Being an opportunist means taking or choosing positions based on what is winning, regardless of your own views - it's equivalent to not having any views at all. — Agustino

Come on Agustino, an individual must have a view of what is "winning", in order to be an opportunist. You cannot negate this to say that opportunism is equivalent to having no views at all.

Trump has strong views - on trade, on torture, etc. - views which are largely not popular and he stands by them, and uses politics as a tool to get them implemented. — Agustino

Sounds just like having views on "winning" to me. How do you distance this from opportunism?

However, I don't know if there would be a break, I would just say that there is a evident change in the wall. — GreyScorpio

When I look to the past, I see that all physical things have definite location. I have seen things. But I have no capacity to move into the past, toward any of those definite locations. I assume that for the very same reason that I can't move into the past, the locations of things in the past are definite. The past has been fixed, it cannot change. I cannot go there to change it. I apprehend a wall, a barricade to my actions. But when I look toward the future, I have no capacity to see anything, I only see it as it goes past. I apprehend a wall to my senses, I cannot sense anything in the future, though I have sensed many things in the past. However, I apprehend real possibilities with respect to the future, the possibility to act, to move, and to change things which have remained the same in the past.

So the wall toward the future prevents me from sensing anything in that direction, but it allows me to move with some freedom. The wall toward the past allows me to see all that has been around me in the past, but it prevents me from moving, or changing anything which has been. Since these two walls are radically different, almost opposed to each other actually, it is impossible that it is the same wall in the past as in the future. Therefore it appears like there must be a break in the wall at the present.

It's because they are located in entirely different areas. Bodies are located in space and time. Minds are not there. — quine

Until we determine exactly what it means to be in space and time, we cannot make any determinations about whether or not things which are not in space and time can influence things in space and time.

If we assume that all things are necessarily in space and time, then from that assumption it is impossible that anything is not in space and time. But if we assume that there are things which are not in space and time, we can still allow that these things are related to things which are in space and time. The relationship would be through the means of something other than space and time.

I agree, for us to remain alive we must keep sustained and we can only do so by using the world as a wall to lean on. — GreyScorpio

I like that analogy, the world as a wall. I think of this wall as a confinement. Do you see that with respect to the past, and with respect to the future, it is not the same wall? Doesn't this imply that there is a break in the wall at the present?

My argument against Cartesian dualism is formally valid. The conclusion is derived from premises. — quine

But, as others have said, the second premise is false. Just because physics has no way of determining how the spatial-temporal and non-spatial-temporal interact, this does not mean that they do not interact.

No. Trump is a Machiavellian practitioner of Realpolitik, but not an opportunist; there is a difference between the two. — Agustino

The difference between realpolitik and opportunism is that realpolitik has made opportunism into an ideology and denies this fact.

Perhaps, a massive team, one within each cell, or each molecule, each atom, or each subatomic particle. The thing is, each is an individual, distinct part, and we still haven't accounted for how they work together to make a whole. Top-down causation is inconsistent with empirical evidence. So we have no other option but to look at what is inherent within the parts, which enables the whole to be created from the bottom-up.

You forget, I'm dualist, I have a soul which actuates my material elements.

That is why we credit our "selves" with top-down causal agency. — apokrisis

I see the causal agency of my self as explained by intentional, free will acts. How do you understand this as a case of top-down causal agency, defined by constraints, rather than as a bottom-up causation defined by a freedom inherent (immanent) within my material being?

So by choice ... one simply chooses not to have freewill and the constraints are thus rendered an abstract illusion that you never really took seriously. Gotcha. — apokrisis

You've lost me in your contradictory ways. Free will is a constraint? That's the problem with your position, you portray the creative results of free acts as the effects of constraints. Do you not see the inherent contradiction? Or are you a determinist denier of free will?

It is their choice to line you up against the wall and shoot you? — apokrisis

How could it not be?

True that. — apokrisis

Finally! We agree on something. Now maybe we can start to discuss these topics in some sort of rational way.

So they can't choose not to suffer the consequences? — apokrisis

The most simple way to choose not to suffer the consequences, is to choose to follow the orders. It's not difficult, just like the law, choose to obey and you do not suffer punishment. If you choose not to obey the law, you might prepare yourself to suffer the consequences. But you may try to find a way to disobey and not get caught, as well as multiple other options..

The consequences are thus quite real as the corollary of their choices. It is all a bit like choosing to jump of a tree and fly, then having to accept the consequences that the law of gravity mandates. Nothing you can do will change anything about the consequences in either situation. — apokrisis

How is this relevant? The consequences we are talking about, are those punishments inflicted upon us by other human beings, not by natural forces like gravity. Do you not respect a difference between these two? Are you trying to say that the army is a thing like gravity, which will punish you if you try to disobey it? Don't you see that it is the individual human beings within the army which will seek to have you punished? Just like if you disobey the law, it is certain individuals who will seek to have you punished. It's not the law itself which acts to punish you, it those who enforce it. Nor is it the army which acts to constrain, it is those members of the army which act in this way.

My position is based on the causal notion of synergy. — apokrisis

I understand synergy to an extent. But synergy is parts working together, toward some sort of unity, similar to how I explained individual human beings producing an army. Can you explain how synergy is compatible with top-down causation, the whole, (the army for example) constraining the parts? I don't see how this notion of the whole constraining the parts is a valid notion.

Let's put aside your fanciful notion that drill sergeants offer raw recruits a lot of free choice during boot camp training, we call an army an army (and not for instance a rabble or a rout) because it really is being regulated by some actual state of form and purpose. — apokrisis

Any raw recruit can choose not to follow the instruction of the drill sergeant, and suffer the consequence. When the choice to follow the drill sergeant's orders is a free will choice, made by a free willing human being, how can you say that the drill sergeant "causes" the recruit's actions to support your downward causation? Sure, there's a special relationship between the sergeant and each recruit, but where is this thing called "the army" which is supposed to be applying downward causation here?

Even your wording betrays that you know that the true reality is other than how you describe it: "we call an army an army ... because it really is being regulated by some actual state of form and purpose." See, the army is being regulated, by some form or purpose (purpose existing within individual human minds). You reveal with your words what you really believe, that it is not the army which is doing the regulating, the army is the passive, artificial thing, which is being regulated by the intentions of human beings.

So what I said in the end, eh? — apokrisis

Sure, it's what you said, but at the same time you describe what you said in a completely different way, thereby contradicting yourself. That's why I interjected into the discussion. You said "the constraints would have to arise immanently". But then you went on to describe those constraints as the constraints of the whole, the army, acting inward onto the individual soldiers, as a downward causation. This contradicts constraints arising "immanently", which implies that the constraints come from within the individual part, as I described by referring to intention and free will. So you haven't explained how two apparently opposed processes, "constraints arise immanently", and "constraints of downward causation" are supposed to be the same thing.

You really do come across as a Putin troll, you do know that, don't you?
— Wayfarer

Again, your style is more trollish than interesting. — Banno

Two votes.

For once, we Sir, are in agreement (Y) — Agustino

Enjoy the moment, it's bound to be short lived.

Thanks for illustrating my point about how a reductionist would want to conceive the causal story. — apokrisis

The problem is, you haven't justified your claim of downward causation, or that anything such as "the army" is a real, natural entity, rather than just an abstraction. If it's just an abstraction, then your claim that it acts causally through constraints is unsupported. I do not see how the real existence of "the army" could be understood as anything more than individuals acting. There are individuals who chose to act together toward a common goal, and we goal this an army. There is no "army" which is causing the individuals to act, they act of their own free will.

There is a common problem in modern philosophy, that philosophers assume something called "inter-subjectivity". From the premise of inter-subjectivity, they claim the real existence of many unnatural entities such as "society", 'the state", even "objective moral principles". The problem is that observation and empirical evidence indicates that such entities, unities which are said to be created by inter-subjectivity, are reducible to the activities of individuals. This reduction is a verifiable reality. Inter-subjectivity, and therefore all the artificial entities which follow from it, such as "the state", and "the army", are reducible to the particular activities of individual human beings. There is no evidence that such abstract entities called "the state", or "the army", are actually constraining the people. Such an idea is actually rather absurd, because it is the activities of the individuals which do the constraining. People constrain other people through the use of authority, rank, position, force, etc..

So we have two possible directions to proceed here. We could overlook the facts of the valid reduction, and insist on the absurdity, like you do. This absurdity is supposed to justify your claim of top-down causation. Or we could accept the validity of the reduction, and look for the principle of unity within the individuals. In this way we proceed toward understanding will and intention as the real cause of existence of these abstract entities ("the state", 'the army"), which have a real presence, and real power. Then we seek the internal source of this causation rather than looking for some phantom external top-down causation.

Psychoanalysis is presented as a form of violence in both of them. — disspeach

I think I see the "violence" you are talking about. In each clip you are asked to speak when the question asked is difficult to answer. The forcing you to speak when it is difficult to speak I suppose is some sort of violence. But there is no true violence here, because you always have the option of not replying. The scenarios created are not real, so it's not like you must reply in order to save your life, or to save your friends life, so whatever violence that may be there, it is not real, it's artificial, an illusion.

So I don't think that either technique is very useful, because they assume to put you into a specific situation to see how you would respond, when you are not really in that situation. This means that you'll have many factors such as how committed and how capable, an individual is to putting oneself in that situation, to deal with,

Mine would be story about cranes rather than sky hooks because I am saying that the constraints would have to arise immanently from the world they also limit. So the constraints are what get constructed. — apokrisis

If the constraints are immanent, then they must be inherent within the matter itself, so really it's all bottom up. There is no top down constraint, that's imaginary. There is no "the army", which constrains the soldiers from the top down. The soldiers unite willingly, creating an army from this willful act of unification. What appears to you as a top down constraint is really just a deeper, more fundamental form of bottom up constraint. It is necessary to assume this deeper form in order to account for the existence of matter itself.

I don't read it that way. The PK is not a tyrant, Plato has another category for tyranny. The PK and the surrounding aristocracy are those dedicated to the re-establishment of their community by putting back the aristocratic tendency that has disappeared from the decaying democracy (indeed this is precisely why it is decaying). — Agustino

The philosopher king has to lay the foundations for the new society. I'd say he is more of a visionary then anything else, he must see far into the future, with a plan, to direct the coming into being of the new society. Remember, the task of the philosopher king is not to rule over society, but to lead the people out of the cave, to help them to see the light. Morality for Plato is tied up with eugenics, as an attempt to direct evolution. Jesus Christ could be understood as a sort of philosopher king. Religion made him into a god. But it would be impossible to have a philosopher king without involving religion.

I think it is important to recognize the distinction between number and measure. It's hard to say exactly what number is, but measure is an application of number. When we apply number in the course of measurement, we make certain assumptions about the thing which is being measured, so there is a third thing which enters into the picture here, and this is a type of medium between number and measure. This is geometry. Geometry consists of assumptions which are utilized in applying number to measure.

"Conquest" here refers to the production of accurate geometrical assumptions. When our geometrical principles become accurate, we may "conquer" the world with understanding because this will produce accurate measurement.

Send them back where? The homeland has been demolished.

I think I've already explained: — tom

All you have explained is that our attempts to understand (interpret) QM (which is inherently probabilistic) proceed through deterministic models. That is not surprising, because this is the only means we have for understanding the physical world, through deterministic "laws". What you don't seem to recognize is that QM is inherently probabilistic, and therefore cannot be properly understood through deterministic laws. Instead of accepting this reality, you seem insistent on claiming that QM is not probabilistic, and through this false premise you create compatibility between QM and deterministic interpretation.

It is as if a driver complained that he had to go wherever the car took him. A passenger might reasonably complain, but not the driver. You can refuse to drive and then complain that the car is not going anywhere, but I'm afraid I have little sympathy. — unenlightened

This is a good analogy. We can ask, why are there passengers and drivers. The passengers are very often complaining, you're driving too fast, you're driving too slow, you should go this way, you should go that way. We call them backseat drivers. Draw this analogy out to human life in general, and there are leaders and followers. Why are the followers so often complainers? I'm just a pawn in your game. Why do we even start to think that it is someone else's goal that we're working toward, not our own?

I think that this type of thinking is unhealthy. It completely misunderstands intentionality, assuming that there are individuals, (or in the case of the op, possibly some entities), with their own secret goals, directing people around, as pawns, without disclosing their goals, what they are using the people for. However, we know from thousands of years of experience that this is not how intentionality works. Intentionality works by having intentions clearly disclosed, through concise, well formulated language, so that individuals clearly understand each other's intentions, and work together toward common goals. There is no such thing as "I am your pawn", when goals are common goals.

For some reason,Tom does not seem to believe that quantum mechanics is probabilistic.

I am also very skeptical that in a case of serious injury or illness of yourself or a loved one that you would maintain this position that you have now. — m-theory

I have a view toward "facts" which is very similar to Rich's, but I will go to see doctors when I think it's appropriate. This does not mean that I think the doctor is giving me advice based in fact. I think the doctor is giving me advice based in opinion. Sometimes I have great respect for the doctor's opinion (after all the doctor is well educated), other times not so much (some times a doctor appears disinterested in the particularities of my problem).

I may not flatly deny that there is such a thing as a fact, as Rich seems to, because I know that it is very practical to refer to some things as facts. As with Rich though, I am very skeptical about the way that people throw around the designation of "fact", only to find out later that the facts have changed.

Pseudo-random number generators are just algorithms. Given the seed(s) and the algorithm, you will know the outcome. In fact, pseudo-random number generators are characterized by the frequency with which they repeat - the lower the frequency, the better the generator. — tom

I don't know much about such seeds and algorithms, but you haven't convinced me that it is possible to know what the number will be prior to the computer acting to determine the number. Perhaps you could give a brief explanation of how you would proceed to determine that number, and how you would be sure that computer would follow your procedure to come up with the same number as you.

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the knowledge required to predict the outcome is not employed? — tom

I really do not think that the knowledge required to make such predictions even exists, so it's rather nonsense to talk about applying that non-existent knowledge. A more appropriate question would be to ask whether it is possible to obtain the knowledge required to make such predictions.

I think the game analogy fails. Games are usually played for entertainment, language goes far beyond entertainment. Most the times we compete in games, there is an object to the game and we try to win. Not so with language. And games have a well published set of rules for consultation while language gets made up as we go. Language is something we must learn, and carrying out, in order to get by in society, just like paying tax. Games we choose to play, for entertainment. If language were a game, then paying tax would be entertainment.

Well, talking the talk is one thing, but walking the walk is another. The latter is by far the most concerning. — Sapientia

You mean Trump actually getting involved in war? That's really scary, isn't it? The guy can't even hold his tongue, I'd hate to see his finger on the trigger.

A president who will not consider warfare is seen as weak. Russians already see this and they will take advantage.

But why would we need to know such an abstract essence anyway in order to know what it means for a person to live well? — John

Don't you see yet? To create any kind of moral standards, which I am assuming is what you mean by "live well", (to live ethically), we need to establish some principles of equality. What kind of moral ethics are you considering, if, for you to live well, is something different than, for me to live well?

Although there would certainly be some general principles in common, what it means for me to live well and what it means for you to live well will not be the same. So obviously this must be determined by each for him or herself; it is not an abstract enquiry at all, which would seem to be what you are attempting to characterize it as. — John

I do not think that this description of "to live well" would be acceptable to any moralist at all. Are you really claiming that each of us should determine for oneself what living well is? What about the thief, the rapist, and the murderer? Should all these people determine for oneself what living well is? If not, then why should you and I get to determine for ourselves what living well is, but these people should not?

You keep talking as if you think that I am looking toward some ridiculous ideality, some pie in the sky abstraction, but it's really just basic morality, the foundation of equal rights. You seem insistent on making morality unintelligible. Each person should determine for oneself what living well is? Come on, should we burn all the laws, demolish the courthouses, and disband all the police forces as well?

Why should it be thought that the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for plants to live would be the same as those for a human? That seems obviously ridiculous! Are you seriously interested in sensible discussion? — John

Well if they are not the same thing, then when we say that a plant lives, and that a human being lives, we are talking about two distinctly different activities and using the very same word, "lives" to refer to those distinct activities. I'm not prepared to make that concession. I believe that living is something which plants and human beings have in common. That is what I learned in biology, and it is inherently tied to the theory of evolution. Therefore if we are going to state what it means to live, I think it should be something which both plants and animals do.

If you want to define "living" by referring to things which only animals do, then you deny plants from the category of the living. Then we would have to create a new definition of living, such as self-moving, or self-nourishing, or self-subsisting, so we can say that plants live too. But if animals do this as well, then why not just adopt this as the definition of "living", so that all things which are living are doing the same thing under that name? Then we avoid the ambiguity of "living" referring to something different for different species. Then the things which you mentioned could be specialized forms of living.

My position seems "obviously ridiculous" to you, but your position seems obviously ridiculous to me. Is it possible to reconcile?

Dissolved? Seriously, WTF? — apokrisis

OK, if you're having difficulty with my English, I'll say that you've denied that there is a dichotomy between "general" and "particular" by saying that they are both generalities. Can you apprehend that? By say that the particular is a generality you have denied that there is a dichotomy between the particular and the general.

The problem with your metaphysical perspective is that you are claiming that "difference" must be fundamentally understood in terms of dichotomy. Then you make statements like that, which deny that there is a dichotomy, yet claim that there is a difference, and you leave yourself unable to understand what you have said. If you would allow yourself to understand difference in terms other than dichotomy, then you wouldn't have so much difficulty with Deleuze's "repetition".

Then you have dissolved that supposed dichotomy so there is no dichotomy here. You haven't addressed the point.

So when it comes to viewpoints, the dichotomous contrast here would be between the notions of the one and the many, or the fixed and the variable. — apokrisis

So where's the dichotomy? If each one is the same as each other, then there is no dichotomy between the one and the many. We are talking "generality against generality", so you cannot make the one a particular and the many a generality to create your dichotomy. Consider numbers for example, let 1 represent the one, and 4 represent the many. How is there a dichotomy between 1 and 4? Now apply this to the following generality, a point of view. Whether there is one point of view, two points of view, or five billions points of view, how would you derive a dichotomous difference? The only potential dichotomy I can see here would be between something which is a point of view, and something which is not a point of view. But to create this dichotomy we need a description of what a point of view is.

I was asking for an example of the kinds of additional things you imagine we might come to know, such that we could then know that we did not previously know we had been living, and that we now know we are living and also know that we know that we are living. — John

I don't understand your question then. My point is that to know that you are living, you must know what "living" means. The "additional things" then are the necessary and sufficient conditions for "living".

You know, we are living when we have been born, are breathing, our hearts are beating, we are experiencing sensations, feelings, even emotions, desires and thoughts and so on. — John

But how are these the necessary and sufficient conditions for living? Plants live, but they are not born, nor do they breathe, they have no hearts, nor sensations, feelings, emotions or desires. How is it possible that these things are the things which indicate to you that you are living, when plants are living yet they have none of these things?

I can't see how anything in your post is at all relevant to anything I've said. In fact, I had a difficult time finding any relevance in your last post. Now it appears like you have interpreted what I've said in a way completely different from what I meant, and I believe that I may have interpreted what you said in a way completely different from what you meant, in order that such a confusion has been created. In any case it's obvious to me that we are now referring to completely different things. One, or both of us, is not making the required effort to understand the other. Disinterest is not conducive to good discussion.

Craig does not delineate the "whatever" (wild-card) in the 1st premise thus, but it seems you do. — jorndoe

I don't accept Craig's formulation, partly due to this ambiguity. In other versions that I have read the authors are clear to distinguish between material objects and immaterial concepts. Craig does not seem to do this, so we have ambiguity as to whether "whatever" refers to just material objects, or to immaterial as well as material objects.

Craig implicitly extends causation beyond the universe, and thus have to justify this before applying the 1st premise to the universe. — jorndoe

Again, I do not agree with the way that Craig extends causation beyond the limits of the physical universe without providing a clear distinction between efficient causation and final causation.

Can you specify accurately how you delineate the "whatever" then? (The universe yes, spatiality ?, time ?, causation no, "whatever" else ?) — jorndoe

I assume causation to be a temporal term. To say that something is a cause, is to give temporal priority to it. Physical, or material existence, is existence which we describe with spatial reference. If there is a cause of all physical (spatial) existence, this implies that there is time prior to physical existence.

Amazing, clocks and rulers measure space and time and yet only take up some interval of space or time. One would almost think that signs of things were not the things themselves. What inspired insight. — apokrisis

I believe that's an improper representation. Clocks and rulers do not measure space and time, human beings measure space and time using clocks and rulers as tools. The abstracted ideas "space" and "time", exist within the human minds. This is what you continually neglect, and overlook in your semiotic descriptions, the necessity for a human mind. So until you can demonstrate how these acts of measuring can occur without a living creature which is actively measuring, your semiotic explanations are unintelligible and most probably simple fictions, produced in an attempt to support an untenable position, just like Whitehead's prehension and concrescence are.

Doesnt quantum physics take time and energy as the two complementary operators of an uncertainty relation for that reason? — apokrisis

No, there is no time operator in quantum mechanics. The time-energy uncertainty relation is neglected by quantum physics in favour of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. Von Neumann could not find a way to make time an observable, which was necessary in order to make time an operator. This means that quantum mechanics is inapplicable in the domain of a very high energy in a very small space, due to an inability to deal with the time-energy uncertainty.

But as I say, I don't pretend that this explains the material side of the deal, only the ontic structure of reality. — apokrisis

So what kind of an ontology is that then, if you have no approach to the material aspect of existence? If all you are doing is describing physical existence in terms of structures or forms, then all you are doing is physics. And since you've strayed outside the institutional discipline of physics, what you are doing is bad (undisciplined) physics.

The op specifically directs us toward the primacy of becoming. If the material aspect is apprehended as primary, then we must approach that material aspect as active in "becoming". If your approach can only bring us toward an understanding of structures which have become, then we need to find a new approach, for the sake of the op, which wants to get at the primary becoming.

Yep. MU right. Humanity wrong. Sounds legit. — apokrisis

Is this meant to be insulting? Concentrate on the principles, understand them for yourself, that is what the discipline of philosophy is directed toward. Don't accept the lazy man's attitude of "if everyone says so it must be the case". Until you recognize the weakness of this attitude, you will never recognize how often it is that "everyone" is wrong. See, the vast majority are followers, the leaders are few and far between.

Again this is just you not getting the logic of a dichotomy - what if means to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. — apokrisis

Actually, I think this is you not getting it. The primary description must be prior to any logic of dichotomy. The logic of dichotomy must be applied to something, material content, and this material content is the primary description. The primary description is not confined by any logic of dichotomy, and that is why we can have competing descriptions of the very same thing. "Competing descriptions" is a function of perspective, "point of view". The principle called "relativity of simultaneity" demonstrates this very well, the importance of the point of view. If the point of view were dichotomous, then it would be impossible to establish compatibility between multiple points of view, different points of view would be mutually exclusive. Each point of view would exclude all others. However, experience has indicated to us that we can establish compatibility between multiple points of view, and this indicates that different points of view are not mutually exclusive. Therefore the point of view is not to be understood as dichotomous. So it is clearly a mistake to insist that the primary description must be restricted by the logic of dichotomy. It is only when we seek compatibility between multiple points of view that the logic of dichotomy is applied. It is applied to determine what is not proper to a point of view, i.e. to exclude what is impossible, as not proper to any point of view. But this cannot be done from one point of view. Therefore it would be mistaken to produce a dichotomy from a single point of view.

The primary description, as derived from a point of view is something passive though, a described state, as observed from a particular point of view. To understand the primary becoming, we need to see the point of view as active.

True, you can do something and be totally unconscious of doing it, as the cold temperature presumably is when it freezes water. But I am conscious of living at least some of the time, therefore at those times I know I am living. Undoubtedly we are on very different roads, mine is a road I know I have set foot on, yours apparently is not a road you do not know you have set foot on. — John

Consider what I just wrote to apokrisis in the preceding paragraph, concerning points of view. When we as human beings develop compatibility between what is evident from one's own particular point of view, and that of others, this is called justification of our beliefs. In common epistemology, justification is a necessary requirement for knowledge. So you being "conscious of living" is not sufficient for your claim, "I know I am living", by common epistemological standards. What you are conscious of must be justified before it can qualify as knowledge. This is to mitigate the fact that we can be mistaken in our own interpretations, of our own experiences, in our unified quest for knowledge. So we seek corroboration. That is why I say that before we can say that you know you are living, we need some determination of what it means to be living. Otherwise "living" could refer to anything, and you're simply making things up.

Also I don't believe you have given me the examples I asked for. — John

So what kind of additional thing do you think we would need to know about what it means to live, in order to enquire into what it means to live well? Can you give some examples of the kind of thing you have in mind? — John

You can make an example out of any activity. Suppose you want to describe what it means to behave well, don't you need to define what it means to behave first? How about eating? Suppose you want to say what it means to eat well, don't you need to make some specification as to what "eating" is first? — Metaphysician Undercover

In other words, you need to know what "living" is before you can determine what living well is, just like you need to know what "behaving" is before you can determine what behaving well is, or you need to know what "eating" is before you can determine what eating well is. That is the "additional thing" you need to know, what exactly do these terms refer to. For example, how you define "eating" dictates what "eating well" means. If you define it as putting food in your mouth and swallowing it, then the person who is capable of doing lots of this will be eating well. If you define eating as providing your body with the nutrients required for subsistence, then eating well means something completely different. Likewise, depending on how you define "living", "living well" will have a variety of different meanings.

The 1st premises are the same. This latter argument is clearly nonsense, violates identity (the 1st law). Causation is one more cause than causation...? — jorndoe

The latter argument is nonsense only because you make a category error. The first premise "whatever begins to exist...", refers to particular things. "Causation" refers to a concept, a generality. So the first premise is meant to read "any particular thing which begins to exist...", and you are replacing "any particular thing" with a generality, a universal, or concept, "causation", which, because it is an abstraction is not a particular thing. So you have committed a category error.

Apparently unlike you MU, I already know what living and eating are, I do them every day. I also have ideas about what it means to eat and live well, but I admit it is an ongoing, open-ended enquiry. I think I am well on the way, but I also think that if I had begun with your assumptions then I could never have set foot on the road.

You haven't presented the examples I asked for, either. — John

As I said, the fact that you do something doesn't produce the logical conclusion that you know what you're doing. The cold temperature makes the water freeze. It really does this. But that doesn't mean that the cold knows what it is doing, So I think that you and I are on distinctly different roads. And, please look back, because I've already given you the examples you've asked for.

Yes. And....? — apokrisis

Well, if we assume that there is consistency in the amount of time that it takes for the repetition to occur, then the "amount of time" is something other than the repetition itself. Therefore time is something other than the repeated change, it is derived from it.

But I said that the requirement for separation is the cause of spacetime. — apokrisis

Actually you very distinctly said that spacetime is God's way of causing the separation.

Your attempted apophatic definition of temporal separation in terms of not being "a spatial separation" ends up resting on a spatialised notion of separation as its primary distinction. — apokrisis

How would you conclude this? If the temporal separation is only determinable by us through the means of a spatial separation, how does this produce the logical conclusion that a temporal separation is necessarily a spatial separation?

So we see why SX strains so hard to find a generating seed difference in calculus. Materiality is the obvious issue for this Deleuzean scheme (as it is for all metaphysical schemes I agree - even Peirceanism). If you duck into maths - the science of patterns, the conjuring with pure immaterial forms - then you can simply sideline the very issue that your metaphysics must address. You can appear to be speaking about substantial actuality when really - in shifting into the register of the model - you most definitely ain't. — apokrisis

Isn't this exactly what you do, "duck" into the symmetries necessitated by the general theory of relativity?

A proper dichotomy is one that openly proclaims the absoluteness of its reciprocal transformations. — apokrisis

I've said this numerous times already in this thread, what is required here is a description, not a dichotomy. We can only proceed to the dichotomy after we derive the description, because we first need to make a designation of what it is , before we can determine what it is not. Any random designation of "it is not this.." could be wrong if we have not first made a designation of what it is. So the description "what it is" is prior to any dichotomy. Therefore if you are looking for any sort of "absoluteness" it will be found in the description rather than in the dichotomy, which is a function of the description.