That could be it, but I think it depends on how we would define "the mark". What I have been arguing is that to have a mark, which is aimed for, is to have an intended good, so actions which aim for a mark are inherently good. Now we can identify two types of mistakes, one is to miss the mark which is aimed for, and the other is an artificial type of mistake which is created by the assumption that the mark itself may be judged as good or not good. In the latter case, one may aim for "a mark", and achieve the goal, but the conventions of society (religions, laws, mores, etc.) may dictate that the mark was not good. So the person is guilty. And because of the supposed malintent, the guilt is of a higher level than one who makes a mistake of the first sort, which is to miss a mark which has been designated as good.

The artificial type of mistake, in order that it's a real mistake, requires a judgement of the mark. So the mark must be held up to, compared, to some principles for such a judgement. Now we have choices in judging the mark, aletheist would say God, Marchesk would look for some other principles. They are all conventions, even though "God" directs us toward something beyond the conventions. Our choice in these conventions is supposed to be very important, because it is the judgement of the mark which produces the higher level of guilt. One with bad intent is often said to be evil. If there were no such judgement as to whether the chosen mark is good or bad, we would only need to worry ourselves with the lower level guilt, which is involved with not hitting the mark.

The fact that there are competing systems for judging the mark, different conventions, is evidence that such judgements are inherently artificial, and this indicates another option to us, which is to reject such judgement of the mark, as unnatural. Now we start with the assumption that there is no outside third party judgement on the mark, no judgement by God, no judgement by human laws or mores. This leaves only the individual who is making the choice of actions as the one to judge the mark. The individual can turn to whatever conventions or reasons, one wants for choosing the mark.

Now we have no objective good or bad which can be assigned to the mark, and from this perspective, the true nature of the mark begins to come to light. The mark itself is very rarely some definite goal, it's always some fleeting thing in the background. If you stop yourself for a minute and ask why am I doing this, there is very rarely a clear, obvious answer, just many odd goals in the background of your daily activities. This is why the mark is extremely difficult to actually hit. It's just some vague, ill-defined, moving, changing target.

So true, real mistakes, are mistakes in hitting the mark, but the issue is that the mark is not very evident to us. The norms of our society, and conventional wisdom has directed us toward thinking that our intentions, "the mark", can be judged as good or bad, according to some big principles, like God, or whatever ethical standards, and laws which are held, but really our intentions are just some vague forms lurking in the background, which we cannot even recognize, isolate, and identify.

And this is where I would probably be in agreement with Nicoll, what is needed is to focus our attention on the mark, identify it, and bring it into view, before we can even have a hope of hitting it. Without this, we are just aiming at shadows, something moves and we shoot at it. Others will judge us as having bad intentions, but what makes the intention "good" in the eyes of others, is that it is well defined and intelligible. So if "evil is not even to aim for the mark", this is because the mark has not been recognized, or identified. It is like shooting into the dark. To bring the mark into the light is to bring out the good.

You are failing to make a proper distinction between knowledge and belief. The certainty of knowledge consists in the absence of genuine doubt. Do you know how to drive a car? Is it possible you could be mistaken and that in fact you do not know how to drive a car? Do you know the street number of your house, your wife's name, that she is female, that she is human, what makes her happy and what annoys her, how many children you have, what kind of dog you have ? — John

I know how to drive a car, but I am not so certain of my skill to know that each time I drive I will not have an accident. Therefore despite my knowing there is still doubt. And with all the other instances you mention there is still a degree of uncertainty. The city might change my house number. If I have a wife, see may have just left me, etc..

There is no possibility of genuine doubt about any of these. — John

Speak for yourself. That's the thing about knowledge, what you refuse to doubt, someone else might. But just because you feel a huge degree of certitude about some things doesn't mean there is no possibility of genuine doubt concerning those things. There is no possibility that you would doubt them, but others might. As I said, everything is doubtable. You doubt that, but I'm not surprised, because what I say, like everything else, is doubtable, and you're just demonstrating that fact.

But all of this sort of imagining would be a bullshit kind of doubt; it has no real force (unless you are psychotic). — John

What do you mean by "it has no real force"? What type of force are we talking about here? How would you distinguish between doubt which has force, and doubt which has no force?

If you want to be consistent in saying that everything is subject to doubt, then you should not assert that humans have any knowledge at all, but only beliefs. To know something is to know it beyond doubt. To know something is to experience complete confidence. Anything you cannot have complete confidence in cannot be knowledge; it's that simple. — John

If you are going to insist that "knowledge" implies absolute certainty, such that it is impossible that any particular aspect of knowledge could be wrong, then I agree that humans do not have any knowledge at all. But I think you should accept the reality that sometimes when we claim to know something it turns out to be wrong. This is the way that knowledge exists, in reality, despite the fact that I claim to know X, X might still turn out to be incorrect. The "ideal" knowledge might exclude the possibility of mistake, but the thing which we refer to when we use the words "knowledge", and "knowing", always contains the possibility of mistake.

And you still haven't explained how, magically, the certainty of knowing that you say will be achieved through questioning absolutely everything, will somehow emerge out of your state of universal doubt. — John

Have you never noticed, that when you doubt something, you check it to confirm it? That's how we build certainty through doubt. If someone says to you, it's raining outside, you might just take this for granted, as truth, claiming to know that it's raining out. But certainty is lacking here, because this knowledge is based in hearsay. If, when someone says this to you, you doubt it, and therefore check to confirm, you obtain a much higher degree of certainty. Through doubting knowledge we produce new ways to test and confirm things, thus obtaining higher degrees of certainty. From doubting, we test and confirm, that's the scientific method. Certainty is derived from doubt.

All sin is evil. Do you disagree? — aletheist

Yes, I disagree, I think that "evil" is a stronger word than sin, signifying a greater transgression. I think if we ask many of the same questions of "evil', and of "sin", we will come up with different answers, signifying a difference between them. For example, if we ask of sin and of evil, are they forgivable, the answer is likely that sin is forgivable, but evil is not.

I argue that to be inconsistent with God's nature is necessarily sinful, and therefore evil; and again, God does not will anything contrary to His own nature. — aletheist

But a human being cannot act like God, therefore a human being's actions are inconsistent with the nature of God. According to your argument then, a human being's actions are necessarily sinful and evil. What's the point in holding such a believe which makes all human beings necessarily evil, because it is impossible for a human being to be as God?

This is contradictory, in my view; any action that is inconsistent with God's will cannot be good. Indeed, no human being is capable of living 100% consistently with God's will: "The Lord looks down from heaven on the children of man, to see if there are any who understand, who seek after God. They have all turned aside; together they have become corrupt; there is none who does good, not even one." (Psalm 14:2-3) — aletheist

See, you admit that no human being can be 100% consistent with God. Therefore all human beings are necessarily evil, according to your argument. What's the point in saying that human beings are necessarily evil? How can that be an acceptable moral principle? Why even try to be good if it's impossible for us, and we're necessarily going to be evil anyway?

Sinning is not just mistaken actions; often we sin quite deliberately, with full awareness that what we are doing is wrong. — aletheist

It doesn't matter that the sin is deliberate and intentional, it is still mistaken action. The sinful action is inspired by some perceived (apparent) good, which inclines the individual to act that way. The mistake is in the belief that it is worthwhile to sin for the sake of this other good, which isn't a real good. It's a mistaken good.

Which Christian tradition do you have in mind? On the contrary, I think that most Christians would characterize "behaving selfishly, harming others, manipulating them, exploiting them, discriminating against them, causing them to suffer, etc." as evil (i.e., sinful). — aletheist

I think you need to differentiate between sin and evil.

You seem to have a highly unusual understanding of Christian doctrine. Any action that is in any way inconsistent with God's nature - or God's will, if you prefer - is sin, and therefore evil. — aletheist

I've studied some of the greatest Christian theologians, such as St Augustine, and St. Thomas, along with other material taught to me in moral philosophy in university. So I really do not think that my understanding is so "unusual". Were you taught that there is a difference between the real good, and the apparent good? This is fundamental to Aquinas, a principle which he draws from Aristotle.

If, what is consistent with God's will, or God's nature, is the real good, and what is consistent with an individual human being's will, or nature, is the apparent good, then how could a human being's apparent good be the same as God's real good, unless that human being knows what God knows? Just because we, as human beings do not know what God knows, and therefore we do not choose the very same actions as God would choose (the absolute best course of action), in any particular situation, this does not make us evil, or even necessarily sinful. But it does make our actions inconsistent with God's will. And you argue that to be inconsistent with God's will is necessarily sinful, and even evil. No human being can choose the absolute best action, and therefore no human being's actions are truly consistent with God's will, even though our actions are good. We do sin sometimes, but sinning is mistaken actions, and so long as we recognize our mistakes as mistakes, we may be forgiven.

How can true certainty be produced by doubting? Thinking that one knows is not knowing. If we know anything at all we know it with absolute certainty. If there is to be any such knowledge, real knowledge which is truly distinct from mere belief, then it must be impervious to doubt, by mere definition. How could you ever know when your process of doubting is rightly ended? Certainly not by means of doubt! — John

You seem to be starting from the false assumption that human beings have "true certainty". There is always the possibility that a human being may be mistaken, therefore human beings never obtain absolute certainty. We assign that to God.

Nothing I said is contrary to the idea that lack of knowledge precedes knowledge, or that less knowledge precedes greater knowledge. The point is that knowledge, if it is truly knowledge, cannot be subject to doubt. If it is merely belief, then of course that is a different matter. — John

You have a false impression of what knowledge really is. Since it is always possible that we can be mistaken when we claim to "know" something, then the thing which we refer to as knowledge is fallible. That's simply reality, human knowledge is fallible. You seem to represent human knowledge as some ideal, infallible form of knowledge, but that's not what human knowledge is. We reserve that ideal for God, if there is such a being. If there is no God, then all knowledge will always be fallible.

So, your assertion that not-knowing is prior to knowing is irrelevant because it is not contrary to what I have been saying. I have been saying that once we have knowledge as opposed to mere belief, if we ever do have it, then that knowledge cannot be subject to doubt, and also that that knowledge cannot have originated in doubt, since doubt can only lead to more doubt, Perhaps you could explain how you think it is that the absolute certainty of knowledge could ever proceed from the state of doubt, and how it is that you could ever know from within your state of doubt, that all doubts have now finally been put to rest. — John

You have just refuted your own position here. You say "...once we have knowledge as opposed to mere belief, if we ever do have it...". So you now allow that it is possible that we never really have this "true certainty", which is essential to your position. Now you have cast doubt on all of knowledge, and allow with me, that all so-called knowledge can be doubted. Therefore it is impossible that certainty is prior to doubt, because you have allowed the possibility that no such certainty exists.

Evil is behaving selfishly, harming others, manipulating them, exploiting them, discriminating against them, causing them to suffer, etc. — Marchesk

In the traditional Christian conception of good, such things are not evil. That's why forgiving is central to that religion. As I said in the other post, any freely willed human act, being intentional, is an act toward some good. Therefore good is of the essence of the human act, and no degree of mistakenness can remove this essence, these acts will all be defined by the good which is sought by them. You call these acts "evil", but it is simply the case that the people who carry out these acts are seeking a good which is not consistent with the good which you are seeking.

Are you really suggesting that human beings can't tell good from bad, in general? Do we not grow up being told the difference, and enforcing the difference amongst ourselves, and teaching our kids likewise? — Marchesk

What I am suggesting is that most human beings do not know how "good" is defined in indifferent theologies. Sure, the average person may be taught by their parents to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong, correct from incorrect, but these are principles based in human convention. We are taught what is correct and incorrect according to the various conventions. Christian theologians are not taught that there is a difference between good and bad, they are taught to understand a difference between the apparent good, and the real good. There is no "bad" here, because the apparent good is what appears good to the individual, and inspires the free act, while the real good is the good according to God. We cannot say, that because the good chosen by an individual, (the apparent good), is not exactly the same as the decision which God would make (the real good), that the apparent good is therefore bad. The individual may be striving to determine the real good, yet simply not act in the absolutely best way in the situation. Failing to act in the absolutely best way does not make an act bad.

Maybe the problem is not with these religious notions about God, but rather involves our how our conception of what's good is possible. The term 'good' losses its meaning without the concept/experience of 'evil', they co-implicate each other. Imagine that you were in a world where only good could possibly happen, if so then what's good would be the way things are, it would have no differential — Cavacava

In the Christian ethical principles, as I understand them, there is no opposite to 'good", such as "bad". Good is not defined by an opposing term. Good is defined by the concepts of intention and free will. The end of an intentional act is the good which is sought by the person acting. There is no opposite to this. One can choose not to act, or a different act, but these are just different choices, and therefore different goods, not an opposite. In theology they assume an objective good, the real good, which is roughly defined as what God would choose in that situation, the absolute best thing to do in any given situation. But the fact that an individual human being doesn't choose the best action in a given situation, doesn't remove "good" from the act, making it the opposite, not-good, it just makes it less than perfect.

As should be clear by now, the meaning/definition of "good" is "whatever is consistent with God's nature," which accords with saying that "we ascertain what God is like and then define 'good' accordingly." — aletheist

I don't think theologians define "good" as what's consistent with God's nature, rather it is defined as what's consistent with God's will. They assume that in each situation where a decision must be made, there is an absolute best decision, the one which God would make. As human beings, it is our duty to God, to attempt to the extent of our capacity, to determine this best decision. Failing to determine the best choice does not make one's choice evil, as Marchesk seems to be arguing.

Which suits me just fine because my intuition has fairly clear and conventional ideas about what is good, and if God has other ideas, then we are on opposing sides. — unenlightened

I think it is a mistake to assume "opposing sides". This what creates the problem of evil, assuming that there is an opposite to good. Good is defined by what is intended, the end which is sought. There is no opposite to this "object", just different objects. So whatever appears good to me is not exactly the same as what appears good to you, and this is not exactly the same as the good according to God. These are all differences, but they are not really opposing differences, as they are all inherently goods. If we represent them as opposing, then we assume a certain separation which implies the impossibility of reconciliation. We deny ourselves the capacity for understanding the other's intent, by designating it as evil, because the intent to do evil is irrational and cannot be understood. So we must allow that the other's actions are guided by some good, it is just inconsistent with our good. There is a need for reconciliation, not a designation of opposing sides.

That's a strawman. My point was the presences of the experiences are undoubtable. One may still doubt the content of experience is true. Here the point is not that our knowledge or experiences are always accurate, but that they are present. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's no strawman, every aspect of experience can, and should be doubted, therefore the "presence" of experience, or that experiences are "present" is dubitable as well. Time is understood to us as a combination of past time and future time, your assumption of a "present" is a highly dubious assumption.

You seem to want to allow that all the content of experience is dubitable, but there is something else, other than the content which is not dubitable. But experience is just that, content, so to make your point, you need to demonstrate that there is something more to experience than content. What would that be?

Experiences without awareness of the self are not dubious. They are common. Indeed, most of our experiences are exactly that. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I've never ever had an experience without an awareness of myself. I've tried to do this through meditation, but all that does is heighten my awareness of myself. An awareness of myself is even highly evident in my dreams, and this is not even a conscious experience. If you are going to make such a bold assertion, that experience, without awareness of self, is common place, then you need to explain what you're talking about, and tell me how to get myself out of my experience. Otherwise, I believe you're just making up fiction.

With the experience of doubting them one will never know which ones are mistaken. Knowing is not something that can be warranted by some other criteria. As Spinoza suggests, before you can know that you know, know that you know that you know, know that you know that you know that you know, and so on to infinity (this being the supposed skeptical challenge to the possibility of knowing anything) you must first know. — John

I think you're flat out wrong here. We always doubt before we know. First, one might think that one knows, or you might believe that you know, but this is not really knowing, it's just an attitude of certitude. But it's an unjustified certitude, a false sense of confidence. True certainty is only produce by doubting, questioning your believes, and from this real knowledge is produced.

That what you say is false is demonstrable from the fact that there was a time on earth prior to any knowledge. Therefore knowing emerged from not-knowing, so it is impossible that knowing is first, as you claim. Not knowing is prior to knowing, and with not-knowing exists uncertainty and doubt. Therefore doubt is prior to knowing.

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's. — Marchesk

The theologian has the very difficult task of determining our relationship with God, and "good" in relation to this. The importance of that task should not be underestimated. To simply reject the existence of God, in an atheist way, is not the solution, because to many theists, rejecting God is itself the greatest evil. Therefore to the person who has this type of relationship with God, atheism fulfills the definition of evil, hence the attitude of kill the infidels. The ethicist has no resolution to this problem, except to recognize "God" as a real motivating factor in human beings. If an ethicist must recognize God as real, then an atheist cannot be an ethicist.

You can't have your cake and eat it too. Either God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, or we shouldn't use "good" as a description of God. So the price of using this line of argument for the FWD is God's goodness, so far as we understand the word. — Marchesk

My argument is that God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, but it takes a highly skilled, and well-educated theologian to determine this meaning. Human beings do not naturally know what "good" is, therefore what "good" means has to be determined through much study, an this is the study of theology, the human being's relationship with God.

You can understand the word "good" in any way you please, that is the nature of free will. And you can insist that it is impossible that God is perfectly good, because that's the way that you understand the word "good". But ethics is not about stipulating what "good" means, and dictating that, it's about producing agreement on such terms. "Good", in ethics, generally refer to what motivates us to act, we seek the good. Therefore "good" refers to something different in each human act. Good is a particular, which is specific to each act, we can identify the good of the act, and therefore find the intention.

The problem isn't assuming that God would do things we don't understand. The problem is when you combine an omni-good god with the existence of an imperfect creation, specifically evil.

It's a cop out to say that such a God must have a reason for allowing evil, but we can't state what it is. The reasonable conclusion is that such a being doesn't exist, and if there is a God, humans have incorrectly ascribed ridiculous attributes to such a being. — Marchesk

There's no cop out, it's just that most human beings really don't understand "evil". Do you understand evil? If something doesn't go your way, is there evil involve?. The dog shits on the floor, is it evil? You leave your keys in the car when you run into the store and someone steals it, is that person evil? In general, what qualifies as "evil" to the average human being is probably not even similar to what qualifies as "evil" to God. That is because the average human being has no relationship with God, and therefore hasn't got a clue as to what qualifies as "evil" to God. So if you have no relationship with God, then what makes you think that the things which you call 'evil", God would call "evil"? And if God doesn't see them as evil, why should he prevent them?

It's really suspicious that the argument ends up with God's mysterious ways. — Marchesk

The need to assume God, in the first place, is based in the fact that the universe is filled with "mysterious" things. So it should not be at all surprising to you, nor suspicious, that the question of why God does what God does, ends up with "God's mysterious ways". The whole belief in the existence of God is based in the assumption that the universe behaves in "mysterious ways". Nor should it appear as a cop out, because until human beings are omniscient, there will always be "mysterious" things out there.

If you're going to discuss evil in relation to God, you need to take the proper perspective. God has the entire universe to look after, why would He think that a bunch of lowly human beings in a far off corner of the universe, hurting each other, is evil? That's like us thinking that it's evil for ants to be attacking one another. Is it evil for ants to be attacking one another and stealing from each other? Who's going to make that decision?

Red, the movement of an arm, the approaching truck, the dragon bearing down, are all undoubtable experiences too. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's nonsense to claim that these experiences are undoubtable. Why not doubt that what you see is really "red", that what you are doing is really "moving your arm", or that what you perceive is really an "approaching truck"? You may argue as Wittgenstein does in "On Certainty", that it is unreasonable to doubt such things, but if, out of the thousands of times a day that an individual makes such assumptions, there is but one instance of error, then it is reasonable to doubt all such assumptions, because without doubting them one will never know which ones are mistaken.

This is exactly what substance dualism does and how the myth of the "hard problem" is created. It denies our personal experiences, of body, of measurement of the world, which undoubtably occur with out awareness of self, mind and free will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That personal experiences occur without an awareness of self is itself a highly dubious proposition, most likely false. That an experience is "personal" implies that it is proper to the person. How could a person have an experience, that experience being property of that person alone, without having an awareness of one's self? Isn't having an experience which is proper to yourself alone, itself an awareness of yourself?

To "experience" requires an awareness, and to experience something personal requires an awareness of the person. By saying that the experience is proper to yourself alone, you indicate an awareness of yourself. If you assign such an experience to something else, you indicate that this something else also has an awareness of itself, or else it is not undergoing the same type of experience. If it is not the same type of experience, then by what principle would you call it an experience which is proper only to itself?

Mathematics, geometry and logic are all forms of philosophy.

We're speaking past each other. Do you recognize the difference between geometry and mathematics? The parallel postulate is geometry, not mathematics.

Are there civilizations that assert statement that contradict the commutativity of multiplcation? — Frederick KOH

How would I know, what is your point?

In the case of geometry, is the parallel postulate false? — Frederick KOH

I see no reason to assume that the parallel postulate is false.

Give an example of a philosophical axiom that is not also a logical or mathematical axiom. — Frederick KOH

Not all logical axioms are mathematical axioms. The parallel postulate might be a self-evident truth, and it might be a logical axiom, but it is not mathematical, it is geometrical. Do you recognize the difference between mathematics and geometry?

The actualization of existence doesn't take place in time? What does "actualization" mean, then? — Thorongil

I didn't say "actualization", don't misquote me. I said "actuality". An actuality is something real, and it is quite possible that there is something real outside of time. You are simply trying to dismiss the dualist premise by saying that all actualities are necessarily activities, and therefore time dependent. The dualist doesn't believe that all actualities are time dependent, that's how we can talk about eternal things.

This is a cop out. "We don't know what we're talking about, but please accept our propositions anyway." Why would I be convinced of that? It can't just be that the objections are irrelevant speculations. The propositions to which they are addressed must be irrelevant speculations, too. — Thorongil

There is much that remains unknown to human beings, Why would you think that admitting so much is a "cop out"? Would you prefer to pretend that human beings know all there is to know? If logic indicates that it is possible that there is something outside of time, why not accept this as a real possibility, instead of closing your mind to what logic indicates?

You haven't addressed my objection at all. Choosing still takes place in and presupposes time. If God had to create because he is good and creating is good, then he had no choice. So too would his creation be co-eternal with him. — Thorongil

You seem to be mixing future with past. Prior to creation, God did not have to create, God had a choice. But what God created is good. He would not have created it unless he saw it as good. This is how free choice works, when an individual sees X as good, one acts on that. It is only after the act occurs that we can say that the individual saw X as good. It is the "seeing X as good" which causes the act. So it is neither "X", nor 'good", which causes the act, it is the individual who sees X as good, which causes the act.

Concerning your objection then, we say that God is good, because God created. But this does not mean that God had to create. God had a choice. If God did not create, then we could consider that God was not good, but we wouldn't be here to do that. If you think that choosing presupposes time, then you do not understand the nature of immaterial existence. "Time" as we know it is a concept derived from material existence. And experience demonstrates to us that nothing other than choice can be the cause of material existence.

It is relevant because there is point to be made about the difference between — Frederick KOH

So you are saying that some conventions are more widely accepted than others. That might be relevant if we were basing our judgements on how widely accepted the conventions are. But I don't think that's a good way of basing your judgements. We should judge on whether or not we think the convention is true. I think the convention which says that God created because He saw that it was good, is true. I believe this because that's how I understand free will, when we see that something is good, we act on that. So it is completely consistent to say that God created because He saw that it was good.

So if he knew it was good to create, why didn't he create before he did? If he always ever created, then, once again, in what sense is he free? — Thorongil

As Chany says, time comes into existence with God's creation.

In what sense can an "act" or "movement" not be in time? — Thorongil

As a dualist, I recognize two distinct forms of actuality. One is activity, movement, and that necessarily requires time. The other is the actuality of existence, being, and this is the form of any existing thing. Any existing thing must have a form, and this is what makes it an actual thing. The form is a describable state of existence, and is therefore not an activity, nor a movement. Since it is not an activity, nor a movement, it is not necessarily "in time". In fact, whenever there is activity or movement, there is necessarily something which is moving, and this moving thing has a describable form. Since it is necessary that there is a thing which moves, that describable form is prior to activity, or movement. So if time is associated with movement, then this thing, which exists as a describable form, is necessarily prior to time.

If God has always been a creator, then there couldn't have been a time when he freely chose to create. Otherwise, how is it a choice? If you've always had brown hair, then you didn't freely choose to have brown hair. — Thorongil

Human beings have not yet conceived of what it means to be prior to time, so speculations such as this are really irrelevant.

Why is it irrelevant? If he cannot but do good, and it is good to create, then he cannot but create. That's fine, but then he isn't free and his creation must be co-eternal with him. — Thorongil

When God acts, he will do good, but he need not necessarily act, He acts by choice. To not choose to act, is not to do bad, because it isn't doing anything. Privation, which is a lack of good, is not the same thing as committing a bad act. So you need to consider three distinct things, a good act, a bad act, and no act at all. God will not make a bad act, but God has the capacity to refrain from acting. Isn't this how human beings obtain morality, by refraining from bad actions. God will always refrain from the bad action.

In philosophy, an axiom is a self-evident truth, and therefore cannot be wrong. In mathematics an axiom is a postulate. Since the postulate is posited for some purpose, not because it is a self-evident truth, as is the case in philosophy, the postulate may be false. That is why mathematical axioms must all be verified, they may be false. I believe it is highly probable that the axiom of imaginary numbers is a falsity, for the reasons explained.

How's that relevant? There are many things which do not have consistent conventions. That God created because he saw that it was good to do so is a very consistent convention. If you believe that the convention is based in some false principles, you should demonstrate this, as I have done in reference to the convention of imaginary numbers, on the other thread

How are the assertions made in mathematics essentially different from the assertions made in religion? They are both based in convention.

This formalism relies on certain assumptions, and if the assumptions are false, the formalism is deceptive. It is a fact that one spatial dimension is mathematically incompatible with another, and this is demonstrated by the incommensurability of the two sides of a square, and the irrational nature of pi. So the geometrical demonstration of imaginary numbers relies on a falsity. Therefore I maintain my assertion that the use of imaginary numbers is dubious.

Aren't all assertions based on conventions? That's what language is.

So the imaginary number artificially converts one dimension into another dimension?

It's convention, what I've read in different books; it made sense to me, and so I'm just answering what I assume is common knowledge. Your alternative answer is inconsistent with what I've learned.

Ignore my question if you are being ironic. But what guides or constrains the answer you give? — Frederick KOH

I'm inclined to ignore your question because I really don't know what you're asking. Anyway, here's the answer to the best of my knowledge, my answer was guided, or constrained by Thorongil's question.

Give it a geometric interpretation? What do you mean by that?

If God was free to create, why did he choose to do so? — Thorongil

God created because He knew that it was good to do so.

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure. — Marchesk

Do you think it would have been better to be an object without the capacity to choose, like a rock or something, than to be a human being with the capacity to choose, but with the possibility that the choice might be the wrong choice? Because that's what you're arguing, that God would have been a better God if He created us without the capacity to choose.

1. Lucifer was also said to have been perfectly created. Why would a perfect being rebel? It's also stated that his motivation was pride. Why would a perfect being become proud? Imagine if you had a perfect will to live, and God put a cliff before you. Realizing that you had free will to jump off the cliff to your death, would you become suicidal, because free will? — Marchesk

Lucifer is the highest angel, not perfect. To be perfect would be to equate Lucifer with God. That is exactly Lucifer's sin, he thought he was God or equivalent to God, when he was really created by God and therefore less perfect. He experienced all the powers given to him by God, and upon experiencing all this great power, he thought he was God, and this false thinking is his imperfection, the greatest sin.

So at whatever point certain believers decided that God was perfectly good and omni-capable, is the point at which skeptics question the existence of such a being, given that the universe is not a perfectly good place to live in. — Marchesk

When you say that "the universe is not a perfectly good place to live in", how are your terms defined, so that you can truthfully say that? Do we not live in the universe? And is the universe not perfectly suited for our living in it? It seems to me like you must be defining "good" in some odd sort of way. Do you realize that if we took all the pain and suffering out of living, it would no longer be living according to "living" as we know it? What kind of life do you think is "the good life"?

That is very ironic. Lucifer is perfectly free. — Marchesk

As I told you, this is not the case, quite the contrary, Lucifer is fated to eternal damnation, and that is the very opposite of free. It is by the power of God that Lucifer is thus fated. You wish to remove God from this scene, and give Lucifer free reign, but this is impossible, because God created Lucifer in the first place. So if you remove God, there is no Lucifer.

All you have done is created your own personal concept of "Lucifer", as independent from God, and absolutely free. But this is exactly Lucifer's mistake, which you are now making, why Lucifer got condemned to eternal damnation. Lucifer believed himself to be absolutely free, independent from God, not created by God, and therefore absolutely free, exactly what you are now saying about Lucifer. But this is a falsity, and that belief, believing this falsity, is what condemns Lucifer to eternal damnation. So you are simply repeating the false belief which Lucifer held, as if it were the truth, and making the same mistake as Lucifer.

If parents allowing their kids to have free reign over the neighborhood is considered immoral, then God allowing us to have free reign over the Earth can't be good. — Marchesk

God does not give us "free reign". The laws of nature are highly restrictive. And so we have pain, suffering, and death, as a result of the restrictions placed upon us by God. You seem to be arguing two sides of the same argument. You seem to assume that the suffering and death which are directly related to the restrictions but upon us by God, are bad, yet you argue as if God has given us complete freedom as well. Clearly, we do not have complete freedom. So if you want to attribute the pain and suffering which human beings cause to each other, to God, then you must recognize that pain and suffering only occurs when we are forced outside the bounds of God's restrictions, which are the laws of nature.

As I said before, free will is essential to learning. By pushing against God's restrictions, we learn them, just like children pushing against the adults' restrictions learn them. But to arguing that we allow our children free reign, yet we also punish them for being bad, would be contradictory. And that's what you are saying about God, that God allows us free reign, yet God also punishes us with pain and suffering.

But a perfectly good God with omni-powers is in direct contradiction with existence. — Marchesk

In Christian theology, "existence" is good, by definition. That's why God created, because He saw that existence is good. So your statement above, if taken under theological principles is complete nonsense. "Good" is defined by existence, so if God is what gives existence, then God is good.

The problem you are having, is that you want to define "good" in relation to something else, something other than existence. If you do this, then you will be able to say that the perfectly good God is in contradiction to existence. But you have not defined "good" at all. All you are doing is assuming that the concept of "good" can be based in something other than existence, and from this assumption you claim that the perfectly good God is in direct contradiction with existence.

Free will is necessary in order that we may be able to determine the truth, through choice of what to believe, instead of just believing what is told to you by your parents or other authorities. It is by questioning the authorities that we rid ourselves of falsity within our beliefs.

But God, having much greater ability than us to prevent evils, does not do so. The conclusion from this is that God values free will more than the good, which makes God something other than perfectly good. — Marchesk

Free will is the good because it is what allows the truth to be known.

We can imagine another being who values free will to such an extent. Lucifer of yth and fiction is often portrayed as the embodiment of free will, rebelling against God's plan, and embracing or promoting all that is bad. — Marchesk

Lucifer is the exact opposite of the embodiment of free will. Lucifer is fated to eternal damnation, for clinging to false belief, and being the false authority, "promoting all that is bad", denying that the free will to choose for oneself what to believe, is the true good.

The pigeons were simply bored, being caged, they were finding something to do while they waited for the food to arrive. Notice that the food arrived at regular intervals, so when it came time to be fed, the pigeons got anxious. My dog does that too, but getting all fidgety and barking, does cause me to bring the food quicker.

Nature is not an act of human beings, enacting laws is. I didn't think it was necessary to make that distinction. Nature has no capacity to respect moral principles so we do not judge natural acts as moral or immoral. It may be appropriate to call acts of nature amoral. But since the passing of laws is an act of human beings, which has an affect on other human beings, it wouldn't be appropriate to call these laws amoral.

The first guy to spear the animal kills it, and then the second guy who spears it after it's dead is said to have "also" killed it. This is a superstitious sort of thing to say, but it allows two people to have a co-equal part in downing an animal that the group will eat. So it can be a social thing. — Pneumenon

The law works this way too, if you take part in a murder, you are a murderer. It's association through intent. How is this superstition?

When a group works together, toward an end, and one individual delivers the final act which concludes that end, why is it superstition to say that the success is of the group, rather than of the individual? I think it's just a matter of recognizing the fact that there is more to producing the final outcome, then the straw that broke the camel's back.

Call it encoding your consciousness if you like, but I don't think any physical object can surf on radio waves, so you'd have to really release your soul to surf those waves. Surfing radio waves, that sounds like real freedom. Radio waves are low frequency, long wave length, providing the best opportunity to catch a big wave. But they have very little forward power overall because of the low frequency. So to get any real surfing power it would require a massive quantity of polarized waves, coherent, and in phase.

I agree that corporate law is basically amoral. It's aim is to create a stable environment for business, right? — Mongrel

There's no such thing as an amoral law. If the law is designed to "create" some sort of environment, with disregard for morality, it is immoral. Having disregard for moral principles is not a case of being amoral, it is a case of bring immoral.

I am not saying that the corporation is inherently immoral or inherently good. It depends... (as questions of morality always do).

The first corporations, and the first stock issued, and the first stock holders are one thing. Today's corporations valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars, are something else. They have interlocking directorates (they share strategic board of director members), they often have near monopolies on essential products, they have enormous economic, social, and political clout, and they employ million of people. A pea and a watermelons are both fruits, but there is a hell of a lot of difference between the two. Ditto for the first and the latest corporations. — Bitter Crank

If the concept of "corporation", allows for corporations to exist in an immoral way, then it follows that the concept of "corporation" is an immoral concept.

Do you mean that there is something due to which a particular human is the particular human that it is and then there's something due to which humans are humans? — mew

Yes, I think that's about right. There is something which makes me me, and something which makes you you, and since this "something" is different for each of us, we are each particular human beings. That "something" is the essence of each particular. But since there is also something similar about us, which makes us each the same type of thing, a human being, we assume that there is also a generalized essence, what it means to be a human being, and this is the universal.

What would be the latter? Is there such a thing? — mew

I think this is a matter of convention, what it means to be a human being is defined by what is accepted by convention. I believe Aristotle defined "man" as a "rational animal". The modern Platonist might argue that there is an independent "Form", which constitutes the objective meaning of "human being', such that if we could have access to, and know this Form, we would know the true meaning of human being. In other words, one would believe that there is a true, objective meaning to "human being". But I think it is just a matter of convention. Notice that we do not even use the generic "man" very often any more, like Aristotle defined "man", not "human being". Aristotle was before the Latin influence which shifted us from "man" to "human being". A word has an associated concept, (concept referring to the conventions of use), and if that concept proves to be deficient, sometimes a new word, with a different concept must be introduced.

Hi! I've read that according to Aristotle, every thing has an essence which makes it what it is. — mew

According to this statement, a thing's essence is something particular, it is what makes the thing the thing that it is, and not something else, so it is the thing's particularity.

Also, that essence is universal but something universal exists only through particular things. — mew

Now, you have described essence as something universal. So you need to either establish some principles of compatibility whereby a thing's particularity is something universal, or allow that "essence" is used in two completely different ways. Otherwise you may have made a mistake in your description.

I think that Aristotle was a substance dualist, as he distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, so he has two distinct ways of using "essence", one refers to a universal, the other to a particular.