One of the main aims of Wittgenstein's later philosophy (or philosophical therapy) is to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." (116) Language games are one of the devices that Wittgenstein uses to restore some perspective and ground language as an activity rather than as some idealised abstraction: the received view of many philosophers. As Wittgenstein puts it: — Luke

If you take language away from the metaphysician, how is the metaphysician going to do metaphysics? I assume by the claim that this is "therapy", that metaphysics is apprehended as a form of illness. Does anyone really believe that forcing the sick person to shut up is an acceptable form of therapy?

“Metaphysician Undercover: An adequate summary of the argument is – — Robert Lockhart

No offence Robert, but I found your extraordinarily long and convoluted sentences exceedingly difficult to understand.



Lol. Le Francais en simplicitude. Laver les sausages.

am agnostic, so my "if" is meaningful, because I am not sure if there is a God or not, however I am sure that a 'logical' God it is a fantasy, perhaps a necessary one but still if your conception of the divine is some sort of logical magician, happy trails. — Cavacava

How is it possible that something which is necessary could be a fantasy? Can this be rationalized?

Welcome. I agree that things made of cells are living things. But why is that the case? What makes a cell a living thing, and anything simpler than a cell a non-living thing (I assume you agree with the latter phrase too)? — Samuel Lacrampe

Why do you think that a cell is the simplest possible living thing?

This may answer my previous question. But would that not make a fire a living thing much like a cell? Note, this seems to be the position of some people in this discussion. I am on the edge on that one; and yet I cannot seem to find a clear difference between a cell and a fire. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why would you think that a fire metabolizes? Metabolism is clearly defined as what living things do. What "metabolism" refers to is confined to the activities of life. I do not think that a fire is a living process. But metabolism, as a release of energy by an organism, also has a flip side, which is the storing of energy, best exemplified by photosynthesis.

Hi Fred, do you not recognize a distinction between animate and inanimate things?

You are creating a figure of straw, if you assert that when it is commonly said that matter follows laws, the implication is that matter is somehow interpreting laws. To say that matter follows laws is to say nothing more than that it acts in accordance with them. — John

What I assert is that it is wrong to say that matter follows laws, because "follows" implies that one is prior to the other. In this case it is implied by the word "follows", that laws are prior to matter. But clearly human beings create the laws, and this is by following the activities of matter. So laws really follow matter.

Therefore my claim is that to say "matter follows laws" is not the same a saying matter acts in accordance with laws. In fact, I assert that to say "matter follows laws" is not just an ambiguous way of speaking, it is misleading, deceptive, and false.

Some details first. As I read the history of truth (although not specifically so named), I find in it first that "honesty," as the ethos of the speaker, comprising his arete, phroneses, and eunoia, as judged by his auditors, is the test of truth, and it thereby becomes an historical truth. Not that his arguments are true, because they are in fact contingent ("shall we build a wall?" shall we attack at dawn?" and their respective answers could be either true or false). This kind of truth is the province of rhetoric and usually concerns an action to be undertaken. — tim wood

Honesty must be considered in relation to the attitude of the interpreter as well as the attitude of the speaker. This encompasses what is sometimes called "the principle of charity". So when a proposition is judged for truth or falsity, it must be honestly interpreted. This is why it is useful to have multiple auditors, like a jury, to ensure that there is a true interpretation of the proposition.

Then comes the disinterested, a priori argument that is universally and necessarily so - true - that is demonstrated in a proof (of some sort - perhaps geometrical) that is in no way connected to the ethos of the speaker; indeed, the speaker is mere vehicle in this case and the proof is more appropriately denominated a visual proof - a matter of viewing and coming to understand and agree with the proof - as opposed to the auditory rhetorical "proof" in which the character of the speaker moves the listener to action. — tim wood

So I would argue that even when a logical argument is being made, honesty is a factor, because the one judging it must interpret it honestly. Agreement is dependent on honest interpretation, just as much as it is dependent on honest expression. The point is that any such logical demonstration requires agreement in defining and use terms. Without honesty there is no agreement, we may decline definitions at will. This is not simply a matter of what you have described as "rhetorical truth", it is relevant to all truth.

A priori truth, on the other hand, is always and universally true, taking in math, science, arguably ethics, each with it's own criteria for truth.

Mathematics certainly has standards for what constitutes truth. Somewhere in here - I'm not sure where - we may find a candidate for your independently existing truth. It may lie in provability.

Science, similarly, with replicability the standard.

Ethics, with maturity of thought. And so forth for any possible class of inquiry. — tim wood

So all these different truths rely on definitions. The definitions must be agreed to, or accepted, in order that there is truth. If one rejects the definitions, one denies the truth.

The possibility of throwing out reason makes relativism just the shock-troop of nihilism. I do not know if or where Kant expressly argued against nihilism - I can imagine he thought it too silly to be worth considering - but we have a different argument, grown from Heidegger's Sorge, care. We care. Our form of care allows us to modify our notion of truth as being the fitness and rightness of propositions. Care, as I understand it, is a temporal function. It moves, grows, in one direction, towards a maturity of thought that will, I suppose and hope, that will weld all truth together. Fitness and rightness - truth - is always already on the path to perfection, even if the progress along the way is sometimes bumpy. (And your "honesty" finds its way back in, here.) — tim wood

Yes, I have a limited acquaintance with Heidegger's notion of "care", and I think I would be somewhat in agreement, though I think it has a much broader application for Heidegger. Also, I am in agreement with your designation of "fitness and rightness". A proposition is a proposal, and acceptance implies that one judges the definitions, and use of terms as "right". If not, we reject the proposition. Again though, I'll remind you, that such judgement must be made with an attitude of honesty, and this why we can refer to this attitude with words such as "care", "fair", and "charity".

This, then: truth is the fit and right comportment of propositions with respect to their proper subject matter, as apprehended by competent minds of reason and good will.

Let's hammer on this to see if it stands, or not, or can be improved. — tim wood

Now you've hit, with your hammer, a whole new can of worms, what you call "proper subject matter". We've been discussing the use of words, composition and interpretation, in relation to truth. Where do we find "subject matter" here? Isn't the real subject matter represented by this word, "proper"? Without proper use, there is no subject matter, and proper use is what creates subject matter. Don't you agree, that without proper use, the proposition is meaningless (having no subject matter), but with proper use there is meaning, and therefore subject matter? This implies that subject matter is itself the manifestation of truth, which is dependent on honesty and proper use. Can we find the essence of "subject matter", because this might be the material existence of truth?

You were equivocating in saying that matter had to be able to interpret a law in order to "follow" it, as we might say of a human that follows a law — John

No I don't equivocate. As I explained, only human beings "follow laws" whether they are following governing laws, or following laws of physics. I strongly affirm that matter does not follow laws.

Matter follows a set of physical laws which govern it's behavior is another way of saying "there is consistency in the way matter behaves". — VagabondSpectre

Clearly this is an unacceptable use of the word "govern". That's why I am trying to keep things clear here, to avoid such ambiguity. There is consistency in the way matter behaves. There are laws of physics which describe the way matter behaves. But obviously these laws do not govern the way matter behaves.

So when you say "existent material can interpret some fundamental laws", that's a more or less accurate way of saying that matter behaves with some consistency. — VagabondSpectre

No, this is false. It is one thing to say that matter behaves with consistency, it is quite another thing to say that matter "interprets" laws. The latter implies that matter has the capacity to apprehend the meaning of things. There is no indication that matter has the capacity to do this. That's an unsupported materialist assumption.

The problem is more that you are anthropomorphizing matter, in imagining that it would have to be able to "interpret' a law in order to be able to act in accordance with it. Even humans are capable of acting in accordance with laws without being able to interpret them; or even necessarily knowing they are acting in accordance with some law. — John

For matter to act in accordance with a physical law is one thing. For a human being to act in accordance with a governing law is a completely different thing. That they are different is evident from the fact that if matter is seen to behave other than in the way that the physical law describes, it is evidence that the law needs to be altered, but if a human being acts in a way other than the governing law prescribes, this is evidence that the human being needs to be altered. To equivocate between these two very distinct uses of "laws" is a mistake.

With this clarification, it seems there is not much in common between human laws and laws of physics. The two types of "laws" have completely difference essences. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's exactly what I am arguing, and I think it's a very important point to keep in mind in any metaphysical speculations.

My position on the laws of physics is that - to avoid any mystery - laws are "material history". Laws are simply the constraints that accumulate as a system (even a whole Universe) develops its organisation. — apokrisis

I think "material history" is very ambiguous. Human beings have a "history" because they record events, and this record acts as a way of remembering. But the record needs to be interpreted. It is useless without the means of interpretation. We could say that the geological formations of the earth provide us with a material history, but that "history" is really dependent on the interpretation.

We interpret such a material history with the use of the laws of physics. The laws are the tool of interpretation. To say that the laws of physics act as constraints in any way other than as constraining the minds of the interpreters, of this history, is simply mistaken. What you imply is that someone was following (being constrained by) the laws of physics when creating the geological formations, recording history in this way. But those geological formations were created prior to human existence, and therefore prior to the laws of physics, so this is actually impossible.

This again is a big advantage of turning the usual notion of material existence on its head. — apokrisis

If you want to turn the notion of material existence "on its head" you need to develop sound principles. You cannot expect to turn something upside down and have it stand alone on its head, without providing some support for it. It wasn't built to stand on its head, so if you turn it upside down you need to create a new foundation for it, to support it.

But a Peircean semiotic metaphysics - one where existence develops as a habit - says instead everything is possible and then actuality arises by most of that possibility getting suppressed. So the universal laws are universal states of constraint - the historical removal of a whole bunch of possibility. The objects left at the end of the process are heavily restricted in their actions - and by the same token, they then enjoy the equally definite freedoms that thus remain. — apokrisis

This is a totally unfounded use of "habit". "Habit" generally refers to the tendencies of living beings. Any habit is just a tendency, and it may be broken at will, by the living creature. Therefore we cannot produce a "law of physics" from a habit, because we do not observe the necessary consistency, due to the will which breaks the habits. So it is also a mistake to say that the laws of physics could refer to habits, because we know that habits are a type of thing which cannot be modeled by laws of physics.

But a constraints-based holistic metaphysics says instead that laws are simply historically embedded material conditions. History fixes the world in general ways that then everywhere impinge as constraints on what can happen. But in doing that, those same constraints also underpin the freedoms that local objects can then call their own. — apokrisis

This is clearly a mistaken metaphysics. Laws are created by human beings. The laws of physics are generalizations produced from observations. What they represent is inductive conclusions. The laws of physics act as constraints toward further logical proceedings, as premises and fundamental principles for deductive proceedings. It is a mistake to assume that laws of physics represent real constraints acting within the physical world because we know that inductive logic is fallible. The fact that many inductive conclusions turn out to be misleading is evidence that we cannot claim that inductive laws of physics represent anything real within the world. The reality of the laws of physics is that they are tools to aid us in understanding, they are not representative.

Maybe the posting just mysteriously disappeared into the abyss.

Suppose x is (defined as) atemporal, "outside of time". Then there can be no time at which x exists. And x cannot change, or be subject to change, but would be inert. Interaction with x could not occur. — jorndoe

This all depends on how one defines "time". If time is defined by physical change, then physical change is essential to time, physical change is necessary for time to be passing, and there is no such thing as time passing when no physical change is occurring. But if physical change is defined by time, then we invert this model, and we allow for the possibility of time passing when no physical change is occurring.

Now we have two distinct definitions of time, the former and the latter. We can assume something "outside of time", in reference to the former definition, which is "inside of time" in reference to the latter definition. This assumed "thing", could cause physical change, and it would appear to be outside of time according to the former definition, because it is not itself a physical change. However, if we adopt the latter definition of 'time", which allows for time to be passing when no physical change is occurring, then we allow this to be a "cause", inside of time. That cause is properly a "cause", but it has no physical existence. It is outside of time when "time" is defined as it commonly is in physics, but it is not outside of time if we adopt a different definition of "time". The idea that there is a thing outside of time, and that it is necessarily "inert", is produced by the idea that time is defined by physical change, and that this is the correct model of time.

The accuracy of prediction is not what is at issue here. The claim was made that matter follows rules, and this is what allows for the apparent self-organizing of living beings.

This is what Vagabond Spectre said:

The basic rules of the system (physics) guide the apparent self-organization of the system. So it's not really "self-organizing" it's just that we're recognizing certain behaviors of certain arrangements of matter (which through basic rules) produce a pattern of interaction that exhibits more complex behavior as a whole than the bits following simple rules that comprise it.

Do you see the problem here? We have no precedent whereby we can say that matter is capable of following rules. But Sam L. responded with the claim that matter follows the laws of gravity. That's why I pointed out the category error. The position being argued by VagabondSpectre, and apokrisis as well for that matter, is completely supported by this category error. Simply stated, the error is that existent material can interpret some fundamental laws, to structure itself in a self-organizing way. it is only through this error, that supporters of this position can avoid positing an active principle of "life", and vitalism.

In the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument Dr Craig boldly asserts that "whatever begins to exists has a cause". What does he mean? What does he mean by "begins to exists"? And what does it mean to cause something to begin to exist? People don't usually talk about things in terms of "begins to exist.", and I never heard somebody say "x caused y to begin to exist". Let's look at an example: — Purple Pond

This has to do with the way that we individuate things in the world, and refer to them as individual objects, separate from other individual objects. That there are separate unities which can be counted, 1, 2, 3, 4, is fundamental to mathematics, and that the separate entities can be identified and described, is fundamental to deductive logic. So within the fundamental assumptions, or premises, of these logical systems, as a foundational principle, is the belief that there are individual objects within the world.

However, experience and observation tell us that the existence of individual physical objects is temporary. They all have temporal existence, which means that they come into existence, and go out of existence with the passing of time. Because every object is generated and corrupted in time, we must assume that each object has a beginning and an ending in time. Further, we have observed that there are causes of coming into existence and ceasing to exist.

Does that help to explain the issue?

How about instead of "whatever begins to exist has a cause", "everything that I'm aware of has been brought into being by something else". The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

I don't see how that change gets rid of the need for God. We still have all physical things having temporal existence. And if every physical thing is brought into existence by "something else", then we need to assume something like God to account for the first physical thing.

We are not talking about "gravity" we are talking about "the laws of gravity". The former refers to a physical property of the world, the latter to a man-made description of how things behave when influenced by that property. We can say that gravity compels objects to move. But to say that objects are moving in this way because they are compelled to by the laws of gravity, is a category error.

The issue here is that we haven't found any thing in nature which corresponds to "the laws of gravity". So we cannot claim that there is some natural "laws of gravity" which are compelling objects to move. The laws of gravity are abstractions made from the movements of objects, they are not abstractions made from the cause of this movement. So we cannot claim that the "laws of gravity" refer to that which causes, or compels objects to move in that way, because it does not.

Only if the rule is only influencing and not compelling. If a rule is only influencing, then following it is a voluntary act of the mind. But if compelling, then the object does not need to have a mind. We are influenced by man-made laws, and it is our voluntary choice to follow them or break them. On the other hand, our bodies (and all mindless objects with a mass) "follow" the laws of gravity because they are compelling laws, and we cannot help but fall from the sky to the ground. All laws of physics are compelling laws. — Samuel Lacrampe

This really doesn't make sense. Laws of physics, such as "the laws of gravity" are all man-made laws. They are generalities produced by logic, which describe the ways that things behave. They don't compel things to behave in the described way. The rule follows the behaviour, as a description, not vise versa.

OK, I'm persuaded. — Bitter Crank

That wasn't hard. But that's because you're a very reasonable and open-minded person with respect to this type of question.

The basic rules of the system (physics) guide the apparent self-organization of the system. So it's not really "self-organizing" it's just that we're recognizing certain behaviors of certain arrangements of matter (which through basic rules) produce a pattern of interaction that exhibits more complex behavior as a whole than the bits following simple rules that comprise it. — VagabondSpectre

I have great difficulty with this. Matter does not follow rules. We have laws of physics which describe the way that matter behaves, these are descriptive laws. They are not prescriptive laws which are telling matter how to behave. We do not seem to know why matter behaves in such regular ways which can be described by descriptive laws, but it requires a far stretch of the imagination to say that matter behaves like it does because it is following rules. Doesn't it require a mind to follow rules?

You are simply identifying use and token. They are not the same. — Banno

It's all use. You are mistakenly attempting to separate token from use, as if it is not a form of use.

Can you give me an example of a concept which is not given, even remotely, in terms of physical things or relations between physical things? — John

The fact that a concept is "given" in terms of physical things does not necessitate that the concept is "of" a physical thing. Quite the opposite is actually the case. The concept is given in terms of physical things because that is how we communicate. We must communicate through the physical world, and we give each other concepts through physical representations. But the physical thing is the representation of the concept, not vise versa.

All the purely abstract concepts such as mathematical concepts are good demonstrations of such. Consider geometry, we have points, lines, right angles, circles, etc., which all have defined essences. We make a copy of the circle, for example, on a piece of paper, to demonstrate it to others, but this is just a representation of the concept, just like a point or a line on the paper acts as a representation of the concept. That it is just a representation is evident from the fact that we cannot make a perfect circle, the "true" circle remains the concept. Nor can we make a non-dimensional point on a paper, the true point is the concept. The one on the paper is a representation of the concept.

To properly apprehend the nature of concepts, it is necessary to see the physical object as the representation of the concept, not vise versa. This is what Plato described in the cave allegory.

As I said before, the logical meaning of truth is that it is accordance with actuality. — John

But that's not the meaning of "truth", that's the meaning of "true", and this distinction is the one being focused on in this thread.

The difficulty I'm having here is trying to figure out if truth lies in the intention, or in the speech. Answer, it seems neither. The speaker desires to speak truly, but whether he did or did not is not his judgment to make (except as he hears himself, but he doesn't get a vote). Nor is his (rhetorical) proposition true until it is judged so. In rhetoric/persuasive speech, the desire is part of what is judged, whereas in categorical propositions, the proposition is judged on content alone. — tim wood

Let me just say here, that you cannot reduce the question of "truth" to a question of whether it is in the intention or in the speech, because the speech, once it is spoken, must be interpreted. So really, the question of "truth", if expressed in this way, ought to be expressed as whether the truth is in the intention of the speaker, or in the intention of the interpreter. And this rapidly becomes a complex issue because there may be multiple interpreters, each with one's own intent.

I do not see any means of positioning truth within the physical existence of the speech itself, because it requires interpretation for meaning in order to be judged. Some will define a statement, or proposition, as an odd sort of conglomeration of physical symbols combined with a particular meaning, but I don't believe this is reality. If we combine a meaning with the physical symbols, such that they exist together, the meaning must be taken as something vague and ambiguous, general, to allow for the reality of many possible interpretations. This ambiguity disallows the possibility of truth, so truth cannot be attributed to the physical existence of the speech, even if we say that meaning is within the physical existence, because this meaning within the physical existence must be inherently ambiguous. So when those people say that "true" may be attributed directly to the statement or proposition, they are assuming that the statement has one unambiguous "objective" meaning. But this is actually beyond the reality of the statement, as even precisely stated mathematical equations are open to some degree of ambiguity, such as when we subject symbols like = to principles of skepticism. So it is the essential property of the physical existence of speech that it contains ambiguity. And this denies the possibility of truth.

So, a candidate MS is All S is P. We judge that it's true (in any of a number of ways, depending on the exact content of the MS). To be sure, our competence of judgment is likely borrowed, and the judgment itself may be ancient - but in at least some sense it's still our judgment.

For truth to exist at all, it seems we must be able to find it just here in our candidate MS.. — tim wood

So here, we can see where the ambiguity lies. Let's say I produce an instance of S which I claim is not P. I insist that this is an instance of S, and it is clearly not P, so I assert "All S is P" is false. You argue, no that is not an instance of S, because it is not P, and therefore it cannot be S, maintaining, "All S is P" is true.

Obviously, we cannot say that truth is in the MS, because truth relies not only on how we interpret the MS, but also on how we interpret the world. In the example, I would argue that you are just interpreting the world in such a way as to maintain the truth of your MS, when I think it is a bad way of interpreting the world, and we should dismiss your MS as false.

It would seem that truth is never "out there" inhering in the propositions; instead it seems to just be the expression of the synthesis of perception, knowledge, and judgment. Every truth is mine, in so far as I recognize it as a truth. But every truth is also prospectively a part of collective mind.

Truth, then, is the recognized accordance of a proposition with the competent judgment of mind, and as such, testimony to the activity of that mind.
. — tim wood

It is this "collective mind" part which makes truth more than just a subjective opinion of you or I, the opinion that X is true. But this is also why it is best described by an attitude which we have towards each other. That is what I called honesty. So truth is not strictly speaking, a testimony to the activity of a mind, it is as you say the testimony to the activity of a special type of mind, which you call a "competent" mind. I would prefer to narrow down "competent" to the more specific, "honest". One can be very competent in making judgements, yet not be honest, and therefore truth does not enter into that competent judgement. Honesty is what allows one to have respect for others in making such judgements.

We take one step towards removing the arbitrariness of pure subjectivity, of truth, by asserting that the judgement must be made by a competent mind. We take the next step by saying that the judgement must be made by an honest, competent, mind. This ensures that the mind making the judgement has the proper attitude toward other minds.

I would ask you now, can we give truth independent, separate existence? There are many things which competent minds working together create in the world, and these things have independent existence. We can start with physical objects, there are many buildings and things like that. But then we can move into things which have less of a physical existence, like mores, laws, and social structures. Can truth be one of those things, created by honest, competent minds working together, yet somehow existing independently of those minds? Where would we find it? We've already determined that it is not within statements or propositions. If it is within the honest mind, then how is it also independent of the honest mind?

"Self"-organizing information might be slightly deceptive phrasing. I'm not looking for an un-caused cause. Complex structure and patterns can grow in size and complexity from a basic set of simple and well defined rules which cumulatively adds complexity the longer they exist. Complex states far into the progression of a given system depend on and can be informed by previous and less complex states of that system and it's inputs. It is specifically the function of data left-over from previous states/inputs informing (giving rise to apparent anticipation) the progression of the system toward more complex states of being which I would illustratively describe as "self-organizing". — VagabondSpectre

Perhaps you were not looking for an uncaused cause, but that's what you described. When you introduce "a basic set of simple and well defined rules", then you assume information which is outside of the "self-organizing" system. You avoid an uncaused cause by positing a set of rules. But by doing this, you have changed the description of the thing (life). It is no longer "self-organizing information", it is now described as a capacity to follow some rules. And since the rules must exist as some form of information, now your described thing (life) must have the capacity to interpret information.

Do you agree, that your self-organizing thing requires these two things for its existence, a set of rules, and the capacity to interpret rules? There is one other thing which I must add though, and that is the will to act. Rules and interpretations of rules do not create any organized structures without the will to act according to the rules.

What is required for deductive logic is that the use on the left be the same as the use on the right. — Banno

Sure, I agree Banno. Logic is basically rules, and the symbols used need not symbolize anything at all. But even in saying that the use on the right must be "the same" as the use on the left, you are invoking an essence. Notice, that by your description, one is on the right and the other is on the left, so they are clearly not the same usage. Yet you give yourself the right to assert that the use is the same. You do this by dismissing this difference between right and left as accidental, and your claim that the usage is "the same" is only supported by the assumption that it is "essentially" the same.

Here's the classic example of "essence" in use in deductive logic:
p1 all men are mortal
p2 Socrates is a man
c Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Notice that p1 sets out an essential aspect of "man", and that is "mortal". In order for the logic to work, it is necessary that all men are mortal. if mortal is not essential, then not all men are mortal, p1 is false, and the following logic is meaningless.

So, you have decided that there are only physical things and the concepts of them? On what do you base this conclusion? — John

No, I haven't decided that. Concepts are not necessarily "of" physical things. But if you want to posit the existence of a non-physical thing, which is not a concept, you'll need to back this up with some sort of explanation.

It is obvious that truth is not a physical thing. If you want to say that truth is a concept, and nothing more than that, then you should be able to give an account of it as such. — John

According to my discussion with tim wood, I was ready to concede that there is no such thing as truth. So neither is truth a non-physical concept, nor is it a physical thing. Tim went on to suggest that truth might be attitudinal, and you can read my reply to that in the post before you engaged me.

It's not prior to the relationship, but to our conception of the relationship; we conceive of relationships under the aegis of the possibility of the truth or falsity of our conception of them. — John

If this is what you are saying here as well, that truth is attitudinal? Then we are probably in agreement. Read my post, and tell me what you think, because I've offered an identification of that attitude as honesty.

If we boil this down, life is self-organizing information (and consumes energy to do it, and so requires abundance of fuel). — VagabondSpectre

Can you explain to me what exactly you refer to with the word "information"? The reason I ask is that there are generally two ways of apprehending this term. In one sense, when we interpret some display of existence, we derive information from this interpretation. In that sense, information only exists within a mind, produced by the interpretation. This is how many people think of "meaning". In another sense, "information" is the thing independent from the interpreting mind, the thing which is being interpreted. In this sense, there are patterns of existents, and these patterns are said to be "information".

From your use of the term, it appears like you use "information" in the latter sense. It is patterns existing independently from any mind which might interpret these patterns. But if this is the case, then isn't "self-organizing information" rather nonsensical? The term "information", used in this way implies necessarily, organized patterns in existence. If there is no organized pattern there is no information. So "self-organizing information" implies organized patterns which have caused the existence of themselves. Doesn't that seem nonsensical to you? Imagine the existence of an organized pattern. Can you make sense of the notion that this organized pattern caused its own existence?

No, what's ridiculous is the amount of effort you put into reading posts before responding. I explicitly stated that I think there cannot be a concept of truth, and that truth is prior to all concepts: — John

So what would this so-called "truth" consist of, which is independent from all concepts? Is it a physical thing? If not, then how does it differ from a concept?

What do you think a concept of anything consists in? Doesn't a concept of something consist in relating it to other particulars in terms of commonalities and differences in order to establish what kind of thing it is? Is not the possibility of the truth or falsity of these purported relations that form our concepts always prior to the purported relations themselves? — John

No, I really think you have this backward. How could the truth or falsity of a relationship be prior to the relationship itself. If it is the relationship which is either true or false, then truth or falsity is an attribute of the relationship. So how is it possible that this attribute exists prior to the thing which it is the property of? Are you suggesting that there is this thing called "truth", which floats around independent from any statements, yet attaches itself to a statement making that statement true?

I think that maybe you've been looking in the wrong place for "truth". You've now exposed "truth" as "attitudes held by more or less rational beings", yet you claim that these attitudes are "not arbitrary". Perhaps we can identify a particular type of attitude, rather than a multitude of different attitudes, and this particular attitude might lend itself as the essence of truth.

Would you agree that there is a relationship between truth and honesty? Have you ever considered that the essence of "truth" might be found in this attitude which we call honesty? It is evident that any statement may deceive, if that is the intent of the author, and the one receiving is not on guard. So despite how truthful the proposition may appear, if it was proposed with the intent to deceive, that truthfulness will be in appearance only. But if the statement is made in honesty, it will always reflect the true thoughts of the author.

Now, what all true statements have in common, is that they were produced from that attitude of honesty. If they were not produced in honesty, they are not true, and some honest statements are still not true by reason of mistake, but all true statements are derived from the honest attitude. So if we are looking to define "truth", by determining what all true statements have in common, then we should consider this honest attitude as the defining feature.

English seems to have been now completely deducted from the statement as it first appeared. Curious. Perhaps English wasn't the language of logic after all? — apokrisis

Yeah, I got that in my notification. The fact is, that Banno's claimed "examination of language use" is very selective. There is a refusal to examine how language is used in deductive logic, where unambiguous definitions (essences) must be adhered to, or else the logic is rendered useless. Banno just insists that we should refer to "common" use.

It is possible that we might examine numerous instances of "common" use, in the method of Platonic dialectics, to determine if they all have something in common. From this we could synthesize a definition (essence).

Can you explain what Meta meant? Is he just claiming that deductive logic relies on explicit definitions? — Banno

Correct, and doesn't a definition give one the essence of the thing? You may have an aversion to the word "essence", but your "common use", which is full of ambiguities and equivocations is quite useless for any deductive logic.

Here's a definition of experience from Merriam-Webster:
Experience: the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through direct observation or participation
If you never experienced opposition, how do you even know you are getting it right without having ever experienced it? How is it that you know that you understand opposition? — Harry Hindu

This question doesn't make sense. How is it that you know anything? To experience something is not sufficient for knowing something, the experience must be remembered. So if you are asking me how I know I am getting opposition right, I might as well ask you how do you know you are getting anything right?

Of course it does. Opposition is a kind of difference. — Harry Hindu

No, that's wrong. If opposition is a certain type of difference, then describing difference does not tell one what opposition is. Does describing colour tell you what red is?

Now you aren't making any sense, whatsoever. [/i]What[/i] is it that is in opposition? How does it make any sense to think of opposition without including what it is that is in opposition? Notice how you can't adequately describe opposition without using examples of your experiences - like with numbers and is and is not? How do you know what opposition is without experiencing it? How did you acquire that knowledge, and how do you confirm that knowledge? — Harry Hindu

You really don't understand opposition do you? It is purely conceptual. It is not the case that this thing is opposite to that thing, that's just a complete misrepresentation of opposition.

And everyone understands that the standard of truth for a given proposition needn't be the same standard for another. Truth, if it means anything, would just seem to refer to these different "trues." That is, truth is a many posing as and often being taken as a one. In this case, however, being a many is all it is.As a one, it's a nothing. — tim wood

Well here's the problem then. If each proposition requires a different standard to be judged as true, then "true" has a different meaning in each of these instances of use. That's what I mean when I say there is no unambiguous definition of "true". From this, to say that a proposition is true, is really meaningless unless we indicate by which standard it is true. Clearly, there is no one concept of "truth" unless there is one standard by which we judge something as "true", just like there is one standard to judge something as "square", despite the many different sized squares.

I read John as taking the opposite view, that truth is so far from being arbitrary that it is fundamental, primordial. I think he means the truth of particular propositions, that each is, or is not, true. It raises an interesting question: what come first? The true itself? Or the possibility of being true? I suppose that the true/false divide comes into being somewhere when experience and understanding merged, and that the general term "truth" had to wait a long time before it came into usage. The passage from the descriptor, "true" to the noun-substantive (without a substance) "truth." — tim wood

What John says makes no sense to me. John seems to think that there is a concept of truth which is prior to the concept of truth, and that's ridiculous.

If a rock (the very model of modern unconscious matter) is falling towards the earth and you will presently occupy the same space as the rock, does that mean that the rock intends, or could intend, to crush you (assuming some imminently conscious agent from TPF didn't urge the rock off a ledge)? — Bitter Crank

No, the rock does not intend to kill you, because the defining feature of intent is purpose. Unless the rock was thrown by a human being, or otherwise set up to fall with the purpose of killing you, we don't apprehend any intent here. This is just a chance occurrence, that you happen to be under the falling rock. In the case of the sperm and the egg though, it is not a chance occurrence, that they "find each other", because the activities of the sperm are purposeful, the sperm actually seeks the egg to the extent of its limited capacities. Therefore we cannot exclude intent from the sperm finding the egg.

A bull does not intend to get a cow pregnant. It only has to get aroused by the cow's female pheromones. Perhaps, maybe, possibly, it could then intend to mount the cow. — Bitter Crank

I agree that the bull does not intend to get the cow pregnant, but that is only one example of the many possible intentions behind this act. If the bull does not intend to mount the cow, then what causes it to mount the cow? Sure, it is aroused, and wants to ejaculate, so isn't it the case that it mounts the cow for this purpose? And if it does that for this purpose, then how can you deny that it had this intent? The intent is not "to get the cow pregnant", but there is still intent behind the act.

Or the teenage boy on the couch probably does not intend to get the teenage girl on the same couch pregnant. He might intend to have intercourse, but he certainly intends (needs, wants) to ejaculate, somehow, somewhere. The girl probably doesn't intend to get pregnant, either, but if push comes to shove... she might get knocked up, intent or not. — Bitter Crank

I am not arguing for any specific intent, I am arguing for intent in general. You seem to be in agreement, because you allow that there is intent, in your examples, just not the particular intent which one might posit. But that's the nature of intent though, unless it is guided by the conscious mind is very general in nature, manifesting as various instinctual urges and desires. But how can you remove intent from these instinctual urges? Can you honestly believe that there is no purpose (and therefore no intent) behind the beaver's urge to build a dam?

How we misunderstand intent is that we assume that the final outcome of the intended act must be apprehended by the individual acting in order that we can attribute intent to that act. So for example the boy does not intend to get the girl pregnant, so we are inclined to remove intent from that act. But there is still intent of some sort, behind the act which gets her pregnant, so we cannot deny intent altogether. If we do not understand the intent behind an act, as this or that particular intent, this does not force the conclusion that there was no intent.

Intent in its natural form, is very different from the way we represent it. We tend to start from the final end, as that which is intended, and work our way backward through all the necessary steps required to bring about that end. This is the way conscious intention works, we choose a goal and determine what is necessary to bring that about. So we model this in our representation of intention. But conscious intention is artificial, created by the conscious mind, and these models do not represent intention in its natural state. In its natural state, the purpose of the intentional act is something very immediate. The intentional being acts to bring about an immediate result, as there is purpose to every minute act which that being makes. Each particular intentional act may start a chain of efficient causes, and the final outcome of that chain of efficient causes is never a guaranteed particular outcome.

Animals (including us) reproduce because sexual pleasure results in sperm and eggs finding each other. Intention isn't required (but is often enough there, for us, anyway). — Bitter Crank

You'd be surprised at all the situations where it is necessary to posit intention. Anything which acts for a purpose, or aim, has intention, by definition. The purpose or aim of a thing's function is that thing's intention. Isn't there a purpose to the sperm and egg finding each other? So isn't it necessary to say that there is intention here?

It seems like in our society, we've forgotten what the word "intention" means, wanting to equate it with consciousness or something like that. But being conscious is not the same thing as having intent. I suggest that having intent is necessary in order that a thing be conscious, but it is not necessary for a thing to be conscious in order for it to have intent

Purpose is the reason for any "drive or need". So when self-actualization is defined as a drive or need, then the purpose of life cannot be self-actualization, it has to be the reason for self-actualization.

Or you may get the idea that truth is actually something more, perhaps a quality of some kind in its own right. Now here I have a problem: what, exactly, would that property be?

Of course this means that anyone talking about "the truth," or the "absolute truth" (beyond just what in particular makes MS1, or MS2, etc., true), or any of a large number of formulations of this kind, is just talking nonsense. — tim wood

Consider the difference between an object having the property X, and the concept which is X. So for example, we have an object which is red, and a concept of what it means to be red, and this is the concept of red. It is possible to consider the concept as an object itself, and this is what happens with geometric figures, the concept is the object. We have a point, a line, a right angle, a square, a circle, etc.. All these words refer to concepts, so the concept is the object which is being referred to. When we apprehend concepts as objects like this, we can analyze the concepts, just like we would analyze any object.

Now assume that "true" is a property which we assign to propositions. Accordingly, there is assumed to be a concept of what it means to be true. If we consider this concept itself, as an object, we have "the truth" as an object just like "the circle" or "the square". The problem is that there is no clear and unambiguous definition of "the truth", like there is of "the circle", or 'the square". This leaves us with doubt as to whether there really is a concept, which can be considered as an object, called "the truth". This is the issue which Plato attacked vigorously, with concepts such as "beauty", "love", "just", "knowledge", "virtue", "friendship", etc.. When we cannot agree on the definition of the term, how can we claim that there is such a thing (object) as the concept which is signified by that term. Now you recognize the same problem with "the truth". If there is no agreed upon definition of what it means to be true, how can there be a concept of "the truth"?

...I, with the view that essences best ignored in favour of the examination of language use. — Banno

The problem being that you refuse to examine how language is used in deductive logic. If you would get over this refusal, you would see that examining language use, and ignoring essences, presents a contradictory proposition.

I don't see how this is so difficult for you to grasp. I think you're blowing through my posts without taking the time to actually read it - every word.

Actually, it is you that has been arguing that you can experience opposition without any experiences. This is starting to get to the point of where I get bored of having to repeat myself and repeat your own position that you seem to not understand yourself. — Harry Hindu

No, I read your posts, but we're both on completely different wavelengths. You use the word "experience" in a way which doesn't make sense to me. I don't think that opposition is something which can be experienced. You assume that opposition is experienced, and use your words in a way which demonstrates this belief, but this makes your words nonsensical to me.

So in order to make your words make sense to me, you need to explain to me how you experience opposition. Just insisting that opposition is part of your experience doesn't help me, I need you to describe the experience of opposition. And describing differences does not describe opposition.

When we have experiences of multiple things, that is where we get the idea of opposition - that the sound I experience isn't the same thing as the colors I experience, and even the colors are different. — Harry Hindu

No, that's not true. That one thing is not the same as another does not produce the idea of opposition. Two things which are opposite, like negative and positive, or, is and is not, are exactly the same in every way, except in the way of opposition. They differ in only one particular way, and that is that they are opposite, in every other way, they are exactly the same. So a colour and a sound are different, but they are not at all opposite to one another.

This is why I kept posing the question (and you refuse to answer, while I have addressed every point and question you have made) of what we would think about if all we had was an experience of just one thing - just one color - that's it. — Harry Hindu

I don't see the relevance of such a hypothetical question. How am I supposed to describe to you an experience which I've never had? Your question is nonsense, it doesn't get us any closer to understanding what opposition is, nor does it make your point, that you can experience opposition. It's just a distraction.

Really? Then what would be an experience of "the friend is not" if you experienced the friend just a moment ago and now you don't after they walked through the door? — Harry Hindu

That's exactly my point, you don't experience "the friend is not", because you don't experience opposition. You have this odd assumption that you experience opposition, and you try to explain it in the strangest ways.

When I used the term, "experience", I'm talking about the whole deal - the entirety of all of your colors, shapes, sounds, etc. What you do with those colors (comparing them, etc.) is also part of the experience you are having. I don't recall calling the mental act of comparing a sensory experience. It is simply an experience composed of sensory impressions. What I have said, and I'll say one last time, is that your whole experience, whether it be comparing, imagining, or whatever, is composed of sensory data. To say that you can compare things that aren't within your experience is to say what you just said previously - that it's nonsense. — Harry Hindu

Clearly, opposition is not part of one's experience, yet we compare is and is not, positive and negative. How do you account for this? If you do not allow that some things being compared in mental activity, are actually outside of one's experience, you'll always have an unintelligible representation of mental activity. Why do you insist that it's nonsense to compare things which are not within your experience? This appears to be an assumption which is totally unwarranted, and unjustified, yet you'll defend it to your wits end, for no apparent reason.

This is not in contrast to what I have suggested; but I think it is in contrast to the notion of an essence, immutable and eternal, which seems to be what Meta has in mind. — Banno

This is clear evidence that you didn't read my post, and that's why I dropped out of the discussion back then, it appeared like you only read the first sentence, and responded to that. What would be the point to me wasting my time?

And yet you previously claimed: — Banno

As I explained earlier, there is no "correct" or "incorrect" to word usage unless we are talking about logic. And since "essence" is an aspect of correct usage, we only have essence in logic. So "essence" is a logical principle. When I explained that I was talking about epistemological principles here, you seemed to ignore that part of my post. I assumed you were to lazy to read my post, and I dropped out of the conversation.

So from where do you derive whatever you call the "essence"? — Banno

You derive the "essence" from studying the named object. Propositions of that essence are made, and when they are agreed upon we have acceptable premises for deductive logic. With deductive logic we can relate that object to other objects which have a defined essence. Without this defined essence, deductive logic is useless because there is ambiguity as to what the words refer to.

Tell me, Apo, how do you get on with Meta? I can't say I've paid much attention to discussions between you two. Are you in agreement as to the nature of essences? — Banno

As I told you earlier in this thread, I don't think of essence as an ontological entity, I think of it as an epistemological principle. I believe there is a large difference between the form which an object has, and the form which is understood by the human mind (and this understood form is what we call its "essence"). That is why human minds, and consequently "the essence" of objects is often mistaken. Without this separation there is no way to account for error. So every object has a form which is proper to it, and this is independent of the human mind, which itself assigns a form to the object as its "essence".

I've been discussing essences with him for years; it seems to me he has some sort of reified view of essences; although sometimes he talks about them as if they are no more than language conventions. He might join us here again. — Banno

That's about it, essences are language conventions. But, as I've been arguing in this thread, we can only assume the existence of such conventions where they actually exist. In common usage there are no such conventions. So we cannot refer to "common usage" as a premise for logical procedure. We need agreement on firm definitions (essences) to proceed with logic. Therefore we must get beyond common usage to produce some agreement before we have any sound premises for logical process.

How do you deter min that you have collected all the "essential features of all the many different instances of usage" in order to show that you have correctly identified the essence? — Banno

You don't, and can't, identify such an essence. That's why I claim that "common usage" is a fiction. You can look at all the different instances of usage all you want, and identify similarities, but this still will not provide you with the basis for a generalized "common usage".

That's only if the claim that there is such a thing as "common usage" is a justified claim. But as I explained, to create such a generalization, to support this notion of "common usage", requires determining the essential features of all the many different instances of usage. If there is no such essential features, there is no such thing as "common usage".

is a virus alive then? — apokrisis

What's the issue with viruses? Why would one not consider a virus to be a form of life?

I would have said the virus is life, but it is not alive since it has no functioning parts most of the time. — noAxioms

I agree that there is an issue with functioning parts, but a living thing does not have to have its parts functioning in order to be actually alive. Parts can go into a mode where they have the potential to be active, but are not active at the present time. So a seed is generally considered to be alive, though it is not active, it is in a state of suspended activity.

But since a seed is spawned from another living being, the question would be at what time does the seed become a separate living being, and cease being a part of the other living being which spawned it. And if this question cannot be answered, the assumption that there are separate, individual living beings is thrown into doubt. It may not be that we are really separate beings from our parents and our children.

Perhaps, as Cavacava points out, it is the difference between potentiality and actuality? This would differentiate a virus from a cell, and still differentiate a virus from a rock, as the former has potentiality and the latter has no potentiality. — Samuel Lacrampe

Living things have different potentials, and the potentials need not be active all the time, yet these things are still considered to be alive.

A dead cow in a field is an example of life, but is not alive. A live cow might still be created from one, but not the same cow. My clock is alive, but is not life. Alive just means the parts are currently operating (not broken, and not completely dormant). It is a fuzzy definition of 'alive', sure. You might choose to apply the term only to a life form (cow) that might be dead or alive, but the term seems to work for non-living things. — noAxioms

None of this makes any sense to me. How is a dead cow an example of life? It was alive, but no longer is, so there is no life there. It is not an example of life. How is your clock alive? Alive means to have life, to be living, it does not mean to have working parts. That's a nonsense definition of alive.

What do you mean by "the term seems to work for non-living things"? Do you mean that it works for the purpose of assigning "alive" to non-living things. But that's nonsense. What's the point in having a definition which works for creating nonsense?

I differentiated the terms. I would have said the virus is life, but it is not alive since it has no functioning parts most of the time. — noAxioms

Life is the property of a living thing which distinguishes it as alive rather than not alive; if it has life it is alive. Would could you possibly mean by "the virus has life, but it is not alive"? That seems completely contradictory.