I think quitism wins.

The duration of a second now means:

"the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom."

And so comparisons ultimately derive from this one. — fdrake

The problem though, is that this defined "second" is also related to the length of a "day" which is defined by the rotation of the earth. So there is a specific number of those seconds in every day (one rotation of the earth). When, after a long period of counting that specific number of those seconds, without adding any "leap seconds", the point of change over from one day to the next begins to be out of sync, such that it moves from midnight toward morning or something like that, we have to ask, what is the true constant, the caesium-133 atom, or the rotation of the earth.

All of those text strings mean the same thing; it’s not ‘sophistry’ but a simple statement of fact. — Wayfarer

They don't mean the same thing to me, and that's a fact. Perhaps they mean the same thing to someone else, but that person would have to make an argument for this, referring to some principle of identity, and demonstrating how the meaning of each was the same, according to that principle. Even then, since this demonstration would be based solely on what the text strings mean to that individual, it would simply be a matter of opinion. This matter of opinion is what you assert as a "statement of fact". I say that's sophistry.

This is why I keep coming back to the law of identity. In common language use we use "the same" in a number of different ways. It may mean "the very same", "of the same type", or even "similar". As a premise to a logical argument, "the same" has a very particular meaning according to the law of identity. To smuggle a sense of "same" from common usage, which really means "similar", into a logical argument, where it is implied that it means "the very same" is sophistry.

The simple fact is that if we adhere to the sense of "same" which has been smuggled in, meaning "similar", the conclusion of the argument does not follow. The conclusion only follows if we equivocate to the sense of "same" according to a proper law of identity. Therefore the conclusion is made through equivocation. It is a similar equivocation, in reverse, to what Wittgenstein exposes in the so-called private language argument.

This is where you are making a mistake. The past you define as events which have already occurred.
Already occurred from where? From now. — guptanishank

What do you mean from where? I mean they already occurred here. I remember events which have already occurred, and anticipate future events. This is from my perspective. That's what experience is, from my perspective. Everything which anyone ever understands is from one's perspective. The "now" only enters into this as a conclusion. Since I assume a difference between future and past, I conclude a now which coincides with my perspective.

I guess that’s one of the hazards of posting on public forums. — Wayfarer

But it goes far deeper than that, to all instances of overlooking differences in order to declare that two things are "the same". Unless it is a principled declaration, meaning that it is recognized that the two things are not really the same in any absolute sense, only similar, and therefore "the same" in reference to some stated principle, then we loose sight of reality. If it is asserted that two things are the same, yet that principle of reference is not stated, and we proceed to assume that they are the same, as a premise for a logical argument, then we are victimized by sophistry.

That is the case with your op. It is sophistry. You declare that "the same information" is transmitted by different media, without any statement as to the principle by which we can call this "the same"information. You assert that it is the same, and the reader is meant to assume that it is the same, but no reason is given as to why it ought be called the same.

And the problem goes deeper, because if such a principle is brought forward, then this is admittance that what is called "the same" is not really the same, but similar relative to some principle. And the argument which follows relies on "the same" being used in the absolute sense.

It must be hard for you to talk about differences in pressure or temperature when you don’t even believe in macrostate descriptions. Oh the tainted sameness of summing over microstates that make no significant difference. — apokrisis

As I said, it's a tainted sameness, because it's a matter of overlooking differences, and assigning "same", for one purpose or another. By way of contradiction, this is not a true sameness if it includes differences. When we allow such a designation of sameness, then the real differences are, of necessity, undisclosed in order that sameness may be declared. And the reason for not disclosing these differences, the purpose of concealing them, is therefore undisclosed as well. Having such hidden goals amounts to sophistry. Therefore allowing such a tainted sameness allows that we are victimized by sophistry.

Just because the word "red" refers to the thing which causes the concept redness in the mind, it does not follow that the word "red" is necessary for the existence of the thing, and by extension, the existence of the concept. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you claim here is false. Without the word "red" there is nothing that "red" refers to. That's the point. You are claiming that thing which "red" refers to would exist without the word red. But without the word "red" there would be nothing which "red" refers to, because there would be no such thing as "red". So this nothing cannot be an existent thing. To get to the point of asserting that there is something which "red" refers to, it is necessary that there is the word "red".

But according to google, a plane is a flat surface, and so we are really saying the same thing, and in which case our concepts of triangle-ness does coincide. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I am saying "plane", and you are saying "flat". By what principle of identity do you conclude that two very distinct words are "the same thing". And since it is very clear that these two distinct words are not the same thing, then it is also very clear that we are not saying the same thing when we say these distinctly different words.

But why would 'exact same' implies that accidentals have been included? — Samuel Lacrampe

This is how we distinguish between when we are referring to two distinct things which are similar to each other, and when we are referring to the exact same thing, by taking account of the accidentals. So it is by analyzing the accidentals that we determine whether we are talking about two distinct, but similar things, or that we are talking about one and the same thing.

As a side note, I thought your position from an earlier post was that universal forms (2) existed, in addition to particular forms (3). — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, that's what I was arguing. But I also argue that these two types of forms are categorically different, and that's why we need dualist principles to understand reality.

already occurred indirectly refers to now. The complete sentence being already occurred compared from "now".
same with your definition of future. — guptanishank

No, there is no reference to now in "already occurred". As I said, you are deucing now from "already occurred", by saying that "already occurred" must be relative. It is not spoken as relative, it is spoken as absolute. So it is only with the addition of the premise that "already occurred" must be relative, that you produce the deductive conclusion that "all ready occurred" refers (indirectly) to "now". That is why you even admit that the reference to now is indirect.

So overall your definition is circular, because now depends on past and future, and past and future depend on now as well.
Circular definitions as you know are absurd. — guptanishank

So there is no circularity in this description. "Now" is deduced from an understanding of past and future, while "past" and "future" are produce from inductive reasoning concerning observations of experience.

If you come to see that this is not circular, and accept the definition, then we can move onward to see how "time" is deduced from "now". But there is no point if you cannot get beyond the idea that defining "now" based on our experience of past, and anticipation of future, is circular. It is not circular because if you just start with the assumption of "now" you have no way to deduce a past and future from this assumption

No we experience now.
The experience is definitely of the past, but there would be no way to recognize the past from the future or anything else if now stopped. — guptanishank

Look what you are doing. You say that experience is of the past, and you could not differentiate between past and future if there was no now. So your conclusion of "now" is a logical conclusion derived from these premises. I experience past. There is future. Past and future are not the same. Your conclusion of "now" is not based in experience it is derived from deduction. What if there is no difference between past and future? Then your argument is not sound, and you cannot claim a "now".

You are still defining the past and future on "now". You'd have to define them on time, to define now, otherwise the definition is circular, if you are trying to define now on time. — guptanishank

No, past and future are not defined by now, you have this backward. "Now" is deduced from the assumed difference between past and future. If there is a substantial difference between past and future, then there must be a division between them. That division is called "now". We observe that in every aspect of living our lives we act and think as if there is a real difference between past and future. Past things cannot be changed, but looking toward the future we can act to influence what happens, whether it is something to be avoided or to be encouraged. So, based on these two premises, if there is a difference between past and future, then there is a now, and our observations that there is such a difference, we conclude that there is now.

So now is defined by past and future, not vise versa. Time is something completely different. It has to do with our observations of change.

This is where you keep getting unstuck. You keep arguing about whether ‘the same’ means ‘the same’, or whether it means something else. Whether your idea, and someone else’s idea, of ‘a triangle’, is the same or different. Whether the difference between two accidental objects (i.e. rocks) is intelligible. You are arguing here that because the way you describe ‘a triangle’ is different to the way another does, that this difference is significant. All I see in all of that is obfuscation. — Wayfarer

Perhaps it appears as obfuscation to you, but to me the beauty of the world is found in the uniqueness of each and every thing, with each and every minute difference. That is the basis of intelligibility, difference. The senses and the agent intellect act to determine the differences of the world. This is what Timaeus points to, the uniqueness of all the different animals, and different parts of animals, found in the realm of becoming. Understanding and knowing concerning the realm of becoming, is obtained through distinguishing all these differences.

The principle, that there is a difference which is not significant, is fundamentally unintelligible by way of contradiction. This is because by saying that it is a difference, you have already assigned significance to it. You cannot determine a difference without assigning significance to it. That there is a difference which doesn't make a difference is inherently contradictory. That is what Aristotle's law of identity is all about. And the law of identity forms the basis for logical proceeding. By saying that a thing is the same as itself, absolutely no difference is allowed into the designation of "same", and the logical process which follows.

So you really have your ontological principles, which form the foundation for epistemological principles, backwards, just like apokrisis. By allowing that there is a difference which does not make a difference, you permit a tainted sameness into you epistemology. The tainted sameness allows that two distinct things, can be said to be the same, because the difference is not significant. What follows from this tainted sameness, necessarily, is confusion. So in reality, you are the one engaged in what you accuse me of, obfuscation. The difference between my accusation against you, and your charge against me, is that mine is rooted in a firm principle. Yours implies that the judgement of which of the differences are important, and which are insignificant, can amount to nothing more than a matter of reference, so we leave ourselves defenceless against sophistry, those who will take advantage of different points of reference.

I have been reading up on Timeaus again, following your recommendation. The key idea that Timeaus introduces is between ‘that which always is’ and ‘that which becomes’ - being and becoming. The idea is that the Forms are ‘that which always are’, and actual things, particulars or individuals, are in the realm of ‘becoming’. Now at this stage, very little detail of how forms relate to particulars etc is left vague - it wasn’t until much later that the details were really considered. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is the premise of Timaeus, and it is a very important premise, because the incompatibility between those who profess being as a first principle (Parmenides etc.), and those who profess becoming as a first principle (Heraclitus etc.), has been well exposed by Plato's other dialogues. It was explicitly laid out in Theatetus. Aristotle demonstrated how being and becoming are fundamentally incompatible. It is impossible that one is reduced to the other. This produces the logical necessity for dualism which Aristotle exposed.

Hegel, now, in his dialectics of being, alters this, and designates being as the ultimate form of becoming, through negation. Now being is reduced to an aspect of becoming. Becoming is described as being which is negated by not-being, which is negated back again by being, etc.. What this does is allow for a monist materialism, as there is no longer the need for a categorical separation between being and becoming. Being and not being (the logical distinctions) are subsumed within becoming (matter), hence the development of the phenomenology of spirit, where being is an emergent part of the material world, rather than a separate, fundamentally incompatible, category. Now, in the western world, we tend to look at being as a phenomenon, which means that we know it through our sense information. This is distinct from turning our attentions inward, to see being directly within, whereby we apprehend the fundamental incompatibility between being (which is within) and becoming (which is external) .

So process philosophers assume this type of materialism, as a starting point. But you will notice that anyone who carries process philosophy through to its finality, in trying to understand the reality of the world through processes, ends up in mysticism, having to posit mysterious principles, or even God, to account for the temporal continuity of sameness, which is otherwise called "being".

have been reading up on Timeaus again, following your recommendation. The key idea that Timeaus introduces is between ‘that which always is’ and ‘that which becomes’ - being and becoming. The idea is that the Forms are ‘that which always are’, and actual things, particulars or individuals, are in the realm of ‘becoming’. Now at this stage, very little detail of how forms relate to particulars etc is left vague - it wasn’t until much later that the details were really considered. — Wayfarer

Actually, an outline for the relationship between universals and particulars is well laid out in the Timaeus, that's why the writing became so important to the Neo-Platonists and early Christians through the influence of St. Augustine. As you say, Timaeus lays out a realm of eternal unchanging forms (being), as well as a temporal world of evolving forms (becoming). The two appear to be incompatible as Aristotle will demonstrate. As I indicated in my earlier post, Timaeus posits a third thing, in the middle of the Timaeus, and this is "the receptacle", which receives the form in the divine act of creation. This is "matter" in Aristotle's conceptual structure, and I've seen one translation of Timaeus, (I think it comes from a Christian tradition) which actually uses the term "matter". But I believe that "matter" although it was mostly developed by Aristotle, was in use at that time already, perhaps by the atomists, and I think Plato was intent to create a separation from this term. Aristotle, through his use, brought the term in line with Plato's Timaeus.

So I think it is more accurate to say that Plato described this third principle, as the thing which receives the form, without actually giving it that name. Nevertheless, it provides a bridge between Plato and Aristotle, an approach from Neo-Platonism toward Aristotle's "matter". So "matter" is what relates the universal Forms of Pythagorean Idealism, (the realm of being), what is referred to as Platonism in general, to the changing forms of particulars, (the realm of becoming), which we find in Aristotle's physics.

Now to turn to your description of triangularity:

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed.

This idea is inherently contradictory. It claims that the concept of triangularity is necessarily perfect triangularity, but then it allows that a triangle may be of different types. Perfection implies one and only one, the perfect one. Having within the universal concept, different types, is a privation from perfection. Perfect implies One, it does not allow Many. It is impossible that there is a conception of the perfect triangularity when the concept itself allows for different types of triangularity. This is the problem with universals which Plato exposed when he caught a glimpse of "the good". No universal can establish itself in perfection, as "The Ideal", because the ideal is necessarily a particular, the best.

This is the gap, the categorical separation, between the proposed eternal forms, (universals), and the particulars. The idealist, such as yourself, wants to close the gap by claiming that the perfection of "The Ideal" is within the realm of the universal. "The universal is a perfection". But in asserting perfection, "The Ideal", "the perfect idea", is exposed for what it truly is, it is of necessity, a particular. This turns reality right around, such that the perfect Idea can only have real existence as a particular, not a universal. So the gap is closed by replacing the reality of the universal Idea with the reality of the particular Idea. This is why Plato's cave people who are seeing particular material objects, are actually seeing reflections, they are the reflections of the particular ideas which lie behind those objects. What is left is to explain the "matter" which is the medium between the Ideal particular Forms, and what the cave people are seeing and apprehending through universal forms.

No, I don't. Time is a universal. As such, it is immanent in particulars and not transcendent to them.

So, on a hylomorphic version of the cosmological argument, there can be no universals prior to the existence of the prime hylomorphic substance, including time or potentiality. — Andrew M

If you do not allow that the potential for the existence of an object precedes the actual existence of that object, how do you explain becoming? If the potential for a particular hylomorphic substance doesn't precede the actual existence of that substance, how does such a substance come into being from not being? Do all hylomorphic substances have eternal existence?

Why is it contradictory to you? It would be contradictory to understand the word "red" without the language, but not the concept "redness". Concepts are not made of words; rather, words point to concepts. A blind man may know the language, but cannot grasp the concept of redness if he has never seen a red thing. Therefore language is not the cause of acquiring concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

You argument is non sequitur. Just because a person may know a language without knowing a particular concept, does not imply that a person can know a concept without knowing a language.

There is no such thing as redness unless there is such a thing as what the word "red" refers to. And, there is no such thing as what the word "red" refers to unless there is language. Therefore there is no such thing as redness without language.

"Flat", "plane"... don't be so picky about the words MU. — Samuel Lacrampe

You said "exact same properties", so if I am not picky I have not carried out my obligation of due diligence to determine whether the conditions of "exact same" have been fulfilled.

What accidentals can you add to concepts? Remember that concepts are universals. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's the problem. "Exact same" implies that accidentals have been included. "Universal" implies that accidentals have been excluded. The two are incompatible by way of contradiction. Yet you insist upon using the two together, to say that I have the exact same concept as you.

But what about space? Common sense or default position is that space or location is a physical thing. How can you back up your claim that it is not? — Samuel Lacrampe

Space is one of the concepts which we use to understand relations between things. So we say for instance, that there is space between the chair and the table. Upon analysis we find that there is air between the chair and the table, so it is not really space which is there. Likewise, one might say that there is space between the earth and the sun, but upon analysis it is found that there is electromagnetism, gravity, and other things there. So it is not really space which is there. Space is just a concept which we use in our measuring of things, it is not a real physical thing.

The child abstracts the concept of redness solely by seeing red things. The understanding of language is not necessary for abstracting the concept, but it is to test if the child got the concept or not, simply because us observers need to ask the child questions. If we could pierce into his mind without asking questions, then he would not need to understand the language. The language is necessary only to know the words which point to concepts, not to obtain the concepts themselves. — Samuel Lacrampe

So your claim is that the child understands what "red" is without understanding language. Why is that not contradictory to you?

Are you suggesting that universal forms are identical to minds? — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I'm not saying that at all. I don't know how you derived that conclusion, it's far from what I said.

We went over this before but I will demonstrate once again for one concept. My concept of triangle-ness has the essential properties "flat surface" + "three straight sides". Does your concept have the exact same properties? If not, then what are they? — Samuel Lacrampe

Sorry, but my concept of triangle is not the same as that. Mine is of a plane figure, with three sides and three angles. See how different mine is from yours? Yours is "flat", mine is "plane". Mine has three angles. yours does not. Mine is the concept of a triangle while yours is the concept of triangle-ness. To have "the exact same properties", all properties, even the accidentals, must be the same.

Do you really believe that we can have concepts without language?

But I thought you agreed that forms were not physical, did you not? If not physical, then they cannot have any physical properties, such as a physical location. — Samuel Lacrampe

Space and time, as we understand them, are not physical things. Nor are the relationships between physical things physical things. This is why physicalists produce such a confused form of metaphysics, they take the descriptions which physicists produce, concerning the physical world (descriptions of relationships between objects), and treat these descriptions as if they are actually physical things.

I am familiar with how the argument goes. To succeed, the argument must be consistent with what we observe and what we observe are hylomorphic particulars such as the builder, the blueprint and the building, not immaterial forms or formless material. — Andrew M

The cosmological argument is consistent with what we observe, as well as consistent with logical principles derived from what we observe. Do you recognize that in every case of a hylomorphic particular, the potential for that particular precedes, in time, the actual existence of that particular? And do you allow a general, inductive principle derived from this fact?

This really comes down to Wittgenstein's private language argument. Hylomorphic particulars are public observables. — Andrew M

What it comes down to is whether or not you are prepared to accept some simple logical principles derived from our understanding of reality.

The question is about time and as it is a dimension time can exist without any forces but not the other way around. — TimeLine

A "dimension" is a conceptual construct, as is "force". I do not think that the concept of "force" relies on the concept of "dimension", because human beings had an understanding of force before they created dimensions. Also, I would say without hesitation, that human beings had an understanding of force before they had an understanding of time.

But if you want to talk about some natural, real thing which these concepts refer to, we need some definitions, because I think that the consensus in physics is that "time" doesn't refer to any real thing, just like "dimension" doesn't refer to any real thing.

If now is considered as a division between the future and the past, then you'd have to define the "future", and the "past". — guptanishank

Correct, the past refers to things which have already occurred, The future refers to things which have not yet occurred.

You can only experience "now". So if "now" did not change, there would be no past or present. — guptanishank

I disagree with this. Experience is always of the past. What you have experienced is always in the past, and if you try to speak about, or even think about what you are experiencing now, the experience which you are thinking about, or speaking about is in the past. It really doesn't make sense to say that you experience "now" because by the time you say that, it is in the past. Therefore experience is of the past, not now.

I define Time as “change in now”. — guptanishank

This may not be correct. Consider the possibility that now never changes, it is always the same, and what is changing is the physical world. Now we have a physical world which is changing relative to the unchanging now. What constitutes now is that it is a division between future and past. (I see you never mentioned this fundamental aspect of time in the op.)

In the physical world there is a future, and the future is forced to become the past, the static now is what the future is being forced through, transforming it into the past. The questions of "what is time?" now become what is this force; what causes the future to become the past; how does now transform the future to the past; and what does this transformation consist of.

If we start with the last question, we can analyze the difference between future and past, to proceed toward a resolution of the other questions.

Goodness, no. What on Earth are you suggesting? — Banno

I noticed that the referred article suggested that the practising astrologer ought to use the technique of fishing. And I recognize that there is a lot of different angles to astrology; take a look at the center of that chart for example. Do you not think that the use of mathematics with the art of fishing might be productive? After all, there is a lot of so-called science which is just based in statistics and probabilities anyway.

Children abstract the concept of redness simply by seeing a few red things. — Samuel Lacrampe

No they don't.

Simple proof: ask a toddler to pick the red ball out of other coloured balls, and as long as he can understand the language, he will do so correctly. — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, now you add another qualification, the child must be able to understand the language. That just proves my point. Which do you believe, does the child abstract the concept of redness solely by seeing red things, or is the use of language necessary as well?

Are you asking how we know that universal forms (2) are one, and not duplicates in individual minds? The ontological principle that supports this is the law of identity. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, the law of identity does not support this. It states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore it doesn't say anything about universal forms, it says something about things.

Universal forms (2) or concepts have no accidental properties, by definition of being universals.
These forms, although in minds, are separate things from the minds they are in.
The law of identity states that if "two" things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing.
Therefore the form in two minds must be one and the same in both. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is a very poor argument. First, you beg the question with your definition of universal form, by saying that they are separate from the minds which they are in. That is what you are trying to prove, that they are separate from the minds. Then, you still do not have any premise which allows you to assume that concepts in different peoples' minds have "the exact same properties"? I would assume that being in different minds is a case of having different properties.

Note that the builder is a hylomorphic substance. It is the builder, not his mind, that is the causal actor. It is he that is constructing the building so that people can live in it (the final cause). — Andrew M

Actually, the builder's mind is the cause of the various activities of the builder's body. So ultimately, it is the builder's mind which is the "causal actor" in this case. That is what final cause is all about, and this is understood through the concept of free will. The mind sets into motion physical bodies. But the decisions of the mind, which set these motions, are not caused by any physical motions themselves. So the chain of causes, which we trace back from the existence of the material building, through the hands of the builder, ends with the intentions of the builder, hence "final cause".

That is also the form that the cosmological argument must take if it is to be coherent. It is hylomorphic substances all the way down. — Andrew M

No, this is just a statement of your prejudice. You probably aren't even acquainted with the cosmological argument so you just assert that it must be consistent with what you already believe in order to be coherent. But its coherency is based in principles which you haven't considered yet.

Yes, the form of the building can be represented in a prior blueprint. But that doesn't imply that form is separable from matter. Both the blueprint and the building (and also the builder who has the form in mind as the building is constructed) are hylomorphic particulars. — Andrew M

What implies that form is prior to matter, and therefore has separate existence from matter , is the nature of the particular in relation to the nature of time. That is the cosmological argument. The fact that the mind of the builder, with the form of the building, acts as final cause to create the material building, is referred to to explain this peculiar understanding of reality which is necessitated by that argument.

I don't necessarily agree with any form of astrology in particular, but I do think that the cosmos and the human world are related. — Agustino

I have wondered about the validity of Astrology when it comes to the birth of a child because even though current, modern thought is that a woman is pregnant 9 months, she is really pregnant 10 months, 10 lunar months. A lunar month being the four weeks (28 days, same as a procreation cycle of a woman) it takes for the moon to go from a new moon, to a full moon and back again, would make a pregnancy last for ten months. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

So Agustino, why would you think that the astrological calendar would be better than the lunar calendar, in its representations of relations with the human world?


Are you an angler at all?

We, as Americans, cannot assume that those in power are good actors. — creativesoul

That's why you need massive arms stockpiles, to defend yourselves from those in power. Seems like paranoia.

Wasn't Jesus' quarrel with the Jews, not the Egyptians?

Pot has been a great stimulus to help consider alternative opinions. And its something I would heartily recommend those that think they are open minded on this Forum.
As an artist is has enhanced my imagination to improved my output. — charleton

I agree with both of these, as benefits of pot usage. Perhaps by slightly altering your mind it opens your mind to alternative perspectives. It seems to assist the power of empathy.

don't agree. I think physics qua philosophy is in a state of complete and possibly terminal confusion. — Wayfarer

I second this motion. What is at the heart of this confusion, I believe, is a complete lack of understanding of the nature of time.

I think you are using the word 'concept' ambiguously. You mean it in the sense of understanding of a sentence or text. I mean it in the sense of contingent universal forms (2). In that sense, only single words point to concepts, not whole sentences, and these are the same in all subjects that have abstracted it, as demonstrated in my previous post. Therefore, either a subject has abstracted the concept of 'redness', or he has not because he is colourblind; but there is no possibility of misunderstanding concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how a concept could be apprehended on the basis of one word. The concept is always the meaning of the word, and it requires an explanation to understand the meaning of a word. The concept of redness is not grasped by seeing red things, it is grasped by understanding what it means to have the property of being red. So I think this paragraph is way off track from what a concept really is.

That's okay, if they are two separate things because located in different minds, it could be that my concept is an exact copy of your concept. But I don't think this is true. Since concepts are not physical, they cannot have a physical location. Instead, I think that my mind and your mind connect to the same concept. This could explain how communication is done: to communicate is to connect to the same concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

This could be the case, and it appears to be what Platonic realists claim. The difficulty with this position is to support the existence of these concepts with some ontological principles.

But the chair can't be ontologically separated into matter and form. That is the false premise of dualism. — Andrew M

Correction, it is your opinion that this is a false premise of dualism. The Neo-Platonists, following the logical principles which make up Aristotle's cosmological argument, see the need to conclude that the form of the object is prior in time to the material existence of the object; and, it acts as final cause of the object, in the same sense that the blueprints for the building are prior in time to the material building. From this perspective, your claim that the matter and form cannot be ontologically separated has already been proven to be false, and that's why dualism has been so prevalent in the past. It is not the case that modern philosophers have proven dualism to be false, they just totally ignore, and neglect the arguments which prove the need for dualism.

There’s your ‘unconscious modernist bias’ again. In ancient philosophy, ‘the individual’ was hardly a matter of consideration. The subject of debate was the relationship of universals and particulars. — Wayfarer

I don't see your point here. I would use "individual", and "particular" here interchangeably, they would be synonymous. I happened to use one instead of the other. You know, Plato and Aristotle wrote in ancient Greek, and there is a large difference between different English translations of these works. For Plato, I like B. Jowett because the words he uses are simple, what I think is more representative of the original. When I see complex and specialized terms used for translations of ancient material, I tend to think that the translations represent the interpretation of the translator rather than the intent of the author. The use of simple terms with a broad range of meaning creates ambiguity, but ambiguity is a useful part of artistry, and whether its intentional or not, it enters into philosophy.

Poets use a lot of ambiguity. It increases the size of the interested audience by allowing the words to have different importance to different readers. I think we approached this topic once, with respect to interpreting holy scriptures. In philosophy ambiguity is employed for different reasons. One can create a shroud of mystery with ambiguity, like Heidegger does, and this is common in mysticism. Wittgenstein is very crafty with ambiguity, literally playing games with words, laying out traps for unsuspecting readers. What he does is to define a word in a very particular way which is not completely consistent with common usage, it is one particular way of usage. Then he proceeds to banter using the word, producing various examples using that word, inviting the interpreter to fall into habits of common usage, habits which give the word a meaning different from the specific defined meaning. Then the reader is invited to produce logical conclusions which can only be drawn through equivocation. He is very sly, not to explicitly state the conclusion himself, but to imply that the conclusion ought to be made. So the unsuspecting reader makes the faulty, equivocation based conclusion.

I think that there was much ambiguity in the time of Socrates and Plato. It appears like the use of it was rampant amongst the sophists. I believe Plato worked to bring ambiguity out into the open, expose it and leave it bare for resolution. This is how I see Platonic dialectics. Socrates goes through various interlocutors asking them what does this word mean to you. What does "beauty" mean to you? What does "just" mean to you? For each proposed "meaning" he proceeds to analyze it and find problems with it. As it turns out, none of the words analyzed seem to have an acceptable meaning, and that's probably why ambiguity is pervasive. If there is no single, one good meaning, for the word, then everyone produces a meaning which suits their own purpose according to the circumstances.

D'oh! The passage in question explains that quite clearly. It says, again: 'if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.' That is the essence of Aquinas' version of hylomorphic dualism: 'the senses' see the corporeal object, 'the intellect' grasps 'the form'. (Actually when you think about it, you can see a direct line from here to Descartes, except for Descartes' egregious error of treating res cogitans as a self-existent object.) — Wayfarer

We've been through this. That's why I say there is deficiency in the human intellect. It cannot grasp the form of the individual because it only grasps universals. How is it possible for the intellect to adequately know individuals if it only grasps universal forms? And if it cannot grasp the forms of individuals, do you not agree that this is a deficiency?

One of the things I have learned in this debate, is that the active intellect creates the concept, but the form is not created by the intellect, it is received by it. — Wayfarer

Remember, it is the passive intellect which receives the form. The reason for assuming a passive intellect is to account for the receiving of the form. It receives the forms which are created by the active intellect. Aquinas asserts that the passive intellect is immaterial, but as I said to Aaron, this appears like a possible inconsistency to me. As a passive thing which "receives", the passive intellect has the nature of potential, and the real existence of potential is substantiated by Aristotle as matter. So Aquinas asserts a potential which is not of the nature of matter, and since this potential is not substantiated in the Aristotelian way, through matter, it needs to be substantiated in some other way. Otherwise it is just like an imaginary possibility. Anything which is not contradictory may be stated as a possibility, but whether or not it is a real possibility is dependent on the nature of physical reality.

That's rather sexy that trailer. I suppose that's how they got such a following, with the use of sex appeal.

However the passage then goes on to say that while the Forms are 'concrete', they're nevertheless not material:

if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. — Wayfarer

Those are the forms received within the mind that are immaterial. The form of the object itself is also immaterial, in the sense that matter and form are distinct, and one is not the property of the other. However, there must be a distinction between the form of the object itself, and the form received within the mind, or else they would be one and the same, then the material object would be in the mind. It is not though, it is what is sensed. The difference cannot simply be matter, because matter does not constitute an intelligible difference.

And if so, they can't be 'received' from anywhere, because they don't exist until the mind conceives of them. — Wayfarer

They are received by the passive intellect, from the senses and active intellect. The passive intellect receives the forms which the active intellect "creates". Remember the active intellect is similar to the good, it gives intelligible objects their essence, as "intelligible".

So if I understand you correctly, particular things must have particular forms (3) because only forms are intelligible to our minds, and matter is not. Now why is that the case? If I perceive a particular chair, why can't we not simply conclude that it is because my mind perceives the matter of the chair through direct sense data? — Samuel Lacrampe

It is simply how the terms are defined. Form refers to the actuality of what the thing is, and matter refers to the underlying potential for change. So a thing, or object must have an intelligible "what it is" (form) regardless of whether or not it has been apprehended by a mind. But Aristotle strove to make sense of change, in his physics. So he allowed that the form, what it is, changes. However, the sophists contention was that if "what the thing is", ceases to be, and a new "what the thing is" begins being, then "becoming" is not a reality. There is just a ceasing of existence of one thing, to be replaced by the existence of the next thing. In order that a thing "changes", instead of ceasing to be, and being replaced by the next thing, he posited an underlying thing, "matter", which does not change, but persists through the change. This allows us to say that a thing "changes", its form may change while it still continues to be the same thing. What we sense, and comprehend with the mind, is forms, which are capable of changing, and actually are changing. We do not sense the underlying matter which does not change. Nor do we apprehend it with the mind, it is posited as a necessary assumption to account for the temporal continuity of existence.

Sorry if I was discourteous or unkind. — Wayfarer

No apology needed here. I didn't think that at all. I just wanted to impress upon you, that I have read the material, with the serious intent to understand and nothing else, and that it is extremely difficult. Because of this difficulty there are many misinterpretations and misconceptions concerning what these authors have written, even by professors and scholars. That a group of scholars reads some passages and comes to a consensus as to what has been said, does not necessitate the conclusion that any of them actually understands the material. I don't claim to have the perfect understanding, or interpretation, Aaron corrected me already yesterday, but I do believe that I have a better than average understanding of this material.

P1: It is evident that general forms (2) or concepts are the same in all minds. — Samuel Lacrampe

Read my last paragraph directed toward Wayfarer. The fact that there are many different interpretations of the same material, misinterpretations, and misconceptions, especially with extremely difficult material like what we are dealing with here, clearly demonstrates that concepts are not the same in all minds. In the case of very simple concepts, you might argue that the concepts are "essentially" the same, in different minds. But this is to ignore the accidentals, and Aristotle's law of identity is designed such that accidentals must be accounted for, so this does not qualify as a philosophically appropriate use of "the same".

No, it's not racist. Even if it were "unreasonable prejudice", unreasonable prejudice is not racism. Racism is about races not values. — Baden

But according to my post, I refer to a certain form of unreasonable prejudice, one which places the values of one's own culture as higher than another's. And culture is an aspect of race.

It's just a category error to say that if you think one set of values superior to another set that necessarily makes you racist. — Baden

It only makes you racist if you think this without reference to reason, the reason why one's values are superior to another's. If you can produce no reason, and you say this of prejudice, you are racist, because culture is an aspect of race.

Racist has to do with race, not with nation or culture. — Agustino

If you can separate culture from race, such that culture is not an aspect of race, then you might have an argument here.

My understanding is that just as matter is potency with respect for form, so form is potency with respect esse, which is the act of existence bequeathed by God to every finite substance. Aquinas is quite clear that angels are composites of potency and act. See "Article 2: Reply to Objection 3" at the link below: — Aaron R

OK, I stand corrected on this matter, thanks. But this is extremely difficult to understand, and it appears as inconsistency. In Aristotle's metaphysics, the existence of potential, which is central to his physics and biology, is substantiated by matter. It is the same problem we approached with Aquinas' description of the passive intellect. The passive intellect is said to be of the nature of potential yet it is immaterial. So Aquinas assumes a potency which is not associated with matter. For Aristotle, potency is inherently unintelligible due to its relation to the law of excluded middle. It is known by relating it to other things, analogy and metaphor. So the existence of potential is only made real (intelligible) by its relation to matter, and the assumption that matter is real.

If we separate potential from its association with matter, we need another principle to give it real existence, or else we just have an unsubstantiated assertion of reality. This is like the assertion that a possibility is a real possibility because it is a logical possibility. Any imaginary possibility (it is possible that a cow could jump over the moon) is a real possibility unless we insist that the possibility is substantiated by physical existence (matter).

This is why I think it is necessary to turn to Aquinas' conception of time to understand the existence of angels. When we look at the order of creation, the angels are after God yet prior to material existence. This implies time which is prior to material existence. Not all temporal existence is material existence. From here we can work to substantiate the concept of potential and potency, in relation to time rather than matter. So we may leave behind Aristotle's metaphysical principle, which substantiates potency with matter, and now substantiate potency with time.

And the related question: is it racist to believe one's values are better than others'? — darthbarracuda

The short answer: yes. All values must be judged by reason, and to accept one over another simply because it is of the culture that one has sprung from, is unreasonable prejudice.

At the end of the day, particular substances are what exist, whether material or immaterial, and a substance is always a composite of potency and act.

...

Aquinas supposed that angels exist as pure forms, but still as composites of potency and act. — Aaron R

I disagree with this aspect of what you wrote Aaron. Aquinas allows for substantial existence which is not a composite of potency and act. This is obvious in the case of God. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, a form is actual. Pure independent Forms, like God and the angels are pure act. Matter is what provides potency so independent Forms are pure act. This is most evident in God whose essence is His existence. The angels are also pure act, but having been created they are described as aeviternal rather than eternal.

In the case of angels, form plays the role of potency in relation to the pure act of existence ("esse") bequeathed via the direct creative power of God. — Aaron R

So this doesn't make sense at all, to say that form plays the role of potency, because it is an obvious inconsistency. The angels do not partake of matter, or potency, but having a slightly different temporal position from God, they have a slightly different relationship to potency.

But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer

I do not think it is correct to say that the A-T understanding is different from what I claim, because this is what Aristotle argues in BK 9 of the Metaphysics. This forms a crucial part of the cosmological argument, and his famous refutation of Pythagorean Idealism. I think I referred you to the actual passage earlier in the thread. He states that prior to being "discovered" by the mind of a geometer, the geometrical constructs do not have actual existence. They only exist potentially. And, the cosmological argument demonstrates that potential cannot be eternal, so the eternal Ideas of Pythagoreanism is refuted. The word "create" is mine, but to bring something from potential existence to actual existence is to create.

Furthermore, Aquinas in the Summa Theologica is very explicit about distinguishing between independent Forms, which are attributed to the divine, and human concepts which are mind dependent. I must admit that when I first read this in Aquinas, it threw me off, because I couldn't see where he was deriving this principle from. It wasn't until I read through Aristotle's Metaphysics again ( I don't know how many times that made) that I understood where he was getting this principle from.

That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer

What do you mean I'm not reading it right? The first three sentences, as the premise to the entire passage, state:

"EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual."

How can you ignore what is explicitly stated, as the opening premise, then claim that I'm not reading it right when I bring your attention to this?

Accordingly, geometric forms are both mind-dependent, and mind-independent. They're 'mind dependent' in that they're only perceivable by the rational intellect. But they're 'mind-independent' in that their existence doesn't depend on them being perceived by the intellect, and certainly not created by them. They exist - or rather, they are real - whether or not they're perceived. That is why Platonism is called 'objective idealism' - it says there are such things as 'real ideas', which is the crux of the entire thread. They're not 'in the mind', but can only be grasped by a mind. But the fact of them being both dependent on, and independent of, the particular mind, is, I think, my own interpretive contribution to this debate. I haven't seen reference to that argument anywhere in the literature (and if anyone knows better, I would be very interested.) — Wayfarer

You are mixing up mind-dependent with mind-independent in a category mistake, which can only lead to confusion. If you allow that some forms, universals, are mind-dependent, and other forms, the forms of particulars, are mind-independent, then you avoid this confusion. From this perspective a huge part of the A-T perspective will suddenly make sense to you.

So what you think is 'natural' or 'normal' - for instance, that particular things are intelligible, or that triangles are the creations of the human mind - is not at all what the classical theories say. (And I acknowledge my own inexpertise in the subject, but I honestly can't say that I think you know better ;-) ) But I will also acknowledge, you are about the only poster who is attempting to address the issue with reference to the classical tradition. (This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer

Here's something to consider. I've read the original material, and reread the original material, in some cases many times. Understanding does not come easy. The material is complex and layered. It takes a very long time for the understanding to sink in. Every time you go back you apprehend something which you missed before, because of what you've learned since. The cosmological argument only made sense to me more than twenty years after I first encountered it. And although I've understood Aristotle's principle that physical things consist of matter and form for a very long time, the arguments in the Timaeus for particular forms, and Aquinas' distinction between human concepts and independent Forms, only made sense to me after the cosmological argument did.

You insist that my interpretation is biased by a modern perspective, but this does not necessarily mean that I misinterpret, it may only mean that the material is very relevant in the modern world. Please, read Aristotle's Metaphysics BK9, ch 8 and 9, and then decide whether or not he is saying that triangles are the creation of human minds. Here's parts of a passage from 1051a,

"It is by an activity that geometrical constructions are discovered; for we find them by dividing. If the figures had already been divided, the constructions would have been obvious; but as it is they are present only potentially.
...
Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions are discovered by being brought to actuality; the reason is that the geometer's thinking is an actuality; so that the potency proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions that people come to know them..."

(This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer

I think that this is an excellent idea. Take the time and read the original material as much as possible. As I said, it's very complex and layered, but each time that you understand something new, it's a revelation which opens all kinds of doors toward understanding other things. University professors will typically focus on bits and pieces, offering an interpretation, and sometimes an entire platform based on these bits. Unless you take the time to read a lot of work by any particular author, and put the bits into context, you cannot even begin to judge the professor's interpretation.

The point you're arguing is that forms pertain to individuals, whereas I understand them to pertain to types. I dealt with that issue in this post, specifically, 'the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - types, not persons. An essence is general, not specific to the individual, contrary to what you're arguing.

I provided a reference. This whole paper is about ways in which Aristotle might be interpreted so as to support the notion of 'individual essences', which, the author says, he is sure Aristotle did not propose. This does result in many interpretive difficulties, but that is one of the shortcomings of the whole system. — Wayfarer

Here's a quote from the Wikipedia (of all places) entry on "essence":
"Aristotle moves the Forms of Plato to the nucleus of the individual thing, which is called ousía or substance."
As I said, I do not deny forms as types, or universals, I just see the need, as Plato and Aristotle did, to assume forms of particulars as well.

But OK, you have a different opinion than I, a different interpretation of Aristotle than I. Though I think you misunderstand, I respect the difference. The question though is which opinion, or interpretation best suits reality. Whichever best describes reality is the one we should go with.

Do you agree that we can only know things through their form, or essence, this is what is intelligible to us? The form, and nothing else is what is grasped by the intellect. And do you agree that we can know two things of the same type to be distinct, different things? If so, then doesn't this produce the conclusion that two distinct things of the same type must each have a different form?

The form, as such, is not physical, only the particular is physical. That is so even now, and very much to the point. 'A model of car' is not physical, it's a set of specifications which are then manufactured or real-ized physically. — Wayfarer

But don't you agree that the physical object has a form? Without a form, what would the particular object be other than random matter? Look at a car. It is not just random matter, it is matter with a particular form. When you look at the car, you do not see matter, you see particular aspects of the form, its colour, and shape. If you touch it, you feel other aspects of its form. You can hear some aspects of its form, and maybe smell some, or even taste some. But all these things which you sense, are aspects of its form. That's why the physical object, that particular car, is intelligible to you as that particular car because it has a form, and you've come to know its form. The form is part of the physical thing, the part which you perceive and is intelligible to you. If you cannot distinguish one particular car from another, it is because you have not come to know each one's form well enough, not because they do not each have a particular form.

Upon abstraction, intellection, the intellect receives the form of the physical object. But it cannot be the exact same form which exists within the physical object, or else the mind would actually be that object by the law of identity. Let me refer you back to a quote you posted two weeks ago, pay particular attention to the first paragraph.

“EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual. Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower. But, whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; [this is 'body'] and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner [this is 'intellect']. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

The separation of form from matter requires two stages if the idea is to be elaborated: first, the sensitive stage, wherein the external and internal senses operate upon the material object, accepting its form without matter, but not without the appendages of matter; second the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and identifies it as a particular something.

Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable. The product of abstraction is a species of an intelligible order. Now possible intellect is supplied with an adequate stimulus to which it responds by producing a concept.

From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941. — Wayfarer

I don't think you will find a discussion anywhere of the difference between individual rocks, as such differences are accidental. You might find a discussion of the different types of rock. But recall that the notion of there being forms for 'dirt, hair and mud' are ruled out very early in the debates on forms. Again, you're thinking about 'intelligibility' in terms of particulars - that this or that particular individual 'is intelligible'. That is not how the ancients thought about it. — Wayfarer

Your claim "that is not how the ancients thought about it" is not right, because this is at the root of Aristotle's law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". Aristotle's rendition of the law of identity is intended to account for accidental differences, in response to sophists who could produce absurd conclusions from the assumption that two distinct things with the same description were logically the same thing.

It is like talking to a wall. — TimeLine

Communicating with me may be like talking to a wall, but I can see through you like glass. I hope you now recognize that what you promote is nothing but extremely faulty inductive reasoning.

We have an object, THC. We have numerous people who have experience with that object, many of them describing their experience. The vast majority, 89%, describe the object as non-addictive. A slim minority, 11%, describe the object as addictive. Your conclusion: therefore the object is addictive. Facepalm?

Do you not value human life? — TimeLine

Of course I value human life, but that's irrelevant, we're talking about marijuana here, not a deadly toxin.

There are simply levels of doubt. — guptanishank

What you call levels of doubt are really different senses of "doubt", So your argument really amounts to equivocation.

One I have made before, of not adequately defining terms before. — guptanishank

Right, once you produce a definition of "doubt", and stick to it, the problem goes away. The problem was caused by your assumption of different levels of doubt, which was really different definitions of doubt.

How could it work? — Banno

In its ancient form, I believe that astrology was used to predict the changing seasons and these predictions were quite useful to farmers. It may not be the first form of calendar used by human beings, as the moon calendar or a day calendar may be even earlier. But in this sense, as a calendar, I believe astrology could work. The moon calendar gets out of sync because there are not 12 even moons in a year, and the day calendar gets out of sync because there is not an even 365 days in a year. Apparently the astrological calendar gets out of sync as well, but that takes thousands of years.

THC is not physically addictive, like some drugs which have serious withdrawal symptoms in which illness can follow abstinence. — charleton

Try telling that to TimeLine.

Did you click on and read the link that defines clinical addiction? IF 11% of 183.3 million is more than 20 million, how is that a low percentage to you? — TimeLine

Do you even know what "percentage" means? 11% is a low percentage whether the overall number is two, twenty, twenty million, or twenty billion.

Look, you are focusing on the descriptions from the 11% who purportedly get addicted, while totally neglecting the descriptions from the vast majority, the 89% who do not. So you conclude THC is addictive based on that small minority.

Do you not see that this is extremely faulty inductive reasoning? Suppose that 11% of people saw a certain object as green, while 89% saw that same object as blue. Would you insist on the conclusion that the object is green? Your argument makes no sense at all. As in the case with the 11% which say that the object is green, I would say that your 11% who are purportedly addicted, just have difficulty describing what they experience.

Just reminding you of your doucheness. — TimeLine

I don't think you've told me what doucheness means yet. Care to elaborate?

There is clarity around what these percentages mean, around the likelihood vis-a-vis excessive use whereby the potential damage could occur, the risks to the brain if taken for a lengthy period of time etc. How you read the statistics is your problem, but it is not actually a problem. — TimeLine

Right, you're starting to see reason. How I read the statistics is not actually a problem. It's how you read the statistics that's a problem. You focus on a very low percentage of cases, completely ignoring the vast majority of cases. Then you claim that the reports which that small minority make concerning the object (THC), represent the true properties of that object. So you treat the vast majority, which includes me, as if we're chopped liver. I think I know what doucheness means.

Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".

But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point is that there must be both, general forms and particular forms. Suppose there is a blueprint from which a product is mass produced. We still have to account for the difference between each of the items produced. They cannot be the same in the sense of identical, because each is unique. You might be inclined to say that the differences are "material" differences, rather than formal differences. But if the difference can be described (in the sense of "what" constitutes that difference) it is a formal difference. Descriptions, as what the intellect can grasp, are always formal, as the intellect only grasps forms.

This is Leibniz' principle, "the identity of indiscernibles". If two items have the exact same form, they are necessarily one and the same thing. So we must allow that even products which are mass produced, have a different form from each other. Since the mind only grasps forms, if the numerous items had the same form, we would have no principle whereby we could say that one is not the other. But we do say one is not the other, therefore there is a difference between them, and they have different forms.

But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. — Samuel Lacrampe

Under Aristotelian hylomorphism, all physical things consist of both matter and form. It is a type of dualism. That is the fundamental principle of Aristotle's physics, which you and Wayfarer don't seem to be getting. Physical existence is composed of these two constituent parts. So it makes sense, in a way, to say that forms are not physical, as you do, but the form is a constituent part of the physical.

Some philosophers prior to Aristotle had posited a "prime matter", like the atom. The prime matter was supposed to have no form whatsoever, but capable of taking any form. This allowed that all things are composed of the same underlying thing, prime matter (perhaps atoms), which, by themselves have absolutely no form. Having absolutely no form under the Aristotelian system, would mean that they are absolutely unintelligible. What Aristotle demonstrates with the cosmological argument, is that matter cannot exist without a form. Matter without form is an illogical principle. Therefore the concept of prime matter, though it was very useful for the scientific investigations of his time, is something which cannot possibly be real.

After Aristotle, the Neo-Platonist respected his cosmological argument, because it is very strong. The argument though, proves that matter cannot exist without a form, but it allows that form can exist without matter. So the Neo-Platonist took up the cause of independent, non-physical Forms, while maintaining consistency with Aristotle. But when you say "forms are not physical", this is not the whole truth, because a form may be physical, or it may not be physical, depending on whether it has material existence.

Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you are not respecting here, is that to describe the properties of a thing is to describe its form. Properties are always aspects of the form of a thing. That's what makes the difference between rock A and rock B intelligible, the fact that they have different forms. If they didn't have different forms, then the difference between them would be unintelligible, and the claim that rock A is not rock B would be an unintelligible claim.

Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?) — Samuel Lacrampe

So this is a mistaken claim. We cannot explain differences in properties by referring to matter. Matter on its own (prime matter without form) is inherently unintelligible. Having the nature of potential, it accounts for what may or may not come to be, violating the law of excluded middle. The intellect can grasp forms only. So if we can differentiate between two objects by referring to different properties, it is differences in form which is being referred to.

It's more about the inherent unreliability of the physical senses. That comes out more clearly in Thomism as was discussed earlier - the 'corporeal senses' receive sensations from the 'particular', whilst the 'incorporeal soul' apprehends the form. — Wayfarer

All right, but when the incorporeal soul apprehends the form, through the means of the mind, that form is always apprehended through universals. This necessitates that some aspects of any object, are always neglected by the mind, as accidental. The mind apprehends what is perceived as essential to the object, while missing the accidentals. But the nature of a particular is such that each accidental is essential to its existence as the particular which it is. The accidentals are what give it its uniqueness.

So the mind suffers from an inversion of the same limitation which the corporeal senses suffer. The senses can only detect particulars, while the mind only knows universals. So the mind is limited in its capacity to know and understand the uniqueness of the forms of the particulars of the sense world.

To claim that forms only exist as the universals which the mind apprehends represents a misunderstanding of the nature of reality. Where Plato and Aristotle clearly agree is on the idea that each particular must have a form proper to itself. My argument is that the human mind is limited in its capacity to know the form of the particular.

That link between the reason for something, and its existence, or essence and existence, is what was severed by nominalism, culminating in the typically modernist view that things exist for no reason, or only out of 'adaptive necessity', or perhaps that 'existence precedes essence' in existentialist terminology. — Wayfarer

This is why the position I argue is not a nominalist position. Nominalists proceed away from realism in the opposite direction from me. I see that reality is more complicated than what the realist believes, because I see two distinct types of forms, particulars and universals. These are known by Aristotle as primary and secondary substance, primary being the form of the object itself, secondary being its description. The nominalist claims that reality is simpler than what the realist believes, dismissing the reality of forms altogether.

I think the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - to types, not to persons. You see the difference? In other words, all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate ideas, one for each individual. — Wayfarer

OK, but the form of a thing is "what" the thing is. So the question is this: Do you not believe that there is a "what it is", which is specific, and particular to each individual human being, and object? In other words, there is a description which describes MU, one for Wayfarer, and one for Samuel Lacrampe, etc.. If there is a particular description which is proper to each particular person, then it is necessary to conclude that there is a particular form which is proper to each person.

An essence is general, in that more than one individual may have the same essence 1; and the essence is the 'is-ness' as can be seen from the etymology of the word 'essence'. (This of course leads to many other conundrums, such as whether Socrates can be thought of as a man, or mankind, generally, which is, I think, one of the inherent shortcomings of Aristotelian logic.) — Wayfarer

An essence is general, but we can ask of the individual, the particular, "what is the essence of an individual". And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals.

I really can't see how this can be correct. — Wayfarer

It's a really straight forward principle, and I do not understand why it's tough for you to grasp. Say you and I are both human beings, and it is this universal form, "humanness" which makes it true that we are both humans. This is the universal form. However, there is something which makes you Wayfarer and me Metaphysician Undercover, and this is the particular form which we each have. So we must assume that each person and thing has a particular form that is proper to it, which makes it the unique thing which it is, allowing us to identify it as itself, and distinguish it from others. This is fundamental to Aristotle's physics. All existing matter has a form which is proper to it, and it alone, such that if any matter had the same form, it would necessarily be the same matter.

haven't really started studying the Timaeus yet, but from my reading of the summary I can't see where Plato proposes 'individual forms' of the sort you're proposing - if you could point that out I would be obliged. — Wayfarer

I would say that the entire book is an argument for this principle, that each individual thing has its own form. Timaeus describes all different types of things, explaining how each has a form unique to it. Let me see what I can dig up quickly. Start at the end of 30, going into 31, where Timaeus emphasizes that the universe is "one", a unique and individual thing, rather than two, or an infinite number of similar universes. He spends some time describing Same and Different. At 44 he is describing how intelligence is the ability to distinguish between what is the same and what is different. He then provides a physical description of the human body. By p49 he starts to talk about what later becomes known as "matter", as the "a receptacle of all becoming". He discusses the nature of this receiving thing for a few pages.

I see at 51 he says: "Is our perpetual claim that there exists an Intelligible Form for each thing a vacuous gesture, in the end nothing but mere talk?" Then he offers a brief argument to support this claim. By page 80 he is describing very particular things, particular motions, and how they are not random, just particular. Then he gets into the uniqueness of fragmented parts, and the specifics of various diseases. He continues to describe all the uniqueness in the world, and how this is good and a perfection, closing the book with this

These then are the conditions which govern then and now, how all the animals exchange their forms, one for the other, and in the process gain intelligence or folly.
And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its conclusion. This world of ours has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living thing containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one universe, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.

However 1 in 9 cannabis users meet the clinical criteria for dependence as described by the ICD10 or DSM-IV. — TimeLine

Ok, so we're down to 11%. To me, that's already a low percentage. Now how many of those who meet the criteria for "dependence", meet the criteria for "addiction"?

Thus, under appropriate conditions, it can be demonstrated that THC and related cannabinoid agonists have an addictive potential and fulfill the reward-related behavioral criteria for drugs of abuse." — TimeLine

I would assume that if 11% of the people who try marijuana get addicted to it, you would say that it has "addictive potential". I would also assume that if 1%, or if.1%, or .01%, or .001%, (etc.), of the people who try marijuana get addicted to it, you would also claim that it has "addictive potential". That's why I claim that your use of statistics is "bullshit". The statistics are meaningless with such usage.

Consider my example of the claim that the use of LSD causes chromosome damage. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that some so-called "scientists" experimented on some creatures, giving them LSD, and found that a small percentage of those creatures displayed chromosome damage. So, they claim, "LSD causes chromosome damage". You see the deficiency of this claim don't you? In the way that I stated the example, there is no control group, and it is highly probable that the few incidents of chromosome damage were caused by something other than the LSD.

Now apply this to your claim that marijuana is addictive. You have a low percentage of the people who try the drug getting addicted to it. You have no control group, and therefore no scientific means of saying that the addiction is not caused by something other than the drug. So I put it to you, that since the rate of addiction is so low, it is highly probable that the addiction is caused by something other than the drug.

Another key feature of all addictive drugs is the increase in dopamine levels where the brain reinforces the positive and pleasurable effects it has that causes a person to continue the use that only increases in strength as one becomes more tolerant to it. — TimeLine

Do you believe that the addiction to sweets is caused by sugar? If so, why don't you turn your rant toward a real problem sugar addiction, rather than a pseudo problem, THC addiction.

3) I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. It seems to be an unnecessary hypothesis: What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter? — Samuel Lacrampe

This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity, and his hylomorphism. Every object has a "what" it is, which is proper to it, and it alone, this is its form. According to the argument in the middle of his Metaphysics, the important metaphysical question to ask of existence, is "why is anything what it is, rather than something else?". He argues that when an object comes into existence, it is necessarily the object which it is (what it is), and not something else. It is impossible by contradiction that it is something other than what it is. So he concludes that the form of the object is necessarily prior to the material existence of the object, in order to fulfil this condition, that it is impossible that the object is something other than it is.

Plato gets to a very similar conclusion through a long and round about adventure which spans his entire career of writing. He expresses this in the Timaeus, as the creation of material objects from the divine mind. Form is given to material existence, in the process of creation (what I called information earlier in the thread). Plato's method is more like this. We see that things are desired, wanted by the human mind, as "the good". So the human mind designates something as "good", and forms a conception of that object, then proceeds to give physical existence to that object, produces it. So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world.

And since naturally occurring things exist with an intelligible order, or form, Plato sees the need to extend this principle to all material things. They must have been created by an intelligent mind in order that they are observed to exist with an intelligible form. So the same principle of creation is followed in natural things as in artificial things, such that the immaterial form of the thing precedes the material existence of the thing. And this is necessary in order to account for the fact that things are intelligible, i.e. that they have intelligible forms.

I hope that this satisfactorily answers your question: "What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter". What is explained by assuming that each thing has its own particular form, is the intelligibility of the material world. Consider that if we could not distinguish one thing from another, the entire world would appear as random nonsense. It is the act of distinguishing differences within the world, which we all do, that is the act of making sense of the world. This is what the various senses have evolved to do, each one distinguishes a different type of difference, and the mind tries to make sense of all the different differences.

So it is the fact that each thing has its own particular form, peculiar to itself, which makes the world intelligible. That is why we manage to tell the difference between one thing and another, rather than being confused. But as soon as we accept this fact, as the brute fact which it is, we are faced with the much more difficult, and very imposing question, which Aristotle asks, of how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else.

In any case, the 'noumenal object' is indeed something like 'the ideal object' - something as it truly is, as distinct from how it 'appears for us'. Kant says we only know how things 'appear to us'. — Wayfarer

Right, so this is the difficulty exposed by Kant. How do we reconcile "the ideal object" (what the object really is, it's real form) with "what appears to us"? Kant implies that this cannot be reconciled, and therefore we cannot really know the physical world. All we can know is the phenomenal, what appears to us.

But recall that passage from Lloyd Gerson on Aristotle, where A. says that when we know something intelligible, then the mind is 'identical with that intelligible'. That plainly cannot be the case with any actual object which is by its nature separate from us. — Wayfarer

So this is the exact problem which I've been referring to, how the human mind is deficient. The mind cannot become identical with any particular object, because it desires to know every object. Therefore it has evolved to know universals rather than particulars. The result is that we cannot know any particular object to the point of perfection, because we identify with these particulars through the means of universals. This principle indicates that we cannot know, completely, any particular object.

When we know a logical or mathematical truth, then that truth is immediately apparent in a way in which knowledge of a particular cannot be; it is known 'in the mind's eye' so to speak, which is higher than the 'corporeal eye'. — Wayfarer

A logical or mathematical truth is a universal truth. But remember, according to Plato's hierarchy, this is not the highest form of knowledge. The highest knowledge is knowledge of the Forms. And to understand the Forms is to understand that each particular has a Form proper to it, which cannot be completely apprehended by the human intellect. This knowledge of the Forms is not sense knowledge, it is derived from reasoning, but is indicative of the defect of sense (phenomenal) knowledge. And through extension we learn the defect of logical and mathematical truths. As universals they cannot completely know particulars. Despite the fact that mathematical principles are grasped immediately and completely, they cannot give us a complete understanding of reality, which consists of particulars. There is a categorical gap which we need to reconcile through principles other than mathematical principles.

It is more that they're illuminated by 'the light of the Good'. We see by that light the truths of reason, that possess a certainty that sensible things cannot. That is how we can know 'a priori', and on the basis of reason alone. — Wayfarer

I agree, it is "the light of the Good". The Good is the light which makes intelligible objects intelligible. But this principle casts our attention in the direction of "the good", if we desire to follow, and understand the true nature of intelligible objects. And the good is inherently subjective, it is determined from within, by the subject and that's why it is associated with pure reason, not requiring anything empirical. It is the basis of the a priori because it is what inspires us to agree on a definition, we see that it is good. But in recognizing "the good", we are required necessarily to turn our attention inward, and recognize the particularities of the subject. And when the particularities of the subject are recognized as real, we are induced to extend this to all material existence, and recognize the particularities of all material things as a fundamental aspect of reality.

Agree. This is one of the notions that Ockham exploited - he depicted the forms in such a way that suggested 'a heavily populated universe of discourse'. — Wayfarer

Please read my reply to Samuel, above, as to why it is necessary to assume particular forms of individuals in order to account for the intelligibility of material existence.

I think there's a version of that in Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena - 'noumena' means really 'the ideal object' which is I'm sure Platonic in origin. In the secondary literature I see hardly any reference to this kind of interpretation. — Wayfarer

This is what I see as the riddle of Kant"s "Critique of Pure Reason". He refers to the noumenon as "intelligible object", yet he disallows that the intellect can apprehend noumena because our understanding is limited to phenomena. "Intelligible object" in this sense, can only be understood as of Platonic origin, and immaterial, but Kant posits the phenomenal world as a barrier to a true understanding of the intelligible world. We cannot access intelligible objects directly with our intellect because we must interpret phenomenal objects in any attempt to understand the intelligible objects which lie beneath.

Plato, on the other hand seems to allow that the human intellect can apprehend intelligible objects directly, through the means of "the good". And I tend to lean more toward Plato here because I believe that there must be a way that ideas come to us purely from the inside, without the necessity for a phenomenal medium. This is fundamental to decision making, the will, and the creative power in general. These come from within. There is a movement from within, from thinking, through the act of decision making and conception, outward towards the creation of an object.

So despite the fact that we hear and see words as sense phenomena, the intelligible object is always created within, based in an individual's own values (the good), such that the real intelligible object which we form in conception is always coming from within. We receive information from the sense world, such that information is always phenomenal, but the means for interpreting must always come from within. This is the very important problem which Wittgenstein addresses at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. The means for interpreting cannot be taught to us because we would always have to be able to interpret what is being taught. As he implies, we must always already know a language in order to learn a language. He goes in the wrong direction though, finding a way to avoid this issue rather than facing it.

But this little problem implies that our real access to the intelligible realm is through the internal not through the external. In this way, the intelligible realm, the noumenal, which appears as transcendental, and inaccessible to the human intellect, for Kant, due to the very nature of transcendence, becomes immanent, and therefore intelligible to the human intellect, due to the direct internal access, in this interpretation of Plato.