Logically speaking the argument (C) is valid - anything follows a contradiction. But it is unsound because contradictions (N & ~N) are always false. — TheMadFool

There is nothing illogical about an object having a property at one time, and not having that same property at another time. So we may observe, at one time, natural order, and at another time, a miracle. There is nothing contradictory here, N at one time, not-N at another.

From the observation of natural order, we cannot conclude that natural order is necessary, that is the problem with inductive logic. So even if we conclude from observation, "there is natural order", this natural order is not necessary, it is still possible that at another time or place, there may not be natural order.

Therefore there is no contradiction between arguments A and B, they refer to the world at different times, or different aspects of the world.

Right, so if only the present is real, there is no time. Time requires before and after, future and past, as does change.

Your statement is dead on except the last bit about not having a choice in the matter. — noAxioms

Yeah I see your point. We make the choice first, then the evidence supports whichever belief one chooses. Whichever choice we make, we can use the same facts to support that choice.

Who gets to decide? — T Clark

It's all evidence, but each one of us may decide what it is evidence of.

Causal relations require a prior and posterior time, a before and after. There is no such before and after at the present unless they are past and future.

I don't agree that there's a past or future that exists and in which "there are things." Only the present exists. Only the changes that are currently happening exist. — Terrapin Station

If this were the case, that only the present exists, and only changes which are currently happening exist, then it would be the case that any random thing could be currently happening. The past and the future, having no real existence could not have any influence on what happens at the present, so absolutely anything could happen at any moment of the present.

But it is not the case that any random thing is currently happening, as is evident from our observations of a continuity of from the deep and distant past. Because of this observation of a continuity of existence in the past, we also assume a continuity into the future. This observed contiuity is why any reasonable ontology must allow that existence is composed of more than just the present.

Consider a temporal model of the universe. All that we experience is at the present, so spatial existence, existence as we know it, is at the present. But the present is a very insignificant, tiny slice of the temporal existence of the universe, our model must allow for all that has been in the past, and all that will be in the future. Do you not agree that there must be something in the future?

When we speak about what will occur in the future, we speak about possibilities, because we can change things, and influence what will occur. So the location of a thing in the future is only a possible location because actions at the present may determine that things future location. If a thing has only possible locations, such as when we refer to the future location of a thing, then it is impossible that it has an actual location. Therefore future things have no actual location. But it still makes sense to talk about, and refer to future things, despite the fact that they have no location Can you make sense of that?

So, you don't find anything wrong with a game in which heads I win and tails you lose???!! — TheMadFool

I don't see the analogy. If God is real, then all things are evidence of God. If God is not real, then all things are evidence of not-God. You cannot choose X is evidence of God, and Y is evidence of not-God, as if heads means God, and tails means not-God. We have no choice in the matter.

My question is why are two mutually contradictory states (ordinary laws of nature AND miracles - breaking the aforementioned laws) taken to be evidence for the same thing - God? — TheMadFool

I think that's pretty obvious. If there is a God, and there are laws which govern the way that natural things behave, then it is God who makes things behave according to the laws. If this is the case, then wouldn't God be capable of producing exceptions at will?

So, the fact that we can produce laws which describe the way that natural things behave is see by some as evidence that there is a God which makes things behave in that way. Miracles are evidence that things do not, necessarily, by their own nature, behave in that way. The two are both evidence that things behave the way that they do, by the will of God.

Forms do not have spatial existence, so your question doesn't make much sense to me. As I said, they are prior to the passing of time, and spatial existence refers to what is now, as time is passing. So they are in the future, always prior to now. You do realize that there is no spatial existence in the future don't you?

What do you mean what sort of ontological item? It is an ontological category itself. Ideas are commonly believed to be a type of form, but not all forms are ideas.

A form is "what" a thing is. Let's say it's a quality.

Yes, there are particular forms. But if a particular form is given to matter, the temporal nature of matter denies the possibility that this form could maintain its existence as a particular. In other words particulars exist prior to the passing of time, and as time passes each particular form loses that status of being particular through its commingling with other forms. This commingling is what we call material existence, or temporal existence.

Actually, I don't believe there is such a thing as particular material. I think "matter" is purely conceptual, and therefore by nature, a universal, general. It is a concept initiated by Aristotle in an effort to account for the observed continuity of temporal existence.

So to answer your question, since all physical objects are changing with each passing moment of time, exchanging material with their environment, it is impossible that any object, noses included, could consist of particular material. We would have to be able to stop time at a particular moment, and say that the nose consists of this particular matter, at this particular time, in order to conclude that such an object is composed of particular matter. Since it is impossible to stop time, time keeps passing with each moment, and the material keeps changing with each moment, it is impossible that such an object is composed of particular matter.

Noses are partially composed of material, but material does not make up the relationships, nor the processes which that material is involved in. These are immaterial. So a nose is both material and immaterial.

We are talking about "what" something is. I am just demonstrating how ridiculous your description of subjective experience, or noses, or whatever, as particular material, in particular relations undergoing particular processes, is.

Would you like others to distrust you, yes or no? — Harry Hindu

Some people I would not like them to distrust me, others I don't care if they distrust me.

If not, then wouldn't it be a punishment if someone distrusted you after something you did that you are being blamed for? Yes, or no? — Harry Hindu

No, I explained this. The fact that one dislikes what another person does, does not imply that the act of the other was carried out as punishment. I do not like a lot of things which a lot of people do, but it does not follow that these things are punishment to me. "Punishment" implies intent to punish, on the part of the punisher. As I explained, distrust is not intended as punishment, it is intended as protection for oneself from the other.

So you believe that noses are not particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes? — Terrapin Station

That's right, "nose" is defined as "an organ above the mouth...". To define "nose" as "particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes" is kind of ridiculous don't you think?

Right, so you can't object that consciousness can't be material because if so, it can't be "qualitatively identical." — Terrapin Station

What I objected to is you saying that consciousness is particular material, involved in particular relations, and particular processes. Such particularity denies the possibility of qualitative identity.

Which makes whether it's subjective or objective hardly irrevelant. If it requires a mind it's subjective. Per my usage, that's the definition of subjective. — Terrapin Station

Then I will conclude that per your usage, all such similarities are subjective. There is no such thing as an objective similarity, because the fact that two things are similar, not the same thing. implies that they are different. Only a mind can say that they are similar, and therefore if we adhere to your usage, you produce inconsistency with your claim that there are objective qualities. There is no such thing as objective qualities if we adhere to your usage.

Why aren't people satisfied, so to speak, with the ''evidence'' provided in the Teleological argument? — TheMadFool

"Evidence" is a word which needs to be properly understood. It refers to facts which support a belief. So to refer to any facts as "evidence" requires that one apprehends the support which the facts provide. Therefore, what some call "evidence", others will deny as evidence, depending on how the supposed support is understood.

The relationship being referred to here is the relationship between the laws of nature, and God, the former being evidence of the latter. That the laws of nature are said to be evidence of God implies that belief in the laws of nature supports belief in God. Many people do not understand this "support", and some will argue that it is a misunderstanding. Some may require miracles to help them to understand the support. A miracle demonstrates that it is not necessary for existence to be according to the laws of nature.

At any rate, so things that are material can be qualitatively identical in your view. — Terrapin Station

Of course material things can be qualitatively identical, it's the identity which is immaterial, not the thing itself. That's the difference between numerical identity and qualitative identity. With numerical identity, the identity is nothing other than the thing itself. With qualitative identity, the identity is necessarily something other than the thing itself, because numerous things have the same identity.

Also, similarity is simply things being relatively more alike than different in some respect. That's an objective quality. — Terrapin Station

Whether the quality is said to be subjective or objective is irrelevant. It still requires a mind to make the comparison, and determination, that two distinct things are objectively similar, classifying them together, giving them the same name (qualitative identity). The identity which the thing has, in the case of the qualitative identity, is a property of the mind which assigns that identity.

What I don't get is why you have a "qualitative identity" that can't obtain via material. — Terrapin Station

Say you have two distinct material entities. What's to say that they are similar except a mind making that judgement? You might say "they just are similar", but that's just you making an assertion. In reality they are distinct and therefore different.

I don't recall what you said about noses earlier. Do you believe that noses aren't "qualitatively identical" (I'm putting that phrase in quotation marks partially because I don't use it), or do you believe that there's something about noses that isn't material? — Terrapin Station

No, noses clearly are qualitatively identical, that's why we can call each one a nose. The different noses are not numerically identical, by the very fact that they are different.

It's not that there is something about noses themselves, which isn't material, it's the fact that they can be readily identified by the same name "nose", which is immaterial. Since "nose" does not refer to one particular nose, there is no particular material which "nose" refers to. Therefore "nose" does not refer to any particular material thing. If it did refer to a material thing, it would refer to that particular material thing and nothing else. It does not, it can be used to refer to many different instances of material things. Therefore it is false to say that "nose" refers to a material thing.

It seems odd to me that you'd be so eager to say that "2+2" isn't identical to "4," yet you readily say that Joe's subjective experience is identical to Pete's (or at least some part of it is). — Terrapin Station

You seem to be missing the point Terrapin. I believe that Joe's subjective experience is similar to Pete's. And, according to this similarity, we can identify them both as having "subjective experience", through the principles of what is called qualitative identity. Likewise, we can say that "2+2" is similar to "4" through the principles of qualitative identity.

You on the other hand, have claimed that subjective experience is particular material involved in particular relations and particular processes. According to your claim, it is impossible that both Joe and Pete have subjective experience, because they each have different material in different relations and distinct processes. Joe and Pete are distinct.

Are you ready to dismiss this idea, that subjective experience is particular matter involved in particular relations, and particular processes, or have you figured out another way to justify the idea that both Pete and Joe are have subjective experience?

Blaming, praising and judgement of guilt are the same as holding someone responsible. So that would be circular. — Harry Hindu

Not for me they are not the same. These named things are the result, or consequence of holding one responsible. Responsible means that one is accountable. Blaming and such only occur posterior to an act which one is held accountable for. I other words, being accountable, (responsible), is necessarily prior to blame, judgement, etc..

Distrusting someone is a punishment. — Harry Hindu

That's not true. In fact, I think it's nonsense. Distrust is held for the protection of oneself, not to punish another. The fact that the one being distrusted may not like being distrusted does not necessitate the conclusion that the distrust is being held for the sake of punishment. I can't imagine distrust being held for the sake of punishment, that seems like a misunderstanding of "distrust" to me.

What use is blaming someone without punishing them (creating a negative consequence as a result of their action in order to prevent those actions in the future)? In my experience, simply blaming people isn't useful. You have to supply a negative consequence in order to prevent future acts, or they just end up doing it again. — Harry Hindu

This is complete nonsense. First, punishing someone, unless it's a youngster just learning habits, rarely prevents the person from carrying out a similar act in the future. In most cases, the adult who misbehaves will continue to do so regardless of punishment. Does getting a speeding ticket prevent you from speeding again? If that were the case, we could get rid of all the speeders by handing out tickets. Second, blaming someone without punishing that person is extremely useful, because it allows you to remember something about that person's character. This information will be very useful in your future decision making concerning dealings with that person.

Sure, "4" refers to 4, "2" refers to 2. — Srap Tasmaner

If "4" refers to something, and "2" refers to something different, then it is impossible that "2+2" refers to the same thing as "4".

I think Frege construes 2 + 2 as a function. "2" has a sense, and refers to 2. "+" has a sense, but doesn't refer to an object. — Srap Tasmaner

It doesn't make sense to say that "2" and "4" refer to something, but "+" does not refer to anything. Each of these refers to an intelligible object, a concept, and therefore, in your terms, they have a sense. None of them refers to a physical object, and therefore they do not have referents according to this distinction, they only have senses.

So, either "2", "4", and "+", each refer to something, mathematical objects, or they all refer to nothing, and only have senses. It is inconsistent, and therefore illogical to say that one of them has a referent yet another does not.

Frege considers 4 a simple object. "4" is a name for 4 with a simple sense, but 4 also has infinitely many names with complex senses, but still the simple reference 4. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see how you can justify this claim that "4" has a reference unless you adopt Platonic realism, and allow for the existence of the mathematical object, the idea of 4. If this is the case, then also "2" refers to a different Platonic object, and "+" refers to a different Platonic object.

If "4" points at something, then so does "2". Clearly they point at something different.

"2 + 2" and "4" are, usually, different ways of referring to 4. They have different senses, but the same reference. — Srap Tasmaner

That's not true. "4" has its own reference, "2" has its own reference, and "+" also has its own reference. Therefore it is false to say that "2+2" and "4" have the same reference. They each mean completely different things, just like "7-3", and "2x2" mean something different, and refer to something different.

If indeterminism, the position that some things are not efficiently caused at all, is understood to be the case, then those undetermined events must be seen as either purely random, absolutely arbitrary, or purposely caused by 'something' outside of the system of efficient causation. Any truly final cause must, logically, be a cause which is not itself caused. — John

I wouldn't say that a final cause is necessarily not itself caused, because it could be caused by another final cause. One thing may be done for the sake of another, which is done for the sake of another, etc., so that we have a chain of final causes just like we describe chains of efficient causes.

So for instance, the apprehended means to the end are brought into existence to create that end, by acts of willing, and are therefore final causes themselves. But these acts of willing, being the means to the end, can be said to be caused by the end itself. And if we look further, this end may really be the means to a further end, so the chain of causation we can follow until we designate an ultimate end, just like Aristotle did in the N. Ethics, designating happiness as the ultimate end.

The accepted distinction, which I know of, is the distinction between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical identity means the same, absolutely, referring to nothing other than the thing itself, the thing is identical to itself. Qualitative identity means the same in some particular way, so it refers to similarity.

I've never heard of "quantitatively identical", but I assume that what you mean by this is the same in reference to quantity. As I said already, this is a form of qualitatively identical. Having the same quantity is a qualitative identity, just like having the same colour, or having the same size, or being made of the same type of material. These are all similarities by which we can identify things, but it does not mean that the things which are classed in these groups are the same absolutely (numerically identical).

Numerically identical means one and the same. Clearly 2+2 is distinct from 4, so they are not numerically identical. They are however equivalent, meaning that with respect to some quality (in this case a quantitative value), they are the same. Therefore 2+2 and 4 are qualitatively identical.

They do not reference the same entity though. 2+2 signifies two distinct entities each with the value of two. Those two distinct entities, with the value of two, when taken together (signified by +) have the same value as one entity with the value of four (4). 2+2 signifies two distinct entities added together, while 4 signifies one entity. 2+2 is equal to 4, it is not the same as 4. The two entities signified by 3 and 1 when added together also have the same value as 4.

Holding one responsible means to recognize the individual as a cause. It may entail many things, blame, praise, judgement of guilt, trust, distrust, etc.. Whether or not punishment is due is not necessitated, and this requires another judgement.

Your view is extremely bizarre. I've never heard "equal" used to signify that two entities are the same entity. That idea is simply contradictory. If they are two entities, then clearly they are not the same entity, and to say that two entities are one entity is contradictory. Your statement is contradictory.

To say that two instances of particular entities are equal is to say that they are the same in some respect. But this does not mean that they are the same in every respect, and that is what is necessary in order for us to say that two instances are instances of the same entity. So, "equal" implies distinct entities which are, according to certain criteria, the same. It does not imply that the two entities are the same entity.

Perhaps my view is not the conventional view in philosophy, but your view is not conventional in any sense, and it is simply absurd, as contradictory.

The point is that a person is considered to be the cause of one's actions. If one were not the cause of one's actions we could not hold the person responsible for those actions. Punishment is irrelevant.

Correct, "=" signifies "equals", or "is equivalent to", the two are synonymous. Do you have difficulty with the English language?

Back to my question. Do you not recognize the difference between "equals" (is equivalent to), and "is identical to"?

Quit the distraction, we're discussing identity, not equivalence.

I can't see how necessity can be understood to obtain in particular interactions unless determinism is assumed to be the case. — John

Exactly, that's why the concept of efficient cause quite easily leads one into determinism. We only escape determinism by assuming that there are things which are uncaused in the sense of efficient causation. We still allow that these things are "caused" though, in the sense of final cause. But this means there is a radical difference between efficient cause and final cause.

Did I say that it refers to a type of thing? — Terrapin Station

You said:

Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. — Terrapin Station

Don't you think that "type" refers to something?

There's no difference on the conventional usage of "identical" in philosophy. But in your view, the difference is what? — Terrapin Station

You do philosophy without differentiating between identical and equivalent? The former is the same, unqualified, the latter is a qualified same. So one playing card is equivalent to another playing card, allowing us to count 52 cards in the deck, but no two cards are identical. I'm going to stop and wait for you to grasp this simple difference.

I haven't seen it put the way you put it before. It sounds like you are saying that Aristotle's aim was to distinguish the different ways in which people used (the ancient Greek equivalent of) the word 'cause'. If so, then maybe I have been too hard on him. I don't know how Ancient Greeks used words. He's likely to know much more about that than me. Also, even though there will be big differences between how they used a word and how we use its modern equivalent, I think I see some similarities between the uses he describes and the modern uses. — andrewk

Yes, if you read that passage in his "Physics", that is what he says, that he is distinguishing the different ways that "cause" is used. As I said before, you don't see "cause" being used now, in the sense of material cause or formal cause, these ways seem to have been phased out. And Aristotle at that time ruled out "chance" and "fortune", as accidentals, though he said that they were sometimes referred to as causes.

I don't see people around me using 'cause' in the sense of his 'final cause' though. Maybe it's just the society in which I live, but people I know just don't use the word 'cause' that way. I have no reason to suspect that Ancient Greeks didn't though. The closest I have observed is that people will use the word 'because' to explain why they did something. But I find the similarity between 'because' and 'cause' purely textual, not semantic. — andrewk

I think you will find that people do use "cause" in the sense of final cause, quite commonly. This is "cause" in the sense of an intentional act, and is what you described as coming into play in cases of liability and such things. In order to assign blame, we seek the individuals whose intentions played a role in causing the situation.

"Because" is related, because when we ask why of an act, we answer with "because". So "because" speaks of the reason for the act, but the actual cause of the act is the will of the individual. If the individual is not considered to be a freely acting "cause" of a situation, one cannot be held responsible for that situation.

This is not true. Take the hammer and nail example. If striking the nail with the hammer is the efficient cause of driving the nail, that entails no necessity that the hammer striking the nail with sufficient accuracy logically must result in it being driven, or even that its being driven is physically necessary . — John

The necessity is found in the relationship between the cause and the effect. In order to say that striking with the hammer was the cause of the nail being driven, we assume a necessary relation between the two, such that it is impossible that anything else caused the nail to be driven. That a nail could be driven by something else, or that the hammer might strike the nail and fail to drive it, is irrelevant to the case in which the striking of the hammer is said to be the cause of the nail being driven. In this latter case, in which the striking of the hammer is said to be the cause, there is assumed a necessary relation between the striking with the hammer, and the driving of the nail.

I'm referring to identity in the 2+2 is identical to 4 sense. — Terrapin Station

There is a difference between equal and identical 2+2 is equal to four, but it is far from identical to four.

Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. I'm not sure that you're clear that I'm simply denying that multiple people have a single, numerically identical subjective experience. — Terrapin Station

If "subjective experience" refers to a "type" of thing, then how can you identify it as particular material in particular relations? How can you not see this as category error?

It's just like one person's nose is different than another's. They don't somehow share just one nose. — Terrapin Station

So if a nose is a type of thing which many different animals have, how could you claim to identify a nose as particular material in particular relations? Wouldn't it be more correct to identify a nose as a part of an animal?