This seems a bit of a moral panic to me...

What I said is "they do not ... — Fooloso4

Correct. But, in retrospect, my comment makes more sense in this context. Apologies for the mis-quote.

I don't. The point is that it is a major reason why many victims just keep quiet. — Fooloso4

Assuming so is ... bad form. Assuming guilt is bad form. INferring guilt is bad form. Filling gaps with non-existent victims (as far as we currently know, given we're talking about non-reports essentially) is bad form. I don't do that. I wouldn't accept others doing that around me. Perhaps its the legal mind, but I can't allow it (i.e I would push back. Do whatever you want lol).

It is not a pre-determined view. — Fooloso4

Based on the following sentence (in your reply) i'm going to reiterate that it is. We can just leave that, I would think.

That is as far as all but one of these cases went. — Fooloso4

Then we have literally no reason to assume guilt, do we? Nice.

I am saying that grabbing a woman by the pussy without consent is a sexual assault. He claims that this is what he does. — Fooloso4

You will notice that my comments on the initial position apply (perhaps more strongly) to this one. You have nothing.

Twenty-seven is many. — Fooloso4

The context is a section of a group. 27 is several as opposed to 200 (where maybe 75+ would be 'many'). This is a dumb thing to object to anyway. It has nothing to do with the substance.

Is there any number of allegations against him that he denies that would strain his credibility for you? — Fooloso4

No. But I think this is actually the answer you want, you're just not adequate distinguishing the important part: A single provable instance would be enough to write him off in the same way even some of hte lets say less stable detractors have. That's simply not something I can get on with in any way. Accusations don't bother me, that much (particularly ones against a wealthy, older white male (i.e extremely easy target) in the context of his becoming President where half the country already wanted his head). That's a separate conversation, but just stating so it's clear.

If you'd just asked me whether I personally actually think he's sexually assaulted anyone before, I'd have said, oh almost surely. I don't know a single person who hasn't, when drilled. Its a matter of degree. And his 'degree' is likely to be far higher than the ones I'm intimating in the previous sentence. Do I believe he did any of the discreet things he's accused of? I'd be an idiot to go one way or the other.

Facts are provided in the link. I listed them. — Fooloso4

Then, I think we're done. Nothing you've presented provide any basis for your conclusions, in my view. You've doubled down on assumptions, reading words as actions, a pretense of Godly knowledge of character and a knack for inferring facts from non-facts that I'm jealous of. At least one (that other complaints went no further) tell against you. You have to fill in the gaps and assume embarrassing numbers of elements to come to any conclusion. Reiterating the above: I'd be an idiot to believe one way or the other. This is hte correct way to deal with disputed facts when you're not the Judge, God or have direct personal knowledge.

The only aspect you've brought up which has much to say is the E Jean Carroll case which is certainly concerning, and even on terms I've restricted my concerns to. However, I would refer you to the Amber Heard case in London for an example of why this says not much. It just means Trump couldn't win a defamation case. It's word-against-word, and both sides have an extremely vested interest. For several reasons, the Jury was likely disposed (particularly on a lower threshold of evidence in civ cases) to find him guilty. He very well could have raped her. He very well could have done something lesser. He very well may just be a clumsy dick that people are targeting because of his clumsy, lusty behaviour (for the avoidance of doubt, any form of SA is precluded from the description just given).

I have not defended him once. I don't know him. He seems a total goof who I wouldn't enjoy spending time with.
I have pushed back on legally dubious claims and presumptions of guilt. Might be worth focusing a little bit ;)

Why do you lose memories when you teleport and why do you posit that I have a continuous memory from birth to now? — Hanover

Please forgive any prickliness here. It seems, outright, you are not reading my entire posts. Eg, the above vs:

You're free to say you were not 'you' before, say, age 4 when clear memories coalesced. — AmadeusD

So, to be clear, I can;t answer your question because I did not make the claim it refers to. I will do my best to ignore this, as it comes up, and just respond to what I can stand behind. So, apologies if things seemed to be missed and such.

You're distinguishing your example from mine — Hanover

By the fact that, in 'my' (it's actually Derek Parfit) case, you choose to use a machine which purports to "recreate" you somewhere else. But what actually happens, is that you go into a machine, it copies you perfectly - atom for atom - then destroys you and sends the data to another machine which 3d-prints you from that data. This is clearly not like your case of simply living through life, even if this reduces to saying they're are just different cases.
Ignoring the question of whether this would preserve psychological continuity (relation R) at all (reductionists are essentially committed to saying yes, it would, by virtue of being your exact physical double at the moment of transfer) and the question of how, moments after re-creation, you couldn't be the original person as your memories now diverge sufficiently to defeat the rule of identity, the point is this:

If there is someone who recalls being you, and is physically identical do you - is this you? The reason this is an important thing to nail down about identity is presented in:

the kicker for this thought experiment is what's called the 'branch-line case" in which the machine malfunctions, and you survive several hours after the transfer and can talk to your double. You are, though, destined to die in the 'normal' way, in several hours time.

Can there be two "you"s? Uncomfortable. But seems fairly true, if relation R holds. You may simply disagree that this is the correct notion of identity and that's totally fine. I've just not come across a better one, however much this has increased my fear of death.

But if I go from Point A to Point B over 50 years and not a single same cell or single same memory exists from age 1 to age 50, then don't I have the same identity problem as you noted in the teleporting? — Hanover

I think the underlined is not quite right. This might be rectified by moving the date forward to age 4, per the above correction I've made to your initial questions. But that said, in your example - not a single cell, and not a single memory remain? You are not the same person. That seems simple. It relies on the same logic/reasoning/position as the teletransporter case. That case is simply the reverse. Can someone who does have the exact physical make-up, and psychological make-up as you.. actually be you? It seems they can. And, for me, the only issue is how to get around the possibility of two "you"s. For me, this is solved by the fact that the exact instant one becomes aware they did not die in the machine, the two have disparate memory banks. Nothing ship-of-theseus rears its head.

Here is a thought experiment - I do not think it is mine, but I cannot remember whose it is — Clearbury

Parfit outlines several versions of this in Reasons and Persons as related to humans. He uses surgeries replacing body parts, and swapping body parts to tease out the intuitions. Far too long to summarize, but that may be helpful in you find the discussion. DM me if you need further help on that...

On the other hand, if the mind stays with the functioning, then the mind stays where it is and the reassembled brain is either just a lump of meat or another mind, but it isn't the original one. — Clearbury

This is a conclusion for a different thought experiment, on my view. Yours speaks to "at what point" certain things become, or are disestablished. The whole-sale transference of matter in the sense of "Reassembling" is not the same question, I don't think. However, I think when you turn this to brains and minds, we don't know enough about functional memory and where/what in the brain houses/contributes to/eliminates memories to justly answer whether or not the "old, reassembled" brain would carry any memories with it.

Why do I have to use teleportation? — Hanover

I didn't say you did. It was an example. Which is what I posited it as. Bizarre question.

Why can't I just say I existed as a baby at Time 1, Location 1 and now I'm at Time 1,000 at Location 1,000? — Hanover

Because you wouldn't think this was the case. It wouldn't be open to you in my example, which is clearly, and vastly different to yours. You wouldn't be saying it. You'd be dead.
In your case, you DO have the memories. You have psychological continuity. You're free to say you were not 'you' before, say, age 4 when clear memories coalesced. That is another semi-discomforting conclusion from the Relation R take (i.e psychological continuity) which terrifies me, and comforts others. These two ways of thinking aren't really in any kind of conflict.

It's always very hard to know what hte heck Banno is trying to say, as he tends to do drive-by thought-wanking but it seems he's pointing hte same out.

Your continuity as you is all that matters. If that continuity is irreversibly broken (i.e there is no one alive who remembers being you) then you don't exist anymore. This doesn't require any essentialism. It requires a vague, but obviously felt, reality of psychological continuity.

I still think they're just Ship of Theseus problems dealing with identity. — Hanover

Then I'd say you're not adequately contending with the ideas put forward. Mine are specifically designed to avoid that insurmountable sorities issue.

One of those who do not care about the truth? — Fooloso4

You are clearly doing this in bad faith. This one hit like a shitty Twitter response.

No. I am a victim of several sexual assaults, who has chosen not to press charges. So, kindly, keep your bullshit in your mind.

Are you just pretending to be clueless? The defense will do what they can to attempt to discredit the accuser. This often amounts to a psychological abuse and an assault on the victim's integrity. — Fooloso4

Yes. That is their entire job, and half the purpose of an adversarial justice system. If you have an issue with this, it might be worth having a look into the middle east and how their courts work.

Nonsense. This has nothing to do with me — Fooloso4

Its has everything to do with you. Your biases are writ large, and its clear your have a pre-determined view on the matter. It doesn't seem to matter to you that we have systems in place to adjudicate conflicting accounts of things. You are also intimating that a recording of a private conversation, in a context that has absolutely nothing to do with carrying out a sexual assault is evidence of one. You can't be serious can you?

two things seem likely: there are others who remain silent and at least a few of the allegations are true — Fooloso4

These are two things that seem likely to you. Once again, this is about you. Not the facts.

What facts? — Fooloso4

Fucking, exactly my dude. Exactly.

27 is more than several. "perhaps scorned" is weaseling and a sleazy suggestion. — Fooloso4

It is several. No it isn't. You are having a moment because I've suggested a completed reasonable, and previously known possibility for the persecution of socially controversial men. I didn't even suggest this did happen. I've suggested it does not strain credibility. It doesn't. Your protests aren't anything more than that.

When you do not know the facts they cannot indicate anything. — Fooloso4

Ok. So, why are you coming to all manner of absurd conclusions, foregoing democratic judicially processes and assuming everything but God to get to a position like the one you're in?

Alas, if only denial made it true. As far as I can tell, you and Bob don’t even care if it is. — T Clark

Unfortunately, the case here is that there is no good evidence. Caring if its true has nothing to do with the discussion I've engaged in. I can see the confusion you're doubling down on. The problem is, denial is legitimate in the absence of proof. Concluding guilt in an absence of compelling evidence is the type of thing that gets judges removed from the bench.

They do — Fooloso4

Very true. I am one.

where they are assaulted a second time. — Fooloso4

Sorry, what the heck are you talking about here?

This time around by defense lawyers who care nothing about the truth. — Fooloso4

It seems you're not getting what you want out of hte world stage, and thereby foregoing any sense of objectivity here. THat's fine, i guess. But hte facts indicate other than the conclusions you're drawing.

The fact that he has never been criminally charged does that there is not ample evidence that he is a sex offender. — Fooloso4

It's actually a pretty damn good indication of this. I can't understand why, if this was your brother or father, you certainly wouldn't rest on these laurels. But if its someone you would psychologically benefit from being charged and convicted you're happy to lay a really dubious claim out there like this. I realise its just a forum, and who cares, but diligence around provability is an important aspect, and the conclusion drawn here is decidedly undemocratic.

Would you leave him alone with your wife or mother or daughter? — Fooloso4

Yes.

Where is explicit consent? How can there be consent when he does not even wait? — Fooloso4

This isn't evidence of any kind, as regards rape. This is a recording of a private conversation which gives us every reason to detest his character. This wouldn't even count as probative evidence in a criminal court.

It strains credibility to the breaking point to think that this many women just made things up. — Fooloso4

No it doesn't. Much weirder, more expansive and stupid shit has happened. Michael Jackson's criminal trials come to mind. Absolute joke. Full disclosure though: I have been the target of more than one completely and utterly false claims of sexual assault/rape. One of those was in fact, a situation in whcih I was sexually assaulted and the woman wanted to get ahead of it. So, it does not strain credibility to think there are several, perhaps scorned, unstable women willing to lie in court for money. That's not at all hard to conceive, in the context of "this is the election for America's future". Ideological commitment is poison.

Let's face facts, calling him a rapist is an accurate description. — T Clark

No. No it isn't. It is a speculative slur, at this point. Bob is right.

No, not at all. Your example does the same as mine, but the 'biological method' is different. If you simply cannot remember who you are - look down and go "whos legs are these?" you're not the owner of those legs. In this case, I just don't have a name for hwo you are - your psychology has only just now come into existence. Name yourself!
This isn't particularly difficult to grasp, I don't think. It just gives us the extremely uncomfortable conclusion that (for example) in a situation of teletransportation, you die. You don't come to in place 2. You simply die. Someone new, with your same memories, exists in place 2. For some, that is comforting. As long as someone who will be you continues to drive toward your goals and desires, all is well. For me, its terrifying.

Now, that runs counter to most intuitions about identity, for sure. But that is likely irrelevant. As regards Ship of Theseus, no. I am expressly avoiding that question. The body is not that relevant - it just a way of testing the conclusion as against the opposite (i.e "oh! Those are my legs" would indicate no change in psychological continuity in the Jane example).

I think no. Despite Leontisko's protestations (which don't seem to go further than that description) it is clearly hte case that a Christian must accept Christian doctrine. The name "Christ-ian" infers this is, at the base, the doctrine of hte Christ myth. If you do not accept the Christ myth, you're something else related to Christian. But clearly, if you reject the basis for the description of the sect, you're not in it.

That might seem reductive, but the concept of doctrine is pretty reductive, and it behooves me to avoid hte ridiculousness of sectarianism and just make a call, from my view.

This is hte crux; good stuff.

When you wake up, would you think "where is my mind?". Surely not. Would you look down - see two legs and think "where are my legs"?

Are the ones you now have Jane's legs? Then you're still you. Are they your legs? Then you're Jane.

I am interested in what Aristotle thought about this and whether he took part. — I like sushi

Then my suggestion wasn't for you, was it friend? :)

but this doe snot define the purpose of the mysteries. — I like sushi

It may have been the entire purpose, form and execution of the Mysteries (though, not to box-tick drug taking). That's what explorations like Muraresku's are trying to sort through.

I have strong reasons to believe it would be a waste of time reading that. I have heard him before and cannot imagine sifting through a couple of hundred pages is worthy of my time in the hope of finding one nugget of information. — I like sushi

I can't but assume you really aren't coming into much contact with the substance of the work. Which is not Hancock's, btw.That's not meant to be disparaging - this is most people's position having not engaged particularly well. If any of your reasons have anything to do with racism, you should probably just stop and actually read his work - or admit you just don't know? Usually the way.

If you have any interest in Hancock's psychedelic work, Supernatural is probably the single-best-researched book o the topic which isn't specialised (i.e written by a worker, or focussed on one particular pet project). This coming from someone who has worked in academic psychedelic labs and lectured at several universities on the topic.

By all means, tell me if he mentions Aristotle at all? — I like sushi

Yes. But it sounds like you're not particularly apt to accept something from this writer. Which is fair.

So, something cannot correspond, from reality, to, one-to-one, your perception: that wouldn’t make sense. — Bob Ross

I understand, and I'm not quite suggesting this (though, it seems far more reasonable than pretending there isn't one at all). To reiterate something from an earlier take, there is no good reason to think that which excites our perceptions is significantly different from them. The fidelity between people's perceptions tends toward this, as does "objective measurement" to the degree that that is actually going on LOL.

(1) there are a priori preconditions by which your brain cognizes and (2) your brain is cognizing multiple objects, from those sensations, into one coherent stream of consciousness. — Bob Ross

So say's Kant's system. Am well aware of this position. But I don't think that's necessarily the case. The idea of a priori concepts is a baffling one, if you're not going to invoke like genetic memory or whatever. This isn't decisive for me, but I think this, coupled with the above, are points, again, at which for me Kant is left seriously wanting.

If by this you just meant that there must be something exciting your senses in order for your brain to have the material required to represent (i.e., the sensations), then you are absolutely right. — Bob Ross

To make this a speculative proposition: That "something" must be (in the sense of, it would be required) sufficiently similar in form, function and aesthetic to your perceptions to cause them absent any notable aberration in perception (this leans on the above two objections, I suppose, and I take that they are all speculative, and work together).

How? The idea of a coffee is inherently spatiotemporal, logical, mathematical, conceptual, etc. All of that is a priori. — Bob Ross

I don't think so, no. And even if it were, you need to explain to me how the thing which causes coffee is not coffee (albeit, having never been named as such - but that's clearly not what's at issue here). If it's not coffee... well. I'm sure it's quite clear why this a rocky road to go down. And perhaps why philosophies like Kant's don't make it further than universities... No one relates to this nonsense.

I am not following the critique here: a thing-in-itself represents something real—it represent “that”. It doesn’t represent nothing. — Bob Ross

If there is 'nothing out there' corresponding to your perception (which you have very expressly positied) then, no. It isn't anything. It represents nothing but a gap in the knowledge of hte perceiver. Maybe that was hte intention, but it butters no bread as far as I can see.

Ok, I was misunderstanding what you mean by “disconnect”. — Bob Ross

Fair enough - I'll try to be clearer (generally, not going to restate).

It would be, then, under my view that there is “connect” between the object which excited the senses and the phenomena of it insofar as the former is required for the latter but is not knowable, in terms of its properties, from the latter. — Bob Ross

I agree. Which, to the degree I can make heads or tails of it, is precluded by the above issue of correspondence.

You would have to experience the world as it were independently of your experience of it to verify how accurate your perceptions are — Bob Ross

Apodictically, yes.

All you can know, is that when you strip out the way your brain is pre-structured to experience, then there’s nothing intelligible left. — Bob Ross

This is yours, and Kant's view. I'm unsure it's mine, but it also does not defeat what I'm putting forward here.

what do you have left? — Bob Ross

The coffee. Quite blatantly.

That may be your opinion. Not mine. I disclaim that Graham is a personal friend, and has been for quite some time. That said, yeah - pretending that his name is somehow an indication of quality is erroneous at best, prejudiced at worst.

after Mackie, I'm going to say asking anyone to defend their values is a joke.

Cool.

The thing-in-itself, in terms of what it represents, is not a figment of reason’s imagination—it’s a real thing out there. — Bob Ross

Yeah see, this is, on it's face, a totally contradictory set of claims. It represents nothing, unless there is a real thing to which you are referring. In which case, it represents that. It can't really cut both ways. This is one of my personal gripes with the CRP that makes it come apart in some of its most important aspects. This reply would go to a couple of your further paras too.

In the first, you were denying that there is a medium by which we experience — Bob Ross

False. If that's what you got, I cannot, on review, see how.

For Kant, of course there is: it is the way we sense and cognize that provides that disconnect. — Bob Ross

This would clearly provide a connection. And it certainly does for Kant.

for two different external objects per external object — Bob Ross

No. I did not say this, or imply it. I was very clearly speaking about hte 'object of perception' in contrast to whatever caused that perception. I am saying that seeing a true disconnect (i.e "it is not out there" as you put it) is unparsimonious speculation that I find pretty unfortunate.

If you agree that the something which excited your senses cannot be known from the perception intuited and cognized from the sensations of it — Bob Ross

I don't really. That's just the way the thing-in-itself has been spoken about over time. I don't think this was the intention, necessarily, though it is where Kant left it. I also think it's wrong. But that's not an argument about CRP or it's contents. Just that I think this.

then it plainly follows that what you are calling ‘coffee’ only holds intelligibility insofar as it is phenomena and not noumena — Bob Ross

No. And i gave the specific reason for this 'no'. Unless you accept a total disconnect between the thing-in-itself and hte perception (i.e you speculate that empirically, they are simply not the same thing - not that we can't know this, but that it is the case that they are not hte same thing) then there is simply no reason whatsoever to assume the object which causes perceptions would be significantly different to the perception. I see nothing to support that contention, other than saying "its beyond our knowledge, and so it (depending on which of your posts I take as your position) it doesn't exist" or ".. it is something other than that which you have perceived". Neither of these is tenable, to me.

a priori modes of cognizing reality — Bob Ross

Which may in fact simply be informations from objects "out there". See how weak this contention is?

When you work backwards from your experience of the coffee to whatever excited your senses to have that experience of it, you end up with a perfectly unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’. That’s how it should be. — Bob Ross

I think you're perhaps not quite understanding what's being said here. No one is working backwards. One is stepping back. There is no directionality. That's kind of the basis for what I'm saying. There is no hierarchy of the primacy of either our perception of the object, or hte object and this is all Kant can really give us. And I accept that. We can't possibly put one before the other without either dismissing our experience, or pretending it is caused by literally nothing. I know you're not saying those things, which is why I posit you're not quite groking me - which is probably my fault. But I note you've made a moral call here. There is no 'should'. There is discussion. LOL.

Then, you must demonstrate how any phenomenal property of the coffee is a property of the coffee-in-itself — Bob Ross

No. No I don't.

the very concept of a ‘coffee’ is only distinguishable from the generic ‘thing’ insofar as it is already conditioned by the a priori means of cognizing it — Bob Ross

I thikn you're nearly getting it, now. Weirdly, you seem to be claiming the opposite of hte clear inference from this assertion. Namely, that the two objects must be inextricably linked. Given the mode of perception, there is literally no reason to think the object would be significantly different to the perception. Pretend you couldn't possibly know, all you want. That creates no reason to assume, in ignorance, that there's any major disconnect.

That’s why Kant never says “coffee-in-itself” or anything similar, but always ‘thing-in-itself’: it has to be that generic. — Bob Ross

I did cover this, in noting he would never use the term 'thing' other than to describe to generic concept of "a thing". Generic. This does nothing for either side of the conflict, in my view. That's just something Kant did to avoid going beyond hte bounds of knowledge. Unfortunately, to my mind, he absolutely failed in guarding against over-extension by making claims about the thing in itself (some, you've reiterated well here).

As is this:

The Immortality Key

Unfortunately, he gets mystical about it, instead of anthropological. But the synthesis is good. Appreciate you linking your review of your proferring too!

Latino sexism maybe. — frank

This is hte kind of comment that gets a scoff and a 'piss off' from me, sorry mate.

Seriously Michael, for someone intelligent (it seems), this ridiculousness of this post is utterly perplexing.

Looking forward to coming back to this thread in four years and magically, the US will be fine.

The Road To Eleusis

If anyone wants to delve.

Zygotes spontaneously abort constantly. For this reason, it would be pure stupidity to care about them in a way that informs ones morals. Weep, fools!

That’s literally the whole project of the CPR: you just denied the whole book here (: . — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's the case. As best I can tell, on multiple readings and having traversed probably half a million words in analysis (I include lectures here) the point of the book was the distinction after Hume, as between a priori concepts and empirical objects with regard to reason to avoid error in reasoning as between the two incongruous sets of 'things' (though, i definitely transgress Kant here as he would never call an a priori concept a 'thing' other than the general concept of same). That's in the title, the introduction and the entire body of the text and as best i can tell, the conclusions in the Method (the Method, specifically, is where my take derives from). There is nothing in the CRP that gives me any reason to think Kant saw anything more than a logical (i.e non-empirical, which is how your take has been framed) gap between the thing-in-itself and the experience of same (akin to the induction issue). He, in parts (though, I'm not apt to quote them so grain of salt), notes that we can't have experience of anything, without the thing. And so, being unable to know the thing does not present a barrier to us understanding that the thing is out there in a form that (possibly) we wouldn't recognize. But it might be exactly hte same, on Kant's assertions too. We just dont know. At very best, this is neutral as to claiming that 'coffee' isn't out there (though, some uses of descriptive language would ensure that it isn't, because we have never known it and named it coffee).

Ok, now you are affirming the CPR (: — Bob Ross

Reading that quote (of mine, that you used) in conjunction with the above, I can't see how the two are opposed. They both reiterate the same contention, which, I content, is in line with the CRP as a whole.

I wasn’t claiming that. Are you implying that’s what I was saying in the quote you had of my explanation of the coffee cup? — Bob Ross

It certainly sounds like it. You have expressed said the coffee isn't out there. Meaning, something else is causing you to have a cup of coffee (in terms of causation, not like it forces you to drink coffee lol).

The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself — Bob Ross

It was coffee. BUt then you go on to say...

There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross

That 'something' is coffee on both ways to read my take. 1. The object is simply the one we perceive, despite never being able to describe how that's the case; or
2. A different object, which is transitively coffee, has a strict tendency to cause us to perceive what we, in sensation, call coffee.

I have just dropped coffee from my menu, however.

This doesn't make much sense, and I have no idea what you're getting at.

Anyone paying any attention to the temperature of the USA over the last 12 months would have seen this coming a mile off. As i did. Perhaps be less pedantic.

Ah that's a shame. Ah well - hope he enjoys himself out there.

The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself. There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross

The problem I, and it seems plenty of other very intelligent people, have with this conception of both Kant's intention, and the (relatively) plain reading of the concepts is that there is no foundation for expecting a disconnect of this kind between experience and that which causes the experience. We simply have no reason to reduce our description to "something". The experience couldn't be without that which 'triggered' it within us, within the bounds of our a priori concepts. We can easily still use the term "coffee" and just accept we can't know it's properties beyond it's tendency to elicit the experience of itself within the bounds of our a priori conceptual schema. Otherwise, we're saying things cause us to experience other things in some pretty direct fashion. That seems both wrong and possible illogical to me at least in the sense that it's pure speculation and unparsimonious. We have no other way to cite the causes of experience, so why are we being all esoteric and indie about it?

A surprisingly sane thread. Nice one Bob! Particularly at this time.

All i can really say is, hehehe. This was the obvious outcome. It seemed clear to me at least a year out. I very much hope Mikie is getting the help he needs right now. Hands across America.

family. *vin diesel voice*.

Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. — Philosophim

This is what I was trying to get at, but there's no real explanation for why this is the case other than 'it's required for what we take to be experience'. However, some mental experiences (usually drug-induced) can counter this potential. The mind, either without, or unaware of, the body, may not need these a prioris to 'experience' something like timeless space for instance.

Though, you addressed your response to Bob, so i'm unsure exactly the intent.

I think this can be fairly easily sorted out with a question:

Is your position that a Zygote and an Adult Human are the same thing?

This seems, to me, akin to someone who does not know the difference between a fly and a human. Your experience doesn't matter if you're trying to reason your way to a position.

Given the above, I'm unsure you're even having a 'moral' conversation if that's the case.

For sure - OP is entirely wrong. Using the dumb colloquial version for sure.

It's been read.

Really good point worth distilling here - you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. Very good.

It's about who is more competent than whom in a specific area of expertise which may or may not have anything to do with intelligence, e.g. humor and grammar. — T Clark

Which, contra your previous comments, the "DK effect" as described in your proferrings presents a valuable, discreet metric along which to deply the DK epithet. I work in a highly-specialised area, within a highly-specialised area. Plenty of people in the former group (the wider speciality) believe they are apt to perform in the more-specialised area I am working in. They, by and large, are not, and they have not done the work to understand this fact. The effect this has on them is palpable, obvious, apparent and extremely difficult to work with.

This is a plain-reading of the DK effect in action. I see no issue. It is meaningful, identifiable and quite specific.

So it’s messy. — Fire Ologist

I agree with this, and I think this is why this particular debate always ends up coming down to a 'gut feeling', such as that contains any meaning.

An adult organism is constantly changing too. So if we want to say an adult human Is a “thing”, and then say it constantly changes, tomorrow morning we have a new “thing” too according to you. — Fire Ologist

I'm only in partial agreement here. An adult organism is always changing, but with the exception of something like surgical removal or addition, it's form does not change. We do not expect an adult human to become another form. We do with younger humans - even toddlers. Proportions change drastically in those first 10 years, and then function changes drastically in the next four or five. Once that's relatively settled by roughly 25, we do not expect any more significant changes. Nay, we couldn't expect any that are not aberrations. I think this is important and supports my distinction.

So “thing” becomes a meaningless term. There are no things anywhere ever anymore. — Fire Ologist

This seems, sorry to say, a totally unreasonable strawman. It doesn't actually address the use of 'thing' anyway. It addresses it's application to a changeable entity.

we can integrate constant change with its permanent subject of that change. — Fire Ologist

In my view, it's not 'we can'. It is the case. There's nothing further.

Now when a sperm fertilizes an egg, we can say the constantly changing sperm is a thing that, once joined with the egg, ceases to be a thing, and the egg and sperm together start the motions and changes of a new thing. — Fire Ologist

We certainly could. But, if you want to do this, you need also take on board some other very, VERY important aspects of gestation that would provide a new 'thing'. And that also supports both my view above, and that we can have various ideas of what a 'person' or 'human being' comes into existence. The gut feeling determinant remains.

A human zygote isn’t a different thing than a human adult - it’s what a human being is when it is first conceived like the adult is what a human being is when it is grown. — Fire Ologist

I would posit this as the most important, clear, contradiction in your thinking.

If they are not 'different thing's then they cannot be alternate states of 'one another', let's say. They would be the same thing. There is a difference, which you acknowledge here.

Doesn't this perhaps go to the point made by Banno earlier that religion or essentialism are influencing such views? — Tom Storm

The preceding line attests to my assent :P This is me using Banno's point in a way I think is slightly less pedantic, and more effective (to me, personally, anyhow).

I am pro-choice on the grounds that I care about women, I don't care about fetuses other than in respect of the woman carrying it (..any given..). Fetuses, on my view, cannot suffer in a way remotely morally relevant.

Btw, if pro-choice advocates don’t believe that human zygotes, blastocysts, and fetuses are human what species do they think they are? — praxis

I don't think anyone worth speaking to could deny this. Yet, Banno's flimsy point beats it.

No reasonable person could read all three beings as morally hte same, without doing some loop-de-loops which rest on embarrassment, basically.

This is an indication of why the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy, but both you and AmadeusD refused to accept this fact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whatever you're talking about has nothing to do with me. This is not a position i hold/deny/have had much thought about.

Since you've mentioned it, I agree. No f-ing clue how anything else came across. The problem with what you're saying is that its an empirical aspect of any given moral decision and cannot be a guiding, formal aspect of moral thinking in the abstract.

Still, you're not wrong. The literal stretch of time in which one can weigh up options bears heavy on any moral decisions (that are adequately considered, anyway).