The point is, that if you want to understand what Aristotle meant by "potential", or "matter", or some other word, you must read how he used that word. It is only by using that word in many different instances, in a consistent way, that he gave the word an intelligible meaning.

Attempting to understand "the genesis of the terms" is pointless if what one is interested in is the meaning which Aristotle gave the terms. Why would you look at all the different usage in the time around Aristotle, if what you are interested in what Aristotle meant by those words? Why would someone look at how you and various other people use a word if what they are interested in is what I mean when I use that word. So really, what you said is what is crap.

The issue that QM made inescapable was that reality could not be that well-defined; when you get down to the nitty-gritty, the uncertainty principle comes into play. So the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes. — Wayfarer

We must be careful, and take the time, to determine whether the "uncertainty" is within the map, or within the territory. So for example, you say "the more minutely you define it, the less certain it becomes". Many people believe that this uncertainty is inherent within the fabric of the universe. I believe that the uncertainty is due to the deficiencies of the minds and the methods being used in the attempt to understand.

It seems to me that to be an Aristotelian one has to make an act of faith that various undefined terms, like potential, essence, entelechia and eudaimonia (even though I quite like that last one), mean something objective and tangible and can be used in the course of logical reasoning. — andrewk

Aristotelian terms like "matter", "form", "potential", and "actual", are developed through volumes of consistent usage. The key point here is consistency. So as one reads the usage in different books of Aristotle, in different fields of study, the meaning of the terms starts to come through, from these various applications of the same terminology.

The consequence of that is that an Aristotelian argument (and hence also most Thomist arguments) are never going to be accepted by non-Aristotelians because they are not prepared to make that act of faith. — andrewk

What is required, rather than an act of faith, is an act of intense study. You might argue that to embark on such an extended task, such as to understand Aristotle's writing, would require faith that this would be a worthwhile venture. But I don't think it's a matter of faith, rather it's a matter of interest. Some are interested, some are not

I'm just pointing out that the arguments they see as so powerful mean nothing to somebody that is not prepared to take the Aristotelian Leap of Faith. — andrewk

So I think that you are quite wrong here to call this a "Leap of Faith". It is a matter of having an interest in something and having the commitment and perseverance to follow through and develop an understanding of that thing which interests you.

I understood you were making the claim that since the laws of the universe can possibly change. I'm not making the claim that it's impossible to change. I'm making the claim that they won't change in any meaningful way for 1000 times longer than the current age of the universe.

Why would you think that because it's possible for the universe's laws to change, that they will? — fdrake

Do you know what the "laws" of the universe are? These laws are the descriptions which human beings have made in their attempts to understand the universe. The laws are made by human beings, through inductive reasoning; they are generalities produced from observing regularities in nature. We describe the various activities which we recognize and understand in terms of laws. In the last three thousand years, the laws have changed dramatically, because our understanding of the universe has change dramatically. Between the time of Isaac Newton until now, the laws have changed substantially. Why would you ever claim that the laws will not change in a period of time 1000 times longer than the current age of the universe?

Why would you think that because it's possible for the universe's laws to change, that they will? — fdrake

As I said there is very much concerning the universe which we do not understand, spatial expansion, dark energy, and dark matter for example. When we start to get a better understanding of these aspects we will have to change the laws again.

The concept of boundary only makes sense in a continuum. It makes no sense for elements of a discrete set. If time is discrete there is no continuum, so the concept of boundary is meaningless. — andrewk

Not only does it make sense, but it is absolutely necessary. What makes the members of a discrete set discrete is the fact that they are isolated from one another. The thing which isolates one from the other is what I called a boundary. If Y and Z are discrete units of time there must be something real in between them, which isolates one from the other, a boundary. If time is discrete, then what would isolate one discrete unit of time from another? We would have to posit a non-time, between each moment of time. But that doesn't make sense because the only thing which could fulfill this condition of "non-time" would be a stoppage of physical activity. But a stoppage requires necessarily, a period of time with no activity. So we end up with the same description, a period of time with no physical activity.

What could be meant by the boundary between my mind and your mind? — andrewk

That's a good example. The boundary between my mind and your mind, is the external world. Boundaries are very real in the spatial world. Though we don't seem to understand them well they are what we sense, so we must hand them some reality if we want to give any credence to empirical knowledge. In the case of time though, we arbitrarily posit points as boundaries. The designated "point in time" separates one unit of time from the next. But there is nothing sensed or otherwise indicating any separation, or differentiation, between one moment and the next. If you believe that time might be discrete, what do you think could possibly separate one moment of time from the next? What gives you any inkling of justification for this proposal?

Just a classic stock example by Sachs: Take a blind man. It would be the case that a blind man does not have the potency to see anymore, while a man with his eyes closed does have the capacity to see, and in fact a capacity that is furthermore at rest. When the non-blind man opens his eyes, his potential to see is not removed, but is in an active process (Aristotle's word for entelecheia or being-at-work-staying-itself ). In this sense, what we are not talking about something that surprises us or not but something intrinsic to the blind man. — Marty

The argument here, from Aristotle, is to demonstrate that the powers of the soul, the potencies, (the powers of self-subsistence, self-movement, sensation, intellection) exist as a form of potential. Since these powers are not active all the time, but continue to exist as potencies, we must assume that their essence is to be found in potential. When any such potential is active, this does not negate the potential, so we cannot properly describe the activity relating to such potencies as the actualizing of a potential.

Potential is passive, as that which is partaken of. And as Socrates describes in Plato's Parmenides, there is a way that the passive thing is partaken of without loosing anything of itself. This is like time, as Socrates says, "the day". No matter how many different places take part in the day, this changes nothing of the day. So this is the way that a passive potential can be taken part of, without changing or loosing anything of itself.

Do we though? How do we know we don't experience time like a movie, at 24 frames per second (or perhaps, 24,000). I don't think I could tell the difference. — andrewk

As I explained, when you analyze this proposition there is nothing to make the boundaries between one frame and the next. So any such experience of time would need to consist of still frames of spatial (material) existence. But that just brings us back to my original description, in which Y and Z are the still frames of material existence, and time passes between them.

If Y and Z consist of active frames within which there is a quantum of time, then there is nothing to separate Y from Z. We can't posit a time with no time because this is contradictory. So Y and Z must be described as contiguous units of time, with a point of separation. But that point of separation is just posited by us, as an arbitrary point in time. It is not a real separation, because we can't posit a "non-time" to make a real separation. Then Y and Z just are two parts of a continuous time, arbitrarily divided. The quanta are not real. To produce a model with real quanta, and a real experience of existence as a movie, we need to consider material still frames with time passing in between each frame. This implies time passing without any material change, in this intermediary period..

What scientists believe about dark energy has absolutely no bearing on whether the laws of the universe will change in a given time period. Coming to know more about the laws of the universe may reveal the reason for all the 'missing matter', but this novel disclosure has no bearing on whether the laws will change - only what the laws are believed/known to be. With that in mind: — fdrake

This is contrary to your stated argument though. You stated that the laws of physics will not change because the universe will be "in the same regime of energy distribution for billions of years". The existence of dark energy is very clear evidence that such a claim cannot be justified. And if it cannot be justified that the universe will be in the same regime of energy distribution for an extended period of time, then, that the laws of physics will not change, likewise is not justified.

Can you make a positive argument that the laws of the universe will change within 100 million years? Can you establish that the measurement process going on inside an atomic clock or an optical lattice clock will degrade? When will it degrade? How will it degrade? — fdrake

You seem to misunderstand my argument. I am not arguing that a change will happen, I am arguing that it is possible, because that is all that is necessary to discredit your insistence that these activities will stay the same for 100 million years. Your claim is that such a change is impossible, because if you recognized it as possible you would not insist that these activities would necessarily stay the same for 100 million years.

Why are you so violently opposed to an immanent naturalist metaphysics? — apokrisis

I've given you the reasons already, in other threads, as well as this one. You employ unintelligible ontological principles. By appealing to naturalism you deny the well respected dichotomy between natural and artificial, opting for a different definition of "natural". Under this naturalism, artificial becomes a sub-category of the natural. I believe this is a mistaken approach.

This is not necessary. Time could be discrete, like the integers, or like popes. — andrewk

There is a problem with assuming a discrete time though. This is because we experience a continuous time, so we have nothing but arbitrary points in time according to our experience. If we want to understand a discrete time it requires that there are points of division within time itself. So the problem is to find something real which differentiates one quantum of time from another.

So suppose we have our units of change, Y and Z, and each one indicates a quantum of time. Time passes within Y, and within Z, and no time passes between Y and Z. This is opposed to the scenario I described, in which Y and Z were particular states and time passes in between these different states. Now under your proposed scenario, physical change is occurring at Y and at Z, but there is a necessary division between Y and Z, which separates one quantum of time from another. How could this be possible, and what could it look like? If it is a point when no time passes, what could that mean? Y and Z would necessarily be contiguous, but what could separate them? We can't represent it as a stoppage in physical activity, because this would mean that time passes here with no activity. So all we have is physical activity at Y and at Z with an arbitrary boundary between them.

The boundary between two discrete units of time would necessarily be arbitrary and therefore the discreteness of time would just be an arbitrary assumption. The problem is that we do not know of anything which could act as the boundary, or divisor, between one unit of time and another. If you posit a period of time which is designated non-time, to divide time into units, then what is that non-time other than time passing with no change occurring? Then we are back to the other position, of time passing with no change occurring. So once you start to talk about reality existing as quanta, it is necessary to assume time passing with no physical change occurring. And if quanta are real, then it is necessary to assume time passing without any physical change occurring, because this is a necessary condition for real quanta. The other way, discrete time, ends up with arbitrary divisions, and not real quanta.

It allows me to distinguish between accidents and necessities for a start. — apokrisis

Such a distinction is the one that is artificial, arbitrary. It's a good example of how the "difference which makes a difference" is a completely subjective principle. We distinguish necessities from accidents based on our purpose or intent. If the intent is not 'the truth", then the determination is skewed.

So the genome stands for what is necessary. And then that defines what are merely accidents that particularise oak trees - the differences in form that make this one distinct from that one. It is a matter of indifference if one oak tree has a broken limb, or a different pattern of branching, or whatever. — apokrisis

Oh come on, you cannot distinguish what is necessary from what is accidental by reference to the genome. That's nonsense.

So my approach introduces a sound basis for separating reality into its formal necessities and accidental differences. — apokrisis

That's a joke.

A lifetime studying quantum mechanics has convinced Bernard d'Espagnat that the world we perceive is merely a shadow of the ultimate reality — vesko

Sounds like Plato. But Plato didn't need quantum mechanics to come to this conclusion, he just analyzed all the other sophistry going on.

How does the argument go then? — fdrake

Which argument? The argument is yours. You are claiming that by watching something for a month, you can say something about it which will be true in 100 million years from now. If you think that this is really the case, then show me your argument.

However, the universe will still be in the same regime of energy distribution for billions of years, and there is no good reason to believe that the laws will change in this time. — fdrake

OK, I see you've made an argument now. However, I do not believe that cosmologists currently have an adequate understanding of the "regime of energy distribution" of the universe. That's why they posit "dark energy". And your argument is based on this unsound premise. Therefore there really is good reason to believe that the laws will change in this time. We will change our descriptive laws as we come to know the universe better, especially things like spatial expansion. We will have to change the laws in order to account for this new understanding, and it is likely that we will come to realize that what we say about an activity for a month right now, will not be the same concerning that activity in 100 million years.

I think what you said is the very opposite:

The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things.

So sure. Reality appears composed of concrete particulars. But the emphasis is on appears. It isn’t really. — apokrisis

See, your principle of indifference doesn't allow that this difference is real. What I claim is fundamental to reality, particulars, with differences, you are saying is just an illusion. The problem with your stated position is that we know and understand things through the differences between them. We differentiate. So if difference is just an illusion then our knowledge is fundamentally flawed and reality is inherently unintelligible.

But I already knew that your ontology of vagueness first, leaves reality unintelligible. So you have just confirmed this point in another way. If difference were just an illusion then vagueness would be confirmed and reality would be unintelligible. However, the presupposition that reality is unintelligible is a dead end road for anyone who wants to understand (a philosopher), so it is exposed as nothing more than a meaningless statement of opinion.

Your claim is a tautology and thus unproductive. — Samuel Lacrampe

If the tautology contradicts your claim, then you are wrong.

Now, either a thing is red, that is, it participates in the form of redness, prior to us calling it "red", or it is not. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is at question is whether or not there is a "form of redness" prior to us calling something red. I say no, you say yes.

"Man" is not defined merely as an animal, but "plane" is defined merely as "a flat surface". — Samuel Lacrampe

That's totally untrue. My dictionary has a quarter of a page of entry under the word "plane". What is at issue here is whether or not there is ambiguity in word usage, and clearly there is. The ambiguity is reduced by producing definitions. So when you define "plane" as a flat surface, then through this definition you are reducing the possibility of ambiguity.

Once it is defined as "flat surface" we can proceed toward understanding the ambiguities within "flat surface". What exactly do you mean by a surface, and what exactly constitutes 'flat". Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way.

I gave another argument before: the fact that if concepts could possibly be different in individuals, then all attempts for communication would be hopeless. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is not true though. It is not required that individuals have the same concepts in order to communicate. If that were the case, then communication could not be a learned ability. This is the problem which lead Plato to introduce the doctrine of recollection. From your premise, we cannot learn concepts, because then we wouldn't be able to communicate in order to learn them. So Plato posited the principle of recollection, stating that we already know the concepts when we're born, and we just remember them. But this is an untenable position which is refuted in other dialogues, because it produces the absurdity that everyone must already know when they are born, everything which they
will ever come to know, throughout their lifetimes. Then, since these concepts must be passed from one life to another, everyone must already know everything which will ever be known. And that's an absurdity.

Instead of accepting and promoting this absurdity, we ought to consider the proposition that communication is less than perfect. When you say something, I do not understand it exactly in the way which you intend. That is because the conceptual structure within my mind is not exactly the same as that in your mind. But this imperfection does not necessitate the conclusion that we cannot communicate. On the contrary, it is an essential aspect of communication, and it manifests as the fact that communication takes effort. If my concepts were exactly the same as yours, then whatever you said would automatically be received by me exactly in the way that you intended. Communication would not take any effort. But this is not the case, communication takes effort. It is not perfect, and this is because of differences within our conceptual structures'.

The claim that our various conceptual structures (world views) are the same, is just an over-simplification, used to bypass the very difficult question of what is a concept. As soon as the lazy philosopher accepts this (false) premise, that concepts are the same for different individuals, then the real, and very difficult to understand, nature of concepts, can be simply ignored in favour of this false premise.

Finally, if concepts are different in individuals, then most of Plato's dialogue are pointless, because Socrates and his peers, attempting to find forms through arguments, all assume that the form they are looking for is the same for everyone. — Samuel Lacrampe

I believe you misunderstand Plato. Plato's intent is to go beyond this false premise of Pythagorean Idealism, to determine the real nature of concepts. That is why he worked to expose all the difficulties of it. He continually took words with very ambiguous concepts, and worked to expose that ambiguity. This is known as Platonic dialectics. This flies in the face of Pythagorean Idealism, in which ambiguity is not possible.

You contradict yourself with the earlier claim that you believed in concepts being universal forms. If universals, then these forms or concepts cannot have accidentals. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is only according to your definition of "universal form". Your definition doesn't seem to allow a distinction between what the concept says (means) and what the concept is ( its ontological existence). This seems to be because you have no principle which allows for a concept to have any ontological existence. You take the lazy route, just assuming that concepts exist, with no principles to demonstrate how this is possible.


Show me where I've gone wrong.

This is supported by the various fundamental physical laws that science has arrived at.

A merely logical argument against my position doesn’t hold water here. — apokrisis

If it has sound premises, and sound deduction, then the "merely' logical argument must be given higher respect than fundamental physical laws whose premises are often based in not so sound inductive conclusions.

Any potential must be separate, or independent from the pure actualizer because the pure actualizer cannot have any potential. If that separate potential were prior to any actual substance it would be pure potential. Pure potential is proven impossible by Aristotle's cosmological argument, so potential must exist as an aspect or property of an actual substance. This means that the act of creation, which is carried out by the pure actualizer, which creates actual substances, that have potential, is an act of separation. Something actual is separated from the pure actuality, and this act of separation is the creation of potential.

The laws of physics have been shown to operate over all observed parts of the universe - and thus back in time more than that. — fdrake

You should read some material by physicist Lee Smolin, specifically "Time Reborn". The laws of physics have been proven to be reliable only in the human environment, under very specific controlled experimental conditions. And this represents a very miniscule part of the overall spatial and temporal expanse of the universe. There is no reason why we should believe that our laws are applicable in these distant regions.

It isn't a stretch to assume if no one destroys the clock or the measuring mechanism, or turns it off, that the process operating within it that measures time will have that error rate. — fdrake

Yes it is a stretch. From one month to 100 million years is a huge stretch, 1200 million times. By that same stretch the height of my body could circle the earth about fifty times.

But it might also be possible that the intermediary to account for the difference in time is the change from Y to Z so is this a valid argument? — Madman

If you are considering that possibility, then you have misunderstood the argument. I realized that this could be a problem, and tried to word it to avoid that problem. Think of it this way. Imagine that the change is a motion, an object moves from location Y to location Z. Because it has been stipulated that this is the shortest possible change, it is impossible that the object traverses a mid way point, say X, because this would imply that the object traverse YX then XZ, and the possibility of this this has been denied. There cannot be a describable intermediary between Y and Z without contradicted the premise that the change from Y to Z is the smallest possible.

So what we have here is a unit of change, a quantum, which is indivisible. However, from one state to the next, from Y to Z, time passes. There is nothing which is changing while this time is passing, or else we'd be able to describe that shorter change, occurring between Y and Z, but the change from Y to Z has already been designated as the shortest.. There is position Y, then there is position Z, which are two distinct positions. There is no physical change between these two, only time.

Try this. Let's say that when change occurs, object A changes to become object B. Something happens in between, and this is "the change". We could say that during the change, object A becomes C then becomes B. But then we have a change between A and C, as well as between C and B. To account for these changes, we could place D between A and C, and E between C and B. As you can see, in this way we would face infinite regress.

So we can make the assumption that there is a smallest possible change, to put an end to the infinite regress. This is supported by the limitations of material existence. So if that smallest possible change is denoted as the change of A to B, then we cannot assume any describable material existence between A and B, and all we are left with between A and B, is time passing. And time is necessarily passing to account for the fact that at one moment A is the case, and the next moment, B is the case. But no material change has occurred until B is the case.

What allows the extrapolation of the error - and thus statements like '1 second in 100 million years' - is that the clock had a certain error which accrued over a month. The measurement error precisely gives 'how much it changes over time'. — fdrake

The measurement error does not give "how much it changes over time". It gives how much it changed over one specific month of time. To conclude that it gives how much the change will be in a million years from now, is faulty logic, because all the possible variables are not known. It's like saying that if something doesn't change in a day, then it will be the same for a hundred years. But we do not know what could happen in the future, to change the rate of the activity which is being measured today.

The conclusion requires the premise that the activity which is being measured for that month will continue to be, as it was for that month, for a hundred million years. And this is an unproven premise, therefore unsound.

OK, ordinary probability is fine. So if I roll a 7 with a pair of dice, does it make a difference if I roll a 4 and a 3 instead of a 2 and a 5?

Sometimes differences don’t make a difference. And that is determined by the context. — apokrisis

Of course it makes a difference. You can only make the decision that this difference doesn't make a difference in reference to some intent, or purpose. But we're talking metaphysics, ontology, and the foundations of epistemology, we can't make our principles concerning the nature of reality relative to our purposes. That is the context here, ontology. And since it is the truth which we are concerned with here, we cannot decide that there is a difference which doesn't make a difference in relation to the truth, as this is contradictory.

And so you agree that there are differences that don't make a difference! — apokrisis

No, I do not agree. Just because I call two distinct things by the same word does not mean that I agree that the difference between them doesn't make a difference. That I think is a ridiculous conclusion. One is mine, and the other is Wayfarer's. I respect that difference, and I would not steal Wayfarer's banana bread, claiming that it must be mine because it is the same as mine.

Despite the fact that we use the same word to refer to different things, we still respect that the difference between them makes a difference. If you disregard this difference to produce a logical argument, as wayfarer did, it is a category mistake, and you engage in sophistry.

Where is the problem? — apokrisis

Checked, no problem here. Must be at the other end. ;-) (not *your* end...) — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe such sophistry is a very big problem which has infiltrated most modern metaphysics. Disrespect for the law of identity ought to be exposed for what it is, a complete undermining of epistemological principles. Sure, it's not a problem for you, because it doesn't make a difference to you. But by insisting that it's not a problem just because it doesn't make a difference to you, in complete disrespect for the fact that it does make a difference to me, you insist on making your epistemological principles completely subjective.

I reckon that seals it for once and for all. Wasn't even that difficult. — Wayfarer

It wasn't difficult because you didn't even try. Are you going to try to explain "what A means" or just give some half hearted example of the fact that when two people follow the same recipe they come up with a similar product? How does this demonstrate that there is a "what A means" which is common to the two people? The fact that different people may act in a similar way after reading the recipe does not demonstrate that there is one common "what A means" which is the same for these people. Do you still have no respect for the difference between similar and same?

Jorn, what is your opinion of Shoemaker's claim that time without change is possible? — andrewk

I'll offer my opinion. Physical change without time is not logically possible, but time without physical change is.

Imagine that we divide time into shorter and shorter durations. At some point we reach a duration of time which is as short as is possible due to the limitations of physical change. This is the shortest possible duration of time in which physical change can occur. However, we can still imagine a shorter period of time simply by dividing that shortest period of time, within our minds.

But is this shorter than the shortest period of time (according to physical limitations) imaginary or real? Suppose that a physical change occurs which takes the shortest possible period of time according to the physical limitation. This time duration is t1 to t2, and during this time the change occurs. The change itself cannot be divided, it is the quickest possible change. So at t1 Y exists, and at t2 Z exists, and this is described as a quantum of change.

Now, something necessarily exists as a medium between Y and Z, to account for the difference between them. We cannot say that there is a physical activity such as a motion, which is Y changing to Z, because this motion would be itself divisible into parts. The physical activity is already described as one moment there is Y and the next moment Z, and an intermediate motion is not possible. Therefore we can conclude that the only thing which happens between Y and Z is that time passes. Y and Z are different states with no motion or physical activity intermediary between them. Yet there must be something intermediary to account for the difference between Y and Z. This intermediary is time itself. Therefore it is not only possible that time passes without physical change, but it is a necessary conclusion.

They ran for a period of a month, and they got out of phase by 2.8 x 10^-17 seconds. That doesn't mean it's only proven to be stable for a month. Quite the contrary, the error is so low in a month that it's negligible. — fdrake

Right, for a period of one month, the error was negligible. This means that the physical activity remained very stable for that one month period. It has been proven to be constant for a month. How do we know that in 10, 100, or 1000 years, that activity will not change?

If you and I both follow this recipe, we will both make banana bread. In other words, the recipe results in - it 'means' - banana bread. Not regular bread, not muffins - but banana bread. — Wayfarer

How can this make sense to you? It's just self-reference, "banana bread" means banana bread.

What I make, I will call "banana bread", and what you make, you will call "banana bread". But what I make, and what you make are not both the same thing, they are similar. The law of identity is meant to ensure that no one uses sophistry to produce absurd conclusions, such as, that you and I are both eating the same thing. We are not, we are eating similar things. Meaning is based in the similarity between different things. But, the fact that they are different cannot be overlooked in order to claim that the similar things are the same, or else the essence of meaning is lost. That essence is in the similarity of different things. Therefore, that the things are different is fundamental to meaning.

The principle of indifference is a fundamental constraint on actuality in that view. It explains why we get the “weird” statistics of quantum entangled states and the quantum indistinguishability of particles among other things. — apokrisis

Oh, I see, you get "weird" quantum states because you can't tell one particle apart from the other due to the practise of your principle of indifference. Ever think that maybe this is a problem which should be addressed? And, that you choose a metaphysics which simply ignores this weirdness, as if it's acceptable, is an indication that your chosen metaphysics is not up to snuff?

Most of what you've argued in this thread is that the law of identity means that the meaning of 'the same' is not actually 'the same'; or that A doesn't really equal A, because A for you means something different than A for me. — Wayfarer

If "A" is a thing, then the law of identity applies, because that law says that a thing is the same as itself. So that instance of "A" is that instance of "A", and there is no problem. If "A" refers to a thing, then the law of identity applies to that thing which "A" refers to. The thing has been identified and given the name "A". But you are talking about "what A means". If "A" means something different to you, from what it means to me, then on what basis do you claim that there is a thing which is "what A means"? And if there is no such thing, then the law of identity cannot be applied.

If a difference doesn't make a difference, is it really a difference? — apokrisis

There is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. That is contradiction. If it has been identified as a difference, then by that very fact, it has made a difference. That's the point of my argument. To say that there is a difference which does not make a difference is pure sophistry, it's self-deception if you believe that.

The Laws of Thought are framed for dealing with actual differences - differences that make a difference in relation to some generality. So particulars exist in that they contradict some generality. They only partake in that generality in a specific way. — apokrisis

The law of identity is intended to distinguish one particular from everything else. If "everything else" is "some generality", then what you say makes sense. But in the act of distinguishing any particular from everything else, every difference makes a difference. Therefore every difference is an actual difference. Your attempt to differentiate between actual differences, and differences which do not make a difference, is pure nonsense.

Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? — Samuel Lacrampe

I made no mention of causation, that's your interpretation. What I said is that without the word "red" there is no such thing as what the word red refers to. Do you not recognize that the word "red" is an essential part of "what the word red refers to"? And so there is no such thing as what the word red refers to without the word "red".

Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position? — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, I would not use the same phrasing as you. But I would say that an act must be judged as bad in order to be bad. The judgement of bad or good is not inherent within the act itself. The act must be compared to some set of values, standards, and judged as to whether or not it is bad. The same is the case for wetness.

According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

The defining term is not the same as the term defined. In Aristotelian logic the defining concept is within the concept defined, as an essential feature. So "man" is defined by "animal", as the concept of animal is within the concept of man as an essential property but animal is not the same as man. Likewise, you define "plane" with "flat surface". One is not the same as the other. The defining term is the more general. If defining terms had the same meaning as the words being defined, then we would never get anywhere in our attempts to understand meaning. It would all be circular. "Flat surface" would mean the exact same thing as "plane", and it would be pointless to define one with the other because it would not help you to understand anything. It is the very fact that "flat surface" means something other to you than "plane" does, that it can be used to help you to understand what "plane" means.

Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them? — Samuel Lacrampe

That is exactly what is at issue here, and why there is so much misunderstanding and disagreement about what universal forms are. Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals.

Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things. — Samuel Lacrampe

We determine the properties of physical objects through our senses, observations. And we can compare them. How do you propose that we ought to determine, and compare, the properties of the concepts within each others minds, other than by discussion? Discussion within this thread has demonstrated very clearly that there are differences between any concept denoted by a particular word, between your mind, my mind, and the minds' of others.

In many cases these differences are accidentals, so communication and understanding is still adequate. But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind. So the law of identity is still applicable, it just forces the conclusion that the same concept of "red" which you have is not the concept of "red" which I have. In this way, the issue is decisively resolved. It is only when you want to give "the concept" some sort of independent existence, such as Platonic realism, and claim that the concept within each of our minds' somehow partakes of this independent concept, that "the concept" becomes some sort of vague object which defies the law of non-contradiction. Leave "the concept" within the minds of individuals and there is no such problem, but there is differences between what 'red" means to you, and what it means to me.

That is why I said that time is a dimension, a fourth dimension to be precise, and I say that because there is in some sense a capacity - perhaps ontologically - to locate a what or that we are capable of describing it. We are within it, our frame of reference. — TimeLine

How is a dimension a locatable thing? It is purely conceptual. Think of the three spatial dimensions. How would you locate one of those dimensions around you? Any assigning of a dimension to the space around you would be a purely arbitrary act, not representing anything which actually exists there.

One measurement for another? What do you mean by that?
This is from the first article you referred. The introduction I believe.

"Furthermore, two independent Sr clocks are compared
and they agree within their combined total uncertainty over a period of one month.

...

When the SrI and SrII clocks were compared over a period of one month, we found their frequency difference to be nSrII – nSrI = -2.8(2)×10-17, well within their combined uncertainty of 5.4×10-17."

Honestly I don't understand literally everything in the paper. I trust their error analysis. If you really want me to translate the error analysis in the paper to a more convenient form I could try, but not now. — fdrake

No need to do that. I just don't believe that it's possible to make a statement concerning the accuracy of a clock over a 100 million year time frame, when the activity which is used as that time-measurer has only been proven to be stable for one month.

The one referred article states that the measured frequency was found to remain stable for a month. How do you make a claim about the clock's accuracy for 100 million years from this?

But most cosmological arguments take the form of, A causes B, B causes C...etc but what caused A? = God, not A sustains B, B sustains C,...etc but what sustains A? = God. Really, the latter argument is actually implicit in the former arguments, even if proponents of cosmological arguments don't recognize this. — darthbarracuda

Yes, I agree, it is implicit, and that's basically the same argument. The original, from Aristotle, does not use "cause", though Aristotle is clearly familiar with cause. What he demonstrates is a counter-intuitive temporal priority of actuality over potency, despite the fact that we understand the potential for things to be prior to the actual things..

What I think is that anyone who understands the cosmological argument will produce a version of it using ones own terminology, this demonstrates one's understanding. It's like when our teachers used to tell us in school, do not plagiarize, explain it using your own words.

For a thing has to exist in order to be the effect of something, and there seems to be the question of what it means to exist, which of course is going to include how a thing exists and continues to exist. — darthbarracuda

If you recognize that to exist means to be present in time, then you can proceed to ask, what allows something to exist, to be present in time. Notice that by asking "what allows something to exist?", it is implied that existing is having a special position, a privilege. So when existing is seen as a privileged position, not something to be taken for granted, but something contingent rather than necessary, then the cosmological argument comes into focus because the nature of time requires that existence, or "to exist", be "sustained", meaning to have temporal extension. It is this temporal extension which is focused on here.

Therefore we have a different meaning to the word "cause" here. In its average usage, as efficient cause, "cause" implies a separation between that which is prior and that which is posterior, as cause and effect. We might pinpoint a separation between cause and effect, as a point in time. In this case, "cause" implies a unity between that which is prior (the past), and that which is posterior (the future), within the concept "to exist", which is to be present in time. It is this unity of cause and effect, rather than a separation between them, which allows for an understanding of temporal extension.

All of which is beside the point, but if we can go for 48 pages with you not getting the point, then I will leave it at that. — Wayfarer

Oh I get the point all right. The point is that you keep asserting, over and over again, for 48 pages, "the same", with complete disrespect for the law of identity, and all the evidence which I've brought forward to demonstrate "not the same".

Now you want to go right back and stake you claim of "the same" all over again, dismissing all the evidence of "not the same", as beside the point. Of course it's "beside the point", it's clear evidence against the point. And if I don't get that point, it's because that point is a falsity.

The argument presented here is not really a cosmological argument at all, it's an argument based on the sheer existence of contingent material things right now, as in, not really why do things exist but why do they continue to exist, since this argument is meant to demonstrate that God is the supreme and eternal sustainer of existence (and not that he caused the world to begin). — darthbarracuda

Yes, that is exactly the point of the cosmological argument. It takes the evidence, that there are contingent material things in existence right now, at the present moment in time, and demonstrates that there must be a cause of this, which is other than the material things themselves. The example of the op appears to be a complex representation of the cosmological argument.

When we consider the nature of a contingent thing, we see that any such thing can be caused to cease to exist (be annihilated) by something such as an act of free will, at any moment in time, if one removes what you call the hierarchical support. This demonstrates that a thing's existence must be as you say, "sustained" at each passing moment in time. The support must be asserted at each moment or collapse occurs.

Newton's first law of motion, the law of inertia takes this cause, the sustainer of existence, "the support", for granted, assuming that this support will naturally continue unless interfered with. Once it is taken for granted, we disregard it, as is the case in physics. But the cosmological argument demonstrates that the support is not necessary. The support exists as the relationship between what potentially exists, and what actually exists, and it is the nature of this relationship, that of everything which potentially exists, nothing is actualized necessarily. Therefore the continued existence of material things is not necessary, so it is not something which any metaphysician ought to take for granted.

That is the whole point of this thread. The meaning can be represented by entirely different symbols, languages, media types and so on - so 'the meaning' is separable from the representation. It doesn't matter that you can't read French, German, Latin, or morse code, the meaning is the same for those who are can. Not 'similar'- the same. — Wayfarer

Have you ever read translations? The translator has a choice as to the best words, the best way to translate. One person will translate with completely different words than another. Clearly, the translation is not the same as the original, it is similar.

There is no room for ambiguity in the example given. Of course there can be ambiguity in other matters. But when it comes to conveying technical information, such as specifications, directions, instructions, and so on, then the meaning has to be conveyed exactly. I know this from practical experience, as I'm a technical writer by profession. — Wayfarer

That you can come up with an example, or a few examples, where there is very little room for ambiguity, doesn't negate the fact that in the vast majority of cases of information there is significant ambiguity. In order for your argument to be valid, there can be no ambiguity in any information, or else we could not call it information. Clearly you misunderstand, and therefore misrepresent, the nature of "information". Ambiguity is a widespread attribute of information, and your argument assumes that if there is any ambiguity whatsoever, it no longer qualifies as "information".

Here's a simpler way of stating the cosmological argument:
In the case of every existing thing, the potential for that thing is prior in time to its actual existence. "The potential for that thing" means that at this time, prior to the actual existence of the thing, the thing may or may not come into existence. We say that its existence is contingent. Whether the thing actually comes into existence or not is dependent on a cause. A cause is necessarily something actual. Therefore there is something actual which is prior to every existing thing.

The question is, does Edward Feser reallty think that it is arguments like this that found his belief in God? If so, he's almost certainly kidding himself. If he's like most believers, he believes for entirely different reasons that have nothing to do with Aristotle or syllogisms. Those real reasons are no less valid - in fact in my view they are more so - but perhaps he doesn't want to admit to them because they don't sound as Sciency. — andrewk

*I think I've put my finger on it. Reaching for a proof suggests a lack of visceral experience of the divine on the one hand or a banalization of this experience on the other. If God is intensely there, then one might expect a person to drop the theoretical pretense and have the courage describe this experience poetically, musically, etc. Or maybe remain silent. In any case, such proofs strike me a desiccated, artificial, vaguely false. — 0rff

I guess I would be one of those who is almost certainly kidding myself. How would you know that, and could you help to bring me out of my delusion?

You’re saying that purely for sake of argument. If you were employed to do the job in the thought-experiment, you wouldn't have any latitude. — Wayfarer

I didn't say that just for the sake of argument. You wrote lines in different languages. I don't even know what some of the languages you used were. How could those different lines possibly have the same meaning to me?

You haven't addressed the point I made. The conclusion of your argument can only be derived through equivocation, that's why it's sophistry. When you say "the same meaning" you mean "same" in the sense of "similar". But the argument's conclusion can only be drawn if "same" is taken in the sense of "the very same" or "identical". A phrase translated from one language to another doesn't maintain the very same meaning, nor does one phrase have the very same meaning for two distinct people. The meaning is similar. These are differences which often do not make a significant difference in common practise. But when the conclusion of your argument requires no difference whatsoever, then these differences do make a significant difference, because it's enough difference to invalidate your argument.

The information is either conveyed, or it's not. — Wayfarer

This is clearly a misrepresentation of information. If it were the case that either the information is conveyed or it is not, then there would be no such thing as ambiguity. Are you aware of this Wayfarer? Do you recognize the existence of this thing which we call ambiguity? If so, how do you reconcile the existence of ambiguity with your claims of "same meaning"?

For the caesium-122 clock, this is an error of 1 second in 100 million years. — fdrake

You don't seem to be getting The M[ad Fool's point. By what principle do you derive that margin of error? You could only determine the clock's accuracy by comparing it to another clock. So why would you conclude that the caesium clock is more accurate than the other clock? Have you recorded it for a hundred million years? What makes you think that the caesium clock is so incredibly accurate, other than your assumption that another clock which it was compared to is less accurate?

But - but - we keep leap-seconds, leap-days etc so that we stay calibrated with the Earth's rotation around the sun since we don't want to reject the solar year and its monthly/daily/hourly divisions and come up with a new manner of organising time... — fdrake

So, there is a need for leap-seconds. Why do you assume that this need is produced by the earth's rotation being less accurate than the caesium clock, instead of assuming that the caesium clock is less accurate than the earth's rotation?

This is also why the number of oscillations of the caesium atoms was chosen, since it was incredibly close to the current definition of the second but measured far more precisely. — fdrake

See, you keep make assertions like this, without explaining what you mean by "far more precisely".

Convention privileges a measurer of time as a definer of the second. Then other ways of measuring time are calibrated to it. — fdrake

That's what I mean, it's just a convention, it's not necessarily an accurate way of measuring time. So the conventions change from time to time, and we still haven't found a measurer which has proven to be accurate.

The entire point of calibrating measurements of time is that there is a privileged time-measurer and other measurements of time are calibrated through their relationship to the privileged one. This is then what it means for two time-measurers to be in accord. If they are out of accord, they can be corrected. — fdrake

What gives "privilege" to one time-measurer over another? Why would the caesium-133 atom be more privileged than the rotation of the earth?

If the privileged one behaves in an unexpected way, it will be changed. — fdrake

In other words, it may turn out in the future, that we find out that we were wrong in assigning privilege to the one time measurer over the other.

This is because the conventional definition of time with respect to the rotation of the Earth around the Sun is slightly different from the conventional definition of time with respect to the oscillations of a Caesium atom. And thus the introduction of the leap second is precisely an attempt to calibrate the atomic clock second with proportion of a year second. This is so that we can keep the conventional organisation of time in terms of hours, days, months, years and not reinvent the wheel purposelessly. — fdrake

Now this just validates The Mad Fool's point. Instead of handing privilege to one clock over another, we introduce leap seconds and live with the inconsistency. One person can argue that the caesium clock gives the more accurate measure of time, and another can argue that the earth's rotation gives a more accurate measure of time. The leap second doesn't resolve anything, it just negates the inconsistency without determining which is more accurate. To determine which is more precise, we turn to a third time-measurer which is the revolution of the earth around the sun. But now we still have inconsistencies and we still have not adequately determined which is more accurate, so we could compare another time-measurer, and on and on, as The Mad Fool says, ad infinitum