We walked on the moon in 1967. In 1968 MLK and RFK were assassinated, the cities burned, and in the following years the country realized the government was lying to us about the war in Vietnam. US society has never been the same. — fishfry

Actually the date of the first moon walk was July 20, 1969. Following that, there was a massive party of celebration at Woodstock, New York, from Aug15-18 1969.

Yes I have. I even explained to you the mechanism by which the cause is logically prior to the effect via the act/potency distinction. — Agustino

I saw no such explanation. What you said is this:

Yes, there is a priority in terms of potency and act. The line (or point or whatever) is a potency of the pencil which actually exists. This logical asymmetry between the two is what guarantees the logical priority of one over the other. That is why the pencil can cause the line, but the line cannot cause the pencil. — Agustino

This provides no argument that the cause is simultaneous to the effect. What you seem to be saying is that the potential for the effect is simultaneous with the actual cause. But your conclusion is just a category error. It's like saying that the potential for sunrise tomorrow morning exists simultaneously with the actual setting of the sun tonight, therefore the sunrise is simultaneous with the sunset. Do you see the category error of mixing actual and potential in this way?

Except that he says mathematical propositions (like other formal propositions) acquire their sense from extra-systemic applications, otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs. — Πετροκότσυφας

So that's a very big difference, isn't? It's the difference between truth as coherence, and truth as correspondence. I say that 2+2=4 because it is coherent within the logical system of which it is a part of. You say that 2+2=4 because this corresponds to something real. What does it correspond with? People using those symbols that way, and getting the results that they want.

The problem with your perspective, is as I've described, you have no basis for the claim that 2+2=4 is "right". The fact that you can use 2+2=4 to get the results which you want, does not make 2+2=4 "right", because getting what you want is not always what is right. The fact that 2+2=4 is a part of a coherent logical system is what makes it right. That is why your perspective is wrong.

The issue you raise, that "otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs" is not relevant, because correspondence is established by firm ontological principles. The Wittgensteinian approach is an attempt to avoid the need for ontological principles. As I've demonstrated though, it's a failing attempt because it gives us no realistic approach to the judgement of right and wrong, while firm ontological principles provide us with an approach to that judgement.

Depending on what we are talking about, the cause can be "physical" and the effect "non-physical", or vice versa. Or it is even possible that they both be "physical" or both be "non-physical". quote]

Right, so why would this mean that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical?
— Harry Hindu

Again you evade the questions we need answered in order to make any sense of what you are saying. — Harry Hindu

What question are you talking about? I am only objecting to your claim that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical.

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu

If, as you say, information is both physical and non-physical, then it would be useful for us to determine which aspects are physical and which are non-physical, in order to understand the nature of information.

So consider this. We have identified an object, and we have named it, "information". We agree that it is both physical and non-physical, but we still don't have a firm agreement or understanding concerning the nature of this thing. Do you not think that it would be productive to proceed toward analyzing how we distinguish between physical and non-physical within that thing, in order to get an understanding of the nature of that thing? For example, suppose we have identified and object which is both blue and not-blue. Do you not think that it would be productive to analyze how we distinguish between the blue and the not-blue of that object in order to understand the nature of that object.

In other words, if we agree that an object has contrary properties, my claim is that it is useful to determine the way that we distinguish between those contrary properties within that object, in order to understand the object. By the law of non-contradiction, we only allow that the same object has contrary properties at different times. That is why I used a temporal explanation in my last post.

Non-physical" does not always precede the "physical". The idea of your mother does not precede her material existence. If it did, you have a great deal more explaining to do - like how it is that you are even here - an effect of physical causes like sex and birth. — Harry Hindu

Ok, I agree that in some examples, the physical precedes the non-physical. Perhaps you agree with me though, that the way to approach this issue is through temporality, because that is the only way to accept that contrary properties are attributed to the same object. My argument was in the case of this one specific type of object, which we have identified as "information", the non-physical property precedes the physical because the physical is a representation of the non-physical.

Except that "two plus two equals four" is a mathematical proposition. Splitting food and assorting things is not. I was referring to the latter. Tell me MU, so that I might understand what you're saying, is "two plus two equals four" right according to you? If it is, in virtue of what is it correct? — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes two plus two equals four is right. It is right because it is consistent with the logical principles of mathematics which ensure that it is right. This is contrary to Wittgenstein's position that the statement "two plus two equals four" is right because it is an action which is consistent with certain descriptions of human behaviour.

Sure. You can always prefer math that fail to build houses and fly planes as good as the ones we use. Why you would do that, I don't know, I wouldn't and people tend to want houses that do not collapse and planes that do not crush, but, sure, you can do that. In a less queer fashion, the principles are the extra-mathematical practices and the practices internal to our mathematical systems, i.e. established procedures of calculation. — Πετροκότσυφας

Efficiency and success does not prove that you are right. This is very evident in the fact that one may be very efficient and successful in carrying out wrong, or evil activities.

So you give examples of where efficiency and success have been used to produce things which are taken for granted as being good things, and you conclude, therefore efficiency and success determines what is right. However you fail to account for the instances in which efficiency and success produce evil, and these instances are what demonstrate your position as faulty.

So, twice two four is not correct simply because "that's what everybody does". It is correct because we want ways to do stuff out in the world and we have found that this specific and syntactically rigorous system of calculation within which twice two four is decided, helps us do exactly that. Had you built an equally rigorous system which would help us do stuff out in the world and in which twice two twentyfive, would just mean that you built a new system, not that twice two four is wrong in the old system. — Πετροκότσυφας

See, "two plus two equals four", is not right because it allows us "to do stuff out in the world". Right and wrong are how we judge the stuff which we do in the world. If "two plus two equals four" only incited us to do bad things in the world, like "kill your neighbour" only incites us to do bad things, then we would have to judge "two plus two equals four" as wrong, like we judge "kill your neighbour" as wrong, despite the fact that we use it to do stuff in the world.

The fact that "two plus two equals four" allows us to do stuff in the world, is not what makes it right or wrong, because the stuff which is done with it may be either right or wrong. Therefore "two plus two equals four" must exist in relation to other principles of rationality to ensure that it is used properly, and therefore right. That is why I insist that the reason why "two plus two equals four" is right, is because it is consistent with other logical principles of rationality, not because it allows us to do things.

Right and wrong are judgements of the quality of the things done, not a judgement of the capacity to do things. So we must always refer to a further principle, one which distinguishes right from wrong, in general, to determine whether the stuff we are doing is right or wrong. And the fact that a principle allows us to do stuff does not make that principle right, because in reality, it is that principle's relation to the further principle which determines whether it is right.

The cause is the movement of the pencil, and the effect is the creation of the line, not its being. — Agustino

Oh sorry, I misunderstood. I wouldn't agree with this. The "movement of the pencil", and the "creation of the line" are one and the same thing. They are two different ways of describing the very same event. One cannot be the cause, and the other the effect, if they are the very same thing.

This is because its being depends on other - indeed temporarily posterior - causes relative to its creation. Of course, those causes, relative to its being, will also be simultaneous. — Agustino

We are talking about efficient causes here. According to Newton's first law, if a thing has being, there are no other efficient causes required to maintain that being. This is called inertia. If your claim is that in order to maintain its being, there are other causes required, which are simultaneous to its being, then these are not efficient causes, because efficient causes would be described as forces acting to change the being of the object. Therefore you argue by equivocation, assuming that since there is a type of cause which is simultaneous to the being of a thing, then efficient cause is also simultaneous to the being of a thing.

However, it is clearly demonstrable that if an efficient cause is associated with the becoming of a thing, then it is temporally prior to that thing. And if the thing is the effect of the cause, then the cause is temporally prior to the effect.

They are simultaneous. The fact that I don't see the point on the paper without moving the pencil out of the way does not indicate that there is no point that has appeared there, only that I do not see the point. Those are two different things. I don't need to see the point for it to be there. — Agustino

Do you know what the word "appear" means? To be visible. If you cannot see the point it does not appear. To claim that the point is there, before you can see it, is an unjustified assumption, just like your claim that the cause is simultaneous with the effect, is an unjustified assumption.

You still have done nothing to support this illogical claim that the efficient cause is simultaneous with the effect. You have demonstrated that this claim is derived from an equivocation between two ways of using "cause", and your demonstration, your attempt to justify the claim, is made by referring to something physically impossible (that the point appears before the pencil moves). So your claim remains illogical

Maybe at this point we should ask what we want the term 'real' to do for us. And I suppose also the concept 'physical'. Do either of these notions become become disturbed if I bring into the discussion the idea that memory is itself a reconstruction, that there is no such thing as veridical memory, and therefore we do t have access to a trailing order of pasts that we can line up and study?
By this way of thinking our past is actually in front of us in a way not unlike the present. Each past that we recollect is in a sense a fresh past, and points ahead of us. Recall is always for some future-oriented purpose of ours, so it is anticipatory. — Joshs

I agree with this way of describing memory, it is not veridical. But I think we assume that there is something "real" which the memory refers to. And this is how I would define "real", as what we assume as the veridical, the truth, what some call objective reality. In the case of the past, it is what we assume to have occurred regardless of whether or not it was observed, interpreted, or remembered. At the same time though, we must grant some reality to what is referred to in anticipation. I do not think that just because there is an assumed veridical necessity in "what actually happened", and a lack of such necessity in "what will happen", that things of the past can be said to be more real than things of the future. In relation to myself, who is a being at the present, things of the past, and things of the future, appear to be equally unreal; so if I grant to the past, in the form of an assumption, some sort of reality, I have no reason not to assume some sort of reality for the future as well. Therefore I assume that past and future things are equally "real".

But
if memory itself isn't just a veridical
internal carrying of external objects via symbolization, but an inseparable component of a relational complex of the experience of the present, an experience that is at every moment disturbing our sense of past as well as present, then we may want to reimagine physical as more radically relational than traditionally assumed. — Joshs

The meaning of "physical" is much more difficult, because it is as you say, relational. Exactly what is related to what varies greatly depending on usage, and may be quite difficult to understand, especially when the description is mathematical. So let me start with the most simple primitive set of relations, derived from the basic meaning of "physical", which is "of the body". I believe "the body" is a concept derived from relating past points of memory. Past memories indicate that there is something which remains the same, consistent, as time passes. I look around me when I get up in the morning and things are pretty much the same as they were yesterday morning. This consistency of things, which we apprehend by relating past points, is what Aristotle explained in his Physics with the concept of matter.

The existence of matter accounts for things remaining the same as time passes, and it is fundamental to the existence of the body, because the body provides that fundamental unchanging aspect of reality, which we infer is real, from relating the points of past memory. The unchangingness of the body, which is validated by the concept of matter, is taken for granted in Newton's first law of motion. It becomes "inertia". Through this concept, the related points of the past, held by memory and assumed to be supported by the real, are projected into the future, such that the the body is successfully predicted to maintain its course of existence through anticipated points of the future. What Newton states, is that this projection will occur necessarily, unless there is a "force" which interferes.

So we now have a second type of relation, the relation between the body and the force. Notice how the force is what interferes with the temporal consistency assigned to matter. Necessity and normalcy are assigned to the temporal consistency, and this is only broken by the force. The key point in understanding the force, I believe, is that it will only occur at the present. The force acts to break the continuity between the mapped points of the past, and the future projected points. This can only occur at the present. Therefore "the force" is inherently contrary to "the body", and in many ways it would be best to understand "the force" as non-physical.

However, in the study of physics, bodies are described as interacting. They interfere with each other's continued existence in time (inertia) and this must be accounted for. So the temporal existence of a body, its inertia, (its mapped past points), may be converted to force, in order to model its interference with the temporal existence of other bodies. But as described above, there is an inherent incompatibility between the body and the force, so the expressions are in some way incommensurable. The physical "body" is a representation of the continuity derived from the past points of time, the non-physical "force" is the representation of a change assigned to the present moment. That is why there is a significant difference between inertia and momentum, which philosophers need to respect. The difference is acceleration, which is essential to force, but incompatible with inertia.

So yes, the becoming of the thing is temporarily prior to its being. So what? — Agustino

You were claiming that the two, the efficient cause, and the effect, are simultaneous. That seemed very odd to me, so I thought I'd bring this to your attention. Now you seem to agree with me, they are not simultaneous, one is temporally prior to the other.

Take it another way. The pencil is the cause of a point on the paper. The pencil touching the paper, and a point appearing on the paper are simultaneous, not temporarily separate. — Agustino

But now I see that you are still trying to argue otherwise. "The pencil touching the paper" is a description of an activity, and this activity is necessarily prior in time to what is referred to as "a point appearing on the paper". They are not simultaneous. Try it yourself. You will never get the point to appear simultaneously with the pencil touching the paper, because until the pencil moves out of the way you will not see a point on the paper.

Sufficiency is irrelevant. The question was whether there is a type of priority which is not a temporal priority. Augustine suggested that there could be something which is logically prior to something else, without being temporally prior to it. The claim was that in the case of efficient cause, the cause is logically prior to the effect, but not temporally prior to the effect, the cause and effect are claimed to be simultaneous.

Some things can't come to exist without the priors. — Marchesk

Are these "priors" not temporally prior? If the "prior" is necessary for the existence of the thing, then isn't the prior necessarily temporally prior to the existence of the thing

This doesn't follow, because the future, when it becomes present will be physical in just the same sense as the present is and the past was. — Janus

No, that's clearly contradictory. The future is what is always ahead of us, just like the past is what is always behind us. To say that the future becomes present is contradictory therefore. What is the case is that events anticipated may become present, but the future does not become present. Likewise, we say that past events were present, and events occurring now will be past, but it would be contradictory to say that the past was present.

To avoid this type of confusion, I tried to be clear in my post, to distinguish between time as we experience it, and the physical world. What I was trying to do is to establish a relationship between these two, time and the physical world, not to conflate these two, as you are doing.

It is better to say that the future is non-actual; it exists only as potential, and if nature is not deterministic; what it will be is not yet determined. — Janus

So, with respect to this statement. We cannot say that the future is non-actual, because the future is just as real as the past. It is only by referring to physical existence, that we can make statements like you have here. So physical existence in the past is actual, and physical existence in the future is potential. But when we refer to time itself, both past and future are equally real. The difference between future and past which we can describe in terms of actual physical existence, and potential physical existence, is a substantial difference according to this description. Because of this substantial difference, the present is necessarily something real, as the separator, the boundary. As Joshs stated, we observe the present as constant flux. This flux is described as activity, so here we have another sense of "actual existence", activity, which is not the same as the "actual physical existence" which I have just described as proper to the past.

There doesn't need to be a temporal progression. The cause is logically, though not temporarily, prior to the effect. Why logically? Because the cause must contain the effect within it, and not the other way around. — Agustino

If you analyze "logical priority" you will see that the only valid way that something can be prior to another is that it is temporally prior. The claim that there is a logical priority which is not reducible to a temporal priority, would have to be justified either by examples and demonstrations, or else by some logical argument which demonstrated such. In the case of the former, all examples of priority will be demonstrated to be actually temporal priority or else the claim of "priority" will not be justified. In the case of the latter, if you have a logical argument which demonstrates that there is a type of priority which is not a temporal priority, then produce it.

No, that doesn't tell me that it's not simultaneous, that just tells me that one is cause and the other is effect. — Agustino

It can be demonstrated quite easily. Try it yourself. There is no line until after the pencil moves. Prior to movement the pencil is at a point and there is no line. After the pencil moves there is a line. The line does not appear until after the pencil moves.

The pencil can move without creating a line - if it doesn't move while in contact with, say, a page. A line cannot move a pencil, since it doesn't have that potency. Only a pencil has the potency of creating a line when moved on a paper. But the creation of the line and the movement of the pencil are simultaneous temporarily, though not logically, as explained above. — Agustino

Yes, the creation of the line is simultaneous with the movement of the pencil, the two are the same thing. However, the creation of the line is necessarily temporally prior to the existence of the line. The existence, or "being" of a thing is completely distinct from the "becoming" of that thing. And, the becoming of the thing, by which process the thing comes to be, is temporally prior to the being of the thing.

Basically, the 4 causes leave no gaps. Efficient cause and effect are understood to be temporarily simultaneous, so the Humean notion that we could imagine A happening first without being followed by B is false. Since A (the cause) is simultaneous with B (the effect), they cannot but be linked. Like drawing a line on the paper. The line that is drawn (the effect) is simultaneous with the movement of the pencil (the cause). — Agustino

This doesn't seem right. Efficient cause is necessarily temporally prior to the effect. If they were simultaneous, then there would be no temporal progression between the thing which is said to be the cause, and the thing which is said to be the effect, and one cannot be claimed to be the cause of the other without a temporal progression.

For instance, the line on the paper is not simultaneous with the moving of the pencil, it follows from it, as the moving of the pencil is necessary for the existence of the line, but the existence of a line is not necessary for the moving of the pencil. The pencil might move without a line occurring.

Without movement, the pencil makes a point. After moving, and not until after moving because the pencil must get out of the way, is there a line. If the pencil continues to move, then any part of the line which already exists is simultaneous with the movement now, but any new part of the line only follows after that new movement. So it is clear that there is only a line after the pencil has moved. If the pencil moving, and the line occurring were simultaneous, then one could not be said to be the cause of the other. It would be just as likely that the line occurring would be the cause of the pencil moving as vise versa.

Husserl said that each moment of experienced time( time consciousness) was a tripartite structure of retention, Immediate presentation and protention. In order to experience any 'now' , we are also experiencing g the passing of the just prior now, in he form of retention, a kind of trace of memory. The now also has a protentional component, an anticipating or intending beyond itself into the future. If you think about it, this makes some sense. Awareness is situated as anticipatory, as being directed toward the future. — Joshs

I agree with this. So let's begin with this assumption, this premise, as an approach toward looking at the physical world. Notice first, that this description does not describe the physical world, it describes our experience, memory, presence, and anticipation.

The fact of the matter is that experienced reality never repeats itself exactly, not our perceptions moment to moment or our conceptually accessible world. So we are already used to the idea, from our own experience of it, that the future is going to evade our attempts to precisely duplicate our present or past. Rather than making future reality, however you want to characterize
it, nonexistent, it does the opposite. EX-istence moment to moment implies a certain aspect of non-predictability, of exceeding the past in some qualitative way. But that isnt normally a problem for us. For instance, our perceptual system is designed to optimize for regularities, patterns, consistencies in the flux of incoming sensation. So we don't normally notice the fact that our perceptual world is not self-identical moment to moment. It apppears that way to us because our perceptions abstract the regularities. — Joshs

In relation to the physical world then, you had suggested that each moment of the present could not be predicted in an absolute sense. This would indicate that there is no linear continuity of physical existence between past and future. The present provides a discontinuity to physical existence. My point was that if what we understand as "physical existence" is provided by our experience of past events, and there is no necessary continuity between past events, and future events, then we cannot validly extend "physical existence" into the future.

So it is not my claim that the future is not part of reality, or that the future is "nonexistent" in any absolute sense. What is my claim is that if the future is part of reality, and existent, then we must allow that the non-physical is part of reality and existent. And I see no reason to exclude the future from reality. So rather than excluding the future as unreal, and non-existent, we allow, from our experience of anticipation, that the future is very real, and existent, just like we allow from our experience of memory, that the past is very real. But this necessitates that the non-physical is also very real.

That is what the physical world is, a reality of constant flux, out of which we are able to extract and construct regularities.
If we try to turn these regularities into determinisms, we may preserve a prectability at the cost of a meaningful understanding of a constantly developing world. — Joshs

The "constant flux" refers to our presence. Presence consists of the reality of a determined, physical past, and the reality of an undetermined, non-physical future. Since the past is real, according to memory, and the future is real according to anticipation, the question we must ask is whether the present is real. Is our experience of presence anything more than just anticipation and memory? If there is a real difference between past and future, as I have described with "physical" and "non-physical", then necessarily the present, as the division between these two, is real. Then, the constant flux which we experience at the present may also be said to be real. But if there is no such difference between past and future, if the past and future are equally "physical" for example, then the present itself is nothing real, and the constant flux, which is a feature of our presence is also not real.

Some things, like the integers, are included in that domain, and other things, like the square root of -1, are not. — Wayfarer

So you do not believe in imaginary numbers? They've become a very important part of modern mathematics, I believe they are integral to quantum equations. Issues such as "imaginary numbers" cast doubt on that "domain" which you speak of. A mathematician can make up a principle, an axiom, simply because it is useful for some purpose. It may then get used and accepted by others. Whether that axiom is a "true" principle and ought to be accepted as part of that domain of mathematical objects is another question. If we cannot distinguish which mathematical objects are part of that domain, and which are not, then what supports the assumption that there is such a domain?

To clarify, I was referring to information pointing to no concepts, that is, meaningless raw data, like statics from the tv set, perceived by the senses but unintelligible to the mind. Otherwise, I agree that meaningful information must be non-physical, for the reason you pointed out. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see how it is possible that information could be meaningless. That appears to be contradictory to me. To judge that something is information is to claim that it is not meaningless.

You are once again confusing the symbol or word, with the concept it points to. Yes, we can change the symbols 1, 2, 3, ..., but we cannot change the concepts I, II, III, ... As such, we can make 1+1=3 if we change the symbols, but cannot make I+I=III <-- As you can see, there is one too many bar on the right side of the equation, which makes it unbalanced.

And as it is with concepts of numbers, so it is with other concepts. E.g., we can change the word "red", but the concept of red-ness will remain unchanged. — Samuel Lacrampe

I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. Furthermore, I believe that the entire conceptual structure of what the numerals, 1,2,3,4,5, etc., represent changed significantly when the symbol for zero was integrated into the system, allowing for negative numbers. This marked the beginning of a revolution in mathematical reasoning which eventually allowed for the proper development of algebraic equations.

Your claim that concepts do not change is clearly refuted through reference to the evidence which is the evolution of human thought.

A rock participates in the form of rock-ness, even before a subject observes it or find a word or symbol for it for the first time. — Samuel Lacrampe

There is a problem with this perspective. That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. In order that the thing is what is called "a rock", the existence of the thing must be analyzed, and the form, "rock-ness" must be analyzed and a judgement made, that the thing qualifies to be called a rock.

Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. Furthermore, the thing must be united to each universal which might be used to describe it. Then there is the problem of whether those universals are correct or not. Does the thing only participate in correct universals? What allows us to judge it incorrectly then?

Evidence of human activity indicates to us that we judge things according to their properties, and call them by the applicable name as determined by this judgement. There is no evidence that a thing is actively participating in all sorts of universal forms. The evidence is that we judge it as such. Following Aristotle, we assume that every thing has one particular form, proper to itself, it does not participate in numerous universal forms, it has one form. But, it is judged by human beings according to numerous universal forms, and so it is described by those words.

think this is very close to the naturalistic fallacy. And besides, none of the quoted passage does anything to address what has been rightly called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. One of the noticeable achievements of mathematical physics, is to discover hitherto entirely unknown, and even unsuspected, properties of matter, on the basis of mathematical symmetries and reasoning. To reduce mathematics to 'behaviours' seems comically insufficient to account for these achievements. (It's also worth mentioning, again, the considerable influence of Platonism on the development of modern scientific method, via the influence of the Italian Renaissance humanists on Galileo, among others.) — Wayfarer

What I was trying to point out to Πετροκότσυφας is that Wittgenstein offers a strangely backward way of looking at things. He assumes that there are behavioural regularities, consistencies such as word usage, which become descriptive laws, or "rules", then right and wrong, correct and incorrect, are determined according to whether one acts as the descriptive rule indicates.

Clearly this is backward to what is really the case. What is really the case, is that right and wrong, correct and incorrect, are determined by reasoning, logical consistency, etc.. What follows from this are prescriptive rules of how one ought to behave to maintain logical consistency, and rationality. Then behavioural regularities follow from this teaching of how one ought to behave.

The issue is that Wittgenstein saw the human mind with its reasoning, thinking, understanding, will and intention, as a dark and foreboding place, one which could not be approached or understood, incomprehensible because it is internal and secretive, only having the capacity to be judged according to its outward expressions. So he defined his terms, and structured his epistemology such that right and wrong is limited to the judgement of such outward expressions, right and wrong can only be attributed to actions. Right and wrong cannot be attributed to the principles which an individual holds within one's mind, and which form the basis of one's actions.

Isn't that my point - that it ISN'T useful to make such a distinction when talking about causation and information flow?

What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu

Of course it's useful to make such a distinction, just like it's useful to distinguish between cause and effect. Following your stated principle, it would be pointless to distinguish between cause and effect, because this is an interaction and there is no point distinguishing between the two parts of an interaction. But we make those distinctions in order to understand.

So if information has both a physical and a non-physical part, it is important to distinguish between these, just like its important to distinguish cause from effect in a causal relation. I would argue that since the physical part of information is always a representation of the non-physical part, the non-physical part is necessarily prior in time to the physical part.

It appears like we have been talking about completely different things.

Nope, it's not correct by definition, because there's nothing in place to make it right or wrong. — Πετροκότσυφας

What is in place is the definition of what it means to follow a rule, provided by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. Acting in a way which is judged to be in accordance with a rule, is to be right, correct. To say that two plus two equals four is to act in a way which is judged as being in accordance with a rule, and therefore is to be right, or correct.

Nope, it's not uniform practice itself that makes it right or wrong. It's not the criterion, it's the presupposition for the emergence of the criterion itself. It's the rule, which is based on uniform practice, which makes it right or wrong. — Πετροκότσυφας

This resolves nothing. Even if you represent the rule as "emerging" from uniform practise, my criticism is still relevant. Once a rule emerges, if right and wrong are relative to the rule, the rule itself cannot be wrong, because right and wrong are judged relative to the rule. If a further uniform practice emerged which was contrary to the rule, it would necessarily be wrong. So it is impossible that one rule could come to replace another rule, such that rules might evolve. Clearly, the Wittgensteinian description of the relationship between these three things, "rules", "uniform practise", and "right and wrong", does not correspond with reality at all because we observe the evolution of rules.

Based on that, it's only natural to harden this basic mathematical practice, inherent in this situation, into a rule. Three kids = split food in three. — Πετροκότσυφας

My objection is not concerning the relationship between "uniform practice" and "rule" if there is no ambiguity with "rule", and "rule" is understood as a descriptive rule. It is when a descriptive rule, which emerges from uniform practice, is suddenly claimed to be a prescriptive rule, through some sort of equivocation, that I call foul. So I'll reiterate my claim. We have a uniform practice. We have a descriptive rule which emerges from that uniform practise, "things are done this way". There is no principle here by which we can proceed to claim "things ought to be done this way". Therefore, there is no principle by which we can say that acting according to this descriptive rule is "right", or acting in a discordant way is "wrong". This is a false representation of what right and wrong are. Right and wrong are based in acting according to certain principles which have been judged, they are not based in acting according to a description of uniform practise.

But if the infolding of the universe is a process in which each present moment of time is not exhaustively predictable in a linearly causal fashion from the previous moment, then time becomes something more than an empty construct. Or one could say, the nature of objective reality itself presupposes novelty. — Joshs

Suppose that this is the case, that each present moment is not predictable. What does this say about the future? It is impossible that there is physical existence in the future, because what will exist has not yet been determined. Then we must assign to everything on the future side of the present, what has not yet occurred, some sort of non-physical existence.

So, I correctly guessed Manafort then Flynn. Let's see if I can make it three for three. Next is Kushner. — Michael

Yeah! I hope you're right. I know that the media is full of spin masters, who will edit video to portray whatever they want, but in every clip that I see now of Kushner and his wife, he looks very troubled. Is this the look of a guilty man who knows his transgressions are about to be exposed?

No, you still have it wrong: that there has been a pattern or regularity to your cat's activities is a matter of observation: that there will be such in the future would be an inference. — Janus

Consider that every time your cat comes for food you look at your clock, and calendar, and make a note. After some duration you have a lot of notes. You can look over your notes and state specific times that the cat came, but you cannot claim that the cat's appearance is a pattern, or regular, unless you apply some principle of what it means to be regular, and deduce, from your notes that the cat's appearance fulfills these conditions of regularity. Clearly it is a matter of inference.

What have I said that entails that I must think that? I don't agree with any notion that any way we might be able to think is just "all in our heads". Nature (including us) is such that we can think dualistically (among other ways of thinking); and from that it certainly does not follow that nature is, in some purportedly absolute ontological way dualistic (or monistic). I think what follows is that nature is non-dualistic or pluralistic; it has infinite, and infinitely many, aspects. — Janus

What we have been discussing is the premise that one aspect of reality is physical, and another is non-physical. You claimed that this was a trivial form of dualism. I demonstrated how it is an ontological dualism. Now it appears like you want to reject the premise, saying that it is not the case that one aspect of reality is physical and another non-physical, that this is just one way of thinking about reality, and that there is an infinite number of ways to think about reality, each just as likely to be true as any other.

No, this is wrong. If you see your cat coming in every morning for her food; this is something you have observed. This habit of hers is not 'directly' in-the-moment-observed, like the cat herself is, but it also not an inference; you know she regularly comes in and eats the food you provide for her. — Janus

You have noticed that your cat comes for food. That it comes "every morning for food" is an inference. Your sense observations, along with your memory, can only tell you that you have observed your cat coming time and again. That there is some sort of pattern, or regularity to your cat's activities is an inference.

It might imply an inherent dualism in the way we think about things; but I don't think it implies an ontological dualism. — Janus

Either the dualism is inherent in reality, in which case it is ontological, or it is just a feature of the way that we describe things. Our discussion has been such that we have assumed that it is inherent within reality, therefore it is an ontological dualism. If you want to change your position now, and say that it is just a feature of how we describe things, and that it is all in our heads, imaginary, then that's a different matter completely.

The term "behavioral regularities" does not even refer to the process of learning and its institutions. It refers to acts of sorting and arranging and W. does not hypothethise about its origin. Regarding the rest,
at least what of it is not irrelevant, it does not sound like W. I'm not sure where you've found that. It actually sounds more like you when you were replying to Samuel about school. — Πετροκότσυφας

Have you read Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", or "On Certainty". If so you ought to recognize what I'm talking about. Your whole quoted passage completely obscures what Wittgenstein actually wrote, with terminology like "behavioural regularities" and "behavioural agreement". Wiittgenstein wrote about following rules, learning how to follow rules, what constitutes following a rule, and consensus, not about behavioural agreement.

What is "behavioural agreement", supposed to mean, that we can describe numerous people as behaving in a similar way? Wittgenstein proposes a principle for distinguishing correct from incorrect, but "behavioural agreement" implies no judgement of right or wrong. To say "2+2=4" is correct, to say "2+2=5" is incorrect. To say that Wittgenstein represents 2+2=4 as a "behavioral agreement" rather than as "correct", is simply a misrepresentation of Wittgenstein.

It may be the case, that what Wittgenstein calls "correct", (which is derived from how he defines "rule"), is reducible to a form of behavioural agreement, but that is exactly the point I made in my last post. Under Wittgenstein's epistemology correct and incorrect, right and wrong are defined by behavioral agreement. This eliminates the possibility that behavior which everyone is doing, and everyone agrees upon (behavioural agreement), might in fact be wrong. That possibility is eliminated because "right", "correct", is defined by what everyone is doing. So if an accepted behaviour turns out to be, in fact, a bad habit which everyone is doing, it is impossible to rectify this bad habit, because it is by definition, right, correct.

As explained in this article:



Thus, interestingly, there is a sense in which Wittgenstein actually agrees with the line taken by Hardy, Frege and other Platonists insisting on the objectivity of mathematics. What Wittgenstein opposes is not objectivity per se, but the ‘philosophical’ explanation of it. The alternative account he proposes is that arithmetical identities emerge as a special codification of these contingent but extremely robust, objectively verifiable behavioral regularities. (Yet, recall that although the arithmetical propositions owe their origin and relevance to the existence of such regularities, they belong to a different order.) So, what Wittgenstein rejects is a certain “metaphysics of objectivity” (Gerrard [1996, 173])



A closer look at the contingent regularity relevant in this context – behavioural agreement – is now in order. (At PI §206 and 207 Wittgenstein suggests that these regularities form the basis of language itself.) This type of agreement consists in all of us having, roughly, the same natural reactions when presented with the same ‘mathematically’ related situations (arranging, sorting, recognizing shapes, performing one-to-one correspondences, and so forth.) Its existence is supported by the already discussed facts: (i) we can be trained to have these reactions, and (ii) the world itself presents a certain stability, many regular features, including the regularity that people receiving similar training will react similarly in similar situations. (There surely is a neuro-physiological basis for this; cats, unlike dogs, cannot be trained to fetch.)



So, it is simply not the case that the truth-value of a mathematical identity is established by convention. Yet behavioural agreement does play a fundamental role in Wittgenstein’s view. This is, however, not agreement in verbal, discursive behaviour, in the “opinions” of the members of the community. It is a different, deeper form of consensus – “of action”



The specific kind of behavioural agreement (in action) is a precondition of the existence of the mathematical practice. The agreement is constitutive of the practice; it must already be in place before we can speak of ‘mathematics.' The regularities of behaviour (we subsequently ‘harden’) must already hold. So, we do not ‘go on’ in calculations (or make up rules) as we wish: it is the existent regularities of behaviour (to be ‘hardened’) that bind us.



While the behavioural agreement constitutes the background for the arithmetical practice, Wittgenstein takes great care to keep it separated from the content of this practice (Gerrard [1996, 191]). As we saw, his view is that the latter (the relations between the already ‘archived’ items) is governed by necessity, not contingency; the background, however, is entirely contingent. As Gerrard observes, this distinction corresponds, roughly, to the one drawn in LFM, p. 241: “We must distinguish between a necessity in the system and a necessity of the whole system.” (See also RFM VI-49: “The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of logic is not an agreement in opinions on questions of logic.”) It is thus conceivable that the background might cease to exist; should it vanish, should people start disagreeing on a large scale on simple calculations or manipulations, then, as discussed, this would be the end of arithmetic – not a rejection of the truth of 2+3=5, but the end of ‘right’ (and ‘wrong’) itself, the moment when such an identity turns into a mere string of symbols whose truth would not matter more than, say, the truth of ‘chess bishops move diagonally.' (Note that this rule is not grounded in a behavioural empirical regularity, but it is merely formal, and arbitrary.)



The very fact of the existence of this background is not amenable to philosophical analysis. The question ‘Why do we all act the same way when confronted with certain (mathematical) situations?’ is, for Wittgenstein, a request for an explanation, and it can only be answered by advancing a theory of empirical science (neurophysiology, perhaps, or evolutionary psychology).



Related to Platonism, ‘mentalism’ is another target of Wittgenstein, as Putnam [1996] notes. This is the idea that rules are followed (and calculations made) because there is something that ‘guides’ the mind in these activities. [...] The mind and this guide form an infallible mechanism delivering the result. This is a supermechanism, as Putnam calls it, borrowing Wittgenstein’s own way to characterize the proposal. [...] Moreover, if we try to take these super-mechanisms seriously we fall into absurdities. — Πετροκότσυφας

The problem with Wittgenstein's approach is that he misunderstands, and therefore misrepresents the nature of these "behavioral regularities". Behaviour regularities are represented as something which is naturally comes to us from society, rather than as something which comes about as the result of the individual's willingness. He represents it as the institutions of society naturally pass their conventions to the individual in the process of learning, as if the teacher is the agent, and the student is passive, in the process of learning. This is a misrepresentation of what is really the case, and that is that the individual through the means of intention, will, ambition, and effort, is the agent who is actively learning.

This is clearly exposed in his Philosophical Investigations, where he defines "rule-following" as observed activity which is in accordance with some standards set by society. With this definition of "rule-following" he excludes the true nature of rule-following, what really happens in a case of rule-following, which is that an individual holds a principle within one's own mind, and adheres to that principle with one's actions. The exclusion is demonstrated in the so-called private language argument.

The difference between these two representations of "behaviour regularities" has very significant ramifications. The Wittgensteinian way completely misses the role of intention and will in the act of learning. It is as if Wittgenstein gets a glimpse of intention and sees it as a vast and incomprehensible subject to approach, so he defines his terms in such a way as to completely avoid it. But the difference is this. Right and wrong, under Wittgenstein are determined by social conventions. The problem is that sometimes human knowledge is faulty and social conventions are actually wrong. In this case, then individuals need to determine the real truth, and rectify the social conventions. But this is impossible under the Wittgensteinian principles because right and wrong can be nothing other than what is determined by the social conventions. If we allow that the individual can produce a right, or a wrong, which is contrary to those of society, the whole epistemological system is undermined as contradictory.

So in Wittgenstein's system the description of how right and wrong is determined is inherently faulty. There is no way to judge the principle from which an action proceeds, as right or wrong, because we can only judge the action itself as right or wrong, in reference to the principles accepted by convention. Since only the judgement of actions is possible, and there is no way to judge principles, then the principles of convention cannot be judged as right or wrong.

I have said numerous times that this distinction is unnecessary as the "physical" and "non-physical" still interact and are causally influenced by each other. — Harry Hindu

As I've told you already, the fact that two things interact is not reason to deny that there is a useful distinction to be made between those two things. If you want to claim that the distinction between physical and non-physical is unnecessary, you need a much better argument than that.

You are employing a very narrow sense of 'observe' here. Natural regularities and patterns are observable, but obviously not in the sense that you can look at one like you might look at a tree. — Janus

It is necessary to employ such a narrow sense of "observe" in order to understand the nature of the things which you call regularities, and invariances. These things are not perceived by the senses, they are produced by inductive reasoning, as conclusions.

To address your other objection: if there is some "aspect of reality" that we cannot observe, and that cannot be explained in the language of physics, it can only be daid that it is non-physical in the trivial definitional sense that 'physical' is taken to mean 'unobservable' and/or 'not capable of explanation in terms of physics'.

Any other sense of 'non-physical' implies dualism...or what else? — Janus

Doesn't this sense of "non-physical" imply dualism to you? If there is an aspect of reality which cannot be sensed, nor understood by physics, then we ought to conclude that there are two distinct aspects of reality, that which is sensed and understood by physics, and that which is not. Doesn't this seem like dualism to your?

From this premise, of the two distinct aspects of reality, we can proceed using the mind, rather than the senses and the principles of physics, toward understand this other aspect of reality. If you deny the dualist premise, and the premise is in fact true, then you will never have an approach to this non-physical aspect of reality, always falsely believing that it will eventually be understood by empirical science. The non-physical will forever remain obscured to you, because you will deny the premises required to understand it, and you will act like a monist materialist, continually making false assumptions concerning this aspect of reality.

We don't have to resort to imagining an ideal physics. We could instead imagine the possibilities of an embrace by physicists of arguments by scientists like Lee Smolen and Ilya Prigogone that the currently accepted physical description of reality is hampered by its reliance on a static model that sees time as a superfluous construct. — Joshs

If time is something real as Lee Smolin suggests in Time Reborn, how could time be something physical? Imagine space for example. If "space" were something real it would be nothing, how could that be physical? If it's not nothing, then it is described in terms other than "space" and is not really space.

On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena.

Yeah, this seems to be a statement of the typical physicalist's metaphysical position. "Anything which is real is physical because physics attempts to understand everything."

The question to be asked of those physicalists, is why does physics fail in its attempts to understand everything.

If I observe the sun to rise each morning that is an observed invariance. — Janus

Your missing something which is necessary here. You can watch the sun all you want, and not observe
any invariance. It is your logical conclusion that the sun rises each morning, which is the statement of invariance. The invariance is not observed, it is concluded.

Yes, but I didn't say that the thing is trivial, I said that it is referred to as non-physical in a trivial sense; which is a totally different proposition. — Janus

I don't understand what you are saying. We agree there is some aspect of reality which cannot be sensed, nor can it be explained by physics, and you say that this is "non-physical" in a trivial sense. I think this is "non-physical" in a very important sense. Why do you think it's trivial, when it says that we cannot understand this aspect of reality through sense nor through physics. That seems to make a very important statement about reality and the limitations of the empirical sciences. I'm sure a physicalist would not think this is trivial, because it would mean that physicalism is wrong.

No, logically, the description cannot be the thing described. — Janus

What I meant is that in the phrase "observed invariances" "invariance" does not refer to a property of anything at all, so it is not a description. There is no whatness of any thing which is being described, so there is no description here. "Observed invariance" refers to an inductive conclusion which is derived from numerous descriptions, it is not a description. If you were to insist on calling it a description, it is necessarily a description of numerous descriptions. So there is no "thing described".

The difference being that there is a statement being made about numerous things, not a statement made about a thing, which is a description. I can look at my lawn and describe it, saying that my lawn is green, or I could make the inductive statement, "grass is green". The latter is not a description because there is no particular thing being described, it is an inductive conclusion.

But I don't see why it would need to be thought to be "non-physical" in anything other than the more or less trivial senses that it is either not an object of the senses, or is not something that could be explained by physics, since physics itself presupposes it. — Janus

In the field of ontology, or metaphysics, how can you say that this is trivial, that there is something real which cannot be sensed, nor can it be explained by physics? Since this aspect of reality is responsible for the validity of the laws of physics, I think it's very important. How are we going to understand it if we cannot sense it and it cannot be explained by physics?

As far as I can tell, the hypothesis of info being nothing but arrangements of physical parts seems adequate, when concepts are not involved. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think that is adequate. If information is the arrangement of physical parts, then there must be a reason for that particular arrangement being the particular arrangement which it is in order that we can say that it is "information". It must have the capacity to inform us of something. It is the reason for this arrangement being the arrangement which it is, which allows us to say that the arrangement is information. So "information" means more than just arrangement of physical parts, it means arrangement of physical parts with reason for that arrangement.

That is why I said in my last post to Wayfarer: "This ambiguity manifests as a real problem in metaphysics which assume information is physical, but not a representation."

Part of reality, independent of a subject. As such, math concepts are discovered and unchangeable. We cannot simply decide that "1+1=3", even if everybody agreed to do so. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that this is false. What different symbols represent is not unchangeable, and this is evident in evolving language. So if for some reason the ordering of the symbols which represent numbers gets changed, and this all agreed upon, such that the order is 1,3,2,4, and the symbol 3 starts to mean the same thing as 2 does now, then 1+1 would equal 3.

The point is that there is no necessity between the symbol and what it represents. It doesn't necessarily represent what it does, and this is because what it represents was somehow decided upon. Therefore the relationship between the symbol and what it represents is dependent on the existence of subjects. Since the existence of concepts seems to be dependent on this relationship between symbols and representation, we cannot simply assert that concepts are "objective" if you define objective in this way (independent of subjects).

But my view is, I hope, a bit more radical than that - information of any and all kinds, really isn't physical at all, but is only represented physically. — Wayfarer

The real question then, concerning the nature of information, is whether "information" refers to the physical representation, or the thing (idea, concept etc.) which is being represented. Common usage indicates that "information" may be used in both ways, each being equally acceptable. Then the entire thread is just an exercise in ambiguity.

This ambiguity manifests as a real problem in metaphysics which assume information is physical, but not a representation.

Digging in the weeds — fdrake

That's it! That's the solution to the whole problem. Get into the garden and dig the weeds. First, we have to determine what exactly is a weed.

But we also need a definition of 'better'. The one I would instinctively reach for is 'more useful'. One intuition is 'better' than another under my interpretation if it enables more accurate predictions. — andrewk

Yes, surprisingly enough, I agree with this, but of course, there is a catch. As Aristotle distinguishes two types of knowledge in his Nichomachean Ethics, practical and theoretical, accordingly there are two distinct types of intuition. What I have described, and we seem to agree upon is practical intuition. At the other end of the spectrum is theoretical intuition

Consider practical intuition, as what is called for when we are apply theory to the physical world in practise. The farmer with good practical intuition will choose the best time to plant the crop. Theories of calendar date, soil moisture, weather forecasts, etc., all must be considered with the appropriate weight, to bring about the best result. In the case of theoretical intuition, this is inverted, such that knowledge gained from the world of practise is applied toward producing theories.

In theories, words are defined. Often in the form of hypotheses, the definitions need to be confirmed. Good intuition, in the sense of theoretical intuition, refers to the person who can foresee hypotheses which will be confirmed, and will produce theories which have a high probability of being verified. So for example, people like Isaac newton, and Albert Einstein had good theoretical intuition. Einstein for instance defined simultaneity in a particular way, giving examples to demonstrate exactly what he meant, and he had good theoretical intuition to stipulate that the speed of light is constant.

Based on past posts, I have the feeling that you would reject using 'usefulness' as a benchmark for quality of an intuition. But that then begs the question of what definition of 'better' you would like to use in its place. Again I might guess that you would prefer a definition that had something to do with 'truth'. Personally, I would reject such a definition, as I do not believe in Absolute Truth.

Now my understanding is that Aristoteleans form a proper subset of those who believe in Absolute Truth. So there should be no difficulty finding a non-Aristotelean that believes in Absolute Truth, who thus could continue down that line of discussion, by accepting 'truth' as a measure of the quality of an understanding. But I am not such a person. — andrewk

With respect to "Absolute Truth" then, practical intuition is not at all concerned with truth in any absolute sense. The theories are in place, and they are applied to the best of one's ability, to get the best results, This is a matter of predicting outcomes according to what is necessary for the particular circumstances. In the case of theoretical intuition though, we may consider the possibility of absolute truth. The individual who is crafting the theory must be guided by certain principles. The theory must be the most practical as is possible, the best means the most practical. That is an ideal which the theoretician follows. It could be argued that this ideal, the "most practical", is equivalent with "absolute truth".

I don't think that article really gets to the point. The issue is just what are the matters which were discussed with the Russians, which have most likely not yet been revealed. If one had discussions with the Russians concerning things not illegal to discuss, then there was no need to lie about such discussion in the first place. But If lying about having discussions is exposed, then the natural thing for the liar to do is to claim that the discussions were not concerning anything illegal. But then the question is, why did the individual lie in the first place. Obviously, it's just a matter of the lying continuing. If you're caught lying about a meeting, then you proceed to lie about the subject matter of that meeting.

What is implied by this, is that the subject matter of the discussions is not as innocent as what is being claimed. Remember, Trump stated in public, during the campaign, an invitation to the Russians to hack Hillary's computer. If he stated such a thing in public, who knows how much further he went in private. We don't know if Flynn has decided to come clean and expose the real subject matter. It is likely that some things will remain concealed.

I suppose that's a 'No' then. One can judge that something is a proof without understanding it. — andrewk

How can you be sure that such a proof is actually a proof then, without any understanding? You claim that you can verify the proof to be valid, without understanding it, and I question whether this is really true. Understanding come in degrees, and any such verification, I believe would require some degree of understanding. So I disagree with your distinction between a formal understanding and an intuitive understanding. I think that within any system of logic, there are different depths of understanding, different degrees to which one understands.


For example, if I multiply two numbers, 7 and 8, I get 56. I can verify this by taking 56 and dividing it by 8, to see if I get 7. Such a demonstration requires some understanding, an understanding of the relationship between multiplication and division. I could also proceed to take eight groups of seven, put them together, and count them all up. This demonstrates an understanding of the procedure of multiplication. We can propose that someone could learn multiplication by memorizing times tables or something like that, so that this person could multiply without understanding anything. This would be just an association by recognition. But how would that person "prove" that what they are doing is multiplying, without some understanding of what it means to multiply. So I think that any type of verification, i.e. a judgement that a so-called proof is actually a proof, requires some degree of understanding. The depth of understanding demonstrated by the verification relates to the quality of that judgement.

Perhaps a helpful parallel is a chess game. One can look at the moves in a Fischer vs Spassky game and verify that Fischer did indeed do a sequence of legal moves that resulted in Spassky being in an unwinnable position. But that is not the same as understanding the strategy by which Fischer achieved that. — andrewk

That's a similar example to mine. To determine "legal moves", and "unwinnable position" requires some understanding of the game, a rather shallow understanding. To be able to produce strategies within the game is to have a deeper understanding. I do not agree to your distinction of formal and intuitive understanding, because I think that there are just degrees of depth to this type of understanding, which is specifically understanding the rules of the game.

However, in the case of a competitive game, there is a matter of anticipating the moves of the competitor, and that requires a completely different type of understanding which is unrelated to understanding the rules of the game. We could assume that there are some type of (intuitive?) rules here, which are rules for application. Understanding application is a completely different type of understanding from understanding the rules of the game We could say that there are similar "rules" for application of logic and mathematics as well. This would be such as what qualifies as "8", what qualifies as "7", how do we judge an object as fulfilling the conditions of the definition. Understanding the rules for application is a completely different matter from understanding the rules of the logical system.

But I don't think that there are any such rules, in reality, there is only some sort of intuition. We can't have rules for the application of rules, or we'd need rules for the application of those rules, ad infinitum. So these are definitely two distinct types of understanding. One is concerned with relating rules to each other, and this you call a formal understanding. The other relates rules to other things, opponents in games, and physical objects in science. Of the latter type of understanding, the intuitive one that relates rules to things, do you not agree that there is a better and a worse intuition? So judging by statistics or something like that, the person who wins the game more often could be said to have a better understanding of how to apply the rules.

OK, when you say something is immaterial, or non-physical, what exactly do you mean? merely that it is not an object of the senses, or something else? — Janus

Yes, I would say that immaterial, and nonphysical, refer to things that are not capable of being sensed, so they don't have what we would call spatial-temporal existence, and are not understood by the laws of physics.

What we refer to as "physical laws" are observed invariances of physical processes. Things seem to reliably behave in certain ways, and we call these ways 'laws of nature'. — Janus

So we have inductive conclusions about the way things behave, and they are laws of physics. Do you assume that there is something real behind these laws, corresponding to them? Or are they completely imaginary? Is there a reason why we can describe the behaviour of physical things according to laws? If so wouldn't you agree that whatever this is, it would be non-physical?

So, if the 'laws' are observed invariances of action of physical objects and processes, and those invariances are caused by, or reflect, the will of God or the will and/or the nature of the objects and processes themselves what else is required? Why do we need "immaterial forms"? — Janus

"Observed invariances" is ambiguous. It could refer to the description made by the observer, and it could refer to the thing being "observed". Of course the use of "observed" means that it really refers to the description made by the observer. So we must posit also, a thing which is being "observed". By positing this other thing, we allow for differences, discrepancies, between the "observed invariances" and the thing being "observed". This allows for the fact that we sometimes have error in our descriptions.

Note, that "observed invariances" in the case of physical laws, refers to the activities of things. It is invariances in activities. So when I say that there must be a corresponding "thing" which is being "observed", it is not the physical things which are active, that I am referring to, it is invariance in that activity which is the "thing" which is being "observed". Invariance in activity must be a real thing which is somehow "observed". This "thing" is immaterial, non-physical. Physicalists seem to have difficulty grasping this. The key to apprehending this might be to realized that "observed" is not the best word to use here. Invariance is concluded from inductive reasoning, it is not directly "observed". So we must posit the existence of a "thing", which is not directly observed, but its existence is necessitated by the conclusions of inductive reasoning which can only be true (in the sense of correspondence) if it exists.

I think we're loosing objectivity here. Do you agree that understanding is inherently subjective, meaning that it is always a subject which understands? And do you agree that the judgement of whether or not an argument constitutes a proof is dependent on that argument being understood?

How do you know that? Is it nothing more than a matter of definition? — Janus

Surely it's not definitions. I don't interpret according to definitions in my mind. I might consult a dictionary if I have difficulty interpreting, but even the words in the dictionary need to be interpreted, and I do this without consulting definitions.

But in the world objects engender other objects in various ways, and the forms those engendered objects take seem to be determined by invariances that we call "physical laws". — Janus

How is a physical law anything other than an immaterial Form?

Even if the forms of entities were exhaustively determined by God's will as in Leibniz's Monadic metaphysics; why would there need to be a determining immaterial form in between God's act of will and the actual, physical forms of the entities? — Janus

Because this is what the evidence shows us, that there are immaterial Forms between God's act of will and physical objects. They may be what you call physical laws. If material objects must obey physical laws, then there must be a reason for that. The reason is the will of God. We cannot observe God's act of willing, just like we cannot observe a human act of willing, what we observe is things behaving in such a way as to demonstrate that there is an act of will behind the behaviour of those things. When I see a human being walking down the street, I am not observing an act of willing, I am observing a physical thing behaving in a way which demonstrates an act of will behind that behaviour. The act of willing is not itself observable.

Meaning - the physical encoding of how to interpret the representation. — tom

How can "how to interpret the representation" be anything other than what is in the mind of the interpreter? And this is non-physical.

Hmmm... do you think the legal system is capable to deal with those who have real power? I don't really think so. — Agustino

Judging by our conversations in the past, I don't think you know what "having power" means. So this statement is kind of meaningless.

Once you understand the form - plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines - then you don’t need to imagine it. — Wayfarer

This is a definition, composed of words. Did you read what I said about the relation between the concept, and words? If understanding the form of triangle, is apprehending this, "plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines", then how does one understand the form without imagining the words? And as I explained, the words in our mind are just representations, images, of the physical words.

It just defies common sense that the blind understand colours, any more than the permanently deaf will fathom music. — Wayfarer

But we're talking about understanding concepts here, not about experiencing sensations. The deaf can understand all the principles of music just as easily as the non-deaf. And even though the deaf person cannot hear music, the deaf person could play music. I'm sure you recognize that there is a difference between understanding a concept, and experiencing various sensations. As you've been saying, sensation is of the particular, while the concept is universal. It's true that when concepts are formed, we may abstract from particulars, but once a concept is formed, and has become common knowledge, it is taught by one individual to another. Learning the concept is what is called understanding.

So understanding is not necessarily a process of abstracting from particulars, it may be a process of being taught an already existent concept. Sensing particular instances, such as being shown examples of triangles, is helpful, but not necessary in order to understand the concept. That's what Plato meant when he said intelligible objects may be apprehended directly by the intellect. However, as I indicated in my last post, there is the matter of the words, which still has to be sorted out.

Although it would be pointless to argue that, because it’s plainly false. — Wayfarer

It's not pointless, and here's the point. As you said, the triangle exists in your mind as "plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines". These are words, and even in your mind words are simply representations of physical things. So by saying that the triangle is represented by words, rather than a mental image of a triangle, doesn't get us away from a physical representation. We just go to a different type of physical representation, words instead of a figure.

If his writings on metaphysics bring joy to some people, and they do not induce them to harm others, then that is a good thing (IMHO). — andrewk

I don't think "joy'" is the best word to use here. As I explained, what it brings is understanding. And because we desire to understand, then satisfying that desire with actual understanding brings joy. So "joy" is not incorrect. But "joy" has a very broad, ambiguous meaning, when the more specific word "understanding" is proper according to what I explained. To argue in a way which replaces more specific, well defined terms, with the more general, ill-defined terms is counter-productive. That's the way you are going.

It's like if we were discussing the nature of moral virtue, and we realized that being virtuous is a pleasure, so we switch "virtue" with "pleasure", and you say, if it brings you pleasure, and doesn't induce harm to others, then virtue is a good thing. This would completely miss the essence of virtue, which is concerned with doing good, replacing it with pleasure that doesn't harm others.

So you have removed the virtue from my description, the particular good, which is referred to with "understanding", and replaced it with "joy that doesn't involve harm to others", implying that anything which brings joy is equally good so long as it doesn't cause harm to others. Then understanding is of no more value than masturbation.