I've begun a detailed study of your work, and I'd like to ask a question on this topic, as it's related. Please correct me if I've misinterpreted it.

You propose a foundation—"Discrete Experience"—a single capacity that cannot be denied without self-refutation. This is quite succinct, given other approaches by rationalist epistemologists of different eras. If you allow me, I'll give my own definition, as I understand it: This is the act of arbitrarily selecting and creating identities (separate "objects" in experience).

Identity acquired through this mechanism is an elementary particle of knowledge, according to your model.

After acquiring an "identity," a person, when confronted with similar images in life, constantly re-examines the validity (validity, not truth) of this identity.

From this, as I understand it, it follows that the "usefulness" and "validity" of an identity are far more important than its "truth."

The model I propose does roughly the same thing: identity, distilled into a proposition (what I call an idea), is weighted not by hypothetical truth, but by three criteria: universality, precision, and productivity. (In later editions, I also added "intersubjectivity" as a multiplier.)

So, in your work, you introduce that indivisible unit, developed through discrete experience—identity. All subsequent mental constructs begin with it. There is no "identity" in my model. Logically, it would be correct to place it below the level of "speculation."

Next. According to your model, by comparing the "identity" "recorded" in the mind with reality (when they collide), a person constantly tests this "identity" for functionality. And this plasticity (rather than fossilization) of identities and the ease of their revision ensure the viability of the species. For example: if you've never seen a bear in real life, but know from fairy tales that bears are shaggy creatures with round ears, kindhearted and honey-loving, but then, upon encountering one in the forest, you discover the bear is running toward you and growling, the speed at which you revise your presets is directly linked to your survival. This is very important and suggests that when reality is lenient and doesn't challenge your identities, your life can unfold like a fairy tale. And constantly challenging your presets teaches you to be more flexible. This conclusion, drawn directly from your model, is very useful to me. On the one hand, it explains developmental stagnation, and on the other, it suggests tools for encouraging the subject to reconsider their "identities." This also suggests that before suggesting an "idea" to someone else, it's best to test it yourself multiple times, otherwise it could lead to pain (from facing reality).

For now, I'll continue reading and share my thoughts with you as I go.

There was a recent thread from a biology teacher about love and hate. I immediately noticed your comments and thought, "This guy seems like a constructivist."

I read your post. I'd like to come back to it a little later, as it intrigued me.

Your approach is immediately strikingly fundamental and phenomenological. You seem to be one level above my judgments expressed in this thread.

What else I noticed: these are essentially two facets of the same insight, which is becoming increasingly relevant in the era of post-truth, propaganda, and narrative manipulation.

Of course, your work is more substantiated, consistent, and logically sound, whereas I was setting myself somewhat more practical goals.

The material is a bit difficult to digest, as I involuntarily, while reading what you wrote, mentally compare it with what I wrote myself. I think it will take me a couple of days to grasp your approach.

First of all, I would like to thank you again for your comment.

They are propositions. Propositions are either true or false. Ideas can be building block of propositions. — Corvus

What does Hume do? He says, "This statement is true because I have seen it and it can be verified."

Ideas are mental image. On their own it has no true or false values. As Hume wrote, ideas can be vivid or faint, strong or weak depending on the type of perception — Corvus

Hume would say that by introducing Level 2, I've simply renamed "strong desire" or "hallucination" a "Deductive Construct." If anyone can declare any fantasy a "Level 2 Law," then my model ceases to be analytical and becomes justificatory.

I don't dispute any of this. In fact, in the starting thread, I even call deductive constructs speculations elevated by an act of will to the level of constitutive law.

At the same time, I also make it clear from the very beginning and in subsequent posts that my model isn't about what is considered true and what is false. Rather, it's about what a person considers true and what is false.

Let's return to the guitar example. I'll rephrase it slightly for ease of use and clarity. If you insist, we'll return to your version of the judgments; it'll just be a bit longer.

So, you go to the store and see a guitar. You make two empirical judgments:

1. This guitar is good
2. This guitar is expensive

To be honest, neither of these judgments are purely empirical. They are evaluative. In the first case, you compared the quality of this guitar with others; in the second case, you compared the price of the guitar with others plus your wallet.

So what decision will you make? Buy or not buy? Hume would answer: it's not reliably known. Because it's not empirically verifiable. And it will only become known after you buy or don't buy.

Now let's return to my model. It doesn't establish the truth, but it can help predict behavior. The statements about the guitar in question, according to my approach, are Level 3—empirical. By themselves, they don't regulate anything. But my behavior will be regulated by the Level 2 ideas that prompted me to go to the store. This could be anything, for example:

1. I'm a brilliant guitarist, and my brilliant playing requires a great instrument.

or

2. I'm an amateur who plays for my family on weekends.

Both of these supra-statements are unverifiable; they're my fantasies, but I've accepted them as Level 2. So, when I'm in the store, I'll take empirical statements and compare them with my Level 2 ideas.

Empirical evidence won't motivate me. But my chimeras (which may or may not be true) will!

Moreover, if the Level 2 idea turns out to be a hoax, the guitarist will simply have wasted a ton of money. But reality can also change, and the guitarist will change it thanks to this guitar and his persistence – he will truly become an extraordinary musician. Currently, in the further development of my model, I'm describing how this happens. I'm describing the dynamics of ideas, adding regulators such as "ontological debt," which I wouldn't like to describe here. The model, as presented, has predictive power: will your Level 2 ideas withstand the impact of reality?

Bottom line: Empiricism is good, I'm not abolishing it. But empiricism doesn't move the world. But our chimeras—false or not—do. That's what this whole model is about.

This is where the concept of "idea weight" comes in. At first glance, an "idea" is purely mental and physically incapable of having weight or mass. However, it weighs heavily on reality. A person convinces themselves they're an outstanding guitarist, then goes and buys a real, expensive guitar. Marketers will take stock at the end of the year and say, for example, that few expensive guitars were sold this year. New ways to position the product and manipulate minds must be devised to increase sales. Then, a clever marketer will come up with an advertising concept (which is essentially a brainwashing technique) and create contextual advertising about some success story about a boy who dreamed of becoming a guitarist but later became a great musician and owns an expensive guitar.

Thus, well-crafted and delivered content will encourage more customers to visit the store. What marketers are doing in this case is constructing reality. They aren't exploring the truth, but rather motivating action. The recipient of the advertisement finds themselves defenseless in this situation. After all, they're being sold not the truth, but an idea.

The proposed model can help assess whether I really want what I want, or am I being fooled?

This example is also consistent with other cases where people are brainwashed not just by the fake value of a product, but by the fake value of "Values."

Thanks for your comment. You've pointed out a very important detail. I don't yet know whether I agree with it or not, but it's definitely a weak (unresolved) point in my model.

I'm grateful because you've made me think and clarify. In fact, that's exactly why I posted this here, not just to boast, "Look how clever I came up with this."

I want to calmly consider your clarifications and will return with a response later.

By around 40,000 years ago, our brains had reached their current shape, which involved a reorganization of brain regions, including the parietal lobes and cerebellum, contributing to increased capacities in planning, language and visuospatial integration. It was also around that time that modern humans got the gene microcephalin (MCPH1) by interbreeding with Neanderthals and Denisovans. MCPH1 may influence brain-related traits, causing better performance. Also, a genetic mutation around that time in the NOVA1 gene produced a variant that affects how neurons connect, modifying intelligence and cortical area, especially in language-related regions. — Questioner

This may or may not be true. Tomorrow, a new, more convincing study will be conducted that will explain it all differently, and everyone, including you, will be forced to admit it.

What am I telling you in all your answers? I'm telling you that biology, physics, and every other science have some universality, but also limitations.

For example, I really like the explanation some psychologists give for why men prefer women with large breasts. Supposedly, evolutionarily speaking, larger breasts increase the likelihood of successful breastfeeding. Why do I like this explanation? It beautifully combines all the dominant discourses of today, including biology, psychology, and so on.

However, there is also an esoteric explanation – supposedly breasts are "antennas of love" that radiate energy into space, which attracts men.

As a biologist, you can call one or another explanation preferable, or perhaps neither. However, what about the connection to reality? I don't know. And no one knows.

That's exactly what I'm saying. Biology has great explanatory power, but it can't describe all of life. My answers are essentially a critique of reductionism. In particular, describing love or hate is not biology's job.

↪Astorre If you’re asking whether there’s a way to determine an idea’s value without the involvement of an interpreter, then unfortunately I can’t think of any such method. Not every idea requires an empirical approach, I think, but it still requires an interpreter—whether to provide purely logical reasoning for the proposed “weight” of the idea, or simply to assert that X is an obvious axiom without further proof. — Zebeden

It's important to clarify here. The proposed model cannot assess the value of an idea or evaluate its truth per se. It's about assessing the weight of an idea in a given mind or group at a given historical point in time.

Let's give an example. Let's take the classical scientific method of evaluating a proposition. Let's take the statement, for example, "all people are sisters." Classical science insists that the proposition must first be reduced to simple concepts. This creates problems from the very beginning. Let's consider the context of its origin. Historically, it's a feminist slogan. It can be interpreted as "only women are people." From a scientific perspective, this statement has zero weight. However, in the minds of representatives of this movement, the weight of this proposition is maximal, almost fundamental. All reasoning of a group or individual can be built on this proposition, and the proponent of this proposition refuses to admit that it's not true (and is even willing to deal with its opponent). Moreover, a person driven by this idea can begin conducting scientific research that will confirm their arguments. And even be successful in doing so. A person can then begin to act in accordance with this belief.

Here I see some limitations of classical epistemology. A patently false assertion generates consequences for reality and the lives of ordinary people who aren't even aware of it.

The model I propose can say: idea X has a weight of U2 in this group. This means that this group will restructure reality in accordance with this idea.

Of course, I've already slightly revised what I presented at the start.

At the same time, why did I consider it important to identify the "weight" of an idea? Because this approach can provide a new lens for predicting the viability of certain ideas you intend to instill in a group, as well as provide new explanations for people's behavior within groups.

But the model faces limitations. For example, I need to identify what ideas group M uses in their everyday lives. We can conduct quantitative and qualitative sociological or psychological studies, and still not obtain verifiable results. Another approach: I can interpret it myself, but then it would be even further from reality.

How would this be applied, for instance, on the ideas of the birth of a star and the beginning of life? Taking both as ideas about reality based on reality, they are both very "Niche" with little in common. Or does your new method only apply to certain areas of reality? — Sir2u

Speaking of a supernova explosion, the event itself could signify the emergence of a new civilization. But the weight of this idea is near-zero for our everyday lives. Unless, of course, it somehow begins to impact everyday life. A supernova explosion itself is an event that means nothing. But the idea that pops into someone's head: "It wasn't a supernova explosion, but an alien war that will soon reach us"—that already carries weight. For now, the weight of this idea is speculation. If this weight is artificially inflated, it could have incredible consequences. It's just a matter of finding enough believers and presenting the information correctly.

The theory of evolution, as presented in your version, has both explanatory power and its limitations. The fact is that any normal scientific theory is like this. The situation is similar with non-scientific explanations.

For example, the biblical explanation of human origins very well describes why humans are the way they are—after all, they are created in the image and likeness of God. However, this approach is not very applicable when it comes to curing appendicitis.

Similarly, the approach you use is very good at describing humans as they were 100,000 years ago. However, since then, humans have changed biologically to a lesser extent. Anthropologists and philosophers with whom I have spoken generally agree that over these years, changes have occurred in humans associated with the acquisition of abstract thinking. According to their claims, the most significant breakthrough in this area occurred around 40,000 years ago, enabling a dramatic cultural evolution. Note that this is less a matter of biological evolution.

According to this line of explanation, what a person feels as a biological organism influences his behavior less than the way he perceives the world. And, for example, the very fact that you're writing this thread is precisely about this: you developed certain feelings due to a slight discrepancy between your experience and your prejudices. Can you think of another biological being that experiences feelings solely because its actual experience does not match its ideas?

Now, to your questions about love and hate. What if we assume that this is less a matter of physics and more an abstraction? Following this approach, the following picture emerges: a person doesn't get what they imagined they wanted, they wind themselves up, endlessly wandering in the depths of their mind, which leads to irritation, then anger, and ultimately hatred. Hatred, when viewed in this way, is less a biological model and more a construct of the mind. Love can be explained in much the same way. I'm not ruling out biomechanics right now. After all, sexual arousal or blinking an eye in response to a threat, for example, can and should be explained biologically. And yes, any feeling, no matter how much it is constructed by the mind, has a biological trace. But does it have a necessary evolutionary cause? That's where I doubt it.

You'll agree that this approach has its explanatory power. However, it doesn't claim to be strictly scientific and certainly won't be taught in schools.

So, to summarize what I've said. Your approach (biology, evolutionary theory) isn't universal for describing human behavior. Therefore, asking questions based on this foundation isn't entirely correct. This isn't a mistake. The phenomenon itself is quite widespread and has been described, for example, by Gadamer: prejudice is an opportunity for understanding.

So, I'm forced to argue with you. This isn't necessary. It's just an idea that groups facts into a convenient way to structure the incoming flow. It's a lens, but not the essence itself.

What's the main idea? It's that if I try to doubt the starting premise, the entire superstructure will crumble. So, I'm the one who doubted your starting premise. Defend it.

I'm pleased that my approach prompted you to elaborate, but your clarifications don't quite meet my needs. Please don't perceive me as a villain. I'm merely asking that you refine my opening sentence so that it can be delivered in defense of your life's work. From here, we'll move on.

Thank you for your question; I'm interested in this topic. Since this question is being asked on a philosophy forum, I'll be answering philosophically, which may not quite meet your expectations.

I am a retired high school biology teacher, and one of the many things that I told my students is that everything about us survived in us because it gave us some kind of advantage in the environment in which we were living. — Questioner

I'd like to start with your opening statement: "Everything about us has survived because it gave us certain advantages in the environment in which we lived."

This statement is imprecise and can be interpreted in several ways:

1. We possess everything necessary to give us advantages for survival in the environment in which we lived. (This implies that we may also possess something else.)

or

2. Everything we possess is necessary to give us advantages for survival in the environment in which we lived. (This implies that we possess only what is necessary, and that what is not necessary has died off.)

Philosophically, both of these statements are speculative.

First, there are examples of other organisms whose advantages for survival in their environment are no worse, if not better. For example, the falcon, whose eyesight is superior.
Secondly, why does this have to be so? Take the eye, for example. The eye is perfect for seeing underwater, but on land it's vulnerable, which is why land dwellers developed corneas and tear ducts (according to the theory of evolution, which is what I'm trying to answer). Therefore, the eye itself adapted to the environment and wasn't discarded and replaced with another sensor.

These questions immediately arise.
Then why should anything exist for a purpose? A purpose for creation presupposes a creator. What if it's all purely accidental? Why should anything exist in us at all, rather than not? (This doesn't contradict the theory of evolution.)

I see great potential for an interesting discussion on all your questions, but I ask that you formulate your opening statement as precisely as possible.

The examples given here are, of course, not exhaustive. However, even axioms are sometimes revised. This is an extremely rare, but possible, phenomenon.

Thank you for your comment. Do you think it's possible to provide a precise estimate of each parameter of the idea without empirical methods (psychological or sociological)?

Currently, the Model does a good job of achieving its explanatory power, but the estimate of each parameter is highly dependent on the interpreter.

Or when the Holy Inquisition condemned people to be burned at the stake: surely the inquisitors considered this an act of "love", no?

One thing I've learned (and the hard way, at that) is that religious/spiritual people tend to have vastly different ideas than I about what constitutes "good" and "bad", "love" and "hate", and so on. To the point like we're from different universes, hence my question to you earlier. — baker

I don't have any questions for God about good or evil. Therefore, I have no answer for you. Love is not good. Love is grace. The Christian's task, in my view, is deification, transformation through connection to divine grace.

Everyone: I don’t understand why you are offering me a false dichotomy for resolution, outside the context in which I explained my position?

What do you mean by "love"?
If you believe that someone deserves to die, to be killed (by you, even), and you spare them, is that an act of "love" on your part? — baker

Sorry, but I didn't understand your question.

I'm not a UK resident and have no emotional connection to writing this post, but I do have a question for the author.

Do you think it's necessary to distinguish between freedom of private speech and freedom of public speech?

I'll give you my thoughts. Freedom of speech is a social construct. It didn't just fall from grace, but is a perfectly reasonable human choice. The idea itself was invented long before radio or Twitter. Freedom of speech in that era meant the ability to speak loudly. But even when the idea was invented, and not during its existence, was this freedom ever fully realized. Restrictions of one kind or another have always existed. Our modern world is even more sensitive to freedom of speech, because any thought, even a bad one, can instantly acquire high intersubjective weight, which can easily lead to dire consequences. While in the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries, freedom of speech was subject to mild religious or social restrictions (which prevented people from speaking nonsense), today this restriction is gone, meaning greater government intervention is only a matter of time.

Furthermore, if we take a sober (and not idealistic) look at today's world, we can conclude that freedom of speech will be further restricted.

I'm not aware of any Christian tradition that guarantees hell for all. However, many mainstream Protestant faiths, especially fundamentalist literalists, do seem to embrace a hellfire-and-damnation view. I’ve certainly heard sermons claiming people will go to hell for being gay or for atheism, with warnings of “weeping and gnashing of teeth.” Some might even consider Protestant literalism a heresy (I think David Bentley Hart who I quite like, despite his sometimes being an arrogant shit, holds that view). — Tom Storm

I would add that, upon closer examination, regarding the proposition of what is and is not hell or heaven. I wrote about this in one of the threads earlier.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16096/the-origins-and-evolution-of-anthropological-concepts-in-christianity/p1

People are quick to equate religion with so many ascetic rules and with earthly-looking power structures. And they equate its spread with earthly tactics of spreading earthly ideologies, including coercion and psychological tricks. But Christianity was always different as it requires freedom to achieve its ends. The core Christian message is that God is trying to bring us to know and love him. There is no such thing as knowing someone or loving someone without their free, honest willingness. This in itself is more universally appealing. — Fire Ologist

I agree with your assertion. Moreover, I'd like to point out that the question itself is already posed within the paradigm of "why did this ideology take off," rather than, for example, "is Christianity a doctrine of love?"

Let me try to answer your central question:

What explains the success of Christianity?

1. High universality for its time – Christianity's ability to explain various areas.
2. High productivity – Christianity's ability, once accepted as the norm, to generate new, logically necessary, non-trivial consequences that could not be derived from previous experience.

The norm is a point of semantic balance between extremes

This is a fantastic comment. It feels like I have no answer to what you asked, because you so accurately captured the essence of what lies beneath the words of my post. You are already there, within your questions, within the answers. The answers will simply come.

I am so inspired and grateful for your response. It encourages me to continue my research!

This is truly a high-quality level of rhetorical mastery.

The nomadic idea of ​​"home" is tied not to the land, but to everyday life, loved ones, and life itself. The idea of ​​"home on the land" enabled the development of many things related to establishing a life in one place, and, as you noted, primarily agriculture. However, the idea of ​​"home in the mind" (as among nomads) enabled the development of speed of movement and rapid expansion and contraction.

In the history of the world, it was nomads who managed to build the largest (in terms of size) states, but it was sedentary people who built the most stable states.

Yes, the settled people did invent a map with a center. The nomads simply made sure that this center was located where their headquarters were located at that moment.

What else? I would note that nomads are best adapted to the unexpected (famine, cold, catastrophes) – the so-called "black swan." Sedentary people, on the other hand, learned to overcome difficulties based on the principle of "nowhere to run."

History always tells us that a problem can have several solutions, and the model I propose allows us to consider their pros and cons.

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space. — Tom Storm

Considering your number of forum posts, as well as the fact that you read almost every thread on this forum, I imagine you're already more than well-educated. Perhaps there's no document? But for me, a fan of content over form, that means nothing.

Any concept, be it relativism, anti-fundamentalism, or postpositivism, is a conceptual framework or analytical tool—a "lens" through which to describe a phenomenon, defining the boundaries of what is and isn't included within that concept. Roughly speaking, it's an idea to see the world or phenomena in a certain way, and for the sake of economy (to avoid describing the full content each time), an appropriate term—a construct—is selected. This construct is tested and accepted or rejected by intersubjective consensus.

If you approach the topic you've outlined from this perspective, the content of the idea itself, rather than its specific name, comes to the fore.

As for the content of these ideas, they have much in common—they are tools for describing the different views of contemporary people on the world order. Both terms, to varying degrees and with varying nuances, express the different understandings of contemporary people about the foundations of the world. You can create your own construct.

For me, the idea (content) itself is always more important. Perhaps philologists value a more precise demarcation of terminology.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. If we adopt a pragmatic perspective, moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning.

This phenomenon concerns me. I'd like to delve into the descriptive description of the phenomenon (how it happens) rather than the prescriptive (how it should be).

And to what I've said above, I should add this: General indifference, which has become the norm for any individualistic society, continues to be perceived somewhat differently in the case of people with disabilities. It would be interesting to explore this. For example, according to the modern, generally accepted notion in developed countries, we are indifferent to an ordinary person walking towards us. Even if they do something wrong or even violate some norms, look very strange, smoke something illegal, or are simply lounging on the sidewalk after drinking, we calmly tell ourselves, "It's none of my business." And this seems generally accepted.

However, if a disabled person does all of the above, even if they're just walking towards us, we shouldn't seem so indifferent.

You'll agree, even despite our profound individualism, we still have a special attitude toward people with disabilities.

The very fact of indifference toward people with disabilities touches us. Hence, even despite secularism, something still lingers within us at a very deep level. This is a great area for conjecture. And I would suggest that this "special" attitude toward people with disabilities stems from our ordinary unpredictability of existence. We, residents of the 21st century, nevertheless continue to feel vulnerable, and it could easily happen that we ourselves could find ourselves in this position.

Perhaps this feeling among people with disabilities themselves is the root of the protest movement pointed out by the author of the thread: "Piss_On_Pity." Perhaps they don't like being special...

I'd add another layer to this. If we take what I've described about ancient times as a starting point, then in that society, caring for the disabled was a completely understandable and logical phenomenon: it's part of a cultural code based, on one hand, on empathy, and on the other, on the caregiver's desire to insure against their own disability. The modern world is somewhat different. Individualism and organized care for the elderly (for example, pensions) or the disabled (for example, benefits) don't strongly compel a contemporary to contribute to the well-being of such people. "The state will take care of them," or "It doesn't concern me," or "What does this have to do with me?" This is most likely the underlying cause of the problems faced by disabled people today.

Furthermore, I've also noticed that disabled people are portrayed as objects of hate or jokes (in films like "Avatar"). I don't know whether this is truly the norm in society or whether it's a distortion. If this is true, I'd like to point out that the very permissibility of making jokes about people with disabilities was probably perceived differently in earlier times. Furthermore, I think this has become possible due to the secular nature of modern times.

There is ample archaeological and paleopathological evidence that ancient humans, including early Homo sapiens and even Neanderthals, cared for and cared for their fellow tribesmen with serious injuries, disabilities, or illnesses. This is evident in the traces of old injuries on the bones of the inhabitants of that time, and yet, later in life, the tooth enamel of such individuals often appears better than that of their fellow tribesmen (they ate pureed food). This is interpreted by scientists as evidence of healthy group members caring for the sick or disabled.

This has led to disability being seen as a gap between what a body is able to do and what it has been historically expected to be able to do, the gap between body and social expectation. — Banno

In your initial post, you alienate the problem of disability from the individual and transfer it to society or the environment. However, what if we consider the possibility of continuing to live with an illness as a humane act, an act of caring? What if it is part of a cultural code based on empathy on the one hand, and on the caregiver's desire to insure against their own disability on the other?

In this scenario, care ensures the continuation of life, albeit not a fully fulfilling life. Caring for the disabled is no longer an obligation of the state or society, but an individual interest. It's an investment in one's future safety, making altruism a rational choice for group members, not simply an emotional impulse.
Nevertheless, in many countries around the world, government building codes and regulations require buildings to be constructed with the disabilities of some people in mind.

Caring for the disabled, like the social model of disability, existed long before the advent of modern cities and architectural barriers. Care wasn't simply "fulfilling requirements" but a cultural imperative.

Is disability no more than an issue of welfare and charity, or should we [url=http:// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piss_On_Pity ]piss on pity[/url]? — Banno

If caring is a cultural code or a rational interest, it is not pity. Pity is passive; caring is active and instrumental.

I understood your point. And an idea immediately arose. (In this topic, I'm voluntarily eager to be the object of research.)

You seem to be trying to formalize it. To bring it into line with a structure, with an idea that exists BEFORE my thought. I'm talking about a different realm. What if this birth of meaning in my head is not formalizable, but only experienced sensually? (well, either in the eidos or in God, and not necessarily in my head)

I'm writing to you now in plain text, without any processing, as it occurs. This is important.

For example, Baumgarten describes this very accurately in his aesthetics: "to give form to feeling," "to transform a dark feeling into a bright structure."

So here's what (a completely emotional statement): what if it's simply something else, and not structural at all? That it lies, as it were, outside of experience, outside of chess, outside of logic, and any attempt to force it into these frameworks is like combing your hair with a comb—that is, involuntarily shaping your hair into the shape of the comb's teeth?

I want to say again that I am writing exactly what I feel, perhaps all of this looks very unstructured.

I’d like to tell you one more interesting thing about the Russian language. A lot of people think that since Russian doesn’t have a strict, fixed word order like English, you can just throw the words in any sequence you want. That’s not true at all. Let me show you how it actually works with a simple example.

The neutral, emotionally flat version:

Я пошёл спать → “I’m going to bed” (or literally: “I went to sleep”). Now the same phrase with different word order — each one carries its own emotional coloring:

Я спать пошёл → “Alright, I’m making myself go to bed.” lt feels like an internal command, almost forcing yourself: “Enough, time to sleep, no more excuses.”

Пошёл я спать → “I’m off to bed” or “That’s it, I’m going to sleep.” Usually expresses tiredness, boredom, or mild irritation: “Everything’s got on my nerves, I’ve had enough, I’m out.”

Спать я пошёл → “I’m going to bed, period.”
Can sound like a claim or even a small protest: “Don’t bother me anymore, I’ve decided — bedtime.”
These are just a few ordinary permutations of the same three words. And when you add the right intonation, the number of shades multiplies even more.

So, in the end, how do you figure out what was going through my head when I chose a particular order? Very simple: the main thing for a native speaker is not “what is grammatically correct,” but what exact feeling or attitude I want the listener to pick up. The word order is one of the main tools for that — it puts the emotional emphasis exactly where I need it.
In Russian, we don’t just convey information with words — we paint the emotion directly into the sentence structure. That’s why the same objective statement can sound neutral, decisive, annoyed, or defiant depending on how you shuffle the words.

D

I've tried to think about this, but it's incredibly difficult. I've established for myself, and found it sufficient, the following: when I speak or write, I kind of imagine what I want my interlocutor to feel. This doesn't come in the form of words or even images, but rather in the form of emotions. That is, each subsequent word must be such that it evokes the response I intend in the other person's mind. Let me clarify how this works. In Russian, the everyday language of a normal educated person, there are about 40,000 words. This isn't bragging; it's the breadth of how subtly I can express what I feel. This makes me want to read literature, to master the language so that I can express precisely this feeling I've intended, down to the subtlest details. Incidentally, I think this is why Dostoevsky is so popular. He expresses himself incredibly precisely.

Here on the forum, I see that there are also people who speak incredibly precisely and use English to do so. And they achieve this not by the quantity of words, but by the ability to use fewer.

To answer your question, it's more about the emotional image I want to evoke in the interlocutor, and the words themselves emerge.

An interesting topic, very much in line with my research into languages.

According to AI and the articles I could locate, languages compress over time, with the more "evolved" languages showing great reliance upon contextual clues and less extraneous words like articles and the like — Hanover

In my opinion, this is quite controversial, since the very method of predicting future events based on hindsight is quite dubious. As we know, history develops in fits and starts, and some languages ​​that existed 1,000 years ago (and were even considered global) are no longer used at all. This point is important to emphasize.

Mandarin, for example, is a highly compresed language, which is why native speakers translate English in a compressed way. As in they might say, "I bring two chair" instead of "I will bring you two chairs," often eliminating pronouns, plural designations and the like. — Hanover

This observation is interesting, but it may be related not to a desire to simplify, but to the native speaker's language itself. Specifically, in Chinese, tenses are expressed differently than in English, and the use of prepositions or copulas in many languages ​​is replaced by suffixes. Therefore, when English is learned rather than acquired from birth, the native speaker's knowledge of their native language undoubtedly makes a difference. For example, as a native Russian speaker, I have great difficulty correctly placing words in sentences when I try to speak English. If we consider the differences with Turkic languages, such as Kazakh, it's difficult to grasp the use of copulas and prepositions (there, everything is done with suffixes). I also have difficulty expressing thoughts within the three cases that English has, and it seems that in my native language, what I want to say sounds more phenomenological, that is, more sensual. Although, of course, all this is mitigated by a more advanced knowledge of English.

What would I like to say about the current state of language? The constant invention of new, specific terms or different interpretations of words in narrow areas of human activity already easily leads to misunderstandings between representatives of different professions, even within the same language. This is easily verified: try philosophizing using a philosophical dictionary on a factory floor or in a boardroom—most listeners will say, "Interesting man, but what the hell did he say?"

What then does the hyper-compressed vehicle look like if not letters, words, and sentences? How does that shrug look prior to my shoulder shrugging? — Hanover

In my experience, I've noticed that expressing your thoughts in nuanced language is always slower than the thought itself. I like the flow of complexity and duration, because as I speak, I have time to think about what I'll say next.

See above.

Can you give one reason why what you're talking about shouldn't be considered simply your personal problem? — baker

Similar to my previous response to you in another thread: I suggest you consider this not as truth or a claim to truth, but as a lens that may or may not have some explanatory power. And just as in the previous thread, the problem I'm naming (and even calling it a problem) doesn't affect me much: it's purely a philosophical reflection.

Generally speaking, identifying the source of an author's problems always leads to greater understanding of the problem they're writing about. But my personal anxiety isn't quite at that level. I believe I'm quite adaptive (as presumptuous as that may sound). My anxiety stems from a kind of resentment toward the time I found myself in. However, this is precisely a scholarly reflection, and publishing this view is likely an attempt to find like-minded people, or at least those who can convincingly point out the error of my judgment.

I get your OP. But I sense a dread and weariness in you, like a solo traveler in a jungle of information and online presence. — L'éléphant

Not at all. This post is a reflection on the external world, but I found solutions for myself long ago. And I live quite well with the understanding that the world isn't cause and effect. This is perhaps a little more difficult. But it's not bad at all. However, I believe it requires sufficient maturity, and I wouldn't recommend it to others.

Take this with a grain of salt: have faith in those with a conviction to do it right with the world. It is true, individually, we are not mighty, but with a community of experts, scientists, mathematicians and statisticians, specialist, philosophy scholars, and sociologists who work during the hours we are asleep, we are in good hands. — L'éléphant

I'm probably too corrupted to view it that way. But I like it. It's a completely different matter when others believe and continue to get burned. I sincerely feel sorry for them, but I can't help them either.

The idea of ​​this post is diagnostic. It would be interesting to hear other people's opinions on the existence of such a problem in society. I offered this perspective. Other contemporary philosophers offer theirs. Well, well. But sometimes it seems to me that all this is about the same thing.

In fact, this post was inspired by a book I recently came across, "The Man Without Qualities" by Robert Musil. The novel is set in Austria, 1913. The world is on the brink of war. The protagonist is a reflection of that era among intellectuals—a man without qualities.

"The Man Without Qualities" does not denote a lack of talents or qualities, but rather the absence of a clear, fixed identity in the world in which he lives. Unable to "assert himself" or find a permanent calling, the protagonist explores various fields of endeavor. Critics have argued that the protagonist is a mirror of the decaying Austro-Hungarian society and the crisis of European culture in the early 20th century. His amorphousness, detachment, and cynicism reflect the confusion and loss of direction during a period when old values ​​were crumbling and new ones had not yet been invented. The book is imbued with the question posed by contemporaries of that era to the authorities: "Give us a national idea" or "an idea of ​​being." But society received no idea in response.

As we know, war came in response to this demand. It's likely that the state often uses this method of gaining subjectivity in an era of declining values ​​or "ontological foundations." I'm not claiming this is happening consciously. Rather, I would call the "decline of values" a sign of impending catastrophe.

Of course, the described "identity crisis" at that time concerned only the intelligentsia and, to a lesser extent, the average person. However, as writers of contemporary history, we have the opportunity to find out the answer to this question: can a person live peacefully with a private understanding of truth, instead of global narratives?

Thank you for your comment. May I ask you what decision you made for yourself?

In this context, I had no intention of asserting what gender is. My goal was to provide an example.

I might add that we were also taught that if you want a higher chance of certainty and predictability in your world, you need to be rich. Predictably is a by product of power and wealth is how you obtain control. I think that has a certain logic to it, though it never left me with a motivation to make money. — Tom Storm

In fact, as I can tell from your comments, you have done a great job of addressing the issue I raised at the beginning of this thread.

And they came to similar conclusions:

Outside of this, my education left me with a view that certainty is there to be overthrown and the world is chaotic. — Tom Storm

and

Now, Order is perceived as a short-lived, fragile, localized accident amidst universal, fundamental Chaos. — Astorre

Perhaps for some people, this problem seems academic, theoretical, and not particularly interesting.

However, I'll give a striking example from our modern era. A question that resonated prominently at the last Olympic Games, and which resonates in locker rooms and public restrooms in some countries.

"Is this person in front of me a man or a woman?"

This is no longer a philosophical abstraction. Moreover, the old positivist tools (look at chromosomes/genitals) no longer serve as a universal arbiter, and the new ones (asking how a person identifies themselves) only work within certain bubbles and provoke outrage beyond them.

Perhaps I received an outdated education, but it taught me that gender is an objective biological fact, as solid as the periodic table. And now I live in a world where I can be publicly destroyed for asserting this fact, and physically destroyed for denying it (depending on the country and region). And yet, no one, absolutely no one, can clearly and universally define where the line lies.

The same person is simultaneously both completely female (by self-identification, documents, hormones, social recognition) and completely male (by chromosomes, gametes, bone structure, and athletic category until 2020).

Whether these issues concern a small number of people is unknown to me, as I'm not familiar with sociological surveys. However, this is just one real-life example. I wouldn't want to touch on this topic at all, but even with my thick armor, the situation doesn't seem abstract or isolated.

Some will say the overarching problem is religion or the human tendency to form dogmatic ideologies, and of course, others will say the overarching problem is the loss of religion — Janus

This is where I highlight the problem: claiming one or the other as true; claiming the truth of both, or claiming the futility of everything. That's the problem.

For the first time in history, an external, universal, generally accepted authority (God, Reason, Inevitable Progress) has disappeared, one that would say, "None of this is accidental; it's all part of a greater, meaningful plan."

Before, Chaos was an accident amidst necessity (God, Law). Now, Order is perceived as a short-lived, fragile, localized accident amidst universal, fundamental Chaos.

And at the center of this is a contemporary, raised on the positivist notions of the 19th century.