OK, I'll follow you lead then, and start with the assumption that all words refer to the same thing.

Mine's not unsupported, they are different words, therefore there is no indication that they refer to the same thing. Unless there is some indication that the different words are referring to the same thing there is no reason to believe that they refer to the same thing. If you think that these two are the same thing, the onus is on you to demonstrate that. From my perspective, the fact they are different words has already demonstrated that different things are referred to, unless there is reason given to believe otherwise.

Not far into Time Consciousness but it feels like retention is less a razor's edge than a sense that one's current experience is a continuation of an earlier experience, part of the same movement (though not in a narrative way - in fact narrating the movement from what's been retained to where you are now would probably be a surefire sign that those moments are no longer retained.) — csalisbury

I like this representation. That's the continuity which appears to be so important to Husserl. And I think Husserl conceives of a similar continuity between retention and protension. This continuity is what is contrary to the punctuality of "the now". This is the continuity which Derrida intends to punctuate by positing an actual "present", through reference to the punctuality of the now, and claiming this ideality to be "more 'originary' than the phenomenological originarity itself".

One is "matter + its dynamic situatedness with respect to other matter". The other is "the world". I see that these are two distinct titles. You somehow see these two titles as referring to the very same thing. I see the need to posit something additional, if we are to say that these two titles refer to the same thing, some principle whereby we can equate these two different things. Otherwise we just have your unsupported assumption that these two titles refer to the same thing.

Can't you type shorter replies so that a bunch of stuff doesn't get lost? — Terrapin Station

OK

What would you be positng aside from matter physically situated in the world... — Terrapin Station

Matter, and "the world". Two things, necessity of dualism.

I wasn't forwarding anything like a logical argument. I was simply stating a view. — Terrapin Station

This is what you did say.

The relation, since it supervenes on the physical things in question, is physical. — Terrapin Station

I take the word "since" to imply "by reason of". Therefore the logical argument is implied that if something supervenes it is of the same category as that which it supervenes. In reality though, according to the concept of supervenience, the opposite is the case. Supervenience requires a separation between two distinct categories. So to think that supervenience implies that the two things are of the same category, is completely wrong.

If this is the "view" which you wee stating, I just thought I should point out that it is based in some extremely faulty logic. Perhaps you'd be wiser to quit stating that view.

The simplest way to put supervenience is that it's the properties of a collection of things interacting as a system. It's an identity relation rather than a "follows/following" relation. — Terrapin Station

OK, so you're making everything into a "system", a whole, things and interactions between things, and saying that the "system", or whole is physical. That's there is a whole, or "a system" and that it is physical is an unsupported assumption though. Clearly the empirical evidence indicates that things are not all part of one system. This was my point when you joined the discussion. Apokrisis had claimed that we make models to the best of our capacity. But if we model everything as one system, when clearly the evidence indicates that it is not, and we have the capacity to produce a dualist model, which can better account for the complexities which we observe, then we are not making our models to the best of our capacity.

If you assume that there are two systems, and one is "the physical", then the other is not. If there is two (or more) systems, and you wish to group them all together as "physical", then we have to account for the existence of whatever it is which separates one system from another. Either way, there is the necessity of introducing more principles then just things and interactions, and the claim that all is physical is unsupported by the evidence. That is because we need a principle to account for the existence of a "system", or a whole, if such a thing is supposed to be real.

Clearly you assume that the system is something real, as it is the grounds for your claim that things and interactions can be classed together as one, "the physical". But this is the exact issue I had with apokrisis. Apokrisis claimed that limits, are not real, they are simply ideal, but then continued to speak about systems as if they were something real.

The relation, since it supervenes on the physical things in question, is physical. — Terrapin Station

If "supervenes" is meant to suggest that the relation follows the physical things, as a result, or effect of their existence, this is a false premise. Human beings plan the relationships between things, manufacture the things, and put them into those intended relationships. So the relationships which the things will have, after they come into existence, are prior in time to the things themselves. The relations exist before the things do. That's what planning is.

If you mean "supervenes" in some other way, you have no premise to conclude that if a relation supervenes on a physical thing, it is necessarily physical. Then your argument is non sequitur. There is no reason to believe that things of different categories cannot interact. That, I think, would be a ridiculous proposition.

Either way, this claim is very unsound. It does nothing to support your claim that there are no non-physical existents.

The property in question obtains via how A and B are related to each other. That's what relations are. — Terrapin Station

Correct, and what carries out this act of relating other than a human mind? You know, A and B cannot be related to each other unless something actual relates them. If it's not a human mind, it must be something natural which is non-physical.

That doesn't mean that the relational property is something nonphysical that's separate from A and B. — Terrapin Station

Of course it means that it's separate from A and B. It's not described as part of B nor as part of A, it is described as A moving in relation to B. Clearly, it's in the mind which does the relating. If it is not in the mind, what do you think it is. If it's a physical object, we should be able to see it, or otherwise sense it. But we see A, and we see B, and we do not see the relationship between them, that we infer.

It's supervenes on A and B; how they move/change with respect to each other. — Terrapin Station

What supervenes on A and B, the human mind where the relationship exists?

That doesn't depend on a human mind. Things really move/change with respect to each other. — Terrapin Station

Obviously it does depend on the human mind, because as relationships, is simply how we describe the world, and descriptions are produced by the human mind. That one thing is moving in relation to another is simply how we describe things. Show me the physical object which is called "one thing moving in relation to another" if you really think that movement is a physical object.

If you had charitably interpreted what I was saying, you would have acknowledged that my point was not to say or even imply that "the sun moves through the sky while the earth remains still", but instead that "whatever the sun does (or does not do), it does so with observable consistency, which can be the basis for an inductive argument which can be strengthened through additional repetition". — VagabondSpectre

The thread questions "objectivity". You seem to think that consistency in observation is synonymous with "objective". I've demonstrated that consistency in observation does not imply "truth". My claim is that since it doesn't imply truth, we should not consider this to be objectivity.

Now, you have provided no principle whereby we can proceed logically from consistency in observation to your claim of observable consistency. Do you see the difference? We have as evidence, consistency in observation. Consistency is a property of the observations, the descriptions, that's my point. How do you proceed to the conclusion that consistency is a property of the object, to claim "observable consistency"?

Everytime you say "truth", somehow I think you're always referring to "ultimate and objective truth". Well what is that? Does it even exist? Can we ever refer to something as "true" and not be inherently stating a falsehood? I've been very clear from the beginning, in every single one of my posts, that "objective certainty" is not achievable. I've not been concerning myself with it or been discussing it at all since my first post or only to clarify that science and what we call "objective scientific fact" is not founded on deductive certainty, it is founded in inductive likelihood from consistency in observations and reliable predictions. It's a whole different kind of truth than the truth you continuously charge me with not recognizing that science does not produce. — VagabondSpectre

The op deals with a difference between objectivity and subjectivity. Is it your claim now, that there is no such thing as objectivity? I think there is objectivity, but truth is essential to it.

The superficial induction based truths, if strong enough from the get go, tend to remain true, while the deeper truths, which are also founded in induction, provide additional explanatory and predictive power which the more superficial truths lack. — VagabondSpectre

OK, so how do we determine whether the superficial induction based conclusions are true or not? Let's take the sun rising example. Your claim was that no person would deny that the sun rises, and therefore it is true. I deny it, and have explained how it is clearly false.

The fact that the earth spins does not falsify the actual meaning of the statement "the sun rises..." — VagabondSpectre

Yes, it clearly does falsify the actual meaning of that statement. The sun is the subject. It is engaged in the activity of rising, according to the meaning of the statement. But clearly the sun is not involved in any such activity, the earth is the proper subject here, engaged in the activity of spinning. The sun rising is a false description of what is occurring. Why do you not accept the reality, that this is a false description? You want to give to "the sun rises", a metaphorical meaning, and claim that there is "truth" in this metaphorical meaning. But you haven't explained how there is truth in metaphor.

You're basically using plato's allegory of the cave to try and convince me that my statements are "false" when all I'm trying to do is point out that the more consistently the shadows on the wall behave, the more reliably we are able to predict their future behavior. I'm pointing at consistency in the behavior of the shadows and you are saying broadly "you can never be certain of shadows", but I never said that we could be certain, I said that the more consistently these shadows behave the more confident we can be in predicting the future behavior of said shadows. — VagabondSpectre

You're missing the point. What is consistent is the observations, the descriptions. You conclude that the shadows are behaving consistently because there is consistency in the descriptions. But that's not the case, the consistency is in the observations, the descriptions, not in the shadows being observed. Perhaps it's like the sun rising, the shadows are not doing anything at all, the human mind is active, making it appear like the shadows are active. Isn't this what eternalism says?

Change and/or motion. Or in other words, it's processes, or changing relations of matter. — Terrapin Station

Right, and I don't believe that these things, relationships between individual things, are properties of the things themselves. How could they be? A relationship between A and B is neither a property of A nor B, it is the property of the thing which determines that relationship, a human mind.

Whatever that would be. — Terrapin Station

Exactly, Apokisis speaks as if this thing called "energy" is something real, but denies that limitations, absolutes, are real.

It's a problem if the dualism is positing non-physical existents. Why? Because there are no non-physical existents. — Terrapin Station

What is time then?

Did he explicitly say that? It seems like he'd say there is no such thing as "absolute energy," and I'd agree with him. — Terrapin Station

I didn't mean "absolute energy", what I meant is the absolute which is called "energy". According to the principles of special relativity, energy is conceived as a limit to physical existence. Apokrisis had defined absolutes as "limits", which are by definition uneal. But by the way that Apokrisis refers to entropy, and entropification, it is clear that this absolute, energy, is believed to have real existence.

I think the case is more plausible for retention. — The Great Whatever

It can be argued, that whatever is perceived, sensed, is necessarily in the past, by the time the perception of it has occurred. So there is a clear relationship between perception and retention. However, the degree to which anticipation affects perception is not so clear. We could analyze the way that we focus our attention. With all of the things going on around us, we tend to focus our attention on particular things which we are interested in. This is the way that anticipation is related to perception, such that we actually perceive and retain, those aspects of the reality around us, which anticipation has guided us to observe, by focusing our attention on these things.

It's actually a famous line. You know that, don't you? — apokrisis

I know, I'm just joking around. Take a famous line literally and see where you can go with it...

We know that our vacuum is both quantum and three dimensional. — apokrisis

I think that this is self-contradictory. The "quantum reality" is produced by a discontinuity of time created by relativistic principles. There is a disjunction between time from the perspective of a moving object, and time from the perspective of pure energy, which is radically different from a moving object. This is analogous to, or actually the same disjunction in a different form, as the disjunction between rest and movement, in a conceptual structure which allows for absolute rest. Quantum principles were developed to account for the observable effects of this gap in the understanding of time. Therefore anything "quantum" is necessarily four dimensional as time is understood as a fourth dimension in quantum principles.

In my book, absolutes represent limits and so are by definition unreal in being where reality ceases to be the case. And that's why reality always needs two complementary limits to give it somewhere to actually be - the somewhere that is within complementary bounds. — apokrisis

I really don't think this is the case. I think you are misrepresenting, or perhaps even misunderstanding your own "book" in this statement. You allow that the absolute "energy" has real existence. Energy is an absolute, it represents the limit of physical existence, as formulated in the special theory of relativity. You clearly allow that this limit has real existence.

You are employing a dualistic ontology and you don't see that as a problem. — apokrisis

Why is employing a dualistic ontology seen as a problem by you? Dualistic ontology has proven very successful in the past, and it was developed due to very successful arguments, demonstrations and proofs, such as Plato's, that monist principles cannot grasp reality. Why do you apprehend dualist ontology as a problem rather than the solution, which it really is.

It is always going to be the case that we model the world to the best of our abilities. I haven't claimed absolute knowledge in some thing-in-itself fashion. — apokrisis

If we reject dualist ontology, as a problem, for no apparent reason, except that it complicates our understanding of the world, or makes us face the reality of things which we would rather not face as real because they complicate our lives, when the world is clearly complex, we are not modelling the world to the best of our abilities. The models are deficient due to this failing to account for aspects of reality which dualism gives us the capacity to account for. That is the real problem, rejecting the best models, dualist, for no reason, accept perhaps to facilitate the simple life.

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That's why I don't defend a notion of the "good". This thread shows that folk can't in fact define it except in terms of other more measurable things. — apokrisis

Right, we cannot measure good, because we don't know exactly what it is, but that doesn't mean there is no such thing.

And the reason why entropy (or information) has come to the fore is that it is our most universal way of measuring anything. — apokrisis

If entropy is a way of measuring things, a tool of measurement, not a quality to be measured. How can you compare this to good, which is a quality to be measured.

However it is why scientists in the end are right to get exasperated and tell you to shut up and calculate. — apokrisis

No scientist has told me to shut up and calculate, though I've discussed these things with some. I'm a metaphysician, they are scientists, we each do what we do, and don't try to tell each other what to do. Still, we can have meaningful discourse.

The quantum vacuum is hardly nothing. It might be cold, flat and extremely featureless, but it is still a sizzle of quantum fluctuations spread out in a three dimensional vastness of cosmic proportions. — apokrisis

How do you know that the quantum vacuum is three dimensional?

What is the difference between 'real' and 'absolute' here? If you're thirsty, a drink of water is a good, and examples of such utilitarian goods can be multiplied indefinitely. The issue with ethical theory is that it wants to find something that is good, independently of any particular need or want, good in its own right. 'Absolute' in that sense, is what is required. — Wayfarer

I see a difference between relative and absolute, and both relative and absolute things are real. So, your example is of a relative good. The drink of water is good in relation to the thirsty person. We can determine whether any particular good is relative or not, by asking if it is deemed "good" for the purpose of something else, some further end. The drink of water is good, to relieve the thirst. Relieving thirst is good for keeping the person alive, etc..

When we reach the final end of this chain, that is the thing which is "good in its own right". For instance, Aristotle designated happiness as the thing which is desired for the sake of itself. This would be the absolute. But why must there be such an absolute? I see no logical necessity for this. We go through our lives doing this for the sake of that, and that for the sake of something else, until we die. Then even after we die, others are going through the same process, this for the sake of that, and that for the sake of something else. Where is the absolute good? Why would we even fool ourselves into believing that there is such a thing as an absolute good? If all the goods which we know of are relative, then why not apply inductive reason and say that all goods are relative?

That is the subject of the whole field of ethical philosophy. — Wayfarer

Not necessarily, because as I pointed out in my post, to some, that there is an ideal, or absolute purpose, is an incoherent idea. So for these individuals, the field of ethical philosophy deals with something other than determining this ideal, or absolute good, the field of ethical philosophy deals with determining relative goods.

I wouldn't get too hung up on what entropy "actually is". Like the notions of force or energy before it, the more we can construct a useful system of measuring reality, the further away from any concrete notion of reality we are going to get. In modelling, our analytic signs of reality replace the reality we thought we believed in - our synthetic intuitions due to psychological "direct experience". — apokrisis

Well, I think there is a problem here, because "good" is qualitative, and we cannot measure any quality unless we know what it actually is that we are measuring. Otherwise, it's like comparing apples and oranges. We could attempt to measure the sweetness, or the bitterness of each, and compare them but unless we have clearly defined parameters as to what constitutes "sweet", and what constitutes "bitter", our comparisons would be pointless. And, if we established some guidelines, such as X measurement equals sweet, how is this an objective determination as to what is actually sweet? This would be an arbitrary designation. So, with respect to "entropy", how do you propose that we measure this if we do not know what it actually is?

My argument is that all regularity is the product of constraints. So for entropification to "keep happening" there has to be a global prevailing state of constraint. — apokrisis

But is entropification a real regularity, or is it just a function of the way that human beings interpret the properties of a given object. In other words, to express the existence of an object as energy, is to describe the existence of that object in a very particular way,as the capacity to do work. Are you sure that it's not this particular way of looking at the object, as something which can do work, subject to the constraints of the human laws of physics, which supports the notion of entropification, rather than any natural constraints or regularities? If you describe an object according to what it can do for you, but you don't happen to understand all of the many different things which it can really do for you, then your description is inaccurate. That might be the case in describing the universe as energy.

But when humans reach a certain developmental level, they're able to perceive kinds of goods which their forbears could not. — Wayfarer

This seems to be essential to evolution, moral and social evolution at least. How would you describe this principle of innovation? How do we, as human beings come across new goods? I can see how we might determine a new good as better than an old good, according to some criteria of judgement, increased success, and things like that, but how do we come across these better goods in the first place? What motivates us to seek higher goods?

This enables them to discover some idea of real or ultimate purpose, which has formed the basis of the various cultures. — Wayfarer

How would this "ideal or ultimate purpose" be defined? If it is good that human beings continually seek higher goods, in order to find new goods better than the old goods of their forebears, wouldn't the notion of an ideal, or ultimate good, kind of put an end to the seeking of higher goods, by capping it with a highest good? Is there really an ideal, or ultimate good?

Doesn't it follow that 'what is good', is whatever works, whatever is instrumentally effective? There's no real good in the redemptive sense. So the good basically it is still the same kind of 'good' that animals seek. Although animals aren't burdened with the knowledge of their own identity, so it's a bit easier for them. — Wayfarer

There are a number of different ways in which "good" is used, related but not the same. Here, the thing which has worked, in the past, is called good, because it produces success. The way I was just using "good" refers to something wanted, intended or desired, this is called the good. The difference is that the way you use it refers to a past thing, while I used it to refer to a future thing.

So what's the thing with the intention? What's the thing with motivation? God? Mother Nature? Unless you're arguing for some Higher Power or, again, panpsychism, it doesn't make sense to suggest that there's intention or motivation or purpose in these non-human (or other intelligent being) events. — Michael

I'm just stating the reality as I've observed it. So the point in suggesting that there is intention, motivation, or purpose, in these non-human, yet living events, is just to provide an accurate description of what is the case, according to my observations. Whether these observations might lead someone to believe in panpsychism, or a Higher Power, is another thing.

The point though, is that the op is concerned with "the good", and the good is associated with intention. "The good" refers to what is intended, in general, so to determine 'the good" means that we need to determine what intention is, in general. This implies that we need to analyze all instances of intention, to see what they have in common. If you and I can't agree whether something is or is not an instance of intention, how could we ever agree on "the good"?

I think you're reading too much into it. When I say that nature doesn't have intentions I'm not saying that human intention is non-natural. I'm just saying, for example, that evolution (or entropy) isn't an intentional activity that the world-at-large engages in. It's just something that happens given the laws of physics. — Michael

Well it would be quite odd to think of entropy as an intentional act. It seems like the opposite of intentional to me, what happens when intention doesn't intervene. But I wouldn't say the same thing necessarily for evolution. I understand trial and error as intentional activity, and doesn't evolution seem to be a form of trial and error? The reason why trial and error is intentional, is because there has to be some sort of motivation for success, behind the trial. Do you not think that it is likely that there is some similar sort of intention behind the trials of other living organisms?

I think "purpose" is the wrong word to use here. It suggests intention, which nature doesn't have (unless you count us wanting things as nature having intentions, or unless you're arguing for panpsychism). — Michael

This is a problem. If intention is not something natural then it must transcend nature. This makes the good, as the thing which is intended, into some sort of transcendent object, the objective. That's what Plato found "the good" is an ideal which transcends the intelligible world. However, the difficult part is that "the good" as the objective, has real causal influence within the natural world, and the understanding of this manifested in the concept of free will.

It could be considered, that what we have here is two distinct conceptions of "the present", playing against each other. First we have the punctual "now", which is the tradition in measurement. The now is a point which divides one period of time from another, the past time from the future time. Through extrapolation this becomes "the moment" which divides any period of time. Husserl does not seem to accept this punctual now, at p52-53, the division of the continuum of time is disallowed, though it is allowed to have a source-point. The second conception of the present is the continuity, the living present. This is the conception which Husserl favours.

We can class the punctual now as ideal, it is an ideal division, a point between one part of time and another. As such, it cannot act as the real present which we experience, which is a kind of continuous separation between past and future, the punctual now is an ideal separation. Under this conception, the dividing point, the now, does nothing more than divide two parcels of "time", any two. That one is past, and one is future, making a particular moment the present now, rather than any random moment, is accidental. Notice the end of the chapter where Derrida talks about the fissure caused by "what has been called time".

So Husserl focuses on the real present, in which the distinction between past and future is of the essence. So we have the concepts relating to memory and anticipation. This is the living present. The punctuality of the present is not proper to this concept, as it is the property of the other concept, the one which inserts the point to divide and measure parcels of time, the ideal now. What is proper to the concept of present, in the sense of the living present, is continuity. There is a division between past and future, which we call the present, and we live, perceive, and think, within this "present". Husserl describes our modes of activity within this present What we can say about this division between past and future is that it is continuous.

As Derrida indicates, Husserl does not embrace the first concept of the present, which employs a punctual now. However, he provides a quote at p53, referring to "the actually present now", as something punctual. Derrida seems to seize upon this, to produce a concept of the now as "pure actuality", p58. It should be noted that this is still referred to by Derrida as an ideality, though it is called "the form (Form) of presence itself".

"Without reducing the abyss that can in fact separate retention from re-presentation .... we must be able to say a priori that their common root, the possibility of re-petition in its most general form .... is a possibility that not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now, but also must constitute it by means of the very movement of the différance that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now." — StreetlightX

This is that pure actuality which Derrida refers to. The problem with this is twofold. First, as I indicated already, if the now is a pure actuality, it is impossible that a possibility inhabits it, or is inserted into it because this would contradict "pure actuality".

The second problem which comes to my mind, is that the present, according to the second conception, described above is a continuity. To maintain consistency with classical principles, Aristotelian metaphysics, the continuity must be of the nature of potential, rather than actual. This is the position which Aristotle gives to matter, as the continuity of existence despite changing forms, such that prime matter would be pure potential.

So if we posit the real present as pure potentiality, rather than pure actuality, we maintain consistency with the concept of continuity, in Aristotelian metaphysics. Further, we can resolve the first problem, by allowing that the possibility of repetition, being a potential itself, partakes in the pure potentiality of the present.

Does anyone involved in this reading see any reason why Derrida should designate the now as a pure actuality rather than a pure potentiality? What are the reasons for this move?

MU, I wouldn't associate the sign with protention as you have. The possibility of repetition generally, or expectation generally, is something far and above protention, which is something a little closer to home: the kind of primary expectation that comes in sort of 'seeing the future' when you watch movement, with things that are about to happen seemingly 'getting ready to happen' right before your eyes. — The Great Whatever

Perhaps, but notice that Derrida wants to downplay the difference between primary and secondary anticipation as well as the difference primary and secondary memory. It seems that these distinctions are only made to facilitate the concept of a continuous present. Primary anticipation, and primary memory blend together, perhaps even within the originary act of perception, and this provides for the continuity of the present. Secondary memory and anticipation are well separated. But if anticipation perceives one side of the present, the future, while memory perceives the other, past, then this is the important difference, and we don't need to focus on the difference between primary and secondary.

In this case, we need to be able to interpret "the possibility" of repetition. As a possibility, it must be classed as an anticipation, as it refers to the future. The sign, as possibility of repetition, is an apprehension of repetition occurring in the future. But as representation, the sign is something completely different. Sure, it can be both a representation, and the possibility of repetition, but one refers to its position in memory, the other to it's position in anticipation.

All I have, at this point, is something like: retention/protention introduce a non-present into the present the way an indicative sign does,,, — csalisbury

I think it is the difference, or relation between this non-presence, and the present itself which is supposed to be responsible for the flow of time.

I got up to ch2 free then I had to buy it.

The discussion appears to have stagnated, so I'll share some thoughts. Please feel free to question any of these ideas.

In ch4, Derrida presented "sign" as the possibility of repetition. In defining it this way, it is designated as possibility, and this is somewhat different from describing the actuality of a thing. What the sign actually is, is a representation. However, re-presentation is not necessary for a sign to be a sign, only the possibility of repetition is necessary. The actuality of the sign then is within itself, its identity, while its possibility is "of repetition".

By this designation now, the sign has the nature, or essence, of a possibility, or potentiality. It can be classed under protention, as an anticipation, (perhaps even, pre-tense, or pre-tending), anticipating the occurrence of repetition, as the possibility of such. However, as an actuality, a self-representing representation, it is classed as a retention. This is not perception per se, but in some way appears to be perceptive. The duality of the sign makes it the epitome of presence, the actuality of retention and possibility of protention. But according to Husserl, it is not the present itself.

There is an alienation between the sign and the present itself. The "now" we know as punctual, with the appearance of continuity. The retention and protention of the sign deny the possibility of punctuality, though they do appear to support continuity. This alienation is described at the end of ch4, p50. The sign is "foreign" to self-presence.

Retention, and its alternate, protension anticipation, (the essence of the sign) become a non-present in relation to the present, or non-perceptive in relation to perception. Husserl claims the relationship between these two, non-perceptive to perceptive, or non-present to present, accounts for the continuity of time, the flow. For Husserl this difference is the "speading out" of the now. The actual present, the source point, the beginning, the punctuality, is like the head of a comet. The sign, being like the tail of the comet can never actually partake of the source point, the present.

Now on p58, Derrida wants to insert the possibility of re-petition into the pure actuality of the now. The claim is that the movement of the différance means that the possibility is inserted into the pure actuality of the now. Of course this is a highly contentious claim, because if this possibility really inhabited, or was inserted into, the pure actuality of the present, this actuality would no longer be a pure actuality.

There is no prior field of constraint which enables the world to be and mean as it does.

Instead, there is no enabling constraint ("the compass just points"), with the world expressing the infinite of meanings on its own. The world is always free and creating, an emergent expression, rather than something following the order of a predetermining ideal. The rejection of the prior field is the insight of immanence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Exactly, that's why I said it's a dead end, and earlier, that it's somewhat naïve. The rejection you refer to is just that, a rejection, it is not an insight. We can reject all the formerly accepted metaphysical principles, in the mode of skepticism, then attempt to re-establish our own, but the necessary principles will shine through, in continuity. That's reality, and reality necessitates. This is what allows us to avoid the dead ends.

But, in so doing, Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection). — StreetlightX

This is the dead end of immanence, that the "field of immanence" must be attributed to a self. It is quite obvious that such a "field" goes far beyond the existence of the self, and therefore it is misnamed as the field of immanence, it should be the field of transcendence.

Yet one more step: when immanence becomes immanent "to" a transcendental subjectivity, it is at the heart of its own field that the hallmark or figure of a transcendence must appear as action now referring to another self, to an-other consciousness (communication). — StreetlightX

"Communication" cannot skirt the problem of the dead end. It is evident that the so-called "field" is prior to language and communication, as a necessary condition for these things. When we speak, it is necessary that there is something which we speak about, and this something is transcendent to us. The transcendent something is necessarily prior to the will to speak. This leads to the conclusion that the transcendent thing, whether it be conceived of as an object or an ideal, is necessarily prior to the field of immanence. The philosophers of immanence demonstrate that the transcendent thing is an ideal. The problem is that the fundamentals of immanence don't allow that the ideal is prior, nor do they allow that the field is prior.

Why not hold, as Husserl says he does, that the past itself belongs through retention to originary perception, and so undermine Derrida's entire claim to presentation being dependent on re-presentation? If the past is 'present' in this way, then the fact that retention and the primal impression are co-constututive simply does not get Derrida what he wants. — The Great Whatever

The problem I see is that not only retention is proper to the present for Husserl, but protension (anticipation) as well. This creates the divisibility, and non-punctuality of the present, as if part of the past and the future wee both proper to the present. Derrida seems to think that the way to confirm or reaffirm the punctuality of the present is to class retention over with representation. He'll do this by reducing retention to a possibility, the possibility of repetition, which will contrast the "pure actuality of the now". This is toward the end of the chapter, p58.

The "sun" "appears" in the "sky" every "day". There's nothing untrue about this. The sun is visible each day from the surface of the planet earth. No amount of trying to enforce semantic technicalities to say this is "unobjective" will change this observable truth.

An observation does not have to amount to a complete description of something, it can be specific, incomplete, or even based on an abstraction. "The sun rises every day" is a very simple observation and the strong inductive argument which arises from it is extremely specific: the sun is visible with predictable regularity. Again this does not say anything about what the sun "is" beyond that whatever it is, "it's visibility from the surface of the earth follows a cyclical pattern". — VagabondSpectre

You seemed to be inclined to attempt to avoid the problem by claiming "semantic technicalities", rather than to face the problem for what it is. The point is, that the precision, accuracy, or even truth of any stated observation, is questionable, even if numerous individuals agree on the terminology of that statement. So your original statement "the sun is visible in the sky every day" is questionable. Is the sun really in the sky? You may now desire to qualify this by saying that the sun "appears" in the sky, but all you do is imply that there is uncertainty as to whether the sun really is in the sky or whether it just appears to be in the sky, and that just verifies my point.

You're still using semantics to try and make your point while ignoring the one you are trying to criticize. — VagabondSpectre

Yes, the point is that semantics is important to objective truth. You seem to think that you can dismiss the problem by saying "that's just semantics". That doesn't make the issue go away, it's just a case of you finding an excuse to ignore it.

Repeatable observations of reliable phenomenon assist in producing models which allow us to reliably predict various aspects of said phenomenon. It's not objective truth; it's reliable and useful truth; that's science. — VagabondSpectre

Models which predict reliably is not truth at all, it's predictability. As I've just demonstrated, the capacity to predict can hide profound falsity which lies beneath. Therefore the capacity to predict is really irrelevant to truth and falsity. Prediction is derived from conclusions of deductive logic. The truth or falsity of the conclusions depends on the truth or falsity of the premises. The premises may be derived from conclusions of inductive reasoning, but the truth or falsity of these inductive conclusions is an issue of semantics. Whether "the sun rises each morning", "water boils at 100 degrees Celsius and freezes at zero", "the sky is blue", are true or not, is an issue of semantics.

John Searle — csalisbury

What's he got in his hands, a rifle?

"Tribal hippies"?

I have noticed the way 'immanent' is used - as a kind of bulwark against the dreaded 'transcendent', the 'beyond'. — Wayfarer

The problem within immanence in the strict sense, is that immanent, meaning inherent within, does not conceptualize the 'beyond', or transcendent which is accessible within. The concept of "inherent" ensures that the immanent must always be within that which it is inherent within, never transcending it. So if the immanent is within the material body, it is impossible that it transcends the material body, because the concept of inherent implies that it must always be within that.

All of the 'traditions of transcendence' say that truth comes from within. — Wayfarer

I believe true transcendence is found within. The only way toward transcendence of the material body, and the entire physical, external world, is through the internal. In this way a philosophy of immanence is a step in the right direction, but it doesn't succeed until it finds the route to transcendence through the internal, in this way negating the immanence which leads one there. So the philosophy of immanence is therefore naïve, negating external transcendence, not realizing that the immanent itself will be transcended internally.

The first man to make an appointment invented timekeeping. — Barry Etheridge

Time keeping was needed by farmers to know when to plant crops. It was a matter of keeping track of the days with astrological charts, monuments on the ground, and things like that. The day was divided by morning, noon, and evening. Then the day was divided into hours with the sundial.

You're living in your own private Idaho.

The pattern is that the sun is visible in the sky every day; that's the pattern, not the numbers or symbols we use to represent them. — VagabondSpectre

I don't think so, the pattern is in the description, it is described as a pattern. It is dark then it is light, that's how it is described. When it is light, it is called "day". Not by coincidence, the sun is in the sky when it is light. That the sun is "in the sky every day" , is the description. But is the sun really "in the sky", or is the description really inaccurate? The sky is the atmosphere, and the sun is not in the atmosphere. And if the description is inaccurate, then how is the pattern real? The sun is not really in the sky, so this is a false pattern on account of a false description.

The sun appearing in the sky every day IS the pattern. The pattern is there whether I check a box, scribble a one to record it, or not. — VagabondSpectre

No, I don't think so. The sun appearing in the sky every day is a description. Unless someone makes that description, how is that pattern actually there?

On an individual level, scientists seek to find "descriptions" (sometimes to describe, sometimes to explain, sometimes to predict) of things which "agree" with observation and experimentation. — VagabondSpectre

You seem to missing the point. Observations are themselves descriptions. Unless the scientists can agree on the terms of description, then the same event will be described differently by different scientists, hence there will be varying observations, which are actually just different descriptions of the very same thing. The point I am making is that when the scientists come to agreement as to how to describe a specific type of event, this does not ensure that the agreed upon description is an objective truth concerning that event. Agreement doesn't produce objective truth.

I never said what the phenomenon was, you did. All I said was there is a dark spot on the horizon, and with my recorded observations of it's "relative position" over time I have identified a pattern which allows me to predict where this dark spot will appear tomorrow. I don't claim to have knowledge about what the dark spot is; that's your own presumption, I've never said it was a rock. All I claim is to have reliable predictive power over where this dark spot is going to be on the horizon tomorrow. — VagabondSpectre

Your missing the analogy. The observation itself is a description of the occurrence. Even to call it "a dark spot on the horizon" is a description. The truth or falsity of the prediction depends just as much on the accuracy of the description, as it depends on the occurrence of the described event. That is why "the sun will rise tomorrow" is a false prediction. It is false because the description is false, the sun is not rising, the earth is spinning. It only appears like the sun is rising, but this is an illusion.

Your observation, "the sun rose yesterday" is a description. You and all your colleagues might agree that these are adequate terms for the observation. But this does not make it true that the sun rose yesterday, just because you and all your colleagues "observed" this. The description you provided, which constitutes your "observation", is itself a falsity. Despite the fact that everyone involved "observed" this, it is still a falsity, because the observation that they all agreed upon was inaccurate.

But by "laws of physics suddenly changed" I meant things like: "What if gravity suddenly reversed the direction of it's force?", "What if the speed of light suddenly slowed?", "What if the nuclear bonds holding atoms together suddenly became stronger or weaker?", "What if empty space suddenly became electrically conductive"?. These are the kinds of things which we hope will never change, because if they did then some or all of what we pragmatically rely on as scientific or even just general fact could suddenly change, and continue changing, forever, rendering some or all of our current models useless and evidently "not objective". — VagabondSpectre

My point is, that if your observations are not proper descriptions of the events which are occurring, if they are just the "agreed upon descriptions", then the current models are already "not objective", they may well be falsities, despite the fact that they may be highly useful in terms of predictability. Therefore predictability doesn't provide any type of objective truth.

The pattern is inherent in the numbers though; in the data; in the observations. — VagabondSpectre

No, that's the point I am making, there is no pattern inherent in the numbers. The pattern is a property of how the numbers are applied. So numbers, as objects, ideal objects, don't have inherent patterns. Take "two" for example, it indicates two distinct entities classed together under the same title, "two", but there is no necessary pattern within these two entities. But when "two" is related to "one", and to "three", or other numbers, then we have an ordering, which is a pattern. There is no pattern within the object itself, "two", or "the number", the pattern is created by the application of the number.

In the most basic argument saying "the sun will rise tomorrow", the observational data is a series of 1's or checked boxes representing each previous consecutive day recording the fact that the sun rose on that day. — VagabondSpectre

See here, it is the series of 1's, and the checking, which creates the pattern. But let's not forget my original point, "the sun rose" is not a fact, it is a falsity. The sun did no such thing, the earth is spinning in relation to the sun. The capacity for prediction creates the illusion of objective certainty, but if the premise, "the sun rose" is an inaccurate, imprecise, or in this case false, description, then the conclusion "the sun will rise tomorrow", is equally false or imprecise.

The point being, that the predictive power, which science gives us, is only an illusion of objective certainty. If the observed, and predicted event is incorrectly described, then the predictive capacity may hide a profound falsity. The predictive capacity makes one believe that there is an objective truth there, when really there is a profound falsity. All that is required, is for the scientists involved to agree on a description of the event, then the prediction of that described event is supposed to validate the objective certainty of that event. But how is it the case that people agreeing on a description can validate the objective truth of that description?

Suppose we see a dark spot on the horizon, you and I, and we agree that it is a big rock. We can predict that every time we walk past this place, we will see a big rock in the distance on our right. We assume to have objective certainty about this big rock, because the dark spot is always over there whenever we walk by. Perhaps this dark spot isn't even a big rock though. The predictive capacity has hidden a deeper misunderstanding, such that there was no objective truth there in the first place.

We can never be absolutely certain that all the laws of physics wont all suddenly change one day, making science useless, but until then the overwhelming consistency of the empirical phenomenon that scientific theories are developed from represents an extremely strong inductive argument which is why science itself is strong. — VagabondSpectre

We can know, with a high degree of certainty that some of our descriptions will prove to be inaccurate. This we know from experience. Because of this, we can assume that the "laws of physics" will need to be changed to account for new, better descriptions. Therefore we can have a high degree of certainty that the laws of physics will change.

Taking the universal assumption that everyone must experience such an inner voice cannot be made. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That's right, as we can imagine human beings who don't think with words at all, and especially other animals which don't use words, but still think. There is no reason to assume the universality of an inner "voice".

I often think in images, imagining events, ordering my day, or next few minutes, by imagining where and when, what will occur. Then I put words to the events which have been ordered, and this is how I remember the intended order. This is similar to the way I memorize occurrences which I have observed. I go over the images in my mind, numerous times, choosing words to describe the occurrence, trying different words, exchanging the words for better words, until I am satisfied that the chosen words adequately describe the event as it occurred.

Then there is very often a song playing in the back of my mind. I could be carrying on my normal thinking, ordering images and putting words to them, while seemingly all the time I am doing this, there is a song playing as well. Is there multiple inner voices? In fact, I can go to sleep with the song playing, and wake up any time at night, or in the morning, with the same song playing. How does that work, is it playing inside my memory? But it is also present to my conscious mind. It's almost involuntary though, because it takes an enormous amount of effort to remove the song and replace it with another. This can be annoying when it's the jingle from a bad TV commercial. I haven't quite put my finger on the remote control.

So the "inner voice" is extremely complex, and what one person refers to as "the inner voice", may be just one aspect of a vey complex thing. And the aspects present to an individual may vary from one to another, just like the aspects of our physical traits.

I think I agree, all I am saying is that sometimes the way you are wording it makes it seem as if there's first an imagination of a word, and then a representation of that imagination. What I'm saying is that's one level removed, and the text treats the imagination as the representation to begin with (of the actual use of the speech in communication). — The Great Whatever

Yes, there are two levels of distinction referred to. In ch3 it was the distinction between the thing imagined, (the imagined word in this case), and the act of imagining. In ch4 it is the distinction between the act of imagining, and the representation of this, as a type of communication, speaking to oneself.

The claim of Derrida appears to be that in language we cannot, in common practise, distinguish between the real, and the representation. But this is clearly false, in common language use we have no problem distinguishing between the representation, which is the word, and the real thing, which is what the word refers to. So we have no problem distinguishing between the act of imagining, and the words which represent this, "speaking to oneself", such that the "speaking" in "speaking to oneself" is understood as more of a metaphor.

It is only when we go to the next level. where the words appear as imaginary objects, and there is an act which moves these imaginary objects, the act of imagination, that the distinction between real and representation becomes difficult. Both of these are already within the category of "ideal", because the objects, are understood as imaginary, i.e., only within the mind, as ideals are. Therefore the act itself should be considered ideal. So it appears like we have nothing real here to cling to. That could be the problem brought up in ch 3, but now in ch 4, the act of imagination is given reality, as something spoken about, referred to as "speaking to oneself".

The question which comes to my mind is, is it necessary for this ideal act, and its ideal objects, the act of imagination and its imaginary objects, to be represented, identified and spoken about, in order that it be something real? It appears like it was only by identifying this act of imagination as something real, representing it as "speaking to oneself", that this realm of the ideal, the act of imagination, and the imaginary objects, can be considered as something real. Therefore it appears like without representation, there cannot be anything real.

But this is not to say, as Derrida does, that the two are indistinguishable. In fact, contrary to Derrida's claim that language "is" the impossibility of distinguishing between the real and the representation, language actually "is" this distinction. When something is identified and spoken about, it is considered to be real, by virtue of it being represented. We cannot consider anything to be real without representing it somehow. Without representing it, it is not even considered. But inherent within this act of identification is a recognition of the distinction between the real thing, and the representation, the word.

I think it is the difference between a real communicative linguistic act and an imagination of this (which is the representation). Not a a representation of the imagination, which goes one level too far. — The Great Whatever

The problem I see with this is that in the quote from Husserl, on p41, it is clearly stated: "...there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything; one merely represents oneself (man stellt sich vor) as speaking and communicating."

So there is an activity, which has been referred to as imagining words, and this is represented as "speaking to oneself". The act of imagining words is that act in which there is no actual speech, nor does one really tell oneself anything, but this is represented as a speaking or communicating with oneself.