Should the West be unable to deal with even one major military challenge, this will no doubt embolden other actors, and reduce sharply the ability of western, primarily the European, nations to affect international trends. — Echarmion

Venezuelans have just voted that half of their neighbor belongs to them... If others can annex their neighbors, why not them?

Also it poses serious questions. The general assumption is that with NATO members it would be different... But can all of them be really sure of that? Poles and others remember the Phoney War. If the Western countries are reluctant even to spare weapons and funds for a victim of an obvious transgression, can anyone be sure they will die for Tallin?

I don't have a problem with that. I have no problem with characterizing Russia as an imperial state with a very strong nationalist block.

I have a problem of using nationalism in Russia to excuse nationalism in Ukraine. — boethius

It is not an excuse, but an explanation. Ukrainian nationalism is a direct response to growing Russian nationalism. A big neighbor with the president openly denying your nationality and statehood and courting extreme nationalistic/imperial movements might have an effect like that. Sure, Ukraine could do more to curtail that, but it does not change the fact that it is Russia that wants to subjugate Ukraine, not the other way round. Girkin himself stated that the separatist movements in Donbas were rather anemic. If Russia did not stir up the trouble, Ukrainian nationalism would not be a factor at all.

Nationalists there definitely are in Ukraine. But please demonstrate there are groups that honour Nazi collaborators and are clearly organized around an explicitly Nazi ideology, not just have a few "bad apples". Now, if you want to say the nationalism is a different flavour, not explicitly Nazi, but just as bad, sure, I don't have a problem with that. — boethius

Great, so we agree that nationalists inciting genocide are equally bad, no matter whether they explicitly invoke Nazi symbols or not. So we can include Krasovsky, Norkin, Gubarev (and here), Medvedev and dozens of others, too many to list them, because they are doing that every week if not every day. We can list such groups like the mentioned Rusich, Club of Angry Patriots, Russian Imperial Movement and quite a few of others. So if we consider extreme nationalisms in general, then yes, it is a false symmetry, because in Russia they are much closer to the government and their rhetoric is practically mainstream there.

Yes, nationalism plays an enormous role in the causes for the war. The Russian one.

Wagner is recruiting hardened criminals from prison. — boethius

Anyone knowing even a bit of Russian history (and from this post it is very clear that it is not you) knows that before Wagner Group started recruiting prisoners, it was an elite PMC who was very strict about its recruiting. I was talking about WAGNER, you know, like in WAGNER Group, i.e. its founder. He is not a random guy from prison, he is a guy who (along with Prigozhin), used his elite troops to medle in various conflicts around the world, with the blessing and financing from Kremlin. And it just happens so that most of the closest command circle of that group comes from ultra-right nationalist groups, like Russian Imperial Movement. The same goes for the mentioned Rusich Group - these are not some random guys with svastikas, but members of well-trained paramilitary group comprising of far-right nationalists, also most likely funded by Kremlin, or for Russkii Obraz. I have given all those names for you on a plate, all you needed to do was to look them up instead of embarass yourself with cries of false symmetry, which just shows how out of depth you are when you are discussing such topics.

Putin since his second term have been coveting support from Russian nationalists (I have given tons of links with my exchange with Mikie). It happens so that many of the 'mainstream' (if you can call them that) nationalists have close relations with definitely-not-mainstream far-right nationaiists many of whom are neo-Nazi. They have been pampered, supported and financed by Putin for his political gain.

Here, some more reading for you:
https://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2022/opinion/russias-long-history-of-neo-nazis

Now, on the point you are responding to, my point is exactly that Putin can make a simplistic argument!

Doesn't matter how complicated you think it is, a lot of Russians will be sympathetic to Putins justification they are fighting Nazi's in Ukraine. You're saying regular Russians hold your view that it's more complicated, that of course Russia has just as many Nazi's?

Think about it, obviously not.

I focus on the symbolism these groups use in that statement just because that's what will be used by Putin to communicate this to the public. I specifically explain that this factual based motivation is going to be even stronger with propaganda. — boethius

Lol. You clearly have no clue how propaganda in Russia works. I recommend watching some excerpts prepared by Julia Davis.

Anyone who knows anything about Russian history and then considers this situation where literal Nazis, both proud and openly advocating the destruction of Russia, are shelling ethnic-Russian civilians in the Donbas for 8 years, would not conclude that the Russians would be unmotivated to teach these Nazis a lesson in proper estimation of an opponents strength. — boethius

Anyone who knows anything about Russian history (that one made me laugh out loud!) knows perfectly well that there are quite a few people branding Nazi symbols in Russia as well, in nationalistic circles quite close to Kremlin in particular. Dmitry Utkin, i.e. 'Wagner', the guy who has organized the Wagner Group, the essential part of the Russian forces in Ukraine, had Nazi tattoos, was photographed with Nazi symbols and Nazi paraphernalia, just like many of his collaborators, had German nicknames etc. The Rusich Group, another quite important nationalistic group, also openly displays Nazi or neo-Nazi symbols. There was a bit of commotion when video was released with Pushilin giving medals to LNR fighters and it turned out one of them had sewn-on Nazi symbols on his uniforms... How about the Base, the neo-Nazi group, that is run from Russia most likely with the state financing? Or Russkii Obraz, another neo-Nazi group with likely support from Kremlin...

Also, one should not overlook the fact that the Jewish Council in Ukraine fully supports Ukrainian defenders, including Azov. On the other hand, the chief rabbi of Moscow had to emigrate from Russia, because he refused to support the war... Or one can mention that anti-Semitic rhetoric is regularly presented in Russian propaganda media, even though many of the propagandists (like Solovyov) are Jews themselves and oppose this. Or point out to the near-pogrom in Makhachkala...

So, if you go for the simplistic interpretation, you have to conclude that in Ukraine Nazis are fighting Nazis. Or you need to actually get deeper into this and see it is a bit more complicated than that.

Your position, and that of ↪ssu
↪Echarmion
and all the previous war and Zelensky proponents here (as in the Western main stream media) is essentially the cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations. You essentially whine about the fact that Ukraine can't get what it wants (can't be in NATO, can't get Crimea back, can't have Nazi's without criticism, can't get the weapons it wants, can't compete with Russia militarily, can't have nuclear weapons now, can't just disappear Russia somehow) and then whining about Ukraine's situation somehow directly connects to justifying repudiating peace negotiations, repudiating neutrality and committing to a long war of attrition that is incredibly destructive for Ukraine and Ukraine has little hope of winning. — boethius

You and others complain all the time about the supposed US hegemony and how everything in Ukraine happens due to foreign influence. But then it is not whining and cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations?

You're basically explaining how Ukraine could have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality ... but!! that won't remove Russian influence from Ukraine!!!

So what? Ahah, it's better to fight to the last Ukrainian?

Russian influence in Ukraine is far less destructive and far easier to deal with than a giant war if you're any normal Ukrainian citizen. — boethius

No, I have been explaning how Ukraine could NOT have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality.

It seems that Ukrainians have decided that it is better to fight than to turn into Belarus (in the best case scenario). The support for the fight remains high So you are obviously wrong about 'normal Ukrainians'.

A pledge of neutrality would not resolve the underlying conflict any more than the pledges of Minsk agreements did. Russia denies Ukraine the right to get out of its sphere of influence and is ready to use military means to prevent it. So it is not about NATO membership, it is not about cooperation, Russians will not be satisfied until at least they have a pro-Russian government there, preferably with more direct forms of control (like the Russia-Belarus 'Union State').

Again, "what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country"? — boethius

List of formerly neutral countries: Ukraine: After Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine's parliament voted to drop non-aligned status on December 23, 2014. — Neutral Country - Wikipedia

The authors of the very article you quote describe Ukraine as neutral till 2014.

"Co-operation" with alliances such as NATO does not fit the definition of neutrality according to the above definition. Co-operation could exist between NATO and a neutral country if it was for some clearly humanitarian purposes, but no one would claim that "cooperating" with a military alliance is a country that "holds itself as permanently neutral". — boethius

That depends on what the cooperation involves. Sweden has long coooperated with NATO and it is listed as formerly neutral country, Moldova cooperates with NATO and it is listed as neutral... So it is obviously false that 'no one would claim' that: the authors of the very article you quote do so. Either the authors of the definition you quote do not understand their own definition or you misunderstand it or interpret it incorrectly. Not to mention that even Russia has cooperated with NATO all these years (it held joint military exercises in 2011, for example).

Nevertheless, this ambiguity of intentions, playing footsie with NATO, is sufficient to avoid a Russian annexation of Crimea.

However, you get rid of the person that made this ambiguous "maybe NATO, maybe not, neutral but cooperating with NATO" policy in a coup and it's reasonable to assume that the policy is likewise gone.

You're basically arguing: Ukraine was neutral because Yanukovych made it neutral!

Ukraine was not neutral, but the status was at best ambiguous: declaring simultaneously non-alignment ... but not excluding cooperation with NATO, which is basically a contradiction: "We're not choosing sides, but we're allowed to choose this particular side" is not a constitutional declaration of neutrality. — boethius

It is only because you believe 'cooperation' means 'non-neutrality', which is obviously wrong, as the authors of the very article you quote show repeatedly.

The actual reality, as I've described, is that Ukrainian society is divided on which way to go, so elects a compromise candidate. Once there is a CIA backed coup, it is clear pretty clear which way things are going.

So Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk of a completely belligerent Ukraine. — boethius

No, there was no declaration that Ukraine would abandon its military neutrality after the legally elected parliament has removed Yanukovych. There was little popular support for that, as the focus was on establishing the cooperation with the EU. As you wrote yourself, the society was divided over the issue, so your current claim of 'completely belligerent Ukraine' is simply false. 'Hedging the risk' means simply attacking the then-neutral Ukraine just to prevent a possible change of policy.

The argument that Russia would not be satisfied with neutrality since 2008 is an extremely weak one. Even a vague neutrality does not cause any Russian annexations, much less a full scale invasion. — boethius

Well, it is you who needs to support the argument that Russia this time for a change would be satisfied with neutrality, after it has once attacked a neutral country. So far you have given no such evidence. Given that Putin himself has given many different reasons both for invasion and for the escalation, I do not see how you could succeed.

Which does not satisfy the criteria of a neutral country.

Your argument that Ukraine was neutral in 2014 is basically explaining that it wasn't neutral but was "vaguely promised" to join NATO and then some bureaucratic hangups: tada! neutrality!! — boethius

No, not 'some bureaucratic hangups', but a distinct change in the policy, which Yanukovych clearly stated in your own quote, and adopting the law that precluded Ukraine's membership of any military bloc, but allowed for co-operation with alliances such as NATO. That is exactly what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country, i.e. the Wikipedia article which clearly states that in 2014 Ukraine was neutral. That your own quoted source discredits your view is not exactly my problem, is it?

We were discussing what Zelensky could do to avoid the invasion in 2022. — boethius

But that was not what my quote referred to. You have simply misunderstood it from the beginning. That happens, what is ridiculous that you try to double down on your claims with quotes that clearly support what I wrote (now you have added the third one).

But let me get this straight, your counter argument is that the war was guaranteed and committing to neutrality would have changed nothing (in 2022, or anytime before) ... because Russia annexed Crimea after an illegal coup by CIA backed forces? — boethius

No, the war was not guaranteed, but indeed the declaration of neutrality would have changed nothing, given that Russia has no problems with attacking a neutral country (as defined by your own sources), which it did in 2014.

My argument is that declaring neutrality would make the Russian invasion far more costly diplomatically.

The reason the annexation of Crimea (as you note, there's no fighting or invasion as Russian forces are already there) was not difficult diplomatically is because Russia has a giant military base there so partners such as China and India understood the reasons for it.

I.e. neutrality would have real leverage in the real world and significantly increase the diplomatic cost to Russia of an invasion while removing the critical justification (even to the domestic audience) for it. — boethius

But that is obviously false, given that Russia has invaded the neutral Ukraine in 2014. If your argument is 'Russian invasions on neutral countries are costly diplomatically, unless Russia has a base there', then I will mercifully refrain from commenting that. Not to mention that it completely overlooks Russia's involvement in Donbas.

We have every reason to believe that Ukraine's neutrality in 2022 would matter as much as its neutrality in 2014, i.e. very little.

There's then a coup in 2014, and Russia annexes Ukraine and separatists in Donbas try to separate following this coup. — boethius

Yes, and at this time Ukraine is neutral. And 'separatists' are mostly Russians imported by Girkin, as we know.

Ukrainians legally elect someone who is a compromiser with Russia, perhaps because a majority of the Ukrainian people understood at the time, as they have been made to understand all too clearly since, that antagonizing Russia by trying to join NATO does not benefit Ukraine and will cause exactly the war that the point of joining NATO would be to avoid.

The "will of the people" on this point is completely irrelevant to the "pro-democracy" NATO proponents: when the coup is "pro-West" then the will of the people is whatever the West says it is; elections certainly don't matter ... and yet the very same people will accuse Trump rioters in Washington of sedition?!?!? — boethius

Well, actually elections do matter: it was the elected members of the parliament who removed Yanukovych from his office by 328-0. If you have any evidence that all 328 legally elected parliamentarians were actually from CIA, please present it. And further elections also did matter, given that Putin himself said that he respects the will of the people, when they have elected Poroshenko (the house speaker, Turchynov, has been the interim president according to Ukraine's constitution).

I have specifically stated that Ukraine has been neutral at the time of Crimea annexation. ssu has acknowledged that by repeating your own quote that the policy has been TERMINATED. That specific word means it has ended, was finished, it was no more. How from that you have concluded that ssu (or me) claim that Ukraine has been 'neutral the whole time', only you can know.

The simple fact is that when Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine was neutral, as its constitution stipulated. True, it has been previously vaguely promised NATO membership, but at the same time it was excluded from the membership action plan, which was the necessary condition for accession. It was supposed to be 'reviewed' in December 2008, but it never was. That (and the declining support in Ukraine, due to the politicization of the issue) led to the change of the policy from 'seeking membership in NATO' to 'declaring neutrality'. That is why your own quote says 'From 2010 to 2014, Ukraine pursued a non-alignment policy'. The policy was later TERMINATED, due Russian invasion, which means it has ended. The same thing happened to Sweden: it was a neutral country for a long time but then it decided to join NATO, as the Wikipedia article states. It does not mean that because Sweden has done that, then it has never been neutral, because it was not 'permanent'. That is why Sweden and Ukraine are on the 'List of formerly neutral countries' in the very same Wiki article.

You claim that I 'rewrite history' and then proceed to quote two sources that confirm exactly what I wrote. Are you surprised that I question your reading comprehension?

'Neutrality clause' while NATO says it is going to incorporate Ukraine into its ranks and the US is funneling billions of dollars into Ukraine to support a coup d'etat — Tzeentch

Neutrality clause was implemented when NATO (i.e. Germany and France) have shelved Ukraine's aspirations to indetermined future in place of the scheduled specific enagement. It is astounding that such basic facts from history must still be explained (repeatedly).

It's truly incredible. — boethius

Yes, it is truly incredible that your reading comprehension is so low. But it does explain some of your views.

I have specifically written that AT THE TIME OF ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA Ukraine had a neutrality clause.

And you think that somehow this is an acceptable arrangement for Russia, that Russia would start a war over nothing but a formality? — Echarmion

It should be noted that at the time of annexation of Crimea Ukraine had neutrality clause in its constitution, and the reason given was that the new government might some day allow Western forces to station in Ukraine. Thus the claim that Russia might be satisfied with any 'formal neutrality' is obviously false.

Okay— so Russia didn’t plan on conquering Ukraine. Glad you don’t think so. — Mikie

I think the scenario of Belarusinization was much more likely - subjugation without formal annexation. It is simply more convenient this way. But for Ukrainians that would make little difference - they would still lose their independence.

As long as it’s not right next door in Ukraine. NATO had already expanded at the time of this quote. The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia — although there are reports that this was hardly celebrated. — Mikie

But that directly contradicts most of the quotes you have provided! You have given quotes from 1995 and 1997 where exactly that expansion was described as a grave threat and a red line! And just a few years later it turns out that Russia does not really care about that... Your source states:

First, any Russian government would be concerned to assure that the initial expansion was not the first step on the way to subsequent “evolutionary enlargements” that would include the Baltic States and Ukraine. [...] As President Kuchma of Ukraine has said, NATO expansion would place Ukraine “in the front lines” between an expanded NATO and Russia, and the same would be true of the Baltic States and Belarus. — Should NATO grow

Your source clearly states that there would be no difference between the Baltics and Ukraine.

What about your other source?

The Act does not address two aspects of expansion which cause the greatest concern to the Russians, namely the scope and pace of expansion. NATO's current plan is open ended. It clearly contemplates inclusion of the Baltic states. But Russia has made clear that inclusion in NATO of any members of the former Soviet Union is unacceptable. — Opposition to NATO Expansion

So your own sources clearly state that it was 'unacceptable'. When you write 'The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia' you directly contradict the very sources you have provided.

Not to mention that the quote I have provided was given in 2004, i.e. two years after Ukraine has started its accession to NATO. In other words, Ukraine is on its way to NATO and Kremlin's site writes 'Russia’s relations with NATO are developing positively'.

The point is that even considering differences, Russia was not going to occupy the whole Afghanistan with 70 thousand troops or America was not going to occupy Panama with 30 thousand troops. So the whole 'conquest' argument is a strawman.

By the way, you still have not answered my question. Is the phrase so difficult to understand? 'Russia has no concerns' - what could that mean?

Which we apparently can’t say about Russia— because Putin is a madman bent on conquering Ukraine with 190 thousand troops. — Mikie

Do you know how many Soviet troops have initially attacked Afghanistan? Or how many American troops have invaded Panama?

By the way, you have not answered my question... If it is too difficult, maybe we can break it down: can you describe in your own words what the phrase 'Russia has no concerns' might mean?

No, you’ve provided one. The others were shown to be complete garbage. Easy for anyone to go back and check.

Do I’m glad you see you’re sticking with “one second hand reference” versus the entire documentary record and analyses by the US’s own experts. Predictable.

Too bad Burns, for example, wasn’t around so you could educate him with your cute narrative.

It’s amazing how quickly you devolve into nonsense when confronted on your fictions. Pity. — Mikie

Yes, it is easy for anyone to check what was actually said and in what context. That it flies over your head is not exactly my problem, I have tried. And if you mention Burns, you might have missed this part of his report:

Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in the region. It is also politically popular to paint the U.S. and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from Russian nationalists.

So your beloved Burns says that NATO enlargement is used as a political tool to gain support from Russian nationalists (doesn't he know they were made up by the West?!). Could this might be the reason why Putin was saying different things to different people? Just wondering...

Well I'm sure the word Putin would use is not "corrupt" but "loyal". But yes that is what I read as well, and also that he was a bit of a blank slate politically. Noone knew what he really stood for. At the time, he might have simply been considered an interim solution. Someone not offensive, who would make sure the Yeltsin family got off free, and then make way for someone with more of a political profile. But Putin quickly made his mark by taking a hardline stance on Chechnya and is to this day suspected of having orchestrated terror attacks to have a pretext for a second Chechen war. That brought him into his own as a political figure in his own right.

Another allegation is that Putin was essentially always a KGB trojan horse, who played the role of the loyal vassal long enough to get into power, and then started to enact the kind of policies his KGB clique had wanted to employ since the days of the USSR.

Do note that all this is based on somewhat hazy rememberings on books I read / listened to. So it's quite possible I muddled something, Perhaps Jabberwock can correct any glaring mistakes, since they seem knowledgeable. — Echarmion

Yes, that is about it, the only thing that might not be clear from the first paragraph is the sequence: Putin became the prime minister, he has risen up due to hardline stance in the war and then was annointed as the stand-in president in the place of resigning Yeltsin (which practically guaranteed him winning the elections). While I do not think he was exactly a KGB pawn, he certainly would not gain the power nor hold it initially without the support of the circles of the secret services and the oligarchs (which in Russia is often the same), like Berezovsky. Then he got more and more powerful by skillfully maneuvering between different hostile cliques.

No, I have provided five references. Not to mention the bigger context that has just flown over your head. So let me sum this up for you, in a way that even you understand:

1. Russians are fond of saying that expansion of NATO with Ukraine is the Worst Thing that Could Be Done To Russia.
2. In 1997 Yeltsin signs the NATO Founding Act, that literally stipulates that each country is sovereign and may seek its security however it wants. In simpler words, he agrees in writing that any country, including Ukraine, can do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
3. In 2002 Kuchma declares he specifically plans to start the procedure to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
4. A month later Putin meets with Kuchma and declares that they are the best buddies ever and that Ukraine can do whatever it wants with the Guys Who Plan to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (previous quote).
5. In November 2002 Kuchma and the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia meet in Brussels to plan exactly how they want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. Putin attends the meeting with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and says that he is actually the best buddies with the Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia who literally have just finished planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia. He also adds that he wants to do many great things with the Guys Who Have Just Finished Planning to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021111a.htm). Moreover, he literally and specifically says that the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia will not in any way affect his relations with his newly found buddies (previous quotes).
6. In 2003 he meets again with Kuchma, the guy who just started to do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia with the Other Guys Who Want to Do the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia and again says they are the best buddies ever (http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21987). He does not even mention in passing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
7. In 2004 he gives his full support in the coming elections to Kuchma, the Guy Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia.
8. Afterwards he indeed does many great things with the Other Guys Who Started Doing the Worst Thing that Could Be Done to Russia (even after 2008, e.g. Russia was in joint exercises with NATO forces in 2011).

Got it?

If that’s all you have — and apparently it is, given you can’t find another one — then that’s pretty weak indeed. But yeah, that definitely contradicts everything I provided above. — Mikie

No, I have four other that say exactly the same thing. 'Russia has no concerns about the expansion of NATO from the standpoint of ensuring security, but Russia will organize its military policies accordingly in connection with NATO nearing its borders'. What do you believe 'NO CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXPANSION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENSUIRNG SECURITY” means, in your own words? Because I find it difficult to interpret it as 'Russia is gravely threatened by NATO expansion'. You believe that 'Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, and it will choose its own path to peace and security' is unrelated to NATO when it was spoken at the very summit dealing with Ukraine's NATO accession. So what do you think it referred to? You believe that 'processes of expanding interaction with NATO' spoken A MONTH after Ukraine has joined NATO Action Plan have nothing to do with NATO expansion... So which 'processes' did Putin have in mind? I am afraid it is a mystery only to you.

EDIT: Correction, in March Kuchma has declared his intent to join the Action Plan, it was joined in November.

Yeah, in the same way Trump has provided evidence of a stolen election.

So far, 3 “quotes” shown to be complete garbage.

So I’ll repeat: the Russian position on US turning Ukraine into a western puppet never changed, including Ukraine joining NATO. Hence why you can’t provide a single quotation that says otherwise. — Mikie

I have provided five quotations of Putin that basically say that Ukraine is free to do as it pleases, all in context of NATO expansion or cooperation, including some spoken at the same summit that started Ukraine's accession to NATO and including one that literally states that concerning the NATO expansion, quoted directly from the presidential site. You may pretend all you want that Putin did not say that, the record is quite clear.

And yes, the NATO-Russia council context works exactly against your thesis. That you somehow think it doesn’t is hilarious. — Mikie

Sure, Russia is so angry with NATO expanding by Ukraine, that it organizes joint exercises with NATO. That surely works against my thesis.

Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. — Mikie

Sure, that is why on the Kremlin site there is the already known statement:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged.

So either Putin (and his press service) knowingly contradicts himself from sentence to sentence, or maybe Russia's unchanged position on the expansion at that time is not that clear as you believe it is. Take your pick.

But do that remembering that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.

Needed for what? To remain in power? — frank

Not so much yet, rather to stave off dissent. Note that whoever lately dared to criticize Putin directly (like the late Prigozhin or now imprisoned Girkin) did so from even more nationalistic point of view, even the supposed champion of democracy, Navalny, made some statements in this vein. Once the jinn is out, it is hard to push it back into the bottle. And nothing cements the authoritarian rule like a common external enemy.

I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on.

Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections.

In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability? — frank

Well, a full-scale war is not something you can do overnight. The plans must have started a few years back. Besides with the smoldering conflict in Donbas (which effectively negated any chance for Ukraine joining NATO and made EU accession much more difficult) he might have counted on regaining political influences in Ukraine. Also Zelensky was seen as an 'Eastern' candidate, in fact in the Ukrainian West he was suspected by some of being a Russian puppet or agent, given that he came from nowhere, was born in the East, barely spoke Ukrainian, etc. For Russia 'Belarusinization' was a better scenario than a simple land grab, that option was chosen when it was clear that Ukraine will decisively steer toward the West.

But I also think that the escalation might have been dictated by the internal politics. The belliigerence present in the propaganda was hard to contain (just to illustrate, they were seriously debating on the state TV plans to 'open up' the Suwalki corridor, i.e. invading Poland or Lithuania...). The 2014 sanctions, however modest, were hurting Russia more than they admitted. After 2019 the economy began to stagnate and the prospects were not rosy, so the triumph, even at the cost of some hardships, could be just what Putin needed (and the prospect of increased energy resource prices would not hurt either). Some analysts also point out that Putin could not wait much longer - the reaction of the Western Europe to 2014 annexation was timid, to put it mildly, mostly because of its dependence on Russian resources. But they have realized that and began to limit that dependence, so Putin had to make a move before they had alternatives (but was too late anyway, it turned out).

Translation:

(1) You cannot, and have not, provided one quote supporting your claim that the Russian stance on Ukraine and NATO has changed. — Mikie

I have provided four such quotes, including two from the Kremlin presidential site itself. here is the fifth one:

I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners. — Press Statement and Answers to Questions at a Joint News Conference with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma

(2) You completely ignore the historical record.

Lol, no, I supplement the historical record. The difference between us is that I acknowledge that Putin and others have been saying different things to different people at different times AND provide the relevant evidence. It is you who ignores the historical record that does not suit your narrative, so you claim that the stance was 'always clear'. No, it was not clear at all, as the quotes I have provided show. Also, as I have mentioned, you completely ignore the overall context of the NATO and Russia relations, such as NATO-Russia Council, from which some of the quotes come.

And let us not forget that you were completely wrong about the Russian politics, which was the basis for your other mistaken views.

Oh, so years of military training, supplying weapons, conducting military drills — not decisive.

I suppose the tens of billions of dollars spent on Ukraine these last two years — also a minor role. After all, Ukraine is an independent nation that makes its own decisions and can defend itself. — Mikie

Again, you are confused. Ukraine has trained troops with the US support and asked for weapons AFTER the conflict with Russia has already started and smouldered for eight years. To consider it a 'provocation' when Russian-supplied shells were already falling on Ukrainian troops is absurd. I understand that you were unaware that the conflict never ceased when we started this discussion, but now you have no excuse.

You literally can’t even find one quote without the next sentence contradicting your bogus claims.

No, Russia was never fine with the US turning Ukraine into a western puppet. NATO is a big part of that. Easy to understand why, if you do the uncomfortable work of putting yourself into someone else’s shoes. Apparently you’re incapable.

China forming a military alliance in Mexico or Canada wouldn’t go over well in the US. I wonder if the US’s response would be so confusing. Or perhaps the explanation would be that they wanted to conquer Canada for decades and would have attacked anyway. — Mikie

But the next sentence does not contradict anything, unless you demand that we read 'organize its military policies' as 'will start war'.

And again, you just regurtitate your initial points without engaging with anything that was written afterwards. It is no wonder, because you cannot deny that you were completely ignorant about what was going in Russia before 2008, which led you to your completely mistaken view that its imperialistic tendencies are the Western invention, which is of course completely unsustainable in the view of the historic evidence I have provided (and as I wrote I can provide more). I understand that being completely wrong about that is very uncomfortable for you, but repeating your initial points ad nauseam will not change it, it will only deepen the impression that you are making your arguments from ignorance.

Not one word about NATO. Just more vagueness. Apparently you mistook the title of the article for something Putin actually said. — Mikie

Well, it was at at joint press conference of the NATO-Russian council, which dealt, among other things, with the plans on Ukraine's accession... So if Putin wanted to say 'I strongly oppose Ukraine joining NATO', that was certainly a good occasion. Yet he refrained from doing so. Why? You have no idea, so you will pretend he never said this, just like you do with the other quotes I have provided.

For those following along with any interest in history or nuance: Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. — Mikie

But it is your take that lacks the nuance and is ignorant of history. Yes, Putin (and other Russians) said those things, but they also have said other things, sometimes quite contradictory, as I have clearly shown. In three different speeches Putin gives three different reasons for invasion of Crimea, for example. But you choose the one that suits you and simply ignore the other two, even though they contradict themselves. Because you are completely out of depth here, you do not understand why they are saying different things at different times, so you simply stick to your story, and no amount of quotes from Putin himself is going to change your view. The same goes for your view about Russian imperialism, history between those states etc. In other words, you simply pay no attention to facts that do not align with your simplistic narrative.

Yeah, the US has only a minor role to play in world affairs, politically and economically. How ridiculous to claim it’s responsible for things it’s clearly responsible for. — Mikie

No, it plays a major role, but not in every single event. Sometimes it plays an important, but not decisive role. Contrary to beliefs of some Americans, the world does not turn around the US.

I’ve gone over that at length. You want to jump around in time and then claim the story is full of holes. It’s just a boring game of whack-a-mole.

Maybe it would have been better to have laid it all out at once, from 1991 to 2022. But I can’t do that every time someone replies. — Mikie

No, you have not. You have just described very limited, American perspective of things, because you were unaware of the greater context. Lack of nuance and knowledge of history, indeed. Incidentally, now you show your ignorance again, given that you want to start with 1991.

Post 2014 invention, actually. I mentioned 2008 because of the Bucharest summit, and whether Russian imperialism was given as a reason for expansion. It wasn’t, of course. True, Crimea gave the US a nice story to tell.

In any case, your accusation doesn’t even make sense. I’m “blissfully unaware” of “other forces at play” — other forces apparently being my view on Russian imperialism? Just a muddled paragraph.

Anyway— I’ve discussed Russian “Internal politics” a great deal. You gave 3 irrelevant quotes when asked to discuss what you meant by it. Yet the claim stands: Russian positions on US involvement in Ukraine, including NATO, was stated explicitly for years, was known by the US, and was done anyway. If you want to claim this was a “minor factor,” so be it. I have no time machine and no window into Putin’s mind, so I obviously cannot falsify your unfalsifiable argument of what might have happened if everything were different. — Mikie

Now you are just being ridiculous. You have not discussed Russian internal politics, because you were completely unaware of it (and you still seem to be). Obviously you believe the quotes are 'irrelevant', because you have not read them. Your claim does not 'stand', as I have already given you two quotes (more below) from Putin that directly contradict your claims. You just dissmiss them, because you are unable, in your nuance-lacking and history-ignorant argument, to account for such differences in his statements.

Hence why you provide none. — Mikie

Sure, if we ignore everything that Putin says, and what other Russian politicians say, and the Russian propaganda, and Dugin, and Akopov, then there is no evidence whatsoever of Russian imperialistic tendencies. Especially if we also ignore its interventions in various former republics. Because their words are 'Russian perspective' and 'Russian position' only when it suits you, otherwise they can just be ignored. If you or Mearsheimer want to convince anyone that the president of the neighbouring country with the long record of imperialistiic abuses denying Ukraine's statehood should not be perceived as a reasonable threat, then you are going beyond absurd.

So US involvement was a factor, but a minor one. That’s supposedly the big difference here. The major factor was Russian imperialist ambitions — and you point to Georgia and Crimea as evidence— I say these were reactions, and round we go. — Mikie

No, I point to the resentment of the Russians concerning the fall of the USSR and growing independence of its near abroad and Putin's turn toward imperlalism after 2004 in order to consolidate and strengthen his power due to the growing nationalism within Russian political circles, I point to other military interventions that the US had no involvement in and which were definitely not a 'reaction' to anything that the West did. I have described all this in detail and provided many sources, which you have obviously did not read because you consider them as irrelevant, because you just know better. I can provide literally dozens of more scholarly articles about resurgence of Russian imperialism, but you will ignore them as well. But then do not complain that I do not provide evidence, because you cannot be bothered to read it. I do not mind someone being ignorant, those issues might not be to everyone's interest. But engaging in a discussion on these matters and preferring to remain ignorant is another issue altogether.

Ah yes, the one quote you come back to over and over again, even after it’s shown that Putin says the complete opposite in the very same quote. But you’ll hang on to that forever, apparently, even against a long documentary record and quotations from the US’s own cabinet members/ ambassadors.

No, the position hadn’t changed. It was the same in 1995 as it was in 2002, as it was in 2004, as it was in 2008, etc. Russia was not going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a western bulwark, a “liberal democracy,” or (especially) a member of NATO.

But yeah, one poorly documented (and contradictory) quote from Putin in 2002 definitely negates all that. Give me a break. — Mikie

There were two quotes, one was from the Kremlin presidential site, another from the TV program. If you consider direct quote from the Kremlin site (which remains there to this day!) as 'poorly documented', then I wonder what level evidence you require (because you surely do not provide that).

But sure, there are more:

Russia has NO CONCERNS about the expansion of NATO from the standpoint of ensuring security — KREMLIN!

But it is Kremlin again, so I guess 'poorly documented'. How about this one?

Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, and it will choose its own path to peace and security — When Putin Loved NATO

But the bigger issue is that, in your blissful ignorance, you completely miss the context of that first quote. You have no idea why Putin was at the NATO meeting, you have no idea what he was doing there and you have no idea why he said those things that he said. And yes, I am very well aware that there are many contradicting statements from Putin, that is what I was drawing your attention to - he says many things, but you choose only to take some of them at face value.

Ignorance of what, exactly? I think it’s quite clear we’re talking passed each other. — Mikie

Ignorance of the underlying conflict, its roots and progress.

You don’t seem to acknowledge the role of the US, or at best minimize it. Hence why you always talk about what “Ukraine” wanted — as if that’s an easy picture, given the internal divisions. — Mikie

The internal divisions in Ukraine do not change the fact that the majority no longer wanted to be subjugated to Russia. That is why Ukraine has voted for independence in 1991, which raised objections in Russia even then, as I have shown.

And I do acknowledge the role of the US, but I do not see it as the major factor, because I consider other forces at play, which you have seemed to be blissfully unaware of, like your completely false view that Russian imperialism is a post-2008 Western invention - you might as well write 'Hey! Look! I know nothing about the Eastern Europe, yet I am so willing to discuss it!'.

But suppose we take all that to be true. It does not for a moment negate the fact that Russia would view any support from the US as hostile interference. Even assuming best intentions to spread democracy and helping an ally stand up against oppression and imperialism.

Our own people knew this and said so outright. I won’t go through the quotes again. So again, were they wrong? Or does it not matter because Russia has been bent on conquering Ukraine all along? (According to you.) — Mikie

Sure, it does not negate that fact. But that is not sufficient for the argument that Russia would not be hostile toward Ukraine's independence, if not for the US interference. For that you have no evidence and there is plenty of evidence countering it. Russia treats its 'near neighbourhood' as its sphere of influence and has no qualms about heavy meddling there, politically and militarily, no matter whether the US is involved or not. The US had no involvement in Chechnya, Transnistria, Abkhazia.

And it is not 'according to me', I have given quite a few sources that clearly show the imperialistic rhetoric of some Russian circles. Putin said that Ukraine is not even a state - that is the Russian perspective that you somehow never mention (I understand that you were completely oblivious to that, but you no longer have that excuse).

And what is my unconventional view, exactly? — Mikie

That the US influence is a major factor in the conflict.

The danger of pushing NATO was known long before Putin. That never changed. Russia was weaker at some points, but the position on NATO — particularly Ukraine — remained the same.

But don’t take my word for it. Or the Kremlin’s. Take the following — from 1995 (quite a while before 2004): — Mikie

No, the position on NATO was not the same, as I have shown in two direct quotes from Putin (unless we assume he was lying all this time, but then we can disregard the 'Russian perspective' altogether).

And the whole quotation again ignores what was the drive for the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe in the first place. Moscow has sent its troops to Lithuania in 1991, Zhirinovsky has entered Duma in 1993 - with all due respect to the reformists, the nationalistic/imperlalistic circles were strong enough in Russia for the Eastern Europe to be reasonably wary of their big neighbour. Their populations were very supportive of joining the EU and NATO, because they were aware that being left outside might sooner or later result in Russia trying to re-establish its rule (as it did repeatedly in the past).

NATO expansion was the most direct cause of this war. Doesn’t make Putin a good guy, as simpletons will surely interpret this as saying, but it’s at least worth being honest about.

Or we can pretend the US isn’t the world superpower these last 30 years, and that its intentions are mostly benign. That there was no plan for Eastern Europe beyond spreading democracy, if those countries chose to join. Etc etc

A nice story. Conventional. Easy. (Which is why it’s so common.) But ultimately dead wrong and ignorant of history — and nuance. — Mikie

No, the most direct cause of this war is Russia trying to re-establish its sphere of influence after the fall of the USSR. Sure, the US is a superpower and it was instrumental in preventing that, obviously for its own purposes, but it does not change the fact that the root of the conflict is the former 'near abroad' of Russia trying to escape its rule.

And it is rather hilarious that you speak of ignorance of history and nuance, given that you had basically no knowledge of the history of the region at the start of our discussion (beside what you read from Americans speaking mostly about American issues). It is even more so that you try to argue against US-centrism from such a narrow US-based perspective. You believe it is the US that expanded the NATO, you believe it is the US that trains and arms Ukrainians against their will, you start all your arguments with 'the US'. Well, other countries also have history and some agency, you know... The US is a superpower, but it is not omnipotent. So yes, one of us is lacking nuance and knowledge of history.

Russian elections expected in Mar 2024. — jorndoe

Amusingly, on Russian TV Rita and others have stated grave warnings about foreign interference in Russian presidential elections, to which Michael Bohm, the designated bad guy, asked: 'But why would anyone bother with the trouble and expenses, if the result is predetermined?' They quickly changed the subject :)

Yeah, and coming from a guy who makes statements like the one above— that cuts deep. — Mikie

I am sure it does, given that I have proven your ignorance again and again.

Demanded more independence— like EU and NATO membership. Which clearly has nothing to do with the United States influence. Got it. Never mind what Russia was saying about this for years. — Mikie

I have clearly written 'independence from Russia'. And that is exactly what it entails for the countries of the Eastern Europe. At the time EU and/or NATO are the only ways that allow them to escape Russia's embrace.

No, that’s the Ukrainian perspective. You don’t even seem to know what the Russian perspective was. Which is striking— and exactly the point. — Mikie

That is an obvious and blatant lie. I have provided many quotes and articles about the dominant views in Russian internal politics, the things that you have clearly no idea about. Trying to pretend I did not and carefully omitting them from your replies does not change that. You do realize that at any moment people can go back a few posts back and see clearly that you are not telling the truth?

Right or wrong, there was no way Russia was going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a “Western bulwark,” and it was clear about this for years. Especially regarding NATO. If Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 weren’t evidence enough, fine. But then further funding, training, and supplying (all with US backing) — all while Russia warned against it — eventually leading to war, just as our own diplomats and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, et al., predicted, shouldn’t have been a major surprise. — Mikie

Ukraine had every reason to consider Russia as a threat. After 2014 it was no longer a threat, Russia was in open conflict with Ukraine since then. So yes, Ukraine has trained and developed its defences. Russia has funded, trained and supplied hostile forces in Ukraine since 2014, saying that Ukraine training and strengthening troops in response was somehow 'provoking' is beyond absurd.

To write it off as “well it would have happened anyway because Russia turned nationalistic and imperialistic” is less than great analysis. It’s the conventional view, no doubt— but I repeat myself. — Mikie

I have given plenty of evidence that supports my view. You have nothing but your deep, unortodox convictions. I get that you get a kick out of having unconventional views, the only problem is that you have nothing to back them up, on the contrary, again and again you show that you have very little knowledge of the things we discuss here. Your unconventional views seem to be based on your evident lack of knowledge.

The facts you cannot deny from the very beginning of our discussion: Since the fall of the USSR there were strong trends in Russian politics demanding return to nationalistic and imperialistic policies. In order to stay in power and maintain his grip Putin has embraced that rhetoric around 2004 and supported it with many actions in Russia's neighbourhood. It is not particularly surprising that Ukrainians in general preferred not to be turned into another Belarus and tried to follow the path of the Baltics. And, given the change in Russian internal politics, Putin was determined to stop it (even though before he had no problem with it, as is apparent from his own quotes).

To all this you can only muster 'But the US...!'. Until you understand what the actual CONFLICT is about, you will still be wrong about the direct reasons for the war.

Is this a joke? — Mikie

Yes, it shows how ridiculous your claims are. NATO, a strictly defensive alliance, with steadily decreasing army in Europe, is a grave threat, while Russia, with openly nationalistic politicians, meddling politically and military intervening all over its neighbourhood, is not.

The US had a plan for Eastern Europe. That plan is not exclusively NATO. Your inability to understand that isn’t my problem. — Mikie

It is not about my inability to understand, it is about your complete ignorance of European politics, which you have shown again and again.

That’s not the question. It’s not about hypotheticals. It’s about the facts, of what actually happened. And US influence is all over it, from the billion + spent on social influence to NATO expansion to supporting the overthrow of the government to economic influences to supplying military training and arms. — Mikie

It is very much a question. Your claim is that without the US influence there would be no war, so the hypothetical (whether the war would happen without the US influence) is essential to support it. And the facts are that the underlying conflict was already in place and had little to do with the US influence: Ukraine has consistently demanded more independence from Russia and Russia's politics has clearly steered toward nationalism and imperialism. That made the war likely, as Russia has no qualms in engaging militarily in its neighbourhood. E.g. the US had zero influence over the Chechnya war or Armenia-Azerbeijan conflicts, yet both happened.

The question is whether we — the US —should have taken the Russian perspective seriously. I think we should have. We didn’t. And that’s why we have the war. — Mikie

No, it is only you who do not take the Russian perspective seriously. You have asked about the internal Russian politics and I have answered you in detail, citing specific sources. You have chosen simply to skip that part, not engage with it at all, because it clearly denies your narrative about the 'rectroactive' made-up Russian nationalism. You skip such evidence (again) and in a post or two you again will parrot the same point.

The 'Russian perspective' is that about 2004-2005 Putin has taken over the growing nationalistic trends which have demanded return to the imperialistic policy. That confirmed that the fears of its near neighbours, which they have voiced since their independence, are quite reasonable and justified, in spite of initial skepticism of the Western Europe. That is why they have joined NATO in the first place, which of course aligned with the US politics, but the US was not the main cause or drive of the process.

What the Ukrainian people have wanted has varied greatly. We see from polls about NATO or EU membership that things change, and especially in different regions. So to treat Ukraine as a monolith is incorrect. But it’s also irrelevant to the point about US influence, which is all over this war and all over Ukraine for decades. — Mikie

Sure, it is not a monolith, no policy of any country is. Still, the majority wanted the integration with the Western Europe since 2000s. The facts are that they have chosen the president who promised them exactly that (along with neutrality i.e. non-engagement with NATO) and they have rebelled when he reneged on that promise due to Russian influence, which sparked the initial military conflict. And as I have shown, Ukrainians had every reason to fear Russia, given that significant political forces in Russia demanded not only Ukraine's subjugation, but even questioned its statehood, and Putin has openly embraced that rhetoric. That is the 'Russian perspective' you keep overlooking.

Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO? — boethius

Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's.

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion

That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO.

So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.

You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.

I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled. — boethius

Again, my point, which I have repeated over and over, is that the shelling was insignificant. I admit I did not find the two cases you have quoted, but it does not change the overall picture at all - even if the total number of shellings amounted to a dozen. No amount of bickering changes the fact that the amount of shelling was minimal, contrary to your initial claims.

Anyways, here's more evidence: — boethius

Your 'evidence' specifically writes about 'shelling' AFTER the ground troops have withdrawn and states:

'Russia most likely used strategic bombers, cruise missiles and Iranian-made Shaheed “kamikaze” drones, military analyst Alexander Kovalenko said in televised remarks.

That is what Al Jazeera considers 'shelling' throughout the article. I have already patiently explained to you that it is not the 'shelling' what we talk about, it is a bit tiresome to correct the same errors of you again and again, each time you decide to google 'shelling kiyv'. If you do that, at least read the article you have googled.

Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.

It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.

Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative. — boethius

You have evidence for shelling of two military objects, one rather vague. But sure, you cannot come up with any more, because bad Western propaganda is hiding it from us. When unable to provide evidence for your claims, resort to conspiracy, always works.

Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.

In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege. — boethius

I see exactly one report by Klitschko that the city was encircled, but it was quickly denied. However, if it was widely reported, I am sure you can provide such reports.

This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.

Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting. — boethius

Not if it stalls less than two weeks into the campaign. Ukrainians did not even engage most of the troops they had at hand. They did not even have time to move their reserve units before Russians left.

Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine. — boethius

But that is a strawman, as nobody argues for that. The blitz assault was meant to break through the initial defense and cause enough panic and morale drop (particularly if the government fled) that the city would surrender. That is how Wikipedia describes it:

Russia apparently intended to rapidly seize Kyiv, with Spetsnaz infiltrating the city, supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north. Russian Airborne Forces attempted to seize two key airfields near Kyiv, launching an airborne assault on Antonov Airport, followed by a similar landing at Vasylkiv, near Vasylkiv Air Base south of Kyiv, on 26 February. — Northern Ukraine campaign

Now, Wikipedia of course is not always reliable, but then it is not often completely wrong. So yes, it might be possible that you have access to special expert knowledge that counters the common knowledge reflected in the Wikipedia articles. However, you have proven time and again that you do not have any special knowledge, on the contrary, at the beginning of the discussion you have shown that you lack basic knowledge both of the duration and progress of the campaign. So, initially, you had a view quite different from the generally accepted one and the level of knowledge demonstrably lower than those who expressed it. When faced with facts, you continue to redress the argument: the two-month siege of Kiyv ending a week after the fall of Mariupol - such a short phrase with three factual errors! - somehow became a vague 'diversion'.

The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there. — boethius

Two. We have evidence of two targets of industrial and military value (one of rather unknown value, given that all we have is a single picture) that were shelled. If the Russian plan was to shell two military targets in order to pressure Ukrainians into peace talks, it is not very surprising they have not succeeded.

First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre" — boethius

https://www.newsweek.com/russian-military-losses-31st-guards-air-assault-brigade-ukraine-1712686

All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.

Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish. — boethius

Yes, they presume that, because, unlike you, they are familiar with the details of the operation. You base your argument on your very general speculations, completely overlooking how the battle has actually proceeded. It makes zero sense to send your best elite troops behind the enemy lines and just leave them there, if all they were supposed to do was to destroy it (which could as well be done with missiles). Sure, special forces attack airfields, but they do have a plan to retreat rather quickly after that. Russians have dropped 300 special forces and left them there (their helicopters came back to Belarus). They were supposed to hold the airfield until the armor column arrived, but they were unable to do that - Ukrainians had time to counterattack, inflicting heavy losses. And VDV forces were not to stop Ukrainians to use the airfield - Russians could do that with missiles or the ground forces which arrived later, without engaging VDV at all. On the contrary, it is rather obvious that Russians wanted the airstrips to be intact. The special forces had a single, very specific task - to secure the airfield so it could be used by Russians and that is exactly what they tried to do, that is why they stayed instead of retreating. Again, you seem completely unaware of the details of the actual events.

Here is a more detailed article on that battle:
https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/

Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A. — boethius

But that is not my objection, that is another strawman. My objection is that the nature of the attack clearly indicates that Russians wanted much more than a fixing or diversionary attack, because they have committed much more than required for those. The assault on Hostomel was, as the experts in the article quoted above wrote, a 'high-risk, high-reward strategy'. Russians took a gamble and lost a significant number of their best troops. They risked that, because they went for the main prize: quick overwhelming of the Kiyv government. That is also why the advance column moved so fast: it was also risky (as there was a danger of overstretching the supply lines - which happened - and attacks on the extended line, as you wrote yourself), but necessary to support the airborne operation. As a fixing operation such high-risk maneuvers are questionable, as a diversion they are absurd. If Russians moved slowly, overwhelming the resistance on the way to Kiyv and securing the supply lines, they would achieve even greater fixing effect, they could bring much more troops in the vicinity of Kiyv of the 70000 available in the North and siege and bombard the city much more effectively. Also they would not need to retreat in the middle of negotiations, significantly weakening their negotiating position.

This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value. — boethius

But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim.

But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?

Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?

In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value. — boethius

Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed.

A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.

There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds. — boethius

And the flight to the moon starts with launching a rocket and when it disintegrates in the air it is a failed flight to the moon. Still, it would be rather misleading to say that the person has flown to the moon.

But sure, if we take into consideration failed sieges and failed attempts of sieges, then we can call it a failed siege.

Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all. — boethius

Sure, and Russians did not do that with Kiyv - Ukrainians forces were able to move in and out freely.

Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.

You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used. — boethius

As I wrote, I am completely fine with using the term 'a failed siege'.

That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege? — boethius

No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations.

The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role. — boethius

No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses.

Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.

I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight? — boethius

No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv.

Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.

Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.

So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.

Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation. — boethius

So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport?

So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East? — boethius

By the way, it should be constantly repeated that this figure has been made up by Tzeentch and is a result of his complete misunderstanding the Russian command structure (and his bad arithmetics): https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/813992

While I understand it was just a mistake on his part, his further repeating it is simply dishonest. By treating it now as gospel, other debaters simply embarass themselves.

As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation. — boethius

And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice.

Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word " — boethius

Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case. — boethius

It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range.

The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev. — boethius

No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you:



Russians did not blockade the city, as most of the roads were unobstructed and out of artillery range.

So either it was a failure as a quick forward attack to capture the city or it was a failure as a siege. You may insist it was the latter, but, as I wrote, there are facts that contradict that interpretation.

But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege". — boethius

Except they Russians did not encircle 'most of a city'. It is like saying 'I have nearly imprisoned him, because I closed one of the three doors available to him'. Well, it not 'imprisonment' nor 'near imprisonment'. 'One-third of a siege' is not a siege.

It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege. — boethius

It WOULD be a siege, if Russians managed to blockade the city, which they did not. Saying that there was a siege is simply false. And yes, I do have an obsession with attempts to dilute the initial arguments in such a way. The fact remains that your initial claims were false. No amount of bickering over the definitions will change that. 'Oh, two months were actually three weeks, two-month shelling of military targets was actually shelling of a single factory, the near encirclement of the city was actually getting 30 km from it from and one-third encircling it, and Russians did not stay until the negotiations broke down and run away in the middle, but generally, everything checks out'. No, it does not - these were false claims stated by you and they still remain false. You can either own up to it or continue bickering, but the end result will always be that I will remind you of your false initial claims and show again they were false. If you accept that you were completely wrong when you wrote that, we can discuss other things.

1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention. — boethius

Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes.

2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city. — boethius

Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops.

From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success. — boethius

The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. You do not move your advance troops (as you wrote yourself bypassing other centers of resistance, making them vulnerable to counterattacks) and then cut them off from resources. You do not form a 60 km column and leave it standing for days as sitting ducks. You do not leave your tanks after retreat, because they run out of fuel after a few days. There is no amount of incompetence that would allow any such diversionary plans to be executed.

For a fixing operation all you need to do is to gather your troops ready for an attack, maybe with some small incursions. Ukrainians would have to commit their defensive units anyway. You do not commit large forces into diversionary attacks by definiton. You do not drive your diversions deep into enemy lines overstretching your GLOCs, so then you have to commit even more troops to secure their withdrawal. You do not commit your best airborne troops in a diversion. Saying that the attack on Hostomel was a diversion is simply denying the facts.

The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks. — boethius

I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'.

Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones. — boethius

Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. Again, one example of shelling does not constitute 'positive outcome' in any sensible way. Beside that factory there were rather vague reports of a few shellings of the residential outskirts, but with no victim or damage reports. As I wrote the artillery shelling was negligible and you have provided zero evidence that would counter that.

You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.

Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city. — boethius

Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. It does not mean that it was the scenario that Russians necessarily planned. Not that it matters that much, given that the convoy got stalled, the main force never reached Kiyv, because it has overextended its supply lines. Thus the supposed 'siege' never happened, as I have already explained. Most of the forces in vicinity of Kiyv were quick, 'expeditionary' forces lacking heavy equipment and firepower, which run out of steam around the middle of March.

It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:

A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — boethius

Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. Given that Russian advance units (not even the main force) were stalled thirty kilometers from the city and rather far from 'nearly entirely encircling a city' (have you even looked at the map in the article?), the city was not blocked in any way, all units and civilians were free to move into and out of the city, because Russians did not have even the main roads in range. No blockade - no siege, according to the quote you have provided.

I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit. — boethius

I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. But you were not, you have made specific statements which were false and inconsistent with the known facts. There was no two-month or even one-month 'siege' by any sensible definition, the effects of shelling were negligible (because Russians have never got in range, contrary to your beliefs) and Russians left in the middle of the negotiations because their assault failed and they had no other choice. Finally, the composition of the force and the progress of the campaign clearly show that Russians were ill prepared for any 'siege' of reasonable duration.

The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation. — boethius

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). It says the battle lasted that long, which is of course correct, but saying that the city was 'sieged' in that period just shows again that you have absolutely no clue what you are talking about. For starters, you can read the whole article, not just the first paragraph, maybe that will clear things up for you a bit. Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading.

And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument. — boethius

If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov:

Speaking about de-escalation in the Kiev and Chernigov areas, Peskov said it was a goodwill gesture, intended to create favorable conditions for continuing negotiations. — TASS

So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter.

Neither I nor Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic. — boethius

I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. That is simply wrong and inconsistent with the known facts. It became very clear when you tried to argue for that theory, as you have quickly shown that you lack knowledge of the basic facts and timelines. I understand that you try to save face now, but trying to gloss over your gross inaccuracies is not the way to do it - it just shows that you are eager to discuss things you know little about and backtrack when faced with facts instead of admitting your errors.

It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.

It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory. — boethius

The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct.