Nope, Euromaidan began three months before that.

No, there are explanations. But all of them are completely irrelevant. — Mikie

No, on your theory there are no such explanations, as it is pretty obvious after your completely unsuccessful attempts to provide them. That is why you try to dismiss them as irrelevant. I believed that if I have shown you that your theory has a big gaping hole, that might prompt you to seek an actual explanation, but it seems I was wrong, you are perfectly fine with overlooking it. God told Putin to change the policy? Right, that must be it.

The point is that the cause of the change of the politics is essential for the explanation of the current situation. And that cause is domestic: Putin in those years was faced with serious and economic problems, his rule was threatened by the wave of 'color revolutions' (you got that one right, but it still had nothing to do with NATO) and Russians were increasingly resenting the fall of the USSR, turning to those who openly embraced nationalistic and imperialistic ideas, like Zhirinovsky. In order to capture the support of hardliners Putin has made the turn from praising European cooperation toward near-open hostility in such a short period. Yes, NATO was one of the talking points, but it was pretty low on the list - more important was maintaining and expanding the sphere of influence in the 'Russian mir'. That is why he called the fall of the USSR 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century' in 2005, that is why he openly denied Ukraine's statehood in 2008 while still in 2002 he considered it to be a sovereign country that can decide about its own fate. That is why the concept of the 'near abroad' has resurfaced again. Objectively, NATO did not become a greater threat, it just became a convenient tool for making internal politics. But without the NATO expansion perspective that internal politics would have proceeded exactly the same - Russian imperialists are not so much threatened by the former republics joining a military alliance, but by the very idea of their independence. The Baltics are an exception here, as the Russian influences were much weaker there even in the USSR, that is why their joining NATO and the West in general was just shrugged off.

Thus the idea that if there were no NATO expansion plans, Russia would happily live peacefully along its neighbors, has little to do with reality. Let me remind you why the Euromaidan happened - it was a reaction of Ukrainians to Russia forcing Yanukovych to renege on his promises for trade integration with the EU - this had nothing to do with NATO. When Russia invaded Crimea, Ukraine actually had military neutrality enshrined in the constitution. So no, NATO did not provoke the conflict, the conflict at its core is caused by Ukraine's (and other republics) drive to sovereignty. Whether it chose to join NATO, EU or just tightened informal cooperation with the West while ditching Russian influence, the result would be the same.

It is very different in fact. — Mikie

Unsupported assertion.

It has been all along. But things do change at different points in time— which you’re apparently unwilling to understand.

2004, when the three countries you mentioned joined NATO, was after your 2002 quote. That changed things too, but Russia couldn’t do much about it. — Mikie

In 2002 Putin was perfectly aware that the Baltics will join NATO soon, as the process was started in 1999. In fact, the conference with NATO from which the quote was given would be a perfect opportunity to voice his concerns. Yet he did not, he just praised NATO-Russia cooperation and said that Ukraine may choose its alliances.

From the Russian point of view — not mine. I can run through the history if you’d like, but there’s plenty of resources available. — Mikie

Please do. The very fact that you believed that Putin in 2002 was unaware of the planned 2004 expansion shows that your knowledge in this respect might be somewhat lacking.

The 2004 enlargement was one. Orange revolution wasn’t caused by NATO, but neither was Nosovo independence — but NATO supported it, and even led troops there. This did not go unrecognized. — Mikie

The 2004 enlargement was a done deal in 2002. And Russians recognized that NATO led troops in Kosovo AFTER 2002? Then they must have been rather unattentive, given that the troops were there since 1999... together with Russians! Yes, please tell me about history...

But I don’t really see the sense in this. What are you arguing? Not that the Russians didn’t say it was a threat, but that they were lying — or had no actual reason to fear NATO? If the latter, that’s not up to us to say. Maybe the US has nothing to fear if China decides to make a military pact with Mexico — but listening to the US’s concerns would be wise regardless.

Again, listen to our own ambassador. Was he lying too? If not, then 2008 was the beginning of a great mistake, with foreseeable consequences. — Mikie

Yes, I know you do not see the sense in this, because, as i wrote, on your theory it is completely inexplicable. Putin was great friends with NATO in 2002 and was just slightly annoyed with the expansion, and in 2008 it was unacceptable and the red line, even though nothing much changed about NATO which would not have been known to him in 2002. Unless you know and understand why the sudden change of heart, you will be missing the bigger picture. But obviously you cannot, given your rather inaccurate guesses. Your theory also is unable to explain why Putin practically shrugged off the joining of the Baltics.

He didn’t say it in 2008, did he? If he did, I’d agree that the reaction to Bucharest would be baffling indeed.

But he didn’t. So apparently you’re much more interested in listening to Putin when it fits your purposes—in 2002– but unwilling to do so from 2008, which is far more relevant, when he says that NATO including Ukraine is a “direct threat.” — Mikie

Yes, Putin said one thing in 2002 and quite another in 2008, even though nothing much happened that had to do with NATO. That is the exact issue I am drawing your attention to.

What is unclear about the bolded part?

What’s the response? “Well 6 years ago Putin said something different and nothing has happened to justify a change in heart.” Again, is this serious? — Mikie

On the contrary, quite a lot happened to justify his change of heart, but it has very llitle to do with NATO.

Is this serious? — Mikie

Yes, because militarily NATO in Ukraine is not much different than NATO in the Baltics. One might argue that losing 'friendly' access to Kaliningrad (with its missiles directed at Berlin) and cutting off most of the Baltic shore would be viewed as much more threatening. So it is not about NATO as such and it never was.

Oh good — glad you feel that way. The Russians felt differently. Our own ambassador acknowledges the sentiment in the memo I cited above. I guess none of that matters, since according to some internet dude Russia had no reason to view NATO as ac threat. — Mikie

I do not question that Russian attitudes have changed, but you still have failed to explain what NATO actually DID in that period that would change them. You cited two things - the Orange Revolution, but it is not something that NATO did, and Kosovo, which does not really explain the turnabout. So please, tell me what NATO did.

But it does have to do with the events that occurred after 2002.

And the idea that Russia was OK with Ukraine membership in NATO in 2002 is flawed anyway— and contradicted by the same article. But even accepting it wholesale, there’s a concept called “time”, and so things change between one year and the next. Worth paying attention to. — Mikie

I am glad you feel that way, but Putin has clearly stated that it would not 'cloud the relations' and it is really Ukraine's choice. So who has the right view of Putin's or Russia's attitudes - Putin or you, a random Internet dude? Surely you see a difference between 'they were not too happy about it' and 'they were ready to start war about it'?

'Not really anything', except for expanding NATO by another 7 countries, and planning another 2 - Ukraine and Georgia. — Tzeentch

The seven countries started admission in 1999, so in 2002 when Putin said that the expansion 'does not cloud the relations' he was fully aware of the process, so that could not have changed his mind.

NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.
— Tzeentch

NATO was fully aware what the Russians thought of this. Everybody had been since the fall of the Soviet Union. It's just revisionism that tries to sweep this away into the creases of history.

NATO expansionism had received wide-spread criticism, even from people within the administrations that carried out the policy. You can read the memoires of people like Madeline Albright or Robert Gates. — Tzeentch

So you STILL have not read the quote you have decided to discuss? Incredible... Poor reading indeed.

The bottomline is that Putin's declarations on Ukraine's joning NATO completely changed between 2002 and 2008. Given that it was only six years in between and NATO did not really do anything to change that perception, that reaction very well could be considered unexpected and irrational.

Maybe next time just read what you comment on. Then you would not have to complain about your own poor reading skills. Or ask what is the argument about after you comment on it.

Russia's position on Ukraine / Georgia NATO membership was known well before the 2008 Bucharest Summit, and not 'unexpected' at all. The Russian view is discussed at length in several memos written by former CIA director William Burns. — Tzeentch

Above I have given a quote from Putin's official site. So yes, I agree it is quite stunning.

It’s not all because of NATO expansion. But that’s the most direct cause.

Also, it wasn’t “sudden.” As explained earlier. You seem to ignore changes from 2002 to 2008.

Lastly, the differences are obvious. Russia doesn’t like any of it, as they were promised NATO working expand in the 90s, but Ukraine is unique. Look at a map and you’ll see why. — Mikie

No, it is not the most direct cause, as it was not a cause of war with Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

And no, your explanations did not explain anything - NATO did not organize the Orange Revolution and the differences about Kosovo in no way made NATO more threatening to Russia. NATO did not actively do anything in that period that would make it a bigger threat to Russia.

And no, differences are not obvious. The distance from Ukraine to Moscow is about 100 km shorter than from Latvia, so it is negligible. But to be sure, I have checked the map from 2002 and Ukraine has not moved a bit from that time. Thus the difference between 'Ukraine in NATO is not a big concern to us' in 2002 and 'it is a grave threat' in 2008 has nothing to do with its location.

But that is exactly the point: in 2002 the expansion with the seven was well underway and Putin did not declare it as a grave threat, on the contrary, as given in the quote above, he very warmly spoke about cooperation with NATO.

Well, it was not a threat enough to draw any 'red lines' then. At the time he treated the expansion of NATO with Ukraine exactly as he then treated joining by the Baltics or now he treats joining by Sweden and Finland - as slightly annoying, but nothing more. He drew no red lines in those cases.

The proponents of the theory 'it is all because of NATO expansion' are just content with stating that he suddenly in 2008 started to see Ukraine in NATO as a vital threat, while he was and is perfectly calm about the Baltics or the Scandinavian countries. They feel no need to explain that difference, even though such view is absurdly irrational.

That’s fairly straightforward. This is 2008.

It wasn’t just Putin, of course. — Mikie

If in 2002 Russia clearly declared that they have some reservations, but in general they do not object to Ukraine's joining, then the West did not cross any lines in 2008, given that it was just a continuation of the process started even before 2002. It is Russia's reaction that is unexpected and somewhat irrational - if it was not a vital threat in 2002, why would it be in 2008?

And what was that position exactly? — Mikie

That they are not too happy about it, as they felt it does not contribute to the security in Europe. Still, the quote given above from the press release still available on Putin's official site clearly shows that Ukraine's joining NATO obviously was not a 'red line'.

Because Russia had stated, for years, that NATO membership in Ukraine was considered a red line. There was no reason to do so. — Mikie

From the official Kremlin press release on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council:

On the topic of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine. But President Putin stressed that Russia’s position on the expansion of the bloc remained unchanged. — President of Russia

Here is an article in Polish, but you can Google translate it:

https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-wojna-z-rosja/news-rzecznik-rzadu-o-broni-dla-ukrainy-wylacznie-wczesniej-uzgod,nId,7039252#crp_state=1

That is rather misleading. Poland has stopped providing weapons to Ukraine some time ago, as it has nothing left to give. It was a crucial donator in the beginning of the war, as it had ready stockpiles of old Soviet weapons which Ukrainians knew (so they did not require training). Now Poland cannot offer much as it has no decommissioned NATO equipment.

One additional note: right now Poland supplies new armaments produced in Poland (mostly ammo), those supplies are still ongoing and will not be stopped.

But this just assumes that everything that is material is an effect. That is not logically necessary. There might be a first material cause that is not an effect.

If the material world follows the rules of logic, then in order for anything to happen in the material world, it must have been caused by another thing. — Brendan Golledge

I see no reason why that would be necessary.

That the Russians enjoy a large artillery advantage is accepted fact at this point, and a matter of common sense as well based on the indicators I named earlier. Mearsheimer often cites the 5-10:1 artillery advantage. — Tzeentch

It was an accepted fact a year ago, now things have changed rather significantly.

If Prigozhin is indeed dead, then the cause of death is quite obvious: he thought he made a deal with Putin.

With Crimea, Russia can easily block (as it does) sea routes Ukraine is quite dependent, as we have seen. You see, the route from Odessa and other ports (and we have to forget ports in the Azov sea) and any sea route to them is easily inside the range of even the land based K-300P Bastion anti-ship missile system. — ssu

I am assuming that the treaty actually ends the war (i.e. Russia cannot continue it in a near future, at least not until Ukraine is in NATO). The population in Crimea is mostly Russians, so it would be quite difficult to integrate after the war. As you write, for Russia it is a prized jewel of the empire, losing Sevastopol would be a hard blow; for Ukraine not so much.

Well, to literally get landforces into Crimea is difficult. In this map triangles show where Russia has built fortifications. A lot of trenches and dragons teeth in the Crimea too now. — ssu

But if you have Zaporozhia, it is quite easy to cut off supplies from Crimea - just take down the Kerch Bridge. That is what the current offensive is about.

Crimea is worth much more to Russians than to Ukraine. On the other hand, militarily it will be easier to take back Crimea than Donbass. So I would not be surprised if the final treaty involves swapping one for the other.

Another detail missed is that Yanukovych was ousted by a parliamentary vote of 328-0. Sure, one can question the legality of the vote itself, but the fact remains that those who did that were all legitimately elected members of parliament, voting unianimously.

This is an unfounded lie. What happened first is the US backed coup led to 50 Russian Ukrainians being burned alive in the Trade House and Donbass Russian Ukrainians rejecting the coup being shelled and terrorized by Azov Nazis. The fact you ignore that is also reprehensible. And calling it a "revolution of dignity" when it was a foreign-backed coup where citizens and police were executed by CIA-trained snipers is both erroneous and disgusting — Jack Rogozhin

The supposed 'coup' was preceded by three months of protests with dozens of thousands of participants. Were those all CIA agents?

On 12 April 2014 Igor Girkin, an FSB officer sent from Russia to instigate violence has led militants to attack SBU headquarters in Sloviansk. Odessa fire was on 2 May.

Instead of pretending like you know anything about what you're talking about and that maybe there are 10s of billions, or hell why not hundreds of billions of dollars worth of unclosed commodities contracts in Rubles could have been out there: that for some unexplained and irrational reasons that have zero evidence actually exists, the Kremlin, knowing that their currency could be a weak point, decided to commit for the long haul to Ruble prices for their commodities and have taken a severe hit now that the Ruble is cheaper to buy.

Or, you know, you could be honest and just say you have no clue what you're talking about but happy to learn. — boethius

Yes, I am happy to learn, just point me to the source that specifies that the portion of the Russian exports denominated in rubles is negligible.

We are talking about Russia and what critical supplies Russia needs for their economy to simply function.

Obviously, since Russia's economy has not collapsed and nearly entirely cut off from Western supply chains, it's able to source what it needs from mostly China.

I'm also talking about critical technologies.

You also don't know how licensing works. That you need to purchase a license doesn't mean you can't produce whatever it is, it's that you can't export it into the Western economies as it's protected by a patent.

The fact the authors of the article you cite (from the spin machine that is the Heritage Foundation) don't understand the difference between capacity and licensing render their analysis completely useless.

Now, compare this situation where China is spending big to license technologies in order to be able to export those technologies back to the West to the technological differences between China and the West during the cold war, then you'd understand my point. — boethius

It seems you have a problem with distingushing between technologies and products, which is quite amusing from someone accusing me of ignorance.

Sure, Russia can get raw materials from China and other countries. But it cannot source from there production lines, machinery parks, in fact, it cannot even get spare parts for the Western equipment it already has. It cannot extend its maintenance contracts, without which its machinery will be useless sooner or later. China cannot provide to Russia its licenced technologies, even illicitly, because then it would risk breaking those licenses - it would simply not be worth it. Russian industry faces forced obsolescence, and, due to the nature of today's equipment, it will be sooner than later. Today most equipment has software and firmware that needs to be customized and updated, otherwise it becomes junk. Chechens could not even steal tractors properly, because they had a kill switch. E.g. Microsoft will stop renewing licences in September - it would not be a problem twenty years ago, as everything could be cracked and would work as well. Now half of it is SaaS, with some Russian companies having a significant part of their business in the Western cloud, which will be simply switched off. Sure, you can move everything to a Russian operator, but costs time and money.

Will those problems collapse Russian economy? No. They will just make it even more obsolete and uncompetitive than it was before.

However, the data can be completely correct even for commodities.

Saying the exports are denominated in Rubles just means that people needed to buy Rubles one way or another to then buy whatever it is. However, the contracts can easily just reference the international spot price in USD one way or another, and, even if the contracts are in rubbles commodities usually trade on a fairly short term basis so there would be winners and losers in any currency change. Additionally, commodities traders generally hedge against such currency fluctuations so the winners and losers can be completely different parties, all financiers in Shanghai for example, who provide markets for these sorts of derivatives.

And, obviously, saying have is in Rubles is the same as saying half is in hard currency of other nations, which in Russias is a significant amount of cash in addition to it's cash and precious metals reserves. — boethius

As I wrote, it is now impossible to determine how much Russia trades in rubles and how it is affected by the exchange rate, as that depends on the terms of the contracts and the info coming out of Russia seems rather contradictory.

There was certainly the possibility of severe economic dislocations when the war and sanctions started as supply line disruption could have caused cascading failures in industry, infrastructure which then immediately spill over into financial chaos and civil unrest making the problem even worse.

I don't think anyone outside the Kremlin has any good idea of how close or far such a total system failure was due to Western sanctions. What we do know is that they did prepare for 8 years for that exact scenario and were able to mitigate it.

After nearly 18 months it's extremely implausible that Russia would have some severe economic problem now.

The main reason is that everything the West supplied, China and India also supplies. "Competitive advantage" of Western technology can easily be 1 or 2 %.

Unlike the cold war, there's no critical technologies today that the West is far ahead of everyone else. — boethius

That is absurdly untrue. Even China is very much reliant on the Western technology:

https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-more-dependent-us-and-our-technology-you-think

Most of Russia's industries now have a choice: go back to the eighties (which will make them completely uncompetitive anywhere outside the domestic market) or fold. All Russia has left is the resource trade and even that will suffer, as most oilfields and gas fields were serviced by Western companies. You cannot buy such equipment and knowhow through parallel import.

It does not contradict my claim; you've confused my use of "regularly" again

And you don't get to decide what questions are asked and answered, and you don't get to be the only one who asks questions and have them answered

I will continue discussing this subject with others whom--while we disagree--do not engage in such bad faith. Have a good weekend — Jack Rogozhin

You have claimed that Russia could be threatened by missiles deployed in Ukraine and pointing at Russia. However, NATO has not deployed such missiles in any new country since 1950s, so we have absolutely no reason to believe that it would start doing that in Ukraine. Thus your claim is completely unfounded. instead of admitting that you were uninformed on this issue, you engage in bad rhetoric.

I have answered all of your questions...and shown you to be wrong. You have still not answered my one question above. It is time for you to start answering my questions, starting with this one — Jack Rogozhin

If your answer to 'what missiles does NATO deploy regularly to NATO countries' are the missiles deployed lastly in the 1950s, then it clearly contradicts your claim that Russia could be threatened by NATO missiles deployed in Ukraine, given that NATO does not deploy nuclear missiles in any new NATO countries.

I will answer your questions not related to missiles after we settle your claims about missiles.

And I just said what I meant by "regularly" is they regularly do it, not do it on a regular basis. You need to read better

And yes my link backed it up as it did not show they stopped doing that in the 1950s. So, you're just wrong or lying. I'll give you the credit for the former — Jack Rogozhin

Your link shows that they introduced nuclear weapons to new countries after 1950s? Which countries exactly?

And you never answered the question above. Do you really think NATO just sends money to its member countries? :grin: — Jack Rogozhin

Your claim was that NATO regularly puts missiles into NATO countries, I wanted to clear up what exactly you meant by that. For now all I know is that 'regularly does not mean on a regular basis'. So what missiles did you have in mind, what countries and when?

I didn't mean they do it on a regular basis. I meant it's what they do with their NATO partners and my link I posted backs that up

What exactly do you think NATO was going to do with Ukraine for defense once it became member? — Jack Rogozhin

Well, you did write 'regularly'.

And no, your link does not back that up. NATO stopped doing that in the 1950s, that is BEFORE the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since then no new countries received nuclear weapons. So there are no reasons to believe that NATO would deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine, if it did not deploy them in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia.

Well, in your quote you say that NATO puts missiles in NATO countries 'regularly'. The last country that NATO put missiles in was Turkey in 1954. Of course, since then the missiles have been replaced, but in general their number was reduced significantly. As you might notice from your own source, no nuclear missiles are deployed in the countries that joined NATO since 1991. Why think it would be different for Ukraine?

The missiles NATO regularly puts in their NATO countries, many of them pointing to Russia. If you think the US has made public what exact missiles they put in, that would be naive, no? — Jack Rogozhin

It seems you are both saying that NATO is putting nuclear missiles in countries bordering Russia and this is not public knowledge. That seems to be rather self-contradictory? Given that you say that NATO does that 'regularly', where exactly it did that and when?

Russia's economic situation would be difficult if it was in or we had reason to believe it was heading towards recession, that's what all these various macro economic variables synthesise to.

If all the things you point to were a "difficult situation" then why isn't there a recession or analysts predicting a recession? — boethius

Because the economy is in war mode. Russia is spending a lot of money to make new weapons, ammunition etc. Therefore its industrial output is steady, there is no unemployment (in fact, there are drastic labor shortages), wages in some sectors are steadily increasing etc. So on paper there is no recession. The catch is that this industrial output mostly goes up in smoke - it does not contribute to the development of the economy as a whole, in fact it drains other sectors of labor force and support, so it is not prime pumping, just the opposite.

You're literally repeating my arguments to me.

You point to sectors reliant on exports as some sort of economic problem, I explain that (in the context of there being no recession) it would be only a problem if there's some strategic consideration; you then cite someone explaining the same thing, I point that out and then you re-explain this argument that reliance on imports is not a economic problem in itself (if there's no recession caused by said reliance, just normal economic phenomena of specialising in some things and importing others) but would be a strategic problem.

I.e. we both agree these imports do not represent some structural economic problem which was and is your argument.

Whether there's some strategic vulnerability, such as over-reliance on China, these imports represent is a different question, but you'd need to elaborate an actual argument of how China both intends and is going to actually exploit such reliance. For, China is also reliant on Russia for a significant amount of the commodities it needs.

And again, I don't claim Russia's economy is or will be booming. — boethius

No, we do not agree that the problem is limited to some sectors, you just assert that contradicting the sources I have provided.

Overreliance of Russia's industry on imports due to its underdevelopment was a serious problem even before the war. A majority of the Russian industry run mostly on Western technology. Those inputs now, due to sanctions, are seriously limited. While the industry can run without that input for some time, it has no potential to grow, simply because Russia does not have an extended technological base. China will not be willing to commit to develop it, of course, as it would be against its interests. And it will demand premium on whatever it decides to supply, given that Russia has very limited options. In the foreseeable future Russia will not have any significant exports beyond resources and its other sectors will likely stagnate or shrink. For the same reasons its imports will grow. That is why its trade surplus is quickly shrinking.

You literally use the word "devastating".

Devastating for what? "for the Russian war effort".

Which is relevant to this conversation of the war in Ukraine.

You've now moved the goal posts to Russian economy is not "booming" after accepting all my arguments.

The key one is that Russia can effectively pay for whatever imports it needs for it's war effort with commodities: Russia sells commodities relative the international price (that has nothing to do with the value of the Rouble) and brings in foreign exchange which Russia can then use to buy imports it requires for military equipment.

At no point is Russia forced to try to buy foreign exchange with Roubles to then buy imports for military equipment.

You have zero clue what you're talking about and now just flailing around strawmen and throwing the goal posts off the field entirely.

If you're now no longer arguing that the currency devaluation is "devastating for the Russian war effort", then not being clear that you've retracted and reformulated your position to "not booming" and "weak in some strategic sectors" is tiresome, bad faith, and the sign of a weak mind that is not even aware of what it has said in the past, or then you're just a no-good, damn dirty liar. — boethius

Yes, I retract the inital argument, it was based on the data (supposedly from the Bank of Russia, shown in the chart before) that half of Russian exports are denominated in ruble, which seemingly was incorrect.

Balance of trade and capital flows and so on can go one way one year and another way the other year ... or, you know, consistently have a trade deficit for decades such as in the case of the United States. — boethius

Sure, if you ignore all the differences between certain countries, then they are exactly the same. I am pointing specific issues which make Russia's situation difficult and you just ignore them and go back to your generalities.

He's saying the same thing as me: — boethius

Lol. No, he is not. He gives examples of specific sectors which indicate the bigger problem which is the overreliance on raw resource exports - that is the whole point of the meeting (and his speech). I have asked you to provide the examples of the sectors (beside the military one, which is also not doing that great) which are booming and seemingly you are unable to give any.

Any economy will have sectors that rely heavily on imports, that is not indicative of the whole. — boethius

Yes, but Russia is not 'any economy', it is Russian economy. When I point out specific issues with it, you just dismiss them and go back to your generalities. Anyone even vaguely familiar with Russian economy knows that it is overreliant on resource exports (like many economies with access to significant resources) and knows that its industry is underdeveloped. Here is an Al Jazeera article on that, just in case you will not believe biased Western media. It is commendable that you have general knowledge, but it does not replace specific knowledge of the actual situation.

I have zero problem accepting massive discounts in 2022 and 2023, as I explain these are massive flows of material and finance over decades and centuries and what matters is the medium and long term and not any given year or two. I even explain why Russia needs to offload the oil at nearly any price as the oil wells can't easily be turned off and on. However, there is zero evidence Russia is somehow stuck with those discounts for any significant period of time.

You seem to just randomly assign points to me in total disconnect to anything I've written or the points you've made, and then argue against those points sometimes repeating my arguments I've made against your points that you've actually written. — boethius

The actual issue is that you do not engage with any specific points, you just fall back on your general economic knowledge, which does not address the actual issues. For example, you wrote this long reply without addressing the issue of demand at all, even though I have pointed out repeatedly why Russia might have a problem with increasing revenue from supplies to India and China (which are its main clients now).

Russia built up massive foreign currency reserves as well as gold and other precious metals reserves.

The priority in 2022 was not maintaining revenue (whole point of having a war chest) but to maintain market share, especially in fossil fuels.

The reason maintaining market share is important is that industrial projects and capacity can have long lead times and cost significant capital and may not be easy to just shut off and on again (in terms of the state of equipment, skills, supply lines, etc.), especially oil fields of which shutting off may damage the oil fields permanently.

So, Russia offered deep discounts to be sure to move it's stuff and maintain market share.

It would take many, many years for Russia to entirely deplete it's war chest and running a budget or trade deficit for a single year might be a warning sign or might be smart investment that will create larger growth and surpluses down the line, depends on what the money is spent on and what capacities imports help build. — boethius

You forgot to mention that over half of that massive war chest is frozen by the West... Revenue might not be priority at the beginning of the war, but it is now. Budget spending ballooning by over 40% is not exactly a trifle. Running deficit might be a smart investment, if you expect that your revenues will increase or that your spending will decrease in near future, but neither seems likely in case of Russia. But sure, do your basic math: take the unfrozen part of the war chest, compare it to the amount Russia's budget spending increased this year and calculate how many are 'many, many years'.

It's basic math.

Maybe I'll explain it tomorrow with the actual volume and price numbers of the recent oil market to show what price increases make the price cuts worth it in terms of revenue and the how much bigger an effect it has on profits (which is what matters). — boethius

No, it is not. 'Basic math' will not tell you how much oil China and India will buy if you increase the prices. If you disregard that factor, your 'basic math' calculations are utterly useless.

Well, the main point of my analysis is that this isn't the case.

Insofar as Russia sells a lot of commodities denominated in foreign currencies (how the international commodities market works) there will be the forex available to buy whatever imports Russia needs. — boethius

The problem is that the main point of your analysis is not supported by any facts. Insofar Russia sold a lot of commodities to clients who took advantage of their low prices, as it lost its other clients. Expecting that the new clients will buy the same amounts if the prices are significantly higher or that they will buy much more at the same prices requires a bit more stronger argument than just arithmetic projection. So give the actual argument. 'Export revenues can grow in any country' will not cut it.

As long as Russia has a large foreign currency revenue from selling commodities it is easy for the Russian government to subsidise any given sector it wants to protect / grow. — boethius

Lol. That is most curious, given that Russia did not subsidize them properly when it had higher revenues and much lower expenditures. Are you even aware that Russia's economy peaked in 2014 and after Crimea failed to recover under much lighter sanctions?

Linking exchange rates to the commodity prices, somehow mitigating the already existing discounts that are too much of a discount and Russia's problem?

I didn't have time to unpack entirely how little sense that makes on each level. I leave it as an exercise to the reader.

I also didn't even have time to point out that Russia has large cash reserves and so can run a deficit.

We are all Keynesians now except for this guy. — boethius

Your argument was that depreciation of ruble was great for Russia, because it boosts exports. While in theory that is correct, in this particular case it will not boost Russian exports, for the numerous reasons I have already given.

In any major macro-economic shift (such as cutting off nearly all trade with the West) there are losers and winners (what matters is how many of each in the mystical agragate of the economist). Russian economy is growing, so pointing out sectors that were losers from recent events is not indicative of the whole. — boethius

Oh, so for balance point out which sectors are booming, beside the military ones.

Which is just anti-Russian rhetoric, I'd say racist, based on nothing, but also self-contradictory. — boethius

Lol, you are hilarious... You know who Dmitry Medvedev is? This is what he said seven years ago (Google translated):

The situation in some areas is still extremely difficult. Let me remind you that our share of imports in machine tool building is estimated at approximately 90% (90!), in heavy engineering - about 70%, in oil and gas equipment - 60%, in power equipment - about 50%, in agricultural engineering, depending on the category products - from 50 to 90%, too, and so on. Even in civil aircraft construction, imports, unfortunately, are still overwhelming - more than 80%. — Dmitry Medvedev

Are you saying he is an anti-Russian racist?

Which definitely implies Russia is selling under a price cap few are willing to "break" and so the only way to increase revenue is to sell more volume but the mean Saudi's are demanding Russia keep output cuts. — boethius

Russia was selling under the price cap practically till June and it was accused of lying about the cuts (as Daniel Yergin pointed out).

Again, zero understanding of commodity markets. Russia's primary concern when the war started was maintaining market share and ensuring it's oil flows somewhere. Storage is limited and stopping oil producing oil wells can be costly and do irreversible harm to the oil field for a bunch of complicated geological reasons (of course producing the oil efficiently will harm humanity more, but that's not Russia's main concern in 2022 or 2023 ... and possibly for the foreseeable future as they'll have a large amount of the world's arable land and can just watch world burn if they feel like, you know, we've been less than understanding). — boethius

Russia's primary concern was to maintain revenues, given that half of its budget is financed by resource exports. You are pretty confident China and India will buy same amounts for higher prices, but actually give no argument for that. And it does not align too well with the facts: China's July crude imports drop to lowest since January India's purchases peaked in April.

I literally explained several times that Russia (and Saudi Arabia and the other major oil exporters) want high prices and are perfectly happy to cut production if it means prices are higher. For example, obviously you'd be willing to sell 10% less if you are selling at 100% higher the price, but it's even more sensitive to price than that because what you actually care about is profits and the profits will increase even faster than revenue with price increases. It's basic math, I can break it down with additions and multiplications and subtractions if you want.

Now, what each oil exporter doesn't want to do is take it on themselves to cut production just to see another oil producer increase production and take their market share; if they did that then they'd be selling less at the same price and so simply making less money; if they then increased production to try to win back that market share then the price will decrease. The solution is to form a cartel and get enough of the market to coordinate production cuts to increase the price while no single cartel member looses market share relative the other members. — boethius

Again, what is true in principle does not necessarily apply to each and every situation. Sure, Russia would be happy to sell a somewhat smaller amount for a much higher price. The question is who will be happy to buy from Russia at those inflated prices. You assume that China and India will happily buy the same amounts of oil if it is much more expensive. That assumption is, to put it very mildly, unreasonable.

Where do I argue some sort of commodities boom is coming? Generally speaking or even for Russia?

This literally comes from literally no where.

I've simply pointed out that the Russian central bank letting the Rubble float is quite usual and expected and not, in itself nor in this actual context, some harbringer of economic doom.

As long as Russia can sell a large quantity of commodities it will have foreign exchange and some sort of forex driven economic collapse (as certainly can happen as we've recently seen in Sri Lanka) is basically impossible in Russia's case. — boethius

And I have pointed out why Russia's exports will stall while its imports soar. I did not write that I expect a collapse, I wrote that it will be more and more dififcult for Russia to pay for its imports.

You have a remarkable ability to have zero clue what you're talking about. — boethius

Let us see about that...

Russian resources are sold at international prices and if offered at a discount due to having limited buyers due to sanctions that has nothing to do with the Rubble exchange rate, but would just be 20% or whatever off the international price that's denominated in USD (even if the sale is made in other currencies, the price will be set relative the international price). — boethius

Yes, that is exactly what I wrote: 'No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices.' Russia had to provide significant discounts to find new customers for its resources, but it is no longer able to do that as it needs to make profit.

Where currency devaluation cheapens exports is in things that are not commodities but services or manufactured goods where the inputs are bought in Rubbles (i.e. labour and domestic resources and components -- if you need to import most of the inputs to your product then currency devaluation doesn't necessarily result in a lower price of the final product).

Devaluing your currency has an immediate effect of making your exports (dominated by domestic inputs) cheaper to international buyers while also making imports into your country more expensive thus encouraging buying domestic. — boethius

Most of Russia's exports are related to raw resources. We do not know what portion of it is denominated in rubles, what we do know is that Russia wanted to move away from USD and EUR in its trades. It could move solely to foreign currencies, such as CNY, but then it would put control of its trade into Chinese hands, which it might not be willing to do. We also do know (thanks to the chart given above) that a portion of the exports is pegged to RUB.

However, it does not matter much, because there will be no boom in the trade of resources, for reasons already given.

Of course, if your exports require all sorts of imports to produce (energy, material, services etc.), such as basically any small country that specialises in a few parts of the value chain, then currency devaluation can have the opposite effect, but that's not Russia's case. — boethius

That is exactly Russia's case for most exports beside resources, because its industry is underdeveloped and heavily relies (or did, when it worked) on imported inputs, most of those from Western countries. That is why its e.g. automoblie industry practically collapsed - Russians have no know-how, no domestic industrial machinery, etc. There will be no export boom for Russian cars, if the door handles come off or the car does not start.

Russia is not in a recession and pretty much any economist on the planet will be able to inform you that supporting the price of the Rubble has only short term reasons for doing (subsidise import substitution to adapt to sanctions and provide stability and "confidence" generally speaking) but those reasons go away and long term it's wise to let the currency float (at least pretty close) to its market rate (supporting your currency is, fundamentally, subsidising capital flight out of the country). — boethius

We do not know in what state Russian industry is, as we do not know what part is directed to the war effort. And while it might provide better employment and some short-term benefits, it does not lead to development in the long term.

First, Russia doesn't sell to countries that have a price cap — boethius

Yes, I know that. That was my argument, maybe it was too succint. There will be no boom in resource sales for Russia, because there will be no or very few new customers who will be willing to break the price cap (and going through intermediaries diminishes profits).

And there are enough countries to purchase Russian output, in particular China and India as well as countries willing to man-in-the-middle Russian oil to Europe. — boethius

No, as I have already mentioned. China and India were eager to buy at the discount, but it was not profitable enough for Russia. Besides they bought much more than they need already and they cannot store unlimited amounts, not to mention that China's economy is cooling off significantly. Russia will struggle to maintain the exports at the current levels, export boom is simply unrealistic.

And stating that "Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts" like that's against Russias interest or desires is just laughable.

Both Russia and Saudi Arabia always want output cuts as major oil exporters ... just "if everybody does it". — boethius

Again, while generally you are correct, you are wrong in this particular case. Russia does not want output cuts NOW, it needs to increase its exports to cover rapidly growing imports.

That's what OPEC is about, so Saudi Arabia "demanding" output cuts during this conflict is basically siding with Russia to make mad coin. — boethius

Nope. China and India will simply buy less if the price is raised (and they already buy from Russia below the OPEC price) as they have gotten enough cheap oil already, countries working with the West will not buy if the price cap is exceeded. All that is left is the illicit trade, but that will not be sufficient. Again, no boom in sight.

It is a pickle. They could be p-zombies. My wife could be a p-zombie. Of course, I don't have reason to believe you are even that, since I only see words on my cell screen.

And some chat program might be conscious. — Patterner

Sure, it all might be possible, but we do not believe that, we conclude that it is likely other people are conscious and that aliens would be conscious, based on physical evidence alone.

We might believe they are as conscious as we are, depending on the things they say and do. I think it would be a point in favor of consciousness that they built spaceships and flew here. But if we just had their physical bodies to study? What would we look for that would be be the proof that they were? What physical characteristic is proof of consciousness? — Patterner

But how can we know what they say and do? Only by perceiving them physically with our senses. We have no way to get into immaterial mental communion with them. Any evidence that they are conscious would be physical. If we are studying their behaviors, we are studying their physical bodies. We conclude that the body is mental by what the body does. Otherwise we would have to assume they are just self-propelled Chinese rooms.

But, while everything about the brain and body are physical, consciousness does not seem to be. What properties of particles, or bio-chemical energy running along neurons, or brain structures, suggest that the system can be aware of itself? Or have subjective experience, even without awareness? If beings from elsewhere studied our brains in all possible detail, what would they point to and day, "Ah! They are conscious! You can tell, because of X, Y, and Z." — Patterner

Suppose aliens come to us. Can we study them to a point that we decide that they are very likely conscious?

In other words, you agree with my analysis and the depreciation of the Rubble is not a problem, may even boost Russian exports and thus help that trade deficit problem ... — boethius

No, because Russian problems with exports have little to do with prices. Due to its huge official (and probably even bigger unofficial) deficit Russia no longer can provide such deep discounts on resources, so even with the better exchange rate (and, as I have shown, it helps only some, as half of the exports are in rubles) the opportunistic trade with India and China is slowing down - they now have enormous, cheaply bought reserves. Few countries are willng to break the price caps, Saudis are demanding keeping output cuts. Russia will not be able to boost its resource sales significantly. And beside resources there is not much to boost - the industrial base is undercut by the sanctions, Russian arms sales are the lowest since the USSR, obviously due to domestic demand. Add to this the greatest labor shortage since the 1990s...

Imports, on the other hand, steadily grow, which will drain Russia of its hard currencies.

Here are two charts:



As can be seen, almost half of Russia's exports are made in rubles, but only one third of imports. What Russia sells for rubles is worth 13 bln USD, but it buys for rubles only what is worth 8 bln USD. Thus devaluation of ruble IS relevant to its foreign trade. This typically could be covered by the trade surplus (i.e. if what Russia sold for foreign currencies was still more than it bought for them), but this has been also shrinking rather dramatically and it is now headed toward deficit.