Thanks, that all makes sense. But the issue for me is that the act of imagination is a mediation between the imagined word "centaur", and the noema, the imagined centaur. Doesn't this imply that the meaning of the imagined word is not immediately present to the one who imagines it, there is no self-presence, and therefore there is indication. Is it not the case that "mediation" is what distinguishes indication from expression?

Communicative speech thus requires mediation through physical objects that indicate one another: we can see another’s feelings and emotions, but not purely intuitively or originarily by nature, we only originarily see the physical signs through which they’re conveyed. Although expression is therefore generally intended to be used in communication, communication itself paradoxically destroys expression in its most basic form. For that, we need a lack of indicative mediation, which means a lack of mediation through physical signs, which means a lack of mediation through other people: we essentially have to talk to ourselves. — The Great Whatever

So the question is, how is the psychical act of imaging the words, as a mediation, fundamentally different from the psychical act of hearing the words. as a mediation, such that one is indicative, and the other is not?

Nice summary TGW, thanks for that. Here's my take.

I see three phases of separation, or "removal" in this chapter. First, and primarily, the word as it appears within a human mind is removed, or separated from the physical existence of the word. This is tied up with the separation between indication and expression. By removing the psychical occurrence of the word, its occurrence within the mind, from the physical occurrence of the word, Husserl is able to consider the imagined word as a pure form of expression. This is expression without indication. This form of pure expression is referred to as "the solitary life of the soul", talking to oneself, soliloquy. The expression is said to be pure because the meaning is self-present, there is no manifestation, no medium between word and meaning, and therefore no indication.

However, there is a second phase of removal described. This is the removal of the act of imagination from the thing which is imagined, in this case, the word. Following this there is a third phase suggested, and that is a removal of the contents of the act of imagination, the noema, from the act of imagination. Now it is implied, if not explicitly stated, that the contents of the act of imagination, the noema, is not actually the imagined words. If this is the case, then I believe that Husserl's claim that the imagined word is a form of pure expression, cannot be upheld. The act of imagination forms a mediation between the imagined word, and the content, or noema (this could be 'the concept') , and therefore I believe we have indication. In other words, the imagined words are not properly "the content" of the act of imagination, they are in some sense a manifestation, or indication of the actual content.

Dominic Osborn, do you not think that there are others beside you, such as me, who have experience as well as you? Doesn't your experience of communicating with others convince you that there are others? And doesn't this experience of communicating convince you that others have experience, similar to you having experience, but not the same as your experience?

I hesitate to accept this idea of a perfectly rational mind, built upon sturdy, concrete principles and noble truths. For where do these principles come from, and why do we uphold them if not by a preference to uphold them?

Principles become rules in which to follow, given a framework which we adopt based upon certain preferences. — darthbarracuda

Yes, these are preferences in sense #2 which Pierre-Normand brought up. When we have decided that a principle is good, and accept it, we can say that it is a preference. That is something which has occurred in the past. Now when facing the future, we have numerous preferences, preferred principles, from which to choose in making a decision. We choose one, the preference does not choose itself.

You misunderstand what I meant by static. By static, I merely meant unchanging, I didn't mean causally inert. The existence of a opportunity-preference, paired with a principled, character-building preference, leads to action. — darthbarracuda

You are missing a source of activity here. Activity is essential to causation. You have many preferences. In your example, two preferences get paired together. We need to determine a cause of these two particular preferences getting paired together, rather than two other preferences getting paired.

Your claim is that the pairing causes action, which is true, but we still need to account for, i.e. find the cause of, that particular pairing. That is the free will act. Clearly, the preferences don't pair together in a random way, nor do they cause actions in a random way. So it is not the preferences which are the initial cause of the action, it is the mind which uses the preferences.

OK, so let's assume that we identify nothing.

I take it that your argument is that we cannot proceed toward the law of non-contradiction, or any other logic until we identify that we have identified nothing, i.e., we must validate that the thing which we have identified as nothing is truly nothing. And if we have identified nothing, and haven't identified that we have identified nothing, we have problems. So how would we identify that we have identified nothing? How would we know that the nothing we have identified is truly nothing, rather than not nothing.

Furthermore, if we identify that we have identified nothing, i.e., validate that the thing identified as nothing is truly nothing, then doesn't this necessitate that nothing is something? In order to identify that the thing identified is truly the thing identified, isn't it necessary that there is such a thing as the thing identified? Then how could this be nothing? Therefore it is clearly the case that any attempt to identify nothing is self-defeating.

I see no reason to distinguish between preferences and reasons, as if they are two completely separate things. Reasons, in my view, are just static preferences. — darthbarracuda

Right, for the sake of argument, let's assume that reasons are "static preferences". Being static, they cannot act as a cause. It is the reasoning mind, which uses static preferences, in the process of reasoning, which causes the decision. It cannot be a preference which is the cause of a decision because the preferences are not active, they are passive. The mind is active in the process of reasoning, and it is the mind which causes the decision, not the preference.

But to what standard do we judge conflicting preferences, if not the goals we have in mind to accomplish? — darthbarracuda

We judge things according to principles, not goals. We look for objective principles, and we can judge our goals as to whether they are consistent with the principles which we believe are objective.

We choose an option depending on what our overarching goals are. Do I go to the movie theater, or donate to a charity? In both cases, I have a preference to have fun, and a preference to be moral. And this is where we get into the idea of character, or the static preferences a person has. The character is what ultimately decides between two or more preferences, based on what the person's higher-order goals are and a deliberation as to which of the possible routes of action helps attain this goal the best. But of course none of us decided what our character would be, or who we would fundamentally be as a person. — darthbarracuda

No, I don't believe that these are "higher order goals" at all, they are principles. You make the decision of whether to go to the movie, or donate the money to a charity, based on the principles you hold, not on some preference. Your preference is dependent on you principles. So I think that you misrepresent principles as preferences. But a principle is not the same thing as a preference. We know, and believe that preferences are subjective and vary from one individual to another. We know and believe that principles can obtain a high degree of objectivity, as is the case with mathematical principles. And we often employ mathematical principles when deciding what to do. So we know and also believe that principles are completely different from preferences. Now we only need people like you to understand and believe, that it is principles which a rational human being uses to make decisions, not preferences.

How is "the only thing I know is that I know nothing" related to Aristotle's rendition of The Law of Identity?

But to kick our bad habits requires us to have the preference to be rid of these bad habits. An override. — darthbarracuda

This is where you are incorrect. The "override" is a judgement that the habit is bad. It is only a "preference" to be rid of the habit in the second sense of "preference", as Pierre-Normand has argued. So your conclusion is one drawn from equivocation.

The fact is, as I have argued, and Pierre-Normand now agues, that we use reason to judge conflicting preferences, and this is called making a choice. The process which judges preferences cannot itself be a preference. Only after the judgement is made can we say that the chosen one was the preferred one. But if the chosen one is called "the preference", this uses "preference" in a different way from the "preferences" which are judged. The chosen one, as "the preference", comes about as an effect of the choice, and cannot be the cause of the choice.

So you have not addressed the process which judges the preferences to make a choice. You have simply asserted that a "preference" causes the choice, so it is not a choice at all. But this is simplistic nonsense because clearly different preferences are judged, and not a single one of them actually causes itself to be chosen. They are judged as passive possibilities, not active causes. The active cause of the choice comes from that which is judging.

I am not saying inconceivable in principle, rather from our humble vantage point. Yes ts true that folk perceive divine beauty, meaning, or perhaps something of the nature of God, but it is always understood that they are relating to an entity far greater, the part of the iceberg you cannot see. — Punshhh

Well, do you recognize the difference between perceiving something and conceiving something? If you do, you can question what lies in between these two, what creates a difference between them, or what is the difference between them. So suppose someone perceives "divine beauty", as you say. This means that the individual is so inclined as to name what is being perceived as "divine beauty". We can ask the person "why did you use 'divine beauty' to describe your perception?".

If the person can justify this use, give reason for using this phrase, we might say that there is a concept of "divine beauty". But very likely the person will be at a lose of words, or meet criticism with any attempt to justify, and we'd have to conclude that there is no conception of "divine beauty". What you would name "divine beauty", is not what I would name "divine beauty". Sure there are some subliminal inclinations which would make you use this phrase, and you might even come up with reasons for using it, but these reasons don't really justify your use, in the minds of others, so we cannot say that there is a concept of divine beauty.

This is what happens with the word "God". We can proceed through any one of a number of different versions of the cosmological argument, and conclude a first actuality, as I suggested, or a causeless cause, as suggested by another version, or even an eternal cause, and claim this is "God". Someone else might say "God" refers to an omnipotent, omniscient, being, so we are wrong to use the word "God" in reference to what is implied by the numerous different conclusions of the different versions of the cosmological argument. If we quit at this point, and concede, "God" is inconceivable, we will have succumbed to the irrationality of "that which is difficult is impossible".

Now it should be evident that we can perceive things, apprehend them with our minds, and even assert that we have conceived, without actually having the capacity to conceptualize them. Conceptualizing is a completely different process from apprehending or understanding. Conception requires that one justifies what one has apprehended, and understood with one's own mind, in the minds of others. So no matter how clear and distinct this idea is to you, unless you can make the same idea clear and distinct in the minds of others, there is no concept.

Heavy cream, man. — Bitter Crank

One of my all time favourites! I still spin the vinyl, it's pretty scratchy though

In the second sense, an agent's prefered-2 action is what this agent effectively choses to do in the specific circumstances in which she is called to deliberates and act. — Pierre-Normand

This preference #2, is only determined after a choice is made, posteriorly, it describes the choice which has been made. "She choose X, therefore it was her preference". Since free will is directed toward choices which will be made, this preference #2 is irrelevant to the free will/determinism issue. Preference #2 cannot act as a cause, and to introduce this sense of "preference" is to create ambiguity with the possibility of equivocation.

The point I am labouring to make is that the frequent criticisms directed at classical theism - 'Who made God? Mustn't God be more complex than what he creates?' - are based on no understanding whatever of the nature of the question. — Wayfarer

Well, I must admit that I don't see any logic to this type of criticism, so I generally ignore it, seeing no need to defend against it. It is just a symptom of a much deeper problem, as you correctly point out.

I am not saying these are interchangeable or synonymous, but that the idea of the 'one which is three' is not unique to Christian doctrine to perhaps it denotes a deeper truth. — Wayfarer

I'm with you there. Here's a few explanations of the 'one which is three', which I am acquainted with. Plato had the tripartite soul: mind, body, and he demonstrated the necessity to assume a medium between mind and body, spirit. St. Augustine had the three aspects of the intellect: memory, understanding, and will. Then there is Aquinas' explanation. There is no "son" without a father, and no "father" unless there is a son. And, there is a very real relationship between these two which allows them to be what they are, father and son, and this is the holy spirit. I like to understand time in this way, there is no future without a past, and no past without a future, and there is a very real present which allows these two to be what they are. I believe this is the essence of conception, the two opposing terms, and the necessary relationship between them. That is why the 'one which is three' is a common theme.

When you can no longer identify that you have identified nothing you have personal issues to deal with. — wuliheron

By "identified nothing' do you mean identified nothing as if it were something? Is this like seeing something which is not there? So when you no longer know that you are hallucinating, then you have personal problems? Is this "nothing" time? We identify it, and name it as "time", when it is really nothing?

But whatever it chooses, it must choose. — darthbarracuda

Why would you say this? It appears as contradiction. How can you say that "it chooses", if whatever it chooses it must choose? How is that a choice at all?

It doesn't make sense to have a strong preference yet pick the route of least preference satisfaction... — darthbarracuda

Yes, it absolutely does make sense. This is how we proceed to kick our bad habits. We just face the fact that certain things are not good for us, and force ourselves not to choose those things, even though they are our preferences.

The will must choose a certain route of action depending on how strong the various preferences influencing it are. — darthbarracuda

I don't think you understand the way that the will works. Do you understand the concept of "will power"? This is the capacity which we have to resist from following our natural preferences, habits, and things like this which give us pleasure. Once we apply the will power to prevent ourselves from engaging in these unwanted activities, produced by unwanted preferences, we give ourselves the freedom to choose other things. So the will acts to negate all preferences, resist any activity, giving the rational mind time to consider many options. The choice produced by the rational mind is not one of "preference", but one of reason. Then the will releases the suspended choice, allowing the individual to act according to reason rather than preference.

I've read a fair bit of theological material, and I don't see God as that "which is inconceivable to us. I see God as that which is not yet fully conceived, but is yet, in principle conceivable.

I think that designating God as inconceivable, leads to the idea that God is unintelligible, and this leads to the idea that God is incoherent, which leads to the idea that God is logically impossible, contradictory, etc., and this leads to atheism.

So rather, a humble acknowledgement of our cause, even if done in ignorance. — Punshhh

To acknowledge such a cause is to acknowledge intelligibility, and therefore conceivability. Conception should be understood as a process, a process of understanding. One can study, all one's life, trying to understand the mysteries of the universe without ever fully "conceiving", but this does not mean that the individual's efforts were in vain.

...then what exactly causes us to choose one option rather than another? — darthbarracuda

The free will!

If you understand that there is a process of evaluating preferences, how can you conclude that a preference is the cause of the choice. Whatever it is that carries out the act of evaluating preferences must be something other than a preference itself, or else it could not evaluate, it would always choose itself, as the preference with power over the others.

The classical depiction of deity in the Western tradition is as simple - not composed of parts - — Wayfarer

That claim might be difficult to defend. God is one, but first and foremost, "one" signifies unity rather than simplicity. Surely the Christian God is understood to be a trinity, and I don't see how a trinity could be simple. As a trinity, this being could be the beginning, end, and all in between, rather than the beginningless, endless, existence-less "being" which you speak off.

Think of it as a fundamental law of logic and physics that a context without any content and vice versa is impossible. Hence, we see geometry or objects moving into the future, but always changing in the process. — wuliheron

I think you have things backward wuliheron. There is nothing in existence prior to the present, in the future, this is the "void". The void is that wall of emptiness which is right in front of you all the time, the future. There is nothing there which can be remembered, sensed, or experienced in any way. Objects are not "moving into the future" because this would be a process of annihilation at each moment of the present, as the object enters the void of the future.

Instead, objects come into existence at each moment of the present. We have tracked the relative positioning of objects, through the past, and this is what we know as the motion of objects. So the objects have been moving through the past, but they are not moving into the future, their motion always stays in the past. We can project to a future point in time, and claim that an object will move to a particular place when that point in time becomes a past point, but this is not a case of moving into the future. All movement of objects is always in the past, that is a brute fact.

The power of the will? What is the will, if not the manifestation of the most prominent preference, or the conglomeration of a multitude of compatible and cohesive preferences? — darthbarracuda

This is the power to not choose, to decline or deny any preference. Since it can decline any preference whatsoever, it cannot be a preference itself. To say that will power, which is the power to deny any preference, is itself a form of preference, is contradictory.

What is your notion of "void"? Is this an absence of everything, including gravity, space-time, everything?

My own view is that the passage of time is merely the greater context of the void exchanging identities with its contents similar to the Unruh Effect. — wuliheron

How could a void have contents, isn't this an explicit contradiction? I don't understand this concept of "void" which you seem to have. It appears like a reification of nothing. The problem I see with this metaphysical perspective, is that if you make nothing into something, it can be whatever you want it to be, because it's pure fantasy, really nothing. So whatever you make it into is just whatever you want it to be.

A cold wood stove at close to the speed of light would, according to the theory, start to glow red until it eventually disintegrated. — wuliheron

I find this to be a particularly meaningless statement. How would a large solid mass, the size of a wood stove achieve a velocity of close to the speed of light, without disintegrating in the first place? And that velocity would be relative to what? Suppose there is a tiny particle passing the wood stove, at close to the speed of light, wouldn't the wood stove be close to the speed of light relative to this particle? What would cause the wood stove to glow red, unless some of those particles were colliding with it?

My own suspicion is that space and time can exchange identities in extreme contexts and its possible to produce nonlinear temporal effects or "ripples" in time itself and the thrust they are developing is actually time being converted into space behind the device or space in front of the device being warped and compacted, but that's all speculation at this point. — wuliheron

Doesn't relativity theory allow that there is an inverse relationship between space and time? So space and time can change identities under relativity theory, but only through an inversion.

Is it anything akin to writing on philosophy forums? — intrapersona

No, you have to follow the direction of the professor. This is why it is better to study philosophy at school rather than simply on your own, you are necessitated to follow the direction which is provided by the institution, not simply your own interests. Your own interests will become stale, and not being exposed to the vast world of interests of others, you will waste too much time, and not proceed toward your full potential. The institution provides you with an array of interests, and requires that you must become proficient in numerous different areas. This is good.

Here's the problem. Every "fact" which I know of consists of a relationship between things. This fact is taken advantage of, by relativity theory. Nothing is at rest, because everything exists in relation to other things, and considering these relationships, produces the realization that the thing is moving.

The point is, there is no such thing as a "simple", This is a premise which has no basis in reality. A simple would be a symbol with absolutely no meaning, no relationship to other symbols, no context at all. If simples were real, a simple could not become a fact prior to being placed in a contextual relationship. The contextual relationship is essential to the fact. But this contextual relationship denies its status as a simple. Therefore a fact cannot be a simple.

We do choose our preferences, we can examine any particular preference and choose to kick the habit. The fact that we are given preferences at a very young age, through training, moral and otherwise, to fill the void which we are born with (the very void which allows us to choose) does not negate this. Even instinctual inclinations which are given prior to birth may be overcome by the power of moral training. The void allows us suspend activity, will power. This is how human existence has bettered itself, over the many years it's been around, to become more intellectual for example, through training.

But eventually you will realize that all of these preferences are meant to keep you alive - that's the universe's game, to keep you alive until you can procreate and defend the clan. Therefore, in order to rebel, you must discontinue living. — darthbarracuda

Even those habits which you are born with, instincts which keep you alive, may be overcome through the power of choice, this is demonstrated by the hunger strike.

Your argument fails to dismiss free choice, because you would need to produce a human inclination which could not be overcome by the power of the will, in order to prove your point. But each and every activity of the human being may be overcome through the power of choice, as is demonstrated by suicide.

..but it could be a bit more complicated and they could also be messing with space-time itself and doing some kind of weirdness. — wuliheron

How would you mess with space-time itself, tweak the mathematics a little bit?

What's a logical simple?

The ideal objects themselves, however, do not indicate one another but are demonstrated from one another. — The Great Whatever

OK, so here's the part which stumps me. He refers to the "contents" of ideal objects, and the relations between the contents, and that these do not belong to indication. How can there be a relation which is not indicative, what kind of relation is he assuming for these contents?

For example, I assume that logic proceeds through relating symbols, "if A then B", and such things, and these relations are in some sense indicative. This is one relation, which relates the symbols necessarily, it is established by the premise as necessary. There is another relation which relates the symbols to the content, "A" signifies a particular idea. This relation is contingent. But I don't see any relationship between the contents themselves, except those established through relating the symbols in the premises. All the relations between the contents are created through this extraneous means of relating the symbols.

Is it the case, that by "contents" he is referring to the symbols themselves, "A" and "B"? If so, then why does he call them the content of ideal objects rather than the formal aspect of ideal objects? As this is consistent with the traditional form/content distinction?

Then he distinguishes "truth of reason" from "truth of fact", which I don't see at all. Where does he pull "truth of fact" from, aren't logical truths, truths of reason? And finally, he concludes with "the contents of truths that are linked together". What is he referring to with "contents of truths"?

Consider this passage from p25 then, and see if you can interpret it for me, because I'm stuck.

"Motivations linking lived-experiences, the acts intending objective-ideal, necessary, and evident idealities, may be of the order of contingent and empirical, 'non-evident' indication. But the relations uniting the contents of ideal objects, in evidential demonstration, do not belong to indication. The entire analysis of section 3 demonstrates that (1) even if A indicates B with a complete empirical certainty (with the highest probability), this indication will never be a demonstration of apodictic necessity, and, to find here again the classic schema, it will never be a demonstration [31] of 'truths of reason' in opposition to 'truths of fact'. Section 3's analysis also demonstrates (2) that even if indication seems nevertheless to intervene in a demonstration, it will always be on the side of psychical motivations, acts, convictions, etc., and never on the side of the contents of truths that are linked together.

He also seems to speak of the transcendental reduction in such a way that he thinks that empirical reality 'falls to' it, or 'outside of it.' — The Great Whatever

Derrida is very clear, that "the world" is psychical, and "the transcendental" is what is not contained within the world. He is quite unclear with his use of "empirical" though. Perhaps this will become clearer with more use, but I assume that this word indicates some relation between the world and the transcendental. I think that we should not be hasty in designating "the transcendental" as necessarily external to "the world", because there are internal aspects of experience which escape "the world", just as much as there are external aspects. Remember, Kant designated space as an external intuition, and time as an internal intuition.

Many years ago things were much denser. — jorndoe

I don't think "denser" is the proper word. As I understand it, expansion doesn't affect density. What I think, is that when general relativity is applied to vast areas of space and time, a mystery phenomenon appears, which is called "expansion". But expansion doesn't really exist, as a real phenomenon, it's just the failure of general relativity which produces the appearance of expansion. Then instead of approaching the theory of general relativity to see what it is about that theory which produces the appearance of this mystery phenomenon, scientist would rather just give it a name, "expansion", and work out all the necessary mathematics required to deal with this failure.

It seems to me that when Derrida emphasizes Husserl's purported need for indication to be extrinsic to expression, he's trying to paint Husserl as someone trying to preserve expression from a kind of contamination. So, analogously, an idealistic artist might want to say that social differentiation is extrinsic to taste. Though the artist would certainly agree that social differentiation can be understood without reference to taste, what he'd really be concerned about is establishing the existence of a pure realm of aesthetic appreciation which is not interwoven with social concerns. This seems to be the portrait of Husserl Derrida is trying to paint, except with meaning instead of taste. The emphasis is on the purity of expression, not the independence of indication. — csalisbury

The problem I see, is that in the end, it is "sign" which needs to be defined, and this cannot be done by reference to expression alone, we need to refer to indication as well. If we allow the separation intended by Husserl, we have two distinct senses of "sign", one in relation to expression and one in relation to indication. Objectivity will be lost. Then if we come full circle, and look at what it means to be a sign in the sense of indication, without expression, and this I take to be a natural indication. we will find absolutely no meaning here, of any sort, without referring to expression. This undermines the whole practise of separation which would bring us to this point in the first place.

The other is to ask what would happen if we take indication to be intrinsic to expression itself, if, by necessity, it 'contaminates' the purity that ought to characterize expression. Derrida clearly opts for this latter understanding: "Although there is no possible discourse without an expressive kernel, we could almost say that the totality of discourse is gripped by an indicative web." — StreetlightX

We could consider such contamination in the sense of an accidental. Indication is not essential to expression, but it just so happens to occur within expression. You are saying that expression is essential ("by necessity") to indication. I would question the necessity you refer to, is this the only place indication occurs. This would tie in with, why does it appear to exist as an external web, if it's really intrinsic to expression.

Husserl does recognize the ability of indication to be independent of expression, but my sense is the thinks this is already intuitively obvious from everyday examples. Neither Husserl nor Derrida seem to expend effort defending this claim. — The Great Whatever

But that's the point, it is essential to Husserl that indication is independent of expression. Take a look at the beginning of the chapter. The subject being addressed is described as "the exteriority of indication in relation to expression". Husserl wants to "reduce" indication as an extrinsic empirical phenomenon. It is a motivator, or "motivation". Then towards the end of the chapter it is said that all other "reductions", to follow, are dependent on this hiatus. There is what is in the world, psychical, and what is not in the world, transcendental.

Clearly, Derrida is not ready to accept this separation, and this is evident in the final sentence of the chapter "Although there is no possible discourse without an expressive kernel, we could almost say that the totality of discourse is gripped by an indicative web".

What is inflation, expansion?

You should open a new thread. (Y) — jorndoe

Thanks for the vote of confidence, I'll consider that.

What I said was that it is impossible to 'wind the clock back' to the singularity, because at that point, there were no actual laws, nor time and space. That, I believe, is a fact. It is also of note that there are ongoing conflicts about whether the Big Bang really can be said to constitute 'a beginning', precisely because, in Hawking's words, '“A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God,”(Why Physics can't avoid a Creation Event,)New Scientist. — Wayfarer

The discovery of the big-bang is a direct consequence of general relativity, as are black-holes, wormholes, gravitational waves. — tom

General relativity, in conjunction with observations of the universe, have forced people to conjure up "the big-bang" to account for the appearance of a time when general relativity does not apply. Black-holes are a place where general relativity does not apply. What this indicates is that general relativity, as a universal theory, is inadequate. It does not indicate that these things, the big-bang, and black-holes really exist in the way described by the theory, because the theory does not apply here, therefore it cannot produce any description of these occurrences. What is revealed by observations of the universe, and the application of general relativity, is that general relativity is very deficient. Instead of re-evaluating general relativity, scientists turn to mathematicians to come up with all sorts of magic tricks to hide the ineptitude of the theory as a universal theory. Its true applicability is really very limited in scope.

Any evaluative assessment you make, so aesthetic, moral, etc. assessments, are made based on how you feel about things, so whether you want to do that or not, you can't help it insofar as you're engaging in those sorts of assessments. — Terrapin Station

That's not true at all, we can make judgements by referring to principles, such as moral principles. And often the principles will send us in a direction which is contrary to how we feel, like when I want to do something, but know that I should do something else. Perhaps you make your evaluative assessments based on how you feel, I always try to take the time to find the proper principles to refer to. We're two different people. Speak for yourself, and don't try to tell me how I proceed in making evaluative assessments unless you have some justification for your assertions.

It is probably the case that you do, in fact, make philosophical decisions based on what you feel is good. This isn't a bug in you, it's a feature of human beings. Emotion WILL affect how we think whether we like it or not. — Bitter Crank

Sure, emotion always "affects" the way that we think. But this does not mean that decisions are based on what you feel. The base of something, and to affect something are two distinct things. So how I feel may affect my choice of principles to refer to in making a philosophical decision, but this does not mean that my decision is based on what I "feel is good". In fact, most philosophical decisions which I make require days of rumination, and this time period mitigates the fluctuations in thought caused by feelings. Avoiding haste in important decisions helps to reduce the affects of feelings so that I can determine the appropriate principles.

Emotions are part of the way we think. We can't separate them out. We just have to deal with them. — Bitter Crank

I don't have much difficulty dealing with emotions in respect to philosophical decisions. I take my time, and think things through. In some other situations, it is more difficult to deal with the emotions.

In other words expression must be absolutely separable in principle from indication, otherwise expression (and so the order of ideal logical/mathematical truths) falls right back into the maw of psychologism. — csalisbury

Surely Husserl wants a complete separation between expression and indication, but not just to keep expression away from psychologism, more importantly I believe, this separation is what supports the notion of "natural indication". Without the separation, it will become impossible to maintain this principle, that there could be indication which is not expression. .

What objections are they? (That was part of the intent with the opening post.) By the way, please feel free to present your own argument, if you have it reasonably formalized. — jorndoe

Craig's argument is defective because contrary to other versions, such as Aquinas', he simply assumes that the universe has a beginning, rather than proving it as part of the agument, which Aquinas does. Because of this, he gets embroiled in a discussion of actual infinity versus potential infinity instead of starting at the true foundation of the cosmological argument, as formulated by Aristotle, which considers actual versus potential eternity rather than infinity.

Although there are other contemporary versions of the cosmological argument, these are among the most sophisticated and well argued in contemporary philosophical theology. — Michael Martin

I believe the Craig formulation is less complex than Aristotle's or Aquinas'. As I explained in my last post, the cosmological argument presents us with a vey particular set of problems, and offers solutions to those problems. The "argument" part is the presentation of the problems. Depending on how the problems are presented, the solutions vary. The Craig presentation doesn't adequately represent the complexity of the problems, so it is unsuccessful due to being over-simplified. It may be that he is trying to remove, or disguise the inductive aspect, but the inductive aspect is crucial.

By the way, please feel free to present your own argument, if you have it reasonably formalized. — jorndoe

I think that a properly formulated cosmological argument would go something like this:
p1. If there is observable activity, then time is passing.
p2. For any particular observable activity, the potential for that activity is prior in time to the activity itself.
c1. Inductive: The potential for observable activity, in general, is prior in time to that activity.
Problem: We now have a potential which is prior in time to all observable activity.
p3. Any potential requires an actuality as a cause, if it is to be actualized.
c2. If potential is prior to actuality, absolutely, this would ensure an eternal potential without the capacity to actualize itself, and therefore eternally no actual existence.
p4. There is actual existence.
c3. There is an actuality which is prior to observable activity.
Problem: how to describe this actuality. It is generally agreed that this actuality is God, but is God a type of perfect, eternal efficient cause, as Aristotle said, or is God a distinctly different type of immaterial cause, as the Neo-Platonists and Aquinas said?

No.


2. the universe began to exist — jorndoe

What you are not taking into account here, is that Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion. Such an efficient cause is distinct from any efficient causes which we know of, because of the necessary element of perfection. The efficient cause can only be eternal due to some perfection. The circular motion can only be eternal if the circle is perfect. No point on the circle can be different from any other point, in order that none is the beginning or the end. This is the same principle utilized by no-boundaries theories. Since Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, his position falls into this category, as that efficient cause can only be eternal through a similar type of perfection. The difference between Craig and "no-boundaries" is that Craig wants a separation between the perfect (ideal) eternal efficient cause, and the universe which it causes, while "no-boundaries" assumes that the universe is such a perfect (ideal) eternal efficient activity. So Craig takes one step beyond "no-boundaries", to recognize that this is an ideal, and therefore not the universe which we know, separate from it, but he does not proceed to recognize that such ideals do not have actual existence. This, I believe is crucial to a true understanding of the cosmological argument.

That would be your reading, not Craig's argument (at Leadership University, at Reasonable Faith). — jorndoe

I really don't find Craig's version of the cosmological argument to be particularly useful, nor do I find it to be completely consistent with versions such as Aristotle's and Aquinas'. And, I think that the changes he makes, perhaps to modernize the argument, distract from the overall coherency of the argument.

Craig's aim isn't to show that there are things we don't know. But feel free to show there is a special kind of causation (without extraneous implicit presuppositions, special pleading or the likes), preferably applicable here, or, better yet, in a new opening post (might well be interesting). :) — jorndoe

Actually I've seen Craig claim that the cause of the universe is another efficient cause, but this produces the incoherency which you have referred to.

Craig's justification of a non-infinite past duration is largely scientific (Big Bang, entropy, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem), as mentioned in the opening post, though he evades the no-boundary theories. — jorndoe

When the cause of the universe is understood to be another efficient cause, we end up with a solution to the problem posed by the cosmological argument, such as Aristotle's solution. Notice that I say "problem", because that's what the argument does, it hands us the problem of "what caused the universe?". It determines that it is necessary that there is a cause of the universe, and gives us the problem of figuring out what that cause is.

The Aristotelian solution is to assume a separate type of efficient cause, which is an eternal circular motion. Any solution which assumes an efficient cause, must assign to that efficient cause, the characteristic of "eternal", because it must be separate from the efficient causation which we know of, as the passing of time, which is proper to our universe. It must be separate from the passing of time, and therefore it is necessarily eternal.

No-boundary theories are consistent with this idea of circular motion, and eternal efficient cause, and are therefore consistent with Craig's solution for the cosmological argument, as he as well assumes efficient causation. The problem is that an eternal efficient cause is itself an incoherent idea. It is contrary to the notion of "efficient cause", that such a cause could be eternal, and therefore the proposal of an eternal efficient cause is oxymoronic, or self-contradictory.

The Neo-Platonist solution, which was adopted by Christianity, becoming Aquinas' solution, is to assume a different type of cause, final cause (the will of God), as the cause of the universe. In this way we avoid the self-contradiction of "eternal efficient cause", by referring to a type of cause which is not an efficient cause at all. This type of cause is not unfamiliar to us, because it is known to exist in the free will choices of human beings. Furthermore, the concept of free will represents final cause as the cause of efficient causes, therefore the cause, or beginning, of chains of efficient causes. And this is what the cosmological argument also indicates, that we need to assume a type of cause which is distinct from the efficient causation which we know, as the cause of the universe.

So, we can associate these two facts: the fact that free will demonstrates to us a type of causation which is distinct from efficient causation, and acts as a beginning, or cause, of a chain of efficient causation, and, the fact that the cosmological argument demonstrates that we need to assume a type of causation which is distinct from efficient causation, as the cause of the universe.

Why wouldn't an infinite past duration account for existence? — jorndoe

The assumption of an infinite past duration doesn't account for existence, because it doesn't give us the cause of existence. That's what Craig does indicate, that existing things have a beginning, and because they have a beginning, they have a cause. If we assume that the universe does not have a beginning, then it cannot be an existing thing as described. Then we cannot hand to the universe the title of "existence", because existing things are known to have a beginning, and we are denying that the universe has a beginning. So if the universe has an infinite past, "the universe" is necessarily placed in a category other than "existing thing", according to that description, and this designation does nothing for us in accounting for existing things, or "existence" in general, which refers to things that are generated and corrupted, contingent.

The kalam/cosmological argument appeals to causation as we know it; otherwise it would have to demonstrate another kind before appealing to it. — jorndoe

I think you're missing the point. The argument demonstrates through logic, that causation as we know it is insufficient to account for existence as we know it. Therefore it demonstrates the need to appeal to a further type of causation to account for existence as we know it.

There is no further need to demonstrate the reality of this other type of causation prior to appealing to it, as you claim, because that's what the argument does, it demonstrates that this other type of causation is necessary, and therefore it must be real. That's what logic does for us, it tells us what must be the case, based on the premises assumed. If there was a need to demonstrate the reality of the conclusion prior to proceeding with the logic, the logic would be rendered useless.

The most common use is that causes and effects are events, and events are subsets of changes — they occur, and are temporally contextual — causation consist in related, temporally ordered events.
That's how we know causation.
It so happens this is aligned with conservation. — jorndoe

Assuming only one type of causation like this leads to an infinite regress of causation. An infinite regress does not account for existence. Therefore we have to assume a different type of cause if we want to proceed toward understanding the cause of existence as we know it.

The traditional cosmological argument, as presented by Aristotle goes beyond the simple claim that a different type of causation is necessary to put an end to the infinite regress. It starts from an analysis of the components of change, and proceeds to determine that the component which appears to be prior to the change itself, the potential for that change, cannot be prior in an absolute sense. There must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. So this actuality cannot be brought about by the potential for that actuality.

...but "a cause of causation" is incoherent — jorndoe

I think we've been through this already in this thread jorndoe. We use "cause" in distinct ways. Aristotle outlined four distinct ways. The type of causation referred to in physical activity was named "efficient cause". The type of causation referred to in free will choices was named "final cause". Since these two are completely distinct types of causes, it is not incoherent to say that one type of causation is prior to, and the cause of the other.

In other words, if physical activity acts as a cause, it is not incoherent to seek the cause of physical activity. This simply requires allowing for a broader category of "cause", such that all causes are not necessarily physical activities. Therefore when we refer to "the cause of causation", "causation" refers to physical activity, and we are seeking the cause of this, as the cause of causation.