We know how to use words without being able to conclusively describe how or what that know-how is. — mrcoffee

Yes this is what Socrates is famous for demonstrating, many people know how to do things without really knowing exactly what they are doing. This might be applicable to someone's use of "hand". We know how to use "hand", but how many people know exactly what a hand is? If someone gave you a complete list of anatomical parts in your wrist area, would you be able to say which of them belong to your arm, and which belong to your hand. Would you even be able to accurately point to the division between your hand and your arm? Is your wrist part of your hand, part of your arm, both, or something completely distinct?

If we criticize the use of language in the absence of an ideal justification (a definition of exist, for instance), then we are using that same unjustified language to do so, implying that we expect to be understood --implying that we trust the language in practice as we question it in theory. — mrcoffee

The thing is, that knowing how to use language is not an "all or nothing" type of knowledge, it increases by degree. So it is this very act of questioning the usage of others, which is itself an act of usage, that increases one's knowledge of language use.

This is not to deny the strangeness of our situation. A person could say that we don't really know anything. But as soon as words move toward such absolutes they lose their power to distinguish situations in practical life. If I'm not even certain that I have hands, then of what use is 'certainty' except to mark the impossible hope of infinitely itchy philosophers? — mrcoffee

I would not claim that we "don't really know anything", unless you define "know" as requiring absolute certainty. But I don't think that knowing requires absolute certainty, and this is evident from the fact that I proceed with my endeavours, knowing how to proceed, despite the fact that I know that I may not be successful with any particular attempt. And, I never know at what time something may interfere and prevent me from being successful. This fact, that I am not completely sure of my success, inspires me to seek possible avenues of failure, to eliminate them.

So the question, concerning "certainty", is what is meant by "certainty", and this has far reaching epistemological ramifications. Suppose we exclude the possibility of absolute certainty, and we still insist that when something is certain (in a less than absolute sense), its is beyond doubt. Now we have to be able to decide how to determine whether things are certain or not, in order to determine whether they ought be doubted. Once something is deemed as certain, it is called upon, and used in our actions, without question, just like a habit. Suppose we have a failure, we need to determine the cause of the failure. If "x" has already been determined as certain, then "x" will not be considered as the cause of the failure. But we've already excluded the possibility that "x" is absolutely certain, so ought we not consider the possibility that "x" is the cause of the failure, despite the fact that "x" has been determined as certain?

In reality, it is the term "certain", or "certainty", which is a useless word. To say "I am certain that I have hands" really adds nothing to "I have hands", except to emphasize one's conviction. So the issue here is really the nature of conviction. To add "I am certain" to your statement, because you believe that this conviction which possesses you, will deter another's doubt, is not a logical thing to do. It will probably just induce the other to argument.

It doesn't seem possible to get 'behind' this know-how or form of life. I have to use it if I want to try to do so. My objections to the inexplicitness of my knowhow are also thereby made possible. If I demand a definition of 'exist,' why not demand a definition of 'definition' and 'demand'? Why not of 'hand'? Surely we can problematize the use of 'hand' with a little imagination. — mrcoffee

Yes, that's exactly the point, we ought to demand such definitions, this is how we prevent misunderstanding and mistake. In daily usage, if we don't adequately understand, we simply ask the speaker to clarify what was meant. But in specialized fields of education, like medicine, and biology which deals with parts of animals, you cannot just point to your hand, and say this is a hand, because the extent of the object pointed to is vague. So we need to refer to things like fingers and the wrist, to create boundaries for that specific object, "the hand", and we do this with definitions.

I'm not sure that we have a problem. We can distinguish between the individual marks and then categorize these marks. For instance, let A = {s2e, 2rt, e42}. Let f be defined on all strings over lower case letters and decimal digits so that f(s) = 0 if s does not contain the symbol 2 and f(s) = 1 if s does contain the symbol 2. Then f(s2e) = f(2rt) = f(e42) = 1. A less formal example would be three different dogs, each recognized as belonging to the category 'dog.' I can only offer this example because we already understand this category 'dog.' My formal example suggests how math basically scrubs 'ordlang' logic of its ambiguity, which is gets from our fuzzy language, so that it's structure can be focused on and examined. — mrcoffee

As I said, my mathematics is not good, so I don't see how the example deals with the problem. Say object #1 and object #2 are seen to be different, but not identified as different. They are both identified as "dog". We know the objects are distinct, be we are identifying them as the same. You might say that this is just a categorization, but for the sake of the logical process which follows the identification, they are the same. So for the sake of the logical process they are said to be the same, when they are really different.

To me this is far from obvious. How do we evaluate/demonstrate the relation 'less than' without an image of the ideal? I will agree that we can prove the impossibility of certain systems. — mrcoffee

The meaning of "less than" is not demonstrated, it is stipulated by definition, in reference to an order. I don't think "less than" can be judged without reference to the definition, and therefore the order. If you want to argue that a definition is an ideal, I don't think you could succeed because definitions are not perfect, due to the ambiguity of words.

And, since unities can be subtracted from and divided, as well as added to and multiplied, I don't know how you would designate the ideal order. To have an ideal order, I think would require having an indivisible first unity. Zero might serve the purpose, but it allows for the possibility of a negative as well as a positive order. They cannot both be "the ideal order" unless "zero" is defined in relation to some ideal good. Then we'd have less and more in relation to that good.

But if we consider possibility (that the system works) to be an essential feature of the ideal, then I don't currently see how we couldn't immediately institute a particular vision of the ideal. — mrcoffee

I think that this is contradictory. "Possibility" implies necessarily a multitude. There cannot be just one possibility or else that possibility would be the only possibility, and therefore a necessity and not a possibility. This contradicts "a particular vision of the ideal", which implies necessarily the one and only. In other words, it contradicts the notion of "the ideal" to allow that possibility inheres within.

Best wishes. Get well!

Half a dozen folk trying to convince me I ought not be certain of what cannot be doubted.

This is ridiculous. — Banno

If all these people are trying to convince you of this, perhaps you ought to consider that it's you who is being ridiculous.

see what you mean, but I also think logic is impossible without this first step. In other words, the logic you think is violated by the many-to-one map from marks to symbols is itself founded on this map, at least to the degree that it can be formalized. — mrcoffee

Yes I agree that logic is impossible without this fundamental first step. But if contradiction is inherent within the first step, don't you see this as a problem? The first law is the law of identity. The second law is the law of non-contradiction. The very first step, to identify, has contradiction inherent within. So we identify first, then the law of contradiction says we cannot contradict. Aren't we obliged to either forfeit the law of non-contradiction, or go back to our mode of identification and rectify this problem of contradiction inherent within identification?

When numbers are constructed in set theory, they are sometimes sets that contain all preceding numbers, where 0 is the empty set. Or 0, {0}, {{0}}, ... where the 'depth' of the empty set represents the number. In these representations, the nested 'unification' is apparent. — mrcoffee

I'm no mathematician, but I've noticed that set theory has contradiction inherent within it as well. I do not believe that the resolution to the problem of contradiction being inherent within the first step, is to introduce other contradictions to cover it up.

I think math and logic are pretty ideal. For them not be to ideal, in my view, would mean that we could imagine something better. If we could imagine something better, then that would already be within math and logic, since anything better would conform to mathematical and logical requirements. — mrcoffee

To demonstrate imperfections within something is to demonstrate that it is less than ideal. It is not necessary to show the ideal, in order to demonstrate that what we have is not ideal. It may be the case that there is no such thing as the ideal, and then thinking what you have to be ideal is mistaken, while it is impossible to put forward an alternative as the ideal. To demonstrate problems within a system does not require that one put forward resolutions to the problems.

The point that Wittgenstein seems to be making is that doubting the existence of one's hands, or doubting the existence of the external world, fall outside the language-game of use for these particular words. — Sam26

This doubt is not outside the language-game. The skeptic is asking what does the word "existence" mean here, what does it mean to exist. When we try to say what it means to exist, all sorts of logical problems arise. How can one say without doubt, "my hands exist", when one cannot say without doubt what it means to "exist"? So it becomes evident that we use words within language-games without actually knowing what the words mean. This casts doubt on language-games in general, because we can be fully engaged in a language-game, saying things without knowing what we are saying.

I'm not so sure about this. I think we learn what's possible from the past. — mrcoffee

Well, I disagree. I think we learn what's impossible from the past, not what's possible. We make up possibilities with our minds, logical possibilities, they are all imaginary and not things of memory, they are creations of the mind. We make up logical possibilities and our experience from the past allows us to eliminate some of them as physically impossible. But we don't learn what's possible from the past, we make that up.

Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? — mrcoffee

This is not really a case of the past constraining the future though. Our memories are selective, always incomplete, and sometimes wrong. So it's really a case of the person in the present attempting to use past experience to constrain the future, for the sake of some purpose.

As I use the words, a goal cannot be irrational. — mrcoffee

Why would you think that a goal cannot be irrational? Irrational means unreasonable or illogical. Do you not think that a person may at sometime set as a goal something which cannot be obtained by that person? Wouldn't that goal be irrational?

How about we put it this way? Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? — mrcoffee

No, this is where I don't agree. Memory is a function of the living being, at the present. It's not a function of the past, it's how we relate to the past. And those properties of memory which I mentioned, that 'it's selective and sometimes wrong, indicate that it's really not a function of the past, but a function of the living creature, now. The fact that we make mistakes in our memory, and we act on those faulty memories toward constraining the future, as if the memories were correct, indicates that it's not really the past at all which is constraining the future in this way. It is the actions of the living being, to remember and to act on those memories, which is constraining the future in this way.

I might reply by saying that those who refuse to say they are certain are afraid to commit; that the lie inherent in their words is shown by their actions - for example they do not habitually check that they have legs before attempting to stand up, because contrary to their claims they are certain that they have legs. — Banno

You are confusing habit with certainty. Behaving in a habitual way, in no way indicates that one is certain about one's action. If you take that approach you have no argument against the assumption that doing something by instinct indicates certainty. And clearly it's not true that instinctual actions indicate certainty concerning one's actions. So we must allow a separation between proceeding into an action by instinct or habit, and proceeding into an action with certainty. The former is more of the unconscious, and the latter is of the conscious.

Edit: Does breathing indicate that you are certain that you have lungs?

They forfeit their rights when they commit a felony. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

If it's a natural right, it cannot be forfeited. If you are talking about given rights, as privileges, then you cannot justify any so-called "right" which would enable one from preventing that right from being taken away when necessary. Therefore the so-called "right" to possess firearms, just like the so-called "right" to defend one's own rights, is irrational.

If I use a pencil or a typewriter to make the mark 'a' several times, then these individual marks are not strictly identical. Moreover they are in different places. But we can recognize the marks as representing or intending the same symbol. A rose is a rose is a rose, and an 'a' is an 'a' is an 'a.' If I can't recognize that two different but similar marks intend the same abstract, distinct but otherwise undetermined entity, then I cannot understand Sipser's Theory of Computation, for instance. — mrcoffee

This fundamental first step, to overlook the fact that two distinct instances of "a" are not identical in an absolute way and are therefore not actually "the same", for the sake of calling them "the same", is the basic incoherency of logic. Some will dismiss it as a difference which does not make a difference, but if we are discussing the law of identity, then it is necessary that any difference makes a difference. Otherwise we undermine the meaning of "the same", and allow the contradictory notion that two distinct things are one and the same thing.

A similar incoherency is found in the first step of mathematics, relating to the nature of "unity". The numeral "1" signifies a basic unity. The numeral "2" signifies two distinct unities, but also one unity as "two", at the same time. In performing mathematical operations we must overlook the fundament fact that "2" signifies two distinct unities, (just like we must overlook the fact that two distinct instances of "a" are not the same), and treat it as if it represents one unity.

These incoherencies are fundamental to the logical process. Nevertheless we must overlook them, ignore them, to proceed into the logical realm. However, they are significant, and these flaws indicate that mathematics and logic are less than ideal.

agree that this is theoretically possible. At times, I read Sartre to be saying something like that. Consciousness is pure freedom, so I can't really be any of my roles, not even the defender of free will. So Sartre now cannot truly be Sartre five minutes ago. He has to drag his past actions along.This is an attractive theory. It's almost a painting of the ideal situation. We want be to freer and less predictable. We strive to increase our options and the complexity of our behavior. But we do this among others who are somewhat predictable, which is to say among personalities with a certain amount of continuity. The alternative is lots of bodies with 'brand new souls' who aren't essentially tied to what those bodies have done before they arrived (always just now.) — mrcoffee

That's the nature of time, it makes reality rather complicated. But it's not necessarily true that "we want to be freer less predictable". In reality we general strive to be less free and more predictable. Remember how "hard free will" appeared as complete randomness? Nobody wants that. And, it's quite evident in communication, and most social activity, we make an effort to be predictable. We allow ourselves to be educated, and this is the free will tending toward conformity. Perhaps in reality we want to be less free, and more predictable.

Of course people are far more complicated, and we have more feelings about people. But the calculation in both cases seems to involve a probabilistic constrain on the future in terms of the past. The softness of both determinism and free will is in this 'probabilistic.' — mrcoffee

There's more to the complication of human beings, than just a constraint on the future imposed by the past, because there is also a necessity to consider within human beings what is wanted in the future in the first place. Constraints of the past restrict the reality of what one can get, or bring about, create, in the future, but they do not put restrictions on what one can want, or desire. So we can desire things which are impossible. Intention has a great influence over one's thinking and if we don't properly distinguish between what is possible, and what is impossible, physically, our thinking may be corrupted.

I think it is incorrect to represent thinking, deliberation, and calculation as the past putting constraints on the future, because thinking is driven by intention. And intention allows fundamentally that we can want anything, almost to the point of hard free will. So it appears to you, as if thinking is an act of the past (memories) putting constraints on what is wanted for the future. In reality though, thinking is not necessarily clear, accurate, or correct. We often use thinking to rationalize goals which are really irrational.

So we need to characterize thinking in a way which allows this as a reality. This implies that thinking is really a process whereby intentions for the future incline us to make a representation of the past (memory), and bring this representation to bear upon future possibilities. Therefore it is not the actual past which is doing the constraining in the act of thinking, it is really just the representation of the past (memory), and this is why we are prone to making mistakes. So when we make decisions concerning free will and determinism, we must be careful not to consider these representations (memories) as the past constraining the future in a determinist way, because the memories are produced and employed in a free way. The consequence, mistakes.

I understand soft determinism simply as a constraint on the future determined by the present and past. If I drop a heavy object, I do not expect a future in which the rock floats away. — mrcoffee

Free will and determinism are different ways of seeing human actions, human existence. The fact that the rock will fall has nothing to do with determinism. One can believe the inanimate world to be deterministic without believing in determinism, which relates to human acts. This just requires that one accepts such a fundamental difference between human beings and inanimate things.

If I sexually harass a bodybuilder's wife in the grocery store, I do not expect him to walk away bored. My thesis is that we largely understand both people and objects in terms of such constraints (of what they will do as a function of their place in a network of people and objects.) We can include the past in this network in terms of present memory. — mrcoffee

Do you recognize that it is much more difficult to predict human behaviour in a particular situation then it is the behaviour of the inanimate object? And, do you recognize that even though you can assume with a high degree of certainty that the bodybuilder will not walk away bored, it would still be very difficult for you to predict exactly what that person would actually do? That you can predict what a person won't do is not a good argument against free will.

I'm making the smaller point that we already behave as 'soft' determinists. — mrcoffee

I'm still not seeing where you get this idea from. I think it's quite clear that we behave as if we believe in free will, not as if we believe in any type of determinism. When something is important we take our time to deliberate and make a responsible decision.

If you see something, and there is no doubt in your mind, then, certainly, it is the case that you have a belief to that effect! — Sapientia

You make the oddest assertions Sapientia. I really don't see how seeing is the same thing as believing.

If believing in free will only means believing that the future is not exactly determined, then I believe in free will. But I'm not sure that that's how 'free will' tends to be used.

I associate it with human behavior in the context of praise, blame, prediction, and control. If we think that humans are somewhat predictable, then I think this works against 'ideal' or 'hard' free will. We might say that 'soft determinism' == 'soft free will.' — mrcoffee

Well hard free will, in the way you described it as completely random acts, doesn't really make sense. And I've never heard a description of "soft determinism" which makes sense. Some people profess "compatibilism" but I find this to be incoherent. So I guess we're left with free will (call it soft if you like).

Of course. — mrcoffee

So you believe in free will, that the future is not determined. You do not believe in determinism. Why do you claim that we are all naturally soft determinists?

I made it up, and, yes, a 'completely random decision' is about all the sense I can make of free will. — mrcoffee

Do you not believe that there are possibilities concerning what will happen in the future, and that your decisions can have an affect in relation to what will and will not happen in the future?

(With 'hard free will' there would not be alcoholics, since past behavior would give no information about future behavior.) — mrcoffee

I've never heard of "hard free will", would that be like every decision is a completely random decision?

Where's the refutation?
Where's the thought experiment?
Let's go, get on with it,. I haven't got all day.

Where's your thought experiment?

I don't see a refutation

That doesn't address what I said. I said that the word is not the thing. I didn't say that a word is not a thing. — Sapientia

The word is the thing. Words are the subject of this discussion. And, from looking at words we are trying to determine whether there is such a thing as a "belief", which is separate from the words, and if so, what is the nature of that thing, the "belief".

By assuming that there is a thing other than the word, which is referred to by "belief", you are just begging the question.

I refuse to be drawn into a debate over something so silly. — Sapientia

You now recognize the ridiculousness of your argument? How do you derive your presupposition that there would be something which the word "sky" refers to without the word "sky"?

I've already explained your misunderstanding. I refuse to do so repeatedly until it finally sinks in, if it ever does. Please pay close attention to what I'm about to say, because it's the second time that I've said it: we are not in the thought experiment, and my use of terms such as "blue" and "sky" is for sake of convenience only. There are no words in the thought experiment, as there's no language in the thought experiment. I am of course using language, but I am not in the thought experiment. There is a blue sky in the thought experiment. — Sapientia

OK, I'm ready for your thought experiment. There's a blue sky in your thought experiment. What next?

What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

...

The word is not the thing. The concept is not the thing. The belief requires neither. Why would it? — Sapientia

Yes a word is a thing. That's my evidence, the word itself, as a thing. By denying that the word is the thing, you are simply denying the evidence. But the evidence is clear, words are all around us. They clearly exist and are clear evidence.

So, there is no such thing as what a word refers to, without the word. There is no such thing as what "sky" refers to, or what "blue" refers to without those words. In order for there to be a thing which is referred to by "sky", there must be the word "sky". Your ridiculous argument is like insisting that there is something which Bob is doing when there is no Bob.

Let's say that everything is determined, for the sake of argument. What now? The mere assumed fact that the future already exists in a certain sense doesn't give us access to that predetermined future. We still wrestle the experience that we'll continue to call 'choice' or 'free will.' We might joke that we are 'suffering from the illusion of choice' again, but this is the same kind of suffering. It involves an ignorance of what we will do ahead of time (in borderline situations especially.) That's my attempt to demonstrate that the mere abstract truth of determinism doesn't have much weight. — mrcoffee

But if the future already exists, in a hard determinist way, we wouldn't have any incentive to attempt to influence what we apprehend may or may not occur, because it's already determined. Whether or not I'm getting the job I want is already determined, so I don't need to send a resume.

I possess the natural right to defend my life. — Thorongil

There is no natural right to defend your life. That's irrational nonsense, because it is natural that you must die. We all must surrender our lives, that's the reality of living, and to claim a right against impending death is not natural. To claim the right to extend your own life at any cost to others, is selfish nonsense.

That's funny. :mask: I'm glad not to be the only one who observes this. — Sam26

If there's a bad smell hanging around thread like this, most likely it's because the threads are rotten.

Yeah, if we cannot avoid all "tints", then we cannot have the "pure perspective", of course. So, our perspective will be always "conditioned" by some tint or an other. And even more importalntly all our observation cannot be "perfect" since our observations play a causal role.

So, in this view "the pure observation" seems nothing more than an useful abstraction, like, say, a "free particle". The problem is, however, that if there is not a "total pure point of view", then it is impossible to the "soul" to know "how things really are". — boundless

I'm not convinced of the conclusion that if it is impossible to avoid the tint, then it is impossible to know how things really are. I think it just means that we have to take a detour in our proceedings, and work on determining the nature of the tinting. This is why we have numerous different senses to compare, we have logic, and we have philosophy. These are the tools for assessing the tint.

So for instance, I have assumed that the immaterial point of observation, the tint free observation point, is the non-dimensional point between future and past. Now we say, that this is impossible, unreal, it cannot be the case, there is no such observation point. This necessitates that we reconceive "activity", "change", to allow for this reality. We have assumed that as time passes, it goes from future to past, and the present marks the supposed dimensionless boundary. But this dimensionless boundary is a mistaken assumption.

Activity and change occur as time passes and are measured and understood in relation to time passing. Under the new principle, we must allow for the reality that activity occurs "at the present", not just as time passes the present, because we've denied the possibility that the present is a dimensionless boundary. We have no capacity to measure this activity "at the present" because it doesn't correspond to time passing. Therefore we must introduce another dimension of time (I think I mentioned this earlier in the thread), to account for the activity which exists at the present.

This was my analogy of objects coming through a plane, at the present. Suppose you could look straight ahead down a plane. To the right of the plane is absolute nothing, only possibility, that's the future. To the left is all the physical existence of the past. As time passes, the objects of physical existence are coming out of the plane on the left. Suppose that a tiny object comes out instantaneously, but a large object takes a little time to get out. How does this "little time" exist? So the plane must have breadth. The small object gets out immediately, and is in the past for a short period of time, before the big object gets across the plane.

Now assume that we've created a concept of time, duration, the flow of time, by looking across the emergence of the big objects. When the big objects are fully emerged from the plane of the present, this marks the moment when time has gone from future to past. So the non-dimensional plane, which is "the present", which we have created artificially, has been produced by looking across the moment when the big objects are fully emerged into the past. Now we look at the tiny objects, and these tiny objects must make a plane of "the present" as well. They emerge from the future slightly before the big objects, so we can create a separate plane of "the present" by looking across their emergence There are two planes of the present, and the breadth of the present is the entire area between. BY establishing a relationship between the one plane and the other, we can determine the passage of time at the present.

In the analogy, the tiny objects pop out from the future to the past, first. This seems intuitive, but it's not necessarily the case. To really understand the way things exist at the present, we need to look at the way we act in the world, and interact with it. There are some things, with large mass and inertia, which appear to be fully determined. And, we find possibility in small things, and this allows us to make changes which are actually very small in relation to the vast universe. If we assume that change only occurs at the present, then the large things must come out first, determined with mass and inertia, and by the time that the tiny human brain is out, and apprehends what is going on, it has no capacity to alter what has already come out into the past. So the human brain exercises the capacity of free choice only over the tiny things, because the big things are already in the past. This is consistent with the Neo-Platonist's principle of emanation, or procession. The One, which represents the unity of the universe is first, then the Soul, then the Mind.

However, it is clear that we would need to allow some way that the smaller, massless things which would come into existence last, at the present, can cycle back to have an affect on the massive, as the human mind, has the capacity to control the human body, which can control even bigger things. So I've considered before, that the tiny must be the first to emerge, to effect such change. I don't think that this is possible though, that the tiny emerge first, because the first must be the most determined, and this is contrary to what is known. So in reality, the tiny must only change the massive, through an instability in the massive. A tiny change, by a tiny thing at the final emergence of the present, will throw off, or change a larger object due to instability.

If this is the case, the ramifications are that when we divide time into shorter and shorter time periods, to observe tiny particles, we are taking duration measurements on the past side of the present. As we get into these smaller and smaller particles, we lose our ability to observe, because we are crossing the border into the past. If anything is still moving in the past, it has no capacity to affect the future, and appears as infinite possibility. But since it's in the past it's really the possibility for nothing, and so appears to be infinite. When we look out into the universe, on the other hand, at huge massive structures, we need to produce a system for measuring duration which is close to the future side of the present. In this way, we can establish the boundaries of the present, and work on the second dimension of time, which is the relationship between these two. The massive structure appear to be absolutely determined, because the possibilities which exist on the past side of the present appear to be incapable of penetrating through that inertial stability.

In the past, we have produced a system for time measurement based on the motions of the earth and sun, so this is pretty much in the middle of the breadth of the present. Now we have produced atomic clocks measuring duration with tiny objects, so this would be (presumably) measuring time duration at the past side of the present. But we have established no real principles to determine the breadth between these two. How much behind the present, which is determined by the motions of the earth and sun, is the present which is determined by the atomic clocks? Both these clocks can keep time in a synchronized, accurate way, but according to the theory above, they represent parallel "presents", with time, breadth between them.

Is not better to say that "the extent to which "reality", is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem"? If we rephrase in this wa the sentence then I agree. The problem, in any case, is that if we cannot avoid the "tints", then such a problem will never be solved. — boundless

I think the issue here is that we approach a point where there is no separation between the concept and the reality represented by it. For example, there must be a concept of concept. And this is where we approach unintelligibility. That is what happens with the concept of "matter". Matter is fundamentally a concept. By the nature of the concept, as produced by Aristotle, there cannot be any real physical thing which corresponds to "matter", because the physical matter, necessarily has a form and form is not matter. So the physical thing is a form, and that the form has matter, is simply an assumption. We have to assume that it has matter to make the changing of forms intelligible. There is no such thing as "prime matter", matter without form, yet "matter" is a concept, and we must assume that this concept corresponds to something real, independent of the concept. Therefore "matter" is whatever we make it to be, as purely conceptual, but matter is still real, and that's why we need the concept of matter. So the concept must conform to real matter, but we really can't know real matter because what we know are the forms of matter, and matter itself is unintelligible.

This is the tinted glass problem in a nutshell. The tint is the concept, "matter", which is the means by which we make the changing of the physical world intelligible in relation to the assumed static, eternal "soul". We look through the tint, and we know that it's a tint because it's a source of error, and we have figured out that it's there. Therefore we must conclude that there is a part of reality independent from us, which is unintelligible to us, because of the tint. It is the inversion of the tint, what the tint negates, which is unintelligible. Whatever we assume as matter, the concept of matter, then the deficiencies of this assumption, is what remains unintelligible to us. What is not assumed, but ought to be assumed creates the unintelligibility caused by the assumption "matter". So we have to approach the concept of "matter" in a kind of trial and error way, we produce a concept, like Aristotle did, and see if it works. The success was limited, and the concept was replaced by a more comprehensive assumption, "energy". Now we have to assess this assumption for successes and failures. It's a matter of assessing failures which are the result of improperly representing the tint, on and on, until we figure out the tint and represent it properly.

What Robbins described was the brain creating a holographic image via a reconstructive wave pattern. The singular universal hologram can create as many images as there are reconstructive waves passing through it. — Rich

Within the brain, there is an agent, which creates its own wave patterns, interacting with the other wave patterns such that the person perceives the world. In the case of the universal hologram what would create the waves to interact with the other waves?

No individual is continuosly creating holographic images from the holographic universe. The holidays universe is all the wave patterns, the individual creates images that perceives as the outside v objects and inner memory. — Rich

The video clearly shows the individual's brain creating a holographic image.

But does this really carve up the mind at its joints once you get into a systems-style understanding of neurocognition? Is there an imagery faculty, an intuition faculty, a feelings faculty, all making their individual contributions to the activity being witnessed in this theatre of conscious experience? — apokrisis

Perhaps we cannot carve up the mind because that would kill the person, but we can make these distinctions in principle to help us understand, just like we can make distinctions on the visible spectrum, and say "blue" and "red" are particular ranges of wavelength, when in reality, the colours we see are all combinations. Likewise, neurocognition, as it exists consists of all these features together, but we can separate them out, in principle, to help us understand.

Yes, there is also will and the ability to imagine a future possibility which is definitely an aspect of existence, but if you observe what is defining you as you, it is the memory of what was passing into a different what was. This duration of memory defines your existence. — Rich

Well, I can't agree with this.

No, they are all weaving within the same hologram. Each wave in the ocean is creating but also part of the whole. There is no differentiation. It's all One as the Dao suggests. — Rich

That's not what the Robbins video described though. It described each person's mind as creating a hologram from the brain wave patterns interfering with the wave patterns of the rest of the universe, so the hologram is the world as it is, being experienced within the mind. That's what supports his claim of direct realism.

So each individual has one's own hologram but I don't see the means for a universal hologram. All there is in the universe is wave patterns, except where the individual minds create holograms for themselves. But I wonder why all the wave patterns are such as they are, what causes them to be the patterns that they are? We still need to assume God don't we?

So isn't this just pragmatism? You are now thinking of a belief as a proposition - a hypothesis that, if true, would have expectable consequences. You are breaking down the three-part method for forming a reasonable and justified belief - abduction, deduction, inductive confirmation - into its components and labelling the first bit, the leap to a hypothesis that makes predictions, as "the belief". And that separates it from "the justification". — apokrisis

Right, but "the justification" may or may not be composed of other beliefs, or may be partially composed of beliefs and partially composed of other things. So the strength of the justification depends on the strength of the beliefs used in the justification, such that if things other than beliefs are used to justify, then the justification is weak. That's why feelings and intuitions don't make good justification, though they are often used.

So all I say is that animals can't of course speak objectively in a way that clearly separates a belief from its justification. But the basic psychological structure is the same in that the brain is naturally wired up to work like that - to form general expectancies, to then make particular predictions, and then finally to revisit habits of belief when error correction becomes needed. — apokrisis

I think that what separates belief from the other psychological capacities which you refer to, is the temporal persistence. We must be able to maintain the same idea for an extended period of time in order to bring about the effect of inductive confirmation. This is why words are necessary, words have the capacity to fix the idea, to a much greater extent than is possible by simply remembering images. Images shift and change, and become vague very quickly. With words ideas become inter-subjective and this provides the temporal extension which is necessary to strengthen an idea into a belief.

One thing to note about Bergson's concept of duration is that it is not, despite popular misreadings, limited to our/human psychology. For Bergson, our experience of duration attests to the fact that there are durations in the multiple, some of which we occupy, but many of which are, as he puts it "superior and inferior to us". Bergson's famous example, in Matter and Memory regarding having to wait for sugar to dissolve, attests to the fact that that are durations with which we do not coincide, that have 'their own time', a kind of temporal autonomy not indexed by us. Deleuze explains: "Bergson's famous formulation, 'I must wait until the sugar dissolves' has a still broader meaning than is given to it by its context. It signifies that my own duration, such as I live it in the impatience of waiting, for example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine.... My duration essentially has the power to disclose other durations." (Deleuze, Bergsonism). — StreetlightX

This points to the issue with the nature of "an event". The events which we describe, and have words for describing, are proper to our experience of duration, which is really a very narrow range of possible experiences of duration. So if we start to hypothesize about different types of "durations", then we must allow as coincidental to these hypotheses, the possibility that "events" within these different durations are completely beyond what we have the capacity to describe. Transformation mathematics only provide a skeletal comparison, and can't tell us what "an event" would be like in a significantly different experience of duration.

Observe who you are. You are memory. — Rich

I don't agree. I am much more than memory. I think, I anticipate, and I act, none of these things can be directly attributed to memory. So memory is only one of my many attributes.

Not as a hologram but rather a wave pattern within the hologram. — Rich

Those wave patterns of the universe are not necessarily within the hologram, they would exist even if the mind wasn't making the hologram. So they are a partial cause of the hologram. And those patterns are very specific, very particular, therefore there must be a cause of this peculiarity. That's why I asked if God was necessary, as the source of all these particular wave patterns.

It's the same with differences in creative activity, will, and memory. So the trick is to figure out how it can be all the same with differences. Bergson gives ideas as do I.

No God but one unified mind and all if the little minds. — Rich

If each mind creates its own hologram, where is the unified mind? That's what Bohm seemed to be onto, and why I asked about it earlier, how is there a universal hologram.

So beliefs can't be weak and strong? Beliefs aren't by nature probabilistic and so held with various degrees of conviction? There is some "degree of doubt" that is inherent for good reason. It helps to know that we don't know as well as to be sure that we do know. — apokrisis

I agree, doubt is inherent within belief because we know that we are never beyond the possibility of mistake. But I think that what separates belief from similar mental content which is not belief, is the conviction that there is a low possibility of mistake. This conviction is tied up with temporal extension such that a longer period of time without mistake reinforces the conviction.

I am not clear though on how you think belief could be equivalent to memory, although belief certainly relies on memory. — Janus

I didn't say belief is equivalent to memory. I said that of the different mental conditions which I could think of, thinking, memory, and anticipation, belief seems to be most closely related to memory. So it may be like a special type of memory, not equivalent to memory though.

But I think the relationship between belief and memory is more than just belief relying on memory. Belief relies on thinking, and it relies on anticipation, in the same way that memory relies on thinking, and memory relies on anticipation. So belief is more closely related to memory than it is to thinking and anticipation, even though it relies on these things.

I do recall saying that possession of a firearm for one's personal protection is a human right. In other words, it depends not on being a citizen of a particular state, having a particular status (non-grandparents do not have grandparents' rights), etc. In other words, it is a right that one has simply by being born human. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Correct, I demonstrated why this claimed "right" is irrational. Can you either refute my argument, or provide a better one to justify your assertion that it is natural right to possess a firearm for personal protection?

A right is a justified claim, not a burden of proof. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

No, "justified" means that the claim has been proven. Therefore there is a burden of proof, otherwise your claim is not justified, it is merely an assertion. Assertion doesn't make it right.

If you want your arguments to be taken seriously, a good start would be to respond to what people have actually said.

I did not say "weapon". I specifically said firearm.

I did not say "self-defense". I said one's personal protection.

I did not even say "own". I specifically said possess. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

This is irrelevant to my argument.

Ha ha, hope you don't mind if I laugh about that.

We can see that belief is a mental thing, and there are other mental things like thinking, remembering, and anticipating. I would associate belief with remembering. I think the same type of conviction whereby we remember things, is the type of conviction which is fundamental to belief. Thinking itself, being an activity of change, and considering various options, doesn't seem to be consistent with "belief", which is to hold an unchanging thought. And anticipation seems to have doubt inherent within it, so it doesn't seem to be consistent with belief either. Perhaps belief is a special type of remembering.

Precisely. — Rich

OK, but that requires that the boundary between past and future is a real medium, a substance,as the holographic film or plate, and that's quite difficult to conceive of. I can conceive of "matter" as that which exists at the present, but matter is not substantial without form. And the forms of matter are already assumed to be what exists as a hologram. Now we need another form, to account for the real existence of the boundary, which must be independent of holographic forms. And we still need another form to be the cause of the brain's activity in creating the hologram, this would be the soul. So we have three distinct substances and we still haven't gotten to the substantial existence of all the independent physical objects, when there is no soul to produce the hologram. Is there a need for God as well, as a fourth substance, to produce the universal hologram?

I agree with everything else you say in this post; I am just arguing for the usefulness of distinctions between different kinds of believing. — Janus

Actually, I think it would be more productive to differentiate these so-called "different kinds of believing" as something other than believing. This forces us to describe them and determine the differences, and why they are other than "believing", instead of just asserting that these different types of mental conditions are really all the same, as forms of "believing".

A right is a justified claim.

I am not aware of any conditions under which a claim to the possession of a firearm for one's personal protection would not be justified. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I just demonstrated to you why the right to a weapon for self-defence would be irrational. Do you have a counter-argument or just a hollow assertion? Anyone can claim that anything they want is "justified", but to actually justify it, you must demonstrate why it is right.

Go ahead and try, but you'll only run into the problems Hanover just pointed out, and get mired in particulars. Your claim though, is that the right to a weapon for self-defence is "universal", and that's why it's irrational.

The surface is mind/memory (information) unfolding as duration. Our minds translate the waves of information into a projection that feels like space. We are wondering through and observing information waves as space. — Rich

So the surface is the boundary between past and future? This boundary is the medium upon which the hologram exists?

think that you've missed the point. I wasn't arguing that there could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue". I was arguing that the pre-linguistic human would be able to see and distinguish the colour which I am now referring to as "blue". We are not in the thought experiment. I am not in the thought experiment. I am only referring to the colour as "blue" so that you know what I'm talking about. — Sapientia

But you're referring to the belief, as the belief that the sky is blue as well. And there cannot be the belief that the sky is blue without "blue". So where does this leave the belief?