A hologram requires a surface, in the video demonstration it's a plate. Is Bergson saying that in the case of the human mind, the body acts as the surface, or as he says, "the screen"?

Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question. — Sapientia

How could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue"? Remove the word "blue" and we wouldn't know of that colour as blue. The person without language might recognize the colour of the sky, and compare that to objects of a similar colour, but this is completely different from believing that the sky is blue.

The information, like TV signals) are out there in the holographic universe. — Rich

This is what I don't understand. What is the holographic universe?

I must admit, I cannot grasp the holographic concept. I've read Bohm's "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", but I find that there is something missing in the conception which renders the whole holonomics movement unintelligible to me. Doesn't a hologram require a medium?

I was being sarcastic

Seeing is believing. Literally.

By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence. [In my heuristic: real but not existent.]

This is the issue with the nature of time. Common sense shows us that we need to accept as brute fact the substantial difference between past and future. Things which have become actual are all in the past, and the future consists of possibilities, "potential". We ought to confine "physical existence" "spatial-temporal existence" to the past, because the future consists only of possibilities, whereas the past consists of what has actually occurred. But this produces an ontology where the physical world must be continually coming into existence (becoming), from possibilities, at each moment of the present.

Each moment of passing time must be represented not as a state of physical existence, but as the entire physical world actively coming into existence at each moment of passing time. You can imagine that the speed at which the spatial temporal world comes into being at each passing moment, from the world of possibility, must be so incredibly fast, to give us the appearance that there is a state of physical existence corresponding to each moment of passing time. So the emergence of the physical world, from the "extraspatiotemporal domain" of possibility, at each moment of passing time, must consist of activity which is faster than anything we could imagine.

Consistently off topic nonsense. — fdrake

It's not off topic. Do you recognize the fundamental difference, which is exposed by the length contraction and time dilation implied by relativity theory, between the nature of "an event", at speeds near and at light speed, and "an event" at speeds which we observe with our eyes?

If so, then do you see that this makes your talk of a "unique objective ordering of events", fundamentally incoherent, because there is no way to say that an observed event from distinct frames of reference is "the same event".

However there are still two possible (very inelegant, but possible) solutions, maybe. — boundless

The alternative which I was trying to lead our discussion toward earlier, is to assume that the tinted glass cannot be avoided. This is to deny the reality of the non-dimensional point at the present, and to deny the soul its immaterial view point, as impossible, unreal. That is the result of your objection earlier, which is a standard materialist objection to dualism, that such a point would disallow the possibility of interaction between the soul and the physical world. All of this lead me to the long digression concerning the nature of "matter".

So we assume that the soul is fundamentally united with matter, and cannot be separated the immaterial perspective is impossible. We assume that the glass through which the world is observed is tinted, and this cannot be avoided, the tinting of the glass cannot be removed to give us a clear perspective. Therefore we must determine the nature of the tinting and account for this. Now we're back to where we began the discussion, with a slightly different perspective. The soul "interacts" with the world, and this means that it is a cause and an effect. An observation cannot be pure because we cannot adequately distinguish cause from effect, and this is the tinting of the glass. So we must determine the nature of the tinting. The soul interacts with the world through the concept of "matter" (in modern physics, "energy"). Matter is the potential for change.

The illusion, which results in a failure to properly account for the tinting, is in the assumption that matter or energy is something physical rather than something conceptual. If the soul is fundamentally united with matter, or energy, denying the possibility of a clear perspective, then matter or energy is conceptual, of the soul. The soul observes the world through this concept (tinted glass), and when it is not diligent it perceives this matter, or energy, to be a property of the thing being observed, rather than as the concept (tinted glass) through which the world is being observed. The fundamental point being, that "matter" is a concept introduced to allow us to understand the nature of change in the world. There is nothing to prove that "matter" refers to anything real, independent of the mind (what Berkeley demonstrated). Aristotle simply assumed "matter" as a necessary assumption in order to make change intelligible. So it is something we assume "about the world", but it is fundamentally conceptual, therefor not really "of the world"

So what is revealed is that the tinting of the glass is what is referred to by the concept of "matter" and "energy". To the extent that this concept does not adequately represent the real tinting of the glass, i.e. what really prevents the soul from having the pure non-dimensional perspective, then we have misunderstanding.

The first is this: "c" is the speed limit of relativity. Strictly speaking relativity does not imply that light moves as fast as "c". Interestingly you can read this article https://www.sciencealert.com/heavy-light-could-explain-dark-energy . This solution is very inelegant, especially due to Gauge symmetry problems. But IMO it is possible. If indeed no particle is massless, then IMO the tinted glass issue can be circumvented. — boundless

Light is fundamental to the concept of energy, and the concept of energy relates light to matter and mass. As described above, the tinting of the glass is this concept, we interact with the physical reality through this concept. The extent to which this concept misrepresents itself, is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem.

Imagine these three scenarios:
1. You're looking through a tinted glass and you do not know that it's tinted. You believe that your observations are providing a real description, despite the fact that your descriptions are inaccurate because the glass is tinted.
2. You're looking through a tinted glass and you know that it's tinted, but you do not know in which way it's tinted. You know that your observations are inaccurate because of the tinting, but you do not know how to rectify that, because you do not understand the tinting. Therefore you must determine how the glass is tinted in order to produce accurate descriptions.
3. You're looking through a glass and you know that it's tinted, you've determined exactly what the tint is, therefore you can produce accurate descriptions.

What I suggest is that physicists are at position #2. The concept of matter, energy and mass, is the tint. The physicists know that they are looking at the world through this tint, but they do not actually know the tint, and how it affects the observations. The appropriate metaphysical procedure is to recognize that we must determine precisely how the glass is tinted, before we can produce any accurate descriptions. However, the commonly practised metaphysics is to claim #3, that the physicists already know exactly what the tint is, they know what the concept of energy, mass and matter, "adds" to the observations, and therefore accurate descriptions are being produced. Adopting this metaphysical perspective amounts to, in reality, #1, that they are looking through a tint which they do not know is there, because they have assumed that all the tinting has been accounted for within the concept. This is why I say that if the concept represents itself, or is represented as, accounting for the tint, when it really doesn't, then there is a problem.

And I was pointing out that individuals believe that they have the right to possess firearms for their personal protection and that it is a universal right.

...

The right to self-defense is useless if one does not have the right to the means necessary to effectively defend him/herself from a threat. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

I think you misunderstand the nature of a "right". There are two ways to look at rights, either a right is something given, as a privilege, or a right is something inherent within human nature. Neither way justifies a right to weapons of self-defence.

If we are given particular human rights, these do not include the universal right to possess weapons, nor do they include the universal right to defend and preserve our own rights. The harsh reality would be that just like one's rights are given, they may also be taken away, and this denies the possibility of the universal right to defend or preserve one's own rights. So a universal right to weapons of self-defence would be irrational if rights are given because it would deny the possibility of removing any given privileges.

If universal rights are something inherent within human nature, then it is impossible that another can take away your rights, so the right to weapons for defence of your rights is again irrational. In other words, If rights are inherent within human nature, then they cannot be taken away, so there cannot be a right to defend your rights, as this would be inconsistent with the idea that one's rights cannot be taken away.

Either way, your insistence on a universal right to weapons for defence of your rights is simply irrational, and therefore cannot actually be a universal right of rational beings.

What stops the following from being inferred from special relativity: there is no unique objective ordering of events with respect to time. — fdrake

You seem to be overlooking a basic problem which quantum mechanics exposes to us. This is that the nature of "an event" is, inherently ambiguous. From one frame of reference "an event" is a completely different type of thing compared to "an event" from a different frame of reference. This makes comparing the "ordering of events with respect to time", from one frame of reference to another fundamentally incoherent, or unintelligible, because you are not comparing the same thing.

This is the issue which length contraction, time dilation, etc. demonstrates to us. The very same object (event) being observed from different frames of reference (different perspectives), is significantly different. According to your rule #2, we cannot construe this as a measurement problem, the "same event" may be substantially different from a different perspective, as evidenced by wave-particle duality. The transformation formulas do not adequately deal with this problem, because they treat it as a different ordering of the same events (as you represent), instead of a fundamental difference in the nature of "an event".

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make? — Michael Ossipoff

I think that makes a lot of sense. So my objection holds. Why would you mention, or bring up for discussion, something which you claim cannot be discussed. That's nonsense. Either they really cannot be discussed, in which case you wouldn't be able to mention them for discussion, or your assertion that they cannot be discussed is false. Clearly your assertion is false because you are saying "I cannot talk about the national secretes which I am talking about".

Therefore, I think that unless you can explain your distinction between metaphysical and meta-metaphysical, in a way which makes sense, you are just talking nonsense.

Perhaps, but I was just trying to get a handle on what is meant by "objective", in the sense of "of the object". I take it that you think this to be hopelessly incoherent.

But we are addressing human understanding and knowledge of these things, neither of which remain the same. — Janus

No, we were discussing objectivity, what it means to be an object regardless of human understanding. Perhaps you joined into this discussion a bit later, but human understanding is a property of the subject, "subjective".

I'm not suggesting that the two are literally the same thing, but that the are sufficiently similar. — Pseudonym

What? The logical subject is sufficiently similar to the physical object? No, there is a categorical difference between them. They do not have the same type of existence at all.

This world is divisible into parts, if we allow the divisions to be arbitrary.

Each part of the world (a thing) will therefore have a "way it is" (its properties), because it is a part of the world, which has a "way it is". — Pseudonym

You demonstrate inconsistency here. If the divisions are arbitrary, then the "way it is" of the part is dependent on the division. The description of the part is dependent on the division made. This we can know. That there is a "way it is" of the world as a whole, is just an assumption, so we cannot actually know that. And, relativity theory assumes as a premise that there is not such thing as the "way it is" of the world as a whole. It assumes that the "way it is" is dependent on the perspective of the part. So there really isn't any support for your assertion that there is a "way it is" of the world as a whole.

Really, so when hitting a nail in with a hammer you "seriously consider" the possibility that the force from the hammer might not deterministically cause the nail to move if it hits. What do you seriously consider might be the alternative? That the nail simply move the opposite direction of its own accord? — Pseudonym

Yes. Have you ever hit a nail on the side of the head, and watched it go flying off somewhere. Furthermore, I seriously consider the possibility that the hammer might miss the nail and hit my thumb. There are all sorts of possibilities which must be considered when driving a nail. It's not like I think that determinism ensures that the hammer will reliably drive the nail, so I pick the hammer and start swinging away. It is me, making the appropriate actions with my conscious mind which reliably drives the nail, the nail is far from determined to be driven. So I must be very careful to actually make the appropriate actions.

I never broke rule 2. I never referred to any of the things listed in rule 2. I referred to the arbitrariness of "proper time", which ought not even be considered as a "deficiency of measurement", arbitrariness is just a standard feature of measurement. Your accusation was unfounded and just an excuse to disregard the points I was making.

You are assuming that relativity is true, and asking how this affects the ontology of time. The obvious answer is that "proper time" is completely arbitrary, meaning that there is no true, or real thing anywhere, which corresponds to this notion. It's like assuming a "metre", with no physical standard anywhere, to refer to. Do you accept the truth of this, concerning "proper time", or does it somehow break rule 2, and fall into the category of things you don't wish to discuss?

So to maintain a determinist interpretation, we just need to assume an infinite number of infinite numbers of universes?

Why not put that in the op then? Instead of a convoluted list of rules, simply state "Metaphysician Undercover, Rich, and any others who do not agree with the ontological implications of relativity, need not reply."

I don't want to start this thread straight off the bat with a straw man. However, America is rife with an anti-intellectual attitude perhaps originating with American Transcendentalism/Romanticism and proceeding throughout the years under the guise of free speech and religious freedom, eventually even into the education system itself, as seen, in anti-evolutionist or creationist 'interpretations' of science. — Posty McPostface

The intellectuals are seen as responsible for the institutions, and the institutions are seen as fundamentally unrealistic. Let's arm the teachers! Huh? Maybe that suggestion won't pass into the realm of "institution", but it's amazing how much unrealistic stuff does get institutionalized. We cannot blame the institutions themselves, so we can only blame the so-called "intellectuals", for allowing the ridiculous to be institutionalized.

There can be few things as frightening as watching a great nation crumble. — Banno

It had already started when they turned their thumbs down to Transcendentalism, which was in many ways a response to degradation in progress. Perhaps they ought to go back and revisit.

What to you, qualifies as "a great nation"?

Oh I see the point of this thread now. You want to discuss the fact that relativity refutes presentism. Why didn't you just say that in the op?

"I don't want to discuss the question of whether relativity refutes presentism, I want to discuss the fact that relativity refutes presentism."

Of course it has. How do you think we do anything? Any action you take at all is dependent on a belief in determinism, that actions have prior causes. — Pseudonym

You're just spouting random nonsense Pseudonym. I always try to maintain the attitude that I might fail, in any action which I take. This attitude inspires one to proceed with care and seriously consider all one's actions. You demonstrate a complete misunderstand of human actions, when you say that the use of fire is based in the belief that rubbing sticks "reliably" causes fire.

The probability of two descriptions which entirely made up in the head (ie have no reference to properties of the object) matching are no better than random as there is no reason why they would match. The more they match, therefore, the less likely it is that their matching is a random coincidence, thus is requires an explanation. The theory is that the reason they match is because they describe some property of the object. That theory becomes more and more likely the more people match because it become increasingly unlikely that the match is coincidence. — Pseudonym

That descriptions reference objects does not mean that the descriptions aren't entirely made up in the head. You seem to think that the descriptions are somehow outside of the head, as properties of the object. In logic, as in grammar, there is a subject and a predicate. Predication is of the subject. So we have a clear separation between what is in the head, and what is not. That a specific object is designated as corresponding to that subject, requires a different judgement.

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is. — Michael Ossipoff

So you are positing something which is, which is other than that which is. Isn't that contradictory? I know that you say the one "is" refers to what we can talk about, and the other "is refers to what we can't talk about, but haven't you just talked about it by saying it "is". So if it's not contradictory, it's at the least, very hypocritical. How is it possible that you can mention the thing, and have a meta-metaphysics to talk about the things which we can't talk about?

Surely you can see how this is circular? The fact that we think we have free-will (and so have developed a legal system based on it) cannot possibly be used as evidence that we do have free-will, how on earth are you concluding that? — Pseudonym

You're behaving in a ridiculous manner Pseudonym. It was your argument "that ten thousand years of presuming the world is deterministic and having that presumption work is pretty good evidence that it is, in fact, deterministic". The style of argument you are criticizing is your own. I simply pointed out that your premise is wrong, the belief in determinism has not been prevalent for the last ten thousand years.

https://emersoncentral.com/texts/essays-first-series/the-over-soul/

Something to note. This was a time after Lamarck had published his evolutionary theory, and before Darwin had published his. So there was a revolution in the way that human beings related themselves to other living beings going on, a break from church doctrine. I believe Schopenhaur published around this same time as well. Acceptance of Darwinian evolution put an end to the developing notion, initiated by Lamarck, that the will of the individual is an evolutionary force.

Yeah, I remember reading Walden with a sense of reverence during my younger years. It was a rather boring book; but, in many respects a great self-report on living on the far end of society. — Posty McPostface

I found it an entertaining read. Have you read Emerson's "The Over-Soul"? I haven't and I don't think it's studied at all.

Most philosophers start with theories, searching for ways in which to practice what they preach only if they are serious about their philosophies. The transcendentalists reversed this procedure. They began with practices and then attempted to establish them on solid theoretical foundations. Yet these practices all involved spurning certain facts in favor of ideas, leading them invariably to theories that are inconsistent and vague. Their honesty would not allow them to spurn all facts, so they were ever at work reshaping intractable facts to fit their theories or stretching the fabric of their views to cover uncooperative facts. Unwitting victims of their own scruples, they found themselves hating facts that did not fit the mold and being frustrated with theories they knew failed to capture all the facts.

The final victim was transcendentalism itself. Critics, eager to wield the sword of criticism, overlooked the life-enhancing practices at the core of transcendentalism, concentrating their efforts on the many chinks and thin plates in its theoretical armor. Their blades penetrated easily, and they quickly pronounced their victim hopelessly baffling. Even friendly critics felt obliged to begin their articles with the proviso that transcendentalism is not easily articulated. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I think transcendentalism was so ridiculed that even transcendentalists started to deny being transcendentalists.

What it means to be an object can be thought in at least two ways. First it can be thought as a sheer definition, which would be a common sense descriptive approach.

Or the attempt can be made to think it in a comprehensive way that incorporates common sense, scientific knowledge, epistemology, phenomenology and metaphysics; an all-encompassing investigation, which will yield a picture that includes the human cognitive process as it is experienced, understood and judged to be. Obviously this second view of what it means to be an object cannot be a static, timeless one; it will be evolving along with the rest of human thought. — Janus

I think you have something mistaken here Janus. The second view, what it means to be an object cannot be changing or evolving, or else existence itself would be evolving and changing. But what really changes is the properties of an object, and what it means to exist as an object remains the same. Existence remains the same. Otherwise, if what it means to be an object is changing along with the rest of human thought, you have just reduced the second way to the first way, what it means to be an object is how we define it.


What do you mean by meta-metaphysics?

I agree. So when societies or individuals are diagnosed or accused, this seems to imply at least some blurry notion of a preferred state.

I think we have these blurry notions of virtue before we think to justify them. Indeed, thinking we need to justify/clarify our blurry notions was presumably motivated or in pursuit of another such blurry notion --one that tends toward its own clarification. — foo

Doesn't intention itself derive from such a "blurry notion". Suppose your particular, definite intent, at a specific time is to drop into the fast food joint and grab a burger. That intent may have developed from the more general intent of wanting to get something quick to eat, which may have developed from being hungry. So the original source of the intent is just a blurry feeling inside, which develops into the less blurry notion of hunger, and this develops into the more particular intent.

So we can look at all virtuous intent in this way. It develops from a blurry notion, a feeling that we need to be good and cooperate. Then it develops into different particular intentions. So, you refer to a "blurry notion of a preferred state". Let's compare this to hunger. There is something lacking which produces this weird feeling which we identify as hunger, the need for food. Likewise, if a person is diagnosed or accused, we could say that there is something lacking which produces the weird feeling within that person which we identify as the need for a preferred state. But this notion of a preferred state, unlike hunger which is satiated with a burger, is far too blurry, so the person has much difficulty in proceeding toward a particular intention. How could we ever bring this blurry notion out from its condition of being too blurry, so that we can develop clear virtuous intentions?

Common sense knowledge deals with descriptions; science moves to the next level; the level of explanation. — Janus

The point being that the explanations are description based, i.e. empirically verified. There is no scientific explanation of what it means to be an object, or to be a property of an object, because these are not empirical principles, empiricism being fundamental to the scientific method.

Science does not claim to achieve objectivity any more than it claims to achieve truth, its about methods which approach those things. — Pseudonym

I agree that science does not make such claims concerning "objectivity", as I said, that's what philosophy does. But you had made the contrary claim. "Scientists certainly do not consult philosophers to check whether their results are objective. They already know whether their results are objective by the confirmation of others." So that's one thing I objected to, and I'm glad you now realize that what you said wasn't really correct.

If you and I both think the sun goes around the earth, that is a good deal closer to being likely to be a property of the object than my personal opinion that the sun is held up by the moon on strings, which no one else seems to share. — Pseudonym

But both descriptions are clearly wrong, and so both are obviously not properties of the object. Why do you think that one is "closer to being likely to be a property of the object"? Each is a description, and as such it is subjective, of the subject. Subjects make descriptions so a description, though it describes an object, is property of a subject. That you and I agree on a description doesn't mean that the description is any closer, or more likely to be "of the object", because a description is always something made by subjects, so to be "of the object" is a completely different category.

Its not that the scientific method is a guarantee of objectivity and truth, it's a far cry from that. But it's the best system we have, nothing else is going to get closer to true knowledge 'about the object'. — Pseudonym

I tend to disagree. The scientific method deals with descriptions so it is inherently subjective in the way that I described. This is the problem which Kant exposes with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Our descriptions are based in phenomena, how the world appears to us through sensation. To gain knowledge about the object, we need to go beyond this, and ask what does it mean to be an object, to exist as an object, and these are the question which ontology and metaphysics are concerned with. While the scientific method, on the other hand, due to its standards of empiricism, is restricted to dealing with descriptions, so it has no approach to the object itself.

What evidence? — Pseudonym

The whole legal system is designed around intention and free will.

I'm saying that the whole rest of the universe apart from our personal experience is demonstrably deterministic so the simplest theory that does not require us to invent new realms is that we too are deterministic and any impressions of ourselves to the contrary are wrong. — Pseudonym

I think we know our own actions better than we know "the whole rest of the universe". So if our own actions display free will, and we design the legal system for dealing with our actions as if we have free will, then even if the rest of the universe displays determinism, I would tend to think that we don't know the rest of the universe very well. And, it is quite evident that we do not understand the rest of the universe very well, as is evident from concepts like quantum uncertainty, spatial expansion, dark matter, and dark energy.

The Libet experiments for example, showing that the sub-concious brain prepares to take physical action before the concious part of the brain is aware of the decision to. — Pseudonym

The Libet experiments support the existence of will power, the capacity of the conscious mind to prevent "caused" physical action. Preparing to take physical action, and actually taking that action is two distinct things. That we have the capacity to consciously prevent a caused physical action from occurring, until the desired time, indicates the existence of free will.

Experiments on hypnotic suggestion which have shown that when subjects have an hypnotic suggestion implanted, say to crawl on the floor when the hypnotist clicks their fingers, they will invariable come up with some justification for their desire to do so in terms of a free choice "I'm just going to check if I've dropped something" or "what a fascinating floor tiles, I'm just going to take a closer look", all the while the experimenter knows full well that these are post hoc stories and the real driver of the action is the hypnotic suggestion, yet to the subject the feeling is entirely that they are checking if they've dropped something, or interested in the floor tile. — Pseudonym

I don't see how placing an individual in a hypnotic trance is relevant to the issue of conscious free will. That's like arguing that a person has no conscious free will within one's dreams.

I think this is exactly what it does mean. It means that, if my knowledge of the object is exactly the same as your knowledge of the object in some meaningful way, then our knowledge must be truly "of the object" because it is unaffected by our own subjectivity, It is related purely to the object. — Pseudonym

This is clearly wrong though. If you and I both agree that the sun moves around the earth every day, then this is not knowledge "of the object", because it is just an incorrect opinion which we both hold. So agreement between us, though it does make "objectivity" in the sense of "inter-subjective", it does not make "objectivity" in the sense of "of the object" because it still might be wrong. That we both believe the same thing does not make our knowledge truly "of the object", because all this is is consistency, agreement in our subjectivity.

To begin with, I find that there is ambiguity with "self" which I think I should try to expose to some extent. In most instances, "self" refers to an experiencing, observing and acting, human being. But the immaterial perspective which we I am describing, that perspective at the point of the now, is separate from the human being, as immaterial, and this is why I preferred to refer to it as the "soul". While some might call it the "mind", or something like that, we have to keep it separate from "self" because of the ambiguity as "self" implies a composite mind and body. I believe phenomenology provides an approach to this perspective. The point is that the "soul" or the "mind" is other than the "self" of the human being, and this is how we transcend the physical human existence of the "self" by recognizing the soul.

Once we assume that this transcendent position exists, and assume that it is potentially real, then we try to adopt this position as an observation point, to avoid the tinted glass problem. The position is assumed to be the point of "now", the eternal non-dimensional boundary between past and future. Once we assume this point, we project it everywhere, to separate out periods of time and describe what exists in that period of time.

The problems with this perspective are numerous, and it is by understanding these problems that we can start to get a real grasp of the nature of time. First and foremost, there is the issue of interaction, which you mentioned. And to understand this problem we must appreciate the duality of the soul's interaction. The soul is not only an observer at this point, it is causal at this point, and that's what we discussed with the problems of observation. So when we analyze the problems involved with the immaterial observation point, the non-dimensional now, and attempt to construct the real observation point, (determine what colour the glass is tinted, you might say), we have to take into account this dual aspect, the capacity to observe the physical world, and the capacity to act in the physical world.

Here I disagree. In fact I find a very strong analogy with the "immaterial" self we are discussing and the "observer" in SR. — boundless

I think you are making an incorrect comparison to SR here. The basic premise of relativity theory is that motions are relative. The assumption of an immaterial observation point for the soul assumes absolute rest. This is a fundamental difference. Relativity theory, as developed through Newton and Galileo, is a sort of by-product of the Copernican revolution, the realization that mathematics could describe and predict the motions of the planets in a geocentric, or in a heliocentric way. Positioning the soul as an immaterial observer at absolute rest, assumes that there is a "correct" way of representing motions. The absolute rest is necessary in order to validate the "correct" way.

Special relativity explicitly denies that there is such a thing as absolute rest, and by replacing absolute rest with the constant, the speed of light, it produces a condition in which the "correct" way of representing motions is in relation to light. However light is itself a thing in motion, and this assumes that time is necessarily passing. The constant, or fundamental premise is the activity of light, and activity assumes that time is passing. So this is fundamentally different from the premise of absolute rest, which assumes the immaterial soul to be at a point where no time is passing. The difference being that absolute rest provides a viewpoint for the observation of time passing and therefore all motions, while special relativity ties "time passing" to the activity of light. So special relativity provides no viewpoint to observe the activity of light, and if there is any inaccuracy in the assumed relationship between time passing and the activity of light, then there is a tinted glass problem.

The consequence of this difference is that the premise of the non-dimensional point, absolute rest provides a position to view all motions in relation to each other, including the motion of light. The premise of special relativity does not allow this, because it sets as the viewpoint, the activity of light. So the soul's perspective, from special relativity, is as moving light, a photon or some such thing, and all other motions are viewed from this perspective. If we had a complete understanding of the activity of light, and how other activities related to it, then we could use this as an accurate viewpoint. But we do not, so we have created for ourselves, a tinted glass problem. We have assumed a perspective, the activity of light as a constant, without properly understanding that perspective, and what it adds to (how it tints) our observations.

In any case if the observer of relativity is real, he certainly "knows" the "events" that are associated with its light cone. — boundless

So the tinted glass problem is implied right here within this assumption of a "light cone". The notion of a light cone assumes some things about the relationship between time and light, which are really unknown. But in order for the light cone be a true representation, these assumed things must be true. The unknowns are the tinting of the glass, and when we assume that there is no tinting, we assign these properties to the things being observed. The colour of the glass is assigned to the objects observed. You could insist, as some adherents do, that special and general relativity give us a "clear" perspective, and assert that the effect of the tinting really is the property of the object, but I speak of it as tinting because I think that there is overwhelming evidence, beginning with the Doppler effect on the cosmic scale, and the whole idea of waves without a medium, that the glass really is tinted. Therefore what is needed is to untie the passing of time from its designated relationship with the activity of light, such that we can establish a proper perspective to observe the activity of light.

Again, I disagree. The tinted glass problem simply states that the "self" to really know the "world" must be outside it, in a "timeless" realm. All selves have "their" distinction between past and future. But nowhere it is stated that this distinction must be unique. As I said above what SR denies is precisely this uniqueness. Even without considering relativity all selves must have their "own" experience of the world, SR only introduces the idea that each "world" correponds to the "light cone". — boundless

This indicates that you don't yet quite understand the application of the tinted glass analogy to this problem. Basic relativity theory dictates that an observation point is a frame of reference. The possibility of motion is inherent, assumed within the concept of a reference frame, and this sets it apart from the position of absolute rest inherent within the assumption of the soul at a non-dimensional point. The actual motion which is inherent within the observation point is the tinting of the glass. We can never know the actual motion which is inherent within the observation point, because it is treated as possible motion, and so it taints the observations as an unknown factor. From the perspective of the non-dimensional soul, and absolute rest, relativity theory necessarily produces a tinted glass problem. It allows that there is motion within the observation point which cannot be accounted for because it cannot be known. The observation point is an active physical object.

Now consider special relativity. It fixes light as the observation point. Light is the constant, the absolute frame of reference, the soul's new viewpoint. However, there is motion inherent within this absolute frame of reference, which we do not know in any complete or absolute sense, so we have a tinted glass. Since it is our absolute frame of reference, instead of the absolute rest, we have no viewpoint from which to further understand this motion, the activity of light, and these unknowns will inevitably taint our observations.

And progress is (seems to me) the move from an inferior to a superior state. — foo

That would be in relation to something. The judgement of inferior and superior would be a judgement in relation to some objective, as progress is toward that objective, the goal, the desired end. Without that standard for judgement, there is no superior or inferior, nor is there progress, there is just change.

I don't call that metaphysics. As I mean metaphysics, it's the discussion of what discussably, describably is.

In your quote of Plotinus, he's talking about something other than metaphysics. He isn't discussing, but only asserting. — Michael Ossipoff

It was not a quote of Plotinus, it was me describing Plotinus' metaphysics, in a very brief way. The assertions were mine, as part of my description. When one describes something that person makes assertions about the thing.

Metaphysical statements should be supportable and supported. Because there are one or more metaphysicses that neither have nor need any assumptions or brute-facts, then there's no need for brute-facts or assumptions in metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

You'd have to read the entire "Enneads", (and some Plato and Aristotle as well) for that support.

Plotinus's statement sounds similar to things that are said in Vedanta writings. Those Vedanta writings, and Plotinus's statement, could be interpreted as meta-metaphysics that I don't understand, and which (I feel) says more detail than can really be said about meta-metaphysics--or else as metaphysics that doesn't meet my standard of support, and absence of assumptions or brute-facts. ...and of complete uncontroversialness. — Michael Ossipoff

Are you saying that you think metaphysics must be completely uncontroversial to be metaphysics?

Personally, I think ten thousand years of presuming the world is deterministic and having that presumption work is pretty good evidence that it is, in fact, deterministic (at least at the scale we're looking at). Rather than invent magical realms, I'd rather first explore the far simpler possibility that what we think it is to be a human being is maybe wrong. — Pseudonym

Huh? You think that free will has been consistently denied in favour of determinism for the last ten thousand years? Are you blind to the evidence?

Aliens exist, the illuminati exist, lizard men in the centre of the earth exist. I'm quite happy with your definition, I think it eliminates a lot of semantic issues, but I think it's a far cry from the claim theologians are apt to make. — Pseudonym

This is why we have different terms, like "real", "exist", and "being". Different philosophers would set out different semantic rules for distinguishing one from the other. But if you mix up one philosopher's meaning with another, or pay attention to no formal semantic rules, simply referring to layman's vernacular, then we're lost in ambiguity this matter.

I could agree with you here only to the extent that scientists do philosophy. Scientists certainly do not consult philosophers to check whether their results are objective. They already know whether their results are objective by the confirmation of others. — Pseudonym

I agree that scientists do philosophy because I think that science is a form of philosophy. However, I am not convinced that scientists are qualified to determine whether or not their results are "objective". That is because "objective" is another one of those ambiguous words, such that "objective" according to one philosophy is not the same as "objective" according to another.

Fundamentally, "objective" means of the object. There are two principle senses of "object" such that one is physical and the other non-physical. So we have "objective" in the sense of "of the physical object", and in the sense of "of the non-physical object" (implying a goal, or an aim). The latter form of "objective" is proper to the subject.

To make matters worse, there is another sense of "objective" which seems to cross the boundary between these two in common usage. Epistemologists sometimes say that knowledge is "objective" if there is agreement amongst individuals concerning the thing known. Generally, when people say that scientific knowledge is "objective", it is in this sense that they use the word, peer reviewed or something. It doesn't mean "objective" in the sense of "of the object, because knowledge is property of the human beings, not the objects which are known. Nor is it really "objective" in the sense of an aim or a goal of a subject, because it is common to many subjects. It is a sense of "objective" which means "inter-subjective". We must be careful not to confuse this sense of "objective" which is inter-subjective, with "objective" in the sense of "of the object".

Complete mischaracterisation, 'what does relativity do to the ontology of space and time if it's true?' is the point of the thread. I'm not going to engage with you in this thread any more unless you adopt the scenario. — fdrake

Look fdrake, either you're having difficulty understanding, or you're simply in denial of what relativity does to the ontology of time. Fundamental to the ontology of time is the distinction between past and future. This is how we derive the fundamental ontological categories of actual and potential, what has actually occurred, in the past, and what is possible, in the future. The boundary, which gives this distinction its ontological status, is called "the present", "now". From the assumption that the boundary is real, having ontological status, we conclude that the determinations of before and after also have ontological status.

Special relativity assumes that the determination of various events as past and future, or before and after, is dependent on the frame of reference, perspective dependent, "subjective". This is what relativity does to the ontology of time, it makes the distinction between the fundamental ontological categories, past and future, before and after, perspective dependent, i.e. subjective.

Do you understand what "ontology" is? It's the study of being, that which "is". Do you understand the temporal reference of "is", meaning "at the present"? If this is not the scenario you wish to adopt with your question of how relativity affects the ontology of time, then what is the scenario you wish to adopt?

I've been through this in my previous posts. I've not personally heard any scientist make claims about the non-existence of concepts, nor that science can prove its own axioms. I've asked for examples of scientists making these claims but have yet to hear any. Science does, quite justifiably claim that unicorns do not have any effect on the world. It makes the same claim about God, that it probably doesn't exist in such a way as to actually effect the world we collectively experience. — Pseudonym

So, on what basis then would a person with a science based worldview claim that things like flying unicorns, and gods don't exist?

If whether or not one believes in God affects the way that they behave, then the claim about God, which you say that science makes, that God doesn't actually effect the world that we experience, is blatantly false. That's the thing about beliefs, they clearly have effect on the way that we behave. So the thing believed has obvious effect on the world we experience. Just look at the principles of geometry. So if you assume to validate whether a concept exists or not based on whether it effects the world we experience, then it is necessary to conclude that they exist. And since the belief in God affects the way people behave, just like the belief in geometrical principles affects the way they behave, thus affecting the world we experience, then we ought to conclude that God definitely exists "in such a way as to actually effect the world we collectively experience".

So concepts are neither wholly objective nor subjective. The job of science is to determine which are which. On end of the tasks of philosophy might be to prepare concepts for such a test by clarifying them and resolving semantic issues from physical ones. — Pseudonym

This is where you have things mixed up. Philosophy determines the difference between objective and subjective. So philosophy distinguishes between which concepts are objective and which concepts are subjective, not science. Science produces concepts, philosophy determines the objectivity of these concepts.