logic has already proven itself, so it's very unlikely. That's why the example of the demise of geocentric cosmology is so powerful. It demonstrates the power of logic to overthrow the assumed reality given to us through sensation. Empirical observation will mislead us immensely until we use proper logic to overturn the faulty empirical principles.

What you've presented seems to support precisely what I've said. Notice, that when we are discussing the good of an act, we are discussing something attributed to or directly related to the act. We are talking about opposing qualities, like pleasure and pain, we are not not talking about opposites themselves, as independent ideals.. You seem to be trying to separate "good" from the act, as if it were something independent from the act.

Good question. The next would be whether "mind" should be taken for granted. — lll

Mind must be taken for granted, if you're going to do any philosophy. Otherwise you incapacitate your ability to do philosophy. This is why logic must be given priority over the sense information derived from empirical observation, because we know that the senses can mislead us. That's what Plato showed us, and the example of geocentric cosmology referred to by Gnomon above, is a very good one.

Well, I've never considered the possibility that there no such thing as "facts". — 180 Proof

Why not? That would be a good starting point for a healthy skepticism. You ought to try it, because if you do, this will demonstrate to you how deceptively the word "fact" is often used by the sophists around us. Apply good old fashioned Platonic dialectics, and see if you can determine what it means to be a "fact". Is it a "fact" because you say it is? Is it a "fact" because I say it is? Is it a "fact" because we agree that it is? Is a "fact" something independent? If the latter, how is this compatible with the idea that the world is continually changing, and time is relative? If "facts" are independent, then each "fact" must have an infinite number of possible correct interpretations, depending one one's spatial-temporal perspective. Then what good is the assumption of "facts"?

What is contrary to this is what prevents the fulfillment of the motivation. We seek the good but if we do not know the good then what we do may be contrary to it. This is the connection between knowledge and virtue. — Fooloso4

Notice that you say "what we do may be contrary". The point is that we are always going to do something, and we are always acting for some good. And as you say we can act without knowing the good. Therefore acting, which logically implies a good, does not require that the good is known.

Remember, Plato demonstrates that the good cannot be equated with pleasure, by showing how pleasure has an opposing condition, pain, and the good cannot have such an opposite. There cannot be an opposite to the good, because any such condition (like pleasure), must come into being from the non-being of itself, its opposite. So a condition of pleasure must be preceded by a condition of pain which is the non-being of pleasure. Then pleasure is a relief from pain. If this were the case with the good then the bad would necessarily precede the good, and we'd have to seek the bad in order to obtain the good.

Here's a point to consider concerning the relation between knowledge and virtue. If we look at the evidence of how morality has been successfully cultured in the past, we look at religions as the propagators of morality. And, we see that morality is induced through faith, rather than through knowledge. Good acts and good moral character are encouraged and conditioned through hope and faith, not through knowing the good.

I enjoy reading these debates. Philosophim is like a calmer Garrett Travers. — Tom Storm

How is that possible? If you remove the anxiety from Garrett, there is nothing left.

I am by nature a passive person. But as I get older, I get ornerier. I used to let the opposition push me around. But now I am more likely to fight back, not with volume, but with persistence. — Gnomon

Welcome to the club.

It's a novel approach to the "hard problem" of Consciousness, which addresses the question of how dumb Matter can produce Mind. — Gnomon

Have you ever considered the possibility that there is no such thing as "matter"? This is where Berkeley guided us, and Berkeley has been far more influential to modern physics then most people would imagine. The whole field of "process philosophy", which allows the substance of physical reality to be rendered as mathematical equations, instead of as matter, in a fundamental platonic realism, is derived from the annihilation of "matter".

The reason why we can annihilate matter in this way, is that it is simply an idea, it's conceptual. The concept was proposed as a stand in, to represent the aspect of reality which appeared as unintelligible to us, this was temporal continuity. So if we decide that there is nothing real, nothing physical which comprises temporal continuity in the universe, (as in the moon does not exist if no one is looking at it) then we decide that there is no such thing as matter, and we throw the concept out the window, matter is effectively annihilated.

The problem though, is that temporal continuity, though it is fundamentally unintelligible to us, has vast support through empirical evidence. So when we annihilate matter, as process philosophy does, we are left with a huge hole in our understanding of empirical evidence. This is why Whitehead turned to God, and some rather strange conceptual notions, to support the relationship between one moment in time (a foundational event), and the next. You'll also see that Peirce runs into a similar problem in supporting the reality of infinitesimals, when the empirically observed continuum, is assumed to be composed of infinitesimals.

So the issue is that "matter" is a faulty concept as Berkeley demonstrated. As such, our understanding of reality might be better off if we reject it altogether. However, "matter" was very significant, because it represented a very real part of the universe, but one which we did not understand, so we just gave it that name to represent it. If we reject the concept outright, then that vast part of reality which we do not understand, bites us very hard, because it produces a huge whole in our models. Physicists apply all sorts of complex mathematical equations to disguise this hole, and hide it from us. But metaphysicians have no problem to point out the hole. So the physicalists tend to be very defensive toward the metaphysicians for pointing to these failings of physics, being in denial.

It seems that the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the theist argument. — tryhard

There is no such thing as evil. It is a fictional idea which human beings have created. God determines what is good, but human beings suggest what is evil. If the human suggestions prevail, and good is made to be the opposite of the proposed evil, then this good is just as fictitious as the proposed evil, and evil prevails over the true good.

U's explanation does not touch upon his claim regarding knowingly doing evil. — Paine

Plato's first step in his overall demonstration that people knowing commit evil, is Socrates' examples which refute the idea of a necessary relationship between knowing and doing. As Socrates shows, people act without knowing what they are doing. This means that actions are not necessarily derived from knowing. Therefore acting does not require knowing. This is only the first step in a long, and complicated, demonstration which proceeds from Plato's earlier writings to his later. It is complex and nuanced, requiring significant effort to understand and this is the reason why I didn't provide the support for my claim, which you requested earlier. The next step is to understand that acting is inherently good. A human act is directed toward an end, the good.

Put those two principles together, acting does not require knowledge, and acting is inherently good, and you have what is required to conclude that virtue is not knowledge. Beyond this, there is a need to place "evil" in relation to good.

for the good must always have its contrary, — Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, translated by F.M. Cornford

That "the good" must have a contrary is the very idea which Plato ends up demonstrating to be faulty. The good is shown as the motivation for action, and there is really nothing which is contrary to this. In this way the good is shown to be the cause of existence. Why did God create the universe? Because He saw that it was good to do such. So under Aristotelian principles all existence is good, to exist is good, so that the various existing things have different degrees of goodness as determined by the perfection of their forms. Form is fundamentally good. Then it doesn't make sense to assign evil, or badness (if this were the contrary to good) to anything, because all things have form, therefore existence, and the contrary of good (as existence), would be non-existence. This is fundamental to Christianity in the principles of love and forgiveness. We are all fundamentally good, and it makes no sense to assume a contrary to this, that people are evil.

But the issue is with what Socrates demonstrates about the claims that others make, in particular, claims about the relationship between virtue and knowledge.

Consider that virtue is attributed to human acts. Socrates goes to those who act (have a skill), and asks them to explain the knowledge which enables the skill. They cannot, So Socrates forces them to admit that they do not really have the knowledge which they claim to have.

What we have exposed here is the division between know-how and know-that. And, knowing how to do something does not really qualify as "knowledge" in the strict epistemic sense of the word, which refers to knowing that. So Socrates exploits this division to demonstrate that those who know how to do something do not necessarily know what they are doing.

If we apply this principle to virtue, as an attribute of human activity, then we see the division between knowledge, as knowing-that, and virtue, as an activity. Knowledge, in the strict sense of the word is not a requirement for virtue.

Here, I haven't time to work on providing the requested support, but start with this:

Finally, in the Meno the question how virtue is acquired is raised by Meno, a disciple of Gorgias, and an ambitious seeker of power, wealth, and fame. Socrates’ interlocutors are usually at first quite confident about their own competence in the discussion. Nor is such confidence unreasonable. If virtue is a kind of ‘skill’ or special property that enjoys general recognition, its possessor should know and be able to give an account of his skill. As the Socrates’ examinations demonstrate, however, such self-confidence is usually misplaced and the ‘knowledge’ professed by Socrates’ conversation partners is frequently revealed to be at best an implicit familiarity, When they are confronted with their inability to explain the nature of their cherished virtue or expertise, they end up admitting their ignorance, often with considerable chagrin and anger. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics/

He has made the same claim before, along with the same reluctance to actually support it. — Paine

Sorry Paine, I can't read the material for you.

Then how do you know what he didn't teach? — Agent Smith

I like to take the Socratic approach, and claim not to truly know such things. Those were my opinions, I do not profess them as knowledge.

I'll give you an example of something that's not knowledge, the string of symbols: )^a. This is not a proposition, hence can't be knowledge. How can we know )^a? — Agent Smith

I don't know. Got any suggestions? There are some serious difficulties involved with any attempt to understand the nature of knowledge, which Plato demonstrated.

What did Plato claim to teach with respect to morality? — Agent Smith

I don't recall ever coming across, in Plato's writings, a place where he makes explicit claims concerning what he is teaching. But I think might refer to "dialectics" as what he, or Socrates in his dialogues, is doing, representing the philosophical process he supports. This appears to be a form of skepticism, where he takes a word like "just" in "The Republic", and questions a number of people who claim to know the meaning of the term, in an attempt to get an understanding of the "idea" which the word signifies.

How do you explain Socrates' statement that no one knowingly is evil? — Agent Smith

You'd have to provide this statement for me in context, for me to answer that question. I'll tell you though, that it is often very difficult when reading Plato's dialogues, to distinguish between Socrates' actions of critical skepticism towards a concept, and the appearance that he is supporting that concept. Further, Plato changed his attitude toward a number of fundamental concepts over the lifetime of his writings. That is a feature of Platonic dialectics, to maintain an attitude of uncertainty, an open mind. This mental capacity, which is a suspending of judgement toward fundamental propositions, provides for the Socratic condition of uncertainty, not knowing, which is the prerequisite for the dialectical process.

So if Socrates claimed, "no one is knowingly evil", and he professed to know the truth of this proposition, rather than proceeding toward understanding what is meant by this proposition, to better enable a judgement of truth or falsity, that would contradict Socrates' claim to be unknowing, and this would completely undermine the dialectical process demonstrated by Plato. Furthermore, I suggest that the fact that this concept (no one is knowingly evil), is recurrent in a number of dialogues, indicates that it is one that Plato was far from settled on at that time. It could even be, that Socrates himself, the real man, was inclined toward believing this concept, persuaded by sophistry, while Plato was inclined to be more skeptical of it. If this is the case, then we'd see the concept appear in numerous dialogues, even having Socrates appear to be supportive of the idea, and it might not be until a later dialogue where we'd find the indication that Plato actually trends toward rejection of the concept.

How can we know something that isn't knowledge? — Agent Smith

The object of knowledge, what is known, is not the subject of knowledge (the thing as it is represented within the knowledge itself). So for instance, I know my chair, as the object of my knowledge, but the chair isn't my knowledge. The knowledge I have of my chair holds "my chair" as a subject, and predication determines how I know my chair; it looks like this, and is in this place, etc., are predicated to the subject. The subject in this case is meant to have a direct one to one relationship with the object, so that "my chair" might refer to the object itself (external to myself), and it might equally signify the subject of predication (internal to my knowledge). It is intended, in that case, that the subject "my chair" represents only that one identified object, but the subject might in other cases represent many objects classed together, like when the subject is "a chair".

How was Plato going to teach people virtue, if virtue isn't something knowable? — Agent Smith

Plato did not claim to teach virtue, the sophists did, and they charged a lot of money for it. Socrates argued that a person could know what is right, but still act contrary to this, and do what is wrong. This type of behaviour is actually quite common, as intentional criminal acts.

So the problem is that knowing what is right will not necessitate doing what is right. And since virtue is a judgement of one's actions, we have to conclude that there is a separation between knowing what is right, and doing what is right. Therefore even if the sophist were capable of teaching what is right, this would not ensure that the student would proceed to act virtuously. There is an ingredient to virtue, a necessary ingredient, which is missing here.

Look at the difference between your two statements above, "virtue is not knowledge", and "virtue isn't something knowable". The first can be true while the second is false. We know that virtue is not knowledge, from the evidence that people knowingly act wrongly. But this does not imply that virtue is not knowable, as was stated, we can know what is correct, but not act that way. So we can know virtue. But the missing ingredient is the motivation to act according to what is known. Virtue can be known, as an object of knowledge, but it is not itself a type of knowledge, so this is not an instance of knowing knowledge, it's knowing something else, virtue.

There is no light coming from the future, only from the past. You say 'looks' but it is not observation but imagination. — unenlightened

I agree, "looks" is metaphorical. The usage goes back at least as far as Plato, "the mind's eye". So I think that "to look" in this sense is to direct one's attention in that way. So when we look for something, or look at something, we direct our visual sense in a particular way, also focusing the mental attention on that visual sense. A person can focus the attention of one's mind, in a very similar way, but looking without the senses, at something, or for something, completely mental, without employing the senses. Very often this thing focused on is a goal for the future, which a person might direct one's attention toward.

I agree that this is "imagination", but it's a special type of imagination, just like prediction is a special type of imagination, because unlike more random imagination such as dreaming, and the somewhat less random imagination of fiction writing, we assign some sort of reality to this type of imagined thing.

As you say, this type of imagining, which brings the imaginary into the real, is "the trick to anticipation". As a child I suffered from false anticipation. If I expected something really good, and it didn't pan out, I'd be greatly disappointed. I think that directing one's anticipation towards the real is a very important aspect of dealing with anxiety. The problem though, is that in relation to the past we have very clear principles as to what constitutes "real", we can refer to what has been sensed, "observed". But when I look to the future, how do I determine whether or not I will be disappointed, if I assign "real" to an anticipated event?

Fairy dust is like dark matter. The only evidence that it exists is that all our theories will be wrong unless it does. — T Clark

In this situation, the proper conclusion is that the theories are wrong. What's the point in sprinkling fairy dust to support a bad theory?