It is not at all clear, in this case, that 'life' is the kind of thing to which 'meaning' would be applicable at all. — StreetlightX

With the use of most common words, such as "life", there is enough ambiguity to spread an unhealthy dose of category error all around.

For W. philosophical practice (i.e. linguistic analysis) leaves everything as found, which I take to mean that it does not add anything new, it's just dissolves confusions. In this way, it's not productive. — Πετροκότσυφας

How do you believe that philosophical practise can leave things as found, while at the same time dissolve confusions? Doesn't dissolving confusions require taking things found as confused, and re-presenting them in an unconfused way?

i was not actually claiming that we 'should' act responsibly, what i was claiming was that if we want a productive society that enables the well being of its proponents, then we ought to take responsibility for what our own brains end up doing. they are after all OUR brains. — PeterPants

OK, so my point is, that since we are not responsible, what makes you think that we would want a productive society? Doesn't wanting a productive society only come about as the result of a person being responsible? You reverse this, and say that the irresponsible person ought to want to be responsible. But how is this capacity for a person to want to change what oneself is, supposed to exist in this determinist world you describe? Furthermore, you've already described it as impossible for a person to change what oneself is, so how could such a want be in any way productive? If the person is irresponsible, and cannot change oneself to become responsible, then to want such a thing is just a fruitless, frustrating desire which cannot be satisfied.

you seem to be confusing what is practical for you, as opposed to what is practical for society, im speaking of the latter. — PeterPants

But that's the point I'm trying to make. Why would I ever act in a way which is practical for society if I am not responsible? This appears contradictory. So you say, we "must" act in this way. But how could we act in a way which is contrary to our nature? What supports this "must"?

for practical reasons we must take responsibility for our actions, we still do them, even if we are not ultimately responsible for them. — PeterPants

I don't see what you mean when you say that we are not responsible for our actions, but we must take responsibility for them. Where does this "must" come from? You say "for practical reasons", but I don't see any practicality in claiming responsibility unless I am acting properly and might get rewarded. If I am acting badly, how could it be practical to take responsibility for my actions?

that your personal experience of 'deciding' something, is an illusion, a trick. your brain does all the deciding outside of your control or understanding, it then tricks you into thinking you did it. — PeterPants

What does this mean? Isn't my brain part of me? If it is deciding for me, then isn't that me deciding? If my lungs are breathing for me, isn't that me breathing? Are you suggesting that someone else is controlling my brain? If not, and my brain is deciding, how is this not me deciding?

A note on what i mean by responsibility: people are not ultimately responsible for their actions, but we must act responsible, and hold each other responsible, for practical reasons. While still recognizing intellectually that we are not the arbiters of who we are, and as such things like hatred, vengeance etc, make no sense. — PeterPants

How does it make sense to say that people are not responsible, but they must act responsible? Does this mean that they should pretend to be responsible when they really are not responsible? What would give them the capacity to pretend to be responsible when they really are not responsible?

This argument is a moral argument, not necessarily a pragmatic one, as i mentioned above, there is of course still a necessity for punishment as a deterrent, though one could imagine a world where punishment was pretend, people believed it was real but it was actually just CGI for example. — PeterPants

How could punishment act as a deterrent if people don't have freedom to choose?

But the motivation for the experiment is that little is known about the corona in particular, and about the Sun in general. And, if little is known, that means that things can't be predicted or assured with certainty. — Michael Ossipoff

I heard some discussion about the ambitions for this probe. Apparently the corona (not a beer) is much hotter than the surface of the sun itself, and scientists do not know exactly why this is the case. They hope to gather some information.

To exist, logically speaking, is generally just to be the subject of a predicate. — jamalrob

This is where the problem is then. If, from the perspective of what is logical, to exist is simply to be the subject of a predicate, then logic isn't consistent with what we normal mean when we say "exists". This is why logic and epistemology must be based in a good ontology, not vise versa. If we turn this around, and try to base an ontology in what logic makes of existence, we are headed into problems.

Interesting. Can you set out for me the structure of this argument? — Banno

You probably know me well enough to know that formal logic is not my thing. The argument is most likely modus ponens but the important aspect, what actually makes the argument, is the defining of the terms, and definitions are validated by induction. So once the definitions are accepted (the inductive aspect), the argument follows by modus ponens. Let me start with the definitions.

First we have to accept the existence of "objects", or in this case "bodies", the two are one and the same. An object or body is a collection of parts forming a unity which is distinguishable from its surroundings. Call this the foundation of individuation if you like, but without this definition, "a unity which is distinguishable from its surroundings", or some similar definition, we have no basis for claiming the existence of any objects. And without "collection of parts" we have no basis for the claim that an object can be divided.

The second definition is the "living" object, or "living" body, which signifies a distinct type of object. What distinguishes it from an inanimate object is the special way that its parts move. As per the physical demonstration which you must perform yourself, the movements of the parts cannot be said to be caused by a force originating from outside the body, nor are the movements random. The cause of the movements of its parts is within the body. This is a special type of movement which defines living, the cause of the movement of the body's parts is within the body itself. That is the most difficult definition to justify because one must demonstrate it to oneself, and even then there may be doubt that all the parts of a living body move in this way. What is necessary is to assume that all living bodies have some parts which move this way.

Accepting the definitions, we can proceed to say that the living body is a collection of parts forming a unity, which is distinguishable from its surroundings. Its parts have a special type of movement, in which the cause of movement of its parts is within the body itself.

Third definition is of "cause" or source of motion, and this means what is responsible for, or what initiates a movement, and is necessarily prior in time to the movement itself.

According to the second definition, if there is not the special type of movement of parts required for a living body, then there is not a living body. According to the third definition, the cause of the special type of movement is prior in time to that special type of movement.

All living bodies must have the special type of movement. The cause of the special movement is prior in time to the special movement. Therefore the cause of the special movement is prior in time to the existence of the living body.

The "cause of the special type of movement", which is required for a body to be living, is what we call "the soul". So the soul exists prior in time to the living body. What type of existence does the soul have, prior to its activities within the living body? And, if the soul exists prior to the living body, could it not continue to exist after the living body? The living body is dependent on the existence of the soul, not vise versa.

So, it isn't enough to garbage the moon and planets. We have to garbage the Sun too? — Michael Ossipoff

Isn't this just a case of incinerating the garbage? Why don't we load all the nuclear weapons into that incinerator as well?

The point seems important to the discussion. I do not see where and how you bridge the gap between object and interpretation. Let's try it from your side. Let's imagine you say, "That is a tree." You don't actually have to say it; you could just have some notion that translates into "that is a tree." What does "that" refer to? Do you begin to see the difficulty? If it's another interpretation, then you never escape from an endless chain of interpretation. On the other hand, if there is something about the tree that is not merely interpreted by you, then you have a grasp of reality not interpreted. — tim wood

No, I don't see the difficulty. The endless chain of interpretation is avoided by the assumption. For me, it's the assumption that there is actually something there which is being interpreted. For others it is the assumption that the interpretation is somehow, in itself, correct. We all have slightly different assumptions concerning this, and that's why we have differing ontologies, metaphysics. The naïve assumption of naïve realism is that the world is exactly as sensed. So it's really not a "grasp of reality not interpreted", it's just an assumption, and assumption doesn't really qualify as a grasp of reality. The interesting thing is that the further we delve into the nature of this reality, what you call "that" with science, the more we come to realize that none of these basic assumptions are actually correct. So we may be left with the realization that the closer to absolutely nothing we can come with our assumptions, leaving it all to interpretation, the closer to understanding reality we get. But even this is just an assumption, it doesn't really qualify as a grasp of reality.

You have already mentioned sensing, perceiving, apprehending, but then you say these are how we "interpret" reality. Interpret? Are you giving interpret two - at least two - different meanings? — tim wood

Clearly my uses of "interpretation" are different, but they can be classed together as similar, just different context. Likewise, "meaning" has different uses dependent on whether one refers to the meaning which language has, or the meaning which things have in general. They are similar uses but different context. Reading and listening to speech is a type of sensing, As I argued, it's a very focused type of sensing, with an educated, or trained form of interpretation. This goes far beyond the skills of interpretation which are natural to the human body, developed through evolutionary process.

Or are you satisfied that you can never know it's a tree? but if you cannot know that, then you cannot know anything. And more toward the point of this thread, you can never utter or even think anything true. — tim wood

I'm satisfied to say that we can know it, and also say that it's true that it's a "tree", but I'm not satisfied to say that this will always be true. We might develop a better way of understanding what is going on there, and describe it in completely different words. "The sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening" cannot be truthfully said to be true anymore, because what the words say is an inappropriate representation of what we believe about that phenomenon.

So the question: how do you bridge the gap between object and perception, or alternatively, how do you get from interpretation to reality? — tim wood

There is no gap to bridge, as you describe. Reality is within us, the objects are created within us, in interpretation. This all is what Plato described in the cave analogy. The gap which needs to be bridged is the separation between each one of us and the reality which is within us. This we bridge with language, and by creating concepts such as "the world", giving each person a place in "the world". But this unified "world" having us positioned within it is something created by us, and as such it is just a reflection of the reality which is within each one of us. Within each one of us is a different, but real perspective. There is also real separation between us, and this justifies the claim that there is difference between us. The assumption is dualist because there are real thinking minds, and a real separation between them, two distinct aspects of reality. There is no gap between interpretation and reality because these are just two different aspects of reality, interpreter, and what is being interpreted. Getting to know the nature of the separation between us is what bridges the gap between us, creating unity and a unified "world".

Sincerity is not equal to being true. — creativesoul

I didn't say it's equal, I said it's closely related.

You really don't need all this business about changing the meanings of "truth" and "knowledge." That horse has lost before it even gets out of the starting gate. — Srap Tasmaner

As I've insisted, it is not me who is changing the meanings of these words. I am simply attempting to maintain consistency with how the words are commonly used. It is those who insist that "truth" and "knowledge" must exclude falsity who are attempting to change the meanings. But this attempt is destined to failure, because as I explained, it renders these words unusable. And that's not going to prevent people from using them, they're going to continue to use them in the way I describe.

It is not perfectly clear that you can start at (2) and claw your way back to (1), but of course you can just leave (2) alone and plump for (1) immediately. You can even secretly believe (2) if you want. — Srap Tasmaner

So (1) requests that I quit using these terms. That's not going to prevent others from using them the way I describe. (2) says knowledge is impossible. So I assume that we should never call anything "knowledge"? I see no good reason to start calling everything which we presently call "knowledge" by the name of "rational belief" instead. The proper approach is to get the epistemologists to describe knowledge as it actually is, rather then according to some idealistic notion with no practical application. Epistemology is supposed to be the study of knowledge, so they need to be kept on the right track as to what knowledge really is, or else they're off in some pie in the sky fantasy land. What good is such philosophy?

What you say is true, even though you don't know it. — Srap Tasmaner

You've neglected the first point we covered in this thread. "True" is subjective, of the subject. The teacher judges the boy's response as "true", so it is true for the teacher. Before speaking, when the boy is preparing his response, the answer is not a true answer, because the boy does not know, and the answer has not been judged by anyone as true. "True" requires that judgement.

In this case, you arguably do know the right answer -- you got "1066" from reading the book after all -- but you have almost no certainty to go with your knowledge. A rising inflection when you answer is appropriate. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, "1066" is not judged by the speaker as "the true" answer, so there is no truth here until it is judged by the teacher as true. Your attempts to separate truth from certainty are unfounded because you do not respect the fact that "true" requires a judgement. That something is true, is a judgement. In you example, you yourself, are judging the answer as "true", and attempting to project your judgement into your example. But I decline your projection as deception, so there really is no truth where you claim there is.

Meta, what on your view is the difference between belief and truth? — creativesoul

I think that "true" refers to an attitude which we have toward expressing our beliefs to others, such that we are open and honest in our communications. It is closely related to sincerity. A true belief is one which is expressed openly and honestly, not held in secret for the purpose of deception. When you express your beliefs in the way that you really believe them to be, you are expressing true beliefs.

Earlier you concluded that since thought/belief can be false, so too can truth. — creativesoul

"Truth" refers to how we conceive of "being true", and this concept of truth which one holds may not be truly representative of what one believes that "true"means. In that case, what this individual claims that "truth" is, is not what is really believed as the meaning of being true.

It does not follow from the fact that belief can be false that truth can be false. Yet, that is the move you keep making. — creativesoul

The move I am making is to assert that when we refer to a thing such as a belief as "true", we are often fully aware that the thing may actually be false. And, it is acceptable to use "true" in this way, because "true" refers to the sincerity and conviction of one's belief, not the lack of falsity in one's belief. So it is the acceptable use of the word to refer to something which may be false as true.. If "truth" refers to "that which is true", for you, then yes, truth can be false.

This is paradoxical. A fool suits both as a friend and as an enemy. — TheMadFool

The best people in the world are fools, and so are the worst people in the world. No paradox here because "best and worst" refer to a different set of qualities from "fool and genius".

It's a wave without amplitude. — Rich

Doesn't sound like a wave to me.

But how can consciousness exist without an object towards which it is directed? — Agustino

Why can't consciousness simply be aware of itself? Is it necessary that consciousness is aware of objects prior to being aware of itself? Itself would not be an object.

One can turn it upside down and say all the waves contain the ocean. — Rich

I don't see how you can say this, because when the ocean is calm there is still an ocean but no waves. So it is impossible that the waves contain the ocean.

An ocean without waves is extremely easy to imagine as is the opposite (one big wave). One only need to exercise creative imagination. — Rich

A wave is a particular form. It is impossible to imagine a calm ocean as one big wave, because it does not have the appropriate form to be called a wave.

We don't continue to say "X is true" after becoming aware that it is not. — creativesoul

Of course not, one wouldn't say "X is true" when that individual believes X is false, unless that person deceives. But that doesn't mean that we don't say "x is true", when we know full well that it is possible that X is really not true. And, this is acceptable use of "X is true". As I explained to Fafner, if we had to know for sure that the falsity of X was absolutely impossible (absolute certainty) before it was acceptable to use "true", this would render "true" completely useless, because we never obtain such absolute certainty. So in reality, to define "true" as excluding the possibility of falsity, is to produce a definition which renders "true" useless.

What's the difference between believing that "X is true" and "X" being true? — creativesoul

We have yet to determine in this thread, whether or not such a difference exists. It doesn't seem likely to me. Since truth is a property of the subject, true being a property of what the subject believes, I don't see how you could separate X being true from someone believes X to be true. They both appear to say the same thing.

You might be inclined to create a difference, by defining "true" in a way such as "excluding the possibility of falsity". But that would be just an artificial difference, created by that definition which is really a useless definition except for the purpose of creating that difference. What is the point to creating that difference? If the definition is used simply to create such a difference, when no such difference really exists, then creating that definition is just a form of deception.

Read again what I said. We may, as theorists, describe something using propositions, without claiming that what we so describe has propositional form. It's practically the point of indicative speech.

For instance, when early Wittgenstein made the additional claim that reality has something like proposition form, most demured, but went on describing reality using propositions. Simply saying "S knows that P" doesn't commit you to thinking S herself entertains the proposition P. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so if we are using "S knows that P" in the informal sense, then "S knows that P" is insufficient for "P is true", because many things which we know turn out to be false. "S knows that P" would only be sufficient for "P is true", if knowledge consisted of absolute certainty, which it does not.

I don't know how you could think that if you've seen the movie. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm just going by your post. I suppose I missed the point?

The above concluded that since thought/belief can be false, so too can truth.

That would be the case if, and only if, thought/belief were equivalent to truth. It's not. — creativesoul

I am going by the evidence. It is quite evident that when we say "X is true" we do not have absolute certainty, and some times the belief which was said to be true turns out to be false. We know that it could be false, and we have respect for that fact, but we still say "X is true". Therefore if we define "truth" according to how "true" is normally used, truth does not exclude falsity. If you define truth in such a way that it excludes falsity, then you are not remaining true to the way that we use "true", and this definition may constitute a false premise.

One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false. — creativesoul

Yes, this is exactly the point. Either we define truth according to how it is used, the unshakable conviction which inclines one to say "X is true", or we define truth according to the logical principle principle "either X can be true or X can be false". If the latter, then we need to look no further to understand the nature of truth, because there is nothing more to it other than this definition. But I believe that this is an incorrect definition of truth, to oppose it with false, because this is not reflective of the way that we commonly use the word "true", it only reflects how epistemologists would like us to use "true". How we really use "true", is more like the former definition, having a firm conviction. But even when we have such a conviction, we recognize that what we hold as true may end up being false. So truth does not exclude falsity. We might say that it is improbable that something which is true is false, or something like that.

I wasn't asking about what you call it, but what you interpret it as being. That is, there has to be something by which you know it's a tree and not a car. And for so long as it is just interpretation and nothing more, then you can't know, and my question stands. — tim wood

I still don't get your point. How I sense things and how I call things by name are tied together, intertwined. How can you ask me "what I interpret it as being", as if this is something different from what I call it. These are one and the same. What I interpret it as being, is what I call it. If I come across something I am unfamiliar with, I can't interpret it as being anything in particular because I don't know what it's called. I can give it a name, and describe it, but I don't think that this is what you mean by "what you interpret it as being". Do you mean "how I would describe it"?

Of course, my understanding of interpretation is assigning or providing meaning. — tim wood

Right, this is consistent with how I use "interpretation". So for example, when I sense my surroundings, and conclude that I see a tree, this act of assigning "tree" to what I am sensing is an act of assigning meaning. I interpret what I sense as a tree.

In short, something has to be out there, or you got nothing. — tim wood

Of course something has to be out there, which I assign meaning to, just like there is a text out there which I assign meaning to. Where's the difference? My eyes produce an image and I assign "tree" to it, or I sense the word "tree", and I provide an image to correspond. Aren't these both very similar, only one is the inversion of the other? They are both a matter of assigning meaning.

Context and interpretation of texts is problematic, the difficulties of which are not our topic. — tim wood

I beg to differ. The truth of the statement or belief depends on the interpretation, and correct interpretation requires reference to the context. We can surrender the notion of correct interpretation, but that is what I think is extremely problematic to truth. How could there be truth if there is no correct interpretation? I do not think it is possible. Therefore in order to maintain a concept of truth, it is necessary to reference context, and allow context as an essential aspect of truth.

There is no context for reality: reality just is. — tim wood

This is what doesn't make sense, not my insistence on a spatial-temporal context. What could you possibly mean by "reality just is"? "Is" references the present time. But "the present time" gives us no meaning, it is meaningless, without the context of the past and future. So your claim "reality just is", is meaningless without this context.

We don't perceive the scientist's space and time: we perceive, we experience, the world and things as being in the world. The idea of the world or the things in it being constituted through contextualization is incoherent on its face. — tim wood

But we do not perceive or experience the world. "The world" is a concept which we create through our understandings of space and time, in order to give context and meaning to the things which we do perceive and experience. This context, which you call "the world", aids us in assigning meaning, and our quest for correct interpretation. So I am not claiming that the world is constituted through contextualization, "the world" itself is a contextual concept. The point being that we need to differentiate between contextual concepts (universals), and particular instances of sensing and perceiving. We understand the individual things which we are sensing, through contextualizing them in relation to universal concepts. The process of understanding involves placing the more specific, particular instances of perception, into the larger context, the more general concepts of the world, to the most
general, space and time.

Given complete specification, then the true proposition is always true. — tim wood

Here, context is included under the title of "complete specification". And this is the problem with "the true proposition is always true", specification is never complete. In assessing context, one must distinguish relevant from irrelevant factors. "Complete specification" is an impossibility, an ideal, and so the true proposition which is always true, is likewise an ideal, which does not exist in practise. Therefore we have to accept the reality that in practise the true proposition is not always true, it is sometimes false. But the fact that the true proposition is sometimes false, does not prevent us from saying that the proposition is true, nor does it indicate that we are using the word "true" incorrectly when we call it true. It is just this rule, the principle, that true and false are mutually exclusive, which makes this an incorrect use of "true". The problem is that no one really follows this rule in practise, so it's not really a rule of language usage at all, it's just a principle which epistemologists have made up, a faulty one. And so we have to proceed in a different direction to understand what "true" really means.

Waves do not have the ocean and the ocean does not have the waves. — Rich

It's profoundly obvious, that the ocean does have waves, and not vise versa. The ocean is a body of water, and that water may or may not be waving, so waving is a property of that water. Water is the substance wave is the property.

They are one and the same. It all depends upon on how one views it. There is an ocean. There are the waves. There is the ocean. It is a continuous, inseparable whole. I do not observe any gaps anywhere. — Rich

It is a simple issue to solve. Simply ask yourself, can you imagine a body of water without waves, and the answer is yes. Then, can you imagine a wave without an underlying substance which is waving, and the answer is no. Some may insist that light is a wave without a substance which is waving, but this only results in confusion. Either we release the notion that light is waves, and recognize light as particles, or we determine the medium in which the waves exist. But to say that light is waves without substance is nonsense.

I had understood that this demonstration was much the same as that used to show that individuation requires substance. — Banno

You are just confusing me now. You were talking about essences, now individuation and substance. My point has to do with substance, that's for sure, but not necessarily individuation. The point was to recognize the need to assume substance in order to understand the reality of existence. So for example when you look up and see blue, you recognize the need to assume "the sky" which is blue, in order to understand that particualr occurrence of blue. Likewise, when we see a living body, we need to assume "the soul" in order to understand that occurrence of a living body.

I apologise for mischaracterising you. Please, show me the logical demonstration you mention. — Banno

I accept the apology, and will demonstrate the logic. The actual physical evidence which is needed to justify the first premise, you will have to perform yourself, because it is within you. It is well suited to meditation, so position yourself such that you are seated and unmoving. Take notice of the passing of time, perhaps by listening to something, or recognizing your own breathing. After a while you will produce the desire to move some part of your body, perhaps due to some discomfort, or in this case, just to get on with the physical part of the demonstration. So let's say that you make up your mind to move your hand. You are not moving your hand just yet though, you simply recognize that it's something which needs to be done. You wait, and wait some more, recognizing that as you wait, time is passing. Now you move your hand. The cause of you moving your hand is not something external to you, nor is the moving of your hand a random act so it is clearly caused.

So this is the first premise. There is cause of movement of parts of your body which is not something external to your body, but it is properly a "cause" in the sense that the movement is not random. The second premise is that any living body is describable as parts which are moving in this way, described by the first premise. The conclusion is that this cause of movement is the cause of the living body.

So we can say that there is a cause of existence of the living body which is not external to the living body, but nevertheless precedes the existence of the body, as its cause. This is what is called 'the soul", and as the cause of existence of the living body it is what substantiates the existence of the living body as an entity, a unified thing. As the cause of it, it necessarily exists prior in time to the living body. The puzzle is, how is it possible that the soul is independent from the body in the temporal sense, (as prior to it), but not independent from the body in the spatial sense (as a cause internal to the body). But the soul is not necessarily internal to a body, this is just how it appears to us, as an internal cause. Once we apprehend that this is merely how the soul appears to us, as an internal cause (internal being the soul's spatial manifestation), and not necessarily the full extend of being that the soul has, accepting the reality of non-spatial being as the completion or perfection of the soul, then we are free to speculate about things like reincarnation.

Less complicated. "Third door on the right," requires consideration and rejection of other doors, acceptance of the right door, and the question (which does not cease to be a question, even when answered, and certainly not when answered provisionally), "Is this the right door?" Any question of material existence is out-of-court. If you mean exists as ideas, that's iffy, because my idea of a possible world is no possible world, it is merely my idea of a possible world. In this case, "my idea of a possible world" is a noun substantive and cannot be broken into pieces without destroying the original meaning. — tim wood

Interpretation of "third door on the right" begins with the assumption that there is a correct door signified.
That produces as you say, the question, "is this the right door?". Possibilities enter the interpretation. The hallway with doors might have two ends to enter from, for example. My point about the "existence" of these "possibilities" is that they are produced, created by, the interpreting mind. But if the interpreting mind assumes a correct interpretation, these possibilities are related to that assumption as a possibility that it is the correct one.

To resolve the issue of possibilities, the interpreter must consult further information. Keeping in mind that there must be a correct interpretation, the interpreter consults the context. The assumption of a correct interpretation inclines one to consult context. Without context, "third door on the right" could refer to any door, so we assume that "correct" is determined by the perspective of the speaker. By "context", and "perspective of the speaker", I mean what is going on within the mind of the speaker, not the speaker's environment. So if you are at one end of the hall, and I am at the other, and you say to me "third door on the right", I will assume that you are giving me information to be interpreted from my perspective, though you would more likely say "third door on your right" to make things more clear.

For a guess. For present purpose it's enough note there's an act of interpretation. In the sense you argue, all interpretation is faulty; which is to say, exactly, that all interpretation is interpretation. In short, I do not think we're here much concerned with quality of interpretation. — tim wood

But what is key, is the assumption that there is a correct interpretation. To say that all interpretation is somewhat faulty, is just a reflection on how we approach certainty. We never achieve absolute certainty, and we know that, but this does not prevent us from saying "I am certain". So, we have confidence in our interpretation, despite the fact that we know "all interpretation is faulty", as you say. This confidence produces certitude and certainty. The "quality of interpretation" is of the utmost importance, because this is what produces certainty, confidence that the "correct interpretation" has been obtained.

As I indicated, we can abandon the assumption of "correct interpretation" but this brings us to a completely different level of uncertainty.

I can see an argument in favor, but at the expense of being able to talk about reality, because it's all interpretation. We're back to my question: Is this the substance of your argument, that everything is interpretation? Or not? — tim wood

The issue is the assumption of "correct interpretation". In our approach to reality, there is no question in my mind, that we are interpreting reality, that's what sensing, perceiving, and apprehending is. The question is whether reality consists of a kind of substance or something like that, which can ground our assumptions of a correct interpretation. If not, then nothing grounds our possibilities. There is no such thing as having a high probability of having the correct interpretation, if there is no such thing as the correct interpretation.

In the case of interpreting the sentence, we turn to the context, which is what the author meant, to ground the assumption of a correct interpretation. In the case of interpreting reality, what is the "context" which we should consult? In reality, the context we use is the spatial temporal context. So when I look down the hallway for the "third door on the right", I assume certain fixed spatial relations between the doors, and the assumption of these fixed relations validates my assumption that there is a correct interpretation of what is in front of me. When we add time into the context there doesn't seem to be "fixed" relations, and context becomes extremely complex, such that we might give up on the notion of fixed relations. If we do, then we may give up on the notion of "correct interpretation" of reality as well.

Too many unexamined presuppositions. Let's try this. You encounter a tree - no mystery or confusion, it's a tree. For me, it's a tree. For you its an act of interpretation. Question, why don't you "interpret" it as a car? — tim wood

I don't interpret the tree as a car, because I learned when I was young, and consequently my habit, is to call it a tree. I don't see the point you're trying to make, someone might call it a bush or a shrub, in different languages they would call it by things other than "tree".

And why would you say that there is no such thing as the way the world is, because it's continually changing? If your idea is that the world does not change, then I can see where you have a problem, but why have that idea? What compels you to it? — tim wood

As I said, the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is supported by the assumption that there is a "context". We assume that we can produce a correct interpretation by putting the thing being interpreted into the appropriate context. In the case of interpreting reality, the context is time and space. The spatial context alone is very simple, "third door on the right", is direct and straight forward. But if in time, I move to the other end of the hall, "third door on the right" means something completely different.

So if your context is supposed to be "the way that the world is", wouldn't this require determining a particular point in time? But what good would this do for grounding your interpretation of reality, when there is a countless number of points in time which could be chosen?

Hi MU. If your post, that I've spread out here, is an argument, would you please append to this a clear statement of your conclusion, if it isn't included above. I suspect your argument is a piece of extended irony, intended to give some folks a rash. — tim wood

That was a little summary of what we had been discussing earlier in the thread. Essentially, I was arguing that "correct interpretation" is dependent on accurate definitions. The point I was trying to make, in the last post, is that if we go this route, which opposes truth to falsity by definition, then we can go no further in our enquiry into truth, because "true" is defined as being necessarily opposed to "false", and this would form the complete essence of "true" and therefore truth. The necessity created by that definition would disallow that truth is anything other than this.

What I am trying to impress upon some members of this discussion who are inclined to insist that true is opposed with false, is that we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity. When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. So to oppose "true" with "false" with that form of necessity, is a type of ideal, which exists in theory, but it isn't practical. Therefore it fails to provide us with a practical understanding of truth.

I would invite you to consider the Toy Story example I presented earlier. Buzz and Woody actually mean exactly the same thing by the word "flying" and falling, with or without style, is excluded from that meaning. Buzz applies the word to events Woody doesn't only because Buzz has a mistaken belief that these are cases of what he and Woody agree is flying. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't quite understand this example. It is clear to me that Buzz and Woody don't mean the same thing with the word "flying". On what basis do you assume that they do?

So it is with your treatment of the word "knowledge." — Srap Tasmaner

And this is what we find with the word "knowledge", we actually mean different things when we use it. In theory, one says "knowledge excludes falsity". This becomes a premise for deductive logic, and all kinds of epistemological conclusions may follow. In practise though, "knowledge" does not exclude falsity. When we use "knowledge" we believe that falsity has been excluded, but this belief does not necessitate that falsity has actually been excluded. So the meaning of the word "knowledge" is different for the epistemologist who claims that falsity is necessarily excluded from knowledge, and for the average user of the word who recognizes that knowledge is an ever changing, evolving thing, and some knowledge might later be proven to be false.

The invariance we pick out with words is actually there. We have words like "leaf" in our language because leaves are relatively persistent. Even in death, they are still leaves for quite a while before they finally decay enough for us to stop calling them leaves. That boundary is vague and nevertheless useful and effective. What leaves never do is spontaneously turn into mushrooms or fruits or rocks. — Srap Tasmaner

All right, I'm on board with this idea, let's go with it and see where it leads. Let's say that there is real invariance, and this is what our words refer to. Can we call this invariance "spatial relations which are maintained for a period of time"? Our senses might have evolved to pick out some of these invariances, allowing us to identify things. However, our senses are vary sharp, and what they seem to really pick out is changes. So hearing for example, is picking out changes in the air. Smelling and tasting is detecting certain changes as well. Even with sight, what attracts our attention, is changes. But with sight, we can see that this invariance which you refer to forms a background, upon which we detect changes.

So invariance is a type of background, perhaps it's the context, within which, changes are occurring. So as I was saying to tim wood, when we interpret reality (sense, perceive, and apprehend it), the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is validated by reference to a broader context. This is the background invariance. The background invariance provided the assumption of something "fixed". The invariance must be grounded as real though, or else our interpretation will not be, and this involves how we relate to space and time.

Believe it or not, "S knows that P" is just an ordinary piece of Anglo-American philosophical shop talk. It is not, for instance, itself a theory of knowledge. You seem to be under the impression that it is. You seem to think it amounts to a claim that knowledge is knowledge of propositions being true, or assenting to them, or holding them true, or whatever. This little shorthand is no such theory; if any claim is made in using this schema, it is only that it is reasonable for us to describe some examples of people knowing things in this way. (And that it can be distinguished from things like knowing how to ride a bike, knowing John Kennedy, knowing the way to San José.) — Srap Tasmaner

I have only responded to how "S knows that P" has been used in this thread. It is quite clear that P stands for a proposition. If your claim is that "S knows that P" may be used in many different ways from this, that fact is irrelevant, because you are just taking "S knows that P" out of the context from which it was used here, then basing your defence in this unrelated usage.

We know from Kripke and friends that essences are logical rubbish.

So it is reasonable to reject the idea that it is an essence or soul that is reincarnated. Hence one can reject ↪Metaphysician Undercover — Banno

I never said, or implied that a soul is an essence. I don't know where you got that idea, or even what you mean by "essence" in this context. Those are not my words at all.

What I said is that we can infer from logical demonstrations, that when there is a living body, there must be something which has that body, and this is what we call the soul. The soul has a body in the same sense that a subject has the property attributed in predication. So, where there exists a property, there must be something which has that property. And since the living body is a property, there must be something (a soul) which has that property.

"S knows that P" is just an informal schema. It is a stand-in for a proposition formed by concatenating the name of a subject, the phrase " knows that " and a proposition. — Srap Tasmaner

You call this "informal", but it is not informal, because P stands for "proposition" and "proposition" signifies something formal. If we remove the formal reference, we say "S knows that A", where "A" signifies "what" S knows. See the difference? In the one case "A" signifies what is known by the subject, and in the other case P signifies a proposition. So A refers directly to what S knows whereas P refers to a bunch of words which themselves signify what is known. To confuse these two is category error.

Let's say that S stands for a particular subject, and P stands for a particular proposition. S is Bob, and P is "the sky is blue". Now "Bob" refers to a particular individual, and "the sky is blue" refers to a particular state of affairs. What purpose does "that" serve? Bob knows the sky is blue, or, Bob knows that the sky is blue?

When we say "Bob knows the sky is blue", what is meant is "Bob knows that the sky is blue", not "Bob knows this proposition "the sky is blue'". If we add "that", to say "Bob knows that the sky is blue", what we are saying is Bob knows the proposition "the sky is blue", as true. What is added then, by adding "that", is that "the sky is blue" now signifies a proposition which is designated as true, instead of a state of affairs. So by adding "that" to "knows", such that we say "knows that", we change what follows (the sky is blue), from signifying a state of affairs to signifying a proposition.

S knows that P" is also informal in the sense that it is designedly neutral on what sorts of things S and P are -- remember, there is no specified domain of discourse -- except that they would be considered appropriate on the LHS and the RHS of " knows that ". — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, if "S knows that P" is informal, and says nothing about what S and P are, can we use S and P in the normal way? Let's say S stands for subject and P stands for predicate. When you say S knows that P, what you are really saying is that this proposition P, is attributed to this subject S. Now that we have the category error worked out, we can remove "that" as redundant, and just say S knows P, so that P represents a proposition predicated of S, as knowledge which S has, like any object has properties. S knows P is predication. Using the ancient Parmenidean equation, "Being is Knowing", therefore S is P.

Do you agree that, assuming sincerity in speech, that calling a statement "true" displays belief that the statement is true(corresponds to reality, if you like)? — creativesoul

Yes, there is a relationship between sincerity and truth, so when we say "that one speaks the truth", or "what has been said is true", sincerity is necessarily implied. "Sincerity" being the broader term, does not necessarily imply truth, because we use "sincere" in some other ways.. So "sincerity" in this case signifies that the person saying "true" means true according to that person's understanding of the word. If that person understands "true" as "corresponds to reality", then this is what the person means.

Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so? — creativesoul

I went through this earlier in the thread with tim woods. It had occurred to me that the essence of truth was to be found in definition. A definition is not itself false, because it must be judged as such, by comparing it to reality, and reality is inductive principles drawn from common usage. So if it is not an acceptable definition according to inductive conclusions, one might try to argue that it is "false". But since usage varies and changes, these inductive principles cannot rule out any possible uses or definitions as impossible, so none can accurately be said to be false. If definitions are the type of thing which cannot be false, and truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we have correspondence between truth and definition. That is, if one is assuming that truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we find truth as corresponding to definition.

If existence alone makes something meaningful, then it is not the case that meaning depends upon interpretation and judgment, for existence doesn't require either. — creativesoul

Existence, meaning, and things like this, are attributes, properties which are predicated of a subject. But the act of predication requires a subject. Without the subject, there is no existence, or meaning, because these words refer to how subjects describe their environment. There is nothing illogical about saying that all existing things are meaningful, this just makes "meaning" the more general category from "existing", so that all existing things are meaningful, and it is still possible that non-existing things may be meaningful as well.

And...

Meaningless marks exist. — creativesoul

That is a claim you make, but I don't see how you could ever justify this claim. Just by referring to these marks here, you have made them meaningful. So any such claim, that something meaningless exists, is self-refuting. You have referred to the meaningless thing, making it meaningful. "Existing" is an assumption made by a subject, and one cannot make the assumption without giving meaning to that thing referred to as existing. In reality, what you are attempting to do here is refer to non-existent things, and this just demonstrates that meaning is the more general term than existing, because we can refer to non-existing things, such that they have meaning as well as existing things.

And yes, thought/belief and statements thereof come through a subject, however the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. — creativesoul

I would say that this is a dubious premise, to say that the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. We should leave this one as something which can never be demonstrated, and therefore not a sound premise.

We(mankind) have had plenty of historical agreements as to what constituted being true, and have been wrong. We've later found out that that which we once thought/believed and agreed was true, was not. Rather much of what we thought/believed was true was false. Truth cannot be false. Agreement about what is true can be. Therefore, agreement is insufficient for truth. — creativesoul

I agree with the first part of this, that we are sometimes mistaken in what we believe. I don't agree with the second part. When I claim X is true, and I believe it, I am referring to the object, what I believe, as having the property of being true. And other people use "true" in this way as well. It may be the case, that later in time it is demonstrated that this object does not have the property of being true, and I respect this fact, but that does not prevent me, or others from using "true" in this way, and this being an acceptable way of using "true". Therefore, what "true" refers to, in actual usage (and what we should adhere to for our definition, if we wish to maintain accuracy), is not the property described as "impossible to be false". So your statement "truth cannot be false" is inconsistent with reality, because when we use the word "true" we still allow the possibility of falsity. You want to define "truth" in a way which is inconsistent with reality.

Now you are simply appealing to authority. Some famous philosopher said it, therefore it must be true... It seems to me that you've ran out arguments, so I'm out. — Fafner

Ha, ha, that's funny. Either I believe a famous philosopher whose work has stood the test of time, whose arguments are well explained and make sense, and he remains an authority today, or I believe Fafner with the contrary opinion. There's something to be said for authority, don't you think?

This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings. — tim wood

This is where we have to proceed with caution, and not jump to conclusions. You say this as if there are possible meanings, in existence, like possible worlds in existence, but if the interpreter chooses from possible meanings, these possible meanings are produced within the interpreter's mind, just like possible worlds are produced by the logician's propositions.

When an interpreter chooses a meaning, one does so on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. The assumption of a correct meaning is sometimes justified as what the author meant. However, sometime the author might speak intentionally ambiguously, as is often the case in poetry. Furthermore, there is often vagueness within the author's mind as to exactly what one's intentions are, as one's intention are often not completely clear to oneself.

The nature of intention is such that it is often something vague in the background, so if this is extended to "what was meant" by the author, there may not be such a thing as the correct meaning, what was meant. This may cast doubt on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. If this doubt seeps into the interpreter's act of choosing from possible meanings, then the assumption that there is a correct meaning is removed from the interpreter's guiding principles. The selection of possible meanings is produced by the interpreter's mind, and the meaning which is chosen (as the correct choice) is the one which is consistent with the intentions of the interpreter. We may argue that this is faulty interpretation.

The claim that a text is understood means exactly that the author has been understood (although, to be sure, not always as the author expected!), and nothing else. — tim wood

Yes, this is the result. One claims to have understood the author, but this is based on how one interprets the meaning. Has that individual striven to understand "the correct meaning", assuming that the author intends something, or has the interpreter chosen meaning based on what is appealing to oneself. As you say, much interpretation is done fast, and may be near a subconscious level. So in most interpretation there is degrees of each, considering the author's intentions, and the influence of the interpreter's intention, which enter in. We cannot avoid interpreting according to how we've learned to understand the particular words in use, but if we approach an author with an interpretation, the author might very well say, "that's not what I meant". So it is our due diligence to pay respect to the way that the author uses words, and if it appears to be a way which one is not familiar with, effort must be taken to understand that way.

Now this second "interpretation" is a problem, maybe the problem. It simply is not the same as the first "interpretation." There's a better word: perception. But I think it's a mistake to play word games, here. You have to decide whether you "interpret" reality, or if you perceive it. That is, if reality is a text, you can - one supposes must - interpret it. But the consequence of its being a text is that in itself it has nothing on which to ground it as (a) reality - there is no "it," it's all interpretation! — tim wood

Yes, this is definitely where the problem lies. When we interpret a text, we always maintain within our minds, or deeper at the subconscious level, that what we are getting out of it must be guided by the assumption that the author intended something, this is what is meant, the assumption of a meaning of the text . So we don't interpret in any willy-nilly way because we are assuming that there is a correct way. This we learn as a child, learning a language.

When we interpret reality, what grounds the assumption of a correct way? And of course we have perception to provide this for us. But what is perception other than a much more general form of interpretation? So take your example of looking at a photograph. When we learn to read, or to speak, by paying attention to what others are saying, we are learning to focus on a very particular aspect of our environment. Using language requires that we focus on this very small portion of what is going on around us. Perception in general involves this same type of focus. That other life forms perceive things in very different ways, indicates that they have evolved to focus on their environment in different ways from us. We can say that there are aspects of the environment which prove to be important to us, we evolve to focus on them. As a child we learn to focus on language use because it is important. And, living creatures have evolved ( therefore learned) to focus on particular aspects of their environment which are important, and this is perception.

Now the issue, where the problem lies, is what guides us towards the "correct" interpretation of reality. In the case of language use, we are guided by the assumption that there is something meant, a definite meaning, given by the author. In the case of interpreting reality, we are not guided by this assumption, so we produce the assumption that there is a way that reality "is", a type of logical basis, the law of identity. The problem is that this "the way that the world is" is inconsistent with the way that the world reveals itself to us through our senses. The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is".

You don't see it, but what you said here actually proves my point. If the world appears to you in a certain way, then it is an objective fact that the world is either the way that it appears to you, or that it isn't. So having a mere appearance of reality already makes your appearance objectively true or false. So for example if you have an appearance of seeing a cat on the sofa, then it is either objectively true that there's a cat on the sofa, or objectively false. — Fafner

No, it is not an objective fact that either the world is this way, or it is not this way. The concept of "the world" and the existence of the world, as understood by human beings, is supported by the concept of matter. Aristotle demonstrated that matter is necessarily exempt from the law of excluded middle, which you are employing to produce your so-called "objective fact". This refutes your argument.

My definition merely states the conditional that if someone knows that P, then P is a fact. If P is not the case, then by definition the subject cannot known that P (and it doesn't matter if he himself is aware of this). I'm not claiming that we actually know the facts, it is only a definition of what it means to know something. — Fafner

I addressed the problem with this phrase "knows that P" in my last post to Srap. Your use involves a category error.

Do you mean to say that under the same scheme of interpretation, some statement P could be false and someone know that P? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes that is correct. We have to account for the way that the word is used, when we define it. Things which we refer to as "knowledge", often turn out later to have been wrong. Many of the things which we know, are actually false, despite the fact that we claim to know them, and they are referred to as knowledge. The entire body of knowledge consists of things which may later be determined as false. So, we must look at that thing which we are calling by the name "knowledge", analyze that thing, and produce our definitions and descriptions accordingly. Doesn't it seem kind of ridiculous to say that what is essential to knowledge, is that knowledge excludes falsity, when this is not supported by the evidence, the evidence being the knowledge that exists? It's faulty inductive reasoning to say that everything which is known must be true, when clearly many things which are known are not true.

Is it possible for someone to know that I am at work today, interpreting "I am at work today" the same way I interpret it -- "I" referring to me, and so on -- an interpretation under which it is false? — Srap Tasmaner

The issue is what we are referring to with the word "know", what we are claiming when we claim to know. We do not claim absolute certainty with no possibility of being wrong. Often when I claim to know something, I end up being wrong. So we can not set up as a premise, for a logical argument, that to know something is to exclude the possibility of falsity. This would be a false premise, because it doesn't represent "know' in the way that it is normally used nor does it represent the thing referred to when we use "know". It is a premise based in faulty inductive reasoning, a false premise.

Clearly, it cannot be the case that all of these claims are true. — creativesoul

I don't see why not. Point to a place where you see inconsistency and I'll explain how you've misinterpreted what I said.

Doing that would require re-categorizing meaning into different kinds. — creativesoul

Until we have agreement, and understand each other on what meaning is, I see no point in trying to make categories. First we must clearly define what we are categorizing.

have already presented you a case, based upon my framework, which you haven't actually considered in light of the framework itself. Rather than doing that, you continue to apply a different framework to the words I'm using. — creativesoul

Right, we have little agreement or understanding of each others framework. "Meaning" seems to be the stumbling point. I suggest that we could continue in discussion, but we need to concentrate specifically on what is meaning.

The above conflates calling something "true" and truth. That is, it conflates belief(statements thereof) and truth. Granting all the rest, it would follow that calling something "true" is subjective. — creativesoul

OK, now we've gone outside of what I suggested, concentrating on meaning, but I'll make a reply to this, trying to concentrate on meaning. When we call something true, "true" has meaning, it refers to something. What it refers to is something subjective (of the subject). I think that "truth" is a concept we have, agreement between us, or some sort of informal convention, of what it means to be true, so that when different people call something "true", there is consistency between them as to what is meant by "true", because of this unofficial agreement to use the word in the same way. And this is what we call "truth", our agreement as to what constitutes being true. You say that this is "correspondence", and many agree with you, but not everyone. For those who agree with you, truth is correspondence, and they will use "true" accordingly.

Sorry, I can't figure out where you demonstrated this. Would you mind linking the post or posts? — Srap Tasmaner

Are you ready to read? It's a series of arguments started at the beginning of the thread. It is complex arguments, because there are two sides of truth, as correspondence, represented lately by Fafner's (a) and (b). I am still repeating those same arguments now. They are not well understood by the other members, so repetition is necessary. I suggest starting from the beginning.

Here's a summary. There is a sentence, belief, or some such thing which is said to be true. Whether or not that sentence, or belief is true, is dependent on the meaning of it, and this is interpretation, which is "of the subject", subjective. On the other side, there is a supposed reality which the meaning corresponds with. But when we judge something as "true" we judge it according to how this reality appears to us, and this is also an interpretation, subjective. Therefore truth is entirely "of the subject", a property of knowledge. There cannot be truth outside of knowledge.

Sure, you can assume here anything you want about interpretation, but it doesn't matter because you have (b) as well that grounds its objective status. — Fafner

We've been through this already, your (b) is covered by the other argument which you have not addressed. All we have to refer to, as "the way which the world is", is how the world appears to us. This is our interpretation of the supposed objective reality. And how the world appears to us, may or may not be a true representation of the way which the world is. Both sides, (a) and (b) are subjective.

When we apply the word "true", use the word to say that something is true, the (b) side of the correspondence is not "the way that the world is" but "how the world appears to us". So (b) does not ground the objective status of "true" when we commonly use the word, it refers to our interpretation of reality. If you insist that we can only use the word "true" when how the world appears to us is the way that the world is, then we can never use the word, because all we have is how the world appears to us. This leaves the word "true" useless.

However, we do clearly use the word, and when it is used, (b) does not ground the objective status of truth, because it refers to how the world appears to us, not how the world is, and this is interpretation. Your claim that (b) does objectify , relates to a definition of "truth" which renders the word "true" unusable.

You just assume that knowledge (in my sense) is impossible without an argument. You wrote: "Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact" - I don't accept this and I don't see any argument to support this claim. — Fafner

See, you just dismissed the argument, as if it were irrelevant. We already agreed that known fact is based in how the world appears to us, and therefore it may or may not be as the world is. Now you've gone back to claiming that "known fact" is necessarily the way that the world is. Clearly this is not the case, because what is referred to as known fact is often proven wrong.

You've accepted that the reality of "known fact", as we use it, is grounded in the way that the world appears to us. However you assume that there is a different sort of "known fact" which is grounded in the way that the world is. But they are both the same name, with the same referent any time "known fact" is used, the way that the world appears to us. When looking at two things called known fact, how do you propose to distinguish whether it's your special sort of "known fact" which cannot ever be proven to have been wrong because it refers to the way that the world is, from the "known fact" of common usage which includes things that could be later proven wrong.

If you have no way to identify facts which are impossible to ever be proven wrong (known with absolute certainty), from those which may be proven wrong, then your claim is unfounded. Furthermore, if it is as you seem to believe, that "known fact" should only be used to refer to things which are known with absolute certainty, then "known fact" is rendered useless.

I'm saying you've argued that meaning is dependent upon... and truth is dependent upon... and interpretation is dependent upon...

You should've been arguing that some meaning, and some truth, and some... — creativesoul

No, because that's not what I mean, what I mean is that all instances of being true are dependent on interpretation, not some. You keep insisting on "some", but fail to give me any examples of an instance of being true which does not involve interpretation. If you could, I'd have to switch to "some", and this would refute my argument, which is an argument of essences, what is essential to truth.

So then never-mind all of the stuff(arguments from contingency) you've been saying heretofore?

That settles it now doesn't it?

I pointed out long ago that you were failing to properly quantify your arguments. If you believe all the stuff you've been writing about the existential contingency regarding meaningful statements, and this new revelation directly above, then I suggest you reconcile these claims by virtue of properly quantifying and categorizing the kinds of things that can be and/or are meaningful, and the kinds of meaning that apply to these things. — creativesoul

I really don't know what you mean. What is "quantify your arguments"? Are you suggesting mathematics? What is "existential contingency"? And how is my statement not consistent with what I said before? What do you mean by "quantifying and categorizing the kinds of things that can be and/or are meaningful"? Why is any of this relevant? You seem to be writing random nonsense.

The sentence "extraterrestrial life exist" is true (if it is true) because a) in English the sentence means what it means (this is the part concerning subjects) — Fafner

The sentence means what it means, without being interpreted? I give up.

So it is perfectly possible that a sentence is true without anyone knowing it, because it is plain that many sentences that we don't know their truth still make sense, meaning that we already understand what would it take for them to be either true or false without knowing what is actually case. — Fafner

The sentence only makes sense to a person interpreting it. Without a person interpreting it, it makes no sense, and therefore cannot be true.

This only shows that the 'known fact' wasn't really a known fact, but was merely believed to be a known fact. These are two different things on my understanding of knowledge. — Fafner

We can't tell the difference between a known fact, and something believed to be a known fact, because they both appear to be known facts. So we call them both known facts. Since we can't distinguish between a known fact and what appears to be a known fact, or just believed to be a known fact, then it cannot be incorrect to call the thing which is believed to be known fact, by this name, "known fact", unless you want to ban the use of "known fact". Therefore your definition of "known fact" is untenable, rendering it always incorrect to use "known fact", because we would never know whether it is a known fact or not. However, if it is acceptable to refer to the thing which appears to be a known fact, as "known fact", then your definition is wrong. So your concept of "known fact" is actually useless.

Everyone agrees that if someone knows that P, then P is true. (Someone knowing that P is a sufficient condition for P being true.) — Srap Tasmaner

No, I do not agree to that. As per the example of knowing-how, not all knowledge entails truth. Therefore if someone knows that P, this does not mean P is true. We must determine what "that P" means, to see if this is a truth or not. Otherwise, "true" is redundant and meaningless. It only comes about, that "knowing that P" is a sufficient condition for P being true, if you define "knowing that" in a particular way, which supports this. I don't think we've properly determined what "that P" means, in order to jump to this conclusion.

But now this is the converse: if P is true, then someone knows that P. (Someone knowing that P is a necessary condition for P being true.) Its contrapositive is that if no one knows that P, then P is false. — Srap Tasmaner

The arguments I produced earlier demonstrate that it is necessary for someone to know P, in order for P to be true. But "knowing P" is not equated with "P is true", knowing P is a necessary condition for P is true. So it does not follow that not knowing P leaves P as false. The problem you refer to is created by your introduction of the phrase "knowing that P". The meaning of this phrase really needs to be justified.

Let's say P = "the dog is wet". And let's say someone knows that the dog is wet. But this is not "knowing that P", because P signifies the phrase, the words, "the dog is wet". What the person knows, is that the dog is wet. So when you propose that the person "knows that P", you commit a category error, because what the person knows is a particular instance of knowledge, and P stands for a proposition. You say, "a person knows that a proposition", and this is really nonsense. The problem you point to is the result of this category error, the very mistake which Michael was trying to explain to TS.

If you believe that P signifies the meaning of the words, not the words themselves, then "P" signifies that the dog is wet, and "that P" would signify that that the dog is wet. And this is nonsense, so clearly "P" signifies the words, and your argument suffers category error.

I already explained this. Something can be true without anyone knowing it (e.g., my example of extraterrestrial life), so plainly true and knowledge are not the same thing. — Fafner

Fafner, we've been through this already, it took us days to get agreement. Have you lost your memory? Are we back to square one? I addressed your example, "extraterrestrial life" requires interpretation, and this requires a subject. It cannot be true without anyone knowing it.

No it isn't. Knowledge is a relation between a subject and the known fact. It's not merely a state or a property of a subject taken by itself. If you know that P, then P must be true. — Fafner

And we've been through this. "Known fact" (objective knowledge), is what is justified, agreed upon by many subjects. Known fact is not necessarily true. When there is agreement (correspondence) between what the subject believes, and known fact (what is justified or agreed upon by the multitudes), this does not necessitate that what the subject knows is true. There are many examples of when "known fact" gets proven wrong.

Knowledge has this form: For some subject S and some proposition P, S knows that P.
Truth has this form: For some proposition P, P is true. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, let's go with this then. Can you explain what makes P true, other than S knows that P is true? In other words S knows that P is the condition for P being true. The argument I produced, if you followed it, demonstrates that P is true if S knows that P is true, and nothing further about being true. have you something to add? Further, I would say that not all knowledge consists of things which are true (as knowing-how is distinct for example), being true is a special type of knowledge.

It does not follow from there being an order to things, that there is meaning. As if order is prima facie evidence of meaning. — creativesoul

As I explained earlier, if one judges something as meaningful, there is meaning there. That there is not actually meaning there is an assertion that the first person is wrong, and needs to be justified. It cannot be justified because the second person does not perceive exactly what the first does. The second has a different perspective and cannot perceive all that the first does. Therefore not even order is required for meaning, it could be anything which one judges as meaningful. If it is judged as meaningful by any person, it necessarily is so. The introduction of "order" is irrelevant. In my opinion, if it exists, it is meaningful.

If it is the case that meaning is dependent on interpretation, then there can be no meaning without thought/belief. Interpretation is existentially contingent upon thought/belief. Thus, there is no meaning without an agent. If there is no meaning without an agent, one could not be first attributing meaning to something already meaningful. — creativesoul

My argument was that the judgement "that something is meaningful" is dependent on interpretation, because this is what you claimed was necessary for truth of a proposition, "that it is meaningful". That's why I said the representation of my argument as "meaning is dependent on interpretation" is a dreadful representation". If I wrote it that way, at one point, it was a mistake, and not what I meant, and I apologize for misleading you, but that's why I produced what I really meant, in that post, and what I stated in the first place, in that post.

So I do not assert that there is no meaning without an agent, what I assert is that there is no judgement as to whether or not something is meaningful, without an agent.

Do you realize you never actually addressed my statement above, but just responded with a question? — Thanatos Sand

I started with a question as a preamble, then proceeded with a reply to your question. We can validly assume the existence of something without being capable of answering the questions concerning that thing, which you ask. And I provided an example, gravity. Your questions are irrelevant to the point I was making.

To me it seems more sensible to think of the soul as 'having a body'; the soul is not "had", rather it is the having, so to speak. — John

Right, I agree, that was the point I was trying to make.

I see it as being unable to speak of - define - the generalization (except generally, of course) without resort to the particular. It seems to me that reduces "truth" to a shorthand that refers to something that truth isn't, and that beyond that "truth" has no meaning at all. Maybe this is a Socratic aporia: we look into the heart of a thing and are thrown back with some violence. — tim wood

It only "refers to something that truth isn't", because of misconception. If we look at the particular instances of being true, and form a generalization, and this generalization is inconsistent with the common concept of "truth", then there is misunderstanding. Either the common concept of truth is a misconception, or the particular instances of being true which we referred to, are not actually instances of being true. For example, if you look at particular examples of horses, things which are commonly referred to by "horse", and we create a generalization, and then compare this to the biological concept of "horse", and find that there is a serious inconsistency between the two, we would assume that there is some sort of misconception going on.

I'd be happier if you had included the distinction between the a priori and contingently true. One is demonstrated, the other hermeneutic, a matter of persuasion. I assume you have a firm grasp of the difference.... But I take your point. The thing isn't green except as we agree it's green, whence the objectiveness of green. — tim wood

I do not understand this type of distinction at all, it has never made sense to me, as the two categories seem to reduce into each other. One is demonstrated, the other a matter of persuasion? Isn't demonstration a form of persuasion?

Here that distinction matters. I feel no need to assume eternal concepts, nor an eternal mind to maintain their being. 2+2=4 means nothing at all, except as and until someone has a use for it, on which occasion I trust it will always be so and not otherwise. That is, I create contingent truths; I merely find and recognize the a priori. — tim wood

So I don't understand this at all. What do you mean when you say that you "find and recognize the a priori"? To recognize implies prior identification. When you "find" an a priori concept, is it through recognition, meaning that you have previously identified it? How would you identify it in the first instance?

Short answer, with the contingent, yes; with the a priori, no. Proof is immediate: the contingent could be false; the necessarily so, cannot not be so. — tim wood

The a priori you say is necessarily true. But I don't see that anything could truly qualify as a priori. That's where I'm at. Perhaps you could explain this. The only time I can conceive of something that is "necessarily so", is to use "necessary" in the sense of "needed for a specific purpose". I need food to survive, I need a car to drive, etc.. But to use "necessary" in the sense of "impossible that there is a mistake in my thinking", doesn't seem realistic.

Maybe here we catch a glimpse of truth, a gleam of it. Let's go back to green. Green is certainly subjective and a matter of agreement. But spectral analysis isn't. If we elect to denominate the results of the analysis "green," then that green is objective - not a quality of what we think and agree about, instead a recognition of something that is so (and that as it is, it cannot be otherwise). — tim wood

All you have done here is decided to arbitrarily choose a particular range of the spectrum, and designate this as "green". Do you not see this as equally subjective? It's still a matter of agreement, or indoctrination.

If you agree so far, do you care to assay a new definition of truth? — tim wood

I don't think I'm prepared for that. It should be evident from what I've said, that I believe there is misconception concerning truth. To rectify this, we must thoroughly analyze instances where people
use "true" to say "this is true", etc.. It is already evident that there is inconsistency between what people refer to as being true, and what people say truth is. Either there is misconception in what people believe "truth" means, or there is misconception in the people who use "true" to refer to things, or both. I do not believe that the dialectic here has progressed far enough to work this problem out.

In this case your argument is really about knowledge and not truth (which are different topics), so it was false advertisement all along. — Fafner

If this is the case, then could you explain to me how you categorize both knowledge and truth, to maintain this separation which you are inclined to adhere to.

And also, your argument doesn't really prove that we don't know the objective reality either. — Fafner

You're correct here, I took this as a premise. If you want proof of this premise I would have to proceed to a different argument. That argument is not difficult though. "Objective reality" refers to a reality which is independent of the thinking subject. Knowledge is the property of the thinking subject. If we knew a reality which was independent from thinking subjects (objective reality), this would be a reality in which knowledge is impossible because there would be no thinking subjects. Therefore it is impossible that we know the objective reality. In other words, it is impossible to exclude the thinking subject from knowledge, or else there would be no knowledge. But this is what is required to know the objective reality (reality without the subject), something which is impossible.

Every instance when meaning is first attributed. — creativesoul

This is very problematic. When meaning is "first attributed" it is rarely if ever, most likely never, a case of correspondence (truth). You hear a sound for the first time, it is non-random, exhibiting some form of order, therefore meaningful, so you attribute meaning. You haven't the vaguest idea of what that sound corresponds to, yet you know it is meaningful.

Your claim here is way of base. How do you suppose that the instance "when meaning is first attributed" is an instance of correspondence without meaning. If meaning is attributed, then there is meaning. I know you insist that this attribution could be mistaken, but even if I allow your proposition that it could be, then how could there be correspondence in this mistaken instance?

The issue Meta, was whether or not truth is dependent upon language. I claimed it's not. You argued otherwise as above. Now you're saying that meaning isn't dependent upon language. If there is meaning without language, then truth is as well. — creativesoul

You're completely missing the point of the op creativesoul. The intent was to analyze the difference between "true" and "truth". I agree with you that there could be instances of true belief prior to language, this is not an issue. I do no agree that there is truth prior to language. You do not seem to make a consistent distinction between the two. Sometimes you seem to suggest that if there is an instance of being true, then there is truth, and if there is truth then there are instances of being true, as if they are co-dependent. At another time you argued that true belief is existentially contingent on truth.

Tim had offered a working definition of "truth", such that it refers to a generalization. Do you recognize the difference between instances of being true, and the generalization, truth?

If it's 'something' that is indestructible, unchangeable, immortal, beyond time and space, then how do we demonstrate the existence of such a reality? — Wayfarer

The way I see it is that the necessity to assume the existence of a soul is understood by logic. All these different things which are said about the soul, that it is immutable, immortal, etc., are not necessarily true, because no one really knows the exact nature of the soul. And perhaps we cannot know it. This is similar to God. The need to assume God can be demonstrated, but when we start saying things about God, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, etc., it is quite likely that untruths are said because we don't really know the exact nature of God.

Having said that, I don't buy into the idea that you 'have' or 'don't have' a soul. What I think 'soul' means, is really something like 'the totality of the being'. And the totality includes, for instance, proclivities, likings, tendencies, attributes, the past and the future. But it is not an objectively real entity or object of perception. — Wayfarer

The idea that a person "has a soul", is what I argued against, as a misrepresentation, which leads to confusion and the claim that the concept of the soul is nonsense. I think that to properly understand the soul, one must understand that the living body is a property of the soul and not vise versa.

That said, I think at the root of many spiritual traditiions, is the idea that 'the soul' transcends the physical. — Wayfarer

The idea that the soul transcends physical existence is produced by the logical demonstration. To state it very simply, it is evident that the form which the living body will have, precedes the actual existence of the living body. This can be readily observed in the free will act, which is a manifestation of the existence of the soul. The form which the act will take precedes the existence of the physical act.

If souls have bodies and their bodies have parts and cannot be a part of ourselves, what are they, how and why do they exist, and what are their connections to us? Using your definition, they sound like Angels or aliens. — Thanatos Sand

Do you understand the notion of looking at things, and trying to figure out why a certain type of thing behaves the way it does, and coming to the conclusion that there is something underlying that thing which is not immediately evident to your senses, but must be there in order to account for how that thing behaves? We can give that underlying thing a name, an identity, while knowing very little about it, just that it must be there in order to account for the way that the things are behaving. Take gravity for example.

Souls are then defined as parts of us living in parallel universes?
But why, what's all this stuff for, what's it supposed to account for...?
And how would we differentiate it all from fiction? — jorndoe

This is the point I tried to clarify with Banno. You cannot think of the soul as a part of yourself. Souls have bodies, and bodies have parts. So the soul cannot be a part of yourself. Until you understand the need to assume a soul which to attribute the living body to, as the property of that soul, any talk about the relationship between the soul and the body will appear as fiction to you.

As per my example, you can look above your head, and say "I see blue", and to the person who wants to talk about the sky, you can insist "What sky? All I see is blue, there is no sky to be talked about, only blue". Until you see the need to assume the sky, which is blue, any attempt to discuss the finer points nature of the sky is pointless. Likewise, until you see the need to assume a soul, which has as its property, the living body, any attempt to discuss the nature of the soul is rather pointless.

As to giving and taking, you seem to say truth really just collapses into true. Seem to. What you really say is that truth "is the "concept of what it means to be true." Just like the concept of what it means to be green. — tim wood

I wouldn't say that truth collapses into true, because there is a distinction to be made, between the particular instance, something which is true, and the generalization, truth. I admit, that there is a very difficult task to separate these two, especially if we adhere to the principles which I've been insisting on, because both the particular, and the general, are produced by the minds of the subject, so it is quite difficult to avoid category error.

Concept of what it means? Where and how does "concept of what it means" come to ground? What does it mean?

Had you said "truth" is just the generalization of true, akin to "green" as a generalization of greenness in green things, then no problems here. But as you have expressed it, I can't figure it out. No doubt a failure on my part. Would you craft an edit for greater precision? — tim wood

Remember when I described justification. In my opinion, this is how we get objective concepts, objective knowledge, trough agreement amongst us. This is what is accepted as right, correct. It is objective in the sense of "inter-subjective", so it is not a true objectivity in the sense of "of the object", independent of the subject. It is created by a unification of subjects through communication, and I call this justification because it comes about through the demonstration of what is believed to be the correct way to use words. A concept may come into existence and evolve, as the correct way of using words evolves, and this process is a justification of that usage which is accepted as the correct usage. This is contrary to platonic realism, which places concepts as independent of subjects, making them more truly objective, in the sense of "of the object", resulting in the need to assume eternal concepts or ideas.

So I don't see any immediate difference between "concept of what it means to be true", and "generalization of true". Both seem to express the same thing. But what we refer to as "the concept", or "the generalization", is really the accepted use of the word. So there is an accepted idea of what it means to be true, correspondence with reality, and this is the objective, justified concept of "truth".

The difficulty comes about, as is the case with other abstractions or generalizations, when the thing being conceptualized, or represented by the concept, is not well understood, such that the generalization, the concept, is not an adequate representation of the thing. Or, as is the case in this type of discussion, it becomes evident that there is more than one accepted, justified, and therefore objective concept of the same thing, "truth' in this case. This might signify inconsistency, or perhaps distinct ways in which something could be true.

This means that we have to visit, and analyze the particular instances of being true, to determine exactly why the concept of "truth" is divided, and where the misunderstandings lie. It is extremely difficult, because the only guidance we have to find and identify the particular instances of being true, is our concept of truth. If our concept doesn't give us an adequate representation of what it means to be true, we will be misguided in our effort to identify particular instances of being true.

This is the problem which Plato demonstrates in the "Theaetetus", with respect to the concept of "knowledge". They seek particular instances of knowledge, in order that they may analyze them to learn what knowledge actually is. However, they are unable to find any real instances of knowledge, and they realize at the end, that they had a preconceived notion of "knowledge" which was an inadequate description of how knowledge really is, as it exists. They identified things which might be called knowledge, but found that they were really not knowledge according to the preconceived conditions. So the mistake was that they thought that to be knowledge required that something fulfill the conditions of their preconceived notion, when in reality, what was being called knowledge, and existed as knowledge, could not fulfill the conditions of their preconceived notion. In short, there concept of "knowledge" did not correspond to the existing thing which was being called knowledge. The concept was based in an inadequate understanding of the thing called knowledge.

By the way, the inadequate, preconceived notion of knowledge, which led them astray, was the idea that knowledge had to exclude falsity. They could not find a way that knowledge as we know it could exclude falsity. And we can bring this to bear upon our search for instances of "being true". Should "being true" exclude the possibility that the thing which is true, is false? Is it correct to oppose true with false? It appears to me, like the reason why we can't determine what "being true" means, is that we adhere to this (perhaps untrue) notion that being true is opposed to being false.

I have a lot to say about this, but it will suffice for now just to note that nothing in what you said (in this quote or in the rest of your post) proves that our 'interpretations' of reality (whatever that means) don't actually correspond with the reality which they interpret. The most that it can show is that we do not know whether out interpretations correspond with reality, but it doesn't prove that they in fact do not. — Fafner

This may be true, but if it is the case that we can never know whether our interpretations correspond with reality, then what is the point in defining "truth" in this way? This renders the word "true" useless. If, when we use the word "true" to refer to a sentence, we know that there is the possibility that the sentence is actually false, then why would we use "true", other than to deceive?

This means that if our 'interpretations' of reality happen to be the correct ones, and they 'correspond' to our interpretations of sentences, then it is perfectly possible that our sentences are objectively true (correctly represent reality). And nothing that you said proves that this is not the case. — Fafner

That it is "perfectly possible that our sentences are objectively true", does not justify using the word "true" to refer to those sentences. We need something more than "it is possible that the sentence is true", before we judge it as true, and say that it is true. If we cannot get beyond this possibility, then the word "true" is rendered useless.

Compare this with the case of believing something you don't know. I believe that somewhere in the universe there's intelligent extraterrestrial life. Now, I do not know whether it exists, but it doesn't prove that if I say "intelligent extraterrestrial life exist" that I said something false, because it might very well be true for all that I know. Ignorance doesn't prove anything about the objectivity of what you are ignorant about. — Fafner

Right, you cannot say that it is true that extraterrestrial life exists, even though you believe it does. Now extrapolate this example to assume that everything concerning reality is like this. You cannot say that anything is true, despite the fact that you believe things. The word "true" is completely useless unless you were trying to pretend that you knew something which you didn't.

I think that that is just what contingency entails. It seems that if God has a free (in the libertarian sense) choice, then we have something like the following two possible states of affairs, for instance: 'God choosing X' and 'God choosing -X.' Let's say that 'God choosing X' obtained. Since it obtained contingently, 'God choosing -X' could've obtained but simply failed to, by chance, I would say. — Brayarb

If God's free will choice is describable as a chance occurrence, then aren't all free will choices chance occurrences? Doesn't that misrepresent what a free will choice actually is?