Shutz's abstraction does not do justice to the reality of his violent death. Some think that by abstracting Till as Shutz has done, she has closed the casket because we don't see the essential, revolting realism. and this denies Till's mother's request. — Cavacava

I don't agree with this criticism. For one thing, I think the disfiguring of the face is fairly represented. But more importantly though, it appears as if he is being portrayed as something like an angel of God, and it would be more appropriate to represent him as being at peace and satisfied in his post-death condition. The condition of his body is no longer of importance. At the time of his death, it may have been significant to his mother to demonstrate the act of violence which occurred. But the condition of his body is just a symbol representing the violence which occurred, and that violence is a symbol which represents a deeper problem, and under this, probably an even deeper problem. So Emmet Till's act, as an angel, is to bring to our attention the deeper underlying problems. The condition of his body is of very little relevance now. I feel that Shutz is justified to remove the ugliness from her image of him, because she wants to bring out the good, and represent his post-death condition, in a positive way, recognizing him as a beautiful person. The violent act leaves an ugly scar on the beautiful person, but it does not render the person as ugly. So there is no need for the artist to represent that person in an ugly way.

The painting is of a casket, and as such flowers, hands, praying are expected. What perhaps is tough to explain is why they are white...except that if you were to accept my interpretation, then it is heaven, & all those little angels that hover around saints that form the top border of the casket, hovering above Emmett. — Cavacava

I think there is very good reason why the praying hands are white. It demonstrates the sympathy and compassion of white people, that white people just as much as black people abhor this violent act. So this is Emmet's angelic act, to bring to the attention of white people, that other white people will act in such an abhorrent way, in order that these white people will condemn this behaviour. It is unproductive for one social class to condemn the actions of another, without the power to do anything about it. Such condemnation is simply dismissed as the difference between classes. Each society, or sector of society, has its own little set of rules and codes which it follows, and only according to the powers of law can one sector impose its rules on another. The black community had no power to tell the whites that certain behaviour is unacceptable to them. There were no laws to afford them this capacity. So the power of change must come from within the white community. It is necessary that white people see what other white people are doing, as wrong. Therefore the significance of Emmet's post-death condition is best represented as white hands paying respect for what has occurred. The angelic power which Emmet expresses in his post-death condition is the power to change the minds of white people, something which living black people could not do.

So general relativity, a theory with mountains of evidence to confirm it, is "nonsense" because you don't like the notion of spatial expansion. Wonderful argument. Top marks. — VagabondSpectre

I'm glad you have such a high appreciation of what I said. Until you can explain spatial expansion in a way which makes sense, I'll assume my top marks are well deserved.

If you're honest with yourself I think you will realize that the rapid expansion description of the universe isn't "just unintelligible nonsense". — VagabondSpectre

OK then, if you want to discuss philosophy instead of just throwing around catch phrases like "Big Bang", "space itself is expanding", and "rapid expansion of heat and energy", as if there's something real that these phrases represent, then let's have a go, and see if these phrases really refer to something intelligible or not. But speaking gibberish and claiming it to be intelligible doesn't make it intelligible.

I suppose the biggest question is the issue of sincerity. That's what I alluded to at the end of my last post. Does the artist have genuine feelings concerning the portrayed event, or is the artist opportunist, looking at potential controversy as a chance for notoriety and personal benefit. That would be a problem, for a white artist (or any artist for that matter) to take this "American Image", which was really a dreadful occurrence and shamelessly use it for personal advancement. Don't you agree that this would be bad taste?

We cannot really turn to the artist to ask this question, and artists are notoriously vague and obscure when describing the motivations behind their work. They prefer that we see for ourselves, what is within the work, and only tend to offer corrections if they think the critics have gone way off track. So the claim that it's an "American Image" is just an attempt to counter the charge of social appropriation, which I would agree is way off track.

But we still have the issue of the artist's sincerity, and the possibility of bad taste. We have to find hints of this within the work itself, true expressions of feeling would demonstrate that the artist is genuine. If it is true, as you say, that the image is of a sacred icon, then this would be an indication of sincerity. But I'm not sure that I see that. The beige could be an aura or halo, like you say, that makes sense, but it doesn't quite look like it to me. Is that really what the artist intended? What makes you say that it is? Why is there a straight edge and a sharp point at the top? I find the border at the top of the painting to be very interesting. I do see flowers there, as well as a white hand. What makes you think that the white hand is praying rather than preying?

First, an interpretation can be, by accident or not, the thing itself. If you deny this, then every single thing that every single person on this forum says, are misunderstanding. I hope that is not true. — FLUX23

An interpretation is an explanation or description of the meaning of something. How can that be the thing itself. To say what something means, is not the thing itself. An interpretation may be judged as an understanding or it may be judged as a misunderstanding, but this is irrelevant to the fact that an interpretation cannot be the thing itself which is being interpreted.

If a god really do exist, then he can be deistic, materialistic, or omnipotent, and etc. We don't know that. Whatever it is, we just name it X. However, OP provides a type of God in certain religion (most likely Abrahamic God). We name this type of interpretation of God as X'. Then we comprehend the properties of X' and can draw out conclusion that there are flaws and contradiction in its properties. Thus, X' can be proven nonexistent. That is independent of whether X exist or not. — FLUX23

Let's say that there is an existent thing referred to as X. If an interpretation of this thing contains contradictions, that does not mean that the thing does not exist, it means that there is a faulty interpretation, a misunderstanding. It is nonsense to assert that the faulty interpretation indicates that the thing does not exist. If I say that my shirt is blue, when it is really green, because I am colour blind, this does not mean that my shirt doesn't exist.

I am claiming that this thread fails to account for the "actual" God (X) as it only talks about "one interpretation" of God (X'). But the OP and several others are mixing X' and X up and trying to prove or disprove X by arguing existence or nonexistence of X'. This is a fallacy (as Mariner mentioned). I am wondering how they are going to talk about X with a OP like this. — FLUX23

I don't understand your point. All we have to go on, with respect to any existing things, is our interpretations of those things. According to your claim then, we cannot prove the existence of anything, and this is probably true, we take the existence of things for granted. But that's just extreme skepticism, to claim that we can't prove the existence of anything. However, if we are talking about an "interpretation", rather than a fiction, then it is assumed that the thing exists, in order that there is an interpretation of that thing. Perhaps you think that we should determine more clearly whether we are talking about an interpretation or a fiction?

1. Let's say there is the true target of what we are trying to interpret as X.
2. Whatever we actually interpret about X is X', and not X itself. (X' can be X, but we don't know at this point.)
3. X' has been created with the same apprehensive ability we have. It follows that X' is able to apprehend by us with our senses.
4. If X' cannot be apprehend by our senses, then interpretation of X (= X') must be a mistake.
5. Therefore X' does not exist. (This does not mean X does not exist.) — FLUX23

This is complete nonsense. First, in number 2 you allow that an interpretation could be the thing itself, which is impossible. Then in number 3 you state that the interpretation, X', must be apprehensible with the senses, but this is nonsensical. How would you apprehend with the senses an interpretation?

But, saying that something exists but isn't there is a contradiction is it not? — GreyScorpio

"There" implies a particular spatial location. But concepts are apprehended without having any particular spatial location, so it is incorrect to say that something must be "there" to be apprehended, and therefore must be "there" to exist. We apprehend concepts through the means of sensible objects, which are "there", but the concept which is apprehended is not there. This is called abstraction.

Agreed, but these things you have listed are concepts. Things that are unreachable by the senses. Alright, this could be the explanation for God. But this would still make him a concept and that is what he will remain until we have validation. — GreyScorpio

God is known to have the same type of existence as a concept, i.e. immaterial, but this does not mean that God is a concept. A concept is one type of immaterial object, the type produced by the human mind. Plato and the Neo-Platonists demonstrated the need to assume other immaterial objects, Forms, which are not themselves human concepts. So God is like these, an immaterial object which is independent from the human mind, not a concept.

I just feel as though some sort of validation is in order for us to put so much faith in this 'being'. — GreyScorpio

It is a complex, metaphysical, ontological issue, one which is not readily understood. The issue must be approached with a philosophical attitude, a mind which is open to the forcefulness of logic, despite what one's intuition might tell oneself. To state it simply, Aristotle demonstrated with logic, that "what" an object will be, must precede the existence of that object. This is because the object comes into existence as the object which it is rather than as something else. The existence of an object is not the feat of randomness. Therefore the "form" of the object must exist prior to the material object itself, in order that when the material object exists, it exists as the object which it is, and no something else. The Neo-Platonists used this principle to support the idea of separate Forms, having immaterial existence, being necessarily prior to material existence.

It's not nonsense at all. Explosions are the rapid expansion that results from a sudden release of heat and energy. — VagabondSpectre

I know what an explosion is, and a sudden release of energy, I just don't know what an expansion of heat or energy is supposed to mean. By the law of conservation of energy, energy does not expand.

But what are you really saying here. "General relativity is inadequate"? What are it's inadequacies? — VagabondSpectre

General relativity leaves us with the notion of spatial expansion, which is nonsense. This indicates that general relativity is inadequate for understanding the nature of the universe. The real issue is the relationship between space and time which relativity theory creates, making time a fourth dimension. This leaves us incapable of understanding non-dimensional things. We know that there is zero dimensional existence, the evidence is abundant in mathematics. The only logical way to incorporate the non-dimensional into our understanding of reality is to allow time to be the 0th dimension. This requires establishing a completely different relationship between time and space from the one which relativity gives us, which makes time the fourth dimension.

"The heat-expansion event" is just short hand for saying that approximately 13.7 billion years ago, all the matter and energy that is in the observable universe was in a very hot and very dense state as it expanded outward. — VagabondSpectre

And I'll say it again, that's just unintelligible nonsense. What's the point in describing something as unintelligible nonsense rather than just saying "we don't know", other than to create the deceptive impression that one knows what one is talking about, when this is really not the case.

As you can probably tell, I've been trying to avoid actually interpreting the work, alluding to my belief that it is very difficult to do a proper analysis. Anyway, I'll offer a few opinions.

To begin with, I don't think that "cultural appropriation" should be made into a real issue at all. It is simply a divisive weapon, and segregation is destructive to society as a whole. It is by sharing the objects which hold significance to us, that we express love. And when we express love, we share our emotions and inner feelings. "Objects of significance" includes harmful things, and by sharing these harmful things we allow others to express their love for us, through emotions such as compassion and sympathy. To insist in any generalized way, that we should not share these objects of significance, is to say that we should not love each other. Of course this is blatantly divisive, and runs counter to what I believe is of primary importance to the artist, and that is to create an object of significance. The object created is meant to be shared, so the artistic creation is itself a loving act. To say that the artist is sharing something which should not be shared, is like you telling me I shouldn't have shared my feelings with you. I would say why, don't you love me?

On that issue, I pretty much agree with what you said was Schultz's remarks. Unless one infringes on copyright of intellectual property, cultural appropriation is a "pseudo-offence". Consider the Bob Dylan clip, where he says I took the chord progression from so and so. This might be copyright infringement, but that progression has most likely already entered the public domain, so there is no issue here. To say that it is the property of one sector of society, and not another, is rather nonsensical.

So the real issue is not whether we should share such things, but exactly how we express ourselves when we do that sharing. If you have been in a hurtful situation, and I move to express sympathy, and say the wrong thing, it might just magnify your hurt. In this situation, despite the fact that my move was a loving, compassionate move, it is not received as such. There could be many reasons for this. It might be an awkward blunder. But if you knew me well, you would overlook this and see the loving intent. It might be that you harbour a dislike for me already, so that even my approach to you would be seen as an affront. In this case there would be a high probably that what I said would be received as hurtful, so only a few, very precisely chosen words, might be acceptable as loving, and not magnifying the hurt. If I were the one who did harm to you, and realized that I must apologize, it would be an extremely difficult approach. Not only would my words need to be very precisely chosen, but my entire approach, how I could get close enough to you to express myself, would be paramount.

I can approach Schultz's painting in this way. I first assume that it is a true loving, sympathetic expression. But for the ones receiving it, it may be magnifying the hurt. So it is a bit of an awkward blunder, and there is not enough love and trust between them such that they might see the true loving intent, and so it is received as an affront. The question then, is to validate, justify, the assumption of true loving intent.

There is some use of colour in the painting which intrigues me. The border across the top, I see as a confused white, which could be significant. Behind the boy's head is a whole lot of beige, some blue thrown in, with a bit of red. I suppose the red is blood, it seems to come from the head. What do you think all that beige is there for? it's not his hair.

This type of question is crucial I believe, because an artist may abuse a situation, seeking attention, controversy, or media recognition. So we have to look very closely at the aesthetics, the form of the work, to determine whether she is expressing true compassion, or abusing the "object of significance" for other purposes, such as to attract attention to herself. In which case her expression ought to show a lack of sympathy, evidence of mistake, producing an awkward blunder rather than a true expression of sympathy.

We know the rapid expansion of heat and energy happened; an explosion. — VagabondSpectre

"Expansion of heat and energy" is a nonsense phrase. It doesn't make any sense at all to say that heat or energy expands. This idea just comes about from the inadequacies of general relativity to provide us with the means to understand what really has happened.

We have a very good description of what the big bang was, we just don't know have a complete and full description with receipt — VagabondSpectre

OK, if you think that "heat expansion" is a good description, then explain to me what heat expansion means.

Ask a physicist, and they're likely to tell you that we're as certain that a big bang of some sort occurred as we are certain that the earth is round. — VagabondSpectre

In case you're not up to date with modern geodesy, the earth is not round.

We know the big bang happened (but we don't know exactly what it was)... — VagabondSpectre

This is a very meaningless statement. We know that an event X occurred, but we don't know what X was. Every time we attempt to describe X, we are probably wrong, so how can we even make the claim that X occurred? X has absolutely no meaning because we don't know what X is. It's like saying I know that there is something there, but I have absolutely no idea what it is. What's the point in even naming it X, if it could be absolutely anything? Why not call it what it is, the unknown, instead of creating the false impression that there is something known here?

That's right. there's no big disagreement, we're just discussing some finer points. The question right now is how we ought to approach the piece of art, if we are going to judge it. We have two distinct approaches, the artist is trying to communicate something to us (content), or the piece of work is a stand alone entity to be judged purely on its aesthetic qualities (form). Any piece of art though, would consist of elements of both of these, so to properly judge the art, would require that the critic determine the importance of these two primary intents, in relation to each other, in the mind of the artist. To think that the artist is trying to communicate something specific, when the individual is simply trying to produce something aesthetic, or vise versa, constitutes a gross misunderstanding of the piece.

Since a work of art is a composition of many different parts, the task is to distinguish which parts are meant to be saying something, and which parts are meant as aesthetic pieces. For example, in a song, the lyrics may be principally intended to say something, while the music is aesthetic. We can then further analyze each of these divisions, and find that the rhyming and rhythm of the lyrics is aesthetical, while certain phrases are meant to communicate something. In an abstract piece of visual art, we might find that the piece is principally aesthetic, while the title of the piece is meant to communicate something. Then if we look into the abstract art itself, bearing in mind what the title is saying, we might find little communicative pieces, supporting the title, hidden within the aesthetics.

To confuse an aesthetic aspect with a communicative aspect, or vise versa, would be to misunderstand the art. But if the artist is very good, the two will be indistinguishably blended, rendering the work impossible to understand. So this indicates that the real intent of the author is to disguise aesthetic aspects as communicative, and communicative aspects as aesthetic, creating a puzzling effect on the audience. In the case of the op, the different ways to resolve the puzzle may create controversy.

I agree with you to the extent that any work of art must communicate something, even Cage's 4'33 communicates something. From the earliest cave paintings, to the most disturbing atonal music, to the highest form of conceptual art, there is communication, an intersubjective component in every work of art. What is communicated encompasses the reality of the work. What is communicated portrays something about the world (which includes thought and matter), what the work is in itself is purposeless (pace Kant). — Cavacava

But if you reduce art to a form of communication, then we must consider, first and foremost, what is intended by the artist. Because, if you believe that the piece of art is communicating something to you, but you allow that it is communicating something not intended by the artist, then you are practising self-delusion. This is like hearing voices, the artist is telling you something, but the artist is not really saying that.

It is only by removing this necessity, the necessity that the art work must communicate something, that we can really value art for what it is, and that is on the basis of how it affects us, rather than what the author intended to communicate. This is why I said we must consider that the artist creates the art work, not to portray anything, but to be something, itself. The art is made to be an existing thing, not the representation, or portrayal, of a thing. When we see the art in this way, we are not obliged to consider what the artist is trying to communicate. We are free to judge the work based on the affect which it has on us, without having to refer to what the artist is trying to communicate. Any attempt to determine what the artist is trying to communicate is nonsense, because the artist worked to create something, not to communicate.

This misses the whole point of the example. In context, Peirce was illustrating for his audience that laws of nature are real generals; it had absolutely nothing to do with his "power" to let go of the stone. If it helps, we can change the subjunctive conditional to eliminate that aspect: "If my hand were to disappear magically, then the stone would fall to the ground." — aletheist

It's not the power to drop the stone, which is relevant here, it's the power to hold the stone up in a position where it may be dropped, which is relevant. The proposed counterfactual is only produced according to this power to hold the stone above the floor. Set the stone on the table, and the table acts as that "power" which holds the stone above the floor.

This is the difference between the Newtonian way of looking at gravity, and the Einsteinian way. Newton looks at objects as separate from each other, such that their "natural state" is to be separate, and then a force, gravity is required to drive them together. The Einsteinian way reduces gravity to a property of the unity of objects, such that the natural state of objects is to be unified. But from this perspective it is necessary to determine the force which holds objects apart.

How can the laws of nature be "real generals" when something so simple as gravity can be understood in these two opposing ways? One way is that objects are naturally divided, and there is a force which moves objects toward each other, and the other way is that objects are naturally united, and there is a force which holds them apart.

No, what makes the first statement true is not some "power" that Peirce has. Rather, it is the fact that there is a real tendency in the universe for things with mass (such as a stone and the earth) to move toward each other in the absence of some intervening object (such as a man's body). — aletheist

So what is the "real counterfactual" here? Hasn't the man simply produced something unnatural, produced something counter-nature, by picking up the rock and separating it form the earth? Then your so-called "real tendency", is only the result of this artificial separation. Now the law, the so-called "real general", only applies in these instances of artificial separation. This real general doesn't apply to naturally occurring situations at all.

No, what makes the first statement true is not some "power" that Peirce has. Rather, it is the fact that there is a real tendency in the universe for things with mass (such as a stone and the earth) to move toward each other in the absence of some intervening object (such as a man's body). — aletheist

I would differ with this. He had to lift the stone into the appropriate position, and hold it there with the possibility of dropping it. So, what makes the statement true, really is some power that Peirce has. Nature may set up some rocks on the side of a cliff, but it really doesn't have the power to drop the rock whenever it wants. Nature doesn't have the capacity to propose "if I drop the stone".

Space itself is expanding. — VagabondSpectre

I don't think that's correct, because it is the distance between objects which is expanding, not objects themselves. Objects don't expand. If you think that there is a real entity called "space" existing between objects, which is expanding, then what about the space within objects? If an object consists of parts, with space between the parts, then the space between the parts ought to be expanding, and the object ought to be expanding as well as the space outside it. I think that the concept of spatial expansion is really just the result of our inadequate understanding of the relationships between space, time, matter, and gravity. The theories used here misguide us.

Art's aesthetic draws us to the work, the work's matter by way of its form strikes us (or not) as part of narratives that we understand. The value we give to of a work of art lies is in how we experience that work, which can be intimated but not fully explicated. I think great art has an enigmatic aspect, a remainder, something which can't be explained. At the same time our experience of a work of art follows the coherence and logic of the work, regardless of the intent of the artist. — Cavacava

I agree that there is something about a work of art, which draws us toward it. I wouldn't say it's the aesthetic though, because "aesthetic" already implies a judgement of beauty or ugly. So I would say that something "strikes" us, it's striking. To take your example of music, you hear something and it attracts your attention, but right away, you may have made a judgement of whether or not you like it. The judgement is based on aesthetic value, but you do not necessarily make such a judgement. You may just hear the music and think, well this is different, and I don't really know if I like it or not. Then you are struck without judging the aesthetic.

Therefore we can remove aesthetics from the first impression, and aesthetics can be associated with meaning, it is part of the judgement we pass, beautiful, or ugly. Consider the painting of the op. The use of colours and patterns strikes you, and you are inclined toward thinking that there is some beauty there. But when you are informed about what it represents, you realize that there is massive ugliness hidden under that apparent aesthetic beauty. Then to represent this ugliness with even a hint of aesthetic attraction appears to be severely wrong.

I disagree to the extent that whatever the work portrays is its reality, how it communicates and what it has to say is largely derivative of the society and culture that nurtured the artist. A good argument can be wrong, it can be knowingly wrong as in sophistry. — Cavacava

You seem to not be realizing the fact that good art need not "portray" anything. The art work is a creative piece, it is made to "be" something, on its own, something stand alone, a piece of art. This is the reality of the art work. You cannot say that what it portrays is the reality, because it's not necessarily meant to portray anything, it is meant to "be" something. What it "communicates", is entirely a function of the audience, what "I get from it". That the artist intends to communicate is only true so far as the artist attempts to portray something. If the artist is attempting to portray something, then this may be, as you say derivative of the artist's society and culture. But I think it is wrong to look at any piece of art with the perspective of "what does the work portray", because the primary intention of the artist is to create something, not to portray something.

What we need is a way to defuse the power of money on economic decision-making, releasing the economic factors from the narrow channels of money flow that keep enriching the economically high and mighty. This needs to be effected without blocking individual’s ability to acquire wealth, which motivates economic production. It is best to achieve this economic power diffusion with least interference from other entities, like continued manipulation by government. — Ashwin Poonawala

I wouldn't say that this is possible, would you? Take a look back at your moral edict, "do unto others...". So long as an individual perceives oneself to be getting the short end of the stick, that person will not obey such an order. Why should I be nice to those who have everything, are giving me very little, and taking whatever they can get from me? The corporations have figured out how to charge us $X per month for everything right up to the air that we breathe (and that's probably next), nickel and diming us, tapping us until we're sapped out, leaving us two choices, hate them for their unreasonable charges, or join the gravy train. If we hate them, we will not be inclined to "do unto others..." toward them. And joining the gravy train requires that we invert the moral edict, so that it now reads "do unto others what others have done to you". Welcome to the pyramid project.

The big bang happened folks. It was undeniably the heat event that is responsible for the cosmos at large. "Beginning", "Everything", "Infinite", these are red-herrings; we know an expansion happened. — VagabondSpectre

Sure, you can say "expansion happened", it's happening right now. But we're just referring to something which we have a completely inadequate understanding of. And if you think that you understand expansion, answer for yourself, what it is that is expanding.

I believe it is General Relativity theory which leads to the conclusion of the Big Bang, and I don't think that this theory provides us with a good representation of the relationship between space and time. So I think the Big Bang theory is a product of this inadequate understanding of the relationship between space and time.

Before the Big Bang, there was nothing. — Ellie

The Big bang is a very dubious concept. It's what an inadequate understanding of time and space leads us to believe in.

A little-remembered moment from the GW Bush presidency was that, shortly after getting into office, he ordered the military to restart R&D into "Star Wars," leading to god knows how much more money pissed down the drain on that boondoggle. — Arkady

This point goes two ways though. We are now dependent on satellites for just about every aspect of our lives, and a lot of this technology probably came about from the R&D push for "Star Wars". War and defence motivates R&D, but the technology developed can have a wide range of applications.

What a work means as you indicate may be abstract and obscure, but that is not what draws us to the work. What draws us to it is its aesthetic, the affect of its surface. The "meaning" of a work of art is I think secondary, and perhaps incidental to its affect, to its aesthetic. Music can be an example of pure affect. — Cavacava

I think it's not so easy to separate the meaning from the aesthetic. When we look at art, we take it for granted that it was created by an artist, so that premise of meaning is inherent within the aesthetic of the art. I don't know about you, but I look at a natural beauty in a completely different way from an artificial beauty, because the skill and technique of the artist is always in my mind when I look at art. I'm usually looking at "what the artist did" so I'm looking more at the meaning than at the aesthetic. Being a musician myself, I find this to be especially the case with music, so your example is lost on me.

The artistic portrayal of reality must be fictive, it is not the actual experience, not the actual apple, not the actual body in the casket, but rather the way or manner of narrative that enables a unique view of reality. The problem with this is that the aesthetic itself can be bias, prejudice, unjust, but very effective in seducing its viewers/readers/hearers by its affect, which is why propaganda (and rhetoric) can be powerful. — Cavacava

In most cases, I don't think an artist is trying to portray reality, so art in general is neither actual nor fictive, it's something completely different. The more abstract the art is, the more "different" it is. The "affect" which you refer to is just what the individuals of the audience get out of the art. So it's not the case that the artist is actively seducing you, you are allowing yourself to be "affected". You do not have to allow yourself to be so affected, you can ignore the art. Think of a logical argument, if it's very bad, you will not be affected by it at all, but if it's good, you may be affected by it. Even if it's good though, you can still choose to ignore it.

The issue is the fictionalization of reality. Does, can, ought any work of art come close to representing the reality it is supposed to portrait? Isn't there a danger in fictionalization of what has occurred, in that it may not convey the harshness of the reality that it's supposed to represent, instead it may suggest a stance that is far removed from being honest to its origin, as TimeLine and mcdoodle seem to suggest. — Cavacava

The "meaning" which lies within a work of art is often vague, ambiguous, or obscure, art often being of an abstract nature. The meaning is a representation of the artist's intent, what was meant by the artist. I don't think it is appropriate, or correct, to say that the meaning of the art is a "fictionalization of reality", it is more like an obscured reality. The artist may take a little piece of reality and, with the use of obscurity, attempt to create a wide range of meaning from that little piece of reality. Through the use of obscurity, the artist allows one's own intentions to be interpreted in many different ways. What the art means to me, and what the art means to you, may be completely different, due to that use of obscurity.

I think that in the exemplified case, the criticism is based in the fact that the art obscures the importance of that little piece of reality which it represents. So to the ones whom that piece of reality is extremely important, it belittles that importance. The point is that the artist can take that piece of reality which is intensely meaningful to a small group of people, distort it with ambiguity, and present it in a way which is somewhat meaningful to a large group of people. To argue that this is a bad thing to do is to argue that art is bad.

1. Reality is real.
a. Only reality is real
b. Only things are real
i. For the moment the test of thingness is if in principle it can be felt, seen, smelled, heard, or tasted. Here, at least, neither numbers, love, justice, nor any ideas at all, are things. — tim wood

Reality is more complex than this. There is also the movement of things. The movement of things creates a difficulty for the "S is P" form of sentence, because it is described as a relationship between one thing and another.

No, I'm not. I'm talking about existing things. For them to exist, they have to become actualized, according to you, that is, they must become "informed," yes? If so, then how is that process not in time? — Thorongil

I'm not following this at all what do you mean by "informed"? If you mean instilled with a form, then the form must exist prior to the act of informing. Don't you agree?

Oh, really? Then explain the following remarks you make:

"Prior to creation, God did not have to create."
"When an individual sees X as good, one acts on that."
"It is only after the act occurs that we can say that the individual saw X as good."
"It is the "seeing X as good" which causes the act." — Thorongil

Again, I don't follow your point. Could you clarify, what are you asking for?

Mm, but I would say that fascism inverts this formula: it's about the interests of the State over and above the welfare of individual citizens. Exactly how to articulate the limits of both the state and its citizens (along with other interests) is, I think, the very political problem that is grappeled with in both instances. — StreetlightX

That's the key point I think, the good of the state is given priority over the good of the individuals. The problem is that there is no such thing as the good of the state, it's just an idea, a fantasy ideal, fictitious, just like how an atheist would receive the ideal of God. In reality, the good of the state is just whatever the leaders of the state designate as the good of the state, like a church designates the good of God.

Yeah, that's legit. I was also very unclear in my post above, when I said Fascism wants to remain separate from the state despite being the state. It would be more accurate to say that, on an ideological and ideal level, it totally wants to be the state, but, since that doesn't really pan out (it always finds itself forced to cater to - or at least cut deals with- entrenched powers) there ends up being a de facto dual state. The fascists fail to live up to their fantasy. That's where the mobilization thing comes in. If things settled, it would become clear the fascist state was not the unified absolute-everything it's claimed to be. But if everything's running at a high-pitch, it's easier to delude oneself and others, that there's a unified fascist state growing stronger every day, heading toward perfection. — csalisbury

In actuality, "the state" exists only as a concept, it's an evolving idea, as Hegel described. The fascist has to create the illusion that the state is a real existing entity, in order to talk about what's good for the state. So the fascist state is separated out, individuated, and opposed to, that which is not the fascist state. This creates the logical illusion that the state has properties, what is of the state, and what is not of the state, supporting the illusion that the state is a real entity. It is only by conceiving of the state as an actual living entity that we can talk about the needs, and therefore "goods", of the state. In our real, natural condition, "the state" just refers to the mechanisms set up to serve the needs of the people. That "the state" even has an existence as a clearly defined idea, is highly dubious, and that's the Hegelian notion that Marx attacked. "The state" does not even exist as an idea, its just some vague notion that we have, concerning the human condition.

We just need the free market in health care. — Thorongil

Insurance companies intervene in the free market. They negotiate special deals with the hospitals, deals which the uninsured cannot get, so that the uninsured individual may have to pay many times more for the same treatment than the insurance company would pay. No matter how you look at it, insurance is nasty business. Insurance of any type should not even be allowed to be a business. It's extortion.

I don't think it's a question of logic. Why? Because, one thing we do know is that evidence for and against god is unavailable. — TheMadFool

Logic doesn't operate on evidence though, it operates on rules. Adhering to rules produces a logical conclusion. Logical conclusions may be used as evidence.

The simple reason for this, upon even a superficial analysis, is that if the evidence was there, either for or against, one of the warring factions (theists, atheists) wouldn't exist. — TheMadFool

Whether a given occurrence is evidence for, or evidence against, a particular proposition depends on how one interprets the occurrence. We interpret according to rules, and this is a use of logic. So whether a given occurrence is evidence for, or evidence against, depends on what logic one uses. There is lots of evidence for both sides, but that is because each interprets existence in different ways. Therefore each side is supported by different logic.

What I suspect is that there's a desire/hope/abhorrence that determines which side you choose. — TheMadFool

Of course it is true that our logic is greatly influenced by what we desire, because we use logic to determine the means for obtaining what we desire. But the thing desired is often far removed from the logical conclusion, the decision. So for example, if I decide to take the bus to work instead of driving, this could be for many different reasons, perhaps I want to do some reading on the bus. The reason why I decide to take the bus represents the desire (to read), but the choice (to take the bus), is not very closely related to the desire. Likewise there would be a reason why one would choose to be theist or atheist, and this would be related to some desire, but it's probably not very closely related to that choice itself. Therefore I think the question of whether or not one desires for God to exists is a rather irrelevant question, for the purposes you've expressed.

Obvisouly theism and atheism can't be explained in terms of rationality. It's like two people put in the exact same environment (our world) and one sees God and the other doesn't. Clearly the fault is not in logic. I want to know if perhaps desire has a role in this. — TheMadFool

Since God is supposed to be immaterial, theists don't actually "see" God with their eyes. So I think the discretionary difference must be the result of some form of logic. Of course there must be some type of desire involved, as all choice requires motivating factors.

I don't disagree with you, but there needs to be some line drawn otherwise we will find ourselves in an even more absurd position, namely solipsism. — TimeLine

Why would you think that a belief in the impossibility of absolute certainty would lead to solipsism? I would think that since certainty is the property of the subject, the one who is certain, then solipsism would be more closely related to certainty than to skepticism. Being certain would create a division between that which is within one's own mind, which the individual is certain of, and all that is outside one's mind, which one cannot be certain of. If we allow that there is not even certainty within our own minds, then we produce a unity, or consistency, between what is inside the mind and what is outside, both being uncertain.

Why would you suggest that? The souls of the very first humans were united to their bodies, even though they did not have original sin. — aletheist

It could be that because of original sin, we cannot have separate existence of the soul, separate from the body, and many believe that the separate existence of the soul is required for eternal life. Notice that we get redemption through Christ, and Christ has promised eternal life.

Sure, but that involves some equivocation on what we mean by "good" and "evil." We all bear the image of God, which makes us good; but that image is corrupted in all of us, which makes us evil. — aletheist

So where's the equivocation? By the fact that we are beings which act of free will, means that we are good. By the fact that our decisions, and acts are somewhat deficient means that we are evil. As Aquinas explained in the quote, human beings exist as a multiplicity. In some aspects we are good, and in others we are bad. Likewise in our acts, they also have a multiplicity of elements, in some aspects they are good, in others they are bad.

The point is that Jesus clearly taught that human beings since the Fall are not inherently good, contrary to your position. I did not think that it would be appropriate to post the entire context of each quote; I provided the citations so that you can look up the passages yourself if you are so inclined. I also stuck to statements of Jesus Himself; the list would be much longer if I had included the entire New Testament. — aletheist

This is why you should read some theology rather than just relying on some interpretations of what Jesus said. Thomas Aquinas clearly describes what moves the human will as "the good". Also, good is equated with being, so that the human being, since it is a being, is necessarily good. Summa Theologica Q.18 Art.1:

I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things , each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the first part (Q.5 AA. 1,3). But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fullness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of being due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in the fullness of his being, so far is he lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight.

...

We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being: whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.

As for original sin, he describes it as an affliction of the soul itself, a deficiency within the soul. It appears to infect the will. It may be that original sin is the reason why the human soul is always united to a body, and does not exist as a separate substance. We can get redemption through Christ, and baptism removes the guilt through God's forgiveness.

You know, our argument here is not really an argument at all, because we are both correct. In as much as a human being is an existing being, one is inherently good, as I say, but to the extent that we are deficient we are all evil, as you say. We are both good and evil, good in respect to being, and evil in respect to deficiencies. I argue the glass is half full, you argue the glass is half empty.

I am interested in how to define universal notions (I mentioned the categorical imperative) and I think Spinoza' scientia intuitive in his ethics is interesting in that the types of cognition must equally balance between belief, reason and intuition [subjective and objectively], though I fear the result of his certainty may rest on the idea that 'cognition depends on the knowledge of its cause' and that - similar to the cartesian angle - fundamentally attributed to God (or nature). — TimeLine

I don't agree with the categorical imperative, I think it is a fiction. I think that every good is particular, determined relative to the specific circumstances, and therefore assuming such a universal good is a category mistake.

This is the reason why absolute certain is beyond reality. Every application of mathematics, or any type of logic, is applied to a particular situation. The application of logic is seen as the good for understanding the situation. But all the particulars of any situation will never be grasped. So in applying the universal to the particular there will always be something not completely covered, and this will create a degree of uncertainty.

To say that there is certainty within the logical principles, without being applied, such as certainty that 2+2=4, is meaningless because such certainty would be symbols without content. If we say that there is certainty as to what 2 means, and what + means, then we have gone to a completely subjective certainty, with a low degree of certainty.

The mark, the target of one's moral action is the beam in one's own eye, not the mote in another's. — unenlightened

This is what Aquinas would call the apparent good, the target of one's moral actions. He also assumes a real good, and the real good is often inconsistent with the apparent good, and so we sin. I cannot justify the claim that you are wrong in your action, simply by appealing to what appears good to me, because then we would just have inconsistent apparent goods. So I must turn to some conventions, mores, laws, or even the word of God, to argue that your action is not consistent with the real good.

I think we are irrational. And this understanding allows me to understand evil intent. I agree with you in one sense, but it becomes an abuse of language; man with sword intends to kill, man with scalpel intends to preserve life. These cannot be reconciled. A man thinks it is good to kill random passers by with a vehicle to promote a cause and the right understanding of God - that man has it wrong. And so does the man who thinks it is good to do the same thing in a jet plane in a foreign land in the name of democracy. To fight a war against terror is about as rational as curing the fear of heights by throwing folks off a cliff. — unenlightened

I think, that what you call "irrational" here, is an inconsistency between different conceptions of the real good. The average sinner would think I know it is wrong what I am doing, but rationalize the situation in some way, to make the wrong act necessary. This sinner will recognize the conventional good, what I've called the real good, but still find reason to dismiss the real good in favour of the contrary apparent good, and therefore act in an immoral or illegal way. The terrorist, who claims to act by the word of God, appeals to a misconstrued real good. That person might believe oneself to be carrying out the true real good.

In that case, we have a rejection of most conventional interpretations of the real good, based in laws and fundamental moral principles, in favour of a direct communion with God. You could argue that this is irrational, to claim direct instructions from God, as inspiration for one's moral actions, but really it is no different from any other apparent good. The individual has a personal reason for dismissing the real good (good by convention), for a personal good. An atheist might assume the "real good" is to fight a war against religion inspired terror. In these cases though, the person is completely unaccepting of the real good (good by convention), not just dismissing it in this or that circumstance, but dismissing it in an absolute way. The person believes conventional good is incorrect, and must be dismissed. That person has come to conceive of a real good which is completely inconsistent with the accepted real good.

What we call "irrational" is those who don't think in the same way that we do. They don't follow the same principles of reason that we follow, so we designate them as irrational. But these principles are all conventions. If your society is filled with various conventions which are inconsistent with one another, where can you turn, other than your own mind, to find consistency? But once you turn to your own mind to find consistency in principles of reason, you've already dismissed the conventions, and your own mind can be a dark and scary place.

I don't see the point in posting a bunch of out of context quotes.

Christian theology teaches that sin does render us as evil. If we were not evil, then there would be no need for us to be forgiven - i.e., no need for Jesus to die on the cross in order to make our forgiveness possible. — aletheist

Here's a question for you then. If only God is good, as your quote from the Bible claims, and sin renders us evil, as you claim, where does forgiveness leave us? Are we still evil after being forgiven? If only God is good, then it must be the case that we are always evil, even after being forgiven. What's the point in forgiveness then, what does it do for us?

...no need for Jesus to die on the cross in order to make our forgiveness possible. — aletheist

According to your claims, there is no forgiveness. If we are still evil, in God's eyes, after being forgiven, then we aren't really forgiven, are we? You have no idea what forgive means, do you?

I am certain that right now I have a migraine - even though I have never had one before and I have no idea why I have one today - yet, right now I am certain that my head hurts. — TimeLine

How can you be certain that what you have is a migraine then? You might be quite sure that your head hurts, but a migraine is a certain type of headache. From what you've described, it doesn't sound like you're at all certain about having a migraine

Your methodology of argumentation consists in distorting what your interlocutor has said, and then writing reams of objections based on this distortion. — John

That what you say may be distorted, in the way that you claim I distort it, indicates that I cannot even have certainty with respect to the meaning of what has been said. How can I have any certainty with respect to the truth or falsity of what is said, if I cannot even be certain of the meaning of what has been said?

I simply interpret it differently than Aletheist, and I believe it's a more Christian way of interpretation. The Old Testament might lead you to believe that the original sin has rendered us all as evil, but Christian theology teaches that God is forgiving, and sinning does not render us as evil, because we can be forgiven. Jesus sacrificed himself in order that we may be forgiven for our sins. Within the concept of "forgiving", we turn around the original sin, such that we no longer think of ourselves as inherently evil, but as simply less than perfect. By seeing us as inherently good, but simply mistaken in our sins, God is capable of forgiving us. Likewise, we see others as inherently good, but mistaken in their sins, so we forgive them.

The Christian principle which I draw on is the assumption that because we are less than perfect, this does not make us evil, or even bad. All existence is good, or else God would not have created it. But nothing except God himself is perfect. One need not be perfect to be good. Therefore we, as existing human beings are inherently good. Original sin is understood as a mistake which can be forgiven. Human beings are still inherently good despite the fact that we are not perfectly good.

None of your irrelevant objections carry any force at all for me. If you have a wife now you know you have a wife, and you know she is female ( if she is female of course), you know you can drive a car ( how well you can drive it is irrelevant), you know what your house number is now ( if it hasn't been changed) and so on. — John

In other words, I know these things, unless I'm wrong, then I don't really know them. OK, how does that make me certain of them?

Certainty is not derived form doubting; how could it be? If everything is doubtful then there can never be a situation in which everything will cease to be doubtful. I agree with you that anything we count as a belief may be doubted: and this goes for everything concerning the future, since we don't know at all what will happen. But when it comes to what has happened we can be as certain as we are of our own memories. For example you know you can drive a car, because you remember driving cars in the past, even this morning, say. — John

You're not making any sense John. First, I explained how certainty is derived from doubting. Doubting leads to checking and confirming, this is the scientific method. All you do here is repeat your assertion, and ask the same question again, "certainty is not derived from doubting, how could it be?". Well, I explained how it is. It's quite obvious to me, doubt leads to questioning, trials, experimentation, and confirmation. But for some reason, you just overlook the whole scientific method and restate your question, "how could it be?".

Then you agree that every belief can be doubted, but you imply that a memory cannot be doubted. How is a memory not a belief? And we all know that memory often fails us, especially as we get older. So it's utter nonsense to claim that we cannot doubt our own memories. I find my memories to be highly dubious, and to be often engaged in discussions as to who is remembering correctly.

So your position is, I remain convinced, based on a conflation of belief with knowledge, and its great weakness is that you have no way of explaining how any certainty of knowing anything could come out of your standpoint of universal doubt. I believe your doubt like Descartes' is artificial; it is not genuine, heartfelt doubt, it is faux-doubt; and that is why I say it carries no force. — John

I wonder what faux-doubt would be. Does that mean that a person believes oneself to be uncertain, but the person is really certain? How would that work? I could deceive myself into thinking that I am uncertain when I am really certain? Or do you think that I am trying to deceive you, saying that I am uncertain, but hiding the certainty behind an image of uncertainty? Do you think I'm omniscient? If not, then why don't you believe me when I say that I am not certain about anything? To be certain about any particular thing, wouldn't it require that you know absolutely everything about that thing? Aren't all things related to one another by some means? So wouldn't it require omniscience to know absolutely everything about anything? How could I be completely certain about anything if I didn't know absolutely everything about that thing? And that would require knowing how that thing related to everything else.

I really admire the confidence in your assertions, your claims of certainty and all that, but I really think that it's you who is putting up the deceptive façade of certitude. Sometimes people like to create that impression of confidence and certitude, to hide the fact that they really don't know what they're talking about.

But here's the point. Because we are bound to make mistakes, i.e. sin, does this mean that human beings are inherently evil? I think not, I think that our actions are inherently good, but we make mistakes. You seem to think that the original sin has made us into evil beings, such that our actions are sins.

Are you not familiar with the traditional Christian doctrines of original sin and the Fall? God created the first humans in His own image, such that they were able to live in complete accordance with His nature and will. However, they freely chose to sin instead, and the inability of their descendants (including you and me) to live in complete accordance with God's nature and will is a consequence of that. — aletheist

Our position is a consequence of original sin, but it should not make us, ourselves, sinners. The original sin, and fall, are sins of others, and we may learn from their mistakes. Your position makes us all sinners because of the original sin. That's what I think is a mistake.