There is no force setting the compass. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Of course there's a force! The question though, is the force within the compass, external to it, or both?

It's not entirely clear. — The Great Whatever

Well, it seems to be a pivotal point. If there is ambiguity on Husserl's part, then although StreetlightX has accused me of category error, and I have counter-accused Derrida of the same mistake, it could be that we each have equally valid interpretations. But these interpretations appear to be vastly different.

Let me see if I can sort this out. In chapter three we had the distinction between the imagined word, and the act of imagining. Now at the beginning of chapter four we have a distinction between the act of imaging words, and the representation of this, "speaking to oneself". We can take the act of imagining words as what is real, and the "speaking to oneself" as a representation of this.

Now, at p42 Derrida makes the claim that in language, we cannot distinguish "rigorously" the difference between what is real, and what is representative, so this is referred to as an "impossibility". What I believe is relevant at this point is the distinction between the real act of imagining words, and the representation of this, "speaking to oneself". Surely we can distinguish between the act of imagining, and the representation of this, the description, "speaking to oneself".

I've tried and I've tried, but I cannot understand the reasoning for Derrida's claim of this impossibility. Perhaps StreetlightX can explain why Derrida is insistent on this claim. First it is claimed, "Between actual communication (indication) and 'represented' communication, there would be an essential difference, a simple exteriority." But this is clearly a misrepresentation of Husserl's stated position, that "speaking to oneself" is the representation. The imagining words is not a communication at all, it is only represented as communication, "speaking to oneself". So this is not a case of actual communication and represented communication as Derrida presents it, it is a case of imagining words, which is not supposed to be a form of communication at all, being represented as a form of communication, speaking to oneself.

Derrida then proceeds to talk about the "actual" practise of language, but as far as I can tell, this is a reversal of Husserl's position. Husserl has exposed something, imagining words, which is actually not a practise of language, it is only represented as a practise of language, "speaking to oneself" and Derrida now treats this as if it is an actual practise of using language, and proceeds with his argument. Now I really do not see how it is claimed that we cannot distinguish between this thing, imagining words, and the representation of it "speaking to oneself", such that we would believe that the thing represented, imagining words, is an actual practise of language.

The predictions that they made were not based in essence on their false models, but instead were based on identifiable patterns in observed phenomenon. — VagabondSpectre

The patterns would have been of their own creation, how they interpreted what they saw. So they would have made geometrical figures, patterns, to represent what they experienced (saw). Since the interpretations of what they saw were inaccurate, so were the patterns they created. Why not call these geometrical figures, these patterns, false representations?

The point being, that you can make adequate predictions while maintaining false representations. One could claim that a dragon takes the earth in its mouth every evening, and brings it around, through the underground, spitting it out in the morning, and still predict that the sun will rise. You seem to be questioning whether these representations are actually false. I would say that they are false. How then, does the ability to predict come about if the representations are false?

While conclusion #2 represents falsehood, conclusion #1 is a completely rational strong cumulative argument (induction) whose strength is can be found in the reliability of the pattern that it observes and hence the predictions that it makes. "Ability to (successfully) predict" IS "reliability". The actual core foundations of their predictions were sound observations, not falsehoods. — VagabondSpectre

The problem with #1 is that it refers to patterns. The patterns which are created by the observers, is where the falsehood lies. So it cannot be the patterns which gives the ability to predict, it must be something else. I would say that it is in the numbers. Suppose the ancient people marked an observation point, then they marked the point where the sun would rise each day, from that observation
point. By numbering the days they could have the capacity to predict how many days until the sun rises at a certain point. I suggest that the creation of patterns comes following this ability to predict using numbers, as speculation into why the numbers work for prediction. The patterns are theories then, theories as to why the numbers work for prediction.

"Reliability" is produced by accuracy in the numbering system. This is where you find the value of inductive reasoning, in its relationship to numbering. We can entirely remove the pattern, and rely solely on the numbers. It has always been (infinite number of days), in the past, that the sun rises the next day, so we conclude that it will continue. We need not speculate about patterns to produce this conclusion.

Many people say science works because of the process of falsification, and they're right. What rigorous attempts at falsification achieves the weeding out false positions, so that the batch of ideas we're left with, while not necessarily "certain", are distinctly more reliable than whatever came before. We care so much about the repeatability of our experiements/predictions because that's what makes them safe; what makes them reliable. — VagabondSpectre

I would say that falsification comes about in different ways. First there is falsification with respect to the numbers themselves. Suppose the people found 365 days between when the sun came up at the same place. That's not quite right, so after a number of years, 365 days would be falsified, and they would have to adjust. Secondly, falsification also comes about in respect to the relationship between the geometrical patterns, and the numbers. That there are not precisely 365 days in a year indicates something. It indicates that the year and the day are not parts of the same phenomenon. There is incompatibility, inconsistency between the year and the day, because we cannot make a representation of a year, in which a day remains incomplete. Therefore we must have two distinct geometrical representations, one which represents the day, and one which represents the year. There is a much more evident incompatibility between the month (moon cycle) and the year.

Even while they had a lot wrong, like the fact that the earth orbits the sun and not the other way around, the "objectivity" of their knowledge (what they could reliably predict) was never founded on the basis of "objective fundamental truth", it was founded on "reliable truth". — VagabondSpectre

I would not say that this ability to predict was founded on a reliable truth at all, it was founded on a falsity. If ancient astrologists, cosmologists, and geometricians mapped the sun, and other planets as circling the earth, and were capable of producing predictions based on these geometrical constructs, then these predictions were derived from a fundamental falsity, not a truth.

MU, imagination is representative not in the sense that it has to depict some real thing, but in the sense that for Husserl it's derivative of perception, which is presentation proper. Imagination and fiction aren't just ideal: when fantasizing, there's a concrete act going on as well, and a particular fantasied object. — The Great Whatever

Yes, sure there is a concrete act occurring as the act of fantasizing, but is it not the fantasized object which is immediately present to the mind of the fantasizer rather than the act of fantasizing? If the object is immediately present, then how is this a representation? It must be a presentation of the object rather than a representation.

And it's this strange, confused knot in Husserl's text that Derrida uses as a springboard to jump into *all* the contradictions and hidden assumptions of phenomenology. — csalisbury

Before we jump on that springboard we should consider it for soundness, and examine it for weakness.

Please come back when you're done mixing up categories. — StreetlightX

If you don't want to discuss the text with me, that's fine. But to make such unsupported accusations is not. Clearly, as per the quotes provided by me above, what is being described in this chapter of the book is "absolute ideality". If there is any "mixing up categories" going on here, it is being done by the one (Derrida) who claims that the possibility of repetition is a necessary condition of absolute ideality.

If you would consider the first page of the chapter, p41, it is described how, for Husserl, (2) internal discourse is not a case of communicating to myself, "...the existence of psychical acts is immediately present to the subject in the present instant."

Therefore it is impossible that this internal discourse is understood as a "representation". "Immediately present" denies the possibility of representation, which indicates that the object being considered is not immediately present.

Further, it is explained in the quote from Husserl, "that one merely represents oneself as speaking and communicating". So according to Husserl, we must distinguish between what is actually occurring in the case of internal discourse, from the representation of this, which is a speaking and communicating. Then Derrida explains that to avoid this distinction between what is really happening (reality), and the representation of it, we would have to follow Husserl into the category of "fiction" which Husserl defines as a "neutralizing representation".

So instead of going into this concept of "neutralizing representation", Derrida claims that it is impossible, in practise, to make such a distinction, between reality and representation, and that this impossibility is not produced in language, language is that impossibility. This is where Derrida makes the mistake which you accuse me of, mixing up categories. What is being discussed is a separation between reality and representation within ones own mind, and this is necessarily a theoretical separation, an ideal. By asserting the impossibility of this theoretical division, in practise, Derrida finds reason to move from the category of the ideal, to the category of practise, which is other than ideal, and proceeds to discuss the properties of language, as they occur in the practise of communication. But this claim of "impossible" is unsupported

The first mistake which manifests at the bottom of p42, is the claim that when I make use of words, I must do so in "a structure of repetition whose element can only be representation". This is clearly false. It is only by limiting the existence of the word, to being a property of communicative language, that such a conclusion follows. As I indicated earlier, the example of music gives us repetitive sounds, words, syllables and tones, which are often not meant to represent. We use them to entertain, stimulate us, bringing us passion and spirit, rather than representation.

The possibility of such reality, the reality of music and other art forms, which is not representative at all, indicates that Derrida's claim that it is impossible to distinguish between reality and representation, and that the use of the imagination is necessarily representative, is not accurate. Perhaps even some metaphor may be free from representation. Clearly we can imagine a reality which excludes representation. But Derrida appears to proceed from this false premise of "impossibility", that there cannot be expression which is not in some way representative.

Here's the point StreetlightX. If absolute ideality is characterized as imagination (pure fiction) on the one hand, and the possibility of indefinite repetition on the other hand, there is a huge gap or difference, between these two. This difference is representation. Representation is not a condition of imagination (pure fiction), it is a condition of repetition. Therefore these two conceptions of "absolute ideality" are distinct.

Sorry, can you cite, exactly, where Derrida 'defines absolute ideality with the sign'? Page number and quote. — StreetlightX

p44: "In this way, against Husserl's express intention - we come to make Vorstellung in general and, as such, depend on the possibility of repetition..."

p45: "But this ideality, which is only the name of the permanence of the same, and the possibility of repetition, does not exist in the world, and does not come from another world"

p45: "Absolute ideality is the correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition. We can therefore say that being is determined by Husserl as ideality, that is, as repetition".

Clearly, on p45, the ideality referred to is absolute ideality, and this ideality is taken to be the possibility of repetition, and the name of that ideality is "the sign", The mistake here is that there is no necessity to assign to absolute ideality, any particular possibility, which is done with "the possibility of repetition". To maintain pureness in absolute ideality, we must maintain an absolutely indefinite possibility.

Can you also provide citational evidence for the claim that "Expression, for Husserl seems to be... an indefinite possibility"? - especially the notion of 'indefiniteness'. — StreetlightX

I do not have access to Husserl's material right now, only what Derrida gives me to support his argument, so I cannot provide direct citations. But the difference between real, and imaginative should indicate to you, that the imaginative is not limited by the real. This means that the imaginative is not limited to representation as Derrida claims at p42: "I must operate (in) a structure of repetition whose element can only be representative." It may be true that Husserl uses "representation" to refer to imaginations, but I am not completely familiar with how he uses that term.

Imagination creates new things which need not be representative. That is how the word "imagination" is commonly used, the imagination creates new things which are not representative. So this claim of a necessity of representation is unfounded. It is only produced by restricting imagination to representation. Such a move negates, or denies the creative power of imagination, assuming that imagination can only be representative. If we maintain that imagination consists of indefinite possibilities we are not restricted by this claim of representation.

The relationship between imagination, memory, and representation, is further described by Derrida at p47. This is somewhat obscure: "...Husserl constantly emphasizes that, in contrast to memory, the image is a 'neutralizing' and non-'positing' representation..." Then Derrida proceeds on p48 to describe what is meant by "purely fictional". We must question whether "purely fictional" can refer to anything representational, and this has bearing on the originality of the sign.

What I suggest, is that "pure ideality", or the "ideal ob-ject", as described at the end of p45, into 46, is to be understood as an absolute indefiniteness, the possibility to imagine anything, not as Derrida characterizes this, as the possibility of infinite repetition.

But that whole critique is muddled! Necessity qualifies possibility - that is, for a sign to be a sign, the possibility of it's repetition is necessary; it is necessarily repeatable, on pain of no longer being a sign. — StreetlightX

But the issue goes deeper than the sign, which is the possibility of repetition, to the possibility of ideality itself. Expression, for Husserl seems to be an absolute ideality, an indefinite possibility. When Derrida defines this absolute ideality as "the sign", or "the possibility of repetition", he thereby limits possibility, by means of this definition, such that we are no longer referring to an indefinite possibility.

Now we have an inconsistency. I believe Derrida's criticism of Husserl is based in this inconsistency. By defining absolute ideality with "the sign", a qualified possibility, the possibility of repetition, this is no longer the same absolute ideality which Husserl refers to as indefinite possibility. So Derrida has simply replaced pure expression with a form of indication, the sign, and wants to claim that this form of indication, the sign, is the same thing which Husserl intended as pure expression. It is not, because it is not indefinite possibility, it is qualified possibility.

So - what is crucial to note (and this is Derrida's modification of, and contribution to, the transcendental tradition of thought), is that this condition of possibility (repetition) also doubles as what Derrida will later also refer to as the condition of impossibility of the sign. That is: if a sign is to be a sign, it must be open to the possibility of repetition. This is it's condition of possibility. However, because no one instance of the sign will 'exhaust' the ideality of the sign, because the presence of the sign will always be infinitely deferred, this condition (repetition) simultaneously functions as it's condition of impossibility (impossibility of 'full instantiation' at any one 'moment'). — StreetlightX

I don't see how impossibility can be derived from possibility, because I believe that they belong to distinct categories. Impossibility is a necessity, and this is categorically different from possibility. Things which are not a possibility are impossible, but we cannot proceed from things which are possible, to make a determination as to what is impossible. So I don't see how Derrida intends to support impossibility by referring to possibility.

In the quoted paragraph, you say that a sign "must be" open to the possibility of repetition, this is an assertion of necessity. It is impossible to be otherwise. But the problem is, that the possibility of repetition, to have the capacity to be repeated, does not necessitate that the thing (the sign) must be this way. It is still possible that the thing (the sign) could exist without the possibility of repetition. It is only by definition that this principle is created, "sign" is defined as this necessity, this impossibility. But we cannot constrain real possibilities simply by defining them out of existence, therefore this thing, this ideality, which is called "the sign", could exist as something other than what Derrida defines as "sign", and this negates that impossibility.

That's a bit convoluted, but the problem is very evident at p46 of VP. In the final paragraph he speaks of "the possibility of my disappearance". At the end of the page, this leads to the necessity "I am mortal". But of course the possibility of my disappearance does not necessitate my actual disappearance. Then further, "I am immortal" is said to be "impossible". But this does not follow logically from "the possibility of my disappearance", because unless it is demonstrated that I will, of necessity disappear, my immortality remains a possibility, along with my disappearance.

I'll put together a more thorough response later this evening, but, I don't understand how the possibility of indefinite repetition occludes my death. — csalisbury

I think that the realization of death is brought about by the transcendence of the ideal. Notice the difference between "presence" and "the present", on p46. Presence refers to my empirical existence, while "the present" is the ideal which transcends my empirical existence. Because my empirical existence, my presence, is transcended, by "the present", death is necessitated.

If I see food missing from the pantry, it might indicate the local rat has been about again; but to everyone else, not knowing about the existence of this rat, this is no such indication at all. — The Great Whatever

I think that what is meant by repetition in relation to the sign, is that if the missing food, in your example, is a sign of the rat, then this is a repeated occurrence. You would not say this unless you had already drawn that association from a prior occurrence. Repetition is of a temporal nature, it occurred in the past that the food was missing, and you associated this with the rat, so only upon repetition is it seen as a sign.

So if, when the rat takes the food the fist time, you are to make, within your mind, the missing food into a "sign" of the rat, you are anticipating a possible future occurrence, a possible repetition. Without anticipating a possible repetition, you would not create the sign. And if you create the sign only after the second occurrence, you remember back to the first, and say "that rat's been here again", then this is an actual repetition. Either way, the sign is based in repetition, whether it is possible repetition, actual repetition, or most likely both.

In this way, "missing food" becomes an ideal. It is the way that you signify to yourself, the presence of the rat. There is no longer any particularity about it, the particulars, or accidentals of this instance, or that instance, of missing food are irrelevant, there is just the sign of the rat which transcends individual instances. This sign is an ideal object which transcends any particular instance of you perceiving missing food, as each instance of perceiving missing food is apprehended by you as "the rat has been here".

Basically, if 'actual communication' partakes of the order of ideality (which requires repetition), then to the degree that expression also partakes of this order, then expression must also be subject to the repetitions of the sign, and thus language (understood here in it's general sense mentioned above) — StreetlightX

I'm not sue that it follows necessarily that expression is subject to the repetitions of the sign. It might just mean that we have to go deeper within the psyche to find pure expression. What has been exposed is that expression is already contaminated at this level, the level of the sign, and the ideal. The repetition which gives identity to the sign is a sameness, and this is what enables memory, the recognition of a sameness which transcends the moment of presence, creating a temporally extended unity. But we can go beyond this, to look for pure expression in the difference of presence. This is what we find, for example, in music, difference from one moment to the next. Though I admit that there is an appeal to sameness in the overall structure of a piece of music, which makes it such that the artist can remember it, and also, acceptable to others, communicative, a non-repetitive piece of expression is not impossible..

Again, the words are not being recollected, since memory is a memory of something real that has past (or rather, memory presents what is being remembered as real in the past). Imagination is different: it doesn't posit because in virtue of imagining something, you do not take it to exist. This raises interesting questions about the identity conditions of imagined objects, which are different from those of perceived objects: for example, can two people phantasy the same imaginary centaur, if there is no common fictional character or anything like that for them to latch onto? — The Great Whatever

With words though, different people do imagine the very same words. For example, you and I can both imagine "word". If this is not a case of us both recollecting that I just suggested the word "word", then why would we both be imagining the same word now.

What Derrida says in Chapter 4 here, as I understand it, that this distinction cannot holds for linguistic signs, since to use a sign in the imagination fulfills all the same indicative functions that constitutes its real, actual existence in discourse. — The Great Whatever

I believe it is claimed by Derrida that the sign is necessarily an instance of repetition. If it is not a repetition, then there is nothing that it could signify and therefore it could not be a sign. Since it is a repetition, then in relation to presence it must be a re-presentation rather than a presentation. The re-presentation is necessarily of the same thing, by identity, while presence itself consists of difference. This allows that the re-presentation, transcends presence, making the sign a transcendent object regardless of whether or not there is real physical exterior existence . If I understand correctly, it is this very same principle which gives us "the present", and "being" as transcendental to presence, and this allows for the possibility of death. Therefore "I am" is to place "I" in the present, instead of understanding "I" as presence, and this is an affirmation of mortality.

When I say that the statue isn't moving I'm not saying that its location in the universe isn't changing... — Michael

Then what are you saying?

I don't see why you would think the movement of the Earth relevant. Do you not say of the statue "it's not moving"? I'm sure you do. It would be very strange of you to start telling people that it was moving at hundreds of kilometers a second. And it would certainly be strange if you were to say "it's not moving, but only in a metaphorical sense". — Michael

If the statue is fixed to the earth, and the earth is moving, then in what sense is it true to say that the statue is not moving? And if the statue really is moving, then how is the phrase "it's not moving" anything more than metaphor? Clearly, if I said of the statue "it's not moving", I would be saying this in a metaphorical sense. If you took this to be a literal expression, then you would be mislead, because I clearly believe that the statue is moving.

Because the movement of the Earth in space is irrelevant to the meaning (and so truth) of the statement. — Michael

That may be your claim, and you can assert it all you like, but unless you qualify your statement to indicate this, I really don't see how your assertion could be true.

If you were sitting in a car which is driving on the highway, and you were keeping still, would you say that the movement of the car is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of your statement "I am not moving"? To someone sitting on the side of the road, your claim is clearly false unless you qualify it.

Well your example,"it's pissing it down" was clearly metaphorical.

Just as it's not a metaphor when I (correctly) say "I'm not moving" while standing still, despite the fact that I'm hurtling through the universe at hundreds of kilometers a second. — Michael

So how is it objectively true that you are not moving while you are hurtling through the universe at hundreds of kilometres a second?

If you want to discuss metaphor, that's fine, but it's not consistent with the op which seeks objective truth.

"The sun will rise tomorrow" was offered as an objective truth. Now you claim that it is a metaphor. That's fine by me, let's leave it as a metaphor rather then trying to defend it as an objective truth.

don't see why this means that the sun doesn't rise. If I say that you're sitting to the left of someone else, is what I say false because, from some other perspective, this would be the wrong thing to say? — Michael

That is not at all analogous. "The sun rises" implies that the sun is involved in an activity, rising. But it is false to say that the sun is what is active in such an activity, the activity here is an act of the earth spinning. To employ a principle of relativity, and claim that the earth spinning is actually the very same thing as the sun rising betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of reality because it places the principle of activity within the sun rather than the earth. From this perspective, things far away from earth would be moving faster than the speed of light in their rising and setting.

The "sun rising" every day is a great example of a strong cumulative argument.which requires very minimal technical or absolute depth in reasoning or understanding yet which delivers as reliably as any science what it promises; predictive power from experience. This is not a scientific argument, but it does delineate, albieit primitively, the logical shape that scientific theories set out to take. — VagabondSpectre

Yeah sure, but this is clear evidence of the fact that "predictive power" does not give us a proper understanding of reality. Ancient people could predict very accurately that the sun would rise, and where exactly on the horizon that the sun would rise, from a particular point of observation, for each day of the year, and this is how they measured the year. Yet they had no idea that this phenomenon was actually the sun being observed from the perspective of a spinning earth.

The "predictive power" which they had (Thales predicted a solar eclipse) even gave them immense confidence to produce vast theories of cosmology which were completely wrong. So what this indicates is that predictive power does not give us an understanding of what is actually occurring. And when predictive power leads us to believe that this predictive power is actually an understanding of what is going on, such that we produce theories based on this supposed understanding, we are only misleading ourselves.

But in order to "confirm" any given hypothesis, scientifically speaking, and thereby make it "an objective scientific fact", what we must do is be able to confirm it through experiment (not being able to prove it wrong essentially) with adequate accuracy, precision and repeatability. — VagabondSpectre

The point which I am making then, is that no matter how well we confirm our hypotheses through experimentation which determines the capacity to predict, the only "objective scientific fact" which can be derived is that capacity to predict, under the conditions of the experiments. But the capacity to predict does not provide us with an understanding of what is occurring.

I guess one way of putting it is that the answer to lacking ultimate and absolute certainty is to instead of seeking to firmly arrive at it, we can seek to approach it by continuously reinforcing what we do know until the remaining doubt regarding specific truths becomes negligible in every respect. — VagabondSpectre

So the problem which I am trying to bring to your attention, is that no matter how far we go with our efforts to produce a power to predict, this cannot give us an understanding of reality. Even if we can predict with near to absolute certainty, the true nature of the activity which we are predicting will lie unknown, beneath the superficial knowledge which the power to predict is a manifestation of.

All right, I'll go with that. The act of perception itself posits the transcendent object. The object is apprehended as possible phases, perhaps an infinity of possibilities. In what sense are the possible phases "identical"? Is this an equality, in the sense that numerous possibilities could have equal probability? If we cannot apprehend all possible phases, how could we divide probability equally?

But the point about the words is that it takes place in imagination, which unlike with perception, does not involve a 'positing.' — The Great Whatever

This is where I find the difficulty, the proposed distinction between imagined words and perceived words. In imagination, the words are apprehended as unities independent from each other, objects of the imagination. What does the positing here, to make them appear as objects? It doesn't suffice to say that the words were at some time perceived as objects (the positing occurred at this time), then they were recollected in the imagination, because words are artificial, so we must account for them coming into existence, being created as objects, units of identity.

Thanks for the clarification on terminology. My point being that we haven't yet seen the justification for positing the word, or the sign, as a transcendent object. To do this requires justification for the notion that objects may be transcendent. To posit "a transcendent thing, without actually believing there is any such thing" is somewhat incoherent, and doesn't explain the necessity for positing transcendent objects. If perceiving a transcendent object necessitates that there is a transcendent object, then the positing is justified, and we should actually believe that there is such a thing, but the logic of this has not yet been explained.

As far as I can tell he is not necessarily describing sexual assault. "They let you do it" seems to be the crucial bit that differentiates his attitude from one of sexual assault to one of consent. — VagabondSpectre

I suggest that in such actions which happen fast without advance warning, "they let you do it" does not imply consent prior to the act, it implies that they do not file a complaint afterwards.

Even while our experience might be wholly subjective in any sense of the word, there are still consistencies within and between our experiences. The sun will rise tomorrow is a belief held by all humans because of a very strong cumulative argument (inductive reasoning) coming from our experience of it rising each day — VagabondSpectre

The problem here is that the sun really doesn't rise. The scientific explanation of this phenomenon, the illusion that the sun rises day after day, is that the earth is actually spinning. The sun is really not doing anything in this scenario, therefore it is actually false to say that the sun rises.

So why would you say "the sun will rise tomorrow is a belief held by all humans", when I in fact think that this is a false belief, so I try to resist the temptation to say what I don't believe. And, I think that the majority of human beings think that this is a false belief. Despite the fact that many human beings might say that they belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, I don't think that they really believe that the sun will do any such thing.

Unless you can show me the law where womanizing disqualifies you from the presidency, I'm actually inclined to believe that America loves to care but in the end really does not. See: Bill Clinton. — VagabondSpectre

As I understand it, (though I haven't heard the exact recording of what he said), the issue is not one of "womanizing", but that what Trump described is apprehended as an act of sexual harassment, at least, if not assault.

Reality in this first sense usually corresponds to the German Wirklichkeit or Realität, which means reality in a pretty unphilosophical sense: real stuff in the real world, things that have causal effects on one another, are concrete an manifest in space in time, and in short, partakers in efficient causation. — The Great Whatever

I do not think that this assumed category of "real stuff", as separate, transcendental "things", is justified. The world is psychical. If there is such stuff, it is transcendental. We cannot make any judgements whatsoever concerning the transcendental, because such judgements would be based on how the transcendental appears to us, as phenomena, and therefore not judgements of the transcendental itself, but of the phenomenal.

So this assumption, which Husserl makes, that there is a "really existent sign", is completely unsupported at this point in Derrida's book. There have been no principles presented which would warrant this assumption. When someone speaks a phrase, and I hear it, there is an appearance of the words within my imagination, as phenomena within my psychical world. But this is the only way that words exist to me, as phenomena within my world. No principles have been presented whereby I can assume individual objects within the transcendental.

So the eternal is becoming in the moment, but by the time it has become, it has passed into the past? — Punshhh

More precisely, the schema I described has the eternal never passing into the past. That is how it is outside of time. Imagine that we always experience time at the present, such that we observe things as they pass into the past. Now consider that there is something which always remains prior to this, so that it never passes into the past, and we never observe it. We know it is there due to the logical necessity of arguments like the cosmological argument.

Do you recognize, that due to the nature of free will, it is necessary to conclude that the entirety of what we call "the physical world", must come into existence at every moment of the present, as time passes? Free will allows us to make substantial changes to the physical world, at any moment of the present. Because anything in the physical world can be changed at any random moment of the present, we can conclude that no aspect of the physical world exists prior to the present. Therefore the entire physical world comes into existence at each moment of the present. The future is present to us, as a complete void of nothingness in front of us. I think of it as a wall in front of me, one which prevents me from doing anything, or even seeing anything, on the other side, because I have a physical body, and no physical existence can be on that other side.

However, we experience a continuity of existence. We see objects and activities, and notice that their existence continues in a very consistent manner, which we can predict, despite the fact that all physical existence must come into being anew, at every moment of the present. This continuity is described by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. The fact that an existing thing will continue to exist, as it has in the past, indicates that when the thing comes into existence at each moment of the present, something must cause it to come into existence in a way which is consistent with how it came into existence at the last moment, and in the past in general. We can refer to Neo-Platonic Forms as the cause of such continuity, what causes an object to come into existence in the way it does, at each moment.

Yes I do consider something approximating aerviternal, with beings performing acts equivalent to angels. For me this is manifest as an army of such beings attending to your every move*. But in a removed(veiled) sense, as if one is on an operating table with a team of light beings working on the mechanics of your being. This can also be seen as a multidimensional now, in which there is an eternal moment** and an eternity of such beings as a firmanent, inside the very being of each of us. Something which is difficult to convey. — Punshhh

If we assume, as I described, that the physical world comes into existence at each moment, then willful actions can be understood as an altering of the Forms which dictate the way that the world will come into existence. So I don't assume "an army of such beings", as you describe, I think there is simply subtle differences to the way that the brain and nervous system materializes at each moment, as time passes, and these subtle changes result in the parts of your body materializing in slightly different places (movement). What causes these differences in the first place is the immaterial form, the soul, operating within those Forms.

This is somewhat contrary to Newton's first law. This law states that a body will not change its direction of movement unless acted upon by a force. It is generally assumed that the force must be of an external origin. But here we have an internal source. So the immaterial Forms, which dictate how the body will come into existence at each moment, act from the inside of the body, producing a continuity described by the law. The willing agent has the power to alter these Forms from within, influencing the way that the body will come into existence at each moment.

If we consider the necessity of such Forms, we can see that each and every body must have a Form particular to itself. Massive bodies such as planets, stars, and galaxies, have Forms which we as human beings cannot alter. We only have the capacity to alter the Forms of tiny bodies. Nevertheless, since we understand that all physical existence is similar, we must conclude that these massive bodies come into existence at each moment of time as well, and are therefore governed by Forms. From here we can produce something like the emanation of Plotinus. There is first, the Form of One which dictates the mass of the entire universe as it comes into existence at each moment of time. The smaller masses are subsequent in the emanation, with the Forms of the smallest particles of matter having the least influence. The power of God's will is to produce the Form of One, the power of the human being's will is to produce the Forms of the smallest particles of matter.

My point is a somewhat Wittgensteinian one - we are lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it. — Wayfarer

I have little sympathy for Wittgenstein. Where in "On Certainty" he assumes that there is a point where doubt becomes unreasonable, I am one to contest this. Wittgenstein argues that knowledge can only proceed from a foundation of certainty. We must have certainty with respect to what words mean, in order that we can proceed to have knowledge. But his argument is circular, we are certain about these things because we take them for granted, yet he insists that we must take them for granted (i.e. it is unreasonable to doubt them) because we are certain about them. So not only are we "lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it", as you say, but he argues that we are "certain" about these things, and it is unreasonable to doubt these things. These things, which are unreasonable to doubt, (and they are unreasonable to doubt simply because of that habit), these certainties, form the foundation, the base our entire knowledge.

That is why when the word 'God' is bandied about, it lulls us into thinking we really know what we're talking about, when what we really are talking about is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans which, according to the book from which that term is taken, ought to make the hair on the back of your neck stand up. — Wayfarer

My point is, that this is not only true about the word "God", it is true about any word, even the foundational ones which massive structures of knowledge are based on. These include words like "universe", "sun", "earth", "matter". We use them in a way which is indicative of the knowledge which we have. But all of these words we can doubt. Do we really understand what the universe is, or what the sun is, or even the earth, or matter? The ancient people thought they knew what the sun and the earth were, but they didn't understand the relationship at all, without an understanding of the solar system. So they really didn't know what the sun was, or the earth, and quite possibly (I would say probably), we still don't. To this day, we say that the sun rises and sets, and that's really how we perceive it. When I see the sun out there, moving through the sky, I'm not imagining all these spinning, and circular motions which the science describes. And even if I did, how would I know that it's really the best description of these things?

With tables and chairs and the furniture of common discourse, whereas philosophers might wish to make these appear more mysterious than they are, we both know what is meant by them. — Wayfarer

But I think we know just as well, if not better, what is meant by "God", as by "chair". God is the creator of all existence. But what's a chair, something you sit on, something with legs? Either word, God or chair, all we need is simple agreement on what we are talking about, and there is no problem. The thing is, that there are a whole lot of words which we do not have such simple agreement. Now, with the decline of religion, "God" has become one of them.

Notice how my position differs from yours. You think, like Wittgenstein, that we have certainty about certain words, and we have built knowledge on that certainty. I think that such certainty is an illusion, we've been lulled into assuming certainty, when it's really like a false bravado, a certitude. Furthermore, I think that we can take a word like "God", and define that word very simply, like "creator of all existence", and be very certain of the meaning of that word, because the meaning is produced by that definition. All this requires is to agree on the definition. In this case, we know that the certainty is a function of the definition, such that the certainty only exists so long as the definition is adhered to.

...for one willing to die for it! — Wayfarer

You know, we all die, it's sure to come about whether you will it or not.

The Buddhist philosophy of 'two truths', conventional and mundane, echoes the same understanding you find in Eriugena. — Wayfarer

Could you explain what you mean here, isn't the conventional the mundane? What's supramundane?

Here is one of the oddities of our liturgical and theological discourse: we do not know what the word “God” means. We have a well enough grasp of the grammatical rules for intelligible use of the term (even militant atheists know how to use it in a sentence), but Christians standing within the Catholic tradition readily admit their ignorance of its referent.

This is actually a problem which we have with most words, we don't really know what they mean. We know how to use the words, and do use them quite intelligibly, but when asked what the word actually means, we are often at a lose to provide a coherent explanation. What happens is that when we use the word in common usage, there is usually a clear referent, a thing which is being referred to. So we really don't need to know what the word means, as long as we know what the thing is which is being referred to by the word. When we use words in common practise we know the referent, not the meaning.

Take the word "chair" for instance. There is no doubt in my mind, that you and I would each produce a different definition of what that word means, therefore we don't really know what the word means. However, we can both competently use the word, and know what each other is saying, because we would be using it to refer to a particular chair, and this would be obvious.

Why do you not believe that the same is the case for the word "God"? We probably wouldn't produce the same definition of "God", so we don't really know what the word actually means, just like other words. But when we use the word, we know what the thing is which is being referred to, so we can all use the word competently. How is this any different from any other word? In fact, as long as we all agree that there is only one thing which could possibly be referred to by this word, than it is de facto impossible that one could be confused as to what the referent is. Then it really doesn't matter what the word "God" means, because it doesn't have a meaning, it just has a referent. And just like if we were sitting in a room talking about the chair in the corner of the room, the meaning of "chair" is irrelevant, because we both know the referent.

Perhaps Aquinas' most famous line is that God is a being whose existence is His essence. Therefore there is really nothing to say about what God is, except that God is.

Thanks for the info. I find this a very interesting subject. as I have believed, for a long time, that there is a distinct difference between spoken and written language. That is how I approach Wittgenstein's private language. Spoken, I assume to be communicative, while written, I assume is essentially non-communicative. Written language I believe evolved from personal expressions which were not meant to be communicative, they're created to reflect meaning back on the one who created them. This may be found in the basis of art as well, it is fundamentally a non-communicative form of expression, produced for personal satisfaction.

Evidence of the difference between communicative and non-communicative language exists in the fact that in common communicative language, writing consists of a representation of the spoken words, yet the inverse is true of mathematics, the spoken word is a representation of the written symbol. So the spoken "seventy two" for example, is a representation of the written "72".

The distinction between phonetic and non-phonetic is the distinction between languages whose spelling will tell you how to pronounce the word (English, French, etc), and languages whose form will tell you nothing about it's pronunciation (Chinese). — StreetlightX

It may be worthwhile to consider here, the non-phonetic language of mathematics, and all of those mathematical symbols which are principally written but usually have a corresponding spoken word. To a limited extent, we can do mathematics in our heads, but to sit with a pencil and paper greatly facilitates this. And in extension, we now have calculators and computers which we can make to do our math for us. These mathematical expressions, when I sit with my pencil and paper, are generally very personal, and are not meant for communication at all.

The fact that alphabetic scripts encode phonological information that logographic scripts don't seems not to detract from the points about communication and indication: perhaps Derrida's mind was more solidly on the subject because of his Saussurean influence, since for Saussure the signifier is a sound-image, but as far as Husserl is concerned, I don't see how it makes a difference even in writing, since the crux is on communication and not any particular sensory vehicle that accomplishes it, so logograms do not get us 'closer' to pure expressivity in that sense. — The Great Whatever

I think that communication and indication might be correctly related, but it is the role of the physical existence of the sign, which I question. I think that pure expression, with no intent to communicate, utilizes the physical existence of the sign just as much as communication does. This is evident from the example of mathematics, above.

When I imagine words, or think in words, it is almost always with the goal of communication, I am thinking of what I will say to someone else, or what I will write here, for someone else to read. So as much as imagining words, and thinking with words, might appear to be pure expression, the motivation, or intent is still communication, hence it is not free from indication. So thinking in words cannot be pure expression, if expression is lost in communication, as thinking in words is already contaminated by this motivation. On the other hand, when I am thinking with numbers I am working out my own problems, and not thinking with the goal of communicating. When I use numbers, regardless of whether I give them physical existence on the paper or not, I do not have this motivation of communication, so this must be a more pure form of expression.

Note that in this chapter of VP which we are discussing, Derrida already refers to indication as a 'relation to death', 'the process of death at work' (p. 34) and to 'visibility and spatiality' as 'the death of that self-presence' (p. 29). Note also that this reference to death is not (just) a grand rhetorical flourish, but a term motivated by Husserl's own phenomenological emphasis on 'Life' as with the 'Living Present'. — StreetlightX

I can't quite figure out these references to death, maybe it will become more clear later in the book. The life of self-presence is exiled by the exitings of indication, and this is the process of death at work. And the one on p29 is even more intriguing.

I think that the term 'object' is being used metaphorically in all of those examples. I don't think Deity is ever really 'an object' in any sense but the metaphorical. — Wayfarer

First and foremost, an object is a unity, this is described in your passage from Nonin-roshi. We see things as objects, unities, but it is our perceptual system which presents us with the unities which we see. You might see a mountain, while another might see numerous rocks, and trees and such. We see a river, we don't see a bunch of individual molecules interacting. Our perceptual systems in some sense "choose" which unities will be present to our minds, as individual objects.

At a second level, we create intelligible objects, ideas, and concepts. These are also unities, but the elements which are brought together in union, to produce these, are deep within the soul, and not well understood. The intelligible objects are no less objects than the phenomenal objects, because both are created within the mind of the living being and both are unities..

But if we turn back to the external world now, the mountains, rivers, trees, and such things are really out there, there is something real about them which makes us perceive them as the objects which we do instead of as something else. This is the form. But the form is intelligible only, so it is the intelligible aspect of the external, physical world, which causes us to perceive, through sensation, the unities which we do. Now the unity of the physical, material, objects, the mountains etc., which we assume to exist as objects, has been reduced to an intelligible object, a Form, like an idea, or concept. Since an object is first and foremost a unity, and a unity is an intelligible object, or Form, then it is very consistent to refer to the Deity, which is an immaterial Form, as an object. This is why the Deity is sometimes referred to as the One.

And the fact that the text then goes on to say that this knowledge 'cannot be obtained by a living human being, because so long as we live, the soul has its being in corporeal matter, so the intellect cannot be united to God in this way, while the human being is living', makes the point that I was pressing about 'unknowability'. — Wayfarer

But the point which I was making is also made here as well. This is not "unknowable" in any absolute sense. The "unknowability" is due to a deficiency in the particular intellect which is attempting to know, not due to the Deity itself being unknowable. The Deity is actually supremely knowable. So for example, if you tried to teach advanced mathematics to dogs, and found that the dogs could not learn this math, you might conclude that advanced mathematics is unknowable. But this is not really the case. What is really the case is that the intellects of the dogs are not capable of knowing the advanced math, but the advanced math is still very knowable. So we have the same situation between human beings and God, the human beings are incapable of knowing God, but this does not make God unknowable, God is still highly knowable, but the human intellect is deficient

But the key thing is the fact that higher knowledge carries with it a change in perspective, meaning that one who has it, sees things so differently, that he or she might as well be seeing a different world altogether. (Maybe this is the inner meaning of 'new heaven, new earth'.) So what we take to be knowledge, from our perspective, really might not be knowledge at all from a higher perspective. ('The things you think are precious I can't understand'.)

Normally, our sense of what we know is embedded in a matrix of understanding, supported and buttressed by all kinds of suppositions and previously-formed ideas. I think that what happens on the path is that this structure is always being challlenged and changed, so that we realise that what we thought we knew, no longer seems certain. Then you come upon a new perspective which throws what you thought you knew into a new light. 'Ah, I thought that this meant that, but now I suddenly see it means something different'. All the things you thought were real and solid, suddenly appear inconsequential. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree, I think this is exactly the key point. Knowledge evolves, and as we make advancements, our perspective naturally changes along with those changes. So something which is currently unknowable, due to our limited perspective, might in the future become knowable from a new perspective. And something which we thought we knew in the past might prove to be false.

And, the problem of false knowledge is very real, and much more difficult and complex to deal with than simply an advancing perspective. The false knowledge must be expelled, and it isn't necessarily expelled by replacing it with new knowledge, because sometimes it is deeply entrenched. This we can see with ancient cosmology and astrology. The problem is that the false knowledge works for making predictions, but it does not provide an understanding of the phenomena being predicted. Since it works, it becomes pervasive. Remember, Thales predicted a solar eclipse, but the proper orbits of the solar system were not understood. Such deeply entrenched, pervasive false knowledge must be expelled and completely forgotten about, because it is so highly distracting to the pursuit of advanced principles.

I don't think we can conclude that time is prior to temporal existence, the issue might be more subtle than that. — Punshhh

I think there are many different ways to interpret, so when thinking about time, it's good not to really "conclude" anything. This is a big part of that "inconceivability" factor.

Time external to temporal existence might be orthogonal to it, of another form of existence or an eternal moment of some kind. Even in physics they entertain the idea of events occurring outside time as experienced in our world. There might be an ooze, in which both time and space are distorted/extruded across dimensions. — Punshhh

Aquinas uses a term, which others prior to his time had already used, "aeviternal". This is described as a partial eternity, and it is used to account for the type of existence which angels have.

I understand it like this. We can look two directions in time, past and future. If we assume infinite distance, in either direction, a firm of eternity is implied. So we have two distinct potential eternities here, backwards and forwards in time. Angels were believed to have been created in time. However, they were believed to potentially exist forever, immortal, eternal existence, in that forward direction. Having been created in time (generated), the angel should also be corruptible.

Proper "eternity" as defined by the cosmological argument is actual, so the potential for future existence cannot be proper to eternity, there must be actual future existence. This places "the eternal" as outside of time, because it cannot partake in the passing of time whatsoever, or else it would partake in the potential which is proper to "the future", in the passing of time.

Now we can look at time itself, and describe the two parts of time in distinct ways. The past is time which has already occurred, so it has actual existence, and the future has not yet occurred, and due to contingency, the time of the future is potential time. The eternal is an actuality which has been, and forever will be, on the future side of the present, it can never cross that boundary into being something which has actually occurred, because this would put it into the temporal, when it must be purely, and absolutely atemporal. This is why it can never be a physical existent, nor can it ever be empirically "observed", because observation is of things passing into the past. . So while we relate to the things of the future as potentialities, as things which have not yet occurred, the eternal is a necessary actuality, in the future, but it is something which will never actually occur, because this would negate its essence as eternal.

The aeviternal, angels, are necessary to account for the common materialist, or physicalist argument that the eternal cannot interact with the temporal. The angels have providence over the created, temporal world. Being created as immaterial, the essence of their existence is as an actuality, in the future, just like the eternal, but these are like Neo-Platonic Forms, having been created, therefore not truly eternal, their existence as a future actuality, is limited by their manifestation within the temporal world of the past. In other words, the angels share their actuality between future and past, such that they are not truly eternal, (outside of time), but since they have an actuality on the future side of the present, they partake in the realm of the eternal.

The point is that in all the Semitic religions - Jewish, Christian, Islamic - the Lord is literally unknowable or inconceivable in some fundamental way. — Wayfarer

I was really thinking that you're clearly wrong about this Wayfarer, because God is immaterial, having the type of existence of an intelligible object, so it would be self-defeating, even contradictory or oxymoronic to assume an intelligible object which is unintelligible, inconceivable. So I looked it up in Aquinas' "Summa Theologica".

The subject is covered in Pt. 1, Q12. In the first article, it is said: "Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light."

He proceeds to explain how some hold that no created intellect can see the essence of God, and demonstrates how this opinion is not tenable. Then he explains revelation, and by article 4 says that no created intellect can see the essence of God, unless God, by His grace, unites Himself to the created intellect as an object made intelligible to it. In the 11th article, it is explained that this cannot be obtained by a living human being, because so long as we live, the soul has its being in corporeal matter, so the intellect cannot be united to God in this way, while the human being is living. In the 12th article he says that we know "of God", and explains the different types of things which we know "of Him", that he is creator, etc.. And in the thirteenth, he says that this is assisted by the revelation of grace.

So, I would say that we are both right, in some way. God is understood here, to be inconceivable to corporeal creatures, including human beings, due to the inability of the material being to be properly united to the immaterial essence of God. But in a fundamental way, God is most highly conceivable.

I would suggest though that the use of the word "infinite" doesn't seem as appropriate as the use of the word eternity would be, to my eyes.
There are problems with the concept of infinity, which I have pointed out from time to time. — Punshhh

I agree, we should focus on "eternity" rather than "infinite". This, I pointed to earlier as a fundamental flaw in Craig's version of the cosmological argument, his focus on infinity. Aristotle's original version deals eternity, as does Aquinas'. The point being that the argument deals with the nature of temporal existence. When we understand, from the cosmological argument, that there is necessarily an actuality which is prior to the actualities of temporal existence, this necessitates that time itself is prior to the actualities of temporal existence.

I agree with your conclusion that there must be an abosolute prior actuality and if for you this has equivalence with your concept of God, then it does conclude God, I agree. But what is this God(what is its nature), do we know, does anyone know? — Punshhh

I think that when we approach this question, "what is God?", what is God's nature, or essence, we get deflected off from this, by our inadequate understanding of time. In other words, we cannot even get a first impression of what is God, without first developing an understanding of time. But the nature of time is an extremely difficult question. From my perspective, when I started to develop an understanding of the nature of time, I realized just how little we, as human beings, actually know about temporal existence. If God is what brings us to this realization, then "God" is something which we must maintain.

Actually the whole thing really pisses me off, I can't even think about it because it upsets me. Paul did so much work, spent so much time building and caring for the site, then this happens. Sure he got some money for it, but I think it's nothing compared to the work he put into it, and money just cannot cover having something you care about destroyed. Imagine working years to create a masterful work of art, having someone convince you that they really love, and want it, so you sell it, then they take it out in front of you and smash it with a sledge hammer. It's the worst insult, because not only are they destroying the thing you care so much for, but they're doing it right in front of you, in public, making a spectacle out of how they got you to let go of this thing so that they could destroy it.

But aside from this title, there is an elaborate literature on the 'way of unknowing' which is central to Christian mysticism (and also has parallels in other faith traditions). — Wayfarer

Perhaps this is an extreme form of skepticism.

The gist of this is not that simply one throws up one's hands - 'eh, what do we know?' - but one enters into the 'cloud of unknowing' through meditative silence. The biblical precedents are such verses as 'the lord sees in secret'. I think, from the viewpoint of a modern depth psychology, what is happening in these meditative states is the mind is actually becoming directly aware of its hidden depths, through non-verbal and non-analytic awareness. — Wayfarer

This would be very useful, especially in today's materialist society. We tend to think that knowledge is "of" the external world, and even that it is caused by the external world, acting on our passive bodies, failing to see that knowledge manifests within us. So taking such a meditative state might allow one to realize that knowledge really comes from inside us.

I don't think the apophatic approach is characteristic of the kind of theology that developed such ideas as the cosmological argument, it is considerably more reticent, for obvious reasons (although the inconcievability of the divine nature is basic to Aquinas, as I understand it.) But I think it's a mistake to say that recognition of the 'divine mystery' or the fact that Deity transcends human reason and sense, is simply 'succumbing to the irrational', so much as a recognition of the limits of rationality, in respect of that which is superior to it. — Wayfarer

Aquinas doesn't say that the divine nature is inconceivable, he says that it can only be grasped through revelation, it must be revealed to an individual. This means that it is given, or it must be given to that individual. But anything that is given needs also to be received, or the gift is in vain. Now, any knowledge which is given to an individual, no matter how it is revealed to the person, must be. in some way, justified by that person before it is accepted, and believed. This is the way of the skeptic, to enforce strict criteria of acceptance, and I believe the whole point in approaching the "cloud of unknowing" is to be found here as well. If we can wipe out all so-called truths, facts, and approach knowing anew, with a clean slate, we can ask that all be justified before being accepted.

So let's assume the revelation, and this being from the perspective of the one who receives the revelation. The revelation must be validated, justified, otherwise it's nature, as understood by the receiver, cannot get beyond the appearance of an hallucination. This is what the cosmological argument does, it validates the revelation as something real, supporting it with sound logic. When an individual receives such a revelation, that person must treat the revelation as a revelation, not as an hallucination. If the latter is the case, and the person treats the revelation as an hallucination, the revelation will be meaningless, dismissed and forgotten about. But if, through the persuasion of the cosmological argument, or some other logical argument, the individual comes to understand the revelation as a true revelation, and so treats it as such, it will not be dismissed and forgotten about. See, it is commonly said that God reveals Himself to all of us. But if we don't take notice, the revelation is meaningless.

But I think it's a mistake to say that recognition of the 'divine mystery' or the fact that Deity transcends human reason and sense, is simply 'succumbing to the irrational', so much as a recognition of the limits of rationality, in respect of that which is superior to it. — Wayfarer

What I characterized as "succumbing to the irrational" was the position of "I cannot conceive of God, therefore God is inconceivable". When we attempt to do something, and fail because it is exceedingly difficult to do that thing, to say "this is impossible" is irrational.

This is why I accept that any cosmological argument cannot conclude God, because what is it concluding? — Punshhh

As I disclosed in my rendition of a cosmological argument a few posts back, what a cosmological argument concludes, is that there is an actuality which is prior to all observable actualities. Prior to any, and every, observable actuality is the potential for that actuality. But it is impossible that potential is prior, in an absolute sense, so there must be an actuality which is prior to all observable actualities. How is this not concluding God?

My guess is that when we imagine a word to ourselves in silent speech, we are typically not remembering some past actual instance of that word spoken or inscribed. Though of course we can, in which case the actual past existence of that word may motivate any number of things, and so serve as an indicator. — The Great Whatever

There is a passage concerning this on page 35, what makes a word recognizable as the same word, "...the sameness of the word is ideal." "It is the ideal possibility of repetition...". Further, he says that Husserl says, that what we are to receive as an indication must be perceived as an existent, but "the unity of a word owes nothing to its existence". By "unity", I assume he is referring to this sameness. That each occurrence is of "the same" word, creates a unity of those occurrences, or, it is "the same" word by virtue of this unity. Thus expression is a "pure unity". I assume that each occurrence of the word, in the imagination, is the same, as it has no physical properties to make a difference

That is, speech is primary, used to express communicative intentions, and then writing comes along as a representation of speech. — The Great Whatever

What I was saying is not that writing comes along as a representation of speech. I think writing and speech came about separately, in parallel, for different reasons. At first, there wo
that we would today classify as art, should really be classified more as written language, memory aids. Consider artificial landmarks, direction indicators and such things as memory aids. It was when these two forms of language, communicative, and memoric, merged, when it was learned that oral sounds could be remembered through representation with writing, that the evolution of language exploded. A symbol could represent an artificial sound, and this would enable the memory of that sound, and how to make that sound. The writing down of the symbol enables the memory, which ensures the unity, or sameness which is referred to above.

Let's look at it this way then. Suppose I memorize "a centaur is a creature with the head, arms and torso of a man, and body and legs of a horse". Also, I write this on a piece of paper. How is the "existence" of those words on the piece of paper fundamentally different from the "existence" of those words in my memory, such that on the paper the words exist, but in my memory they are non-existent?

Incidentally, there is some mention by Derrida in this chapter, concerning the written word, which is quite unclear. We should bear in mind that in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", in the so-called private language argument, the private language is characterized by a marking down. This 'taking note' is carried out such that the individual can note each time a certain sensation occurs.

I think it is important to respect a fundamental difference between written language and spoken language. I believe that there is such a fundamental difference, and that it is based in a difference of intention behind these two types of language. Spoken language is intended principally, as communication between individuals. Written language is intended principally, as a memory aid. I write things down so that I can refer to them and remember them at a later time. So with respect to "the solitary life of the soul", we should really pay special attention to the written word, rather than the spoken word.

Having said that, suppose I write something down, say my doctor's appointment, and later I take a look at this note to affirm, or refresh my memory. I infer that the physical existence of the note contaminates what could have been a pure expression, with some degree of indication. Now assume that I didn't write it down, and I remembered it correctly. How is the "self-presence" of the meaning of those words, (the date), any different between these two cases, such that the written word involves indication while the remembered word does not?. Here's a third possibility, suppose that I don't write down the date, and I remember it wrong. Now I have words in my mind, the date, and the meaning is self-present, this is the time of my appointment, but the meaning is wrong, false.

Thanks, that all makes sense. But the issue for me is that the act of imagination is a mediation between the imagined word "centaur", and the noema, the imagined centaur. Doesn't this imply that the meaning of the imagined word is not immediately present to the one who imagines it, there is no self-presence, and therefore there is indication. Is it not the case that "mediation" is what distinguishes indication from expression?

Communicative speech thus requires mediation through physical objects that indicate one another: we can see another’s feelings and emotions, but not purely intuitively or originarily by nature, we only originarily see the physical signs through which they’re conveyed. Although expression is therefore generally intended to be used in communication, communication itself paradoxically destroys expression in its most basic form. For that, we need a lack of indicative mediation, which means a lack of mediation through physical signs, which means a lack of mediation through other people: we essentially have to talk to ourselves. — The Great Whatever

So the question is, how is the psychical act of imaging the words, as a mediation, fundamentally different from the psychical act of hearing the words. as a mediation, such that one is indicative, and the other is not?

Nice summary TGW, thanks for that. Here's my take.

I see three phases of separation, or "removal" in this chapter. First, and primarily, the word as it appears within a human mind is removed, or separated from the physical existence of the word. This is tied up with the separation between indication and expression. By removing the psychical occurrence of the word, its occurrence within the mind, from the physical occurrence of the word, Husserl is able to consider the imagined word as a pure form of expression. This is expression without indication. This form of pure expression is referred to as "the solitary life of the soul", talking to oneself, soliloquy. The expression is said to be pure because the meaning is self-present, there is no manifestation, no medium between word and meaning, and therefore no indication.

However, there is a second phase of removal described. This is the removal of the act of imagination from the thing which is imagined, in this case, the word. Following this there is a third phase suggested, and that is a removal of the contents of the act of imagination, the noema, from the act of imagination. Now it is implied, if not explicitly stated, that the contents of the act of imagination, the noema, is not actually the imagined words. If this is the case, then I believe that Husserl's claim that the imagined word is a form of pure expression, cannot be upheld. The act of imagination forms a mediation between the imagined word, and the content, or noema (this could be 'the concept') , and therefore I believe we have indication. In other words, the imagined words are not properly "the content" of the act of imagination, they are in some sense a manifestation, or indication of the actual content.