Well we can count the changes, can't we? Or is "sequence" a notion alien to you? — apokrisis

When we count a repetitive change, to provide us with a notion on passed time, there is an assumption that each repetition takes the same amount of time.

But you don't seem to get that spacetime relativity is God's way of preventing everything happening all at once. It creates the separation between events that is ontically essential for there to be anything interesting in the form of a "world". If forces acted instantaneously and without dilution across any span of time and distance, where would we all be, hey? — apokrisis

To represent the cause of separation as "spacetime" is what I affirm is a mistake. This doesn't properly distinguish the role of time from the role of space. In other words we neglect the principles which differentiate (temporal) "order" from (spatial) "relation". Order already assumes separation, and relation already assumes order. So separation must be first, then (temporal) order, then (spatial) relation. Notice that the primary separation is therefore not a spatial separation.

Or instead, emergence IS time, time being what we call a sequence of change or development. — apokrisis

But time is not "a sequence of change or development", it is a means by which we measure such. The abstraction is not the same as the thing it is abstracted from. A metre is not the same as a thing which is a metre long. If our only means for measuring change and development is change and development itself, then we are trapped within the vagueness of self-reference.

Well I would want a model of thermal or thick time that is consistent with the theory of relativity. And space-time really is a thing in physics, despite your horror of all metaphysics that is post Newtonian. — apokrisis

If you could show me a way past the contradictions I've indicated, then perhaps I wouldn't be so adamant that the description of the relationship between space and time produced by special relativity is fundamentally flawed. But it isn't the fact that this relationship is fundamentally flawed, which is horrifying, as it is a very useful relation in many applications. It is the fact that the vast masses of humanity accept this relation as ontologically sound, without referencing ontologically sound principles, which horrifies me.

We know we are living, otherwise we would not be able to say we are living, right? — John

No, we can say whatever we like, without actually knowing what we are saying. And if we can convince others to accept what we are saying, then what has been said is justified. But the fact that what has been said has been justified does not mean that what has been said is known.

So what kind of additional thing do you think we would need to know about what it means to live, in order to enquire into what it means to live well? Can you give some examples of the kind of thing you have in mind? — John

You can make an example out of any activity. Suppose you want to describe what it means to behave well, don't you need to define what it means to behave first? How about eating? Suppose you want to say what it means to eat well, don't you need to make some specification as to what "eating" is first?

As for Deleuze, as I said, I don't expect that people 'know their Deleuze' to engage with me... — StreetlightX

Perhaps I'm not a Deleuzean specialist, but I can recognize a potential contradiction when I see it.

The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual [it is] real without being actual — StreetlightX

This appears contradictory, because as I understand "real", to be real is to be actual. Of course we can redefine 'real" so that it is not necessary to be actual in order to be real. But what's the point? We are talking about "becoming" here, which is clearly an activity. If we describe "becomings" as relations, and now we introduce a real relation which is not actual, this new relation is not a "becoming". So we admit that "becoming" is not the broader term than "relation", relations which are not becomings may be prior to relations which are becomings, and we have defeated the primacy of becoming.

Deleuze has produced the very same deficiency (from a different angle) which Apokrisis insists on. Apokrisis claims that time is emergent. But emerging is an activity which necessarily requires time. So we are faced with the contradictory position, that emerging is occurring when there is no time for its emergence. In other words, we have becoming, an activity, which is without time. That is because time has become a spatial dimension in apo's relativistic principles. Apo wants time to emerge from space-time.

This is the problem with Pythagorean Idealism which was exposed by Plato. Spatial relations are understood by geometrical constructions, which are understood by mathematical relations. Spatial relations are conceived of as changing in time, mathematical relations are not allowed (conceptually) to change in time. This supports the unchanging, "eternal" Ideas of idealism. The flaw in this position, as demonstrated by Plato, is within the very nature of ideas. If Ideas are eternal, they are inherently passive, as that which is partaken of. If they are not eternal, then they are actively developed by human minds, and are instances of becoming. This constitutes the prelude to Aristotle's cosmological argument, where he argues that anything eternal must be actual, effectively denying the possibility of eternal ideas. We should consider the cosmological argument, in its original form, as the argument which gives primacy to becoming, by giving primacy to actuality. Becoming, as an activity (therefore actual) may now be conceived of as prior to all mathematical relations which are conceived of as passive and unchanging.

The human approach to ontological reality has been to analyze spatial relations, deriving mathematical and geometrical relations. Then the human beings attempted to establish compatibility between these relations and time, mathematical relations forming an eternal backdrop, to represent an absolutely consistent "time", upon which geometrical changes are mapped. Because the mathematical relations are those which render the changes in spatial relations intelligible, the human being has given priority to the mathematical relations, rather than the 'time", which the mathematical order represents. But this is to neglect the true back drop which is the temporal order of becoming. Now human beings should see themselves as faced with the task of associating mathematical relations directly to time, with respect for the most simple property of becoming, "order", to determine how spatial relations emerge from the backdrop of temporal order.

So, we are not necessarily living then? — John

I didn't say that. I said that we can claim to be living without knowing what "living" means. How does the assertion "I am living" produce the necessary conclusion "I know what it means to be living"? It is easy to put a name to an activity. It's not so easy to understand the activity. Naming an activity does not indicate that you understand it. So by what means will you describe how to best carry out the named activity, if you've only named it without understanding it?

I don't believe that at all. In order to determine "how" to do something, we must first identify what it is that we want to do. Giving something a name (i.e. "living") does not mean that we have identified what that thing is. Your claim, that we find ourselves living, and therefore we know what living is, is untenable. Ancient human beings found themselves breathing, but they didn't know what this was, as they didn't know what air was.

The opposite to what you say is actually the case. We find ourselves doing things, and then we seek to understand exactly what it is that we are doing. Only when we come to this understanding can we determine a better way of doing it.

Philosophy should be primarily concerned with how to live, in my opinion. — John

Don't we need to determine what it means "to live", before we can approach the question of how to live?

But the whole point is to reverse the order of priority in order to think the construction of the primitive out of the virtual, which, although not actual, is in every regard real: "The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual [it is] real without being actual, ideal without being abstract [...] The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to them". — StreetlightX

I believe that the "virtual" must be actual as well as real. But it cannot be actual in the common sense of physical bodies in motion. The need for two distinct types of "actual", provides the approach to a reconciliation with dualism. Within the virtual exists what you call "the differential elements and relations". But the virtual is what I call the non-dimensional point, which must itself be like a self, with a right and left, up and down, etc., in order to provide for the possibility of dimensionality. The principles which will differentiate the parts of the neighbourhood must inhere within the non-dimensional point. So the principles for dimensionality inhere within the non-dimensional.

Now we must remain true to our premise, the primacy of becoming. This will necessitate that the virtual itself is a world of flux, the relations etc., the principles within the non-dimensional, are active, and changing. It is argued by Lee Smolin in "Time Reborn", that we must allow for the laws of nature themselves, to actively change in time. So, if within the realm of the virtual, there is activity, we must reverse our established relation between space and time (time being presently represented as following from the activities of physical bodies), to allow for becoming within the virtual. This is "the reversal" which gives reason to express time as the 0th dimension, instead of the 4th, allowing for the reality of this activity of the virtual.

And what does it mean that the differential can be determined only in qualitative form? Simply that, as we've said, the derivative is never simply a value that correlates to a single, particular point on a primitive function, but instead defines the qualitative character of the function around a particular point. In Simon Duffy's words, "the differential relation characterises or qualifies not only the distinctive points which it determines, but also the nature of the regular points in the immediate neighbourhood of these points" (Duffy, "The Mathematics of Deleuze's Differential Logic and Metaphysics"). This is the import of the Aden quote above. Now, the point of this giant mathematical detour is that insofar as the differential is understood as this element of pure quality ('the cancellation of quantity in general'), it serves as the model for Deleuze's notion of pure relationality. Again in Bowden's words: "even though dx is totally undetermined with respect to x, as is dy to y [[dy/dx can only be determined in relation to each other, without each each value is nothing], since the relation subsists, they are in principle determinable with respect to each other" (my emphasis). — StreetlightX

I want to return to this point (pardon the pun) because I like it so much. If we assume a particular point (a non-dimensional point of location), then there is a surrounding area, "the neighbourhood", which may have a number of positions in the neighbourhood related to this point by the same function. These points are exactly the same, functionally. In a simple spatial relation we could say that these functionally identical points make a sphere around that original point. The points equidistant from the original point.

Now from this point of view, of functionality, each of these related points has the exact same relation to the original point. They are the very same point, functionally, but my description has described them as a number of different points in a neighbourhood. So we need a principle whereby we can individuate the parts of the neighbourhood, as different from each other. They must be different because they are being described as different, and we can visualize the points on the surface of a sphere as different from each other. We need to introduce dimensions. Dimensions will provide the basis for this difference. To do this, we must return to the original point, and give that original point context, a position. We cannot appeal to the functional points for context because this would constitute circular reasoning, and there is nothing to distinguish one from the other, so such a determination would be completely arbitrary. So the context, and therefore dimensionality, must be derived from the underlying flux which relates one non-dimensional point to another, and this presents a problem due to the nature of "flux". Bohm's proposal is a local clock, an inner time for each neighbourhood. The clock takes the place of the non-dimensional point of location. But since he hasn't assumed a non-dimensional point, just a neighbourhood with a clock, he gets an infinite regress of a clock within a clock within a clock. If we assume a non-dimensional point, then dimensionality can only be determined from within that point.

The thesis is that the economy rules, and the economy no longer has a use for the masses. Therefore, 1. the masses have lost the power they had as producers and consumers, and 2. they have no function; therefore 3. they will be scrapped. — unenlightened

I'm with Hanover on this point, I don't see how the economy can destroy the masses. To mass is a fundamental attitude of the human psyche, like a herd animal, we find security and consolation in each other. We want, and do, the same thing, and this creates massing, and the mass.

A changing economy will change the mass, but I don't see how it will destroy the mass. You talk about "the masses" though, so your assumption is that the mass has already been divided into the masses. If you can identify how it is that the economy divides the mass into the masses, then perhaps you would have an argument as to how a continuation of this process would dissolve the mass altogether.

And where did you establish that only slight variations can occur over an infinite number of jars? — Jeremiah

As I said, we should drop the possibility of an infinite number of jars, because this is an appeal to the principle of plenitude, which in this case, establishes an unreal relation between the finite and the infinite. It assumes the possibility of an infinite number of jars, without demonstrating how this is a real possibility. I believe that due to the nature of time, and physical existence, this is not a real possibility. This is the weakness of Ergo's op, it asks about infinite jars. When you ask unreal questions you get unreal answers.

If we say something can happen outside normal distribution then we are saying an occurrence that is not a slight variation can occur. — Jeremiah

A slight variation in the proportions of coloured marbles is the normal distribution, just like when you flip coins, a slight variation in the number of heads and number of tails, is the normal. You appear to be arguing that the existence of such a slight variation indicates the possibility of a large variation, if given enough repetitions. On what principle do you argue this? Consider the example I gave already:

"Say you flip a coin 19 times, with 10 heads and 9 tails. Does this suggest to you that if you flip the coin 19,000,000 times you'll end up with 10,000,000 heads and 9,000,000 tails?"

The question is, how do you get from the continued observance of small variations, which would be your premise, that there is not exactly the same number of each coloured marble in each jar, to the conclusion that a large variation (one much larger than any observed variation), is possible? What would be the premise which you would apply to give you this conclusion?

We can bring out the importance of this seemingly trivial point however if we turn again to Deleuze's reading of the calculus. I said originally that "the differential must differ in kind from the numbers that make up the primitive curve" - this was ambiguous and you were right to call me out on this. It's indeed far more precise to say that the derivative of f(x) yields another function f'(x): what I wanted to convey is that on Deleuze's reading, the difference between these two functions is not simply quantitative but rather qualitative. What does this mean? Negatively, that the differential cannot be a magnitude or a quantity: at the point at which dy/dx = 0/0, the value of the derivative is itself neither zero nor an infinitesimal. As Sean Bowden puts it, "dx represents only the cancellation of quantity in general"; instead, Deleuze's argument is that while it cannot be determined in the form of quantity, it can (only) instead be determined in "qualitative form". — StreetlightX

The existence of the difference, or relation, which cannot be expressed quantitatively can be demonstrated by the difference between spatial dimensions. The relation between spatial dimensions is incommensurable. The relation between the circle (2d) and the diameter (1d), is pi, which is an irrational ratio. If one takes two equal length line segments at a right angle to each other (representing two distinct dimensions), the diagonal (which crosses both dimensions), is again irrational.

Consider the difference between a straight line and a curved line. We could assume points on those lines to mark off segments. No matter how small the segment of line is that one marks off with the points, the segment of curved line will always be fundamentally different from the segment of straight line, and the relation between them is incommensurable. I believe there are two approaches to this problem. First, we could consider giving dimensionality to the point. Then a point on the curved line would be fundamentally different from a point on a straight line. But this would make "points" complicated, requiring different types of points for different applications, a 1d point, a 2d point, etc.. Furthermore, the non-dimensional point has been proven to be very useful, so there is very good reason to consider that it has some basis in reality. The second possibility then, is to maintain the non-dimensional point but to allow that the space between the points on the curved line is fundamentally different from the space between the points on the straight line. This requires that we reify space itself. We must allow that the space between points is something real, if we desire to maintain the use of non-dimensional points, and also allow for the reality of the non-quantifiable relation between different spatial dimensions. Space exists and it has real qualities which we do not know how to measure. We measure objects, but since objects are merely the way that space is represented to us, the unintelligible aspects of space render absolute accuracy impossible.

Now we approach the basis of the non-quantifiable relation. This is the relation between space (being now described as something real), and the non-dimensional point. In order to understand this relation we must give the non-dimensional point a position with respect to space. Without a position, it cannot be related to space. I believe its position is in time. The non-dimensional point is a point in time. Now we must reverse the relationship between space and time, which makes time the 4th dimension, such that time can have its proper relation to space, as the 0th dimension.

And what does it mean that the differential can be determined only in qualitative form? Simply that, as we've said, the derivative is never simply a value that correlates to a single, particular point on a primitive function, but instead defines the qualitative character of the function around a particular point. In Simon Duffy's words, "the differential relation characterises or qualifies not only the distinctive points which it determines, but also the nature of the regular points in the immediate neighbourhood of these points" (Duffy, "The Mathematics of Deleuze's Differential Logic and Metaphysics"). This is the import of the Aden quote above. — StreetlightX

This is very good, because if we consider the point in time, as the non-dimensional point, we can start to see the vague relationship between points in time, and the surrounding space. Recognize that we have reified space, such that it is something "real", in the sense that physical objects are real, but what we are actually looking for now is the real reality, the reality which is the "becoming" that lies beneath the object which has been identified as space, and is associated with the 0th dimension, time. Since the incommensurability has been identified as existing within the dimensions of space, the vagaries which exist around the non-dimensional points are proper to that object, space itself. So we must go deeper, into the non-dimensional points to find real quantity, or quantifiability.

Why is this reciprocal determinability of the differential important to Deleuze? For two reasons: first, not only does it provide a model for pure relationality, but second and even more importantly, this model itself has a distinctive trait that allows Deleuze to set himself against a position that his entire oeuvre pitches itself against: the idea that what exists prior to individuation is an indeterminate generality which is then progressively differentiated though limitation or negation (which itself calls for a correlative abandonment of any hylomorphic model of individuation). — StreetlightX

With respect to this then, my position is that the whole appearance of indeterminateness is due to the somewhat unintelligible nature of space. Because space has unintelligible aspects, we can conclude that space does not necessarily behave in the way that it should. The "way that it should", is the way that is determined by this underlying reality, the sphere which Deleuze is saying is completely determined. This is the realm of what Bohm calls "hidden variables". In his "Wholeness and The Implicate Order", he posits an underlying realm of activity, becoming, of which we see only a reflection of, in the spatial existence of objects, just like Plato's cave people only see a reflection of reality.

Let me point out the obvious: it is not actually provable that you can eventually end up with a jar filled with only white marbles given the physical conditions that I described. — Ergo

There is reliance on what is called "the principle of plenitude". This principle states that if something is possible, then if given an infinite amount of time, that possibility will necessarily be actualized. That is why, even if it is provable that a jar of only white marbles is possible, it is still not provable that this will actually occur, because it assumes an infinite amount of time. So we have an unprovable relationship between the finite and the infinite, which is simply assumed here. Each time we fill a jar, we have a definite (finite) occurrence. We are assuming that "time" is such that if we continue with finite occurrences, time will give us the capacity for infinite repetition.

So we must make a particular assumption about the nature of time in order to support the principle of plenitude. There is a relation between time and numbers, such that numbers are an order, two comes "after" one, and three comes "after" two. We assume that one could theoretically keep counting forever and therefore numbers are infinite. But we could use the principle of plenitude against itself. We could say that it is possible that time will end. Therefore if given an infinite amount of time, it is necessary that we will reach the end of time, and this negates the infinite amount of time, in a paradoxical way.

But we can put the principle of plenitude aside because it only comes into play after the possibility is established. I believe that it is Ergo's claim that a jar of all one colour is not even possible under the described circumstances. And Jeremiah claims that it is possible. I have a question for Jeremiah. If slight variances in the mixture, from one jar to another are observable, what leads you to the conclusion that a jar of all one colour is possible?

'Becoming' or 'flux' are words used to denote what is as it presents itself to us. What is presents itself as a vast field of more or less changing similarities and differences. Some things remain so similar through time that the differences may be indistinguishable to us; they are for us so much the same across time that they are logical identities. But we believe that they are not ontological identities, at least insofar as their physicality is concerned, because we know that they must be changing, however subtly, as time passes. So becoming is not a determinably identifiable 'thing', but a general attribute of phenomenal reality. — John

If something presents itself to us, as to "remain so similar through time that the differences may be indistinguishable to us", yet we "know" that it must be changing, then how is it that we know this, other than by the means of logic?

So I didn't say that the idea of becoming derives from logic. — John

You haven't described how you can derive a concept of becoming without the means of logic. You say "'Becoming' or 'flux' are words used to denote what is as it presents itself to us." But I see static things present to me, far more than I see activity present to me. And if things which present themselves to me are not the same now as they were before, I conclude that there has been change, and therefore becoming. How is this not a use of logic? What presents itself to me is many different static things which are not necessarily changing, but could change, and do change. I also observe some activity, such as a fire, and I conclude that this is something which is in the process of changing. These changes are so rapid that I cannot identify the static things.

The question for you, is why do you use your logic to conclude that all the static things I observe are really in a process of becoming, instead of concluding that all the processes of becoming are a change between static things. If you are going to use logic to make the claim to "know" that what appears as "beings" are really "becomings", what are your premises to support this? How are you describing "becoming" such that it is not just a relation between static things?

It is the idea of identity which is derived form logic... — John

This is not true. Logic proceeds from identity, so identity is necessarily prior to logic. It is quite clear that we must have a good grasp of identity before we can proceed with any logic, as logic operates on identified things, so the very opposite of what you say is the truth, logic is derived from identity.

That is why we must accurately identify "becoming" prior to applying any logic. The conclusions of the logic will represent the identity given, in the relation of premise/conclusion. The accuracy of the conclusion will reflect the accuracy off the identity. If we cannot identify "becoming" as something other than a relation between definable states, then all of our conclusions will be representations of this.

As I tried to show above the dichotomy proceeds from our reasoning, which I think is fairly obvious. One side of it comes from logical reasoning and the other from ontological reasoning. These two incommensurable kinds of reasoning cannot be grounded in ontology simply because one of them is firmly grounded in logic. — John

You've forgotten one important step. Prior to reasoning, whether it be "logical reasoning" or "ontological reasoning" (whatever difference there's supposed to be here), we need to identify and describe the identified thing. The description of a thing is not derived from logical reasoning, logical reasoning follows the description as an attempt to understand the described thing.

It seems that we have a name for the thing, "becoming", but without a description of the thing referred to by the name, that name could signify anything. And if we proceed with reasoning alone, when we just have a name, then "becoming" could refer to anything which is logically possible. So unless we have a description of what it is which is referred to by "becoming", then all your forms of reasoning and your various dichotomies are completely meaningless in this inquiry.

I think the thread has progressed to the point where we can recognize that "relation" is not an acceptable descriptive term for "becoming". There was some talk of "functions", but a function is a particular type of relation, so this appears like a step in the wrong direction. Until we can get some acceptable terms, there is no call for any sort of logical reasoning.

But dichotomies are justified logically. — apokrisis

This is just circular reasoning. What I'm asking is to ground the dichotomy in ontology, rather than to base your ontology in dichotomy, simply because dichotomy is logical. Why would you think that existence has to adhere to logic? And if not, then why assume dichotomy as a fundamental ontological principle?

And yet, if it works, it works. — apokrisis

Whether or not it "works", is relative. Walking "works" for getting us places, the horse "works" for getting us places, so does the boat, the train, the car, and the plane. Some of these work better than others, but the others still work. Depending on where you want to go, some of these will not work to get you there at all, though they'll still work to get you places.

So sure, reductionism works to build laptops and cities. But by definition, it is not holism.

And my argument is that the two are in fact related by the reciprocity of a dichotomous relation. If we understand reductionism vs holism properly, each is "true" as the inverse of the other. — apokrisis

I don't understand how you can claim a dichotomous holism. That appears to be self-contradictory.

Well if you can explain what kind of crisp existence is not the result of a symmetry breaking dichotomy, go for it. — apokrisis

And I don't understand what you mean by "crisp existence". The way that you use "crisp" leads me to believe that crispiness is artificial, produced by the mind which dichotomizes. What leads you to believe that existence itself is crisp?

But then he doesn't get the need to remain dichotomous. — apokrisis

This "need" you refer to must be justified, or else it's not a need at all, just an assertion. Any such dichotomy is artificial, created conceptually, for a purpose. So your "need" only exists in relation to a particular end (necessary for the sake of...). You may claim that there can be no knowledge or understanding without dichotomy, and this may be justifiable, but it does not produce the conclusion that there can be no existence without dichotomy. And once you allow for the possibility of non-dichotomous existence it gives you a completely different perspective on the relationship between existing and knowing.

So what Ergo is suggesting is that the proportion in the jar will be always be even. — Jeremiah

I don't think Ergo is suggesting that the proportion will always be perfectly even. The question is, how does the reality of a minor variance in proportion translate, for you, into the possibility of a major variance in proportion? Say you flip a coin 19 times, with 10 heads and 9 tails. Does this suggest to you that if you flip the coin 19,000,000 times you'll end up with 10,000,000 heads and 9,000,000 tails?

"Positive", "negative", it's all excitement and incitement to me, which needs to be subdued with self-medication. And the medication of course has its own problems.

There's a fine line of dianosability, and who knows when one crosses it. The drug companies would say we all cross it. In the case of medical marijuana, we all claim to cross it.

In general, that's not true, as mania demonstrates.

The mixing machine is analogous to the mixing of tinctures in a can of paint. If every time you open a can of paint, the colours are well mixed, then the mixing machine has been applied to the parameters necessary for the job. But if sometime you open a can to find a streak of unmixed colour, then the mixing machine hasn't done it's job, and has not been properly designed.

I'd happily see Hollywood obliterated if possible. Let Agustino arm the bomb and I'll light the fuse. Then we can get back to throwing grenades at each other. — Baden

This approaches the other problem I brought up, and that is the unification on the entertainment and news media. There is something very sick about this. Consider that when Trump ran in the GOP primaries he was both a source of entertainment, and news at the same time. The problem is, that when the news is your source of entertainment, it is most often the case that you are getting your entertainment at someone else's expense.

We had the tragedy of 9/11, well covered by the news media, but for many people around the world, it was pure entertainment. We had "shock and awe" in Baghdad. Wasn't that just a strategy for entertainment, disguised as a strategy of war?

You joke about bombing Hollywood, but making others bear the brunt of your joke is the foundation of this problem, which is getting entertainment at someone else's expense. We call it making fun of someone. The true comedian recognizes that this is unacceptable behaviour, and switches things up to make fun of oneself. But what happens when my own entertainment is a case of me making fun of myself, but all I notice is that I am entertained, and I don't notice that I am making fun of myself. I'll continue to beat myself into the ground (...and loving it!).

But the entertainment part sounds like you're simply saying that you see any strong emotional reactions you have as stressful. — Terrapin Station

Right, don't you find that any strong emotional reactions are stressful? There is such a thing as emotional balance. A strong emotion throws off that balance, causing the stress involved with recreating the balance.

Note that one can of course, artificially reverse this whole enterprise so that rates of change are mere 'properties' of self-identical substances. But everything that is in any way important is thereby missed: the entire process of individuation whereby a thing 'takes on' an identity is missed. Any attempt to treat these relations as properties - which is entirely possible - simply misses the becoming of the entity or process at hand. Recall too that in the OP, I marked a distinction between becoming and change. — StreetlightX

This is the deep, and most fundamental problem of acceleration. If we assume that an object is at rest, and it is, due to some force, induced to move, then there is a moment in time when it moves from zero velocity to some determinable velocity. That initial movement cannot be expressed as a "rate of change", because it is fundamentally, therefore conceptually, different from a rate of change.

Of course physicists have no heed for this issue because relativity theory disallows the possibility of rest, so ultimately there is no such thing as a zero velocity, rest is relative. Then the change from rest to acceleration is just an expression which doesn't represent anything real. Consequently, acceleration is understood as a change in direction, so we have curves, and the ever present pi, in relativity formulations of acceleration.

The outcome isn't randomized though. Ergo uses "random" in the title to throw you off. Nothing in the description of the factory indicates that there is any randomness. Evenly sized, shaped, and weighted marbles are produced, of different colours. They are brought together in even proportions and mixed evenly. The outcome can be nothing other than an even mixture. The system is designed to produce an even mixture.

Well of course it's not random in any absolute sense. The op describes a very specifically, organized mechanical system, therefore the outcome (the filling of the jars) is not random in the sense which you are using "random". The use of the word "random" in the op title is somewhat mischievous, if not downright deceptive, because there is nothing random about the described arrangement.

I'm with Ergo on this. The manufacturing process, conveyors, and mixing mechanism are designed to continually produce a consistent mixture of colour. Therefore you will never get a jar of all the same colour marbles unless there is a failure in the mechanism of the factory.

I'm holding my breath in anticipation.

Again, a property is a relation... — The Great Whatever

I agree, to some extent, with apokrisis here, we cannot say that a property is a relation, because the relation is actually something else. We can say as apo does, that the property is related to the object in some way, such as habituation, or we can say that the property is related to the subject by predication, depending on how you categorize "property". In either case, the property is not the relation itself, the relation is some form of activity.

Why do you see it as causing stress? (I work in the entertainment industry, by the way.) — Terrapin Station

Take sports for example. Once you start watching, you get a team. The question of whether or not your team wins, makes the playoffs, etc., becomes stressful. A win might make you feel good, but a loss will make you feel bad. The anticipation is pure stress. If I get into betting, that just brings the stress to a whole new level.

Different, but similar stress instigators inhere within the major forms of entertainment, music, movies, etc.. The stress produces and elevates the excitement of the show. The show may cause excitement, but excitement is just an elevated level of stress within the members of the audience. So the entertainment is designed to incite the emotions, and this itself is stress, which manifests in the excitement of anticipation. The entertainment is designed to create stress. Anticipation is a high level form of stress, being closely related to anxiety, and that's why sports are such successful forms of entertainment, the difference between winning and losing has what it takes to create anxiety.

Presumably you're someone who sees advertising/marketing as an affront? We could explore why you feel that way about it. — Terrapin Station

If you read my earlier post, I find the entire entertainment industry an affront. The reason I feel this way is that it has transformed entertainment from an effective form of stress release, into a cause of stress. Therefore it is a self-perpetuating habit. We seek entertainment to relieve ourselves from our stresses, but the so-called entertainment just causes more stress so that we seek more entertainment. It's consumerism at its best (or worst), addiction, where the consumption of the product continually increases the need for the product. I may as well be paying my money to the local coke dealer.

This is why I think relations are troublesome: either one erases their specificity by treating them as a property, or one ends up recoursing to some Platonic notion of Participation which just makes the whole thing mysterious to begin with. The upshot of treating relations as external to their terms, on the other hand, is to grant relations a kind of autonomy with respect to their terms, or rather, it reverses the relation: rather than the relation being defined by it's terms, terms themselves become defined by their relations. This is the link between relations and becoming: if understood on this model, a change in a relation would imply a change in the relata (rather than the other way around): "If relations are external to their terms, and do not depend on them, then the relations cannot change without one (or both) of the terms changing. A resembles B, Peter resembles Paul: [if] this relation is external to its terms, it is contained neither in the concept of Peter nor in the concept of Paul. If A ceases to resemble B, the relation has changed, but this means that the concept of A (or B) has changed as well. If properties belong to something solid, relations are far more fragile, and are inseparable from a perpetual becoming" (Dan Smith, The New). — StreetlightX

This is what relativity theory does, and how physicists come up with "energy". Motion is an expression of relations, and energy is an expression of the motion. Objects are defined by their energy, which is really an expression of their relations. Since the "energy" is seen as the important aspect, we can focus directly on that, and actually lose track of the relata themselves. But I don't think that the suggested logical process in this passage is sufficient to get to the "primacy of becoming". The problem is that this "thing" which is created, the relation itself, or in the case of physics, the energy which is an expression of the relations, is itself artificial. It is a concept derived from relations and therefore there is an inherent reliance on the existence of the relata for the validity of the concept "relation".

To build a concept of "relation" and then remove the relata is inadequate if the desire is to produce a concept of "becoming" which is not dependent on the existence of relata. That is because the concept of "relation" is produced from observation and documentation of the existence of the relata. The concept "relation" is produced with this purpose in mind, it is meant to represent this. It is grounded in this, and it is valid only on this grounding. If we desire to pull out the relata, and have the "relation" stand alone, we no longer have any grounding of the concept.

This is the problem with apokrisis' "symmetry-breaking". This position is an attempt to bring the relation "symmetry-breaking" into a stand alone position, prior to the existence of the relata. But the basic concepts employed here, energy, and relativity, were not meant to be used in such a stand alone position. So when the relata are removed, the concept must be grounded in something else. Now we have the necessity of "symmetry" which is logically prior to symmetry breaking. But this symmetry can be nothing other than an eternal object, like what is found in Parmenidean Being, or Pythagorean idealism. Now the whole exercise, which was to establish the primacy of becoming has failed.

What is evident is that our understanding of "becoming" here, has not even approached the level professed by Aristotle through his cosmological argument. I think that focusing on "relation" is the wrong approach, because "relation" is inherently grounded in the existence of the relata. We have no way to get from the concept "relation" to the other side, which is the non-existence of the relata, and this is what is necessary in order to understand the "primacy of becoming". We must focus on the nature of "becoming" itself, free it from the concept "relation".

Notice that in the case of "becoming", Aristotle gave exception to the law of excluded middle. We can take this to indicate that the two opposing terms which are essential to the concept "relation", become irrelevant in "becoming". We must completely free ourselves from the confines of such terms. That demonstrates how different "becoming" actually is from "relation". It is the "becoming" which may or may not create the terms, rather than the terms which define the "relation". I think we must be prepared to completely dismiss all terms of logic and mathematics, to understand the "primacy of becoming". That is why this route is prone to drawing one into mysticism. We might look into it, but maintain your footing because you wouldn't want to slip right in. Or would you?

Experiment and manipulation works on stone and wood; it does not work on persons, but distorts rather than refines. — unenlightened

This is morality though, in a nutshell. It is experimentation and manipulation turned inwards on humanity itself. So this same inward experimentation and manipulation can go two ways, bad or good. Plato recognized this, that is why he advocated strict controls over the arts, He didn't say to shut the arts right down because this is all bad, he said to control it, so that it is good.

But when we're talking about "experimentation", there is a degree of unknown, inherent within. The unknown needs to be balanced and overcome by the known, to bring out the good of the experiment. Consider Jesus and his disciples, wasn't this just a big experiment on the manipulation of humanity? The thing about experimentation is that even if it goes bad, we can learn from it, and derive good from a bad experience. That's how we should look at the experimentation and manipulation of advertising which you refer to. It's already happened, it's ongoing and can not be stopped. But even if it's bad, we can learn from it, and therefore derive good from it.

On the contary, the OP is arguing becoming is necessarily a relation. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No I don't think that's the case. Look closely at how the relation between becoming and relation is described in the op. Relations are said to "belong" to becoming. It also puts relation in "the domain of becoming". And says that relation "implies" becoming. This means that relations are becomings, but there is nothing to indicate that becomings are necessarily relations.

So I think this is the way that we are supposed to be looking at "becoming" here, such that it is the broader category than "relation", therefore a becoming is not necessarily a relation. This is the only logical way that we can give primacy to "becoming", because relation is necessarily a relation between things. So if becoming is necessarily relation, then we would give primacy to the things being related.

Becoming is necessarily a relation because it involves a distinction. To become means something is in realationship to other things-- a boundary of object, change and presence-- even when it's not made explicit or sorted into specific catergory. The moment anything is, becoming is so. It's not a thing of existence, but an expression given by anything that exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But the op asks us to consider the primacy of becoming. This means that we must reject this idea that "becoming is necessarily a relation", because "becoming" expressed in this way logically excludes the primacy of becoming. So "becoming" as "necessarily a relation" is not the same "becoming" which is referred to by the op.

But what prevents more general notions of relation that exist outside such contraints? — apokrisis

You can say whatever you like, "square circle", or whatever, but unless you can support what you say, it's meaningless. So you can mention "notions of relations that exist outside such constraints" all you want, but until you give an example, or describe what you are talking about, you may as well be talking about square circles.

How can we speak of time with any counterfactal definiteness and particularity if we can offer no story on how it stands "other" to some suitable context? — apokrisis

I don't know why you're obsessed with describing everything by referring to its "other". That's not how we describe things, we describe things by saying what the thing is. So we can say what time is, by describing a relation between past and future, and there is no need to say how it stands "other" to something else.

So time has an outside! — apokrisis

No, that's why I said that we can dismiss this idea as unreal. I said, such a relation would be outside of time, therefore we can dismiss it as unreal. We have not established any premise whereby we can assume the existence of anything outside of time. Doing such, with the premises and conclusions that we have, is completely unjustified and unwarranted, it's nothing more than an excursion into fantasy.

I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss the importance of the time-energy uncertainty relation. It is not well understood, and perhaps that's why Shankar does a bad job covering it. But it is derived directly from the Fourier transform due to the nature of the frequency - time conjugate variables. It was not discovered or invented by Mandelshtam and Tamm, as it was already understood by people like Heisenberg, Von Neumann, and Pauli. Dirac apparently had produced a formal representation in 1926.

As I understand it, the time-energy uncertainty is closely related to the local/non-local dichotomy. Von Neumann could not bring time into the QM equations as he desired, as an operator, a conjugate variable of the Hamiltonian operator for energy. Others, like Pauli saw this right away as an impossibility, time is not observable, and they were willing to accept the consequences So time became a parameter, it is therefore outside the system. This leaves an uncertainty relation between the quantum system and its environment which determines time. That allows for relations between the internal and the external of the system which are not constrained by the laws of physics.

You have a "____" there. Are you saying that the "____" is nothing, in an absolute sense? I don't think it is. Clearly it signifies something, just like if you had a word there. The only difference is that the ___ provides a higher degree of vagueness than the word.


It is due to the nature of time, that relations are always becomings. Relations are changing in time, that is fundamental to relativity theory. A static, and therefore eternal relation, would belong to the category of being. But such a relation would be outside of time, so we can dismiss that relation as unreal.

This doesn't make any sense to me, but OK. I'll let SX speak for himself on the matter. — The Great Whatever

That was just my way of phrasing it, and that was probably not good. But the point is, that if we make "becoming" the broader category than "relation", which is what is necessary to understand becoming in the way that SX describes Deleuze, then we need some other way to understand "becoming". If relations are all the examples of becoming which we have, yet we want to understand becoming outside of relations, what can we turn to?