As I was saying, when you have an experience, it isn't of just one color across your visual field and nothing else. You have an experience of a plethora of colors, and each color is different, or not the other colors. The colors are also not the feelings and sounds that you also experience, which are different. — Harry Hindu

I really don't see how a sensory experience of seeing the colour green can be construed as a sensory experience of seeing not-red. This conclusion must be produced by deduction. Therefore it is a logical conclusion that this is seeing not-red, it is not a sensory experience of not-red, whatever that might mean. Otherwise we could conclude that the sensation of seeing green is a sensory experience of seeing not-cold, or seeing not-big, or seeing not-solid, or any other random conclusion. But these random conclusions are just that, logical conclusions, they are not sensory experiences.

Or is this what your trying to argue, that the experience of seeing colours can be described as the experience of not-hearing sound? That's actually nonsense, because to determine that something is not-sound requires that one have knowledge of what sound is, and this is not prerequisite for seeing colour. So it's obvious that one can experience colour without this colour being not-sound if there were no such thing as sound.

And you can experience things, like a friend, and then not experience them. — Harry Hindu

We are talking about the difference between what is and what is not. To experience a friend's presence, then to experience that person's lack of presence, is not an experience of "the friend is not".

This seems to agree with what I said about the friend. You experience them and then you don't. That in itself is an experience of "is and is not". You seem to be agreeing with me, but just can't bring yourself to accept it. — Harry Hindu

No, I don't agree with you, because I disagree that this is a sensory experience of is and is not. You experience the presence of your friend, and you may conclude, "the friend is". Then, later this experience is replaced by other experiences and these other experiences are not experiences of "the friend is not", they are other experiences. It requires that one compare one experience to the other, to conclude logically that one experience is not the same as the other, and therefore conclude that one is not the other. This is not itself a sensory experience, it is a comparison of sensory experiences, producing a logical conclusion.

The comparison of sensory experiences, which is what some mental activity consists of, is not itself a sensory experience. What you do not seem to be grasping is that mental activity consists of such comparisons, and there is no need that the things being compared are sensory experiences. So mental activity can proceed by comparing things which are not sensory experiences. This is the case when we compare is and is not, these things are logical principles, they are not sensory experiences.

And if we already accept that this common usage is the test of our definition, why bother witht eh definition at all? — Banno

There is no such thing as "common usage", you are making an unjustified generalization. I use a word the way I want to use it, you use it the way you want to use it, and each time one of us uses it, it is used in a different way from the last time.

The "test" of a definition cannot be a referral to "common usage" because I will refer to usage which supports one definition, and you will refer to usage which supports another definition. What good will that do us? I will insist on using the word one way while you will insist on using it another. To be useful in any sort of logical proceeding, or argumentation, a definition must be based in agreement.

"Common usage" is a just fiction. It implies that there are some sort of agreements, or conventions, which create this commonality, but none exist. Therefore the claim that there is such a thing as "common usage" is a misleading deception. There are no agreements behind "common usage", and any claim of convention is fictitious. So there is nothing to conform that usage and therefore no formal commonality. Reference to "common usage" is reference to a non-existent entity and utterly useless.

If you want to say something useful, then bring up some examples of usage. That is real "common usage". But each example will be different from the last, so to produce any sort of generalization will require a synthesis of essential features from each of those instances of usage.

You're simply revamping my own position. To have this idea, of "is and is not", is to already experience distinctions, of different things at once or over a certain period of time. What form do these distinctions take? — Harry Hindu

No there is no experience of such a distinction, that's the point. What kind of experience is an experience of is not? There's no such experience. The idea of "is not" is not derived from experience, it comes from something else.

Thinking wouldn't even be happening, or necessary, if some system that thinks didn't have change to process - change, the degree of which the local environment provides. — Harry Hindu

The local environment doesn't provide you with an experience of is not, that's the point. Whatever is not within the local environment you do not experience, so you cannot get this idea of "is not" from experiencing the local environment.

If all you experienced was blackness since you came into existence, could you say that you would be able to think? If so, what would you think of? — Harry Hindu

This experience of nothing, which you refer to, might be some sort of experience of "is not". But we do not ever experience this experience of nothing, so you cannot claim that we get this idea of nothing from experience. Nor can you claim that we get the idea of "is not" from experience, because "is not" refers to what is not capable of being experienced.

Well, consider. In criminal law, in the U.S. at least, juries regularly decide a defendant is guilty or not guilty of a crime. That's a determination, a finding, in the law; subject to revision as the result of an appeal, but otherwise inviolate. However, that determination is not necessarily true (as commonly defined) or untrue. That's to say, a person may well be not guilty of a crime and yet have committed it--may in fact be guilty of it, or so I think most would say. — Ciceronianus the White

What do you think "guilty" refers to then? If the jury makes a determination of "not guilty", but you allow that this is not necessarily a true determination, and the person might actually be guilty, what does "guilty" refer to? The actual, factual, guilt or non-guilt of the defendant, according to this assumption, is something independent of the jury's judgement. So when the person is judged as "not guilty", and the person is "in fact" guilty, what does "guilty" here refer to? Is it a feeling which the person has, deep inside, this person somehow feels guilt, and this is what "guilty" refers to, that subjective feeling? Or, is it a judgement made by God, that the person is in fact guilty?

The question being, is actual or factual "guilt" a subjective feeling, or an objective judgement? If it's a subjective feeling, then if the person does not believe that they have done something wrong, there is no guilt here. But if it is an objective judgement, doesn't this require the assumption of God, to pass that judgement, and support your notion that the person whom the jury judged as not guilty is "in fact" guilty.

Like I said, I'm not really sure what the "ground of being" means. — Bitter Crank

"Being" is the present tense of "to be". So what it is that is being referred to with "the ground of being", is that which validates, or justifies, (grounds), the notion of existing at the present time. When, in contemplation, one delves into the idea of the present in time, as a division between past time and future time, that person is faced with all sorts of unresolvable issues.

To begin with, we can see the past as radically different from the future, due to the fact that things in the past have actually occurred, and things in the future have the possibility of occurring. Because of this radical difference we are forced to accept the reality of the present. We can place the present, which is what "being" refers to, existence at the present, as the end of the past, and the beginning of the future. But if one comes to understand "being" as a real active process, in which possibilities existing in the future are becoming actualities existing in the past, (which is what existence at the present implies), then it is necessary to understand the present as the beginning of the past (when the past comes into existence through "becoming"), and the end of the future ( that same "becoming" puts an end to the future existence). The "ground of being" does not really make sense to the common intuition, just like the notion of the present as the beginning of the past, and the end of the future, does not really make sense to the common intuition.

I'm not disagreeing that our mind can create new patterns, or relationships as you call them. My point is that even the new relationships are composed of sensory data. You can still only think in colored shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings - but mostly colored shapes as we seem to think that the world is more how we see it because our sight provides us the most information about the world compared to our other senses. — Harry Hindu

This is what I disagree with. My claim is that you can think in relationships themselves, that is what logic is, thinking in relationships without the use of sensory data. In any complex logic, like mathematics, sensory symbols are used as a memory aid, but in fundamental, basic logic, no such symbols are necessary.

For example, I think in the relationship of opposition, is and is not. There is no sensory data of this, yet I think this relationship. Although I must utilize symbols to express this fact to you, I know that X excludes not-X, without reference to any symbols or sense data, There is no sense data within my mind which expresses this relationship, I think it without referring to "X excludes not-X". I just know it, and use it in my thinking. I just know that deciding to proceed excludes not proceeding, for example, without referring to those symbols. But if I am to communicate the relationships which I have thought, to you, I must come up with the symbols to express them. It is evident that thinking exists prior to the symbols which express the thought. Therefore we are capable of thinking in logical relations without reference to sensed symbols.

I like that reply, it's well composed. If it's the case, as Burr said, that "The law is whatever is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained", then why is God not the law? Many theologians boldly assert, and plausibly maintain the existence of God. But a theologian is not a lawyer. So, is it because there are not enough lawyers boldly asserting the existence of God? Why would a lawyer even try to defend the existence of God, because as the theologians know, this takes great effort, and a lifetime of dedication to plausibly maintain, and there might not be any financial benefit for the lawyer who tried this?

What is "true" in the law and what is "good" in it can be very different things than they're considered to be outside of it. — Ciceronianus the White

How can this be the case? Are you saying that there is a different form of "good", and of "true" which the law follows, which is not necessarily good or true for the individual? How could it be, that something which is true or good within the law, is false or bad in common society? Wouldn't this give lawyers license to do bad things, saying that it's bad for normal people to do these things, but it's OK for lawyers, working with the law to do them? Isn't that a double standard, like Plato's Noble Lie? It's good for the rulers to lie to the subjects, because the lying is for the subjects' own good, but it is bad for the subjects to lie.

Although being an able lawyer requires a certain degree and kind of intelligence, though, I don't think it or what one does regarding the corpses of loved ones have much to do with living an intellectual life. — Ciceronianus the White

Care to expound on this special kind of intelligence required to be an able lawyer? Is that the capacity to outwit the others, thereby proving your point, regardless of whether or not what you are arguing for is the truth? Would that be a type of intelligence to be proud of?

Democracy is a form of government, not an overall mindset of the populace, which is what we're talking about--culture. — SleepingAwake

I think the form of government plays a large role in the overall mindset of the populace. In the west, democracy is seen as the best form of government. This fuels a belief in the superiority of democratic societies over non-democratic societies. That belief in the superiority of the form of government is held by the individuals, and cannot be prevented from filtering down, and manifesting itself as a belief in the superiority of the individuals themselves, of that society. So despite the fact that democracy holds the equality of individuals as a high principle, we tend not to include those outside of democratic societies within this equality, in our "mind set", as we see them as having a lower form of government and therefore inferior to us.

I'm not referring to "the fundamental aspect of the mind". I've taken exception to your claim that "you can only think in the same forms that your experiences of the world take". What I've pointed out is that this is not true, we think in other forms, relationships which we have not experienced through our sensory perceptions of the world. Whether or not thinking in these artificial, creative, relationships is the fundamental aspect of thinking is irrelevant. What I am arguing is that they are an aspect of thinking, and cannot be so dismissed, as you claimed.

I think "Liberal Capitalist Culture" is actually a fair descriptor. Or as the Soviets used to call us: "Decadent." That sort of thinking is actually QUITE present in the progressive circles, and it occasionally scares me. The whole "Property is Theft" and redistribution of wealth thing is coming back in thought, disguising its true nature. — SleepingAwake

Let's call it what it is, "democracy". The western way is the way of democracy Those who are dissatisfied with the "decadence" of the western way are dissatisfied with democracy. And there has always been undercurrents of that dissatisfaction within the western world itself. In the sixties we had the movement of the hippies with their leaning toward communism. The capitalist powers portrayed communism as a dangerous threat to the existence of human beings in western society, and suppressed that movement on the basis of this danger.

Now, to this point. The old fashioned way meaning by any means necessary, which is true, but has happened for ages. We're just willing to ignore that if it makes us feel smarter or better than someone who makes money. When it comes down to it, we're in a weird, parasitic symbiosis with each other. We need food, and instead of growing or hunting it, we have someone else manufacture our desires, which are also their desires, and give them slips of paper or a transfer of magnetic energy to obtain our 1 to 2 hours worth of family time with good food. The arrogant nature of any sort of modern economic system is that it instills a false sense of accomplishment in the head of house's brain when they receive praise for bringing home dinner. The head of house only purchased the meat or vegetables. In truth, the one who labored hardest was the farmers who farmed the meat and veg, and too often, they're the underpaid and talked down to. No matter what label is applied, there's always that arrogance. — SleepingAwake

This is known as the division of labour, and there is nothing shameful about the division of labour. In Plato's Republic you'll find it as the basis for his concept of justice, each person doing one's own thing, which is different from every other person's thing, without interfering with the other. In this way, each person is allowed to make a valuable contribution to society by doing what one is good at. I would prefer to be a farmer working the fields than to be an executive working the company, and I don't think it's correct to portray one as "harder" than the other. One is not necessarily harder work than the other, they are just different. But why should the executive get paid hundreds of times more than the labourer?

That's why I prefer "desire" over "causal disposition", because there is no "cause" here. "Causal disposition" is a misnomer, because what is being referred to by this term is not causal at all. The inclination to act, which is being referred to here, doesn't cause the act because the will prevents any such inclinations from causing actions, allowing for deliberation.

God forbid someone in a philosophy forum actually suggest a need for evidence. — Jeremiah

The working of logic isn't dependent on evidence.

OK, so what I call a "desire", you call a "causal disposition". Do you recognize a difference between a causal disposition, and an intention? The difference being as I described, that the causal disposition doesn't necessitate any action, because the will prevents such action through will power. When the person decides what action to take, then this action is intentional. The intentional act is initiated by the will, not the causal disposition. Therefore we cannot say, as you suggest in the op, that the unconscious causal disposition is what motivates our activities. It is the conscious intention which motivates activities.

What relationship is established with me just closing my eyes and imagining the color green? — Harry Hindu

Obviously I'm not talking about something like imagining a green colour, that would be obtained from sensory experience. I'm talking about the relationships which logic is founded on, like opposition, being and not being, or negative and positive, plus and minus, and the relationship between parts and unity which numbers use.

You can only think in the same forms that your experiences of the world take, and it is a fact that the only way you could have learned a language is by having some kind of sensory experience and then store those experiences, or qualia as some call them, for recalling later. — Harry Hindu

This is false though, and that's why we have "fiction". The imagination creates forms which haven't been experienced in the world. You may argue that the content of those forms is derived from sensory experience, and fiction is just a matter of establishing unexperienced relationships between experienced content, but then what are the relationships here? The relationships are what the mind is creating in thought. If this is what is being created by thought, then isn't the real content of thought the relationships which the thinking mind is creating? If that is the case, then when we think in terms of relating one relationship to another relationship, there is no need for sensory content.

Religion is like opium. Too much opium can leave one dead in a ditch, but just the right amount can return function to the pain-crippled. — Mongrel

Too much religion will leave one dead in ditch?

I have studied philosophy of mind at university and psychology and I often had a problem with peoples definitions of mental states and I couldn't recognise or agree with their depiction of them.

In the study of memory it has gone from their being one continuous memory store to finding out that there are a large range of types of memory and brain abnormalities/lesions etc have shown that one type of memory is independent from another.

These findings cast doubt on our ability to define mental states unless we practise careful phenomenology and look at data on brain disorders etc. And overall this should encourage serious caution in making wide-sweeping claims or naive intuitions. — Andrew4Handel

Here's the problem A4H. A "state" is a describable condition, and as such it is "static", unchanging according to whatever fulfills that description. The brain is active, and what is studied in the brain is its activities. So if you are one to believe that there really is such a thing as a "mental state", then you have a fundamental incompatibility, an irreconcilable difference, between "mental state" and "brain activity", one being passive, the other active. You can reconcile brain activity with thinking, but thinking is not the same as a mental state. What I think is that "mental state" is a useful assumption for some theoretical purposes but it doesn't really refer to anything real.

The common usage of the word is used ambiguously, MU. Surely you're not suggesting that the dictionary is the arbitrator of philosophical language? — Marty

Yes, I know there is ambiguity in the common usage of the word, that's the case in any word which has more than one definition, which is most all words. I suggested that we adhere to one particular definition, and referred to the dictionary to claim that this particular definition is in fact a definition which is acceptable by the majority of the population.

You've refused my proposition, so I can only conclude that your demand to maintain ambiguity is the manifestation of an intent to argue by equivocation.

Very interesting. I like Tolstoy, he had a very complex and thoughtful mind, making for some really good reading. And I've heard that "The Death of Ivan Ilyich" is worthwhile, so I'm going to try to make time for it.

What I claim is that presentism is wrong because it makes you delete memories or mental processes occurred in the past. Presentism is about ontology of time. If presentism were right, then memories about the past would be deleted with the events and the times of the past. So, presentism is in trouble. — quine

Why would memories be necessarily deleted? They are part of your present, just like anticipations of the future are part of your present.

Suppose that Jones made a decision that he would wake up early in the morning. However, some seconds later, his decision does not exist. — quine

I don't believe that this is a proper representation. Jones' decision exists within Jones's mind at each moment of the passing time, so it is incorrect to say that Jones' decision no longer exists. That's what memory does, it retains something from the past at the present. And even if Jones forgets when he goes to sleep, he may have set an alarm to remember for him. So his decision continues to exist at the present, represented by the settings in the clock.

I don't think it makes sense to talk about willingly consenting to one's death. One can only consent to something from which one has the power to withhold to consent. I can neither consent to, nor withhold my consent from, the law of gravity. The same goes for my death. — andrewk

There are many things which the laws of nature would incline us toward believing that they are impossible. But through intelligence we can mitigate these so-called "impossibilities". Despite the law of gravity, I can get in a plane and fly. We've also sent humans to the moon. In as much as there is "gravity", clearly we can get beyond that. What about death, can't we get beyond that too?

That 'we' applies to Christian philosophy, and to some extent to Western philosophy more generally, but not to humans in general. I find the Taoist perspective much more natural, in which life and death are two sides of the same coin. We cannot have one without the other. To deny one is to deny the other. Isn't it interesting that this is almost the opposite of the Christian view which may, as you seem to suggest, assert that to deny one is to uphold the other. — andrewk

How are two sides of the same coin not opposites? If it is such that we cannot have one without the other, then they are pure opposites, absolutely, like hot and cold, big and small. This type of opposition, in which we cannot have one without the other, is the type of opposition which we need to avoid when talking about life. We need to conceive of life and death such that one is not dependent on the other. Then we could conceive of life without death. Why should an understanding of" life" be dependent on an understanding of "death"? This makes no sense, because all we need to understand life is a description of what it means to be alive. What it means to be dead is not relevant.

If we assert of something that it is dead, and this is true, then it would be false if this thing is alive, and vise versa. Likewise, of the coin, it must be heads or tails. But why do we describe the coin as having two distinct sides? The two distinct sides is in reference to the properties of the object. So with respect to life and death, then according to this law of two distinct sides, we would be assigning properties to some matter, either it's alive or it's dead. Why ought we think in this way? Why shouldn't we think of living matter as matter which is the property of a living being, and non-living matter is matter which is the property of some thing other than a living being, rather than thinking of living or not living as the property of the matter?

From this perspective, it would be incorrect to say that we cannot have one without the other, because we could have living matter without dead matter, or dead matter without living matter. Matter is a property of the thing rather then the thing being property of the matter. So there would be no reason to base the conception of one in the conception of the other, as we do with proper opposites. Living beings and dead beings are just different things. They are not opposed to one another, they are just different from each other. And of two different things, removing one does not necessitate that the other is removed, because they are different things, not opposite sides of the same thing.

So it all depends on how you conceptualize the two. In conception we cannot have hot without cold, just like we cannot have negative without positive, one defines the other. We cannot have one without the other. But when we apply this, the reverse is true. If it is hot, it cannot be cold, or if it is positive it cannot be negative. In application, one opposite excludes the other, but in conception one is not possible without the other. The distinction you refer to is just two different ways of looking at the same thing. In conception we cannot have life without its opposite, death, but in existing matter, to assign one as a property. negates the possibility of the other. This is just like hot and cold, right?

Your two views then, which you claim are different, are really the same. One says that we cannot have the concept of living without the concept of being dead, so that the ideas of being dead, and of being alive, are co-dependent, while the other says that if something is alive it cannot be dead, and vise versa. Neither of these resolves the problem because one says that you cannot conceive of life without conceiving of its opposite, death, and the other says a thing cannot be one without excluding the other.

I think the common meaning of 'accepting' something, where that something is not a contract between agents, is to not be emotionally disturbed by it. Think of the stages of grief, of which the last one is Acceptance. That doesn't mean consent, as consent has no meaning in that context. It means to no longer be significantly emotionally disturbed by the loss. — andrewk

OK, that's an adequate definition of "accepting". But how can you think seriously about what it means for you to die without being emotionally disturbed? Your definition implies that to accept death means wone can consider the consequences of one's own death without being emotionally disturbed. I cannot, and that's why as soon as I start thinking about what it would be like if I were dead, I have to change the subject of thought, because that type of thought overwhelms my capacity to think reasonably. So even if to "accept" something doesn't necessarily imply consent, it does imply satisfaction with the identified occurrence in the form of emotional stability. How can one be satisfied with the thought of one's own impending death without referring to the individual's after death experience?

Well, I think your interlocutor here can just say something to the effect of the desire is equivalent to the will insofar as one has to choose to desire, instead of being casually disposed to hunger. — Marty

This is what I am saying is wrong. I am saying that one does not choose to desire. Desire is type of feeling we get whether we want it or not. We can choose things which will make the desire go away, such as when we choose to eat in the cases where the desire is hunger, but we do not choose to desire. Even though we often use "desire" in a way such as we choose to desire specific things, this would be a misrepresentation of what I am referring to with "desire". So we should not create ambiguity, and equivocate with the meaning of "desire".

How do you figure this to not be a semantic dispute? — Marty

It is a semantic dispute, but it only takes on that character because you insist on using "desire" in a different way from me. But my way is well supported, by the dictionary. So if you would respect it, instead of simply denying it for the sake of creating an argument, then we could proceed.

I didn't find a way of making death acceptable to myself. I simply found that it was. — andrewk

Don't you find that to be unreasonable though? To accept something is to willingly consent to something. I think it's unreasonable to willingly consent to something for no reason. Don't you?

The reasoning behind takes the loss of death to mean life's not worth living, that if it's true one's going to die, then one might as well get on to it. In effect, the argument is: "If I don't get to live forever, being here wasn't worth my time," as if we were somehow haggling with someone about our lifetime. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I am not arguing that "death" means "life's not worth living". This is because we assume that words have a meaning which is objective, or transcendent, beyond what the word means to an individual. What I am saying is that I cannot reasonably accept the impending death of myself, without committing myself to the idea that my life is meaningless.

I believe that this may be because we oppose life with death. So to consent to one is to deny that the other is important. To resolve this, it might be required to remove this opposition. Perhaps being dead is not opposed to be alive, maybe it is just different from being alive, then I might be able to accept death, as a change, rather than as a negation of my existence.

I think it's postering most of the time. Does MU really think their life is a waste of time if he dies? I doubt it. More likely he just has to hear himself say that, to grant him the status of a person beyond death in his own mind, as it quells fear of his own end. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, that's not the point at all. I don't think my life is a waste of time, and that's why I can't accept death. If I thought that my life is a waste of time, I'd have no problem accepting death. The issue is that I cannot bring myself to accept death without forcing upon myself the idea that my life is meaningless. Whenever I think about what will be the case when I die, i.e. the reality of my death, I am completely overwhelmed by the insignificance of my life, such that I cannot continue with those thoughts. Therefore I cannot accept my own death into my own thoughts, because it introduces great insignificance to those very thoughts, negating the will to think.

Re your feeling that lack of individual survival after death would render the present nonsensical: have you always felt that way, or has it evolved through life? In my case my attitude to death has undergone several major shifts in the course of my life. I wonder if that's normal, or unusual. — andrewk

I think you misunderstood what I said. What I said was that the concept of individual survival after death is what makes death acceptable. You said, essentially "speak for yourself", implying that perhaps you have found some other way of making death acceptable. I said death is unacceptable to me (I don't believe in individual survival after death), and I cannot conceive of a way to make death acceptable, without allowing that I might just as well die right now. So I asked you, have you a way of making death acceptable?

Which I think contradicts the first point.

If you say 'there's nothing that can't be understood', then in effect you're saying that we're capable of omniscience, of being all-knowing. But I don't think we are; I think knowledge is determined by conditions and factors, chief amongst them the human faculties of understanding, shaped, as they are, by adaptive necessity. So that becomes the fundamental question of epistemology - what is the nature of knowledge itself. (I don't think science asks itself this question.) — Wayfarer

I don't believe there is any contradiction here. Assuming that there is nothing which cannot be understood does not necessarily imply that I am capable of understanding everything. Nor does it necessarily imply that "we", as human beings are capable of understanding everything. What it implies is that I believe everything exists according to intelligible order and is therefore capable of being understood.

What I believe is that human beings are not the most intelligent beings possible, and that there are things which cannot be understood by human beings, yet may still be understood by a higher intelligence. As we discussed earlier in the thread, I also believe in evolution. So I believe it is quite possible that life on earth will evolve to a higher form of intelligence. I think it is quite evident from history, that intelligence is in fact evolving. That life on earth would evolve to the point of being capable of understanding everything is highly doubtful, but this does not negate the possibility that all things exist according to intelligible order and are in principle capable of being understood.

But historically speaking, the Christian-Aristotelean view reached its apogee with the medieval synthesis, which was geocentric and based around Ptolemy. It was that which was dissolved by the Scientific Revolution, and maybe the Christian foundations of Western culture with it; which takes us back to the point made in original post. — Wayfarer

My opinion is that the scientific revolution did not dissolve the Christian-Aristotelian foundations, it built upon these foundation. The foundational principles can still be found throughout the sciences, in such things as the divisions of life forms, the divisions of time periods, and how we conceive of matter and mass.

The feeling of hunger isn't a desire. It's a casual disposition. I don't desire to feel hunger, I am hungry and as a consequence I desire to eat. Once I desire to eat, I intend to do things. That's why desires and beliefs are normative. — Marty

I don't agree. I think you interpret the feeling of hunger as the desire to eat. But you can still have the desire to eat yet intend not to eat, that's will power.

Of course not. There is no essence to compare my use to. All there is, is the use to which others put the word. — Banno

I assume you are saying that there is no such thing as correct usage. How does logic work then?

That is the point I was making about the 'undetermined questions' of the Buddha. Please take a moment to reflect on this, it is a central issue here. When asked if the Buddha continues to exist after death, the Buddha refused to answer that question. There's a reason for that refusal. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I've reflected on this before. It really makes no sense to offer an answer to a question when one does not know the answer. And that's the problem with Christian dogma in relation to this issue. Some individuals have spoken very authoritatively on this, when they really did not know what they were talking about. But notice in the passage you referred me to last time, it is stated that this issue may be apprehended through "discernment". Personally, I'd like to figure that out.

What is beyond the scope of empirical sensibility and rational understanding, is by necessity non-conceptual, beyond logic. That is no slight on conceptual knowledge, which is perfectly applicable across an enormous range of knowledge.

It's an interesting fact that the undetermined questions in Buddhism, mentioned above, are very similar to Kant's antinomies of reason. (Sorry for the highly compressed post but heading off for an Easter lunch.) — Wayfarer

I believe that things which are beyond the scope of rational understanding, that which you say is necessarily non-conceptual, can be brought into the fold of "understood" through the use of reason, logic, and the act of understanding. So there is nothing, which by its very nature is beyond the scope of understanding. It's just the case that reason and logic have not yet been applied in the correct way to bring these things into the realm of understanding. This is the evolution of knowledge.

So things such as Kant's antinomies of reason are produced by a failure in conceptualization. I also believe that on the larger time scale, the evolution of knowledge takes place through very radical changes. These are changes to the most fundamental principles, what Wittgenstein called foundational or bedrock beliefs. The foundational principles of a society are the oldest principles, and therefore were developed by the most underdeveloped human beings of that society. The problem is that there is always a huge contingent of human beings who refuse to accept the reality that such fundamental principles ought to be subjected to skepticism. Of course that's to be expected because these people were taught, and firmly believe, these principles.

That's what Socrates expressed, skepticism concerning principles which were fundamental to his society. And his trial and death demonstrate the strength and power of conviction of those who refuse such skepticism But it was this skepticism which allowed religion to merge with the scientific principles of ancient Greece, in the form of Christianity. For example, the Greeks held that the sun moon and planets had individual orbits around the earth, each represented by a god. This fundamental representation of these bodies orbiting the earth hindered the progress of ancient Greek science. They met a dead end where much of reality was beyond the scope of conceptualization due to these faulty fundamental assumptions. So the most fundamental, basic, bedrock principles of that society (because they are the ones which are the oldest, therefore most primitive, which the culture was built upon) had to be dismantled and dismissed. Christianity introduced new fundamental principles and laid the foundations for a new society, from which the solar system could be apprehended as one united entity. Those "new" foundational principles have now become ancient.

To say 'death only becomes acceptable to an individual when that person apprehends that the individual soul continues its existence after the death of the body' is unreasonable, because it is speaking about that which one does not know - which is what goes on in other people's minds. — andrewk

OK, I agree with you that I should not speak for others. I am a big defender of the idea that every human being think's in one's own individual way, despite the fact that we produce generalizations. I believe generalizations are produced through societal conventions. Societies produce norms in their "way of thinking", and children are trained in these norms through the institutions. This is how generalizations may exist

So let's just dwell on this issue of "death" for a few moments. The idea of death is unacceptable to me. I cannot conceptualize it. When I think of it, as an eternity of time without me, after I'm gone, it renders the fact that I am here now, as totally nonsensical. So either I have to dismiss the idea that my life has some sort of meaning, relevance, or I have to dismiss the idea that after I am dead, I am really gone. if it's the former, I may as well just die right now, and if the latter, I have to make sense of life after death.

You seem to believe that others, perhaps yourself, have found a way of making death acceptable. How do you do this without producing the notion that you might as well just die right now?

Note however that rebirth as an individual is seen as bad - that from which we seek liberation. In that context, expectation of continuation of individuality after death could hardly be seen as something that helps one to accept death. — andrewk

I find this to be a questionable idea. It may be true, that such things as pain and suffering are attributed to the individual and this is why the ultimate goal of the dissolution of individuality might be posited. It might even be argued that it is the nature of having to be, to live, as an individual which is the cause of such discomforts. However, unless this suffering is so overwhelming, that it would incline one to desire death without obtaining that ultimate goal, rather than to live as an individual, your argument doesn't make sense. Only if one's life were absolutely unbearable would one choose the ultimate cessation of existence over a continuation of individuality after death.

I don't know if the tree fern outside my window is actually a tree, nor if that shrub over there should really be called a tree. That does not men I do not know how to use "tree". — Banno

Clearly, you have stated here that you belief that you could sometimes be wrong in your use of "tree". Remember, what we are discussing is not whether you have the capacity to use "tree", but whether you have the capacity to consistently use that word correctly. Now you've admitted that you might be incorrect sometimes in your use of "tree". Wouldn't that be because you do not know the essence?

Famously, there is nothing that is common to all, and only, fish; and yet, we use the word. That is, it is not possible to set out the essence of "tree" or "fish", and yet the words are used. — Banno

I agree. In most cases it is impossible to state the essence of something. In these cases it is always possible that one's use of these words might be judged by another as incorrect, even though the first person might insist that the usage is correct. In other cases, such as technical terms, and especially mathematical terms, the essence is well defined, so we don't make those mistakes.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". On this we might agree, but I will not follow you by adding that there is a metaphysical entity that corresponds to what a tree is. — Banno

The question is not whether there is a metaphysical entity which corresponds to what a tree is, that's not what "essence" is all about. It is a term derived from logic, so it is epistemological, and denotes that there is a correct way of using the term. So if a term has a defined essence, it must be used only according to that essence, in order that it be used correctly in logical procedures, or else mistaken conclusions (due to equivocation for example) will be produced.

It appears like you and I are talking about two different things. You claim that you can satisfactorily use words in daily communication without knowing any essences. I agree with this, because there is no real correct or incorrect way of using words in common communication, it's just a matter of pragmatics, whatever successfully allows you to communicate is acceptable. My claim is that when we are dealing with logical arguments, and mathematical applications, we must designate a correct way of using the words, so we refer to essences. What type of existence an "essence" has is something we shouldn't even discuss until we agree on the need to assume a "correct way of using a word".

This is a very deep question, but I really don't see it in terms of 'survival'. I think the popular notion of living forever in some after-death state is mistaken and that existing eternally as an individual would be hell. — Wayfarer

OK, I agree "survival" is not the best term here, because of the very thing Noble Dust is arguing, the association of "survival" with evolution, and the ensuing connotations. But these concepts of what happens to the soul after death describe a type of survival, or something similar to survival. I do believe that all major religions which adhere to the principles of continued existence after death, maintain that this is somehow the existence of the individual.

I think in the wisdom traditions, there is an understanding that one has to die to realise the higher states. And dying is not surviving, it is not maintaining one's self or sense of identity. That is symbolised in such sayings as 'he who looses his life for My sake will be saved'. When Jesus was on the Cross, he cried out 'Why have you forsaken me?' And I think at that point, he really didn't know, he was utterly alone and bereft. (As I write this, it's Good Friday.) — Wayfarer

As I pointed out earlier in the thread, it was argued strongly in early Christianity, I think by Paul, that it is the individual, the person, who will be resurrected, and we will maintain our individuality upon resurrection. We all die, but after some length of time there will be the day of judgement, upon which we will be resurrected, in our own individuality.

So I think the idea that 'I will live forever' is a comforting illusion - just as atheists say it is. But I also don't think it is what 'eternal life' actually means. — Wayfarer

What would "eternal life" mean to you then? "Life" is meaningless without the individual beings who are living, i.e. the living beings. How might we abstract "life" from particular, individual, living beings, to assume an "eternal life", when individuality is essential to living beings. It is also observed that all individuals die, so it seems like we have this impenetrable cycle. Individuality is essential to life, and death is essential to individuality. Our two possible procedures toward a concept of eternal life are 1) to remove the necessity of death from the individual, and 2) to remove the necessity that a living is the property of an individual. If we cannot remove individuality from life, we have no way of removing death from life, unless the individual may be immortal. This is the western way, to assume the immortality of the individual.

In the early Buddhist texts, there are references to 'the deathless state' which is a synonym for Nibanna (see for instance here). However, that verse also says that until it's apprehended, until one attains the direct insight into it, then it is something to take on faith. — Wayfarer

So notice, that it is stated in that passage that we can gain a footing into the "Deathless" through discernment, so it is not necessarily taken on faith alone. The western approach, or "discernment", is through a recognition of the role of the individual, and in this approach it must be the individual who is deathless. Perhaps the Buddhist approach sees a way beyond the individual?

So I don't think about the concept of 'immortality as 'continuing existence'. That is what the ego would like to make of it, but it is not what it means. — Wayfarer

Any concept, to be a proper concept, must be intelligible, coherent, and consistent, making sense. In western philosophy, immortality only makes sense as a continued existence of the individual, so that's what the concept does mean for us. As I mentioned in an earlier post though, Christianity does introduce a discontinuity, a break after death, such that there is a period of time between death and resurrection, this was later developed as "Purgatory".

But you have not restricted your comments to Christianity, and thereby you imply that somebody who belongs to a religion that does not say the individual retains its individuality after death, cannot accept their death. Given the very large number of Hindus and Buddhists in the world, most of whom do not believe that, and many of whom manage to accept their death with equanimity - that claim seems in direct conflict with what can be observed. — andrewk

I disagree with this. Hinduism clearly describes a reincarnation of the individual soul. I'm not so sure about Buddhism, but I think they generally believe in some sort rebirth, and this again would be as an individual. What is at issue, is whether the individuality of the person is lost to some form of general existence as "Life", or "The Soul", in the continued existence of life after one's death. Are there any religions which have developed such principles, or is this confined to unprincipled mysticism?

If this follows it seems like beliefs, intentions, and desires are conscious processes only. But then when I consider things like the Libet Experiments - in which attempted to disprove free-will by postulating that brain-states fire before our actions in so far as we're aware of them - then how I generally approach this problem is by postulating that unconscious activities predominantly make most of our actions in the sense that they're the ones to motivate "our" desires, and that in accordance with that fact, that we are our unconscious motives and desires. So thus, the terminus of freedom does not end with consciousness, but unconsciousness. And as being my unconscious desires, I'm free. — Marty

It may be useful for you to distinguish between feelings like desires, and the will itself. It is most likely the case that most desires originate from some place other than the conscious mind, and they creep up on us, as the various appetites, but it is through the will that the conscious mind suppresses and controls these appetites.

With will, we suppress desires, allowing the conscious mind to deliberate, and make intelligent decisions. Then the will allows action according to these decisions. So for example, a feeling of hunger (desire) may creep up on you, and instead of eating the first thing in front of you which looks edible, you suppress the desire to eat, while you decide on what to have for dinner.

Following such decisions, we have "intentions" which are usually understood to be proper to the conscious mind. This refers to decisions made in advance, as to what is wanted, decisions made with a minimal amount of influence by desires and appetites. This is how we normally use "intention", to refer to these thought out goals, and that is why intention is associated with consciousness. But this way of comprehending "intention" requires that we separate intention from desire, or appetite, because the desires and appetites affect us prior to the will, and the will must act to suppress them, while intentions are formed through this action of the will. Intention then refers to what has been chosen by the conscious mind, as a goal, after the desires have been suppressed by the will.

Surely the survival of a species as a whole is not hard to conceptualize. Seriously... — Noble Dust

No, I honestly cannot conceptualize this. A species is a concept, an ideal. It is an abstraction. For example, we have many existing beings which we class together as human beings. We form an abstraction and we say that there is a species called human beings, despite racial differences and other differences. The unity here is created by the abstraction, we class all the individuals together as one class, human, and this act of classing them together produces a unity which we know of as the species. Without this unity, there is no entity or "being" called the "species". So it doesn't make sense to speak about the survival of this non-existent entity. And if we speak about survival of the concept, that's a different matter completely.

The entity, the species, is just an abstraction, it has no real existence. The divisions between one species and another are based in conventions put forward by biologists, so any talk about a species surviving or going extinct, is just a reference to these conventions. There is no real entity which is the species, which either survives or does not. For instance we recognize a distinction between Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons. If Neanderthals are understood as a distinct species, then the species which those individuals belonged to, ceased to exist. If Neanderthals are understood as a subclass of the species Homo Sapiens, then the species which those individuals belonged to, did not cease to exist.

I can't even parse through the confusing misapplication of terms here. And I've already made my point earlier about this distinction. If survival is the highest good, than an almost comically ironic solipsism is the only way forward. Because, as you say, you only equate survival to the individual. So if survival (the highest good) is only about me, then my "good" is, in truth, the only good that exists. So it's you versus me. Given the last slice of bread left on the planet, it's fair game for me to grotesquely murder you for the sake of my own survival, since survival is the highest good (but only my personal survival, since the survival of the species is not a real thing). And you never addressed my points about suicide. Feel free to vehemently disagree, or whatever. But at least address my points about suicide in relation to this debate instead of attempting to only hit me at whatever weaker points you might perceive to exist in my argument. — Noble Dust

Placing survival of the individual as the highest good doesn't produce solipsism. You haven't demonstrated any reasonable argument for your assertion that "my good" is not the highest good. And the idea that my good is the highest good does not necessarily produce the perspective of "you versus me". Actually it's quite the contrary, when, with our intellects, we apprehend that cooperation is the means for getting what we need. Numerous individuals working together provide more for each individual than individuals working alone. That's what Jesus demonstrated with the bread and the fish. It seemed like there was not enough food for the thousands of people, so he collected up all the food that was there, and divided it up evenly amongst all the people, and suddenly there was enough for everyone.

I don't see your point with the suicide example, perhaps you could make it more clear.

So all abstractions are not real then, logically? Surely you agree. — Noble Dust

We can say that concepts, abstractions are "real", but we need to recognize an ontological distinction between the reality of a concept and the reality of a physical being. Because of this difference, the survival of a concept is a completely different matter from the survival of a physical being, and we cannot conflate the two, as they are completely different. A very true concept, such as the circle, is said to be eternal. To say that a species survives is to produce a nonsense conflation between the concept and the physical being.

You misunderstand my analogy (and analogies are imperfect, as this one surely is). When I say that survival gets me from point A to B, I mean that survival moves me along the path of my life. It's only one of the things that does so. It's surely an important driving factor. But, the analogy could be said instead like this: survival is a mechanism of life. It doesn't describe why life exists. the mechanics of the car engine don't tell me why someone might find it beneficial to use a car. Surely this is easy to understand?? — Noble Dust

"Survival" describes the primary function of life. There are numerous powers, potencies, or capacities of the soul (life) which Aristotle identified. The first one, the primary one, is the power of self-nourishment, which produces subsistence. The other powers, self-movement, sensation, intellection, are built on top of this. These other powers are dependent on that first one. Therefore that primary power, self-nourishment, which is related to subsistence and survival, is the most important power, because it supports the others.

We do not need to understand why life exists in order to understand the powers which living beings have, and understand the hierarchy of priorities of these powers. You seem to take a reverse stand point, assuming that with the intellect, which is the highest, most fragile and unstable power, we can apprehend why life exists. But our only recourse toward understanding this "why" is through understanding life itself, and this means understanding the hierarchy of powers. To say that one power, which is dependent on another power for its existence, is more important than that power which it is reliant upon, is simply wrong. Cessation of the lower power will necessarily result in cessation of the higher power, but cessation of the higher power does not necessarily result in cessation of the lower power. Therefore the lower power is more important.

I think what Noble Dust is getting at, is that there may be a conception of life, within which virtue is of a higher importance than whether one lives or dies. And I can think of no better illustration of the idea than the Death of Socrates, from the Apology. The detachment shown by Socrates at the approach of his own death, indicates that he at least believes that the death of the body is of minor consequence compared to the overall state of his soul. — Wayfarer

The point I made, is that death only becomes acceptable to an individual when that person apprehends that the individual soul continues it's existence after the death of the body. This is exemplified by the death of Socrates, and the precepts of Christianity. What is believed in, is the continued existence of the person, the individual's soul. When we produce an artificial, and conceptual unity of life, "The Soul", as is found in some mysticism, the importance of the individual is lost.

We can produce a morality of virtue, based in such a unity, the unity of living beings, The Soul, but the reality of this unity cannot be justified. The unity cannot be conceived of as real because of the real separation between individuals, with no apprehended principle of unity. So that unity, The Soul, when apprehended by the logical reasoning of the individual human being, remains as a pie in the sky illusion of mysticism. Then the individual perceives that entire moral system, based in such a fictional unity, as unsound, and not an adequate morality.

Again, in the traditional understanding, there are many circumstances in which death is a lesser evil than dishonour. If, for example, one had to commit some monstrous evil in order to preserve one's own life, then, given that the fate of the soul depended on the actions, it would be preferable to die than to commit such an act. — Wayfarer

The idea that the individual's soul continues to exist after death is paramount in supporting such actions. If we remove this idea, of the soul continuing to exist, then one's own death may still be perceived as an option because the nature of free will allows that each individual decides for oneself the best course of action.

Do you recognize a difference between the using proper nouns, such as "Metaphysician Undercover", which identify a single object, and the use of a noun which identifies a class of objects, like "tree"? It is only in the latter case that knowing how to correctly use the word is associated with knowing an essence. Knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is, and this is the essence. Do you think that one can consistently use the word "tree" correctly without knowing what a tree is?

Are you sure it wasn't your mathematical skills that weren't up to the task? Maybe a little too much liquid incentives to the volunteers?

As I mentioned, there is a distinction to be made between correct use and incorrect use. So we ought not talk about "use" in general, because the kids use words in all kinds of random ways. If you allow that there is such a distinction, then why not allow that correct use demonstrates the "essence" of the thing?

You seem to allow that there is a correct use of the word "life". What would distinguish between correct and incorrect use of the term if there was no essence to refer to?

I've not begged the question, and, speaking of the article, you may note that it says "According to the most widely accepted versions of the Way of Negation: An object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally inefficacious." But, I suppose that point is moot now. Cheers. — Arkady

The "Way of Negation" is specifically Frege's way. Why restrict yourself to Frege's way when there are scores of other philosophers? Honestly, I often find SEP to be very narrow and misleading. I would not consider it a very good authority.

The actual philosophical issue (as opposed to just terminological) is whether or not the Pythagorean Theorem is causally efficacious. You say it is, but others say it isn't. Instead they'd say that you used your hands to lay out a square foundation, and that the movement of your hands was causally influenced by electrical activity in the brain. The Pythagorean Theorem isn't to be equated (or so some say) with any of the physical processes that actually caused your body to move the way it did, and so isn't the cause of the building being square. — Michael

There is no doubt that I used my hands to lay out the foundation, so my hands are the cause of the foundation. But I did not lay the foundation in any random shape, I made it square. The question is what caused the foundation to be square, not what caused the foundation. It's a different question to ask what caused X to be X, from asking what caused X. Each is a different question of causation.

There's a very simple answer, and that is that the Pythagorean theorem is the cause of the foundation being square. As you say, some people might deny this, but then what is the cause of the squareness of the building, if not the Pythagorean Theorem? Why deny the obvious?

Well, I'm a philosophy graduate and I've been exposed to much usage of the terms. According to your link, your definition is provided by Frege, who defines an abstract object as "causally inefficacious". So I think it's really you who is trying to restrict usage to an idiosyncratic definition.

That being the case, then I see no point in continuing to talk about it, as a conversation in which the participants don't even agree on the definition of basic terminology is bound to be unfruitful. — Arkady

Those who define their terms such that their arguments are simply begging the question, and then refuse to examine their definitions, shouldn't even bother with philosophy.

Well I probably don't agree with your definition of "abstract object" then. I just constructed a building. I used the Pythagorean Theorem (abstract object) to lay out a square foundation. Are you claiming that the Pythagorean Theorem is not a cause of the building being square? Or are you saying that the Pythagorean Theorem is not an abstract object?