A man can not reason his way to God. — Beebert

Speak for yourself on this. I was atheist from my upbringing, and started practising philosophy as an atheist. It took many years of reasoning before I was convinced of God. God is logically necessary, as the creator of material existence. The cosmological argument is particularly forceful logically. But there are complicated metaphysical concepts involved, such as "potential" and "actual", and the argument will not be accepted unless these concepts are understood in the right way. Therefore the logic will not be accepted without the appropriate education.

I'd have to think through this. My preliminary answer would be something like "Truth is a concept that denotes the reality of a particular proposition, belief, or statement." — Brian

OK, let's start with this. What do you mean by the "reality" of a proposition? Let's assume that a proposition consists of words, either written or spoken, and there is also supposed to be something which the proposition refers to. Each of these may be physical states of the world. Each of these states must be interpreted. If someone interprets them both, the words and the thing referred to, in the same way, that person would say the proposition is true. In other words, if I would describe a particular state of the world, with the same words as used in the proposition, I would say that the proposition is true.

Or perhaps truth is the property a proposition has when it is in fact true. We say things like "Statement X is the truth." In other words, Statement X has the property of being a true statement. — Brian

Yes, this is what I would agree with. When we judge a particular collection of words as true, we claim that it has the property of truth. The problem is that truth is not attributed to the physical existence of the words, it is not something which is sensed in the words, it is attributed to the meaning of the words. The meaning is interpretive, and truth is attributed to the meaning, so this makes truth subjective.

We can't even agree on that. Quitting isn't a bad thing if something isn't worth the bother. If you give me something worth my time, I'll try again. Take it or leave it. — Sapientia

As you demonstrated, nothing I give you will be determined by you to be worth your time, because you refused to even read it, citing that because it was from me, you knew it was not worth your time. So even if, perchance, something I gave you was actually worth your time, you would never know this, assuming that it was not worth your time, and not bothering to take the time to understand it. That is the classic effect of prejudice. Remember the boy who cried wolf? You treat me as if I am that boy. But I never cried wolf, you just misunderstood, being deficient in interpretive skills.

I can think what I like, and so can you, and so can the cat and the dog. Now show me why any of such thoughts matter (except in terms of self-interest). — tim wood

The human being has an innate desire to know, this is what defines philosophy. You can refer to this as "self-interest" if you like, but to dismiss it is to dismiss philosophy. Now you are starting to remind me of Sapientia.

If by "god" you simply mean an answer to a question not yet otherwise answerable, you're free to do so - and you're in excellent company if you do. — tim wood

No, that's not what I mean , and that's why I explicitly stated it's not what I mean:

And referring to God is not just a matter of attributing what is unknown (temporal continuity), to the Will of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not something I am familiar with as a fact. Please make clear how it is a fact. — tim wood

This is what I explained in the other thread, "'True' and 'Truth'". We can take it up here, or in the other thread, or both places if you like. It has been demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle, then taken up later by Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians, that material existence, as we know it, requires an immaterial cause. That this demonstration has been made is a fact, and I paraphrased the demonstration in the other thread. Whether you, or any other human being accepts this demonstration as a valid justification of the conclusion, is another issue.

Perhaps language confusion here? How do you get from the reality - the fact - of a concept, to affirming the real existence of what the concept is a concept of? Are you arguing that everything that can be conceived is real? Or just some things? Or, how about just that concepts are concepts, however valuable they may be, and reality is something else. — tim wood

I was not arguing for the real existence of what the concept is a concept of, I was arguing for the real existence of the concept. Perhaps you've forgotten, or did not notice, that I distinguish two distinct relationships between human concepts and material objects. In some situations, we are trying to understand a material object, and we produce a concept as a representation of the material object. In other cases, such as in the case of the circle, we produce a concept, then we make material representations of that concept in our creative endeavours. You seem to have a desire to conflate these two, such that the only valid relationship between concept and material object is the former, in which the concept is meant to represent a material object. So you would ask, "what the concept is a concept of", even of the concept of "circle", when it is quite clear that the concept being discussed is the concept "of" a circle, and this is not a representation of a material thing, it is a concept, the concept of a circle.

Yes, that's exactly what I said is a nonsense contradiction, that "we" refers to timeless observers.

Well, you're welcome to go back and give it another shot. You might be able to improve upon your last failed attempt. But I don't think you will - that is, give it another shot and, if you were to, be able to demonstrate signs of real improvement - which would mean we're at an impasse. — Sapientia

Uh, no, I think not. The quitter is the one who needs to try again.
I believe it was you who did not read my post, and said:

I think you're playing games, so I'm going to cut this short and read no further. — Sapientia

So I believe it is you who needs to give it another shot. The appearance of impasse is simply your refusal to try. Compromise requires effort from all sides. There will be no agreement if one of the parties refuses to try. And this clearly points to you.

I believe this is the correct understanding of god, by whatever local name he goes by. In this sense, god is very real. That is, god is a concept, period. But a peculiarly powerful one. To use your earlier distinction between concepts and things, god is not any kind of thing. How do I know? In any absolute sense I do not know, but by that standard i don't know anything, nor does anyone else. — tim wood

What about God as the creator of things? Don't you think that there must be a reason why there are things instead of just randomness? What I mean by "things" here is something with temporal extension, so that a description of a state will remain valid for a period of time. For instance, "the chair is at the table" maintains its validity for a while, due to the temporal existence of these objects. Without the existence of objects, there would be random changes from one moment to the next, and a moment is a very short period of time.

How can we account for the cause of temporal stability without referring to God? The issues with quantum mechanics indicates that physicists are incapable of accounting for the temporal continuity of existence. And referring to God is not just a matter of attributing what is unknown (temporal continuity), to the Will of God. What metaphysicians, and theologians, know about the nature of the will as an immaterial cause, and the fact that it has been determined as necessary that an immaterial cause is required for material existence, leads one to the conclusion that a cause such as a final cause, similar to an act of will, is the cause of material existence. So there is good reason why the Will of God is designated as the cause of material existence. It is necessary that material existence has an immaterial cause, and the will is the only type of immaterial cause that we know of. So the immaterial cause, which creates material existence is designated as the Will of God.

The error is to aver that god is real, in the sense of a thing, perhaps even like a kind of human being, only with unlimited supernatural powers an abilities. — tim wood

I agree that this idea of God is a misunderstanding. God is never really described as a thing, as God is described as the creator of all things, not Himself a thing.

As to it's either being or not being a circle (or god), the question is not whether something is, or is not, something that it is not (as with, is this real circle a perfect ideal circle?) Rather, is this what we think it is, or not? (E.g., is this a circle or is it not a circle, as "circle" is understood in the context.) — tim wood

This skirts the issue. The issue is, "what is the real circle?". Is the real circle the concept of a circle, with it's perfectly irrational pi, or is the real circle an instance of a circle drawn on paper, or physically existing somewhere else? If the concept is real, then how would you deny that there is a real God when you allow that there is a real concept of God?

I believe you're thinking temporal priority, when it really is logical priority, and that in thought, as an idea. And even that is arguable. As to coming into existence, I think you're shorting the notions of telos and nisus. The telos of a cat is to be(come) a cat; the kitten's nisus is to realize its telos. While not yet a cat, it is exactly not a cat. But that just means that it is exactly something else, which is a very clumsy pseudo-philosophical way of saying that the kitten grows into a cat, that is, is continually changing. — tim wood

I think your missing the point. The point is that the logic demonstrates that a sort of "Idea" of each particular, individual thing, precedes in time, the material existence of that thing. Of course, we believe that there have been things long before there were human beings, so these "Ideas" are not human ideas. This is why Neo-Platonism was so well received by Christian theologians, because they designated these Ideas as divine.

Instead of taking a religious perspective though, let's just call these "natural Ideas", or "forms", as Aristotle did. It is very important to notice that these Forms, (I'll use the capital F to distinguish the natural Ideas from the human ideas), are of particular things, rather than universals which human ideas are. So each particular, individual thing, has a Form which precedes in time, its material existence, and therefore the Form of the thing is something separate from the material thing itself. We see an object, like a chair at the table, the chair has a Form, which is necessarily separate from the material chair itself, because it precedes the existence of the material chair, in time. The separation is a temporal separation. The temporal perspective of the human being is extremely limited, as is evident by relativity theory. It is restricted by the material constitution of the human body. You see the material chair at the present, "now", but just prior to the present in which you are seeing the material chair, is the Form of the chair, (the Form is at a different "now", a shifted now, which is prior to the "now" of your experience), and the Form causes the material existence of the chair, at the now of your experience.

And you always are completely correct in this criticism. But the criticism is too narrow and reductionist. All right, truth is in the mind, but not as an ideal. Perhaps as a kind of judgment. Maybe that's it. Truth is the mind's judgment as to whether certain propositions are true. As such it has nothing to do with the particular trueness of any proposition, and is not even in itself a guarantee that the proposition is true. It is just a judgment (Insert Gurugeorge, here). — tim wood

I don't believe that you completely followed the last passage which I just I wrote. And if you could follow it, you most likely dismissed it as "untrue", from the opening premise, that the Form of each individual thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, so it makes no sense to you anyway. If you've dismissed this as untrue, then we need to go back to the argument from Aristotle, which I presented, and hash this out, because either the premise is wrong or it is right, and what I say about "judgement" now, will be based in the assumption that the premise is correct.

The reason why I insisted for so long, that we do not allow truth out of the ideal realm, was to avoid the notion of truth being a correspondence between human ideas, and material existence. So now I've introduced Forms, which are separate from material existence, and also separate from human ideas. I propose that material existence is a medium between human ideas, and the Forms. Truth, as correspondence, is a correspondence between human ideas, and the separate Forms.

The problem with judgement now, is that the human mind is fallible, and cannot be trusted to accurately judge truth. Judgement is an act of will, a passing of judgement. Many times we judge something as true, when it is false. So if we are to assume that truth is a judgement, then this judgement must be an action carried out not by the human mind, but the Mind in which the Forms exist. But we haven't yet determined that the Forms exist within a Mind, that is the ancient assumption which puts the Forms in the mind of God. All we have is that the Forms are necessarily prior in time, to material existence. There is an act, which is the passing of time, and this act makes material things correspond to the Forms, but what kind of thing could "judge" whether human ideas correspond with the Forms?

So "judgement" may not be the proper concept here because unless we assume a being like God, with the capacity to judge, we cannot have a judgement. It is a left over idea, held over from the times in which human beings thought that the Forms must exist in the mind of God, and the judgement of "truth" was made by God. Now I have presented a slightly more complex model. I have posited material existence as the medium between the Forms and the human ideas. Instead of the Will of God, passing judgement, making material existence correspond to the Forms as independent "truth", I posit the passing of time. Truth, from this perspective is not a judgement, it is the passing of time. We can replace the statement "God is truth" with "The passing of time is truth".

Anyway, can you go with this: that truth is a kind of judgment that invokes the world and the being in the world of the person making the judgment. (And has nothing to do with the trueness of any proposition, except through hope (trust, honesty, etc.). Please feel obliged to clean this up, if you think it needs it. — tim wood

In the old days, "truth" would be the judgement of God. The human mind is fallible, and judges truth incorrectly quite often, so truth cannot be a judgement of human beings. Our society has grown up as a religious society, where God played an important part, such that many of the foundational concepts like "truth", are supported by the assumption of God. For instance, notice that it is common to say there is an "objective" truth or falsity to every proposition regardless of whether it is believed by human beings to be true. This invokes the "God's eye view". Now we tend to dismiss the reality of God, so concepts such as these, concepts which are foundational within our society, are left hanging.

This is the evolutionary cycle of the progression of knowledge. The foundational concepts of a society are the oldest, well established principles, but ancient. As time passes knowledge progresses and we learn vast new fields. The vast new expansions of extended knowledge will inevitably undermine the ancient principles, which were developed from the full extent of the restricted capacities of ancient people. Consider something like what Wittgenstein says, we cannot doubt these foundational, bedrock concepts. In actuality, what he does is question them, cast doubt on them, exposing the reality that we must doubt them. When we subject these bedrock principles to a complete system of skepticism, it becomes evident just how much modern knowledge has undermined fundamental principles.

So this is the importance of human judgement. Each foundational concept, being a fundamental premise, must be analyzed and judged by a system of skepticism. If the concept has been undermined by modern knowledge, as is the case with the foundational concept of "truth", we must determine the premises which have been added at a higher level, which contradict the foundational concept. The foundational concept, as well as the contradictory concepts, must be analyzed together, and they must be altered to be made consistent.

Suppose the universe died. The theory of the Great Crunch has come true. We have a state what was before Big Bang. There is no time. It is in such a case we can talk about that "someday" or "sometime" universe existed? There is no time but we know that the universe existed. Now it does not exist, and time does not exist. So you can say that the universe existed after it "died"? — carl37

Your thought experiment is impossible, contradictory nonsense. You project yourself to a fictitious future time, a time in which the universe does not exist any more, and then you propose to be saying, at this time, "the universe existed". But it is impossible for you to be at this time, when the universe does not exist anymore, so it is impossible for you to be saying, at this time, "the universe existed". Therefore your statement "there is no time but we know that the universe existed" is pure nonsense because there would be no "we", and so nothing that "we know", if the universe ceased to exist.

Were you not? I wish it didn't have to be like that with you, but when you respond like that, what do you expect? There seems to be a recurring problem with you that distinguishes discussions I have with you from discussions I have with others. That wasn't the first time that I've concluded that it's better to cut it short and leave it be. — Sapientia

Oh, I apologize. You have my sympathy, so I'll offer some advice. It appears communicating with me is just too complex for your simple mind. If you do not want to play language games with me, then let's not. But quitters are losers, so next time I attempt to engage you in such a game, you're best off not to even reply, as some other simple minded members do, so as not to be persuaded into a position where you will be inclined to quit.

You don't see the contradiction? You say "there is no time". Then you say at sometime our universe existed. If there is no time, how can there be "sometime" unless you use "time" in two different ways? "Time" in one sense no longer exists, yet in another sense, you say at sometime the universe existed. Can you provide consistency for your perspective?

When our universe dies, he will be still in the past. — gunner

Is there time (and therefore a past) without the universe?

1) Let's suppose it is: truth is an ideal. Whence ideals? Which came first, the horse or the ideal (of a ) horse? I think the real horse came first. But what would be the real truth that is prior to the ideal? If this question is legitimate, then it follows that truth is not originally or entirely an ideal. Further, it can reasonably be asked what property the ideal has that is not already manifest in its instances. What property does the ideal horse have that is not already manifest in one or another real horse? (Assuming that the ideal horse is not an unnatural or super-natural horse, although it's fair to include in the one ideal horse all the perfections of many real horses and none of their imperfections.) — tim wood

As much as many people today do not believe this, it has been well proven by Plato and Aristotle, that the form of the thing is prior in existence, to the particular thing itself. It is best laid out in this way, by Aristotle. Anything which exists is necessarily the thing which it is, or else it would not be the thing that it is, it would be something different. And it is impossible by way of contradiction that a thing is something other than the thing it is. So when a thing comes into existence, it must already be pre-determined what that thing will be, or else that thing might be something other than the thing that it is, and this is impossible according to the above statement. Therefore we must assume that the "form" of the thing, the "whatness" of the thing is prior to the thing itself.

This is what the neo-Platonists expanded on, the immaterial Forms which are necessarily prior to the physical existence of objects. Christian thinkers like Aquinas were clear to distinguish between this immaterial Form which precedes the existence of an object, and human ideas which follow the existence of objects in abstraction. I intentionally used the word "ideal", to allow that even in human activity, the ideal like a template, or prototype, precedes the object which is created as a representation of the ideal. So we cannot speak of a "real truth" which precedes the ideal, because the ideal is the real truth.

2) Let's assume that truth is not just an ideal. It follows immediately, then, that there's more to truth than just being an ideal. Where else would that be but in the real, in praxis. — tim wood

You always fall back on this, or a similar position, that truth is not in the mind, that it is not an ideal, seemingly not willing to follow where the investigation leads.

As an ideal, truth is a universal. — tim wood

This is not the case. Concepts and such are universals, but the ideal is a particular concept, it is the one chosen as the best, the most appropriate, the ideal. It is not a universal, it is a particular. Every object has a particular form unique to itself, and the statement of that form is also a particular statement, unique in reference to that particular object. That is the thing about truth, it is particular to every situation. The truth concerning that situation is the best description of it, the ideal description, it is unique and particular.

Truth, then, becomes the possibility that we trust, or at least can hope for, that is realized in the true. The ideas of truth and true are in part just as MU claims. But as part of being in the world, they extend beyond the idea into that which makes them truth, or true. — tim wood

OK, let me consider this notion of extending beyond the idea, which you suggest. Consider that the ideal extends beyond the idea, referring to the best, or most perfect idea. Do you see that it is impossible for the ideal to exist within the human mind, due to the deficiencies and fallibilities of the human being? The human mind cannot hold the best, most perfect idea. Therefore truth, in its most perfect and real form is not something within the human mind.

.

Intelligent, wise, challenging, but we expect nothing less from MU. Certainly the distinction between a real god and a concept of god is a distinction that makes a difference. And it is one I wish everyone would make. How much more insightful, fruitful, and fair would be theology/religion and all discussions flowing therefrom if only participants understood the difference, and that it makes a difference! — tim wood

I'll take the compliment any day. Thanks. That's better than what Sapientia says of me, that I'm just playing games and intentionally missing the point.

I happen to think the concept of god is uniquely valuable. When understood as a concept, I think much good results. Affirming a god in reality, on the other hand, has a uniquely evil history. — tim wood

This is an interesting point, but it alludes to an issue which needs to be addressed. Is it possible for a concept to be valuable, and not in some way be real? Take the concept of a circle for example, it's a very valuable concept because of its usefulness, but something about the irrational nature of pi indicates that the perfection expressed by the concept cannot exist in reality. So we could say, theoretically, that the circle is a very useful concept, but affirming that there are real circles, existing in the physical world is a falsity constituting a unique type of evil. Still, the concept is useful and that's what makes it valuable.

The point which needs to be made, is that what is described by the concept, through the defined terms, is not the same as the thing in the world which we use the word to refer to. So we see rain drops on the water, and say they make circles, or see a hula hoop, and call it a circle, but since these things do not have a precise centre, as is required by the concept, they are not "real" circles, in the sense of the perfect circle, described by the concept. In my last post, I described the inverse situation, when we re attempting to understand a thing or phenomenon, our concept of it is often deficient. So in some cases (the circle) our concept is prefect, while the things referred to are imperfect, while in other cases, the concept is deficient to meet the perfection of the thing (what I called misunderstanding).

You suggest a third option, that a concept might be produced as some sort of fictional figure. The fictional figure, like Santa Claus for instance, would be useful for some purpose, but have no reality behind it. This seems to be what you are suggesting for "god".

Two nitpicks: confusion over the two you call a misunderstanding. I suppose, if it really is a misunderstanding. What it really is, is error, and depending on the who and why, maybe a deeply vicious error. At any rate, history is so full violence based on this error, among others, that the possibility of error not due to misunderstanding needs accounting for. Second. "either X is Y or X is not Y" may be infelicitous in a discussion, but it's scarcely meaningless or nonsensical. If there is a real god, then he either is, or is not, as claimed. Whether or not anyone is capable of evaluating the claim is another question. — tim wood

I do not understand the distinction you are trying to make between error and misunderstanding. Aren't all errors misunderstandings, and all misunderstandings errors, making the two one and the same? What do you mean by an "error not due to misunderstanding"? If you are talking about intentional wrongdoing, then this is not error, and you are referring to a completely different class of actions. I can see that if you think that God is a fictional object, created like Santa Claus, then you might call this intentional wrongdoing rather than error. But you've said that the concept of god is valuable, therefore it is not wrongdoing, or error at all. How is the concept of "god" different from the concept of "circle", in the sense that nothing in the world can match the perfection required by the concept?

The concept is a useful fiction, but it is only useful so long as there is something real, in the world which is being referred to with the name. The day that there are no more presents on Christmas morning, is the day that "Santa Claus" loses its usefulness. So as much as "Santa Claus" is a fictional object, it still refers to something real, the presents, and that's what makes it useful. But now all we have is a simple misunderstanding, the presents on Christmas morning are associated with the concept of Santa Claus, and that's a misunderstanding. The concept does not match the phenomenon. Likewise, you might think that "god" is a useful, fictional figure. If it is useful, then there is something real which constitutes the usefulness, and associating that concept of god, with that real usefulness, is a simple misunderstanding. Like "Santa Claus", the utility might be accomplished in more honest ways.

Second. "either X is Y or X is not Y" may be infelicitous in a discussion, but it's scarcely meaningless or nonsensical. If there is a real god, then he either is, or is not, as claimed. Whether or not anyone is capable of evaluating the claim is another question. — tim wood

This situation is not as simple as you make it out to be. Consider the circle, and replace "god" with "circle" in the quoted passage. If there is a real circle, then either it is or is not as claimed. The circles in the world are not exactly as it is claimed that a circle is, so if these are "real" circles, then real circles are not as claimed. But some will say that the "real" circle is the concept, and therefore the real circle is as claimed, but the real circle is only conceptual, circles in the world are not real circles. So if the "real" god is conceptual, then god may be as claimed. But if the "real" God is the thing referred to in the world, which makes the concept useful (like the real Santa Clause is the reason for the presents under the tree), then the real God is not as claimed. And it all depends on your perspective of what "real" refers to.

Second. In what sense is my belief or non-belief, or anyone else's, constitutive of any real god? He either is as you claim, or not. I don't get a vote, and neither does anyone else. — tim wood

This may be a slight misunderstanding because things are not so straight forward as you imply. There are two distinct ways in which we name things. We can use a name to refer directly to a thing, or phenomenon, even though we do not have a proper understanding of that thing. Or we can use a name referring to an understanding, or concept, without referring directly to any particular thing or phenomenon. So, take for example, in Physics, some fundamental particle like the Higgs boson. Physicists can talk about the about this particle, as a concept, without pointing to any existing thing or particular phenomenon, they discuss the concept. Or they might point to some phenomenon and say that is the Higgs boson.

So it is very possible to have a disjunction between the concept which the word refers to, and the thing which the word refers to, and this would be a misunderstanding. Since human knowledge is never perfect, there is always some degree of separation between the concept and the thing, some degree of misunderstanding, where the concept of the thing doesn't exactly match the thing. Therefore it doesn't make sense to say "either God is as you claim or not". The person may have an understanding of "God" which is completely consistent with the accepted concept, just like the physicist may have an understanding of the "Higgs boson" which is completely consistent with accepted principles, but this concept of "God", or "Higgs boson" may not be a proper understanding of the real thing, or phenomenon which is referred to by these words.

If you desire to determine whether God is as so and so claims, or not, you must go beyond the concept of God, to compare the claims with the real thing, God. If you simply compare so and so's claims of God, with the accepted concept of God, your endeavor will be futile. Due to existing deficiencies in the concept, we must assume that the accepted concept is not completely as God is, and so and so's claims might vary at optimum places.. In this way, we really do get a vote as to whether any particular person's belief in God is representative of the real God, but not the atheist, the atheist is deprived of that capacity.

You're are just repeating the distinction. Since all knowledge is internal, nothing can be justified by external correspondence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is manifestly untrue. We justify things, one to another, and when we do this we use words, symbols, or some other form of demonstration. The demonstration is external correspondence. Therefore what you say is the exact opposite of the truth, in reality, all justification is by means of external correspondence.

So how do we justify our claims? We do so internally. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The entirety of your post follows from this falsity.

What evidence do you have that St. Paul wanted to defend the act of crucifixion and vindicate the Jews? As in what sources are you basing this on? — Agustino

1, He was Jewish, a Pharisee, opposed to the followers of Jesus.
2. He upheld the conviction that Jesus claimed to be Son of God.

How much more evidence do you need? Put two and two together. That Jesus claimed to be Son of God is the conviction the Jews passed, which cost Jesus his life. The only reason to insist that Jesus made this claim, when he clearly didn't, is to uphold that conviction.

St. Paul saw that he could appease both the Jews and the Christians, create consistency between them, if he fostered the belief that Jesus actually is Son of God (which would support the Christian resurrection, and also justify the Jews putting Jesus to death for claiming to be Son of God) . This was Saul's epiphany from God, on route to Damascus, "to reveal His Son in me". Therefore the tradition began, that Jesus is Son of God.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. That's part and parcel of living life. We all do it. But when it comes to God, you get a double standard and special pleading. — Sapientia

I understand that extraordinary claims, and extraordinary evidence, are part and parcel of living life. I also understand that life itself is extraordinary. Therefore life itself is extraordinary evidence. And extraordinary evidence is what is required to back up extraordinary claims. I don't understand why you employ a double standard "when it comes to God".

You haven't clarified the ambiguity at all, you've just repeated it. What does it mean to say that God comes to an individual from within, and that God makes his presence known from within? We can't make much progress until I know what you're talking about. I suspect you're hiding behind obscurity - exploiting it. — Sapientia

Ok, sorry I didn't explain, because you didn't ask. I think you were being ambiguous and obscure. Do you understand anything about the inner self, anything about the soul? If so, do you not recognize that God could make His presence known to you through your inner self? The very fact that you are alive, and therefore have a soul, is God making his presence known to you, but you ignore Him.

I'm not really asking anything, except rhetorically. If they can't justify it, I can't believe it. Anecdotal evidence isn't enough. — Sapientia

Well, I guess if God makes Himself present to you, through your inner self, and anecdotal evidence isn't enough to convince you of anything, then it is impossible that you will ever recognize God, because you will even reject your own anecdotes as evidence of anything. I do not resist, reject, and lock up my inner self, subduing it with the deception of denial. I allow freedom to my self, and even allow that God might give my free spirit some guidance.

We think of many people who make these kind of claims and genuinely believe them as whacks. Why should we think of people who believe that God has communicated with them any differently? A clairvoyant who isn't just a charlatan should be put in the whack box. — Sapientia

Yes, it is common to believe that people who think God has communicated to them are "whacks". So what? Does believing something make it true?

This is false, Jesus DID claim to not only be the Son of God, but to be one with the Father. This is actually one of the charges of the Pharisees against Him before the Crucifixion. — Agustino

You seem to misunderstand the facts Agustino. The charge against him was indeed a charge of claiming to be the Son of God, but when asked if that's what he calls himself, he said that's what you call me, or they call me, I call myself Son of Man. He always claimed to be Son of man, but did not discourage others from calling him Son of God. He got himself falsely accused.

Mark 1:1 starts by mentioning this is the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.

Luke 1:35 which details the birth of Jesus, where again, the angels say that he will be the Son of God.

John 10:30 - Jesus says "I and the Father are One"

John 10:36 where Jesus handles the accusation of blasphemy because he claimed to be the Son of God.

Etc.

Really the evidence is very clear, I can't understand how anyone who has read the Gospels can claim that Jesus did NOT claim to be the Son of God. — Agustino

I see absolutely no evidence here that Jesus called himself Son of God. You'll have to find something better than that to back up your claim. But, if you read completely, a good translation of the gospels of the New Testament you will see clearly that he called himself Son of Man.

Actually it is Saul who was adamant to say that Jesus wanted us to believe that he was Son of God. But Saul was Jewish, and wanted to defend the act of crucifixion. The only way to vindicate the Jews who put Jesus to death, was to insist that Jesus claimed to be Son of God. While vindicating the Jews in this way, the only way to support Christianity was to claim that Jesus actually is Son of God.

There's a long tradition in rabbinical teaching of the teacher asking questions rather than providing answers or statements. Jesus eludes to the idea of being the son of God. He also refers to his "father in heaven" in the context of describing God. So these were things that were understood at the time, but the significance of Jesus' approach to teaching gets lost to history pretty often. — Noble Dust

It is quite common in the Old Testament to see God referred to with the name "Father". It's actually in the Lord's Prayer. I think it's quite a stretch to accuse everyone who uses "Father" to refer to God, as claiming to be the Son of God.

That's ambiguous. What do you mean by that? — Sapientia

All our knowledge of anything is shown from within. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, suppose we remove this distinction then, between what is internal and what is external, because it is ambiguous. How would anyone justify any claims, if they cannot demonstrate external correspondence with what they are claiming that they know within themselves?

With ghosts and such, the claim is that the ghost is out there, so to justify the claim the individual must demonstrate where that ghost is. If God comes to an individual from within, and , makes His presence known to that individual from within, how can we ask that individual to demonstrate God's existence by referring to what is external to the individual.

My claim - and I maintain that this was quite apparent from the start, and in retrospect you might be able to see this - is that the claim that one has experienced the presence of God in their life is analogous in ways to the claim that one has experienced the presence of extraterrestrials or ghosts in their life. — Sapientia

Extraterrestrials and ghosts are thought to be external entities, what if God shows His presence from within?

Also if Jesus didn't exist or if he never claimed he was the son of God, than I'm pretty sure that would be a major flaw with Christianity. — dclements

I really do not think that Jesus ever claimed to be Son of God. To my knowledge, he referred to himself as Son of Man. There are two distinct claims involved here, that Jesus claimed to be Son of God, and that Jesus is Son of God. These two are part of a very complex issue surrounding his life, sacrifice, resurrection, and Christianity itself. It may well be a major flaw in Christianity, but Christianity was created by human beings, and this is just a reflection of the imperfection of human existence.

OK, so planning, thinking, conceptualizing, contemplation, and things like this are not waking experience, because they are not perceptual experience. I assume that they are "parallel to waking experience", like daydreaming. Is this what you mean by "parallel to waking experience", activity of the awake mind, which is not involved in perceptual experience?

I feel very sympathetic to the correspondence theory of truth tonight. It seems so basic and yet feels so right.

My coffee cup has coffee in it right now. This is a fact (although give me a few more minutes and it won't be a fact anymore). The proposition that I put forth in a sentence before, that my coffee cup has coffee in it right now, is true because it corresponds to the fact that my coffee cup does indeed have coffee in it right now. (actually it's decaf, which some people may reject as real coffee, but nevertheless...) — Brian

The op is concerned with the difference between "true" and "truth". The difficulty with correspondence theory is that as much as it is concerned with true statements, "it is true that my cup has coffee in it", it has no approach to truth itself. In a sense, you could say that it takes truth for granted, as it takes correspondence for granted.

If we ask the question, what is correspondence, we get a completely different approach to "truth". We cannot just say that it is true that my cup has coffee in it if my cup has coffee in it, as correspondence assumes, because this is just redundancy. So we must look at the two things which are said to correspond, and despite the fact that they are completely different (one is a statement the other a state of the world), they are both interpreted in the very same way. "My cup has coffee in it", and the specified state of the world, must both be interpreted as the same. in order that the statement is true.

In my waking life there is a logical continuity of happenings. If I am walking down the street, in the next moment I will be continuing to walk down the street unless I decide to stop and do something else. In my dreams there is no such logical continuity. I may be walking down the street one moment, then in the next moment in a car, then in a house, etc.. The content is very random with very little logical continuity.

The content of a dream is not fundamentally different than that of waking life. — Question

I strongly disagree. In my experience the two are very different.

I suppose it's the same as when we go to the movies. We don't stand up and shout, "That's not true!". Some form of suspension of disbelief is required to entertain a film as well as a dream. — Question

The lucid dreamer I spoke to claimed to have some control over what was happening in the dream. When we go to a movie we do not even consider the possibility of having control over what happens in the movie.

That doesn't seem to be the case in my experience. I've had lucid dreams where I know it's a dream; but, still am in the domain of believing/extertaining what I am seeing as real as in waking life. — Question

The question though, is a question for the lucid dreamer who has control over the dream. How can one have control over what is happening in the dream, yet still believe that what is being seen in the dream is as real as what is seen in waking like? Wouldn't having control over it make it like a daydream? And in a daydream I know that what I am daydreaming is not real, because I have control over it.

In other words, what's the philosophy of lucid dreams and it being in relation to reality or a sort of reality in itself? — Question

Suppose that in a regular dream, what is being experienced in the dream is taken by the dreamer as being real, what is really happening. In a lucid dream, one has some control what is being dreamed. I've heard a lucid dreamer tell me that despite having some control over what is to happen in the dream, the dream is still experienced as if it is real. How do you think this could be possible? How could one have some control over what is happening, and yet experience it as if it is really happening?

Dreaming/daydreaming are qualitatively different than waking experience. Daydreaming always occurs parallel to waking experience. Sleep-dreaming does not. — Terrapin Station

What do you mean by "parallel to waking experience"? Daydreaming occurs while one is awake, it is an awake experience. I've done it many times and it's a completely different thing from dreaming when I am asleep.

While I am still asleep, long before I wake up, part of my mind says "It's just a dream". — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Perhaps, but I'm talking about while the dream is going on. This is called lucid dreaming, when one can exercise some form of control over one's dreams.

Putting that aside, have you never woken up from a dream, to realize at the moment of awakening, that it was just a dream? In this case, the dream is being experienced as if what is happening in the dream is really happening.

Dream content (being the content of short-term memory) is also real, being the experiences (sensations, interoceptions, observations, introspections, etc.) which actually occurred during waking hours. — Galuchat

I don't agree that dream content is real in this way. The images in my dreams appear to be completely made up, and nothing I've ever experienced in my waking hours. However there appears to be some sort of word association, which relates the made up images to things I've already experienced. So for instance, there will be a person in my dream, who doesn't actually look at all like my brother, because the image is completely made up, but I will know that person in my dream as my brother. When I awaken, I'll wonder, why did my brother look like that in the dream?

I almost always know that I'm dreaming when I am. Dreams to me seem very similar to daydreams, imaginings when awake, etc. only I'm sleeping instead. So it's similar to knowing that I'm daydreaming or imagining something when I'm awake. — Terrapin Station

If you know that you are dreaming when you are dreaming, and dreaming requires being asleep or else it would be daydreaming, then I can assume that you know when you are asleep. How do you know when you are asleep, and not awake? How do you differentiate between these two, what is the difference for you, between being asleep and being awake, so that you know when you are dreaming, and not just daydreaming?

Thinking as a materialist, you have reality being generated without external input, some (supposedly) internal gibberish, which I don't believe. — Question

How could you not believe your dreams, while they are going on? That's the thing with dreams, they are apprehended as real, when they are going on, but when you awaken they are dismissed as unreal.

Anyway, to answer your question, I think that dreams are also what can be regarded as a form of reality, although impermanent and vague. Why we don't acknowledge it as a form of reality is a deeper question about how we think about how reality works, as something external illuminating our mind as a projector displays still images in quick succession. — Question

I find this to be contradictory. If you acknowledge that your dreams are unreal, then how can you, at the same time, say that they can be regarded as a form of reality? It is true, that what we believe as real, at one time, may be dismissed as unreal at another time, but this requires a conscious decision, that what was formerly believed should now be disbelieved. This is sometimes called "changing your mind", and it involves the recognition of a difference between what is real, and what is believed to be real. So when I awaken from a dream, and what I believed as real within the dream is dismissed as unreal, what I am doing is changing my mind. I recognize that what I believe to be real, and what is actually real, are distinct, and this allows me to apprehend the fact that I believe my dream as real, when it is going on, but dismiss it as unreal, later.

Since this "changing my mind" is a case of deciding that what my mind has produced at a particular time, is not real, and opting for what my mind produces at another time as more real, how does this support idealism? What do you base the determination of "real" in, your belief?

At the first go I got Epicureanism, and Humanism on the second. — jorndoe

Believe it or not jorndoe, I am the same as you, Epicurean. I don't think I would ever get Humanism though, so I don't know how that works.

I think that laws are rules set by people in power as an effort to control an aspect of the population. Is that not a reasonable definition? — MonfortS26

No, I don't think that's reasonable. Laws are put in place to protect the defined rights and freedom of individuals. Therefore they are not intended to control the population, but to ensure that each member of the population is best able to exercise one's own freedom.

Sorry, I don't believe in space-time. I think it's an unwarranted conflation of "space" and "time", which refer to two distinct aspects of reality.

That's about it, "nothing" has many different meanings dependent on the context in which it is used. In context, it always seems to mean something, so it usually doesn't refer to nothing in an absolute sense. Sometimes in philosophy though people will introduce the idea of absolute nothing, which is what wax1232 did in the op. It is highly doubtful that absolute nothing is at all meaningful, though some may use it as a counterfactual in a thought experiment; "if there was absolutely nothing, then...". How could this be a meaningful thought experiment?

What makes a counterfactual true? — creativesoul

What makes a counterfactual true, is the same thing which makes any proposition true, how the words are defined. In most cases, correspondence is inherent within the definitions, so that the definitions correspond with usage of the words. But a definition does not necessarily adhere to correspondence, and usage varies. In some cases we define words the way we want to, regardless of whether this corresponds to the way that the words are used or not.

So, creativesoul defines "true" as corresponding, and this makes it true that counterfactuals cannot be true, despite the fact that Michael would define "true" in another way, making it possible for counterfactuals to be true. One might insist, that there must be an "objective truth" to the matter, but how could there be? We are free to define and use words how we like, and clearly "true or false" depends on how the words are defined. Truth is subjective.

I would say that nothing is impossible. Clearly we have something, and to create nothing from something is just as unlikely as to create something from nothing.

Right, it's not nothing, so to declare it as nothing is a false declaration.

I'm no physicist, but what the quantum vacuum principle demonstrates, is that within the context of a real world situation (i.e. within something), it is impossible to create nothing.