How we frame things for funding purposes is not evidence for our personal motivations. — Dfpolis

Why continue stating falsities? We all have our careers, and we do what we get paid to do. It's called earning a living.

Thales could not have predicted a solar eclipse without assuming truth of the body of astronomical knowledge he received. He need to know the observed cycles (the scientific laws of his day) and where in those cycles he was when he made the prediction (aka the initial conditions). — Dfpolis

Sure, but the assumption of truth doesn't amount to truth itself. You said "unless we know that certain things are true...", but assuming that something is true is not the same as knowing that it is true. So what Thales assumed as the truth was not actually the truth, and his false assumptions did not hinder the predictive capacity of the model. Therefore the predictive capacity of the model does not rely on knowing that certain things are true.

Whether we think of the sun orbiting the earth, the earth orbiting the sun, or both orbiting the galactic center depends on which frame of reference we chose to employ. None is a uniquely true frame of reference, only more or less suited to our present need. — Dfpolis

Go ahead, insist that there is no such thing as "truth" in this matter, declare that it's all reference dependent, you are only arguing against your own claim that we need to know that certain things are true. Metaphysics adapted to modern science has definitely turned in this direction, the "reality" of what is being modeled depends on the model.

Right, but when appearances are false they're useless to physical science. Only veridical appearances (observed phenomena) are of use in the study of nature. — Dfpolis

I thought you just said that it depends on the frame of reference. How can there be a veridical appearance when how things appear depends on the frame of reference?

The end goal is not to fit all observations to some descriptive system or other. It is to find the pattern, the formal organisation, that gives the clue as to the causal machinery. Once you can model that underlying causal machinery, you are in business. You can generate predictions. — apokrisis

This is where modern science is not inclined to go, toward the "underlying causal machinery". All that is necessary for adequate prediction is to find the pattern and model it. The model may then produce the predictions derived from the representation of the pattern. The "underlying causal machinery" if that's what you want to call it, is irrelevant to the predictive capacity, which is what is valued.

Don't bother introducing raza to any facts, that's rather pointless.

That said, this is a mischaracterization of science. Science is, in part, descriptive of what is and has been, and so concerned with states of reality, not merely prediction. Biology, astronomy and oceanography provide numerous examples of objective description rather than prediction. Cosmology is at least as concerned with the origins of the cosmos as with its fate. — Dfpolis

Yes, science is "in part, descriptive", but the trend in modern science, due to the way that scientific projects are funded, is toward usefulness, and that is mostly found in predictive capacity.

Second, unless we know that certain things are true, reliable prediction is impossible. We need a set of initial conditions (e.g., the present sate of reality), an adequate knowledge of the relevant dynamics, and, usually, a knowledge that they mathematics we are employing is adequate to the reality we wish to predict. Thus, whatever practical end our prediction msy seek to advance, our foundation needs be a firm grasp of truth. — Dfpolis

I don't agree with this. Thales predicted a solar eclipse based on models which had the sun and moon orbiting the earth. To produce a successful predictive model requires no "firm grasp of truth", it only requires a good representation of how things appear to be. Appearances are modeled and siccessful predictions are made. But appearance is not necessarily truth.

As I understand it, a self-deceiver is confronted with a choice to pursue a difficult line of reasoning which he/she suspects (but does not know) might lead to reassessing a cherished belief, but instead of following that line of reasoning finds comforting, probably superficial, reasons for ignoring that line of reasoning and just continuing to maintain the cherished belief. The truth or falsity of the cherished belief might not necessarily matter, incidently, maybe the belief that the self-deceiver cherishes is in fact true (constructing an example might be interesting - I'll have a think about it) but the self-deceiver is (arguably) at fault from the rational perspective for not having engaged in the ignored reasoning process. — jkg20

I think that this is a common form of self-deception (there are numerous different types). Let's suppose that I don't know with any degree of certainty that X is the case ([perhaps someone just told me X is the case and I believed it). So I believe that X is the case though I have no reason to be certain about this. Over time I will forget that I am truly uncertain that X is the case, remembering only that I believe X is the case. In this frame of mind, I may perceive hints of evidence that X is really not the case, but I may not act to reassess that belief because I deceive myself by thinking that I would not hold the belief, X is the case, without properly assessing it in the first place.

In other words, I falsely believe that if I hold a belief, that belief must have already been properly justified. The deeper the belief, the more fundamental it is, (like a Wittgensteinian "hinge-proposition") the deeper the self-deception is, that the belief is beyond doubt. So the self-deception involves telling oneself that such a deep seated belief cannot be doubted when in reality the person knows that it can and ought to be doubted.

So creativesoul holds the belief that it is impossible for a person to self-deceive. But clearly this is a belief which can and ought to be doubted. Creative self-deceives by refusing to look at the vast evidence presented, believing only the prejudice, refusing to doubt what ought to be doubted, merely insisting over and over again, that self-deception is impossible

You actually don't have any good argument for why people should not be interested in ideas that cannot be definitively cashed out; the very idea of "cashing out" reveals your instrumentalist bias. — Janus

That's pragmatism for you. It's why science has turned to prediction as its MO rather than truth. Prediction is useful, truth is just interesting ... but only to some.

What is in reality is real. What is real is not necessarily in reality. Unless you define it that way. — tim wood

Why separate "reality" from "real" in this way? It makes no sense to me. Reality consists of all that is real. If it is real, it is part of reality, of necessity by common definition of "reality". The suffix "ity" is added to "real" to say that the complete collection of all that is real is reality.

You are claiming that there are real things which are not part of reality. Of what sense is that? What type of ontological status would you assign to these real things which are not part of reality. They must exist because they are real. So what kind of existence do they have if they are not part of reality? Why would you suppose that some real things are part of reality and other real things are not part of reality? On what basis would you distinguish the real things which are part of reality from the real things which are not part of reality? Aren't you just proposing a dualism, real things which are part of reality, and real things which are not part of reality?

p1 Being tricked requires not knowing your being tricked. — creativesoul

You're mixing present and past tense "being tricked". "Having been tricked" requires not knowing that you've been tricked. And this is fulfilled when you forget that you've tricked yourself.

The passage of time is literally created from the way your brain perceives the world around you, ask yourself, would time exist if there was not a single conscious being in existence? — xxxdutchiexxx

Doesn't the geological evidence show that time was passing before there was life on earth?

Anyway, what I was asking you was don't you live your life as if there is a substantial difference between past and future?

What if you stop experiencing the passage of time as you do now? what if you begin to experience all past, present and future events all at the same time? You would no longer experience the passage of time, everything would simply be one with everything else.... — xxxdutchiexxx

Sure, you can make up a fictional scenario in which there is no time. But it's fictional so of what use is that?

In order for you to grasp what I am saying, you must take yourself out of the picture, remove your self from this reality and allow your perspective to change, you must allow yourself to see the big picture without judgement, once you remove your ego you will be able to fully see things for what they really are. — xxxdutchiexxx

OK, I'm ready to play this game. I remove myself from reality, and there is nothing, no universe, absolutely nothing. Where and when do we start? Any assumption we add here, to produce a perspective, will be just an assumption. So "to fully see things for what they really are" requires that we assume a perspective. Do you agree? Without a perspective there is nothing.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. Deception - in and of itself - comes in many forms. One of which is lying to another. One cannot deceive oneself. That's pure unadulterated nonsense — creativesoul

What you are refusing to take account of, is the fact that people change as time passes, and their minds change as well. Deception is an act in which the act of the deceiver is prior in time to the falsity being believed as true by the deceived, the result of the deception. One is the cause, the other the effect. So the deceiver hands a falsehood and the receiver takes it and is deceived.

There is no logical reason to conclude that one cannot deceive oneself. What the person at an earlier time knew as a falsity, is represented to oneself at that time as as a truth. The same person at a later time, having forgotten the act of deception, believes the falsity as a truth. Never in this whole process does the person "knowingly believe a falsehood" as you insist is necessary for self-deception. The person at one time tells oneself that a falsity is the truth, not actually believing it is the truth. The same person at a later time believes it to be the truth without remembering that at one time it was not believed to be the truth.

Time is a perception of our minds, the way we experience existence is from one moment to the next, from our perspective there is a linear progression through time, but the truth is that time is not real, its simply something that our species perceives — xxxdutchiexxx

Do you really believe that there is not a substantial difference between past and future? If there is such a difference, how can time be "not real"?

I was talking about knowing if thy self is telling a false hood, if we don't know it is a false hood, is that knowingly telling a lie? — ArguingWAristotleTiff

OK, we were talking about different things. I already presupposed that lying was when one knew that it is a falsehood being told, intentionally telling a falsehood as if it were the truth. You were talking about being true to one's own self, which I took to mean adhering to one's principles. In this case, one could be true to one's own self and still lie to others. Now I see that by "true to one's own self", you mean not intentionally telling a falsehood.

How do you relate this to speaking how one feels? Suppose that I feel something is the right thing to say, but I have no idea whether it's the truth or not, so I say it as if it is the truth, because I feel that it is correct to say it as the truth. Is this being dishonest, making a statement as if I know it to be true, when in reality I have no idea whether it's true or not? It's not knowing oneself to be telling a falsehood, because the person doesn't know whether it's true or false. However the person makes the statement in a way to indicate that the person believes it to be the truth. Isn't this still a form of deceit, perhaps even lying, to say that something is true when you do not know whether it's true or false?

Yes, yes, yes. You misread me above. Relations are real and immaterial. Do you agree that the reality that comprises the things in the world, the bricks and chairs and so forth, also contains relations? Or would you rather agree that immaterial things like relations are not part of the reality of material things, although they are real. Or, if in the same reality, how exactly do you define that reality? — tim wood

If they are immaterial, why would you say that they are "part of the reality of immaterial things"? Isn't that contradictory? Can't we just say that reality consists of two parts, the material and the immaterial? This allows us to make real sense of the immaterial within us (ideas etc.) by providing a category "the immaterial", which extends independent from us as well as within us. So we would define that reality in dualist terms. There is nothing wrong with dualism, just a modern bias against it because people fear the complex, that which they cannot understand. Dualism actually resolves a whole lot of metaphysical problems which persist for monism.

I'm thinking that in the last case it's hard to define that reality in a way that does not create new problems. For example, if the immaterial is real and in reality with the bricks and chairs, & etc., without further distinction or qualification, then there are uncountable infinities of real things in reality - where do they fit? — tim wood

I don't see how this is a problem. If something is "uncountable", this is due to the human being's deficient capacity to count it. But if the human being is incapable of counting something, this does not necessitate that that thing is infinite. "Infinite" and "uncountable" are two distinct concepts. The infinite is necessarily uncountable, but not all uncountable things are infinite, because of the human being's limited capacity for counting. So it is a mistake to conclude that if something is uncountable it is infinite.

I think you maintain, and have maintained across multiple discussions, that the immaterial is in reality. Do you? And if you do, how do you account for it. — tim wood

It's not a question of "how do you account for it?", because no one can account for all aspects of reality. That is not a fair question. The proper answer is that it is necessary to include the immaterial as real, in order to account for all aspects of reality. When we try to understand reality, we see that our progress is stymied if do not allow for the immaterial as part of reality. When we come to the realization that the immaterial is part of reality, then we are inspired toward understanding it, because philosophy makes us wonder about all of reality, not just the material part. So we need to study the immaterial aspects of reality which are most evident to us, and that is ideas. Plato provides an excellent approach toward understanding the immaterial.

The answer to your unfair question is that the immaterial cannot be properly accounted for because any understanding of reality is incomplete. However, allowing that the immaterial is real is a step forward, toward a complete understanding of reality.

Here's an example, the nature of time. We live at the present, while the past and the future are equally real. However, all our experience, all that we do and think about in living our lives, indicates to us that there is a radical difference between past and future. There is a radical difference because we can act to avoid or encourage possible future events, while we know that past occurrences cannot be changed. To deny that this is reality of time, that past and future are radically different, is to deny what is most fundamental to our experience. If we take this, what I call "most fundamental to our experience", that past and future are radically different, as a brute fact about reality, then we can draw a couple of obvious conclusions. First, we need dualism to account for these two radically distinct aspects of reality. Second, we can conclude that there is a third aspect, the present, which acts as a boundary of separation between these two. We, as human beings living at the present exist at this boundary which separates the two dualist aspects of reality. We can categorize "material' as past, and "immaterial" as future existence.

It's not forgetting which is deliberate misrepresentation of one's own thought and belief, it is remembering which can be such. This is the case when aspects of the event which has been remembered, have been forgotten and replaced by the imagination. These things which have been produced by the imagination are deliberately misrepresented as memories.

We appear to be back knocking heads over language. — tim wood

That's Platonic dialectics, another example of how ancient methods are still useful.

You ask if the relation between the sun and earth is real. Of course it is. But you insist, or so I read you here and everywhere else this issue arises, on the relation having a reality that I understand as a claim for materialty. For me it is permissible, informally, to take ideas - immaterial things - as real, because they clearly are. For me it is not permissible to include them in reality, or at least the same reality that contains material things, and there are lots of tests that differentiate the two. — tim wood

My claim was that the relations between material things are real, and that they are immaterial. Therefore we must allow that the immaterial is real. I take it from this post, that you want to class relations as material, but I don't see how that is possible. Let's suppose that one object is two miles to the northwest of another object, or one object is bigger, or heavier, than another object. How are these relations something material?

So our differences are resolved if you acknowledge my distinction, or show clearly how ideas are material things (even as you say they are immaterial). — tim wood

No, I don't think our differences can be resolved in this way. You want to say that relations are real, yet immaterial things are not real. And I see no way that a relation can be classed as material, therefore it must be immaterial. If relations are immaterial, and they are real, then the immaterial must be real.

Deliberately misrepresenting is not forgetting... — creativesoul

I didn't say that. I see, as usual, you didn't read my post, responding just to an out of context word.

I said that filling in the blanks with imagination, where memory leaves things out, and representing this to oneself as memory, is misrepresenting one's own thought. In recalling distant memories it is difficult to distinguish aspects of "true memory" from imagination because "the memory" changes over time. If one represents this to oneself as "true memory" when there are aspects of imagination which have been mixed in over time, this is misrepresentation.

My guess is that a lot of people hate politicians, because they all lie to the people. And Trump is a poor politician, so that maybe makes him better then the rest in their eyes? — ChatteringMonkey

Oh yeah, this is a classical example of the logic of Trump rhetoric. Politicians are liars. I'm not a politician. Therefore I'm not a liar. Here's another one. If you have a problem, you can always find someone else to blame your problem on. Therefore if America has any economic problems, they are caused by foreigners. But blaming your own problems on someone else only fosters hate, and such rhetoric ought to be seen for what it is, hate speech.

How would you determine if you were being deceitful with yourself? — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I won't go into that here, because that's a complicated issue (check Moliere's thread on lying to oneself), and it's not the issue here. The issue is being deceitful toward someone else, lying. And the point is that you can be true to yourself and still be lying to others. This stems from a selfish disposition.

Brings up an interesting point to me anyway. Can anyone be inherently selfish and deceitful? Or is that selfishness and deceitfulness a free choice made against some inter conflict to not be selfish and deceitful? And if there is internal conflict than are they being true to themselves, or merely justifying there act of will ? — Rank Amateur

I think some people are inherently selfish and deceitful, it is a disposition they have grown into. It doesn't in itself necessitate inner turmoil, as some people are quite comfortable in this position. The problem though is that a lie, to successfully deceive someone, sometimes requires a cover-up to hide any evidence which would expose the lie. The cover-up may need to become more and more elaborate as evidence of the cover-up also need to be covered up, so the whole thing can snowball. Internal conflict involves doubt about the capacity to make a successful cover-up.

Since lying is deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief, and it is always done in situations when the speaker believes that they ought not allow others to know what they think and believe, it seems to me that one cannot lie to oneself. — creativesoul

Forgetting is very real. When a person represents to oneself a memory, which is not really a memory, but something imagined, because the real thing has been forgotten, then that person is misrepresenting one's own thought and belief. This is actually very common, that a person represents something imaginary to oneself as a memory. And the person doing the "remembering" very quickly overlooks, and forgets the division between the aspects of the memory which are real, and which are imagined.

That is why two people can both say "I remember the event this way", when the two ways are contradictory. The two people will both argue sincerely that it must be my way because I remember it that way, when it is impossible that both ways are correct because they are contradictory. Are you married?

I don't agree with you in that when someone is acting honestly and true to their self, that they are can also be actively being deceitful and taking advantage of others. If a person is being honest and true with their words AND it turns out that they were incorrect does not make them deceitful, it just makes them wrong. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

True to yourself means adhering to your principles whether they are selfish and deceitful principles or not. So it is quite often that a person who is being true to oneself is lying and deceitful to others. If a person believes that lying to others is beneficial, then staying true to that belief means lying to others.

Are you comfortable demonstrating the status "uneducated"?

Are the Rothschilds regarded as American? — raza

Irrelevant, the Rothschilds were not the cause of the 2008 economic crisis.

Of which the deficit in 2008 doubled by 2016. — raza

And that economic problem was caused by foreigners or American greed?

You presume, uncritically and without qualification the "existence of the immaterial," that you imply is in or an aspect of reality. You set this existent "beyond the scope of modern science,.. due to its limitations." No problems here? On its face it's incoherent. — tim wood

Why is this incoherent? Isn't the relation between one material object and another material object, something immaterial? It's seems like it's only incoherent if you start with the premise that "immaterial" is nonsense. But that's ludicrous. The existence of the immaterial is extremely evident.

Clearly there are Xs that lack the materiality that is the usual object of science. Equally clearly one can attempt to identify, qualify, and quantify these Xs. One can even attempt to think about them in an organized way and it's fair to call that kind of thinking "science" - on the bases of its methods, not its content. But all of this, no matter how well done and how useful - and history shows it can be well done and useful - remains a castle in the air, a fantasy, a fable, a story. By no means do I intend to undercut the value of these enterprises. I do mean to question the claim that they're anything more than what they are. — tim wood

Scientists think, and proceed, in terms of relations, but science has no capacity to determine the ontology of "a relation". So relations, (the immaterial), are taken for granted as something real. They are what scientists use to describe things, they describe in terms of relations. If relations between material things were not real, then what scientist are doing would be meaningless. Is the relation between the sun and the earth real? In philosophy we do not take the existence of relations (the immaterial) for granted as science does. We want to validate, justify, the ontological status of what science takes for granted, the immaterial.

I find your position akin to the Creationist who wants for Creationism a place at the table for science, going so far as to call it creation science. The trouble, of course, is that creationism is no science at all. — tim wood

This is not a good analogy. I am arguing for the priority of philosophy over science, not trying to lower philosophy to the status of a science.

Keep, then, your metaphysics. Keep it for what it is, what it's worth, and what you get out of it. I like metaphysics too, although my understanding of it differs from yours. But it's not a trump card playable outside of the confines of its own game. — tim wood

Now your right back to your complaint about "scope", speaking as if metaphysics is confined by its own game, but that's not the case. What confines metaphysics is reality, and this is no game. The mind is free to go wherever it pleases, being constrained only by reality, not by itself. So metaphysics is really not confined by its own game at all, it's only confined by reality, and that's the "free" part of free will. Science though cannot play outside the confines of its own game, and that's the nature of science. It has to follow rules, and going outside those confines renders it other than science. Science is not constrained by reality, it is constrained by artificial rules. With an adequate hierarchy, metaphysics which is properly constrained by reality, will produce those rules.

American money handlers etc blah blah? — raza

Do you know any of the facts concerning the economic crisis of 2008? Here's some info from Wikipedia:

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, is considered by many economists to have been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.[1][2][3][4]

It began in 2007 with a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.[5]

...

The precipitating factor for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 was a high default rate in the United States subprime home mortgage sector – the bursting of the "subprime bubble".

...

The US Senate's Levin–Coburn Report concluded that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street."[34] — Wikipedia, Financial crisis of 2007–2008

Millions of homes were lost to foreclosure. It seems it's as they say, Trump supporters are simply uneducated. Get your shit together raza.

You ask a very interesting question about honesty. I do define him being honest, as being true to how he feels at that moment and I have no doubt that he will speak it and that is being as honest with ones self as one can be. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Oh no, don't you see a problem with this sort of "honesty"? If the person prioritizes self-interest, wants to take advantage of others, and is deceitful, and says what that individual feels like saying, how can this be honesty? The person is acting deceitfully because that's what the person feels is the best tactic, yet you call it "honesty" because the person is "true to how he feels". I don't think so.

Do I think he would knowingly say something that he knows is not true? Nah, I don't think it is his style and for what purpose would he lie? — ArguingWAristotleTiff

How well do you think you know president Trump? I have seen evidence which demonstrates that he does lie. Most people lie now and then, for one reason or another. I don't know him well enough to say with any conviction for what purpose he would lie. However, he seems to me like the type of person whom if he wants something he will do what he thinks is necessary to make that desire come true, and that might include lying.

What kind of tactic is that, to break an agreement with your closest ally on the claim that they are a threat to national security?

The present American economic problems are not caused by foreigners, they are caused by the greed of American money handlers, bankers, brokers, insurance companies and the lot. This became very evident a decade ago. No action has been taken to stem that greed, as an increasing number of Americans slip from the category of "haves" into the category of "have-nots". Trump rhetoric targets those on the border between "haves" and "have-nots", the so-called middle class, as they are vulnerable to the fear of sliding into the "have-nots". The rhetoric falsely directs their attention toward foreigners as the cause of American economic problems, when in reality the problems are caused by greedy Americans.

Along with insulting the allies, the tariffs will only increase the price of consumer goods. And with no policies in place to stem the tide of greed, wages will not increase to match the price increases. The result of that "tactic" which is derived from the false presumption that foreigners are the cause of America's economic problems, will be more Americans sliding into the category of "have-nots".

My point in the OP was that concepts (even concepts involving truths, numbers and fictional things) exist in physical form inside our head. — Read Parfit

I think you are missing the essence of conception here. Since concepts exist in the form of definitions, and a definition must be agreed upon to form "a concept", then the essence of conception is in the agreements, or conventions, which dictate how we use language and symbols. The symbols "1.2,3" for example, must be used in the conventional way in order for the arithmetical concepts to exist. These conventions do not exist "in physical form inside our head", they exist as relations between us. Since the existence of a concept can only be understood through reference to relations between human beings, then we cannot say that the existence of a concept is something "inside our head", because it is just as much something outside our heads, in between us, as it is inside our heads..

Knowing either can be a sign of erudition, but when did Richard Feynman ever resolve his problems in physics by referring to efficient, material, formal, or final causes? When do ethical models of war concern themselves with balance with respect to extremes? What anthropologist or biologist worries about telos or hylomorphism? Who that matters except for historians of thought cares about substance?. — tim wood

See, these examples right here demonstrate the limited scope of science.

Do you really not know what "beyond their scope" means - or what I meant by it? If you mean to represent that ancient philosophies are or should be the correct tools for science and research and advancing knowledge, then you are espousing a terminally Procrustean view.

Or do you imagine that Aristotle is the last word on all matters that we have a record of him expressing a view on? — tim wood

I think it's quite clear that Aristotelian, and Neo-Platonic metaphysics, each provide a wider scope for an understanding of reality than does modern science. Each of these two deals with the existence of the immaterial, which is beyond the scope of modern science. So where science doesn't go, due to its limitations, we must turn to the ancient principles, to pick up where science leaves off. Nothing procrustean, science and metaphysics just have a different scope. The latter is much more inclusive of all aspects of reality.

I suspect it's both, but that many of those who insist on the accuracy of these models apply them beyond their scope. — tim wood

What do you mean by "beyond their scope". If the model is meant to represent all of reality, how could one go beyond the scope? I can see how one might ignore deficiencies in such models, but this is not the same as applying the model beyond its scope.

Good question.

It is crude at times, rude at times but always honest.about how he sees things at the time, even if that position changes. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

How would you define "honest" here, true to how he feels at that moment? If he feels like this is the right thing to say, whether or not it's true, he'll say it. And this is being honest?

What hidden tax? — raza

The hidden tax is the tariffs. When there is tariffs on the raw materials, it rolls into the price of the product. The product is more expensive to the consumer because there is a hidden tax within, the tariff.

As I understand it tariffs imposed were to bring negotiators to the table to possibly eliminate tariffs at both ends. — raza

They were already at the table, because the US, with the new president Trump, insisted on renegotiating NAFTA. The Trump administration threatened to impose the tariffs on Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum if a deal was not reached by a self-determined, and unreasonable deadline. The tariffs were applied June 1. The pretext which allowed the tariffs to be applied under the existing NAFTA convention was "national security is threatened". This was taken as an insult by the Canadians. The US already has extremely high prices for aluminum and steel, and this is a contributing factor to America's loss of auto manufacturing, which is a key issue in the NAFTA renegotiations.

morality is part of human nature. — Benkei

People, by nature have immoral tendency. Selfishness and immorality cannot be removed from human nature simply by defining "human nature" such that it includes morality. Actual morality requires effort from the individual.

We're in agreement. But how few people in politics give more than lip service to such truth. I see self-interest, ambition, vanity, pride, political agenda driving most if not all participants in politics. I would argue a good person can't succeed in politics, nor would ever attempt it. Which is nothing more than my opinion. — punish me

That's exactly why Plato argued that democracy is a bad form of government which inevitably ends in tyranny. Those who really desire to get elected do so of self-interest. They get elected through means which are compared to offering candy to children. The population is like children, not knowing what is really "good" for them. The "good person", who would make a good ruler, recognizes that being a good ruler is the most difficult job, and has no interest in taking on that job. According to Plato, the good person will only move toward taking on that task if life under the bad ruler becomes worse than the perceived task of being a good ruler. This will be not until after the democracy has degenerated to a tyranny.

Taxes were an initial step, it seems to me. Turning around an economy should theoretically, and historically, take a far greater time than what has passed to date. — raza

So I assume there's a plan, method to the madness. Cut taxes, and make up the missing income with tariffs on imports? Replace the overt tax with a hidden tax, causing insult, annoyance, and possibly chaos in the international community by reversing the convention. That sounds more like madness to me.

Because 40% tax are for new goods deemed luxury and non-essential. — raza

The tariffs on steel and aluminum are because these are luxury items? I thought Trump deemed Canadian metals as a threat to national security and this was the premise which gave him the right to impose such tariffs, overruling existing trade conventions.

Human nature dictates all... — punish me

But isn't morality concerned with controlling oneself to act responsibly, rather than allowing "human nature" to dictate one's behaviour?

Thanks Pattern-chaser, but Galuchat seems to have given up.

And will President Trump see the writing on the wall, and resign office before impeachment? — 0 thru 9

Ha! He sees himself as supreme ruler. I really think that he doesn't think that impeachment could ever be possible.

OK, tell me if I understand you properly then. "Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory.

Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not?

If there is nothing that is 'unintelligible' then the word has no use, because it cannot apply to anything. In everyday life the word 'intelligible' is useful because some things are and some are not, when we take it to mean 'capable of being understood by an intelligent human'. What would be the point of changing the meaning of the word to something that is different from how ordinary people use it, AND has no application? — andrewk

I don't believe that is the way that "intelligible" is normally used. It is a word in which its most common usage is in philosophical discussions like this. Though it is sometimes used in everyday parlance it's meaning is determined from philosophy. It means capable of being apprehended by the intellect, as distinct from being apprehended by the senses, so that we have a distinction between intelligible objects and sensible objects. It appears like it is you who is trying to change the meaning of the word from how it is normally used.

This is a problem in modern philosophy, and it seems to be prevalent in materialist ontology. Individuals will see the usage of a word in a particular way, and want to restrict the word to that vernacular, producing a definition, as a proposition to be adhered to. So for example, you propose that "intelligible" be restricted to "capable of being understood by an intelligent human", rather than the more customary "capable of being apprehended by the intellect". Do you see the unnecessary limitation you are trying to impose? This has two possible bad effects which I apprehend right away.. One is that it may limit the capacity of understanding of anyone who adopts that definition, rendering the person as incapable of understanding usage beyond that limited scope. And the other is that it greatly increases the likelihood of equivocation when the forces of habitual usage cause the usage to exceed those unwarranted limitations.

It is my opinion that there is good reason to believe that the world is unintelligible to all finite intellects. And in the usual way 'intelligible' is used, that is the same as saying there's good reason to believe the world is unintelligible tout court. — andrewk

What do you mean by "finite intellects"? On one hand you propose to limit "intelligible" to intelligent humans, and now you propose all "finite intellects". Consider the possibility a being which has not come into existence yet, which may or may not come into being following the evolution of human beings, and this being would have an intellectual capacity greater than any human intellect. This is not a finite intellect, because it has no physical existence, it is an intelligible proposal, a logical possibility. It has no physical existence, it is just a logical possibility, something which could occur. So it is impossible that it has finite limits, and it is nonsense to speak of such potential in terms of what is "finite", because the premise of "possible" negates "finite" right off the bat. Things which may or may not come into existence in the future do not have finite existence.

See what happens to your restricted sense of "intelligible"? You must make exceptions to allow for beings other than human. Then, being atheist you need to add an exclusion to your exception, ("finite"), to disallow the possibility of God, and you end up with incomprehensible nonsense.

As Popper showed us, this is how science in particular, and almost all knowledge, works. We can prove almost nothing true, but we can falsify it. We act as if the theories that are useful and have survived many attempts at falsification are true, and use them to cross roads, send rockets to Mars and cure plague. All while we know that they could be falsified one day. — andrewk

Right, so if your object, or intent, in relation to a particular idea (that something is inherently unintelligible) is to falsify this idea, then doesn't it seem contradictory, or at least hypocritical to adopt this idea as an opinion? To hold as an opinion implies that you believe the idea. To work towards falsifying it implies that you do not believe it, and are skeptical. If you hold it as an opinion you will not be skeptical of it, and you will not work toward falsifying it.

To say that the universe is intelligible because it is intelligible only to God renders the word useless because the Christian definition of God includes that he knows everything, which entails that She knows the reason for everything, so it is by definition intelligible to Her. That definition renders a useful word useless and it would take a great deal of evidence to back up a claim that it is the standard use of 'intelligible' in theology. — andrewk

This is not true. The point is to allow that "intelligible" is related to all possible intellects, instead of just human intellects. So to say that the universe is intelligible to God does not render the word useless, it just denies that there is anything which is truly unintelligible, in an absolute sense. Therefore it renders "unintelligible" as useless, in a way. But this is what the principle of sufficient reason does as well. Now the point is that when we use the word "unintelligible", since nothing is unintelligible in an absolute way, we are using it to refer to how things appear to us as human beings, something appears to be unintelligible. It is only unintelligible in relation to whomever finds it to be unintelligible. And this is because that person has a deficient approach.

Furthermore, if we say that the universe is intelligible to God, and unintelligible to human beings, there is no premise here to say that the universe is intelligible only to God. Aquinas and other Catholics refer to angels as intermediary between God and humans. Each angel has providence over some physical existence. So the universe, as a physical object, could be intelligible to an angel. Therefore the point remains, and that is that if the universe is unintelligible to human beings, this does not mean that it is unintelligible to every being. And because there is a point to it, it doesn't render the word "intelligible" useless, it just defines "intelligible" as an absolute, while "unintelligible", in order to account for its common use, is defined relative to the human intellect. The two are not opposed, they are categorically different.

In short, to say that something is intelligible if it is intelligible to God is to say nothing at all. — andrewk

This is not the saying at all, it is a misrepresentation. The saying is that everything is intelligible, what the principle of sufficient reason says. However, some things appear to be unintelligible. Because everything is intelligible, then the reason why things appear to be unintelligible is due to deficiencies in the intellect which is trying to understand them. Or, we could turn the argument around and start with a premise derived from evidence and observations. Many things are intelligible. Different intellects have different capacities. When things appear as unintelligible to one intellect they are often intelligible to another intellect. So when something appears as unintelligible to an intellect, there is no reason to believe that it is unintelligible to every intellect. Therefore there is no reason to believe that anything is unintelligible to all intellects.

Abstractions are a special kind of existent, and one can argue that they do not actually exist. e.g. circles do not actually exist; rather, circular objects exist from which we abstract out the concept of circular via the way of abstraction — Relativist

Why would one try to argue that mental objects do not exist? What would be the point of this argument, and how would it be supported.

This seems a digression. At issue is: what non-mental objects exist? Contradictions exist only as mental objects. — Relativist

As far as I'm concerned what is at issue is that you are limiting your definition of "exist" so that only non-mental things can be said to exist, in order to make your argument. If your argument against God is based in the assumption that immaterial things, such as mental things, do not exist, then why don't you just take the easy route? 1) Immaterial things do not exist. 2) God is described as an immaterial thing. Therefore God does not exist. See how easy it is?