But I am saying the opposite of that, that we can analyze these things for what they are, independent of our judgements. You put beauty in the eye of the beholder, but do you really believe that it is simply by judging something as true, that it actually is true?

Beauty, goodness and truth are unanalyzable and so cannot be the subject matters of discursive inquiry, rather they respectively make the different kinds of discursive inquiry associated with them possible and so must simply be presupposed, in my view. — John

I think that Platonic dialectics demonstrate that these things are analyzable. What he did was to analyze the different ways in which each of the different words is used, in an effort to determine the thing referred to by the word.

Vitalism is plain wrong.
...

In 1828, the German chemist Friedrich Wöhler found a way to make urea from a common chemical called ammonium cyanate, which had no obvious connection with living things. Others followed in his footsteps, and it was soon clear that the chemicals of life can all be made from simpler chemicals that have nothing to do with life.

How does the fact that human beings can produce certain chemicals essential to life prove that these chemicals can be produced without life? That conclusion requires the unstated premise that anything a man can produce, can be produced without man. This implies that all the products manufactured by human beings could have come into existence without the existence of life, just because we build them out of naturally occurring elements. It's truly unbelievable to think that computers and airplanes could have come into existence on earth without the presence of life

It's the ambiguity of the interpretation which realism can't stand - something has to be either real (1) or not (0). It can't cope with the idea that there are 'degrees of reality'. — Wayfarer

The ambiguity is expressed by the premises of special relativity as the relativity of simultaneity. If we consider that "reality" refers to what "is" the case, then the relativity of simultaneity defines the ambiguity of reality. In QM time and energy are canonically conjugated variables. However, due to the ambiguity of time expressed by special relativity, the positioning of time, within QM is not so straightforward. Apparently, von Neumann sought to place time as a quantum operator, with point particles existing in three dimensional space. At this time it had been impossible to establish consistency between relativistic principles and QM. But canonical positioning of particles (positioning within a given system) is conceptually different from spatial co-ordinates, due to that ambiguous nature of time, so this was problematic. Physicists now use 4d space-time fields, so that rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity it is incorporated into the fields.

I guess I like stating everything in the most convoluted way possible. But here's the thing, it's just an opinion, an attitude, a belief that it would be unphilosophical to think otherwise. So it can't really be proven, it can just be explained.

Well, I already said that I don't think it's wise to even believe that there is anything in existence which cannot be conceived. And as I defined conceiving, it is a specialized form of thinking, so clearly I don't think there is anything in actual existence which cannot be thought of, in any absolute sense.

OK, you are being very fair. I respect your definitions and simply therefore request that you proceed to answer my question using the following definition for conception:

x is conceivable=x can be thought of/is percievable — maplestreet

I would not equate conceiving with thinking of, or perceiving. If this were the case, then other creatures which think and perceive would have conceptions. I think conception requires some judgement of consent by the thinker, a judgement that the thinking is correct thinking.

How can you prove to me that I can't have a conception of something contradictory? — maplestreet

Then it would not be a conception, it would be a misconception. A supposed conception, which contains a contradiction is really a misconception. That's the point here, we control these things through definition. I follow a definition which separates a conception from a misconception. So if you claim to have a conception which consists of a contradiction, then to me this is not a conception at all, so I dismiss it as a misconception. If you continue to insist that it is a conception, then either we give up our attempts to communicate, or you describe to me your definition of conception which allows you to say that what I call misconception, you may call a conception.

More importantly, how can you prove that one cannot have a conception of a square circle? — maplestreet

How you prove such things is to demonstrate that they are contradictory. So you would need to define "circle", and "square" in such a way that the two conceptions would exclude one being attributed to the other, by virtue of contradiction. Those who would say that a square circle is possible would be defining these terms in another way to ensure that there is no contradiction.

So we produce impossibilities by definition, and maintaining the fundamental principle that contradiction is unacceptable. Thus what is signified by the contradiction cannot be conceived of, and is said to be impossible. This is what is inconceivable, contradiction.

What you ask in the op, is if there could be something in reality, existing, which could not be described in any way other than in a contradictory way, this would make that thing inconceivable. I don't think that this is possible. If something appears to us as if it cannot be described except through contradiction (and this might be the case with what is referred to as "becoming"), then we have to keep on looking for a different way to describe it, until we determine the way which is non-contradictory.

I believe that from the point of view of the philosophical mind-set, which is the desire to know, it is necessary that we maintain this position. If we allow the possibility that there is an actuality which cannot be conceived, then anything which appears as if it cannot be described in any way other than a contradictory way, would appear to be such a thing. We would give up trying to know that thing because we would assume that it is the existing thing which is inconceivable. Therefore the true philosopher, who maintains the desire to know everything, would never admit to such a possibility.

Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows." — Terrapin Station

What I've been discussing with Moliere, is that there is no need for him to know that the item is a chair, nor is there a need for him to know what a chair is, in general. When someone is talking about a particular object, and calling it a chair, all that matters is that the people hearing know which object is referred to as the chair. So knowing what a chair is, or that the object referred to with "chair" is really a chair, or not, is completely unnecessary for us to be capable of making true statements about the chair. All that is necessary is that we agree on which item is referred to as the chair. It is highly likely that the context of the word "chair" within the speech and actions of the speaker is what determines the object that "chair" refers to, not some sort of conditions as to what constitutes a chair, within the hearer's mind.

I think it is very important to understand this, before we move on toward analyzing any sort of standards by which we say that the object is or is not a chair. At the basic fundamental level, all that is necessary is the agreement, that this object will be identified as the chair. Then we have a basic truth, that particular object is "the chair", and this is a fundamental truth. It doesn't require any standards or criteria. But if we want to establish a class of items to be called chairs, then we need some criteria for classification, and this is where definition comes into play. Now we have a completely different type of truth, we are not agreeing that this object goes by the name "chair", we are agreeing on the criteria by which any object may be correctly called a chair.

In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity. — Moliere

Suppose we have a category now, the category of chair, and we want to judge an object as to whether its a chair. We have two distinct judgements to make. First we have to judge the standards. Are these the proper standards for defining "chair"? And, we have to judge the object to see if it fulfills those conditions.

So back to the first case now, when we are just referring to some entity with some name. There is no double judgement. One person says "chair", and the other person judges what the particular item is that is being referred to, as the chair, without referring to any set of standards. The item referred to is the chair, and that is the truth. In the other case, we want to determine whether the item referred to is really a chair. Then we need to make this double judgement, which will lead us toward the truth of whether the item really is a chair or not

What are you asking for? — Moliere

Well, consider "the apple is red". This phrase might be referring to a particular object on the table which appears to be red, and we might therefore say it is a true statement, by means of correspondence. On the other hand, it might be a defining statement, referring to a type of object titled "the apple", and describing this type of object as red. What I've argued, is that these are two very distinct types of meaning which that phrase could have (you haven't yet seen the need for discerning these two distinct types of meaning). The need for two distinct types of meaning comes about from the two very distinct ways that truth or falsity is judged of the phrase.

The example phrase is very simple with respect to correspondence, as I described. "The apple" is agreed to refer to a particular object, and "red" is agreed as the term for the way it appears to the human eye. But when we take "the apple" to refer to a class of objects, rather than a particular, we are making a generalization. "The apple is red" is a defining phrase, saying that all tings in this class, called "apple", are necessarily red. Then, in order that there is truth here, it must be the case that all objects which will be called "apple" are necessarily red. Otherwise, our defining phrase, "the apple is red" is false.

Now here's the difficult part, and this appears to be the substance of your discussion with Terrapin. What allows either of these meanings of the phrase to be judged as true? In the case of the correspondence, there is an agreement that the particular object is called "apple", then we agree on a judgement of truth, regardless of what anyone might say an apple "really" is. That is the apple, we've designated it as such, and therefore the phrase is true regardless of whether that object is really an apple or not. So let's move to the defining statement. Now we cannot go on a simple arbitrary designation, (that object we will call apple), we need structure, consistency. And we cannot say that all things we call apple are necessarily red, because we define "apple" by other criteria. And we must maintain consistency within this conceptual structure of criteria. No longer are we looking at a thing called "apple", but we are looking at all the things called "apple", and deriving our truth from that. Here, the agreement is not between you and I, that this object on the table will be called "apple", which makes the truth. The correspondence, or agreement, if there is any, is between all the objects called "apple", and the definition of "apple".

My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple".

So in a double-slit experiment with a particle, name the hidden variable. — tom

The hidden variable is the concept of activity itself. Notice how you say, "in a double slit experiment with a particle". You are misrepresenting the experiment, because what is there in that experiment is activity. That activity may be expressed as energy or it may be expressed as a wave, and that is a variable.

There are two distinct types of activity. One is called change, and it is internal to an object. The other is called motion and it is objects changing in relative position. Relativity theories cannot be applied to change unless that change is represented as motion. Relativity theories represent change as objects moving relative to each other. The modern concept of energy is intrinsically tied to relativity theories, and therefore relative motions. In understanding activity as energy, that activity is represented as motion, and relativity theory is applied. If internal change is an activity, that activity must be understood, or represented as motion, in order that it can be expressed as energy. Therefore in order to understand any activity as "energy", that activity must be represented as motion.

A wave is an internal activity of a substance. It is a change, not a motion. If one desires to represent this internal wave activity as energy, then it must be rendered conceptually as a motion. Relativity theory does not do this, it only allows that energy is the property of moving objects, there is no wave energy. The method by which wave activity (which is an internal change to an object) is transformed to energy (relative motion of objects) is the hidden variable here.

I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word. — Moliere

So if you don't recognize these two distinct types of meaning, then how do you account for the difference between truth by correspondence and truth by coherence?

What you have demonstrated is that you haven't the first clue what is meant by the term "hidden variable". Look it up! — tom

I have looked it up. And I've watched the clip Wayfarer provided above, thank you Wayfarer. Furthermore, I know very well what a variable is, and I know very well what it means for a variable to be hidden. And as I explained, I see many variables hidden behind mathematics, the mathematics making them appear as constants.

All hidden variable theories disagree with quantum mechanics, so they are wrong. — tom

You seem to be in some sort of state of denial, afraid to face the possible reality of non-locality. You deny that hidden variable theories are even applicable just so that you can claim that MWI is the only realist interpretation. Do you really think that Many Worlds is a more plausible interpretation than non-locality? Are you afraid to face the fact that special and general relativity may be wrong? Clearly they do not provide us with an adequate representation of time.

As Tom mentions, hidden variables have a particular history in a quantum context. In particular, Bell's Theorem shows why no physical theory of local hidden variables can reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics. — Andrew M

The fact remains that the best theory which physics has, for dealing with gravity is general relativity, and this is far from adequate from a metaphysical stand point.

If you take the pilot wave route, determinism is preserved, but it posits hidden variables which, as you may guess from the name, there is no evidence for. — Andrew M

So, the point Andrew M, I am a metaphysician, not even a physicist, and I can identify numerous possible hidden variables, such as gravity, expansion of space, dark matter, dark energy, so I don't know how many possible hidden variables there really is. Very many I would say. From my perspective there is massive evidence for hidden variables.

If you take the pilot wave route, determinism is preserved, but it posits hidden variables which, as you may guess from the name, there is no evidence for. — Andrew M

It's redundant to say there is no evidence for hidden variables. If there was evidence, they wouldn't be hidden. But "evidence" is a property of the mind which seeks relationships, it is not a property of the physical world. So evidence may be right in front of one's eyes, or even right on one's list of observations, but if that individual does not establish the appropriate relationships, it is not seen as evidence, and so it is claimed, "there is no evidence".

Evidence is a funny thing. If we are looking for evidence, we must create logical relationships in advance, to know what we are looking for. Without this, nothing is evidence, because there is nothing which we are looking for evidence of. So let's say that we are looking for evidence of "hidden variables". Well, the variables are hidden, we know not what they are, so we have no idea of what we are looking for evidence of. Until the possible variables are brought out into the open, and exposed as possible variables, we cannot even begin to look for evidence.

I submit to you, that there is an immense quantity of evidence of hidden variables. The variables are hidden in the mathematics. That is the way in modern physics, and it's become epidemic since the practises of general relativity. Whenever a variable pops up, mathematics is created to work it into the theory, and it becomes lost into the theory, hidden by the mathematics. Let's consider general relativity as the prime example. Special relativity is a particular theory, gravity is a variable in relation to this theory. The mathematics of general relativity allow this variable to become hidden within the theory, so that it doesn't appear to be a variable any more. It is a hidden variable, hidden by the mathematics. That is the practise in modern physics, create mathematics to deal with the variables, this obscures their presence, such that they become hidden variables, hidden by the mathematics.

No. you are simply conflating mathematical and semantic meanings. Whether X represents the number of times you went to the shop, cleaned your teeth, fed your dog or whatever (your so-called "defined object") is absolutely irrelevant to the mathematical meaning of 'X', which is a variable; and a variable is just a symbol for a number we don't yet know. — John

I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense.

That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings. — Moliere

I'm not sure I agree with "our capacities do not create meanings", but consider this. Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? "The colour" refers to two distinct things, the visual impression, and the aural impression. Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.

This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.

If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way. — Moliere

Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings?

Now, you're not paying attention to the example. The example does not demonstrate that we can do different things with words. it demonstrates that we can know the meaning of a word in two very distinct ways. I am not talking about doing anything with a word, you keep interpreting in this way, and now I have to keep on correcting you. I am talking about interpreting, and that is doing something with the mind, not the word. In the example, we are doing something with our minds, knowing the meaning of a word. And, we do this in two distinct ways, by either relating the word to an object, or by relating the word to a definition.

One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words?

X represents a known and defined object, "the number of times that I went to the store last week". Clearly you're wrong to say that we don't know what it is. We know, according to that definition. It is the value of this defined object which is unknown. It is determined by placing it in relations to other things with known values.

In any case all of this is a red herring for the reason that algebraic definitions are not equivalent to semantic definitions as i already pointed out. — John

You are simply denying the semantic part, where the symbol X is given meaning, and focusing on the mathematical part, to maintain your assertion that we cannot give symbols arbitrary meaning.

Sure, it doesn't matter whether X is the number of times you drove to the store or the number of times you deceived your wife (and the latter may well be incalculable ;) ) but that arbitrariness is a separate (non) issue. — John

No it is not a separate issue, it is a clear indication, that contrary to what you claim, we can, and do, by definition, give a symbol an arbitrary meaning.

Let X = the number of times that I drove to the store last week. "The number of times that I drove to the store last week" is the defined object.

Take a look at the wording again. Existence participates in God? You've set up a binary here. — Thorongil

This is Aristotelian logic. The concept "animal" is within the concept "man", because "man" is defined by "animal". Animal is within the definition of man. Likewise, the concept of life is within the concept of animal. The more general is within the more particular. But since "life", as a concept, is within "plant" as well as "animal", we can say that the concept participates in both, "plant" and "animal". God has existence, so existence is the more general, and the concept of existence is within the concept of God. But this doesn't mean that "God" is the only concept which the concept of "existence" participates in.

The relationship between X and what it represents ( an unknown quantity) in algebra is anything but arbitrary. — John

But X does not represent an unknown quantity, it represents a defined object "Let X = ..." The task of the mathematician is to assign a numerical value to that defined object. The definition of X is completely arbitrary because we can fill the space with whatever random definition which we want to figure the numerical value for.

They know what apple means. — Moliere

So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition.

If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use. — Moliere

OK, so back to my original question then. When a child learning language knows how to point to the proper object when the word "apple" is spoken, does that child know what "apple" means? If so, then that child knows what "apple" means without knowing any definition of apple.

At first, you said that this person does know what "apple" means, and that's why I said we need to distinguish between two senses of meaning. One being associated with the capacity to define the word, the other being associated with the capacity to relate the word to an object.

No, I'm thinking that, according to Aquinas, existence is a property independent of God, in that God can possess or partake of it just as created things can. — Thorongil

I don't understand what you wrote. Created things are contingent, they are dependent on God as the cause of their existence. God exists necessarily. The reason why God exists necessarily is that created things are contingent, therefore there must be a cause of their existence. That there "must be" a cause is necessitated by the fact that these contingent things are actually existing. The necessary cause is God. So here's the logical order. We observe that things are actually existing. These things are understood to be contingent, they don't exist of necessity. Therefore it is necessary that there is a cause of their existence. This necessary cause is God.

I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a word in different ways. — Moliere

But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple".

I can wonder if, when we learn as children that we can't always get what we want, do we then just become morally upright or do we become more cleverer in getting what we want? — Gooseone

Let's consider this example for a moment then. Suppose a baby manipulates its mother to get what it wants, food. Next the child starts to see that it can't always get what it wants, simply by crying, the mother actually has some say in that matter. Let's say that proper moral development would have the child recognizing that the mother has wants as well, and even that the mother has authority. Whether or not the child gets fed is actually dependent on the mother. But if the child doesn't develop in this way, and instead of learning to recognize the mother's authority, it just becomes more and more clever at manipulating the mother, developing the idea that it had some sort of authority over the mother, by always finding a way to get what it wants, wouldn't this be a road to mental illness?

How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think. — Moliere

So isn't it necessary to distinguish between meaning in sense #1, and meaning in sense #2 then? If we don't maintain this distinction there could be ambiguity or even equivocation. Meaning in the one sense lends itself to truth as correspondence, and in the other sense, coherence.

If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc. — Moliere

Here's a slight problem. When I say I know what "tomato" means, does this mean that I can ring off an acceptable definition as you have, or does this mean that I can identify a tomato? It is possible that one is capable of the latter, without being capable of the former, or even vise versa. So for instance, if a child learns the word "tomato", and is able to point to a tomato when the word is spoken, but is not able to state what the word "tomato" means, would you say that the chid knows the meaning of "tomato" or not? If not, why is being able to relate the symbol to the object not a case of knowing meaning?

But this seems to propose that there is something outside of God, namely existence. That's not something classical theists would want to maintain. — Thorongil

There are existing things, and God created them. God's creation is other than God. You seem to be thinking of pantheism which is somewhat different from classical theism.

I get this. What I still don't get is the purpose of the five proofs (or any other proofs a classical theist might concoct). What are they proving? That God possesses a property called existence? But that already presupposes that God exists, which is what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. It's a circular mess. — Thorongil

I think that Aquinas specifically states that the five ways are not to be taken as "proofs", in the sense of arguments which are meant to prove God's existence. They are called the five ways, and they are meant to explicate, or enhance one's understanding of God.

According to Aquinas. But why should I accept his conception of God? You conveniently ignored that question. — Thorongil

I avoided this question because I have no simple answer for it. Why should I accept anyone's conception of anything, "blue" for example? Because it makes sense? Because other people accept it? Because it is useful? There are many different reasons. That's what the five ways are for, to present to you, some of these reasons. You don't have to accept it though, if you don't want, that's a matter of choice, and that's why the five ways are "ways", and not "proofs".

Yes, they can be arbitrary. That's the point, we can build a structure of meaning on an arbitrary definition. Whether or not the stipulated meaning is arbitrary is irrelevant. There is a relationship between symbol and what is symbolized, and this could very well be arbitrary, but that doesn't affect the fact that there is meaning there. That's algebra "let X represent ...".

So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition. — John

This isn't entirely true. A person can stipulate a definition as a premise, for the purpose of deductive argument. The logical argument, and others which follow, using conclusions as further premises, will produce a structure of meaning built upon that stipulated meaning. So we can have significant meaning which is built upon stipulated definition. This is fundamental to scientific theory.

The issue which we have to be very wary of, is when a stipulated definition is close to but varying slightly from the meaning of conventional usage. Then, if in the process of logical argument, one slips from the stipulated definition to the conventional meaning, we have a case of equivocation. These are generally sloppily produced arguments found in places like tpf, and pop philosophy, they are not the arguments of good philosophy or good scientific theory.

it's not a claim, it is a testable deduction...for the umteenth time. — tom

A deduction is only as sound as its premises. What is your definition of Reality?

It has been shown by experiment that both local and non-local realist theories disagree with Reality. Quantum Mechanics has never been shown to disagree with Reality. — tom

What does "disagree with Reality mean"? Do you have an assumed Reality which a theory either agrees with or disagrees with?

Great, then show me a passage in Aquinas or some other classical theist to this effect and I might believe you. — Thorongil

All you need to do is read the first section of Summa Theologica. Here's the gist of Pt1,Q3, Art1:
"I answer that God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence.
...
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from his essence.
...
Therefore His essence is His existence."

Does this not amount to the same thing? I ask anyone reading this to explain the difference here. — Thorongil

No it doesn't amount to the same thing, for the reasons I explained in the preceding post. God's essence is His existence. This does not mean, as you claim, that God is existence. It has to do with how one concept participates in another. "Animal" participates in "human being", such that a human being is necessarily an animal. "Existence" participates in "God", such that God necessarily exists. But just like an animal is not necessarily a human being, existence is not necessarily God.

If you still don't see it, try this. Notice how Aquinas always refers to "His existence" when relating God to existence. Existence is a property which God has. This is not the same as equating God to existence, as is what you do when you say "God is existence". Aquinas recognizes that existence is something which God has, while you claim God and existence are one and the same thing. To say that God necessarily has the property of existence, because this is God's essence, is not the same thing as equating God and existence.

Actually, I did just define him in such a way. Unless you're going to tell me that God has only one unambiguous definition, then my stipulation about Big Foot is perfectly justified. If you still don't like it, I could make up a word, like "fdjh" and say that this is defined as existing. How would you dispute that? — Thorongil

I would not dispute that, but that is not what you said about Big Foot. This is what you said:

"Oh no, I don't have to prove that Big Foot exists, because he's existence itself, you see, so he naturally must exist!"


To define "God" as necessarily existing, is to say that God could not be conceived of in any other way than existing. This would be to conceive of something other than God. But this says nothing about what existence itself is, except that it is something which God has. To say that God is existence is to equate God and existence, and this is to say what existence is.

Let's define "human being" as necessarily animal. This means that "human being" cannot be conceived of in any way other than as an animal. To conceive in another way would not be the conception of "human being" it would be the conception of something else. But this says nothing about "animal" other than that it is something which a human being necessarily is. To equate these two, human being and animal, to say that human being is animal, is to say what animal is.

So Aquinas does not say what existence is, which would be the case if he said God is existence.

It's more that in this matter I'm excruciatingly aware of how much I don't know. — Wayfarer

Well stated, that is exactly Socrates' attitude, and the position we should all take, including the high level physicists. Many already have this attitude with respect to limited branches in the field, the key is to expand this principle to all areas, even fundamental assumptions. Start with the premise "I know nothing", and justify every premise before proceeding.

Knowledge is a journey which proceeds into the unknown. The destination is unknown. Each premise, or assumption, is a fork in the road, the option to proceed or not. Do I take this road or not? There's a map of sorts, because I can look ahead, with my limited comprehensive capacity, and see where it has brought others. Are they coming to a dead end? What other options do I have? Have some others taken other roads? The nature of possibility is that there are always other options. The roads less travelled are not so well cleared, they must be sought. Where they might be exposed, who knows (tpf?). Perhaps I'm already beyond the turn off, I missed it because it was the less travelled road, so I have to go back and find that fork. Perhaps individuals slip off the well travelled road at different points all along, seeing the dead end ahead, adopting different assumptions which are not the same as each other, but are inconsistent with the well travelled road, then they start to come together again on a different well traveled road, off there in the distance somewhere, as they establish consistency with each other. Should I create my own turn off, or go all the way back looking for a more well travelled turn off?

It is better to have no understanding than a misunderstanding. Misunderstanding is the illusion of understanding, the believe of understanding which is really not understanding, it is mistaken. Misunderstanding robs one of the capacity of choice. All appears as understood, but it is not. Under the illusion which is called misunderstanding, there is no choice as to which road to take, the certitude involved with the confidence of knowing, and the appearance of understood, denies that possibility. But the confidence is misplaced, involved with misunderstanding rather than understanding.

A point is reached where the person who (or the public opinion which) decides whether the money flows into the coffers, has to take the "truth" on faith, rather than understanding it in person. From this point on, the more inaccessible the sophistry, the better. The money continues to flow regardless, on faith alone. — Punshhh

It's really always taken on faith, the western system is an honour system, built on strong moral principles, honesty, with trust and faith entwined with honesty. Though there are some exceptions to the rule, honesty is not the problem, physicists who are being funded to do their research truly believe that they are proceeding in the right direction. The vast majority of the money comes from the consumers, industry follows this, and hires physicists and engineers to get the competitive edge. In universities, learning institutions, and publically funded research centres, there is more freedom of direction for the researchers. Here, it is probably not so much the case that the physicists go in the direction that the money is, but the money goes in the direction of where the physicists' minds are.

The real issue I believe is misunderstanding, and this is honest mistake. The sophistry which Socrates exposed was real honest misunderstanding, at the institutionalized level. The sophists truly believed that they knew these things, and were proceeding in the honest and good way by educating others. What he demonstrated was that they really did not know what they professed to know. This opens the door to doubt and skepticism. But the point is that unlike deception which is relatively easy to determine, honest mistake is extremely difficult to identify. Fundamental principles are firmly believed, and maintained by the community, to the same degree whether or not they are actually true. There is no essential difference between a true fundamental principle and a false one, they both play the exact same role in the community. To expose a false one requires applying the principle to something outside of the system within which it is currently employed. That's what Socrates did, he took fundamental principles which were being employed in various fields of technology, and said look what happens when I employ this principle in another field, absurdity results. Why do you cling to this principle as if it is a truth? Clearly it is not.

Sure, we should try to figure out what the cause is. My only point is that we don't need to doubt the existence of the apple just because we don't know what that specific cause is. — Andrew M

It's not that we must doubt the existence of objects if we do not know the cause. You know we can live without knowing the cause. But if we want to find out the cause, then we must doubt the existence of the object. By doubting it, we express recognition that its existence is contingent. The question which naturally follows is "contingent on what?". So we proceed to seek that cause. If we take the existence of the object for granted, then we assume that it's existence is necessary, so long as it exists according to the laws of nature, which are induced from its observe existence. We state the law to the best of our knowledge, and we circumvent the question of why does the object exist, by converting it to "why does the object act according to the law?". This is answered with "because it exists" (existence being taken for granted). Existence appears as a necessity because it is the premise for logical procedure. Therefore it is not doubted, it is not seen as contingent, and the cause is not sought.

Thanks for engaging, I would see "valuing" as the bit where our thought / mental abstractions / future projections get an emotional response. I would not know to what degree it facilitates our thought process (where it might be observed that our consciousness enables us to negate our value judgements / emotions to a degree which separates us from other animals) but our thoughts are crucial in coming to terms with the way we 'might' automatically respond to our own value judgements / emotions. — Gooseone

Do you recognize two approaches to one's own value judgements? First, we could automatically start acting on the values, we'd be constantly working on how to achieve things. In this way, everything appears as a means to the end, because we never even think about the values (ends) themselves, we are constantly engaged in procuring the means. If it gets to the point where one loses contact with one's own values, just constantly acting to procure the means, without even having a clue as to for the sake of what, this could be mental illness. Second, we could question our values. Is this value reasonable? Should I hold this value? Why do I hold this value? But again, if one takes this to the extreme, being afraid to act for fear of doing the wrong thing, this could also be mental illness.

The difficulty lies in being able to articulate (think "rationally") about what's actually governing our behaviour, which appears to rely on a degree of self awareness / consciousness. There are values which are commonly shared (procreation, survival ...usually) and which have a very obvious physical base, yet when abstract thought comes into play, these values can be "hijacked" to some degree, a degree which (in my mind) does not necessarily correlate to easily defined physical or common values (like valuing knowledge to such an extent it might be detrimental to our physicality). — Gooseone

So the second approach I described, questioning one's values, could lead to this hijacking you refer to. The hijacking itself is not mental illness because it is supported by reason. The question then becomes, is the reason truly logical, or is it more like rationalizing. If the latter, then again we may be facing mental illness.

The main thing I'm saying is that "valuing" is indeed innate yet it starts to take on more / other functionality as our self / awareness increases. If we negate this (like in asserting there's such a thing as pure rational thought) or don't make an effort to report how our own value judgements influence our rationality to others ("Oh, I was just playing") we actually succumb to being mere pawns of our own value judgements / emotions. — Gooseone

This "functionality" you refer to, is I believe, what I call questioning one values. The idea of "pure rational thought", might cause one to suppress all values, under the idea that pure rational thought is the only true value, an other values might need to be suppressed to allow rational thought to be pure. But this might be a mental illness as well. And the opposite extreme is like the first approach mentioned above, when we just continue to act on our values, we concentrate on carrying out the acts themselves, loosing track of what our values actually are.

(I feel what I'm addressing is mainly difficult because it's not common knowledge and that the fact it isn't common knowledge is due to people valuing to manipulate others highly and try to prevent becoming too predictable... where a lack of common knowledge in this regard creates an environment where people might be inclined to follow their value judgements blindly while thinking they're behaving rationally... because everyone else seems to be doing it.) — Gooseone

This as well might be a mental illness, valuing the manipulation of others. If it comes to the point where an individual would have to obscure one's own behaviour, to prevent oneself from becoming too predictable, because what is valued is the capacity to manipulate others, doesn't this seem like mental illness to you?

When you declare bankruptcy to ditch your creditors, you're a winner because a new door has opened to you? What about the creditors? The only reason they're losers is because they associated with you.

Fair enough, point taken. I'm aware of Lee Smolin's books, but I don't know if I'm up to reading them. — Wayfarer

He's into Loop Quantum Gravity, did some work on string theory, but seems to think that may be a dead end. I read Time Reborn. I liked it because it challenges physicists to take seriously the idea that time is something real. It brings to light real problems in physics which lead toward the idea that time must be something real. However I was somewhat disappointed with the book because it offers no speculation as to what time is. The title hints that the book might go that way. If time is real, it must be something describable.

I agree with you, but I don't think the likes of you and I sounding off about on forums is going to make the least difference. — Wayfarer

Oh come on, please don't shatter my illusions. This is my little fantasy world here, let me live it and leave me to my pleasures. If it's not hurting anyone, leave me in my deluded state. It's not like I'm trying to force you to join me.

I thought he just told them there's winners and losers (which by the way is true) — Agustino

Huh? I was told, you win some, you lose some, and this I think is true. What's with this notion that everything is either black or white? Where is the colour in your life?