How possibly could a blind person understand 'the concept of colour', when colour is a purely visual experience? (On second thoughts, don’t try to explain that.) Surely the blind can understand 'the concept of a triangle' because aside from imagining it, they can handle it, feel it, pick it up - shape is tactile. But a colour is a different matter altogether, being solely visual. — Wayfarer

A blind person can understand the concept of colour through definition, description, just like one can understand the concept of triangle in this way. If conception was as you describe here, experience dependent, then we could never understand things which had just been described to us, but we had not seen. The various fields of science demonstrate that the true nature of conception is within definition, as there is much which is described and conceived of, without having been experienced.

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image. — Wayfarer

That's a particular triangle you are imagining, not "triangle-ness". I can't imagine triangle-ness without using defining words. And that's the difficulty I had with Samuel's post. Samuel was trying to separate concepts from the words which define them, such that a blind person could not conceive of a triangle because one could not see an example of a triangle. But this is not conception at all, this is imagination. Conception is much more difficulty to understand than imagination because it involves word use convention and inter-subjectivity. One cannot properly conceive of "triangle-ness", without proper word use.

This is what I believe is at the root of the question of "is information physical", word use. I believe definitions are the essence of a concept. Concepts exist as definitions and descriptions. So to understand the nature of a concept we must understand the nature of words. It is the very nature of words, that they cross the boundary between external (physical) and internal (mental), with very little change, we can perceive them clearly. There is very little difference between words imagined within one's mind, when an individual is thinking, and words heard when one is listening. we remember them clearly. What differs is the source of heard words versus words brought up in imagination. So when we consider the significance of words, what is important is the difference between the author and the auditor.

Suppose we remove the physical barrier between these two, the author and the auditor, so that we can represent information as non-physical. Let's say that words pass from your mind to my mind, and back and forth, without the medium. What exactly would the word be then? Words exist within my mind, when I'm thinking of what to say, as representations of the physical entities which I've heard. Without that physical aspect of information, I wouldn't be thinking with words, because they are something which my mind has represented from the physical realm. But what would the concept be then? Right now, concepts exist as descriptions and definitions, but without words, there'd be no such thing. That's why I think it's a mistake to insist on this idea that information is non-physical. The deeper one goes into this analysis, the more it becomes apparent that if information was non-physical it would turn out to be absolutely nothing. So in order that information has any real existence, as anything at all, we must assume that it is physical.

The procedure I prefer then, is not to deny the existence of the non-physical altogether, because we know from other arguments that despite the need to consider that information is physical, the non-physical is very real. We simply accept the reality that information is necessarily physical, and deny the non-physical existence of information. This allows us to approach information for what it really is. It is instances of the non-physical soul, making use of the physical world. We know that the non-physical soul makes use of the physical world already, because that's what the living body is, an instance of the soul making use of the physical world. And we can see that in all human endeavors, they are instances of the soul making use of the physical world.

In this light, Kant's distinction of phenomenal, and noumenal, becomes very intelligible. Kant restricts knowledge to the phenomenal realm, what we receive through our senses, information. Knowledge is phenomenal, it is produced from information, and information is what we get through our senses, it is physical. But in describing things in this way, he necessarily has to posit the noumenal to support the independent existence of what is sensed. The noumenal cannot be physical because it is what we cannot sense. So we arrive at the reality of the non-physical in another way. The non-physical supports the independent existence of the physical. Now we are faced with the task of figuring out how the non-physical soul may apprehend the non-physical noumena directly, without the use of the physical medium, information.

Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

How can one imagine triangle-ness without any physical properties? Isn't that exactly what triangle-ness is, a physical property?

As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem here is that space and time are not properties, so neither can place be a property. That's why motion is so difficult to understand, it's not the property of an object, it is a relationship between objects.

And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained). — Samuel Lacrampe

How would you propose to determine the spatial-temporal location of a concept?

agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this. — Samuel Lacrampe

How are you defining "objective" here?

And, with respect to your discussion concerning the concept of redness, all you are doing is defining "redness" in such a way to ensure that a blind person cannot apprehend the concept of redness. I disagree with this type of definition of "concept". I think that if you explain to a blind person, the concept of red, then that person can understand that concept without having to see an example of red, just like a blind person can understand the concept of triangle without having to see an example of a triangle. One needs sight to see the property "red" but not to understand the concept "red".

What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, your definition of "ideal" is completely different from mine. Ideal to me means perfect in conception. Therefore a thing cannot be an ideal. You define ideal as the perfect thing.

I would not use the word 'ostensive' to describe learning a meaning by reading long texts. Ostension is pointing to a dog and saying 'dog', jumping and saying 'jump' or making a sad face and saying 'sad'. — andrewk

No, "ostensive" means learning by direct demonstration, and that's what giving examples is, just like drawing triangles is demonstrating the meaning of "triangle". The difference we are discussing here is the difference between giving the meaning of a word by definition, and giving the meaning of a word by demonstration. You seem to be of the opinion that definition is the preferred method for presenting the meaning of a word. My claim is that demonstration gives one a better understanding of what the word means.

But even my sort of ostension is prone to error. It's possible that I've got the wrong idea of what other people mean by 'dog' and our success in communicating about dogs thus far has been a happy coincidence of the fact that the animals we were talking about lay in the intersection between my understanding of dog and yours. — andrewk

Yes, that's what I said about this type of learning, it is a matter of "faith", in the sense that one must have faith that the teaching authority is truly an authority. And the problem, as I explained, is that you cannot make the appropriate judgement on this until after you have learned what the teacher is teaching, until after it's been taught to you. You may have an opinion, that the supposed authority is truly an authority, or not, prior to the procedure, but just like going to a movie, you don't know for sure whether you will like it until after you see it.

My understanding of language use is mostly WIttgensteinian, so I see my use of 'dog' or 'potential' as elements of a language game that often, but not always, works in everyday life. But it all falls apart as soon as we move away from everyday life into metaphysics. — andrewk

That's odd, I find the very opposite is the case. I found that everyday use of words was very odd, with the way that many words are used being strangely inconsistent and ambiguous. I am one who has always had difficulty communicating. Communication does not come easy for me, so my word use is deliberate. When I studied metaphysics I found that word usage suddenly started to make sense to me. Word usage was always a puzzle to me, and in ancient philosophy such as Plato and Aristotle, with all the demonstrations, I found that the pieces of the puzzle started to fit together. So I see everyday word use as very fragmented, but metaphysics makes sense of that fragmentation.

It sounds like becoming an Aristotelian involves a process of initiation into a new language game, that involves a lot of reading. I am not inclined to do that because, while that language game may be fun (Feser certainly seems to enjoy it), it doesn't seem to lead anywhere.

As a wise member of the previous forum once said:

"Fancy piles of words cannot oblige the universe to be thus and so'

(or something like that). — andrewk

I can speak from experience, and tell you that all the reading does lead somewhere, it leads to an understanding. "The way the universe is" is not what is at issue here, what is at issue is understanding. Anyone can make statements defining "the way the universe is", but what's important is understanding. And we all desire to understand, that's human nature. But this is where you're very clearly lacking faith. You do not believe that the alleged authority is really an authority, you have no faith in that proposition, so you dismiss the endeavor as a waste of time.

What is required is that any defined terms used in the proof have exact, objective definitions. However it is not mandatory to use any defined terms. One can write a proof without any defined terms, in which case no definitions are needed. — andrewk

OK, I think I understand, if a definition is used, it must be unambiguous. An ambiguous definition would not qualify as a proof because the conclusion may be the result of equivocation or misunderstanding. But a proof can be made without any definitions.

In the case of making a proof without definition, the meaning of the terms must be properly demonstrated in order to avoid ambiguity. This is the case in Aristotelian metaphysics. The meaning of the important terms is demonstrated by numerous examples through many pages of text. This requires attentive study and dedication from the student. You called that a leap of faith, but "faith" here would imply that the student believes that the effort is worthwhile. That is the nature of ostensive demonstration, it requires effort to learn, and one must have faith in the authority of the teacher. It is only discovered after the practise, whether the effort was worthwhile or not.

You seemed to be saying earlier in the thread, that this type of argumentation, through a demonstrating of the meaning of terms rather than a clear definition, does not constitute a proof. Now I see that you believe that it may constitute a proof. And whether or not it actually constitutes a proof is not a judgement which you can make until after you've put in the effort to understand the terms.

To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas? Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from something else; thus a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several "patterns" (and therefore Forms) of the same thing; e.g., "animal" and "two-footed" will be patterns of "man," and so too will the Idea of man.Further, the Forms will be patterns not only of sensible things but of Ideas; e.g. the genus will be the pattern of its species; hence the same thing will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in separation; — Πετροκότσυφας

This is exactly the question which Plato addresses in The Timaeus, how eternal Ideas may relate to particulars. The question has arisen as at the heart of the critique on Pythagorean Idealism, such Idealism being supported by the theory of participation. The problem with "participation" had been exposed in The Parmenides. This is why the Neo-Platonists invert their understanding of the Forms, such that the true Form is a particular, rather than a universal, it is the One. And, the passive role of the Idea in "participation", as that which is participated in, is replaced with an active role of the One, in "emanation". The One is an active Form which emanates forth reality, rather than a passive Idea which is participated in. This allows that the relationship between the eternal One, and particular entities is a relationship of causation.

Why do you say "certainly, no change means no time". Humans realize time through change. The principle used is simple, If change occurs, then there is time. How can you invert this to say "if there is time, then there is change", to make your statement with certainty?

In other words, we know that time is necessary for change, because we abstract time from change. Therefore we know all instances of change involve time or else this abstraction would be invalid. But we do not ever proceed from the observance of time, to conclude that change has occurred. We cannot make this abstraction. Therefore we cannot know with any certainty that all instances of time involve change.

You have committed a fallacy of false equivalence, thinking that because all change involves time therefore all time involves change, as if time and change are equivalent.

Human beings make categories. Without a human being there is no time category. I'm asking if you think that there could be time without change. Or is the time category just an empty category?

So, not the numerically the same, but the meaning remains the same. — Wayfarer

OK, so the meaning is not numerically the same, then I assume you use "same" in the qualitative sense. This means that there is some difference between the two things which are being called the same, they are not one and the same, in the sense of numerically the same. Do you agree?

The whole point of the idea is that the obvious differences in the way the information is represented, don’t effect the message which is being transmitted. The argument is that the information content must be separable from the representation in order for this to be the case. — Wayfarer

But since there is some difference between the two things which are referred to as "the same", then we need to account for this difference. Why would this difference not be due to the (physical) way which the information is represented?

It is ‘the same information’ because no matter how it is represented, it always means the same thing. — Wayfarer

The information, in its various different forms of representation, doesn't mean exactly the same thing, the very same thing, in the sense of numerically the same. It means the same thing in the sense of qualitatively the same. Therefore there are still differences, accidentals. We need to explain the existence of these differences, and how else can we do that without considering the possibility that the differences in the physical medium are responsible for this. If the information were the same in the sense of numerically the same, we wouldn't need to consider the physical existence of the information, the very same information would come through different media. But the information is not the very same, it is qualitatively the same.

So I think that if the information could exist completely independent of any physical medium, it would appear in any physical medium as the very same information, numerically the same. But since the information is in some way dependent on the physical medium for its existence, it cannot switch from one physical form to another without some sort of change in itself.
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In other words, if it were purely immaterial, like the soul is believed to be, it could change from one physical form to another, maintaining its identity as the very same soul, numerically the same, despite having a completely different body. So take myself for instance, my soul had a different physical body when I was a baby, from what it has now that I am grown. But it's still the very same, numerically the same soul, now, as it was then. "The soul" serves as the underlying actuality, the underlying form, which allows me to say that I am the very same person which I was earlier. But "the soul" is not information. And "same" is used in the other way when referring to information. There is no single actuality which underlies all the different instances of the same information. This is evident from the fact that to be actual, information requires that it be interpreted. The act of interpreting gives the information its actuality, but this is carried out by an intellect which is independent from the information.

So you impute free will to all entities then? — Janus

No, I don't impute free will to all entities. You disagreed with the logical argument that the form of a material object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object with the claim that it makes things deterministic. I showed how it is not inconsistent, with free will, because the form could come from a freely made decision. This does not mean that the form of every material object is derived from a free will decision. It is possible that the form of every object comes about from a freely willed decision, and that's what those who argue that the universe is created by the will of God say. Still, this does not imply that the entities themselves have free will.

It seems to me, that you are just looking for excuses to avoid the argument I presented, rather than addressing the logic of the argument itself.

In any case, I would say that even in a case where free will is operating there could be no prior form (independent of the constraining present internal and external existential conditions which you have said constitute an entity's essence) which determines what an entity will become: because if there were then that so-called freedom would be determined by that prior form and not by itself; freedom cannot be freedom if it is determined by something apart from, and prior to, itself; it must be thought as causa sui. — Janus

No, the free choice determines that form, not vise versa. Remember, we are talking about an object coming into being. Prior to it coming into being there are no necessary internal or external conditions, because there is no object. It is only when there is an object, that it is necessary that there is an essence of that object. So by looking at an object we are inclined to describe its essence in those terms, of internal and external conditions, which it necessarily has, but prior to the object's existence, we know these as possibilities. Therefore it is evident that the form of the object which is prior to its material existence, which we know as possibilities, is fundamentally different from the form of the object which we know through its material form.

Or are you claiming that this form is free will? If so, the ideas of something formed and something free do not seem to mesh together very well. So, it remains entirely unclear to me as to exactly what you are trying to say here. — Janus

As I said, the logical argument necessitates that the form of the object is prior to its material existence. This form is not the free will, but the free will may determine this form. The human act of producing, or creating something is an instance of this. Prior to the object existing, there is no necessity of it coming into being. At the moment in time when the object comes to be the material object which it is, the moment which we call the present, what it is, is determined. At this moment the free will can act to determine what it will be.

Also, why must an act of free will be "an immaterial cause" if the the physical is not deterministic? — Janus

The physical is determined, by the forms. That was the original argument. You didn't like the argument because it was contrary to your belief that determinism isn't the case. I demonstrated that this is not inconsistent with free will, so determinism isn't a problem. That the physical world itself is deterministic is not a problem because what we are talking about here is the immaterial forms, which are distinct from the physical world. The physical world consists of all things which have come into being at the present. But what was the present has already become the past, so this is entirely past time. And past time is deterministic.

The possibility of error does not invalidate a measurement, the actuality of error does. — fdrake

I don't claim that the possibility of error invalidates the measurement. I assume that the measurement is accurate. I claim that the extrapolation is invalid due to the likelihood of unknown factors in relating the micro time scale to the macro time scale.

You keep on assuming that the extrapolation is the actual measurement. It is not. The measurement was for a one month period. The extrapolation is for 100 million years.

So I quoted you some stuff about the chronology of the universe - the stelliferous era, the one which we are in now, is predicted to have the same atomic physics through its duration. — fdrake

You still have not accounted for dark energy yet. If I understand correctly, the so-called expansion of the universe indicates that frequencies such as that of the caesium atom, are changing. I assume that all your statements concerning the stability of the stelliferous era are unjustified until dark energy is properly accounted for.

Instead of focussing on what we can believe evidentially about the actuality of the laws of nature changing, you instead internalised the laws of nature to scientific consensus - claiming that the laws of nature change because of changes in science. In some trivial sense this is true; laws are descriptions of patterns in nature, if our descriptions change the linguistic formulation of patterns changes or new patterns are given descriptions. — fdrake

Yes, the laws of physics, which are the human descriptions of nature, change. But this is not trivial, as you claim. They change because human beings really have a very limited understanding of the vast universe, and they are always learning new things which make them reassess their old principles. You seem to think that our knowledge concerning the universe is already conclusive, and there is nothing which is unknown. Therefore you claim that our descriptions and principles of measurement will remain the same. I think this is naïve. And, my example of dark energy indicates that a huge part of the universe, that which falls into the concept of spatial expansion, remains essentially unknown.

And in this, you provide the claim that the behaviour of oscillations between hyperfine states has been observed for one month, therefore measurement error analysis based on that month's observations cannot be used to calculate an error rate which is beyond the month. Maybe not beyond the month, you've been admittedly imprecise on exactly how 'the data was gathered in a month' actually changes the error analysis. Saying you have no idea of how 'it was gathered in a month' invalidates the quantification of error in the measurements. — fdrake

As I said, I don't say that there are errors in measurement, just in the extrapolation. Do you understand the difference between measuring something and producing an extrapolation from that measurement?

(1) You read the temperature from the thermometer at time t. Say that the duration of your observation was 1 second.
(2) There is a possible error associated with the thermometer and its error analysis which can multiply the error in an unbounded fashion.
(3) After 1 second, you do not know the temperature in the room since the error is possibly so large.

Try as you might, there isn't going to be any way you can establish the constancy of the laws of nature within a second through an a priori argument. All we have are perceptions of regularity and that stuff seems to work in the same way through terrestrial timescales in the real world. If this were something that could be reconciled a-priori Hume's arguments against it and Wittgensteinian-Kripkian analogues in philosophy of language and the whole problem with grue and blue wouldn't be there. It's always going to be possible that there's a huge unaccounted for error in the thermometer, therefore we don't know the temperature in the room on the thermometer's basis. — fdrake

We are not talking about measuring something, then turning away for a second, and asking whether the measurement is still valid, we are talking about measuring something then turning away for 100 million years, and asking whether the measurement is still valid. So your analogy is really rather ridiculous.

I would like to think you would also believe that this argument form is invalid, since it leads to the complete absurdity that it's impossible to form opinions based on measurements. — fdrake

Again, as I've stated over and over, the issue is not the measurement, it is the extrapolation. For some reason you seem to still be in denial that there is an extrapolation involved here.

At this point, you said taking the reciprocal and saying the clock has amassed that error assumes the clock is working for that long. In a trivial sense it does - since if the clock didn't function for that long it would have a different amassed error but not a different error rate. Unless, for some reason, you undermine the measurement process of the clock by saying it requires the constancy of the laws of nature... — fdrake

If, the frequency of the caesium atom is actually changing over time, like in the example of the earth's orbit actually changing over time, then the error rate will change over time, unless the frequency rate is adjusted to account for that change.

Edit: when I say there's no good reason to believe atomic physics will change in 100 million years, I mean that there's no good reason to believe that operation of nature relevant to atomic physics will change, not that the scientific understanding of atoms won't change in that time period. It will, it will get more expansive and more precise. If we're still even alive as a species by that point, ho hum. — fdrake

The point is, how well do the laws of atomic physics represent what is really the case with the activities of the atoms. Hundreds of years ago people would say that there is no good reason to believe that the length of a year would change in millions of years. Now they've been proven wrong. Do you not think that the atomic physicists of today, will be proven wrong in the future?

By metaphysical necessity, I mean the metaphysical necessity of a proposition. By the metaphysical necessity of a proposition, I mean that it's something true which is not contingent. Something that must be the case of necessity, and cannot change. I'm sure you can see that 'the physical laws will not change' is implied by 'the physical laws cannot change' - and in the latter statement is the expression of what I mean by metaphysical necessity of physical law. I don't think it holds. I don't think it's necessary for the clock to function as it does, and I don't think it's required for reciprocating the error rate in terms of seconds/seconds to get how many seconds are required for amassing a single second of error. — fdrake

I can't grasp your point here at all. If you take a measurement of one month, and extrapolate that measurement for 100 millions years, then in order for your extrapolation to be correct, the physical law produced by your measurement, "cannot change". Therefore any possibility of change negates the validity of your extrapolation.

We know the Earth is Moving away from the Sun and that the year is getting longer. I's been measured. — tom

OK, that's an example of how something which is assumed to be constant from observation on the short term may prove to be less constant on the long term.

We can measure and calculate the energy of transition between hyperfine ground states of the caesium atom. — tom

So, according to the paper that fdrake referred, this has been proven to be constant for a period of one month. On what basis does one claim that it will remain constant for 100 million years?

For the energy of transition of caesium atoms to change - a change affecting all caesium atoms everywhere simultaneously I presume - what laws of physics do you propose to change? — tom

You are falling into the same pattern of argumentation as fdrake did, asking me to prove that things will change. Fdrake insisted that this particular activity will remain the same for that extrapolated time period, so the onus is fdrake's to demonstrate that it will. From my perspective, I just need to demonstrate that change is possible, to refute fdrake's claim that this activity will necessarily stay the same.

For example, if prior to scientists knowing that the year is getting longer, some people thought that the year would remain constant for billions of years, and someone like me argued that this is a faulty extrapolation, how would that person, like me, be expected to know just exactly what was changing? It is not necessary to know what is changing in order to make this argument. All that is necessary to prove wrong the claim that things will remain the same, is to demonstrate the possibility of change. If change is possible, then the claim that things will stay the same is unsound.

My argument is that the extrapolation is faulty because there are too many unknowns which could influence things. So if you want to defend the extrapolation, then you should demonstrate that there are no such unknowns, do not ask me what the unknowns are, and how they will affect the proposed constant activity, because they are unknowns. However, I did indicate one such unknown factor, and that is what is called "dark energy".

Well, we had an argument over whether metaphysical necessity of physical law was required for the measurement to be accurate at that point. — fdrake

What do you mean by metaphysical necessity of physical law?

Whether in 100 million years the clock has the same error rate depends on whether the physical laws would change. — fdrake

Remember, we went through this, physical laws are descriptions produced by human beings. Let's see if we can maintain a distinction between "physical laws" and "the way things are". That the caesium clock has x number of cycles per second is a physical law. The evidence of experimentation demonstrates reason to believe that this is the way things were for a period of one month. In other words, the physical law which states x cycles per second of the caesium atom has been demonstrated to be accurate for a month of time.

The quantification of the error in terms of 1 sec/100 mil years and its equivalence to the stated error rate in the paper is a separate issue. — fdrake

I don't see how this is a separate issue, it is the issue. The question is whether such an extrapolation is valid.

So we had this super-discussion of the necessity of physical law - neither of us believed that it was necessary. But yeah, if you want to talk about the scaling of the error rate without, in my view, muddying the waters with all this talk of the metaphysical necessity of physical law, I'd be interested in chatting about it again. — fdrake

Perhaps I misunderstand what you mean by metaphysical necessity of physical law, but I do believe that if you want to extrapolate the way that you do, you need some principles whereby you can argue that what was observed to be the case for one month will continue to be the case for 100 million years.

Take tom's example, that it has now been proven that the earth is getting further from the sun, and the years is getting longer. That difference is so slight that people in the past would never have noticed it. They would do projections into the future, extrapolations as you do, without realizing that every year the length of the error grows by the tiniest amount. After a very long time, this tiniest amount multiplies into a larger amount. What if something similar is the case with the caesium frequency? This is just one example, of one possibility, but have you considered this possibility, that the error is cumulative?

I’m perfectly aware of the distinction between ‘the same’ in a numerical sense, i.e. ‘the same object’, and ‘the same’ as in ‘the same kind’. That has never been at issue. You’re changing the subject again. — Wayfarer

How can you say that the two ways of using "same" has never been at issue? My argument, from the beginning has been that the conclusion of your argument follows from an equivocation of those two distinct ways of using "same", though my way of expression may not be the clearest. I don't deny your right to use "same" in the way you do, I just question what it means. This is the first line from my first post to you:

This argument is very problematic as well. The word "same" here is used in a very unphilosophical way. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, do you understand the difference between these two ways of using "same"? One way is to say that two things are the same "qualitatively", that by reference to some quality or qualities, they are the same. This is what I call "same" based in similarity. The other way of using "same", what Sanford calls "numerically" the same, is to say that they are one and the same thing, what I call the very same.

At my table I have four chairs, and all four are the same chair, qualitatively, because they are members of the same set. But I sat in a different chair yesterday from today, because they are not the same numerically. I can only say that I sat in the same chair (numerically) if it is the very same chair, even though they are all the same chair, qualitatively.

Not at all. When Metaphysician Undercover came into this thread, it was to say that two sentences which say the same thing, don’t really say the same thing, but similar things, which devolved into a pointless argument about the difference between ‘similar’ and ‘same’. — Wayfarer

While I was trying to explain to you the two different ways of using "same", and produce my refutation of your argument on the charge that you equivocate, you just kept reasserting "it is the same information", and "you are obfuscating".

Now that you are fully acquainted with, and understand the two distinct ways of using "same", are you ready to analyze the argument, to see in what sense "same" is used in the premise, and to see in what sense "same" must be used to draw the conclusion, and determine whether there is equivocation? Perhaps we may come to an agreement.

So, when you say that two distinct sentences say "the same" thing which way is "same" used? It appears to me, like it must be used in the qualitative sense. The meaning can't be identified as the very same (numerically) because there are slight differences which we ignore as accidental, in order to claim that the meaning is the same. Nor can we produce a temporal continuity from one instance of meaning to another, (as we can with the chair), to say that it is numerically the same. Do you agree that "same" is used here in the way that Sanford calls "qualitative"?

I propose that time isn't actually a thing but that it is derived from the rate of change in the universe. If everything were to stop moving and changing then time would also stop. It is a sequence derived from comparing frames. I thought of this while I was studying calculus, which is in a way the study of change. — John

Time as a concept is abstracted from change in the universe. But don't you think that change is something real, which is occurring in the universe? And if so, isn't time necessary for change, whether or not any human beings abstract the concept of time? Then time passing is a necessary condition for change. Why couldn't there be time passing without any change occurring?

Right, so the second is defined by a physical constant, but the year is defined by a varying quantity. — tom

That's an arbitrary assumption, that the second is constant, and the year is variant. Because of this arbitrary assumption, any, and all discrepancy in measurement is assigned to a variance in the year, and no variance is assigned to the second, despite the fact that some discrepancy might actually be due to a variance in the second.

Consider this example. Assume that the length of the day is constant, and that the length of the year is also constant. However, they are not completely compatible, so there is a necessity of leap years. This does not indicate that one or the other, the year, or the day, is constant and the other is variable, it simply indicates that the two are incommensurable. Likewise, in the comparison of the second and the year, the need for leap seconds does not indicate that one is constant and the other is variable, it indicates that the two are incommensurable.

The clock will not be as accurate as it is now in 100,000,000 years. No one is claiming that. — tom

Actually, that seems to be exactly what fdrake was claiming.

I wasn't referring to determinism in that connection but to ontological determinism, where the nature of future entities is determined by their present internal conditions. even here it could not be rightly said that what entities will become is exhaustively determined by what they presently are because it is also determined by external conditions affecting them. — Janus

So my description of free will holds then. The nature of future entities is not necessarily determined by their present internal conditions, nor by their external conditions, it may be determined by an act of free will. And so you have no argument against the principle that the form of a thing is prior to the material existence of that thing. You reject this principle based on your claim that it is determinist, but it is not. In the case of free will the future of the object is determined neither by the object's internal conditions nor by the object's external conditions, it is determined by an act of free will which is an immaterial cause.

Seems to me that change takes time, so as to be classified as change in the first place.
Which, together with the mentioned empirical perspective (no change implies no time), intrinsically relates time and change. — jorndoe

Change takes time, that is self-evident, but why does no change imply no time? Don't you think that it is possible that time could be passing while things are staying the same?

But as for 'blurring the difference' - I am making a very general point about the ontology of ideas. I generally assume that most readers understand ideas to be ultimately within the individual mind (as MU has stated throughout). If pressed, most will say that ideas are, therefore, the product of the brain, which in turn is the product of evolution. This is the general consensus in modern culture. Of course its true that none of the pre-modern philosophers understood evolutionary science, so none could respond to it. — Wayfarer

Have you read Plato's Republic? He makes comparisons to breeding dogs, and choosing for favourable characteristics. At one point he puts forth a proposed system of eugenics. Breeding of human beings within the proposed republic is supposed to be completely controlled, to select for favourable traits. Who gets to breed is supposed to be arranged by a lottery, but the lottery is fixed, such that the rulers can control and breed for favourable characteristics. The controlled breeding is disguised, and hidden from the common people by what is called "the noble lie".

Particular Imagined existences are always part of general material existence though, and the material (in the sense of 'content') of imagined existences is always the material of material existence. — Janus

This doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying that matter has an imagination, and imagines what it will be prior to being that?

This argument holds only if determinism is presumed. I don't accept determinism so the argument has no power to persuade. — Janus

That's not true. The argument is very consistent with free will, so long as you allow that the human mind with its freely willed decision is the cause of the thing being the thing that it is. No determinism here. All material things can be caused necessarily to be the things which they are, without denying free will. The will is not a material thing, and acts as the cause of material things being the things that they are. It is the assumption that the will is a material thing which denies the possibility of free will.

So, what you think of as essence is something which changes constantly along with the conditions of your existence or is it something prior to your existence? — Janus

Of course essence is something which changes. "Essence" refers to what the thing is, so if a thing is changing so is its essence. This is well explained by Aristotle under the concept of "form". The form of the thing is "what" the thing is, and that became known as "essence" by the Latin speakers. The form is the actuality of the thing, what is active, while the matter is passive.

The issue I have with Metaphysician Undiscovered concerns his obfuscation over what it means to say 'two things are the same' or 'two representations have the same meaning'. — Wayfarer

Your confusion comes from your refusal to acknowledge the two distinct ways in which "same" is used. Not recognizing ambiguity and equivocation in your own use of the term causes you to be confused when someone attempts to point it out to you. My actions of attempting to explain to you these two distinct ways in which "same" is used does not constitute obfuscation. Your attempts to disguise this difference is obfuscation.

Try reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on "Identity", as a starting point. This is from the first paragraph of the introduction:

A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

No it doesn't. The second is DEFINED with respect to a material property of Caesium. The new definition would have been chosen to be close to a previous definition which it superseded, for convenience, but needn't be the same. I presume you are familiar with leap seconds (and leap years)? — tom

Yes, the second is defined that way, I am fully aware of this. However, the year is defined by the earth's orbit. For fdrake's claim that the caesium clock will continue to be as accurate as it is now for 100 million years to be true, the relationship between the earth's orbit, and the caesium frequency, must remain the same for 100 million years. The use of leap seconds demonstrates that this is highly unlikely.

You need to watch this. — tom

Interesting, but the point is this. The reason why the frequency is precisely 9,192,631,770 times per second, rather than 5 billion, 10 billion, or some other arbitrary number, is that the second is already is defined in relation to the year. So if they chose one of those other numbers, 5 billion times per second, for example, there would not be the right number of seconds in a day, and in a year. So what this statement ("9,192,631,770 times per second") represents, is a relationship between the activity of those caesium atoms, and the motion of the earth in relation to the sun. If that relationship is not absolutely stable, then that number cannot be represented as a stable number.

I posted it because you consistently seem to blur the differences between Aristotle, Plato or "the ancients" (not to mention Kant), while, at the same time, you speak of others (for example, MU or Janus) as not getting the basics of Platonism, platonic epistemology, Aristotle or whatever. — Πετροκότσυφας

This is a very good point, to consider the differences between the principles of these great philosophers. A very good example is found in the ontological differences which Neo-Platonism, and Aristotelianism expressed. Neo-Platonism with its immaterial Forms was accepted into Christian religion as fundamental teaching, by people like St. Augustine, and became foundational to their ontology. The Aristotelian principle of unmoved movers, eternal circular motions, provides a more materialist description which doesn't require immaterial Forms to account for material existence, because matter is included within the concept, as that which is moving.

In Aquinas we can see an attempt at the very difficult task of creating consistency between the Neo-Platonist traditions within Christianity, and the more recently introduced texts of Aristotle. As I said, this was an extremely difficult task, which required volumes of text, and despite St Thomas' arduous attempts at explaining the usage of different terms, some inconsistency still remains

This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige. — Samuel Lacrampe

There are faults in this statement. Just like in the case of describing an object, likewise in describing a concept, two people having exact descriptions does not necessitate that we are talking about the same thing. If I say "big and green", and you say "big and green", this does not mean that we are talking about the same thing. It is true, that if all properties coincide, then it is the same thing, (as per the Leibniz principle), but the human being doesn't have the capacity to identify all properties, so your claim that if two people produce the same description they are talking about the same thing, is unsound.

You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same.

It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around. — Samuel Lacrampe

There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. And, the act of using words to describe things is what gives words their meanings. I describe this process of ostensive definition to you already. So the opposite way around is just as important as the one you describe, describing objects in ostensive demonstrations allows one to learn the words, and this is necessary in order that we can proceed to describe other objects.

If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not coincidence, it comes through effort, and is called learning.

Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe

Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. That's why we happen to have similar concepts in our minds, there is a structured education system which ensures that we are all taught these similar things. The defense of my position is not difficult, because the evidence is everywhere within the institutions of our society. The institutions are set up to ensure that we are all taught very similar things.

You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I did not "move the goal post", I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. But this leaves "ideal" as meaningless. That's what you did, you defined the ideal as obtaining 100% on your exam, and then said that if you get it, you have obtained the ideal. By this procedure we could say that absolutely anything is the ideal, and always be obtaining the ideal. But that leaves "ideal" as meaningless because then the ideal could be anything which you want it to be.

How would I know? If I knew, then those measuring would know, and you wouldn't be making the claims that you do. Remember, my claim is that error in the extrapolation is possible, and therefore the claim you make, that the extrapolation will be the case, is not justified until you provide proper principles to back up this claim. Further, I argue that such claims about accurate measurement of temporality in the past, have proven to be wrong. And, the concept of dark energy indicates that we do not have a complete understanding of temporality. This evidence supports my claim that not only is the extrapolation possibly wrong, it is probably wrong. I do not claim to know anything about what the error actually is.

I like even more fdrake's correction that an ecology can't be seen as one monolithic system, but one composed of an entire assemblage of local, regional and global systems that interact with each other such that "overall system patterning must be understood in terms of a balance reached between extinctions and the immigration and recolonization abilities of the various species." So you don't just have this single trajectory from neonate ecology to legacy ecology constrained solely by geographic region, but, as it were, a whole slate of 'options' in-between that depend on local contingencies, and which, even more importantly, are patterned across time. — StreetlightX

What I'm interested in is how you would relate this description of interconnected systems and cycles to the concept of "growth". Growth appears to be a necessary aspect of an individual living being, and now its very common to judge economies in terms of growth. What is at issue, in my mind, is that if growth may be said to be something "good", then what is the proper description of growth which would best fulfil the conditions of being good.

The op describes "succession" as a growing. However, the end state of the growing, the "climax community" seems to be a well adapted ecology with a lack of growth. This end state is described as the best, such that the growing is not as good as the end state (lack of growing) which the growing brings about. So growth here would appear like a venture into instability, and therefore a bad thing if the climax community is a good state. However, growth is still necessary in order to produce the climax community.

So far, it is implied that growth involves a development of those cycles and systems, which are internal to the ecology. Some sort of boundary is also implied, and the boundary would distinguish between what is within the ecology, and what is outside. To me, the concept of "growth" implies a changing in the boundary. In its simplest form it might be an expansion of the boundary. But an expansion of the boundary is not necessarily "good", because this often leads to stretching oneself too thin. So a truly good growth might be a changing of the boundary in a way which better supports the production and sustenance of the complex inner cycles.

Here's the problem. The boundary, whether it's closed, open, or partially closed, indicates some sort of separation between internal and external. Changes to the boundary which are good for the internal are not necessarily good for the external. And the external must be respected as real, so "good growth" cannot be defined solely on the effects which the growth has within the ecology.

In ecological or evolutionary terms, one can think of this in terms of robustness: robust ecosystems, those that can best handle 'perturbations'.. — StreetlightX

I would assume that a perturbation is something with a cause external to the particular ecology. So I think you need to distinguish at least two distinct types of perturbations, one natural, and one artificial. I think "natural" speaks for itself, but if growth is defined by a changing boundary, then such changes could cause external perturbations, like poking a sleeping bear. So there must be two aspects of good growth, one which allows the ecology to handle perturbations, and one which prevents the ecology from causing perturbations.

I am wondering, are we part of the virtual reality, or are we real? If we are real, then I am real, and you are real, so you cannot be part of my virtual reality, you are real. If we are not real, then what difference does it make, even to ask your question?

A definition can't enable or disable the proof of a point of any interest, as any proof that uses the defined term can be converted to one that doesn't by simply replacing every instance of the defined term by that which it is defined to mean. For instance, if I have a proof about bachelors, and I have defined bachelor to mean 'Live, adult, male human that has never married', I can change the proof to one that does not use the defined term, simply by replacing the term by those italicised words, wherever it occurs. — andrewk

That's irrelevant, because all those other words would need to be defined as well, according to your stated principles of reasoning, which requires definitions. So these words could just be defined in a way which suited the purpose as well.

The purpose of a definition is to enable one to write shorter, more intuitive proofs. Semantically, introducing or removing a definition cannot change the provability of anything.

A useful definition is one that shortens a proof or attempted proof in a way that makes it easier to find a way through the logical maze. — andrewk

This seems to contradict what you were saying earlier, that reasoning requires exact, objective definitions. Your objection against Aristotelianism was that it didn't provide clear definitions which are required for proof. Now it appears like you are saying that definitions are not required for proof, they just make the proof easier.

Myself, I would rather read hundreds of pages of examples of usage of the terminology to make sure that I grasp a firm understanding of the meaning, rather than a few words of definition. The former ensures that I have a clear understanding of the things being proven, the latter only ensures that I can associate some words with some other words.

Just for a fun thought experiment redefine "God" as the creator of a virtual reality that we are in. — Myttenar

Who creates the "we" who are in this virtual reality?

Isn't this:

Now, one cool way of looking at a single animal - in this case you or I - is precisely as a kind of bounded ecology: bound by skin, we are walking, talking, systems of internalised cycles and metabolic processes. — StreetlightX

an example of rugged individualism? To think of an individual as a bounded ecology is to totally ignore the importance of the larger community. And when you discuss ecology in terms of closed ecological systems, you miss out on an important aspect of ecology, leaving yourself no premise for real growth.

For a non-A the worth of a definition is determined solely by its usefulness and clarity. — andrewk

I think that in metaphysics your principles would take us around in a circle. You say, that to prove something requires clearly defined terms. And, the worth of the definitions is determined by their usefulness. So it appears to be as I stated, you would produce your definitions according to what is useful to prove your point. And your point would be well proven because you would have produced the definitions which are useful to prove that point. So we would never make any progress toward actually understanding reality, we'd just be making up various different definitions to prove various different points

Because there's other interpretations, such as a doppler frequency shift due to velocity between us, which looks a bit odd in the face of light-speed is always the same in every frame of reference. Particularly when those measurements suggest a speed of closure or departure between them and us greater than c.

And it also looks peculiar when placed in the immediate vicinity of the Expanding Universe theory, where distance is said to change. Sorta makes one wonder what exactly is meant by velocity = time/distance — AngleWyrm

If I understand correctly, the activity which results from the expanding universe does not qualify as "motion". So the "distance" between objects may be increasing, but this is not properly called a motion.

No , I wouldn't agree to that. Try this explanation as to why I don't agree. The caesium clock uses a frequency of 9,192,631,770 Hz. This means 9,192,631,770 times per second. "Second" here is derived from the earth's orbit around the sun. So this number represents a relationship between the radiation of a caesium atom, and the earth's orbit around the sun. Until we understand why that relationship is exactly as stated, we cannot validly claim to know that the relationship will continue to be as stated.

There's no point in arguing over definitions. — andrewk

This has been our difference of opinion from the beginning. I believe that it is very important to argue over definitions. This process is sometimes called platonic dialectics, and it is through this process that we determine correct definitions. You seem to think that all reasoning and proofs, begin with definitions and proceed to conclusions, but I think you are completely excluding the ostensive proofs, and reasoning which are necessary for giving us correct definitions.

I expect we can at least agree on the following statements.

1. The OP would be considered by an A to be a proof.
2. The OP would not be considered by a non-A to be a proof. — andrewk

Actually I can't offer an opinion on this. I find the OP to be a very long argument, and at the same time overly condensed, summarized. I am simple minded and need things to be well spelled out in order to understand them, and I cannot judge something as a proof or not without adequately understanding it.

No, I haven't equated essence with existence at all; what I have said is merely that a thing cannot have an essence if it does not exist, because without existence (of some kind; i.e real or imaginary) there would be no thing that could be said to possess an essence. — Janus

But it's clear that the essence of a thing precedes the thing's material existence. This is the case when we make a plan for something, in advance. So an essence can be independent of the thing which it is the essence of.

A thing must first be ("that it is") before it can be something ("what it is"). To say that is something before it is; would be to speak nonsense. — Janus

No, this is not nonsense at all. Aristotle demonstrated logically that "what a thing is", its essence, is necessarily prior to its material existence. The demonstration goes something like this. Material things come into existence, they are not eternal. When a thing comes into existence, it is impossible that it is a thing other than the thing which it is. When the thing comes into existence it is necessarily the thing which it is, and not something else. Therefore what the thing will be is necessarily prior to the material existence of thing, to necessitate that the thing when it comes into being, is what it is, and not something else.

So, if a thing's essence includes its "accidentals", by which I presume you mean all its relations with other things; you would seem to be contradicting yourself, because a thing's relations constitute its particular existence, and in formulating it this way to you seem to be making its essence dependent on its existence; which is the assertion you are supposed to be arguing against. — Janus

What I mean by "accidentals" is properties which are not essential for calling the thing by the name that it is called. So for instance, I am still MU whether I had eggs for breakfast, or cereal for breakfast. What is in my stomach is accidental, so I am still called MU despite these differences, they are accidentals. However, a complete description of me, my complete essence, what I am, would include what is in my stomach.

The description of a thing's relations with other things is not part of the description of the thing itself, it is the description of a larger thing, of which the first thing is a part. To describe a thing, the thing's essence (what the thing is), is to describe everything inherent to the thing, and this includes accidentals which are inherent.

If a thing's relations with other, external, things constitutes a thing's existence, then we must keep this separate from the thing's essence. In defining "existence" this way, a thing having an essence, what it is, does not require that it has existence, relations with other things.

In any case for me essence and existence are inseparable and co dependent. The problem I have with the formulation " a thing is the same as itself" is that is unnecessary because it necessarily follows from " a thing is"; and also because it is misleading insofar as it suggests that a thing bears a relation to itself. There can be relations in a robust sense (as opposed to a vacuous tautologous sense) only between different things. — Janus

When you realize that the thing's essence (what it is) is prior to the thing's material existence, then this objection is seen as unfounded.

The Law of Identity is very simple: A = A. — Wayfarer

You obviously do not know the law of identity. This appears to be some logician's symbolic representation. Do some research, I know you're good at it.

To me, this is actually a relatively straightforward philosophical idea - agree with it or not, and nowadays the majority of people probably would not. But Metaphysician Undiscovered is in a muddle about this salient point, and I would discourage anyone who has persisted with this meandering thread not to keep flogging this horse, because it’s dead. — Wayfarer

Still not ready to analyze your argument to see whether you equivocate those two meanings of "same", I see.

How many times do I have to repeat myself? The inaccuracy is not in the rate derived from a month of observation, the average of x amount per second, for one month. The inaccuracy is in the claim that what was for one month will continue to be for 100 million years.

I like to learn wherever I can from discussions, and the lesson from this one has been that the gulf between Aristoteleans and non-Aristoteleans is immense. I am starting to think that it is bigger than that between theists and anti-theists. — andrewk

We agree. Fancy that. The Aristotelean / non-Areistotelean division is deeper than the theist /atheist division. I see the theist /atheist division as a manifestation of the other, like a symptom of the illness.

The As have no proof of their view, and the non-As have no proof of theirs. It comes down to core beliefs. — andrewk

Actually, as I demonstrated in this thread, this is not the case. You simply redefine "proof" in such a way that the A's proof does not qualify as proof under you restrictive definition of proof. That's the problem with your mode of argumentation, which is to make definitions and produce "proofs' as logical conclusions from these definitions. You can "prove" whatever you like, by tailoring your definitions.

A baby is born at 10pm in New York. Someone looks at their watch. Since the measurement process took a second, we can't justifiably say the baby's been born at 10pm. When you look away from a thermometer after checking the temperature, you can't justifiably say what temperature it is. You can't justifiably say the dinosaurs were around millions of years ago. You can't date trees based off their rings. All of geological history may as well be a myth, all of evolutionary theory has to be thrown away, every single measurement or calculation ever that was done must be discarded because it can't be justified since it's an extrapolation. Measurement error analysis is impossible, every psychological experiment ever done is bunk, every piece of anecdotal evidence is in even worse standing. The fabric of our social life disappears - we can no longer learn and generalise based on our experiences. — fdrake

We're talking about precision in measurement, not whether or not we should discard extrapolations which may have some inaccuracy in precision. I am not arguing that we ought to throw away the measurements of the atomic clock, just because they may not be as precise as you think they are. I am arguing that the clock may not be as precise as you claim it to be. Do you realize that if one very small factor is overlooked, then that factor is multiplied over and over again in extrapolation?

But here again, you extrapolate using a principle which may or may not be correct. Your principle here appears to be that if it is possible that a measurement may not be as precise as some believe it is, it ought to be discarded. So you extrapolate and say that all of our knowledge ought to be discarded because it may not be as precise as some people think it is. It's not the measurement that ought to be discarded, it's the belief that the measurement is more precise than the degree of precision which is justified, that ought to be discarded.

Radiocarbon dating suffers from the very same issue. We understand the rate of decay of C14 from our observations over a relatively short period of time. Then, we extrapolate to a much longer period of time, assuming that the rate of decay has maintained consistency over that period. There are other assumptions involved as well, such as the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. But the point being discussed here is the assumption that the rate of decay, which is observed over a short period, remains exactly the same over a long period.

Identity consists in the fact that a thing is; from that it follows tautologously that a thing is itself, and is the same as itself. — Janus

This is not true, because there is a difference between "what a thing is", and "that a thing is"; this is the difference between essence and existence. Identity is concerned with what a thing is, it's essence. What you have stated is that a thing's identity, its essence, is that it exists, and that's not true at all, because that a thing exists is common to all things, and this is completely different from what a thing is, which is specific to each thing.

The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.

This is the same nonsense. If you write a technical specification for a particular model of machine and then turn it out according to those specifications, you get the same machine each time. — Wayfarer

I'm sure that you recognize that two cars, the same model, same year, the same colour, are not the same car? This is the use of "same" that I am referring to. I do not deny that you can use "same" in your way, and call them the same car, that is not the point. Clearly there are two very distinct ways of using "same" here. By what you've stated above, the cars are the "same" car. But if you bought one of them, you would know that they are not the same car, one is yours, the others are not yours.

The point is that the law of identity indicates that they are not the same car. It provides the premise to assume that your car is different from other cars, despite the fact that it is one of a number. turned out from the same specifications, and is therefore the "same" according to your description above. So, your use of "same" here is contrary to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. In your usage, all the cars are the same, according to the law of identity they are not the same. My argument is that you only produce the conclusion of your argument in the op, by equivocating between these two, very distinct ways of using "same".

You’ve wasted thousands of words arguing about the meaning of the word ‘the same’. — Wayfarer

If I never demonstrate to you these very distinct ways of using "same", then my words are wasted. But if you accept the difference between these ways, and proceed to analyze the op argument, maintaining this distinction, then the words are not wasted.

Notice that the in that Wiki article, it says 'whether universals or particulars'. As far as I'm concerned, this thread is about universals, and in that case, any 'A' is equal to, the same is, any other 'A'. There's not 'my A', and 'your A', which are subtly different, because you and I think of them in slightly different ways. — Wayfarer

But your argument is that information is not the physical 'A' itself, it is what is represented by the 'A'. And what 'A' represents to me is not the same as what 'A' represents to you. What it represents to me is similar to, but not the same as, what it represents to you. Therefore it is not the same information, it is similar information.

That's because it's the same information, represented differently. — Wayfarer

The point though, as I've argued, is that it is not the same information, in the strict sense of the word "same" it is similar information which we call "the same" for practical purposes. That's why there is ambiguity and we can never be absolutely certain that we got the interpretation absolutely correct, because the information is not "the same", it is similar. We can only say that the information is "the same" by discounting the accidentals, and claiming that it is essentially the same. The accidentals are differences which are ignored because they are unimportant. So your use of "same" here is a form of "similar", it is not "same" according to the law of identity.

Now the conclusion of the argument doesn't follow unless "same" here is meant in an absolute sense. Any slight difference, accidental differences, between the representation in one medium and another, such as the fact that different media pose different limitations on the transmission of information, invalidates your conclusion that the information is separate from the physical medium, non-physical. Your conclusion is not valid it is based in an equivocation between two senses of "same". Now we are forced to consider these accidental differences, and the possibility that differences in the information are due to differences in the physical medium, as well as the possibility that information is actually physical.

This is what the whole thread is about from the word dot, you've been too busy wanting to argue to actually notice it. This is definitely my last response to you in this thread. — Wayfarer

I'm the only one whose stayed true to what the thread is about, and you are refusing to talk to me. That's because I've proven your argument to be wrong, and you're to stubborn to change your mind.