The nature of "good" is such that what is good is particular to the specific situation. There is no general "good" which is applicable to all situations, as the good is something particular, and determined in respect to each individual situation. An omniscient God would know the particular good which is applicable to each and every situation. How would a human being know each particular good?

An omnipotent and omniscient God could ensure that only the best things happen in every situation. But then we'd have no free choice. And free choice is essential to the human nature, so if God wanted to ensure that only the best things happen in every situation, there would be no human beings. If God is omnibenevolent as well, then it must be the case that creating human beings, and allowing human beings to exist, and have free choice to make mistakes and even create evil, is better than not creating human beings.

This is how God gives of Himself, in the act of creating. He has determined that it is better to create situations in which He will restrain His omnipotence because he has decided through His omniscience, that it is better to have such situations. Therefore He takes from His own omnipotence, to give to us the power of free choice by means of restraining His power to act. He has determined that allowing us the power of free choice is better than exercising His omnipotence. And so He has acted, through His omnibenevolence to suppress His omnipotence, to create us and allow us to exist with freedom of choice. This is why God's gift of creation is so special, because he actually takes from Himself, His omnipotence, by restraining Himself, to give to us the freedom of choice. It is the highest selfless act, which is to willfully take from yourself, to give existence to another.

These three perceptions are different but are not wrong because, prior to making an interpretation, these are mere observations. — Samuel Lacrampe

How is an observation itself not an interpretation? To observe is to pay attention and take note of what is happening. But one person cannot observe the whole of reality all together. So whatever it is that is being observed, at that particular time, by that person, is what is of interest to that person. Don't you think that this, therefore, what the person takes note of (observes), is the person's interpretation of what is going on.

If a person improperly takes note of what is going on, don't you think that the person's observation is wrong?

don't think it's necessary to have a super-sophisticated metaphysics in order for ethics to take off, as if we couldn't do ethics without some sort of Cartesian-style metaphysics-in-the-service-of-ethics. The two above quotations are qualifications enough, I think, because they don't demand any sort of (non-trivial) metaphysics while simultaneously being extremely compelling. — darthbarracuda

What exactly do you mean by "...for ethics to take off"? There's a distinct difference between producing a code of ethics, and producing within other people, the will to follow a code of ethics. When you refer to "doing ethics", I assume you are talking about the former, thinking about morality, what's good and what's bad, and philosophizing about what people should and shouldn't be doing.

But what is important in ethics is how to get people inspired to act morally, and this is where metaphysics is useful. So in your final sentence, you say that the two quotations are "extremely compelling". Can you tell me what it is, about those statements, which compels you? And, can you tell me in what way do they compel you? Do they incline you to act morally, and if so, how?

"On the one hand, we have the idea of a moral fact as a fact about what we have reason to do or not to do. — darthbarracuda

So here we have the very same issue, stated with different words. Ask yourself, what gives you reason to do something, or what gives you reason not to do something, which you might otherwise be inclined to do. This is the same question as "what compels you?".

Indeed, it seems that even this kind of moral realist's focus on explanation pushes us back in the direction of the idea of a moral fact as a fact about what we have reason to do. For, again, to the extent that we think of right acts as acts that tend towards social stability, we think that they have this tendency because they represent the reasonable thing for people to do. It is the tendency people have to do what is reasonable that is doing the explanatory work. But that, too, simply returns us to the original conception of a moral fact in terms of what we have reason to do. (We might say similar things about the idea that we can characterize a moral fact in terms of the proper function of human beings; for insofar as we understand the idea of the 'proper function' of human beings, we think that their proper function is to be reasonable and rational.)" — darthbarracuda

We have the following phrase in this passage "...the idea of a moral fact as a fact about what we have reason to do." First, we need to respect the fact that "reason" can be used very ambiguously, and even equivocally. The "reason" why I act, refers to the thing which compels me to act. In this sense, there is no good or bad inherent within "reason", as the act may be good or bad, both have reasons for them. There are reasons for the bad act just as much as there are reasons for the good act. From this sense of "reason" we have the word "rationalize", which is what a person does to give reason to an act which was bad. Because of this, it is a mistake to say that morality, is determined by "reason", we have reason to do bad acts just as much as we have reason to do good acts. We have "reason to do" bad acts just as much as we have reason to do good acts.

Further on, there is reference to what is "reasonable", the "reasonable thing" to do. In this sense of "reason", an attempt has been made to remove the bad reasons for acting, such that there is some objectively good form of reason, and this underpins "reasonable". This assumes that there is a particular way of reasoning, which the good person will follow, and this is what we call "reasonable". But this is not a well-grounded assumption. Each person thinks in different ways from others, and acts in different ways from others, under the same circumstances. So the assumption that there is a particular objectively reasonable, way of behaving is really unfounded. If we assume that there are many different ways of thinking and behaving under the same conditions, many of which are equally "reasonable", how would we distinguish which of the many different ways are unreasonable?

And the alternative isn't just 'hand-waving', either. It is the recognition of that sense of 'final purpose', or the reason that things occur, in some larger sense than the simply naturalistic, because all natural creatures do is consume, procreate, and die, in the end. — Wayfarer

I think it's very difficult to produce epistemologically sound moral principles without determining the proper ontological status of things like final cause, intention, and will.

“The way in which this conscious life is allegedly illusory is finally explained in terms of a “user illusion”, such as the desktop on a computer operating system. We move files around on our screen desktop, but the way the computer works under the hood bears no relation to these pictorial metaphors. Similarly, Dennett writes, we think we are consistent “selves”, able to perceive the world as it is directly, and acting for rational reasons. But by far the bulk of what is going on in the brain is unconscious, ­low-level processing by neurons, to which we have no access. Therefore we are stuck at an ­“illusory” level, incapable of experiencing how our brains work. — Saphsin

Presuming this analogy, suppose I am working with my computer, doing something. I haven't the foggiest idea of what is going on within my computer, all that circuitry and electronics. Why would anyone ever think that the work I am doing with my computer is just an illusion, and what is really going on is all that electronic activity underneath? This is like arguing that on a construction site, the activities of the various tools being used by the different trades people is what is really going on, and the belief that a particular building is being constructed is just an illusion. The architect is sitting in an office somewhere, with "no access" to the particular trades people. But that doesn't mean that the trades people are not following the architect's plans. It doesn't matter that the person carrying out the task doesn't know all the particular low level activities which are going on. This does not make the task being carried out illusory.

When asked to explain how a philosopher knows the true forms of ideas, Plato stated that some nonetheless strive to see the light, after which the truth is known to that philosopher intuitively, but only some people have the intuition. The ability to express that knowledge is a skill, but no matter how much people work on it, they cannot improve their knowledge if they are not natively endowed with the insight. — ernestm

"To see the light" is a reference to the part of the allegory in which "the good" itself is represented. We must ensure that "the good" is held in distinction from "the idea of good". The good is said to make the intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes the visible objects visible. It is important to apprehend "the good" which lies behind the intelligible objects, because this is what produces the knowledge that the shadows are merely shadows. Without the good, there is no distinguishing the shadows from the objects themselves, and there is much confusion, just like if we didn't apprehend the sun we wouldn't necessarily see shadows as shadows. By pointing out the sun, then all of a sudden that the shadows are shadows becomes highly intelligible.

That is why seeing the light is like a massive revelation which instantly makes sensible objects as shadows, highly intelligible. When the good is apprehended then instantly one can distinguish the intelligible objects from the shadows of these objects. It then becomes intuitive for that person to approach all of reality, in this way, to distinguish between intelligible objects and their representations, the shadows, which are sensible objects.

I do not believe that it is the case that one must be "natively endowed with the insight". What is the case, is that one must "see the light". Plato has probably led millions of people to see the light. Every human being is endowed with the capacity to see the light, one must simply be shown the light, and accept the "Truth". Once this revelation has occurred, the power of it is so strong. Not only does one see clearly the distinction between objects and the shadows, but the necessity that all shadows must have an object which creates the shadow.

This is the "Truth" which is revealed when one sees the light. All sensible objects are of the nature of a shadow, and behind that shadow is necessarily an intelligible object, which in conjunction with "the good", creates the existence of the sensible object, as a shadow of the intelligible object. Without apprehending the good, we are the prisoners of the cave, seeing the sensible objects (shadows) as if they are real, independent objects. After apprehending the good, it becomes highly evident that the sensible objects, and entire sensible world, are dependent upon intelligible objects for their existence.

Care to explain where you're seeing contradiction?

This is what then doesn't make sense. If the crooked is the not straight (in some degree), then only something straight could be used to measure the degree of that non-straightness. — apokrisis

I don't agree with this, because we are using straight, and not-straight, to refer to different categories, not opposing qualities within a category. We classify things by putting them into different categories according to qualities. The difference between crooked and straight is a qualitative difference, they are not opposites within one category, like hot and cold. We measure within the category such that we measure the degree of that quality defined by that category. There is a difference which separates one category from another, the qualitative difference, and we cannot use the measure from one of the categories, to measure that difference.

So for instance, weight and temperature are distinct categories. We cannot use the measurement we use for weight, to measure the difference between weight and temperature. Likewise, straight, round, and angled, are all different qualities, different categories. We cannot use the means by which we measure one of these, to measure the difference between one and the other.

The idea that all qualities are reducible to one measurement system is a detrimental form of reductionism. There is a demonstrable incompatibility between one dimension and another, which is evident from the irrational nature of pi, and the incommensurability of the sides of a square with the diagonal of the square. Because of this incommensurability, the means by which we measure one dimension (straight), cannot be used to give us the difference between one dimension and another.

In understanding any particular curve, what is important is understanding how it deviates from a straight line. That it deviates from a straight line is a given. This is quite consistent with what I said three days ago.

As I said, it's very useful for determining the different ways in which the thing being measured varies from the standard of measurement, but the straight ruler wont tell you why the thing you are trying to measure is crooked. Nor will you get an accurate measurement of the crooked thing using the straight ruler. That's why we must devise other means for measurement. But first we must figure out why the straight ruler is not giving an accurate measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was there from the beginning. You've been arguing that "not straight" suffices as an understanding of any possible not straight thing. Are you starting to get it yet? Or have you really been in agreement with me all along, and are just being contrary as a matter of principle?

I don't see the relevance. I thought you were arguing that they were antonyms of straight. Anyway, we have other shapes which are defined relative to circles. And there are others such as squares and angles. So what's your point?

Great. And what particular shape does each of those particular words refer to then?

Curved = ?

Bent = ?

Twisted = ? — apokrisis

I can't understand why this is so difficult for you apokrisis. The word refers to the shape, just like "square", "rectangle", "circle". What do you mean by what shape does each refer to? The shape is signified by the word! I could look into a dictionary to get definitions, just like I could get definitions of square and circle. Is that what you want? .

Curve = "...having a regular deviation from being straight or flat, as exemplified by the surface of a sphere or lens.". Bent = "curved or having an angle" Twist = "change the form by rotating one end but not the other, or both ends in opposite directions"

Each has a different definition. None is the opposite of straight. Are you starting to understand yet?

So do you agree that "straight" is routinely understood as being the antonym of these various forms of crookedness - "bent", "twisted", or "curved"? They are all ways of asserting "not straight"? — apokrisis

No, I don't agree. All those words have a particular meaning, referring to a particular shape. Each is different from one another. Despite the fact that each of these shapes is other than straight, I do not believe that any of them is opposite of straight, and that is what is required in order for one of them to be the antonym of straight. In fact, I think it is a misunderstanding of geometrical principles, to believe that any shape has an opposite shape, they are simply different. Do you think square is the antonym of circle? A direction has an opposite direction, but a shape doesn't have an opposite shape.

The rest of my argument follows of course, so no need to repeat it. — apokrisis

I don't recall your argument, but it should be clear to you now, that your argument follows from a false premise, so it's a rather useless argument. That's probably why I didn't bother to remember it.

You never asked me for the antonym. You asked me if it's not X, what is it? How should I know? Obviously there's countless possibilities for what it could be.

Generally speaking, pain is the consequence of error. So are you saying that from one's feeling of pain, an individual infers one's existence? If this is the case, pain goes much deeper than error. A lack of food is painful, and the lack of food which a baby feels cannot be said to be its "error". So why focus on error as the source of self-consciousness? Are you looking for the original sin?

How should I know? There's all sorts of forms it could have. Maybe it's liquid, or gas. these things have very odd changing shapes which cannot be described as bent, crooked, or twisted. Maybe it's like an electron, what shape is that?

I really don't see what point you're trying to make. You've totally lost me. Do you think that if I say something is not X, then I should know what it is? That's illogical. The premise that it is not x, produces no logical conclusion of what it is.

According to many theists of contemporary religious circles, what is considered to be a ‘deity’, or ‘god’, is repeatedly characterised as being ‘supernatural’. This term alone should be sufficient in its definition; however, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, in utilising nomenclature such as ‘supernatural’, we are implying the existence of a deity to be non-natural. That is, not of this world. — Javants

Traditionally, "artificial" is opposed to "natural". So to say that something is not natural does not entail that it is supernatural, or not of this world, it could be artificial. Generally, something non-natural is most likely artificial. As well as the artificial, we have a third class, the supernatural, which is neither natural nor artificial. So there are two accepted classes of things which are non-natural, the artificial, and the supernatural.

As such, with science being the study of the phenomena of the natural world around us, and its basis in philosophical inductive and deductive reasoning being found upon human observation of the natural world, how can something not of this natural world be analysed in the same way the natural world can? It would be like trying to understand the concept of an empire from the perspective of a nomadic hill tribe , or as I will discuss in my discourses on detramentalist morality, understanding omniscient morality from the perspective of a human society. If a God is beyond the realms of scientific observation (by which I do not mean physical observation, as in sight, but rather technical observation which may or may not be aided by scientific theories and/or technologies), how can he/she be scientifically observed, and thus, proven? — Javants

Our method of procedure, as an approach toward understanding the supernatural, is to understand the other category of non-natural things, artificial things. We need to recognize that the natural sciences, dealing with natural things, are not capable of understanding the existence of artificial things. People who mistakenly categorize artificial things as natural things by denying the distinction between them, rob themselves of the capacity to truly understand the existence of artificial things. Not having the capacity to understand the existence of artificial things leaves them with no approach to the supernatural.

Interesting point, but I don't quite agree. You might recall the big debate on the old forum between myself and Landru among others - I think you also - as to the historicity of the Resurrection. My view is it is an historical fact, it is something that really occurred, not only a myth. I am not going to get into that debate again, but it was about a similar point. — Wayfarer

But what is "historical fact"? It is just memories, and memories are fleeting. We reinforce our memories by revisiting them, going over them again and again in the mind. We must recollect or else the memory disappears. But each time the memory is reinstated through recollection, there is an opportunity for change. I meet up with my old buddies once in a while, and we sometimes discuss events from back in the 80's, or even the 70's. We each have a completely different perspective to begin with, and when we piece them together, we always have to deal with contradictory memories. That's the nature of "historical fact", it is loaded with contradictions, and untruths.

But we can't underestimate the ingenuity of human beings, who have developed this great memory aid, which is writing things down. However, we also must not overestimate the power of this tool. Language changes over time, substantially. Even my children use many words in ways completely different from the way I use them myself. So even the written material has to be brought back up, and reinterpreted, in order that the memory, or "history" is not lost within the shifting meaning of words. Some written material has been found which we do not even have the capacity to interpret, because the connection, the continuity, has been lost.

That should provide an explanation as to why I believe that "literal truth", and even "historical fact", are not meaningful phrases when referring to something documented a long time ago. These are like vague memories from your childhood, which are being revisited. And, even though writing things down has greatly increased our capacity to extend the memory time period, we also need to recognize the problems with this extended time period. Imagine being fifty or sixty years old, having memories of when you were five, if your language underwent substantial changes a number of times throughout your life. Each time your language changed, you'd have to reinterpret your memories, a radical change would require translation of your memories. And since the evolution of language is a continuous process, this reinterpreting of your memories, if it is to maintain accuracy, must also be carried out continuously. If you wait five or ten years, while your language is changing, then recollect your memories, you may have lost the capacity to produce an accurate interpretation.

I think, overall, one of the better hermenuetics is the one offered by Karen Armstrong about 'mythos' and 'logos' - that mythos is not and was never intended to be read as a literal truth, but embodies an insight in a way that one can imaginatively comprehend it. It's all about meaning. Whereas logos (the logical/analytical/historical) is all measure, control, how to function in the world. They were recognised in most traditions as complementary, but current Western culture is definitely unbalanced in favour of 'logos', whereby the Dawkins of this world attempt to reinterpret 'mythos' as 'logos', which makes it seem ridiculous, and the ridicule those who believe it. — Wayfarer

There is an artistic mode of writing, common in poetry, which we need to respect as existent, and also well used by writers. This mode of writing intentionally utilizes the ambiguity of words. That is how the author appeals to the widest possible audience. Strong words, words with "strong" meaning, are words which are meaningful to everyone, but what that word means to me, might be quite different from what that word means to you. Using such strong words will allow that a piece of poetry will be very meaningful to a wide variety of different people. But if we compare the meaning, we will be at odds. In other words, if the written piece has a very specific, and unambiguous meaning, it will be meaningful to a very specific group of people, having a narrow audience. If it is ambiguous though, different people will derive different meaning, such that the piece will be meaningful to a much wider variety of people. Under this premise it becomes even more meaningless to look for a literal meaning in something which was intended for a mass audience, because that was never intended in the first place. Not only is there shifting meaning through time, but there was never intended to be a fixed meaning.

This mode of writing brings us as far as possible from "literal truth", but ironically it is the most meaningful writing because it appeals to the widest possible audience. This is how the artist obtains a massive following, by distancing oneself from literal meaning. The artist's ability to obtain a massive following may also play into the field of politics. It may compete with politicians and this principle of vague meaning might be at odds with the fundamental values of democracy. But now the importance of the distinction you make between "mythos" and "logos" should become evident. Literal truth, logos, is quite opposed to the artistic writing of mythos, metaphor, parable, allegory. But in comparison to the other, literal truth is quite useless for dealing with the masses of people.

So-called primitive art always had purposes that were really nothing like what we might consider the purpose of art. For that matter what about the difference between religious art and secular art? The rise of the portrait genre in Europe, for example? Those who commissioned Rembrandt probably had very definite purposes in mind. — John

The purpose of art is probably one of the most difficult things to define. It cannot be defined by the intent of the author because generally the author doesn't even clearly know one's own intent, in producing art, it's just a matter of inspiration. So to define its purpose we would have to look at what it does. I would say that it has a certain type of mystic power over people, that is what it does, influences people in a mystical way.

That's why "purpose" is a red herring and the subject of much wasted energy amongst philosophers and critics. It's nothing more than a reduction or art or work to a particular concept, a sort of status game where someone's creation of effort is lauded for an idea considered relevant​ or cool. — TheWillowOfDarkness

To say that "the purpose of art" is not an important question, is like saying that the purpose of life is not an important question. Some think this way, some do not.

Do you object violently to the description of "straight" for some reason? — apokrisis

Yes, for "some reason" I hate untruth, it makes me get violent. If the thing is not straight, and it is described as straight, then I object violently to that description.

If something is not bent, what is it? If something is not twisted, what is it? If something is not curved, what is it? — apokrisis

Right now, what it is unknown. That's what's necessary, to figure out what it is. As an example, consider that the Copernican model of the solar system could not be proven to be correct, because it still employed the faulty Aristotelian description of perfect circles, putting the circles around the sun instead of the earth. With the use of circles, the numbers derived from observation could not be resolved. It wasn't until Kepler introduced ellipses, that the mathematics could be resolved.

And so you change the subject yet again. — apokrisis

I thought I'd try to make some progress in this discussion. You seem to be bogged down in your infatuation with measurement.

However I don't believe the 'inspired word of God' ought to be interpreted to mean that the Bible is literal truth, as much of it is plainly symbolic. — Wayfarer

It's ironic, but there is no such thing as "literal truth". "Literal truth" can only be taken metaphorically, because all literature needs to be interpreted, and any interpretation is just that, an interpretation. There is no such thing as "the objective interpretation", because every interpretation is produced by a subject, and therefore there is no such thing as the literal truth, because no interpretation is "the interpretation". Every interpretation is subjective. We can all read Biblical stories, and get some meaning out of them. Whether you look at them as true stories or not depends on your interpretation. But it is nonsense to ask if the Bible is the literal truth, only because "literal truth" is a nonsense notion.

Crookedness is defined in terms of a departure from straightness. — apokrisis

Sure, you can define crooked as not straight if you want. But there are all kinds of different ways that something can be crooked. It could be bent, twisted, curved, etc.. So "not-straight" tells us very little about the shape of the object, because "straight" is just one particular ideal which the object does not conform to. So we can proceed from the determination of not-straight, toward describing what the thing is really like, idea which it does conform to. Describing an object is saying what it is. And if necessary, we sometimes have to produce new idea which are based in the very existence of that object itself. Nevertheless, we describe an object by saying what it is, not what it is not. Proceeding toward understanding the object by saying what it is not, is very tedious, and it is much more efficient to describe what the object is.

This is simply how measuring the world works. — apokrisis

There is a lot more to understanding the world than measuring it. If the object doesn't conform to a particular ideal, and cannot be measured according to that ideal, then we do not gain an understanding of the object by saying it is not-X. We need to describe it, say what it is, in order to understand it. Describing an object is completely different from measuring it. And, I think it is necessary to have an accurate description before it is even possible to measure an object. The description allows us to determine which of our ideals will be useful in measurement, and develop other ideals if necessary.

That's the hard part. That's what we need a different theory for. I hold the string to the ruler, so I just convert it to that straight ruler scale, but this does not really measure the item. That's why we need to refer to other scales. We can measure the volume by putting it in water and seeing how much water is displaced. We can weigh it, and figure the density. All these are different ways of measuring the item. I don't know how you would measure for crookedness, it depends on how you would define that. But what's your point?

The method given in the Tau Manifesto for finding the area of a circle seems unnecessarily complex. The comparison given, between how the Pi Manifesto, and how the Tau Manifesto each deal with this issue, is beyond my comprehension. The author of the Tau Manifesto seems to think that the Tauist way of figuring the area of a circle, or the volume of a cylindrical container, is somehow a better method. But I don't understand the reasons for that conclusion

Why should I be honest? Everybody lies, and people who lie are usually better at getting what they want. Wouldn't it be more logical from an evolutionary standpoint to be a liar? — MonfortS26

To get what you want most often requires help from others. In order for others to assist you in getting what you want, you must express yourself clearly so that there is no ambiguity and confusion, or misunderstanding, as to what you want from the others. Lying only creates such confusion and misunderstanding. So there is no such general principle, that lying enables one to better get what one wants, the general principle is the opposite, truthfulness enables one to better get what one wants. However, if one is a well practised liar, and knows precisely the particular instances in which lying will be useful, that person may be able to use lying in a productive way, by interjecting lies when it is perceived that they would be beneficial. This is called deception. Even though deception can be useful in helping one get what one wants, it often backfires with substantial consequences. The general principle that lying is counter-productive holds as true in most circumstances.

Have you checked out ernest's 60,000 word essay on natural law and the social contract?

That worries me. So, I'd better think about something else right now. Bye, Arkady.

Ok. I believe I understand your position, and you give a good account of it, but I just don't think we're coming from the same place on this issue. — Arkady

Yes I see we're definitely not coming from the same place. That's why I brought to your attention, how absurd your opinion appears from my perspective. Your claim is that art does not take part in the knowledge generating endeavour. From my perspective, the knowledge generating endeavour can only be described as art, being a creative act. My opinion is that you really need to take a good look at the knowledge generating endeavour, and adjust your perspective accordingly.

I think that it is an important point epistemologically, because objectivity, is what we seek in knowledge, but it does not naturally inhere with the principles of knowledge. Objectivity is created by the human beings who create knowledge. When the act of creating knowledge is seen as an art form, then subjectivity is seen as inherent within knowledge. Then generating objective knowledge is a matter of ridding knowledge of subjectivity. But as I described already, we have a distinction between pure, true objectivity, and inter-subjective objectivity, the latter being objectivity by convention, is inherently subjective itself.

So you keep avoiding my question of how you would actually measure crookedness. Is there any way other than comparing it to what it is most directly not? — apokrisis

Well, as an example, I would take a string, and make it follow all the crooks of the crooked object, to get a better measurement.

Do you believe that it is generally accepted that plumbers qua plumbers are artists when they exercise creativity? — Arkady

Sorry, I was rushed and didn't explain myself well. Let me just clarify what I mean. The plumber, qua plumber, is not an artist, because they are taught to follow specific techniques, building codes, and practises dictated by the union. Trades people qua trades people, are not artists, for the very reason that they must follow specific dogma to be accepted as part of that trade. But if a plumber is in a particular situation which requires creativity, I think it is generally accepted that in this particular instance the plumber is acting as an artist.

I can't see how the whole question of what is or isn't art has anything to do with this thread... — Wayfarer

The issue is with how we, as human beings approach the unknown, and seek to bring the unknown into the realm of the known, what is called in Arkady's words the "knowledge generating endeavor". I believe this is a purely subjective activity best described as art. Arkady clearly denies art from this process, but does not offer anything else as a replacement.

..'one criterion might be that an artistic work serves no other purpose than to satisfy an aesthetic, whereas a piece of trade-craft, such as plumbing or whatever, has a utilitarian purpose. — Wayfarer

I was hoping I might get to this point in discussion with Arkady, because this brings us to the metaphysical divide between "beauty" and "good". If we ask, what is X good for, in a pragmatic sense, we are looking for the end, "that for the sake of which", is how Aristotle is commonly translated. This produces a chain of causation (final causation), X is good for Y which is good for Z etc.. So in his ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be an ultimate end, something sought for the sake of itself, and the other goods are sought for the sake of the ultimate good, which acts as an end to the chain. He proposed happiness.

Other philosophers have proposed that we can avoid this chain of final causes, "goods", by assuming "beauty" as the ultimate end, that which is sought for the sake of itself. From this point, it appears like we have a division between aesthetics and ethics. But exactly how this division exists depends on how we define "beauty". And, if "beauty" is proposed as the ultimate good, the end to the chain of final causes, we need to demonstrate a relationship between "beauty" and "good". If we maintain a pure division, that some things are sought for beauty, and some things are sought for good, then we have an ethical dilemma because unless we can show that "good" is higher than "beauty" we have no means to bring ethical principles to bear upon activities which are carried out for the sake of beauty.

Argument by assertion. — Arkady

Wow, what a retort, coming from someone whose entire engagement with me has been nothing but argument by assertion. First, I gave you the dictionary definition of "art". Then you asserted that we shouldn't go by dictionary definitions, and you knew of some other way that "art" was used. All you have done is continuously assert your believe that there is a difference between the creativity of an artist, and the creativity of a scientist. I ask you for principles to define this division, but all you do is repeatedly attack my definition which is well justified by the dictionary, asserting that I am wrong.

I haven't thrown away the ideal of the perfectly straight, I've determined that it is not useful in this situation. There are still many uses for those ideals. We use these ideals, such as geometrical principles, in construction and manufacturing, production. We build things according to these principles. But when we go to measure naturally existing things, we find that they do not naturlly exist according to these same ideals. We can artificially force naturally occurring elements to take the form of the ideal, as we do in manufacturing, but in their natural occurrence, they are not in the form of the ideal.

Actually the nonsense is in your passage which I first responded to:

As for the arts, Coyne does allow that the arts can be "ways of knowing" in certain ways, in that the arts can, for instance, tell us what certain historical figures looked like via their portraits. But for the most part, why should the arts be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor? This is clearly a case of humanitiesism: the encroachment of the humanities on the domain of the natural and social sciences. — Arkady

To think that art is not a knowledge generating endeavor is simply ridiculous beyond words. Instead of facing the reality of this mistake, and moving toward apprehending the true nature of art, and the role which it plays in human existence, you attempt to define "art" off into a corner somewhere where it becomes an irrelevant sideshow.

I have determined that the straight ruler is incapable of measuring the object which I desire to measure. If you want to call that "measured in some degree", then that's fine. I still need to find a better tool.

Yes as far as I know, it's well accepted that these trades people are artists. If someone said to you, "I am an artist", by what principle would you argue "no you are not an artist"?

Yes, I've worked with plumbers in the past, they take pride in their work, and I believe they often consider their work to be art. I think it is common throughout the trades, to refer to one's work as art, it signifies that you take pride in what you do. Finish carpenters especially think of themselves as artists. I worked in foundations for some time, and we'd sometimes refer to our various constructs as "a work of art". In this context, we'd be emphasizing the aesthetic value of the work.

Is this the specialized form of creativity which would constitute your understanding of "art"? Things created for aesthetic, rather than pragmatic purposes would constitute art?

What, in your opinion, delineates artistic human activities from non-artistic ones? As I asked above, if a plumber devises a creative solution to stem a leaky pipe, has he thereby created art? — Arkady

I think the answers to those questions should be obvious to you. What delineates an artistic human activity from a non-artistic activity is creativity. And of course, the creative plumber who devises a new solution to an old problem, is artistic. I gave you the dictionary definition, and whether you like referring to such definitions or not, the dictionary generally indicates accepted usage.

You , for some unknown reason, want to separate out certain types of creative acts from other types of creative acts, to say that those are acts of art, and these are not acts of art. Since it is you who is wanting this division within creative acts, you should be the one putting forward the principles by which you would maintain such a division. And it will not suffice to outline an arbitrary division, nor will it suffice to make a division based in some inter-subjective conventions. I want to see real objective principles whereby we can judge particular creative acts, and differentiate between artistic and non-artistic creative acts.

The point being, that if there are no such objective principles dividing these creative acts, then we can categorize them together and analyze them together. Then when we observe acts in which creativity is at the forefront of the act, we can derive a good understand of the nature of creativity, and apply this toward understanding the creative aspect of other acts, acts in which the creative elements might not be as well exposed.

If pointing out obvious differences between radically different spheres of human activity is "petty," then I'm guilty as charged. — Arkady

The point is, that "art" refers to human activity which is creative in nature, and this type of activity extends throughout all the different spheres of human activity. Creativity, and therefore art, is a common aspect of many different human actions. You might call these "radically different spheres of human activity" if you like, but we know that they all have something in common, creativity. And as much as composing music is radically different from painting a canvas, which is radically different from producing an hypothesis, I see nothing other than arbitrary assumptions, to indicate that any of these are not forms art. If they truly are similar, in the sense of being creative acts, artistic acts, then we can classify them as such, analyze, and attempt to understand these acts as artistic acts.

The straight ruler is your analogy. Don't you recognize it as your analogy?

I suppose on the same principle you object to rulers that pretend to be straight, and clocks that pretend to be regular. — apokrisis

My claim was that we cannot derive the true nature of a real black hole through the means of the Schwartzchild principle because it approaches with the concept of a perfect symmetry, when the real black hole is not a perfect symmetry. You replied with the above quote about using straight rulers. And so I explained that I would object to using a straight ruler to measure a crooked object. That is what applying the Schwartzchild GR principle to a real black hole is analogous to, trying to measure a crooked object with a straight ruler. As much as the Kerr formulation may be an adaptation of the perfect symmetry in an attempt to measure the black hole, which is not a perfect symmetry, it is not the best approach. The right approach is to formulate a new theory which starts from a description of what a black hole really is.

The aim of art is to create. However, the aim of science is to explain. — Arkady

This is really quite petty. "Art" is a very general term. Yes, the aim of art is to create, but there is no limit to the number of different things which artists aim to create. If some artists aim to create explanations, how is that creative act, as a creative act, essentially different from the creative act which aims to produce a building, a bridge, a computer, a car, a movie, a piece of music, or a painting? These are all acts of human creativity, artistry.

I'm talking about "using" art: i'm talking about creating art. Beethoven didn't have to worry about producing or replicating a particular note: he worried about writing it. There is no issue of accuracy there, hence the difference between a composer and a musician. — Arkady

In agreement with John, I think you have a poor understanding of the act of composing music. There is an idea within the composer's mind, and the composer must reproduce that idea in musical notes. The effort is in producing the required musical notes, memorizing it, and building on it. The writing down is an aid to memorizing the parts. Sure, one could compose a piece of music, simply by writing it, according to a mathematical formula or something, but this would be a lifeless piece of music. The real act of composing is to bring an idea from the mind into the realm of musical tones.

Accuracy is very important, because the composer proceeds from an ideal within the mind, and works to replicate that in sound. You should not underestimate the fact that the composer is working from an ideal, trying to replicate that ideal in physical sound. If the sound does not fulfill the conditions of the ideal, the composer is dissatisfied and will continue to work, through reference to mathematical principles, as well as intuition and trial and error, until the sound becomes what is expected of the composer. Judging by the intricacies, and complexities of Beethoven's music, I would say that he was an extreme perfectionist. In fact, I believe many artists suffer through psychological problems involved with perfectionism. Artistry works with ideals, and the process of trying to bring to reality different ideals which are apprehended as there, somewhere, but very difficult to grasp. The process of grasping these ideals, and bringing them to fruition in the physical world is not easy.

But all this is a diversion from the point, which was your statement that Coyne doesn't believe that the arts should be regarded as a truth-seeking or knowledge-generating endeavor. You supported this position by separating the creative aspect of science, from art proper, with complete disregard for the fact that all human creative activities are by definition, art. Adhering to this unwarranted division will prevent you from taking what we know about artistic activities, which can be gleaned from studying the activities of the pure arts, and applying this toward understanding the creativity within science. By means of your imposed division, you have disallowed any association between the pure arts, and the creativity of science. This greatly impedes our ability to understand the use of creativity in science. So unless you rescind this imposed separation we will have no way of understanding the use of creativity in science because you will not allow comparison to any clearly exposed examples of creativity in the pure arts.

I think your intent is to separate the subjectivity of art from the objectivity of science. Your desire is to misrepresent the creative endeavour of science, which seeks to expand knowledge into the unknown, as some sort of objective activity. But clearly this is a misrepresentation. This creative endeavour, found within science, is no different from any other art, it is a purely subjective act. In fact, since this act serves as an approach to the unknown, it is the most purely subjective act of any creative act. Within the realm of the unknown, there are no objective guide points, no objective principles whatsoever, as "unknown", it is the completely untraveled road. This is the most purely subjective form of creativity. To approach the unknown requires the highest form of subjective discipline, and this is an artistic skill. if you disallow reference to the pure arts, to learn this skill, you have done yourself a great disservice.

So you don't think GR might help with that? — apokrisis

No, I don't. That's the point. GR is coming at the real existing phenomenon which is called a blalk hole, with the Schwartzchild principle, which assumes a perfect symmetry. This is the straight ruler. The real existing black hole is not a perfect symmetry, so it is something which cannot be measured with the straight ruler. The straight ruler (GR with Schwartzchild principle) might be able to help us determine how the real black hole differs from the theoretical black hole, in a somewhat unreliable, speculative way, but it will not be able to tell us why the real black hole differs from the theoretical one. Therefore won't tell us the true nature of the real black hole. We need another theory for that, something which gives us the appropriate ruler.

Non-sequitur. The scientific process requires creativity, sure (one must be creative in conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical tests of said hypotheses, etc), but it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature. The aims and goals of science and art are completely different. — Arkady

Here's our difference of opinion right here. My dictionary defines "art" as "human creative skill or its application", and that's how I generally use it. If we maintain this definition, your claim that "it doesn't follow that all creative endeavors are artistic in nature" is false by contradiction to the definition. All human creative endeavors are artistic, by definition. So it appears to me like you are trying to produce a highly restrictive, and contrived definition of "art", to support a claimed separation between science and art. But the fact is that science uses art as much as any other human endeavor, and where it uses art is in its approach to the unknown, conjecturing hypotheses, devising empirical test, etc..

If we can agree, that this is art, and that it consists of the same elements as any other art forms, subjectivity, experimentation, trial and error, etc., then we can look at how art actually is a knowledge generating activity.

However, one of the cornerstones of the scientific method is the replicability of results, which lends science its objective force. Given appropriate circumstances, one should (at least in principle) be able to replicate an experiment and obtain similar results. — Arkady

The same type of replicability, and objective force, which you associate with science, exists throughout the arts. There are objective principles concerning mixing the paint colours, and there are objective principles involved with musical scales. But in the arts, we learn to distinguish two distinct types of objectivity, one associated with truths derived from the nature of reality, and the other associated with truths according to convention. The latter is sometimes referred to as inter-subjectivity, so it is not true in a purely objective way, it is a subjective based objectivity, something which is true by agreement. So for example, that blue and yellow paint will mix to produce green is an objective truth. But that this type of green is more pleasing than that type of green, or that this type of theme is more likely to sell your artwork than that type of theme, is more likely just an inter-subjective truth, something which is true by common taste, the current trend, or conventions amongst the artists.

We find the same principles in music. There are objective truths, based in the nature of reality concerning the principles of the octave, and harmonies. But within the accepted scales, there are many conventions as well which have no such objective base. They are just subjective preferences, produced from pragmatic principles, or ancient practises which have obtained universal acceptance. Consider theatre and movies, the principles followed in those arts are overwhelming inter-subjective. But notice that inter-subjective truths are no less "true" than pure objective truths. That following a certain formula sells your artwork, because this is what people like, is no less of a truth for the artist than the objective fact that blue and yellow make green, or that the fifth is in harmony with the tonic. Nevertheless, in philosophy we can learn to distinguish between these two types of truth, and we can find them intermixed, but identifiable as distinct, in the arts.

As for artists striving for accuracy and efficiency, I can only wonder what is the basis for that contention. While accuracy of some work's representation of reality may be a desideratum of some artists, I don't see how accuracy is a goal inherent to the artistic process (except in the fairly trivial manner that artists often seek to realize their mental vision or concept of the art in executing it). How would one gauge the "accuracy" of, for instance, Beethoven's Fifth? — Arkady

Any time that human beings use art, there is always a concern about accuracy. And this is primarily accuracy in relation to pure objective fact. When the musician wants a harmony, that harmony must be as pure as possible. Tuning is critical, and a slight difference in frequency is repugnant to the trained ear. The same is the case in mixing paints, the artist wants to be able to precisely replicate the colour which was produced before and is now desired. This is no different from the art involved in the sciences. The scientist wants accuracy in relation to the pure objective facts.

However, inter-subjective objectivity mixes and intermingles with pure objective fact, in all of the arts. So even in the scientific arts such as conjecturing hypothesis and devising experiments, inter-subjective principles will enter, sometimes under the guise of being objective truths. There is a problem which is very peculiar to science, and this problem exists because science is the means by which we distinguish pure objective fact from inter-subjective fact. The problem is that because science is validated by empirical evidence, it has no mechanism within its own principles, which would allow it to distinguish between pure objective fact, and inter-subjective objectivity, within its own body of scientific knowledge. "Empirical evidence" implies agreement with respect to a judgement drawn from the experience of numerous human beings. But this is exactly what inter-subjectivity is. So the means by which the scientific method judges something as pure objective fact, is simply inter-subjectivity.

I disagree that the perception is an act of interpretation. The perception comes before the judgement. Step 1: I perceive the stars twinkling. Step 2: I interpret that stars twinkle. Step 2 has the potential to be incorrect because, as you say, it is an act of interpretation. But step 1 cannot be incorrect. It is a simple fact. If I am incorrect about the interpretation, the fact remains that I perceive the stars twinkling. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point though, is that Step 1 does not have to occur as the described Step 1, "I perceive the stars twinkling". One might perceive twinkling stars, one might perceive stars that are not twinkling, another might not see any stars at all. So the perception, which you are referring to as Step 1, is itself an interpretation of what is really out there, because we can see what's out there in many different ways. The fact that you can revisit the perception in your memory, and reinterpret, giving it another description if you like, is irrelevant to the fact that it already is an interpretation, as a perception.

Let's stay on the ground of "common sense". — Samuel Lacrampe

So, referring to common sense then, how do you account for these differences of perception, if perception itself is not an act of interpretation? Three people are looking at the night sky. One sees stars twinkling, another see stars not twinkling, and the other doesn't see any stars. I think that they each see something different, because the act of seeing is an act of interpreting what's out there, and a person could be mistaken in this act. You think that the act of seeing is not an act of interpretation, and that a person cannot be wrong in the act of perception, but how do you account for these differences?