I'm trying to work out what exactly you mean by "value" Gooseone. As I said in my last post, I really don't agree with the concept of "value judgement". I think that our means for evaluating is separate from our means for judging, so to say that a type of judgement is a value judgement doesn't really say anything, because where the values come from within our mind is somewhere other than where the judgements come from.

So this was a case where physiological trauma affected the ability to value but (for example!) a very intelligent mind in a very dumb environment could be affected by a lack of valuing, mainly because the common goals of the environment do not suffice and there is a lack of information in which value could be found. — Gooseone

So here you mention "the ability to value". But I don't think that valuing is really an ability, I think that it is something inherent behind any intentional activity. So valuing occurs whether we like it or not, and it's not really an ability. The problem though, is that we judge the way other people value things, in relation to the way that we value things, and that difference may incline us to say that the other is lacking in the ability to value. The person is still valuing things, so doesn't really lack in an ability to value, but when we judge that person's values with respect to some other values we claim that the person lacks in that ability.

Also, psychopathy could be summarized by a strong thinking process and strong value judgements (mainly extreme egotistical ones) yet a clear lack of value judgements 'shared' by the environment is what makes most of us see psychopathy as a mental illness. — Gooseone

So now you have a "shared" value. I assume that what you mean here is a consistency between numerous individuals as to values. This would enable individuals to make similar judgements. If one is not making similar judgements we might conclude that this individual has different values and is mentally ill. But how would you know whether the different judgements are the result of different values, or the result of a different thinking process?

I have a hunch our value judgements are more important then our thinking processes seeing a sudden trauma which would hamper my thinking process could only be detrimental if I would be keenly aware of a sudden lack and how this lack hampers my ability to achieve my previously cherished values. — Gooseone

Now where do the values really come from? As I explained before, they must be prior to the thinking process, so they can't be produced by thought. We can't really call them value judgements, because they are something which just comes to us, as if by necessity. And as much as you might think, "I don't like this value which I hold, I'll get rid of it", we can't really do that unless something comes along of even more value, allowing us to relegate. But what would cause this new value to be more highly valued than the old value? It must be somehow relate to the thinking process. Does it facilitate the thinking process?

Wayfarer, have you ever heard the saying that history repeats itself? Consider ancient Greece, where Socrates frequented the forum in an effort to expose the sophists as the fraudsters which they were. At that time, someone like yourself might say, I would not expect to find out the truth about these matters from a 'philosopher', at the forum. Philosophers were frowned upon for the very reason that they went against the institutions. But the information has to start from somewhere, and it wasn't until Socrates worked to exposed the sophists as fraudsters, who were simply seeking money to support their stream of false information, that Plato established the Academy.

Modern speculative physics is the very same thing, sophistry. It is highly educated individuals simply seeking money to support their stream of false information. If they are to be rousted, as the sophists which they are, where else to start this movement other than a philosophy forum?

I agree that doing so would appear useless but might have "some" merit, mainly by virtue of there being a consensus about the role of individual value judgements. 'I' would not, for instance, regard psychopathy as a mental strength yet seeing they appear to make great captains of industry, what do I know? I also wouldn't agree on mental illness being a lack of mental strength, but the hole Agustino seems to have dug himself into here might stem from a continuous shifting between societal value judgements, mere physical well-being and individual value judgements. — Gooseone

I think that the point we are getting to here is the question concerning the nature of "value judgements". I would ask, is a so-called "value" judgement really a judgement at all? Consider, as I suggested in my last post, that motivating factors are separable from mental strength. Mental strength is related to judgement, as judgement comes from an exercising of mental capacity, the capacity to think. But value is what directs such thinking. Value is prior to thinking, judgement posterior. So value is the motivating factor, which produces thinking, practise, and mental strength, but what directs value itself? It cannot be that thinking and mental strength determine what is valuable, or else we have a circle, what is valuable directs thinking, and thinking determines what is valuable. Such a closed loop would deny the possibility that mental illness could enter in. Perhaps we must distinguish two types of mental illness, that which affects the values, or motivating factors, while the thinking process might remain strong. And, that which affects the thinking process itself, disallowing the strength which comes from practise, repetition and habituation.

Who is 'we'? I know for sure I don't understand it, and I'm pretty sure I'm not going to find out the solution on a philosophy forum. (Not wanting to be rude, or anything like that.) — Wayfarer

In this case, what I refer to with "we" is what I believe to be every human being in the world. None of us have the adequate understanding of the nature of time, which is required to produce a coherent understanding of the nature of existence. And as I said, the modern tendency is to insistently produce simplifications. You might say, it keeps the mathematics eloquent. But to over-simplify something very complex is a mistake if you are attempting to understand that complex thing.

Where else, other than a philosophy forum would you expect to find out the truth about these matters? You know that it is a metaphysical issue rather than a physical issue, so a metaphysician is more highly qualified to tackle such problems than a physicist. But there is no funding to hire a metaphysician to bring issues against established institutions of science. So you might only find one taking advantage of a public forum, at one's own will, occupying one's own free time. Also, consider that physicists such as Lee Smolin for example, who advocate for the "reality" of time, and advance notions which question the completeness of special relativity tend to get ridiculed and ostracized: http://motls.blogspot.ca/2009/08/why-lee-smolin-is-immoral-double-faced.html Pay particular attention to the final paragraph where the blogger is concerned about influence over the general public who control the funding agencies.

Your explanation needs to account for the double-slit experiment. What goes through the slits, if anything, such that an interference pattern is observed on the back screen? — Andrew M

The slits are an object, and so have actual existence. Their existence justified by past observation. Objects have substantial existence, and I divided substantial existence into two categories, past and future, actual and potential respectively, such that the two are fundamentally incompatible. What goes through the slits is energy, and as I explained in my post, energy exists in the realm of becoming, which occupies the boundary, or separation between the two types of substance. It exists at the present. Therefore nothing substantial goes through the slits. That something moves through the slits is just our way of describing relationships between substances.

This is how we understand motions, as relationships between different substances. When we deal completely with actual objects, we deal with different types of objects, all within one category, observed existence, that of the past. We establish relationships between these objects and this is what we call motion. Notice that motion is completely conceptual. It is not necessary that any objects "really move", it is just the case that the observed relationships change, and this we call motion.

Now, introduce the second type of substance, future existence. All substance of the future is potential rather than actual, so there is a boundary which separates these two principal categories. The concept of energy allows that not only actual objects are related to one another, but potential objects as well are admitted into these relationships. The deficiency in this concept is that the proper separation between the two fully incompatible categories is not respected. Thus actual objects, may be related to potential objects, as if they are both one classification, objects, without accounting for the categorical separation. If the categorical separation I describe is real, then it seems impossible that potential objects "really move", because there is no real object to move. And if this is the case, the status of the movement of actual objects is also thrown into doubt.

So consider that energy is just an extension of the concept of motion, and as I said, motion refers to the relationships between objects. These relationship change, and we call this motion. "Motion" refers to our descriptions, not the objects themselves. If all the objects being related to each other, are observed objects, actual, in the past, then then we can maintain consistency in our descriptions of the relationships. But if some of the objects are actual objects, and some are potential, and they are related through the concept of energy, then there is a deficiency according to the failings in maintaining this categorical separation. The described motion, energy through the slits, is a description which relates things on one side of the slits to things on the other. But as I said, the concept of energy is deficient as it does not properly provide for the categorical separation between actual things and potential things. Therefore we have no determination of what goes through the slits, an actual thing or a potential thing. If it's a potential thing, then it is impossible that it really moves through the slits. If it is an actual thing, it is doubtful that it really moves through the slits.

World lines apply to objects, whether particles or apples. The world line for an apple is the convergence of particle world lines. — Andrew M

There is no such thing as the convergence of particle world lines, each is an individual. You could create an average, or a gravitational centre, but this requires another completely different assumption.

That's a causal explanation. But in everyday life, it is intelligible to talk about an apple as persisting because we know its continued appearance is not random coincidence, whether or not a causal explanation is readily available. Which is sufficient justification for the claim that the apple exists. — Andrew M

OK, I accept this, because you recognize that a cause may be needed. Let me put aside the question of whether or not you are actually convinced of the necessity to assume such a cause, and proceed under the assumption that it is necessary. We can take the traditional approach now, and assume that the cause is God. This is Newton's approach in the first law of motion. The continued existence of the object is simply assumed, guaranteed by the Grace of God, as the most divine Gift, existence. But don't you agree that the true philosophical approach, and consequently the scientific approach, would be to attempt to determine and understand the activities of this cause?

If we proceed, while holding the belief that there is necessarily a cause of temporal continuity, how could we integrate this cause into what we observe as the continued existence of the apple? Isn't it necessary to assume that at each moment of time, there is a cause which acts, to ensure that the apple will appear in a way similar to how it appeared in the last moment. Any change to the apple would be caused by an interference with this divine cause. This could be an interaction with other objects, each object having its own cause of temporal continuity, the will of God acting within each object individually.

But what constitutes a moment of time? This divine cause has been described above, as acting between moments of time, such that at each moment of time, the apple has continued existence. What happens when we divide the duration of time into shorter and shorter periods? At some point, we will reach a period of time which is so short, that this cause has not had time to act. What do you think we would observe in this short period of time, pure randomness? Perhaps you would expect to see that if you forgot about this cause. But if you believe in this cause, then you would expect to find it in action.

Well, as Agustino says above, you have to think that you're a genius before you can actually be one. But this is just inviting people to make fun of you.

Chemicals to make the mind stronger are a real possibility, but I think you're playing with fire there.

No, an inability to reconcile individual goals with societal goals says something about what 'we' are capable of at this point, just because it might not be a simple either / or does not mean the starting point is completely baseless. — Gooseone

I am not arguing that the starting point is baseless, I am arguing that it is useless, or meaningless. It is a staring point, so it is a base. Let me explain again. Agustino starts with a definition of mental illness, and then says that mental strength is having no mental illness. So if the doctors, who are the specialists in the field, say that psychopathy is mental illness, then by Agustino's own definitions, it is impossible that any psychopathy could be a mental strength.

Yet Agustino still wants to say that some psychopathic behaviour could actually be a mental strength. Unless an alternative definition of mental strength is provided, there is no premise to argue this. That is why, in order to properly discuss this issue, we must start with a clear definition of what mental strength is. Then we can move to identify, and classify, different types of variations in relation to what mental strength is said to be. This allows that mental illness might be determined as a specific type of privation of mental strength. Not all waverings from the defined "mental strength" should constitute mental illness, that would be ridiculous. Agustino's position does not allow any variations to mental strength because mental strength is just a catch-all category of not mentally ill.

I don't see how this is possible. He may try to feign it, but since he lacks the first-person understanding of empathy, his feigning will only ever be very imperfect. — Agustino

I think you underestimate the capacity of the human being to deceive another. The lying con artist comes in all different forms, some are good, some are not so good. They can all look you right in the eye and lie to your face, with great ease. If it's a good liar, this doesn't mean that the liar was once honest, and knows how to present oneself as honest, it most likely means the opposite, that the liar is well practised, from childhood. Being an honest person, and knowing how to be honest, does not make one a good liar, by knowing how to appear honest. Like any acting, practise makes perfect.

But what makes the con artist a good con artist, most of all, is the nature of the con itself, and this is derived from the creativity of the artist. I don't see how you can consider this creativity as anything other than a mental strength. If the creative capacity of the psychopath is considered in this way, then how can it be anything other than a misdirected mental strength, despite the fact that the "misdirected" aspect makes it clearly a mental illness. If this is the case, then mental illness may not even be in the same category as mental strength. Mental illness would be within some motivating factors, not within the strength of the mind itself, which is built up by habits and exercises. That is where strength comes from, practise. The motivating factors of the psychopath would be producing the wrong habits and exercises (antisocial thinking), such that there is still strength of mind, but not in a reasonable way.

No, I'm making the point that what is understood by "psychopathy" there isn't that. It's actually mental strength, but it's painted as mental weakness merely because people are afraid of strength, and they're especially afraid of strength when it could be used for evil. — Agustino

You appear to have gotten lost and confused now Agustino. Look at the op, you clearly define mental strength as the opposite of mental illness. Now you're saying that some forms of mental illness are actually mental strength, they are just misunderstood by society, misdiagnosed you might say.

But that is exactly the problem I pointed out with the op, you position mental illness as the describable condition, then proceed to position mental strength as opposed to this. That is the very problem, you have nothing to determine mental illness except the diagnosis of the doctors. You haven't produced any principle of mental strength, to refer to, by which you can say that a doctor's diagnosis of mental illness is wrong, and that the person really displays mental strength. So you have absolutely nothing to stand on if you are to say, as above, that a certain psychopathy is actually a misunderstanding.

You got too tied up in the health and welfare of the individual:

Definition of Mental Illness: Incapacity of non-physical origin (non-genetic, non-inherited, non-aquired from accidents/diseases) which prevents one from successfully navigating and prospering in one's environment — Agustino

See, your idea of mental illness refers specifically to the individual, "one". Now when it has been explained to you that the person with mental strength will actually demonstrate actions of putting the well-being of others as priority over the well-being of oneself, your definitions may be completely reversed. Or at best, they are just plain wrong. You're completely lost, you have no grounds for diagnosing mental illness, and no bearing for determining mental strength.

I think it's much more likely that there's something basic that we don't understand, than parallel universes. — Wayfarer

The basic thing that we don't understand is the nature of time. There is One fundamental principle which is well proven by experience, and therefore produces the most sound base for any ontology, which is ignored, neglected, or even dismissed by most physicists. This is the basic assumption that there is a substantial difference between future and past. We know that this is true, because things in the past have already occurred, and things in the future have not yet occurred. This simple fact has far more influence over the way that we live our lives than any other definable fact. It permeates all aspects of all our actions, languages, and concepts. For some reason, at the level of theoretical physics, and metaphysical speculations carried out by physicists, there is a tendency to deny this simple fact. I see it as an unwarranted attempt to simplify the complex, an unjustified application of Occam's razor.

The substantial difference between future and past necessitates the assumption of two distinct types of substance, one proper to the past, the other proper to the future. We cannot assign substantial existence (the existence of substance) to the present, because the present appears to us as a division between future and past, and such a division has not temporal extension. Substance necessarily has temporal extension. So we have two distinct types of substance which bear the labels actual (past) and potential (future). Of course one must be transformed into the other, and this is what occurs at the present, actualization, what we call activity. This produces the concept of "becoming", which refers to the activity at the present.

Now we have another difficulty to overcome. Activity necessarily requires time, temporal extension. But we've already relegated temporal extension to the past and to the future, producing a timeless boundary at the present. The boundary between past and future, the present, can no longer be considered to be timeless, because we must allow that becoming occurs at the present, and becoming is a concept with temporal extension inherent within it, just like substance has temporal extension inherent within. The only logical option is to assume another dimension of time, which is proper to becoming.

So we temporal extension, in the classical sense, which refers to the tradition concept of time. This assumes a non-dimensional point in time, derived from the non-temporal point which separates future from past. We can map out many different time periods, containing duration of time, in the classical sense. But this non-dimensional, non-temporal point, dividing two periods of time, is artificial. And, it is an inadequate representation. It is derived from the assumption of a non-temporal division between past and future, "the present is a point in time". It is inadequate, because from this assumption "becoming" is unintelligible, it defies the laws of logic. This problem with becoming has been demonstrated over and over in different ways by different philosophers. In order to render becoming as intelligible, we must be able to assign to it a temporal order. This is a passing of time which occurs at the present, within that artificial point, that divides future from past. This newly found dimension of time is completely different from time as referred to in the classical sense, because it is ongoing within the point which divides between two classically separated durations of time. The challenge is to establish principles of consistency between the two, to create one concept of time, consisting of these two dimensions.

Earlier on the other thread on this topic, there was a discussion about the interference pattern in the double-slit experiment. I noted that the interference pattern is independent of the rate at which electrons are fired. So I put that question to Physics forum, and also Stack Exchange, and sure enough, the physicists there said that 'time is not a boundary condition' of the interference pattern.

The question I then asked was, are other kinds of wave-functions also independent of time? What is the significance of a timeless wave? That question didn't produce a response. I think it's significant, but to prove it, I would probably have to go and re-enroll in physics and spend 5 years on it. But, intuitively, what it tells me is that the probability wave is not a function of time, and I think that has profound philosophical significance. — Wayfarer

So from my perspective, there really is no "timeless wave". The wave-function must be measured according to the other, undeveloped, dimension of time. It is proper to the realm of becoming, as all energy is. "Energy" refers to a relationship between what actually is (past), and what potential is (future), so its existence is proper to becoming, which can only be measured according to the new dimension of time. What this perspective opens up to the mind, is the vast realm of unknown, which lies on the other side of that newly dimensioned point in time, the present. This is the realm of the not yet actual, the future. Since it is prior to the passing of time at the present, it is truly timeless. Our only means of access to it, is to develop the dimension of time which is proper to the present, becoming and the wave-function. By doing this, we can establish a mathematical relationship between the realm of what actual existence (past), and the realm of potential existence (future, 2nd type of substance). But without this relationship, which can be defined as a unified concept of time, we have no approach to this non-empirical realm.

I just did a quick read on Wikipedia and found that a world line applies to a point. Yet you referred to a "distribution of particles". So it appears impossible that a distribution of particles could follow a single world line.

I've already explained my grounds, temporal continuity needs to be justified. If you're attempting to justify continuity with "a world line", then can you explain this concept to me?

Potential is real, and therefore must have some type of existence, though it is distinct from actual existence. We can assign "actual existence" to what has occurred, and this is the basis for observation. Anything observed, has occurred. The existence of an actual object is something observed. The object is in the past, as it has been observed. There are no objects in the future, yet the potential is there. What type of existence could this potential have? Clearly it is non-temporal existence, because time only occurs at the present, as time passing. Only things in the past have experienced time passing, so only things in the past have temporal existence.

So help me out here. Do you think there is a causal basis for the apple on the table appearing as it does from moment to moment? Or do you think that, for all we know, it's just random coincidence? — Andrew M

Clearly it's causal, an object cannot be random. Random existence is unintelligible but an object's existence is intelligible.

It's a creative theory. But what does it mean? Do potentially-existing objects interfere in the double-slit experiment? — Andrew M

I assume you understand that there is a distinction between past and future. An actually existing object owes its actual existence to the fact that it has been actualized. The act which causes its existence is in the past. A potentially existing objects is one that has not yet been actualized. It is in the future. The act to cause its existence has not yet occurred. Do you recognize the difference between a past act and a future act? The past act has already occurred, and so it has existence in time. The future act has not yet occurred and so it does not exist in time.

The argument from Aristotle is that all objects are particulars. Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else. When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is. Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence. If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory.

I don't necessarily agree that westerners have less rituals. It could be, that the rituals are just simpler, subliminal, taken for granted and therefore not well noticed. But aren't simpler rituals more likely to be more genuine? I think that to an individual not familiar with the culture, any ritual will always appear to be contrived. Isn't that what makes it a ritual?

Thank you unenlightened, you've expressed very well what I was only capable of alluding to. Agustino's mental strength, which is called a "capacity" doesn't give us anything until we say capacity for what. Now you have given us "fitness'' according to evolutionary theory. But this throws Agustino's theory of mental illness into disarray. If one's mental capacity is judged according to societal norms, then an individual who excels in the capacity for fitness may be judged as outside the norm, and mentally ill.

Evolutionary fitness is an extremely difficult concept. If it is related to survival, we can immediately abstract it from survival of the individual, because evolutionary theory doesn't associate survival with survival of the individual. Now, the person with mental strength does not put one's own survival as the highest priority, and one who puts one's life at risk is not necessarily mentally ill. Furthermore, evolution goes beyond the survival of the species, such that new variations may create newly evolved species. How can we reconcile this with the proposed concepts of mental strength and mental illness?

So the question is whether a third person description can account for first person. — Marchesk

It is a simple fact that the third person description cannot account for the first person, and this can easily be demonstrated from the way we analyze inanimate objects.

If we can dissect an object, we assume that the object is necessarily made of parts. When we dissect an object, to examine the parts, the original object no longer exists. Each part is now an object. So we have two very distinct perspectives, either the whole is the object, or the parts are the objects. We cannot observe the whole as the object, and the parts as the objects, at the same time, and this is born out in the nature of reference frames and relativity theory, reference frames are related by theory, not observation. However, we still say that the object consists of parts, and that the object coexists with the parts, but this is merely theory, it cannot be observed in this third person way.

In the first person, the object is the person, and the parts are within the person. Since the object is observing itself, from this perspective, it has the position necessary to observe its inner parts without dissecting itself. So the first person is the only valid perspective where we can observe an object coexisting with its parts, without annihilating the object to observe the parts, and then synthesizing the object through theory.

Consider a handshake. What's going on when there's genuineness there? — Mongrel

I think the handshake is an expression of giving. I give you my hand, says I trust you, and the other gives a hand right back to reciprocate. Consider the difference between this and saying "I give you my word". To say this is to ask for someone's trust, without first telling the person "I trust you", which is what the handshake does. So to say "I give you my word", approaches disingenuousness, by reason of what unenlightened says about making an effort to be genuine, and so it is less genuine, But moving to shake one's hand is to say I trust you, rather than to say "trust me". It is an expression which is truly saying something about me, coming from within me, rather than an expression which is contrived for the purpose of making you see me in a certain way.

Yes we do. That's because object persistence is part of the ordinary concept of an apple. — Andrew M

Saying that temporal continuity, "object persistence", is part of the concept of the object, does not justify the assumption. That's like saying that the reason why I believe it, is because I believe it. Conceptions can be wrong. And that is the whole point here, we assume temporal continuity, but on what basis?

That's correct, but the issue here is what is meant by the term "apple". — Andrew M

No, that is not what is at issue here, you don't seem to get it. We know what is meant by "apple", or "object", temporal continuity is implied, but the question is whether or not this is a misconception. We know that the word "apple": is being used to refer to the appearance of a persistent similitude on the table. We know that the idea of temporal continuity is implicit with the concept of "apple", but the question is, is this temporal continuity real, or is it just an appearance. If it is just an appearance, then this is a misconception.

When I joined this discussion, what I questioned was the existence of the particle. I question the existence of the particle by the same principle that I question the existence of any object. If the assumed temporal continuity of the apple, or any object, is a misconception, then the same thing follows for the existence of the particle.

So tell me how your understanding of capacity (which you take from Plato et al) helps you achieve or not achieve mental strength, or else I'm not interested in criticism which puts nothing better in its place. — Agustino

It's your thread, your definitions, you tell me your understanding of this non-physical capacity which you call mental strength. That's what I'm interested in, what constitutes mental health, but you just seem to want to focus on mental illness. You claim that you want to talk about something practical not theoretical, but you're lost in some theory about what constitutes mental illness. Fuck mental illness, let's concentrate on something practical, how we can obtain mental strength. But no, logic, puzzles, theories, etc., things which exercise the mind, are too academic for you.

Even the word "strength" depends on what we value abstractly, in any case it might be seen as an ability to endure certain immediate circumstances to achieve a goal on a longer term. — Gooseone

Strength could apply in two ways here, with respect to value. First, there is the need for a certain mental strength which gives us the capacity to establish a hierarchy of values. This is how we apprehend which things actually have value to us. Then there is a strength required to resist giving up on these determined values, and allowing these priorities to dissolve.

You're not really quibbling with ideas, you're quibbling with their formulations. But their formulations are ultimately quite irrelevant to their applicability, or to their value as ideas. — Agustino

I can't see your point here, ideas are formulations. Have you ever met an idea which is not a formulation? It appears like you are trying to separate form from content, saying that the form of your approach, which is what I objected to, is unimportant, it is the content which matters. But what I think I demonstrated in my post, is that your approach is pure form, there is no content. We are left with a non-physical capacity, as the content of mental strength, what does that mean?

What I meant as opposite is this: mental illness is incapacity - mental strength is capacity - NOT lack of incapacity .... I wrote the opposite merely because I didn't want to write the same sentence again using capacity instead of incapacity. — Agustino

Pure capacity means nothing. The same capacity which is the capacity for good is also the capacity for evil. Have you read Plato? The same capacity which is the capacity for mental strength is also the capacity for mental weakness. Capacity without the qualification, capacity for "X", is meaningless. And so your definition of mental strength is also meaningless.

The definitions of the op are rather useless. By defining the positive with the negative they imply an infinite regress of circular reference. The primary definition is mental illness, which is defined as an "incapacity". This implies a capacity which is deficient. But "mental strength" is itself defined as a lacking of mental illness, and therefore it is inherently a deficiency, by this definition. The primary deficiency, "mental illness", is said to be of a non-physical origin, so this implies that the capacity itself which is deficient in mental illness, is also non-physical, or else there would be no way to relate the deficiency to the capacity.

The glaring problem of the definitions is that mental strength is not defined by referring to this assumed non-physical capacity, such that mental illness would be defined as a deficiency of this non-physical capacity. Instead, mental illness is defined as an incapacity, and mental strength is defined as the negation of this incapacity, such that we have no defined classification for the capacity itself, only an implicit reference that the capacity is a non-physical capacity

We are left with a logical puzzle, produced by implicit references. It is only by piecing together this puzzle, that we can determine that mental strength is really being portrayed as a non-physical capacity, and ask what does this mean. The definitions imply that it is "non-genetic, non-inherited, non-acquired from accidents/diseases". So what is this capacity supposed to be?

Well what you said, is that the ontological possibility is "something non-contradictory that could obtain within the constraints of a given actual world", So it clearly isn't just a non-prohibited way of talking, it is expressly prohibited by the constraints of an actual world. What I am trying to get at, is this relationship between that actual world, and the way of talking. There must be some relationship there, or else "ontological possibility" refers to nothing, it is fictional.

Instead object persistence is implied when we talk about particular apples. — Andrew M

Talking about something does not cause the existence of the talked about thing.

The simple explanation is that the apple's identity doesn't depend on its molecules and atoms being the same. — Andrew M

So if such aspects of the apple are changing, then by what principle do we insist that the same apple continues to exist? We cannot just say "it is the same apple that it was yesterday", assuming that because we say that it is the same apple, therefore it is the same apple. We know that many things have changed, and therefore it really isn't the same apple. We need a principle to justify us saying that it is the same apple, so we can claim this to be the truth.

So the issue is really about meaning and use, not justification. — Andrew M

No, it's really a matter of justification. You can sit and watch the apple all day, and even see it change, without taking your eyes off it, so you know that no one has switched it. You know that it has changed, so you know that it is not the same apple. Yet we say that it is the same apple. Saying that it is the same apple does not cause it to be the same apple. So we need to justify this saying. What causes it to be the same apple, despite the fact that it has changed? We need to know this in order that we can be satisfied that what we are saying (it is the same apple) is the truth

Logical possibility is simply (p) a la something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is (p) a la something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world. — Terrapin Station

OK, so as I said, "ontological possibility" is defined according to a relationship to an actual world. Do you not agree that to understand what an ontological possibility is, we need to determine the nature of this relationship?

Hmm, here's a question for you then. If the history of the world is called the evolution of the wavefunction, then what is the future of the world?

I may be uneducated on the matter; but, why is this timeline where I'm asking these questions apparent to me and not any other? — Question

Perhaps you are in a different world? It seems like every participant in this thread is in one's own world. At least we are somewhat capable of interacting though.

It only obtains when it's actualized. (All actuals are possible.) Otherwise, it's just a way of talking about the fact that something (some object, event, etc.) isn't precluded/prohibited by anything. — Terrapin Station

We're just going around in circles. You accepted that there is a difference between a simple logical possibility, and an ontological possibility. Ontological possibility has been designated as a special type of possibility Now we must allow that there is something which substantiates that designation. You can't say that a possibility is only ontological after its been actualized, because the actualizing of one possibility excludes many others, but prior to the actualizing of that one, the many were all ontological possibilities.

Saying that something that doesn't exist (or occur, or whatever--it's important to not get hung up on the particular word we're using) has a relationship with anything is simply nonsense. There's nothing to have a relationship if it doesn't exist/occur/whatever term you'd use. — Terrapin Station

I take this as a denial of ontological possibilities then. Clearly possibilities are not existing things. If we assume that there is no relationship between a possibility and an actually existing thing, then we have no principle whereby we can say that a possibility is an ontological possibility.

agree with the subset comments. But I'd say what distinguishes ontological possibility from logical possibility is that logical possibility is simply something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world. — Terrapin Station

Ok, so here's the point. If an ontological possibility is something which could obtain within the constraints of a given actual world, then mustn't we assume that there is some type of relationship between that possibility and that actual world? If relationships between things within that actual world are described as spatial relationships, this relationship must be something other than a spatial relationship.

Again, I wouldn't say that possibilities are real, although depending on alternate ways of defining "real," I might agree with that. However, it would have to be some way of defining real so that it doesn't amount to saying that non-actualized possibilities somehow exist/subsist/occur/obtain/etc. (whatever term like that that someone might want to use). — Terrapin Station

It is the relationship between the possibility and the actual world which is what I'm concerned with. That is what we were discussing, whether or not there could be real non-spatial relationships. So I'm not concerned with arguing that possibilities are somehow real but non-existent I actually suggested earlier that we start with the assumption that possibilities are non-existent. However, we still have to deal with the reality that some of these non-existent things have a relationship with existing things. It is the nature of this relationship which is relevant to my argument that a representation exists as a representation, without a mind.

OK, let's try this then, we can start with logical versus ontological possibilities. Do you agree that ontological possibility is a sub-category of logical possibility? Anything which is an ontological possibility is also a logical possibility, but not every logical possibility is an ontological possibility. What distinguishes something as an ontological possibility, is a relationship which it has to the actual world. So logical possibilities do not necessarily have this relationship, but ontological possibilities do. Do you recognize the category of ontological possibility as a valid category, and therefore this relationship as something real?

wouldn't say that I see possibilities as "pure fictions." But I simply see them as something not precluded from occurring given a world that's not strongly deterministic through and through. In other words, it's simply a way to talk about the fact that some thing(s) could happen. — Terrapin Station

The point though, is that unless you allow real relationships between what has actual existence, and any real possibilities, then you have no way of distinguishing between real possibilities and fictional possibilities. Real possibilities are distinguished from fictional possibilities through relationships to what has actual existence. In other words, without such relationships anyone could claim all sorts of absurd possibilities, such as the possibility that I could jump to the moon, or some other nonsense. And so, if there are no such relationships, we must treat all possibilities as equally fictional, because they don't have any relationship to the real world, any stated possibility says absolutely nothing about the real world. Therefore your assertion that there are no such relationships produces the necessary conclusion that all stated possibilities are fictions, and there is no such thing as a real possibility.

If I understand correctly, then according to the modal logic of "possible worlds", there is absolutely no way to distinguish one possible world from another as "the real world", any possible world is just as real as any other. If Many Worlds interpretation gives actual reality to possible worlds, then there is no basis for Question's questions which assume this world as "the real world". Such an assumption contradicts the primary premise that no one world is distinguishable from the others as the real world.

Do you agree that there is a relationship between the present state, and any possible future state, regardless of whether or not that future state actually comes to be? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not at all. — Terrapin Station

You do not recognize a relationship between what actually exists, and what is possible, therefore I assume that for you, any, and every, possibility is pure fiction. And since my position is dependent on the assumption that possibilities are real, we have nothing further to discuss.

If you do not believe that all possibilities are purely fictional, then what supports the reality of any possibility other than a relationship between it and an actually existent state?

Haha, you're talking about possibility and necessity, so yes you are. That's what modalities are. — Terrapin Station

No, logical modalities are a very specialized use of these terms, possibility and necessity. Check your dictionary, for the #1 definition of necessary: "requiring to be done". I have clearly explained that I am using "necessary" in this most common way, and "possible" in the related, and #1 way: "capable of existing".

If you refuse to recognize my usage, despite the fact that it is the most commonly incurred usage of these terms, insisting that I must be using these terms in some specialized way, which perhaps you would prefer, I assume willful neglect on your part.

But yeah, I asked about the idea of saying that there is something that doesn't exist, which is a simple contradiction--you're saying that there is something that there isn't. — Terrapin Station

Since you flatly refuse to recognize that in common parlance we refer to things which are possible, and things which are necessary, according to the primary definitions of those terms, and that these things referred to are not existing things, I'm afraid that I cannot further assist you in understanding what I am talking about.

You'll often hear classical theists, and here think of Aquinas as a paradigmatic historic example thereof, claim that God is not a being among beings, but being itself. — Thorongil

Aquinas is known for his claim that God is a being Whose existence is His essence. If we interpret "essence" as the form, or 'what' a thing is, and existence as the fact that a thing is, then we have "the fact that God is, is what God is".

I think you have provided a somewhat inverted and I believe, invalid interpretation. You have said, the essence of God, is existence. God is being itself. Notice the difference. My interpretation makes God a specific type of being, allowing that there are other types of beings, but this special type of being, God, is such that what it is, its essence, makes its existence necessary. What this being is, is its existence. Your interpretation makes "God" the name of the category, being, or existing, such that all existing things, by the fact that they exist, are God, or part of God. My interpretation makes "God" the name of a being which cannot be other than existing.

The main problem is that it seems to define God into existence. — Thorongil

Yes, God is defined as existing, and you might even say that God is defined into existence, but this should not be seen as a problem, it's very consistent. The type of existence which God is understood to have, is as a separate Form. A form is an intelligible object, a concept, and the existence of such an object is substantiated by its definition. Therefore the substance of God's existence must be His definition. Just like any intelligible object (concept) God is what God is defined as. That cannot be avoided if God is understood as a separate Form.

One wonders why he even bothered with the five proofs, which leads me to believe that I've neglected something, though of what that might be I have no idea at present. In sum, it's a nice little trick that I'm surprised hasn't been employed more often. "Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!" — Thorongil

You actually have neglected something, because as I explained above, this interpretation "God is existence itself" is invalid. So the position is not that God must exist because God is existence, the claim is that God must exist because the very definition of "God" is that the being referred to by "God" exists. To speak of a non-existent God is necessarily contradiction, and therefore must be rejected and denied, because this is not to use the word "God" to refer to something existing, therefore negating the definition of "God". I had a long thread on this subject at pf, and there are numerous atheists who just cannot comprehend this. When the essential properties of a thing are identified, then these are the defining aspects of that thing. If we proceed to talk about that thing as if it does not have those defining features, then we are not actually talking about that thing, but something else. To claim that we are talking about that named thing, is contradiction. So if "God" is defined solely by the feature "existence", then to speak about a non-existent God is the most pure contradiction.

The difference with Big Foot, is that "Big Foot" is not defined as existing. Atheists will use such a tactic, and claim God is not defined as existing, claiming omnipotence, omniscience, absolute good, and such things, as the defining features of God, and these in substitution for existence, allow without contradiction, that God does not exist. But who do you think knows better how to define God, a theologian such as Aquinas, or an atheist?

The Five Ways are necessary in order to provide an understanding of why we need something such as "God", which is defined as existing. If there is no need for such a term then we can cease using it. And it would drop out of our vocabulary.

Note the scare quotes around world and universe. So are they 'worlds' - or worlds? Are they real - or 'real'?

I don't think we will ever know. — Wayfarer

If Many-Worlds is proven false, we will know for sure that the worlds are not real.

The question I am asking is, if 'parallel universes or histories is the solution, what is the problem?' Why is it necessary to postulate such an apparently bizarre notion in the first place? What problem is it trying to solve? — Wayfarer

I think the problem is that physicists are trying to understand the true nature of real possibility, with an inadequate understanding of the nature of time. In other words, their understanding of physical activity has come to the limits allowed, by their understanding of the non-physical time. Since time is what makes physical activity possible, and physicists do not have an adequate understanding of time, physicists do not have adequate premises for understanding the possibility of physical activity.

Speculations such as Many-Worlds are just examples of what comes about when a science pushes the limits of its premises. When premises are taken to the point where they produce absurd conclusions, what is demonstrated is a need to revisit the premises. In the case of quantum physics, what is glaringly obvious, is the inadequate understanding of time.